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Bad ethics, good ethics and the genetic engineering of animals in Bad ethics, good ethics and the genetic engineering of animals in

agriculture agriculture

Bernard Rollin

Colorado State University

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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation

Rollin, B. E. (1996). Bad ethics, good ethics and the genetic engineering of animals in agriculture. Journal

of animal Science, 74(3), 535-541. https://doi.org/10.2527/1996.743535x

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Received September 29, 1995.

Accepted November 9, 1995.

Bad Ethics, Good Ethics and the Genetic

Engineering of Animals in Agriculture

Bernard E. Rollin

Colorado State University, Fort Collins 80523-1781

ABSTRACT: Genetic engineers have been remiss

in addressing ethical and social issues emerging from

this powerful new technology, a technology whose

implications for agriculture are profound. As a conse-

quence of this failure, society has been uneasy about

genetic engineering of animals and has had difficulty

distinguishing between genuine and spurious ethical

issues the technology occasions. Many of the most

prominent concerns do not require a serious response.

On the other hand, concerns about a variety of

possible risks arising from genetic engineering of

animals require careful consideration and dialogue

with the public. Such concerns are an admixture of

ethics and prudence. A purely ethical challenge,

however, hitherto not addressed, is represented by

problems of animal welfare that arise out of geneti-

cally engineering agricultural animals. A principle of

“conservation of welfare” is suggested as a plausible

moral rule to guide such genetic engineering.

Key Words: Animal Welfare, Ethics, Genetic Engineering

J. Anim. Sci. 1996. 74:535–541

Introduction

The advent of biotechnology has provided society

with what could become the most powerful technologi-

cal tool ever possessed by humanity. The public

response to biotechnology, however, has not been

overwhelmingly positive, and a good many social and

ethical concerns must be addressed before it will be

acceptable to society in general.

Primarily because 20th-century science has tended

to distance itself from ethical issues, these issues have

been defined for the public by others, sometimes in

inaccurate ways. Three very different sorts of issues

must be examined and addressed regarding genetic

engineering of animals: the claim that it is intrinsi-

cally wrong; the claim that it is dangerous to society

and nature; and the claim that it is likely to produce a

good deal of suffering for animals. Each of these

claims will be examined in the context of animal

agriculture.

The Denial of Ethics in Science

Genetic engineering is perhaps the most powerful

technology ever devised by humans. Although still in

its infancy, its potential for affecting health, the

environment, the food supply, and the very nature of

humans and animals is clear. Whereas scientists

generally greet these prospects with unbridled en-

thusiasm and excitement, the general public is far

more guarded and equivocal in its response. In this

presentation, I discuss some fundamental issues that

must be dealt with in order to both bridge this gulf

and ensure the orderly development of one aspect of

this technology of direct concern to animal science, the

genetic engineering of animals.

In a recent book (Rollin, 1995), I articulated what I

call a “Gresham’s law for ethics.” Gresham’s law, it

will be recalled, asserts that bad money will drive

good money out of circulation. In other words, if people

are faced with the option of paying a debt with either

of two currencies of the same face value, they will pay

with the one possessing the least intrinsic value. A

parallel phenomenon occurs in ethics: given a new

situation for which no consensus understanding of the

moral problems involved exists and given that the

situation naturally demands articulation and discus-

sion of such issues, the most shrill and dramatic

articulations of these problems will tend to seize the

center stage. We in the United States have seen this

occur in a variety of newly emerging social issues,

such as the use of animals in research, concern with

the environment, the advent of women’s issues and

radical feminism, issues of diversity, issues regarding

homosexuality. In the absence of ethically informed

ROLLIN

536

expertise to counter and moderate the distortions

inherent in such formulations, they tend to dominate

the social mind and drive the legitimate ethical

concerns out of its awareness.

This is, of course, what has occurred vis a

vis

genetic engineering in general, and the genetic

engineering of animals in particular. Center stage has

been occupied by lurid sound bites calculated to

frighten and titillate: “Genetic engineering is playing

God”; “Genetic engineering is against nature”;

“Genetic engineering does not show proper respect for

the gift of life”; “Genetic engineering breaches species

barriers and violates species integrity.” As empty of

content and undefended as these assertions may be,

they fill the ethical lacuna in social thought and

become entrenched and difficult to counter, and they

essentially define the universe of moral discourse for

the society.

Much of the blame for this unfortunate state of

affairs in the arena of genetic engineering must be

laid at the feet of the research community. Part of the

problem arises from its insularity and distance from

the general public. Even more of the problem comes

from scientists’ disavowal, in theory and practice, of

responsibility for the ethical and social issues raised

by new developments in science and technology.

As I have demonstrated (Rollin, 1989),

20th-century science has deliberately distanced itself

from social ethical issues in both theory and practice.

Nascent scientists are taught that science is value-

free, that, in the words of one biology textbook

(Keeton and Gould, 1986), “science cannot make

value judgements”; that ethical judgments fall within

the purview of at worst politicians and at best society

in general, but not within the activities of the

scientific community. This doctrine, which is a major

part of what I have called the ideology or common

sense of science, is historically based in a laudable

caveat: not to admit into science meaningless, un-

verifiable assertions of the sort about “life force” or

“absolute space” that pervaded 19th-century science.

But however laudable its intentions, the results have

generated problems, as we shall see.

In practice, scientists follow this ideology and rarely

discuss ethical issues occasioned by their activities in

courses, journals, conferences, or other forums. As a

result, they end up taking indefensible ethical posi-

tions without realizing that they are doing so—

witness James Wyngaarden’s remark that “genetic

engineering should not be hampered by ethical

considerations” (Michigan State News, 1989), or the

numerous versions of the claim that animal use in

science is not an ethical issue, it is strictly a scientific

question.

In theory and practice, scientists’ adherence to this

ignoring of ethics runs afoul of ordinary common sense

and public sensibilities; regulating research on human

and animal subjects and genetic engineering provide

instructive cases in point. In addition, the way is

paved for opportunists to define the issues in a

manner to which it is difficult to respond and from

which it is difficult to recover.

What must be indelibly marked by agricultural

scientists is that science was not, is not, and can never

be value-free, or even ethics-free. When massive

amounts of public money are funneled into AIDS

research rather than into curing baldness, or when the

study of the relationship between race and intelligence

is socially disallowed, the subject matter studied by

science is determined by social ethical values. When

biomedical research is performed on rats rather than

on unwanted children, and the control of pain in these

rats is socially mandated, the method of science is

determined by social ethical values. And when the

degree of statistical reliability demanded in science

fluctuates when one is testing the efficacy of a new

human drug vs when one is testing a new survey

instrument, one again sees the influence of ethics.

Experimental design, acceptable sample sizes, and

acceptable confidence intervals will vary greatly

across different types of research because of moral

concerns, even when similar sorts of questions are

being asked. Thus the very logic of science is

modulated by social ethical concerns.

Similarly, genetic engineering of animals raises

significant social ethical concerns that the agricultural

science community must address, else these issues

will be erroneously defined by others. I have already

mentioned such spurious issues, but it is worthwhile

to briefly indicate why they are illegitimate.

The Spurious Ethical Issues Raised

by Genetic Engineering

The average person, indeed sometimes even the

average scientist, will inevitably raise the issues of

“playing God” when asked about the ethical issues

occasioned by genetic engineering of animals. I would

argue that neither this nor any variation of this

represents a genuine ethical issue. To be sure, the

creation of new forms of life may be offensive or even

immoral to certain theological traditions, but that

does not mean that such activity represents an ethical

problem in secular society not ruled by that tradition.

If “playing God” in this area is intrinsically wrong, it

is hard to see why damming rivers, eradicating

smallpox, and building cities is not also wrong. As a

matter of fact, there are numerous theologians from a

variety of traditions who do not see genetic engineer-

ing as inherently wrong.

One can similarly dismiss, at least on a rational

level, the claim of various religious leaders that “the

gift of life from God, in all of its forms and species,

should not be regarded solely as if they were a

chemical product subject to genetic alteration and

BAD ETHICS, GOOD ETHICS, GENETIC ENGINEERING

537

patentable for economic benefit” (Crawford, 1987).

Such a dictum contains no argument or even clear

statement of what is allegedly problematic; until these

are forthcoming, the position cannot be taken seri-

ously. The same is true of Jeremy Rifkin’s claim that

genetic engineering “desacralizes nature” (Rifkin,

1985).

One can similarly dismiss Rifkin’s and others’

jeremiads about the intrinsic wrongness of “violating

species integrity” or “crossing species barriers” (Rif-

kin, 1985). In actual fact, we know that species are

not the fixed, immutable rigid building blocks of

nature that Aristotle and the Bible believed them to

be, but “snapshots” of a dynamic natural process.

Species evolve; why then is it intrinsically wrong for

humans to participate deliberately in that evolution,

especially when we have been doing it since we

evolved, unwittingly by serving as a selection pressure

on other organisms and contrivedly by domestication

and by cultivation, preferential propagation, and the

whole panoply of artificial selection? Indeed, it is

estimated that 70% of grasses and 40% of flowering

plants were “created” through human artifice, and

vast numbers of animals have been drastically modi-

fied (witness the dog).

Theology and environmental philosophy probably

provide the unseen skeleton underlying the objection

about species integrity. In the case of environmental

philosophy, which is a dominant mode of thought in

contemporary society, much is made out of the point

that species should not be allowed to vanish as a

result of human activity. It is a psychologically small

step, albeit a conceptually vast one, to move to the

view that species ought not change at human hands, a

position for which no adequate defense exists.

There is another concern sometimes voiced by those

who allege the intrinsic wrongness of genetic engineer-

ing of animals. Theological types, in particular, object

to the “mixing of human and animal traits” (Craw-

ford, 1987). Presumably, this means the insertion of

human genetic material into animals, or the insertion

of animal genetic material into humans. The former

has occurred; as we shall discuss later, the human

growth hormone gene was inserted into animals in

order to create meatier, leaner animals. To my

knowledge, the latter has not been attempted.

What, precisely, is intrinsically wrong with such an

admixture? We have certainly inserted animal parts

into the human body to treat disease, pig heart valves

and pig skin for example, and we routinely use animal

products for medical purposes. Suppose that an

animal were found that contained genes for prevent-

ing cancer (sharks, allegedly, are tumor-free). Sup-

pose, further, that this gene produced no untoward

effects in humans; indeed, its only effect was to confer

immunity against neoplastic disease. Why would such

gene transfer be wrong in and of itself? Similarly, if

the case were reversed, and the gene were transferred

in the other direction, from humans to animals to

instill disease-resistance, it is difficult to see why this

would be morally problematic. To be sure, when the

human growth hormone gene was transferred to

animals, it caused animal disease and suffering, and

thus such transfer was wrong because of its effects.

But one has still not shown that in and of itself such

transfer is wrong.

Issues of Risk in Genetic Engineering of Animals

The above sorts of objections, claiming that genetic

engineering of animals is intrinsically wrong, have

fueled the gap in social thought about genetic

engineering of animals in the absence of forthright

articulation of genuine concerns by the scientific

community. We have argued that none of these claims

of intrinsic wrongness represent legitimate concerns.

Nonetheless, there are genuine issues of risk to

humans and to the environment growing out of genetic

engineering of animals that must be addressed and

managed for the technology to be socially acceptable.

The issues discussed above can be resolved if the

biotechnology community undertakes such serious and

genuine dialogue with the general public on all

aspects of this technology, which I believe it must do

to survive.

It is vital that discussion of such risks and their

management not be restricted to “experts” but rather

involve the general public, perhaps through local

community review. The general public does not trust

experts to articulate risks, to assess their likelihood,

or to manage them: they have lived through too many

Chernobyls, too many Challengers, too many killer bee

escapes. In agriculture, the public has seen the

unexpected consequences of DDT, the unanticipated

contamination of ground water from herbicides, pesti-

cides, and fertilizers, and the unexpected spillage of

millions of gallons of hog manure in North Carolina

during the summer of 1995, despite assurances from

experts that it could not happen. And indeed, the

public has a point—scientists tend to get cavalier

about risks in their area; ask any university biosafety

officer. Scientists furthermore tend to minimize the

danger of unanticipated consequences of new technol-

ogy or believe that they can fix them with further new

technology, whereas members of the general public

fear the unknown and tend to believe that technologi-

cal fixes generate new and unanticipated conse-

quences. Failure to involve the public in such risk-

management discussion is very likely to result in

rejection of genetic engineering. This has already

occurred with bST and with Campbell’s genetically

engineered tomato. Jurassic Park should provide a

parable for genetic engineers.

Potential dangers emerging from genetic engineer-

ing of animals obviously stem from the rapidity with

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538

which such activity can introduce wholesale change in

organisms. Traditional “genetic engineering” was done

by selective breeding over long periods of time,

allowing ample opportunity to observe the untoward

effects of narrow selection of isolated characteristics.

With the techniques currently available, however,

scientists are doing their selection “in the fast lane,”

and thus we may not detect the problematic aspects of

what we are doing until after the organism has been

widely disseminated.

Another way to put the same point is that with

traditional breeding, there is an enforced waiting

period necessarily associated with attempts to incor-

porate traits into organisms. In the animal arena,

especially, one can significantly change animals from

the parent stock, but it will take many generations to

do so, during which time one has ample opportunity to

detect problems with the genome one is creating, or

with its phenotypic expression. To be sure, as occurred

with the breeding of many pure-bred dogs, one may

choose to disregard the untoward effects. But the point

is, one could see the problems developing if one cared

to do so. With genetic engineering, however, one can

insert the desired gene in one effort, and the problems

that emerge may be totally unexpected.

There are many instances of this, in fact, even in

traditional breeding. One famous example of this

concerns corn, and grows out of the phenomenon

known as pleiotropy, which means that one gene and

its products controls or codes for more than a single

trait. In this case, breeders were interested in a gene

that controlled male sterility in corn, so that one could

produce hybrid seeds without detasselling the corn by

hand, which is very labor-intensive. So the gene was

introduced to provide genetic detasselling. Unfor-

tunately, the gene also was responsible for increased

susceptibility to Southern Corn Blight, a fact of which

no one was aware. The corn was widely adopted, and

in one year a large part of the corn crop was

devastated by the disease.

Similarly, when wheat was bred for resistance to a

disease called blast, that characteristic was looked at

in isolation, and was encoded into the organism. The

back-up gene for general resistance, however, was

ignored. As a result, the new organism was very

susceptible to all sorts of viruses which, in one

generation, mutated sufficiently to devastate the crop.

What we have then, vis a

vis the danger associated

with genetic engineering, is what philosophers call an

a fortiori situation. If such unanticipated conse-

quences can and do occur with traditional breeding,

where one of necessity proceeds slowly, how much the

more so does the danger of unanticipated conse-

quences loom when one is creating transgenic

animals? When one inserts a sequence of DNA (a

gene) into an organism, one cannot anticipate

pleiotropic activities, where the gene affects other

traits one has not anticipated. By the same token, one

may have overlooked the need for more than one gene

to get the desired result phenotypically. Any of these

factors can produce a variety of conditions deleterious

to the organism. The way to control this risk, then,

whether one is doing traditional breeding or trans-

genic shortcuts, is to do a great deal of small-scale

testing before one releases or depends on the new

organism.

The second type of danger resulting from fast-lane

genetic engineering of animals can be illustrated by

reference to food animals. Here the isolated charac-

teristic being engineered into the organism may have

unsuspected harmful consequences to humans who

consume the resultant animal. The deep issue here is

that one can of course genetically engineer traits in

animals without a full understanding of the mechan-

isms involved in phenotypic expression of the traits,

with resulting disaster. Ideally, though this is proba-

bly not possible either in breeding or creating trans-

genics, one can mitigate this sort of danger by being

extremely cautious in one’s engineering until one has

at least a reasonable grasp of the physiological

mechanisms affected by insertion of a given gene.

A third general kind of risk growing out of genetic

engineering replicates and amplifies problems already

inherent in selection by breeding, namely the narrow-

ing of a gene pool, the tendency toward creation of

genetic uniformity, the emergence of harmful reces-

sives, the loss of hybrid vigor, and, of course, the

greater susceptibility of organisms to devastation by

pathogens, as has been shown to be the case in crops.

So, once again, we encounter a problem that

already exists in traditional breeding. As we find the

traits we consider desirable, we try to incorporate

these traits into the organisms we raise, be they plant

or animal. We continue to refine and propagate these

animals and plants until a particular genome

dominates our agriculture. In other words, we put all

our eggs in one basket. The number of strains of

chicken in production of eggs and broilers, for

example, has decreased precipitously since the rise of

large corporate domination of the industry during the

last 40 years. What this means in practical terms is

that the industry stands and falls by what it considers

the few superior genomes it has developed. If circum-

stances change, or if a new pathogen is encountered,

wholesale devastation of the population will of neces-

sity occur and has occurred, for example by Newcas-

tle’s disease or influenza. Loss of genetic diversity

means loss of potential for adaptation to new circum-

stances.

The way in which genetic engineering can acceler-

ate this tendency is clear. Suppose a “superior” animal

is created transgenically with great rapidity. Those

who utilize this animal gain a clear competitive edge,

be it because of increased disease resistance, greater

efficiency in feed conversion, greater productivity, or

whatever. In order to compete, other farmers replace

BAD ETHICS, GOOD ETHICS, GENETIC ENGINEERING

539

their stock with this animal, because old strains are

viewed as obsolete. The entire branch of agriculture

tends toward a monoculture, with the extant gene pool

severely limited. Over a period of time, however,

untoward consequences of the new genome emerge, be

it disease susceptibility, reproductive problems, stress

susceptibility, or some other problem. A potentially

disastrous situation forms because the best sort of

response to the crisis has been lost with the loss of

genetic diversity. Alternatively, social or economic

circumstances may change so as to require change in

agricultural practices or locale such that the extant

genome does not fit well with the new circumstances.

Once again, the presence of a limited gene pool

militates against the sort of quick, reasonable, and

efficacious response that a diverse gene pool would

provide. In the end then, genetic engineering of

animals runs the risk of accelerating the tendency

that is already established in at least certain portions

of animal agriculture (the chicken and egg industry,

for example).

A fourth set of risks arises from the fact that in

certain cases, when one changes animals, one can

thereby alter the pathogens to which they are host.

This can potentially occur in two ways. First, in

genetically engineering for resistance to a given

pathogen in an animal, one unwittingly could create

an environment in the animal favorable to a natural

mutation of that pathogenic microbe to which the

modified animal would not be resistant. These new

organisms then could be infectious to these other

animals, or to humans. (Society already has wit-

nessed such untoward consequences as a result of its

indiscriminate use of antibiotics in medicine and

agriculture. Widespread use of these drugs killed off

susceptible bacteria, and in essence served to select for

bacteria that were resistant to them.)

One possible example of this sort of reaction has

recently been discussed regarding the so-called SCID

mouse developed as a model for AIDS (Lusso et al.,

1990). These animals are genetically engineered to

possess a human immune system and are then

infected with the AIDS virus. Some researchers

suggest that, in such a mouse, the AIDS virus could

become more virulent and infectious by interacting

with native mouse viruses, thereby taking on new

characteristics such as, for example, becoming trans-

missible by contact with the airborne virus. It is for

similar reasons that the National Institutes of Health,

which has developed a different mouse model for

AIDS, took extraordinary precautions to ensure that

the experimental mice could not accidentally escape.

Even if one were to genetically alter an animal

without specifically changing its immune system, one

might inadvertently alter the pathogens to which it is

host indirectly by changing the microenvironment

where they live. This, in turn, could result in these

pathogens becoming dangerous to humans or other

animals. Thus, for example, in altering agricultural

animals such as cattle by genetic engineering, one

runs the risk of affecting the pathogenicity of the

microorganisms that inhabit the organism in

unknown and unpredictable ways. The more precipi-

tous the change, the more difficult it is to estimate the

effects of the pathogens.

A fifth set of risks is ecological, associated with the

possibility of radically altering an animal and then

having it escape into an uncontrolled environment.

Although this might seem to be a minimal danger

when dealing with intensively maintained and strictly

confined swine, chickens, or laboratory animals, it

could pose a real problem with extensively managed

and loosely confined sheep or cattle, as well as with

rodents, or rabbits that may escape despite ordinary

precautions, and, most obviously, with fish. Ex-

perience teaches us that the dangers of releasing

animals into a new environment cannot be estimated,

even with species whose characteristics are well

known. Witness the uncontrollable proliferation of

rabbits and cats released in Australia and the

mongoose in Hawaii, as well as our inability to deal

with the accidental release of killer bees, or imported

snails in our waterways. Ignorance of what could

happen with newly engineered creatures is even more

certain.

A sixth set of risks is also environmental. By now

we are all familiar with the threat to global and

regional ecosystems posed by agricultural expansion

in Third World countries. Slash-and-burn techniques

deployed to provide grazing land for cattle has led to

desertification in some areas (Africa) and dramatic

loss of species in others (South America). What effect

would genetic engineering have on these pernicious

pursuits? The answer is not clear. It could be argued

in favor of genetic engineering that our ability to

genetically adapt animals and plants to indigenous

conditions would halt such practices while allowing for

economic growth. However, it is equally plausible to

suggest that such technology could augment plunder

of the environment by foisting animals on all sorts of

hitherto undisturbed areas with unimaginable conse-

quences. Once again, it is difficult to foresee such

risks.

A seventh set of risks derives from potential

military applications of such technology. It is not

difficult to imagine the sorts of weapons that could be

created using animals as carriers to infect populations

with human pathogens.

Finally, the patenting of genetically engineered

animals poses socio-economic risks. For example,

many farmer groups anticipate that small family

farmers might be forced to acquire expensive patented

animals in order to compete with large corporations

and could well be forced out of business. This, in turn,

might strengthen the ever-increasing tendency of

large agribusiness to monopolize the food supply. We

ROLLIN

540

have ample evidence from bST and elsewhere that the

public will reject anything that endangers family

farms. The extrapolation of these technologies to Third

World cultures, where adequate regulation is unlikely

and socio-cultural disruption can threaten the social

fabric and way of life, represents another risk in this

category.

Issues of Animal Welfare

Responding to the above concerns is just as much a

matter of prudence as self-interest for those engaged

in genetic engineering, because they are themselves

put at risk by many of the dangers enumerated, and

because any catastrophic outcomes will likely result in

severe restrictions of their activities and in massive

public rejection of the technology. A purely moral

challenge lies in the issue of the welfare of the animals

to be engineered. Because human benefits can and will

likely exact a cost in animals suffering, and there is no

benefit to humans militating in favor of controlling

that suffering, the task of protecting such animals will

be formidable. On the other hand, as I have discussed

elsewhere, social concern for animal welfare has never

been higher in the United States and abroad (Rollin,

1995).

In agriculture, attempts to engineer animals have

been largely based on increasing animal efficiency and

productivity. Based on the history and the develop-

ment of confinement systems in industrialized agricul-

ture, it is clear that if the pain, suffering, and disease

of the animal does not interfere with the economic

productivity, the condition is ignored. (Hence the

existence of the so-called “production diseases” en-

demic to confinement agriculture.) Most important,

there are no legal or regulatory constraints on what

can be done to animals in pursuit of increasing

agricultural productivity, either in agricultural

research or in industry. Given the absence of such

constraints and the historical willingness of industri-

alized agriculture to sacrifice animal welfare for

productivity, the moral problem inherent in geneti-

cally engineering animals for production agriculture is

obvious.

Most of the attempts that have thus far been made

to genetically engineer farm animals have generated

serious welfare problems. For example, attempts to

increase the growth rate and efficiency of pigs and

sheep by insertion of modified genes to control growth,

while achieving that result, have engendered signifi-

cant suffering (Pursel, 1989). The desired results

were to increase growth rates and weight gain in farm

animals, reduce carcass fat, and increase feed effi-

ciency. Although certain of these goals were achieved

(in pigs, rate of gain increased by 15%, feed efficiency

by 18%, and carcass fat was reduced by 80%),

unanticipated effects, with significantly negative im-

pact on the animals’ well-being, also occurred. Life-

shortening pathogenic changes in pigs including

kidney and liver problems were noted in many of the

animals. The animals also exhibited a wide variety of

diseases and symptoms, including lethargy, lameness,

uncoordinated gait, bulging eyes, thickening skin,

gastric ulcers, severe synovitis, degenerative joint

disease, heart disease of various kinds, nephritis, and

pneumonia. Sexual behavior was anomalous; females

were anestrous and boars lacked libido. Other

problems included tendencies toward diabetes and

compromised immune function. The sheep fared better

for the first 6 mo but then became unhealthy.

There are certain lessons to be learned from these

experiments. In the first place, although similar

experiments had been done earlier in mice, mice did

not show many of the undesirable side effects. Thus it

is difficult to extrapolate in a linear way from species

to species when it comes to genetic engineering, even

when, on the surface, the same sort of genetic

manipulation is being attempted.

Second, as we mentioned, it is impossible to effect

simple one-to-one correspondence between gene trans-

fer and the appearance of desired phenotypic traits.

Genes may have multiple effects, and traits may be

under the control of multiple genes. The relevance of

this point to welfare is obvious and analogous to a

point we made earlier about risk: one should be

extremely circumspect in one’s engineering until one

has a good grasp of the physiological mechanisms

affected by a gene or set of genes. A good example of

the welfare pitfalls is provided by recent attempts to

genetically engineer mice to produce greater amounts

of interleukin 4, in order to study certain aspects of

the immune system (Lewis et al., 1993). This, in fact,

surprisingly resulted in these animals experiencing

osteoporosis, a disease resulting in bone fragility,

clearly a welfare problem.

Another example is provided by a recent attempt to

produce cattle genetically engineered for double mus-

cling (G. Niswender, personal communication).

Though the calf was born showing no apparent

problems, within a month it was unable to stand up on

its own, for reasons that are not yet clear. To the

researchers’ credit, the calf was immediately euthana-

tized. Yet another bizarre instance of totally unantici-

pated welfare problems can be found in the situation

where leglessness and cranio-facial malformations

resulted from the insertion of an apparently totally

unrelated gene into mice (McNeish, 1988).

Thus welfare issues arise both in research on

genetically engineered agricultural animals and, more

drastically, in potential commercial production. The

research animal issues can best be handled with

judicious use of anesthesia, analgesia, and, above all,

early end points for euthanasia if there is any

suffering. The issues associated with mass production

of suffering genetically engineered animals must be

dealt with in a different way. For this reason, I have

proposed the “Principle of Conservation of Welfare” to

BAD ETHICS, GOOD ETHICS, GENETIC ENGINEERING

541

guide the agricultural industry (Rollin, 1995). This

principle states that genetically engineered animals

should be no worse off than the parent stock would be if

they were not so engineered, and ideally should be

better off. Genetically engineering disease resistance

(e.g., for Marek’s disease in chickens) is a good

example of the latter case.

Implications

Agricultural scientists cannot ignore the pressing

socio-ethical concerns about genetic engineering of

animals. By meeting the issues head on, they can first

of all separate good ethical coin from bad and avoid

the pernicious consequences of our “Gresham’s law for

ethics.” Second, they can listen to and enter into

dialogue with the public, engage their concerns about

risk, and thereby bridge the gulf of fear and ignorance

distancing ordinary people from this new technology.

Finally, they can help ensure that the unfortunate

tendencies in modern agriculture to place emphasis on

productivity and efficiency above animal well-being

can be checked in this new technology so as to

ascertain that it is “animal friendly” and beneficial to

animals as well as people.

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