ATTACHMENT 1
10.6 Parenthetical Information Regarding Supreme Court Opinions
A plurality opinion is an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in a case
where a majority of the Court agrees in the result, but there is no majority agreeing with
the rationale by which that result is reached, and where there are more Members of the
Court agreeing with the rationale in the opinion announcing the judgment than with any
other rationale (dissenters are not counted in determining whether there is a plurality).
E.g., there was a plurality opinion in United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976),
where Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which the
Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Powell joined, and Justice Blackmun filed an opin-
ion concurring in the judgment.
The joint opinions of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, announcing the
judgments in the death penalty cases Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), have sometimes been
erroneously cited as plurality opinions. Those joint opinions are in fact not plurality
opinions because there were three other Justices who, while concurring in the judgments,
agreed on a rationale different from that of the opinions announcing the judgments. The
joint opinions of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens announcing the judgments in the
other death penalty case decided at the same time, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), are, however, plurality opinions,
because only two other Justices—each of whom filed separate statements concurring in the
judgments—have followed a rationale different from the joint opinions in reaching the
results.
The joint opinions in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek should be referred to as joint
opinions. See United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976). Do not use the terms
“prevailing opinion” or “pivotal opinion,” although the term “principal opinion” may be
acceptable (see Wainwright v. Spenkelink, 442 U.S. 901, 902 (1979), penult. line; Hopper v.
Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982)). The term “principal opinion” has also been used to refer
to an opinion, part of which is a majority opinion and part of which is a plurality opinion.
See Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 77, 78, 80 (1979). An extreme example of a case
where the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court is not a plurality opinion is
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970). Justice Black announced the judgments in an
opinion “expressing his own view of the cases.” See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
622, 651 (1979), for another example of a case where there was no plurality opinion (the
opinion announcing the judgment is joined by three Justices, but the opinion concurring in
the judgment is also joined by three Justices).
NOTE: Concurring in the judgment and concurring in the result mean the same
thing. But do not say “Justice X, concurring” where the Justice does not vote with the
majority. Also, consistency should be maintained: Do not say “Justice X, concurring in
the judgment” where an opinion concludes: “For the foregoing reasons I concur in the
result.”
Apr. 2014 64