Indo – US
Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
Implications on South Asian Security Environment
Adil Sultan Muhammad
Visiting Fellow
Henry L. Stimson Center
July 2006
1
Table of Contents
1. Introduction............................................................................................................. 2
2. The Nuclear Deal .................................................................................................... 3
3. Is It About Energy?................................................................................................. 4
4. Major Issues............................................................................................................ 6
a. Separation of Civilian/ Military Facilities .................................................. 6
b. Type of Safeguards ..................................................................................... 8
c. Nuclear Suppliers Group............................................................................. 9
d. Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) .................................................. 10
5. Implications on South Asian Security Environment............................................. 12
a. Regional Instability................................................................................... 12
b. Regional Realignments ............................................................................. 16
6. Pakistan’s Likely Response .................................................................................. 18
7. China Factor.......................................................................................................... 20
8. Way Forward ........................................................................................................ 22
9. Regional Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty ............................................................. 22
10. Regional Non-Proliferation Regime (RNR) ......................................................... 23
11. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 25
2
Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement:
Implications on South Asian Security Environment
Adil Sultan
1
Introduction
The Joint Statement of 18 July 2005 provided a roadmap for future strategic partnership
between India and the United States. The new cooperative framework aimed at making
India a global power has many facets including strategic, energy and economic
components. However, the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement which is part of the
overall energy dialogue attracted most attention due to its serious implications for global
non-proliferation regime and on the South Asian security environment. The agreement
would enable India to acquire civil nuclear technology from the US and other members of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and accord India, de facto status of a Nuclear
Weapon State (NWS).
The nuclear deal, if remain unchecked, could allow India to make qualitative and
quantitative improvement in its nuclear arsenal, triggering a possible nuclear arms
competition in the region, involving Pakistan, India and possibly China, thus
destabilizing the entire region. Similarly, the overall India-US strategic partnership at the
possible cost of regional instability could impinge security interests of other regional
players; forcing smaller countries to re-evaluate their security imperatives and explore
options such as strategic realignments, in order to better safeguard their security interests.
The emerging India-US relationship aimed at enhancing India’s stature in the region,
besides having possible negative implications for the South Asian stability does provide
US with an opportunity to use its increased leverage with India, and work towards
regional stability by helping to resolve outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan.
The US could also work with these two non-NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) NWS to
1 The author is a Wing Commander of Pakistan Air Force working in Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division. However, the views expressed in the paper are those of the
author himself and do not necessarily reflect or represent viewpoint of the Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Air Force, or the Strategic Plans Division.
3
bring them into mainstream non-proliferation regime through some kind of a regional
arrangement, and under a treaty obligation, which could alleviate proliferation concerns
of the international community, arising mainly due to non-NPT status of India and
Pakistan. Such an option would bring the two non-NPT NWS under a treaty obligation,
which could then become a basis for civil nuclear cooperation with other members of the
NSG.
The Nuclear Deal
In the Joint Statement of July 2005, President Bush stated that as a responsible state with
advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire same benefits and advantages as other
such states. He also said that the US would work to achieve full civil nuclear energy
cooperation with India as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving
energy security. He would also seek an agreement from the Congress to adjust US laws
and policies, and that the US will work with friends and allies to adjust international
regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. The Indian
Prime Minister on his part conveyed that India would reciprocally agree that it would be
ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and
advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the
United States.
2
The intense and heated debate on the nuclear cooperation agreement remained mostly
focused on the non-proliferation implications of the deal, with little or no attention on the
regional implications of the nuclear agreement.
3
The opponents of the proposed nuclear
cooperation termed the agreement a ‘fatal error’ for global non-proliferation regime, and
believe that this could have a domino effect as many nuclear have-nots will be more
inclined to regard NPT as an anachronism, reconsider their self-restraint, and be tempted
by the precedent that India has successfully established and that now, in effect, has an
2 “Indo-US Joint Statement of 18 July 2005”, The Hindu, <www.hindu.com/thehindu/nic/indousjoint.htm>
3 See Stimson Center analysis of Indo-US Nuclear Initiative by Michael Krepon of Henry L Stimson Center
<www.stimson.org/home.cfm>
4
American blessing.
4
This could have a negative effect on the behavior of several states
including Brazil, South Africa and Ukraine, to name a few, that had given up their
nuclear weapons program,
5
with a hope that other countries would emulate and the
international community could be led towards global nuclear disarmament. The
supporters of the deal however, argue that the sale of nuclear technology would serve
both countries’ national security interest as well as the goals of non-proliferation.
6
They
also do not agree with the fact that the proposed nuclear deal is in any violation of Article
1 of the NPT, and have in fact termed the argument as a ‘petty canard’ – that is based on
a novel legal interpretation of the US obligations that has never been accepted by the US
government since the United States signed the treaty in 1968.
7
However, Henry Sokolski
like many others does not agree with this new and perverted interpretation of the NPT
and commented; “the violation is hardly a “petty canard”, it’s a real problem – one
which, as the US and its allies plead their case against Iran and North Korea -- is only
likely to become more of a headache. The US will be joining the ranks of North Korea
and Iran as NPT violators.
8
Is It About Energy?
The proponents of the India-US nuclear initiative argue that the deal is “an effort to
strengthen India’s ability to expand its civilian nuclear energy’s contribution to India’s
large and rapidly growing electricity needs, rather than a closet ‘atoms for war’ effort
that would have the effect of covertly accelerating the growth in India’s nuclear
arsenal.”
9
Similar argument was given by Secretary Rice in her testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, once she said; “Civil nuclear cooperation
agreement with India will help meet its rising energy needs without increasing its
reliance on unstable foreign sources of oil and gas, such as nearby Iran”.
10
4 Strobe Talbot, “Good day for India, Bad for Nonproliferation”, Yale Global, 21 July 2005. <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.id=6042>, p.4.
5 Lt Gen (Retd) Talat Masood, Dawn, April 4, 2006. <www.dawn.com.pk/2006/04/04/ed.htm>
6 Ashey Tellis, “Should the US Sell Nuclear Technology to India? – Part II”, 10 November 2005. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.id=6487.
7 Ashley Tellis, “Atoms for War?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2006. p.9.
8 Henry Sokolski, “Unconditionally Bad”, June 26, 2006. <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q>
9 Tellis, Atoms for War? Op cit. p.7.
10 Remarks of Secretary of State Condolezza Rice at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, Wednesday,
April 5, 2006. p.6-7.
5
India’s utilizes 11% of various available energy sources including oil, gas, coal, wind and
nuclear power for producing electricity. Out of this only 2-3% is produced through
nuclear power. The civil nuclear cooperation agreement, once materialized in its true
essence by 2025 could increase this production to a maximum of 6.5 - 8% only.
Therefore it is not clear how this increase of 4.5 - 6% in nuclear electricity could make
any substantial difference in global climatic conditions or in the Indian economy. Tall
claims asserting India’s need to harness nuclear technology for satiating its energy
requirements have been appearing since late fifties when India went about seeking
foreign assistance to establish its nuclear infrastructure. In 1962, Homi Bhabha, the
founder of India’s nuclear program, claimed that by 1987 nuclear energy would
constitute 20,000-25,000 megawatts of installed electricity-generation capacity. His
successor as head of the Department of Atomic Energy, Vikram Sarabhai, predicted that
by 2000 there would be 43,500 megawatts of nuclear power. Neither of these predictions
came true. The cold hard fact remains that India’s current nuclear power generation
capability stands at around 3,300 megawatts, which constitutes barely 3 percent of India’s
installed electricity capacity. (Wind energy, in comparison produces 4% of the Indian
electricity). Indian establishment has now laid down ambitious benchmarks to generate
10,000 MWs by 2010, 20,000 MWs by 2020 and 150,000 MWs by 2050 – projections
that appear surreal given India’s past record and her infrastructural capability to absorb
such energy production into her existing distribution system. Therefore it is more likely
that India will continue to divert nuclear expertise and materials, provided for producing
‘cheap, efficient and clean’ energy, towards accelerating her ambitious nuclear weapons’
program.
11
Edward J Markey, while testifying before the House International Relations
Committee said; “In 2005, only 1% of India’s installed electrical capacity was fuelled by
oil and only 2.7% by nuclear power….Throughout the next century, Coal will continue to
be the major player in India’s electricity sector. India plans to build additional 213 coal
plants by 2012. These plants will produce the bulk of India’s electricity. A realistic, safe,
and practical plan for partnership between the United States and India would be a
11 Momin Iftikhar, “India’s Civilian Nuclear Energy Program – Hype or Reality?”, South Asia Research and Analysis Studies, June 12, 2006.
<www.saras.org.pk/viewarticle.php?topicid=149.
6
Clean-coal cooperative, not a nuclear one,”
12
and an aggressive plan by India of
improved energy efficiency could substitute for all the future power output from nuclear
reactors currently being planned in India between now and 2020.
13
Major Issues
In order to achieve the objectives of the July 18 Joint Statement, both countries initially
wrangled on the issue of sequencing of steps that attracted significant public attention.
After submission of the separation plan, the US administration started convincing
members of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) to make India specific exceptions,
which could allow India to acquire advanced nuclear technology from these countries.
India is now in the process of negotiating safeguard agreements and an Additional
Protocol for its designated civilian nuclear facilities with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). The two other controversial issues that still needs to be negotiated,
which would make India’s intentions more obvious are; India’s position on
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).
Separation of Civilian/ Military Facilities
Before the March 2, agreement, the US wanted India to put ‘great majority’ of its 22
nuclear reactors on the civilian list. Presuming the ‘great majority’ means three quarters
of the total number of reactors, it would have meant that India should have declared as
many as 17 reactors, including the six already under IAEA safeguards, as civilian.
14
Additionally, US asked India to place its current and future Fast Breeder Reactors
(FBR’s) under safeguards, which India claims to be an indigenous test program, still in its
infancy, and cannot be declared as civilian. India hopes to use the FBR for future energy
needs that sought to bridge the gap between the shortage of natural uranium that India
faces and the vast thorium reserves it has.
15
Another factor that could have contributed to
12 Edward J Markey, Prepared Testimony before House International Relations Committee on India Nuclear Deal, May 11, 2006.
13 Ibid.
14 V. Sudarshan, “Be Civil Please”, Outlook, February 2006, p.34.
15 ibid, p.35.
7
India’s refusal to place FBR’s under safeguards is that U-333, - a by-product of fission in
FBRs, is a suitable fuel for India’s nuclear powered submarine that is being developed
under R&D program euphemistically called the ATV project. By putting FBR’s under
safeguards, Indian scientists feared that their indigenous research would be exposed
through external inspections and India’s intellectual property rights over this new
technology may be diluted if inspectors monitor every stage of their ongoing research.
16
Nuclear experts familiar with the origin of the FBR technology disagree with the Indian
claim of ingenuity as the technology has its roots in France.
Some in India viewed US insistence to bring maximum number of nuclear facilities
including the FBR’s under safeguards an attempt to cap India’s fissile material
production. It was therefore strongly resisted by the Indian nuclear bureaucracy including
head of India’s Atomic Energy Commission Dr Anil Kakodkar. Prime Minister Singh
also came out openly in support of his scientists and declared; “we have made it clear that
we cannot accept safeguards on our indigenous fast breeder program,” and added; “we
have taken into account our current and future strategic needs and programs after careful
deliberation of all relevant factors, consistent with our nuclear doctrine…there has been
no erosion of the integrity of our nuclear doctrine, either in terms of current or future
capabilities…it will be the autonomous Indian decision as to what is ‘civilian’ and what
is ‘military’. Nobody will tell us what is ‘civilian’ and what is ‘military’… the number of
thermal nuclear reactors that India would agree to put under civilian list would be equal
to 65% of the total installed thermal nuclear power capacity.”
17
Gary Milhollin in his
testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee commented on the Indian offer and
said; “In effect, India’s offer is like that of a counterfeiter with a 22 room house, who
offers to let the police look into 14 rooms as long as they stay out of all the others….
Everyone knows that it will be the eight undeclared ones that make the bomb”
18
India
also managed to keep the FBR’s out of the civilian list, yet another major concession to
16 Gen. (Retd) V P Malik & Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, “Indo-US N-Deal: Overcoming the Last Hurdle”, Observer Research Foundation Analysis, March 2,
2006.
17 Prime Minister Singh’s Statement on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States in Parliament, February 27, 2006.
<www.hindu.com/thehindu/nic/suomotuu.htm>
18 Gary Milhollin, Testimony on “US – India Atomic Energy Cooperation” hearing for Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 26, 2006.
8
India which prompted George Perkovich to comment; “this is Santa Claus negotiating.
The goal seems to give away as much possible.”
19
Type of Safeguards
The Joint Statement of 18 July refers to India “taking a decision to place voluntarily its
civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.”
20
An unlikely voluntary arrangement
on the pattern of five NWS could have enabled India to offer more number of facilities
for safeguards and withdraw these whenever required citing national security interest.
Such a provision if agreed, could have essentially placed India squarely in the company
of NWS.
21
It was however, out rightly rejected by the Administration as well as the
Congress. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs,
Robert Joseph, while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said; “
US would not view a voluntary offer arrangement as defensible, and the safeguards must
be applied in perpetuity.
22
Similarly, Chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Richard Lugar had made it clear at the very onset of the nuclear debate that the
Committee will judge the efficacy of the separation plan in terms of three key criteria. He
identified these as “safeguards, non-assistance and transparency.”
23
There are currently three types of safeguards agreements in vogue, INFCIRC
24
/66,
INFCIRC/153, and Voluntary Safeguards Agreements. It is not yet clear what will be the
final outcome of the on going negotiations between India and the IAEA. India could ask
for a facility specific safeguards on the pattern of INFCIRC/66 agreements on its
designated civilian facilities individually or collectively for all of its civilian facilities in
the agreed separation plan. These would then be ‘in perpetuity’ and would thus preclude
19 Steven R. Weisman, “Dissenting on Atomic Deal”, The New York Times, March 3, 2006.
20 “Indo-US Joint Statement”, July 18, 2005, The Hindu.
21 Sharon Squassoni, “US Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress”, CRS Report, 24 October 2005.
22 Statement of Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, November 2, 2005 Senate Foreign Relations Committee
India Hearing.
23 Seema Mustafa, “Nuke Plan Not Given to Cabinet, Sent to US”, The Asian Age, January 7, 2006.
24 INFCIRC, an abbreviation of “Information Circular,” is a designation the IAEA uses to record its agreements with states and organizations. INFCIRC/66 and
INFCIRC/153 are model agreements; the actual agreements with states will bear different numbers. INFCIRC/66 agreements predate the NPT and were used in
bilateral safeguards arrangements, whereas INFCIRC/153 agreements are “full-scope safeguards” under the NPT.
9
future use of any of these designated civilian facilities for the production of nuclear
material for nuclear explosive purposes, and would also eliminate possibility of
withdrawing any of these facilities from safeguards for national security purposes.
25
The other type of safeguards INFCIRC/153, which is also known as comprehensive
safeguards agreement, is essentially for non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). The
existence of a weapons oriented component in the Indian nuclear program automatically
rules out possibility of a comprehensive safeguards arrangement under INFCIRC/153,
26
as technically India and Pakistan both do not fall into the category of NNWS.
During the on going discussion on the type of safeguards with the IAEA, India would
continue to push for a favorable arrangement, which could help in an implicit recognition
of India as a NWS. As PM Singh in his address to the Indian parliament had earlier
stated; “United States [has] implicitly acknowledged the existence of our nuclear
weapons program…as a responsible State with advanced nuclear technologies, India
should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other States which have advanced
nuclear technology, such as the United States.”
27
An Indian Embassy backgrounder on
the agreement also noted that the “NWS including the US, have the right to shift facilities
from civilian category to military and there is no reason why this should not apply to
India.”
28
Nuclear Suppliers Group
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created as a result of India’s nuclear explosion
of 1974, which formulated rules to preclude the possibility of any future misuse of
nuclear technology provided to a country for peaceful purposes. It is a group of 45
countries, aimed at regulating nuclear trade within the group and with other countries,
who are signatories to the NPT. India is not an NSG member, neither a NWS, nor a
signatory to the NPT, therefore it is ineligible for nuclear trade with other countries, as
25 Fred McGoldrick, etal., “The US – India Nuclear Deal: Taking Stock”, Arms Control Today, October 2005, p.2. <www.arsmcontrol.org/act/2005_10/OCT-
Cover.asp>.
26 C. Raja Mohan, “N-Deal: Now Focus on IAEA Safeguards”, Indian Express, 25 December 2005, p.2.
27 Ibid.
28 Ashley Tellis, “India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p.25.
10
long as NSG amends its rules or makes India specific exceptions through a consensus
decision. In order to convince members of the NSG to allow nuclear trade with India, US
has already initiated consultations with the group.
29
The Administration hopes that it
would be able to convince the NSG to make India specific exception that would allow
full cooperation with India without abandoning NSG consensus rules or the full-scope
safeguards condition of supply.
30
Initial responses from some of the major nuclear
suppliers including UK, France and Russia have all been positive. Whereas, member
countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Ireland have indicated their
reservations on the basis of their non-proliferation policies.
31
Taking a lead from Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement, France was quick to sign its
own variant of the deal with India,
32
and Russia, not wanting to be left behind, has
already supplied nuclear fuel for India’s nuclear reactors at Tarapur. China has so far
been cautious in its approach towards the nuclear cooperation agreement and has called
for abiding by the rules of the global non-proliferation regime.
33
Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT)
In his recent paper, ‘Atoms for War?’, Ashley Tellis writes that following nuclear tests of
1998, India decided to increase its fissile material production for two reasons; first, to
provide Indian policy makers with an option of deploying a larger nuclear arsenal than
originally intended; and second, as insurance in case a global fissile material cutoff
regime, which could require India to immediately terminate the production of weapons
grade fissile materials, were to unexpectedly materialize, and for this purpose the idea of
using India’s power reactors in a ‘low burn-up’ mode to increase the production of
weapons grade plutonium and possibly produce tritium was also explored.
34
29 “NSG Begins Mulling Response to US-India Cooperation Deal,” Nuclear Fuel, Sept. 26, 2005.
30 Sept 8, 2005 HIRC US-India Hearing, Nov 2, 2005 SFRC US-India Hearing, in, “US Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for Congress”, CRS Report, updated
January 12, 2006. p.19.
31 Mark Hibbs, “US to Face Some Opposition if it Seeks Consensus NSG Rule on India,” Nucleonics Week, Sept. 29, 2005, in, “US Nuclear Cooperation With
India: Issues for Congress”, CRS Report, updated January 12, 2006. p.19.
32 “Paris Ready to Sell reactors”, Deccan Chronicle, 31 January 2006. <www.deccan.com/home/homedetails.asp.>
33 “Hurdles Ahead for Landmark Nuclear Deal”, BBC NEWS, 3/3/06. <www.bbc.co.uk>
34 Tellis, Op cit. p.13.
11
India’s continued reluctance to declare a moratorium and its insistence on a multilateral
verifiable FMCT seems to be an attempt to exploit this extended window of opportunity
as long as the major parties do not resolve their differences and a consensus is reached at
the CD. Unless the FMCT is negotiated, India is under no obligation to halt production of
fissile material. “In one important respect, India has received more leniency than the five
established nuclear “haves” have asked for themselves: The US, Britain, France, Russia,
and China say they have halted the production of the fissile material that goes into
nuclear bombs, while India has only promised to join universal ban that would include
Pakistan, if such a thing ever materializes”.
35
The US Administration does not seem interested in demanding a moratorium on fissile
material production from India as is apparent from Under Secretary Robert Joseph’s
testimony to the House International Relations Committee hearing in which he stated;
“[US remains] committed to achieving Indian curtailment of fissile material production
and we have strongly encouraged a move in this direction. … but we will not insist on it
for purposes of this civil nuclear initiative.”
36
Indian officials on the other hand, have
repeatedly asserted that; “there is no commitment at all to cease production of fissile
material ahead of conclusion of [such a] multilateral FMCT.”
37
Some of the Washington
based Indian experts suggest that India should not cap its nuclear weapons program, and
restraining India’s ability to build up its nuclear stockpile could “threaten to place New
Delhi at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Beijing, a situation that could not only undermine Indian
security but also US interests in Asia.”
38
Ashley Tellis, while testifying before House
International Relations Committee stated; “Congress should not support any amendments
that are intended to limit, or have as their effect a limitation on, India’s capacity to
produce fissile materials for its nuclear weapons program….Accordingly, any effort to
stipulate that an Indian fissile materials production moratorium would be a precondition
for implementing the deal in effect functions as a ‘poison pill’ that would sunder the
35 Strobe Talbot, Opcit.
36 House International Relations Committee Hearing.
37 “Backgrounder on India-US Nuclear Energy Cooperation,” July 29, 2005.
38 Tellis, Opcit. p.25.
12
accord.”
39
The Indian leadership, while ruling out any such probability asserted that;
“there will be no capping of our strategic program, and the separation plan ensures
adequacy of fissile material and other inputs to meet the current and future requirements
of our strategic program, based on our assessment of the threat scenarios. No constraint
has been placed on our right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes.”
40
Michael
Krepon, a leading critic of the agreement quipped: “it’s a sweetheart deal for India… The
Administration told Congress that
the agreement would be about the growth of India’s electricity and not the growth of
Indian bomb making potential and that standard clearly has not been met.”
41
Implications on South Asian Security Environment
The Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement if implemented without checking
India’s potential to increase its fissile stocks and eliminating any possibility by India of
improving its nuclear weapons could lead to arms competition in the region involving
Pakistan, India and China, thus destabilizing the entire region. US objective of making
India global or at least a regional military power to achieve its own perceived interests
could also impinge upon security interests of other countries. It could force major
stakeholders to re-evaluate their security interests in the face of emerging Indo-US
strategic partnership thus triggering transformation of regional alliance structures, where
India is seen decisively shifting towards the United States and Pakistan being compelled
to explore options that could best serve its security interests independent of the United
States.
Regional Instability
The nuclear cooperation agreement once implemented would enable India to make
quantitative and qualitative improvement in its nuclear arsenal. The assurance for
39 Ashley Tellis, “The US-India ‘Global Partnership’: Legislative Options”, Prepared Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, May 11, 2006,
p.5.
40 Prime Minister’s Statement on Implementation of India’s Separation Plan, March 07, 2006 New Delhi. <www.hindu.com/thehindu/nic/pmspeech.htm>
41 “US Critics Slam Indo-US Deal”, Indian Express, March 3, 2006. <www.expresindia.com>
13
perpetual nuclear fuel supply from the US would free India’s indigenous uranium
reserves to be exclusively used for making more number of nuclear weapons. India has
agreed to allow monitoring of 14 nuclear reactors to ensure nuclear fuel at these sites is
not used for weapons, eight other reactors and an unlimited number of future reactors
would continue to produce fissile material for producing NWs, free of any international
controls. It was reasserted by PM Singh during his address to the Indian Parliament on
March 7, once he said; “there will be no capping of our strategic program, and the
separation plan ensures adequacy of fissile material and other inputs to meet the current
and future requirements of our strategic program, based on our assessment of the threat
scenarios. No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new facilities for
strategic purposes.”
42
The March 2, separation plan would allow India to increase its
production from the estimated 6 to 10 additional nuclear bombs per year to several dozen
per year. India today has enough separated plutonium for 75 to 110 nuclear weapons.
43
A
former senior Indian intelligence official reaffirmed this once he said; “the assurance of
nuclear fuel supply from the US and the NSG would free India’s existing capacity to
produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for its nuclear weapons
program…Under the deal, India shall…. have the capability to produce 50 warheads a
year.”
44
The US Administration officials and the proponents of the deal, however, do not agree
with this assertion and argue that India is self sufficient in uranium reserves and if India
wanted to increase its fissile stocks, it could have done so - with or without the nuclear
deal. According to Mr Tellis, “India has sufficient reserves to sustain the largest nuclear
weapons program that can be envisaged…possesses enough uranium to sustain more
than three times its current and planned capacity as far as nuclear power production is
concerned…this basic reality will not be altered whether Bush-Singh nuclear cooperation
initiative now being reviewed by the US Congress is successfully consummated or not.”
45
He has also termed the proliferation concern that US supplied fuel would free up India’s
42 “Prime Minister’s Suo Motu Statement on Discussions on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the US: Implementation of India’s Separation Plan”, March 7,
2006, The Hindu. <www.thehindu.com/thehindu/nic/pmspeech.htm.>
43 Joseph Cirincione, “Nuclear Cave In”, CEIP, March 02, 2006
44 “India Can Make 50 Nuclear Warheads A Year”, The Hindu, June 19, 2006. <www.thehindu.com/2006/06/19/stories/2006061904331200.htm>
45 Tellis,Op cit p.7.
14
indigenous reserves purely for producing nuclear weapons, as a fungibility thesis, as
India possesses requisite uranium reserves to build as many weapons as it might
realistically desire.
46
Contrary to what the Administration officials and the proponents of the deal argue, the
2005-06 report by India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) on its official website,
states; “we [India] have rather meager reserves of uranium…. On the other hand, the
energy demands are fast growing. With our modest uranium reserves…”
47
India’s
national magazine ‘Frontline’ in its last Dec-Jan issue also acknowledged the fact that
India’s nuclear program is heading for a crisis, due to uranium shortage in the country.
48
Gen (Retd) V P Malik, India’s former Army Chief writes; “Those who are of the view
that India has enough fissile material tend to include the 1,000 tons of reactor grade
Plutonium that India has obtained as a by-product from its nuclear power reactors.
According to many scientists, this Plutonium is not suitable for nuclear warheads as it is
of low quality. It does not produce consistently predictable fission and is relatively more
prone to accidents.”
49
Henry Sokolski, a leading nuclear expert wrote; “India currently
produces 300 tons of uranium annually – just enough to run its current fleet of heavy
water power reactors. The additional 150 tons it needs annually to fuel its military
facilities is being drawn from a pre-existing stockpile that’s due to peter out in next 12
months.”
50
India’s insistence on keeping large part of its nuclear facilities outside the inspection
regime, insistence on US assurances for perpetual fuel supplies for civilian facilities even
if it violates part of the agreement, and India’s reluctance to declare unilateral
moratorium on fissile material production clearly indicate India’s intention of increasing
its nuclear weapons stockpile. This could make other nuclear weapons states in the region
uncomfortable. As Senator Sam Nunn wrote in his article; “there is every reason to
46 Ibid. p.9.
47 “Shaping the Third Stage of India Nuclear Power Plant”, Department of Energy, Government of India. p.1-2. <www.dae.gov.in/publ/3rdstage.pdf
48 “Nuclear Power: Uranium Crisis”, Frontline, Volume 22, Issue 27, Dec 31- Jan 13, 2006. p.1. <www.flonnet.com/f12227/stories/>
49 Gen. (Retd) V P Malik & Brig. (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, “Indo-US N-Deal: Overcoming The Last Hurdle”, Observer Research Foundation India. p.2.
<www.observerindia.com/analysis/A576.htm.
50 Henry Sokolski, “Unconditionally Bad”, June 26, 2006. <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q>
15
suspect that Pakistan and China will react to this deal by ratcheting up their own
suspicions and nuclear activities – including making additional weapons material and
weapons.”
51
The nuclear cooperation agreement could also help India to make qualitative
improvement in its nuclear weapons program. As one of the supporter of the nuclear deal
agree that; “access to new reactor technology from abroad promises to give India’s
nuclear engineers exposure to new advanced designs that maximize efficiency, output,
and safety and which could in principle be applicable to future designs developed by
India’s own indigenous nuclear industry overtime.”
52
This could lead to intangible
proliferation of nuclear technology. Indian scientists would be given access to advanced
technologies, which could then be misused for making qualitative improvement in
nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. India has a past record in which it received
nuclear and space technology for peaceful purposes but misused it for making NWs and
their delivery systems. As Gary Milhollin in his testimony stated: “India, in fact, is the
first country to develop long range nuclear missile from a civilian space program. India’s
Agni missile tested in 1989, was built by using the design of the American ‘Scout’ space
rocket. India imported the blue prints from NASA under the cover of peaceful space
cooperation.”
53
Some of the nuclear experts believe that if India indeed decides to make
qualitative improvement in its nuclear arsenal, it would require testing of the new
designs. As part of nuclear cooperation agreement, India has made no binding
commitment that prohibits nuclear testing. On the contrary a pledge to supply nuclear
fuel in perpetuity, even if the agreement is revoked because of some reason, provides an
option to India to test new designs in the future if it needs validation. India’s continued
resistance to sign CTBT indicates that India would like to keep the option of nuclear
testing open, and would not succumb to US pressures as part of the new nuclear order.
51 Sam Nunn, “Nuclear Pig in a Poke”, May 24, 2006, The Wall Street Journal. <http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB114843258760661354.html>
52 Tellis, “Atoms for War?” Op Cit . p.51
53 Gary Milhollin, Testimony before Committee on Foreign Relations, April 26, 2006. p.7.
16
Regional Realignments
Pakistan always had an Indo-specific linear threat perception. This simplistic linearity
which identifies security and national interest mainly as response to an external threat,
which in turn is viewed mostly as Indo-specific, influences the strategic thinking within
Pakistan.
54
Pakistan’s linear approach towards India stems from the outstanding territorial
disputes and from the fact that both India and Pakistan have fought number of wars and
experienced a series of crises. The first military conflict in 1948 between the two
countries exposed Pakistan’s military fragility and activated Indian threat to its territorial
integrity.
India’s military superiority as a result of uneven distribution of military resources at the
time of partition, forced Pakistan’s security planners to look towards extra regional
powers. In the 1950’s, intensifying US-Soviet rivalry provided Pakistan with the leverage
it needed to pursue its inclusionary doctrine of involving outside powers in the region to
safeguard its own security interests. Pakistan quickly linked itself with US strategic
planning in the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1954), the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (1954), and then the Baghdad Pact (1955- later the Central Treaty
Organization), and a bilateral Agreement of Cooperation (1959).
55
According to 1959
executive agreement; “United States would regard, preservation of Pakistan’s
independence and integrity as vital to its own national interest and to the World peace,
and in case of aggression against Pakistan, the US would take such appropriate action,
including the use of armed force, as may be mutually agreed upon.”
56
Pakistan’s inclusionary doctrine, aimed at involving one of the two super powers during
the Cold War enabled it to safeguard its security interests in the region, but in return had
to pay heavy price of playing a frontline role in the decade long Afghan war and in the
ongoing war against terrorism. Acknowledging Pakistan’s crucial role in safeguarding
54 Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, “Pakistan's Security: Problems of Linearity”, South Asian Journal, October-December, 2004, No.6. <http://www.southasianmedia.net>.
See also Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, “Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Build up, 1979-99: In Search of a Policy”, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications,2003).
55 Devin T. Hagerty, “The Development of American Defense Policy Toward Pakistan, 1947-1954”, Fletcher Forum, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1986), pp. 217-242.
56 “Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan”, United States Treaties and Other
International Agreements, Vol. 10, Part 1, 1959 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1960), pp. 317-319.
17
US interests in the region, Gary Milhollin in his testimony stated; “under any calculation
of America’s strategic relations, Pakistan ranks higher than India. Pakistan is essential to
our ongoing military and political efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan is also essential to our
campaign against Al Qaeda…Pakistan is also a leading power in Muslim world; a world
with which United States needs better relations…In any competition for strategic favor
from the United States, India finishes a distant third [Israel being the second most
important country]”.
57
Pakistan’s commitment to help US achieve its objectives in the region at the perils of its
own security was based on the premise that in return US would ensure safeguarding
Pakistan’s security interests in the region. The Indo-US strategic cooperation aimed at
making India a global military power while according a symbolic status of a major non-
Nato ally refutes any such presumption by Pakistan. This could impact strategic thinking
within Pakistan thus forcing it to re-evaluate its strategic priorities and work on the
contingencies in which US and India would be close military and political partners
against future potential adversaries. Other regional powers including China and Russia
are also conscious of the changing strategic environment. Nato’s incursions in the
Eurasian heartland, India’s growing interest in the Central Asian energy reserves are
some of the factors that could ultimately trigger transformation of regional security
alliance. In this backdrop recently concluded meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) at Beijing drew unprecedented response from the member countries.
India’s decision to maintain a distance from the SCO was another interesting
development that could be interpreted as ‘crystalization’ of future alliances’ structure in
the region. The primary objective of the SCO is to enhance economic cooperation
amongst the member countries on the pattern of ASEAN (Association of South East
Asian Nations). However, it does not restrict member countries to enter into a security
alliance in future, if their common interests are threatened by other regional aspirants
with or without external assistance.
57 Milhollin, Opcit. p.4.
18
Pakistan, in the last few years has been trying to alter its country centric approach and has
adopted a more pragmatic foreign policy, involving reorientation of its relations with its
regional neighbors including Russia. In a recent interview to Russian news agency Itar-
Tass, President Musharraf highlighted Russia’s significance in the region and said;
“Moscow enjoyed influence in Central Asia, a region with which Pakistan had historical
and cultural bonds….There is a mutuality of interest in this region between Russia and
Pakistan. He referred to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a grouping of
Russia, China and Central Asian countries….[where] Pakistan is looking forward to
getting full SCO membership, and on Pak-Russian defense cooperation, the President
added that Pakistan was interested in purchases from Russia and advocated that this area
should also not have an Indo-centric approach.”
58
While it may be premature to assume that SCO or some other security arrangement could
emerge as a counter balance to the Indo-US strategic partnership in the near future and
Pakistan would in fact be able to de-link itself from the US. However, Pakistan’s primary
security objective has always been to ensure Pakistan’s territorial integrity against an
existential threat from its large eastern neighbor. If this threat is compounded because of
the Indo-US strategic partnership and becomes difficult to manage, Pakistan could be
compelled to exercise all available options including a possible strategic alliance with
other big powers such as Russia and China.
Pakistan’s Likely Response
Pakistan has so far adopted a cautious approach and seems not to be in a panic mode. It
will most likely follow the policy of ‘wait and see’ before making adjustments in its
minimum deterrent posture. Some of the factors that could affect Pakistan’s strategic
thinking are; first, the final outcome of the deal, how would it shape India’s NWs
potential. Second; the likely conventional imbalance as a result of 2005 Indo-US Defense
Cooperation Agreement, and finally; the future of India-Pakistan peace process.
58 “Ties with Russia must not be Indo-centric: Musharraf sees mutuality of interest”, DAWN, June 08, 2006. <www.DAWN.com>
19
If India-US civil nuclear deal facilitates qualitative and/ or quantitative improvement in
India’s nuclear weapons capability, Pakistan would take definite remedial measures to
ensure credibility of it’s minimum nuclear deterrent. While describing Pakistan’s nuclear
policy, President Musharraf earlier stated; “Pakistan pursues the strategy of credible
deterrence in both conventional and unconventional fields in accordance with the threat
it may perceive. Pakistan, he said, has quantified the strategy of minimum defensive
deterrence and is refining its deterrence level of force…whenever an imbalance is
created in the region; Pakistan has to balance it out in accordance with its strategy of
minimum deterrence.”
59
While reacting specifically to the nuclear deal, Pakistan’s
National Command Authority (NCA), an apex strategic decision making body expressed
satisfaction at the current state of Pakistan’s strategic deterrence, noting that the strategic
capability was sufficient to meet current and future challenges. However, it noted with
concern the implications of India-US nuclear deal on strategic stability in South
Asia…the NCA expressed firm resolve that a credible minimum deterrence requirement
will be met.
60
The second factor that could impact Pakistan’s strategic thinking is the growing
conventional imbalance between India and Pakistan. The Indo-US Defense Agreement of
2005, once implemented, would enable India to acquire state-of-art advanced fighter jets
with possible transfer of technology besides other high tech conventional military
equipment. The resultant conventional military imbalance could force Pakistan to either
increase its defense expenditures in order to maintain rough conventional parity between
the two countries, or increase its reliance on nuclear deterrent, which could lead to
nuclear instability in the region. Another significant component of India-US growing
defense cooperation is the US offer of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System to India.
Despite futility of such a system in the India-Pakistan context, mainly due to
geographical congruity and very little reaction time, deployment of BMD could only
force Pakistan to re-evaluate its minimum deterrent posture.
59 Addressing Foreign Correspondents Association of Philippines, News Summary Associated Press Pakistan, April 21, 2005.
60 Dawn April 13, 2006. <www.dawn.com.pk/2006/04/13/top5.htm>
20
The third factor that could affect strategic thinking on both sides is the future of on going
India-Pakistan peace process. Despite repeated assertions by both sides that the peace
process is “irreversible”, there has been no forward movement on the core issues. Unless
the major disputes are not addressed, the nuclear equation between the two adversaries
cannot be de-hyphenated.
China Factor
China is an important part of the South Asian regional security complex.
61
Importance of
China in the Indian strategic calculus provides an ostensible reason for India to acquire
nuclear weapons.
62
China factor also helps diverting possible western cynicism on India’s
huge military expenditure that is primarily aimed at enhancing India’s military stature
rather than stemming from any genuine security concern and this was also reflected in
PM Vajpaee’s statement soon after the 1998 nuclear tests, once he said; “India had
become the sixth nuclear weapon state and should be treated as such by the other five.”
63
The official justification however, was that the regional security environment had
deteriorated because of Pakistan and China’s increasing military cooperation. I.K. Gujral,
India’s former Prime Minister refuted this claim and in fact blamed the BJP government
for pushing the country into nuclear arms race for purely political reasons as according to
him “there was no [external] security threat when he left the office of the Prime
Minister”.
64
Some of the Indian security analysts however seem obsessed with the
Chinese military threat in an effort to project India as an equivalent or a potential military
adversary to China. They believe that India should – “create precisely the kind of
dilemmas for China that Beijing has created for it… by arming Vietnam with strategic
weapons, establishing a naval presence in Cam Ranh Bay and elsewhere in South East
Asia, to match China’s ensconsed military positions in Myanmar as also in Gawadar in
Pakistan’s Makran Coast, cooperating with Taiwan in the nuclear and missile fields, and
61 The term has been more elaborately explained by Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver in their book “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security”,
(London: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
62 Abraham, Opcit. p.2.
63 Kamal Matinuddin, “The Nuclearization of South Asia”, (Karachi: Oxford, 2002), p. 124
64 Outlook, New Delhi, 8 June 1998, p.8
21
coordinating its activities in Washington with those of Taiwan lobby.”
65
The exploitation
of Chinese military threat helps India to create an illusion in the west especially in the US
that if helped in its pursuit of becoming a great regional/ global power, India could in fact
become a counter weight to China. Such an assumption is a self serving piffle. According
to Gary Milhollin, “India-as-counterweight-to-China theory reminds one of the argument
made by the first Bush administration in the 1980’s, when it contended that the United
States should export sensitive dual use equipment to Saddam Hussein in order to build up
Iraq as counterweight to Iran. US pilots were later killed in Iraq trying to bomb things
that US companies had provided.”
66
A brief analysis of Indo-China capabilities would rule out any possibility of India
becoming a potential challenger to China’s military capability in the foreseeable future,
and before making such an assumption it would be prudent to answer some of the
questions; First, what is the time period required to develop India’s military capability
vis-à-vis China, and what would be China’s military potential by that time? Second, why
would India increase its neighborhood troubles that are already unmanageable by
confronting militarily? And finally, why should India play a protector of US interests in
the region at the cost of its own security and economic growth? Ashley Tellis while
asserting India’s independent foreign policy objectives, in his testimony to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee said; “a strengthened bilateral relationship does not imply
that India will become a treaty bound ally of the United States at some time in the future.
It also does not imply that India will become a meek, compliant and uncritical
collaborator of the United States in all its global endeavors. Rather India’s large size, its
proud history, and its great ambitions, ensure that it will always pursue its
own interests – just like any other great power.”
67
65 See Introduction, Bharat Karnad, “Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy,” (MacMilan India Limited: New Delhi), p.xiii.
66 Gary Milhollin, Director Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School, testifying before the
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, April 26, 2006, p.5.
67 Ashley Tellis,“US-India Atomic Energy Cooperation: Strategic and Nonproliferation Implications”, Prepared Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, April 26, 2006, p.7.
22
Way Forward
The nuclear cooperation agreement requires United States to amend its own domestic
laws that were formulated as a result of India’s misuse of civil nuclear technology and
exploding a nuclear device in 1974. US has also taken upon it to convince members of
the nuclear suppliers group (NSG) for making India-specific exceptions, to benefit India
from civil nuclear technology. Such preferential treatment for a singular country aimed at
building strategic partnership does provide opportunity for the US to demand a degree of
reciprocity and responsibility by India. If the agreement is not aimed at enhancing India’s
NWs capability then US must insist on some tangible commitments that could restrict
India from making any qualitative and quantitative improvements in its nuclear arsenal.
US also needs to explore options that could bring India and Pakistan under non-
proliferation obligations in order to exclude any future possibility of proliferation of
nuclear technology from these two NPT outliers to the NNWS and at the same time
enabling both to benefit from the exchange of peaceful nuclear technology.
Regional Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty
A proposal to freeze production of fissile material was first made by the US President
George Bush on May 29, 1991, as part of a comprehensive initiative on arms control in
the Middle East.
68
But due to dissenting positions by some of the member states at the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) Geneva, a consensus agreement on Fissile Material
Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) has not been reached so far.
According to the July 18 Joint Statement both India and the US committed to work
towards conclusion of a “multilateral fissile material cut off treaty” but India has so far
refused to make any unilateral concessions as part of the deal for which the US
Administration has come under severe criticism. In order to deflect growing cynism, the
68 Shai Feldman, “Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in Middle East”, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p.167.
23
administration forwarded a draft treaty bill at the CD on May 18, 2006,
69
which appeared
to be more of a damage control exercise rather than any sincere effort towards restricting
India’s potential of increasing its fissile material.
Following the announcement of the nuclear cooperation agreement the international
community has been repeatedly demanding from the US to take steps that could limit
fissile material growth in Southern Asia, which otherwise could spiral out of control as a
result of India’s reluctance to freeze its fissile material increase, and could possibly lead
to nuclear arms competition in the region. In this regard one of the options being
propagated by the non-proliferation community is to have a regional fissile material
control arrangement involving China, India and Pakistan pending formal negotiations at
the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
70
It however would remain a debatable preposition
as China would not like itself to be equated with South Asian neighbors in terms of its
nuclear capability, while US remains outside of any obligations. Another option that
appears to be more balanced in its approach is to deal with FMCT impasse outside the
CD, and amongst the seven declared nuclear weapons states including Pakistan and India.
This (5+2)
71
approach as a transitory solution could have better chances of a success as it
would reduce unwarranted clutter by countries that in any way do not produce fissile
material for nuclear weapons. However, the key differences between major countries that
have so far stalled FMCT negotiations at the CD, would still need to be addressed in
between the major stake holders before any progress on a limited (5+2) FMCT could be
made.
Regional Non-Proliferation Regime (RNR)
One of the projected advantages of the Indo-US nuclear cooperation is integration of
India into mainstream non-proliferation regime. If the advantage is significant enough
entailing exceptional treatment for India then the inclusion of other two outliers Israel
69 Acknowledgement by Department of State Spokesperson Sean McCormack on May 18, 2006, in Wade Bose “US Unveils Draft Fissile Material Treaty”, Arms
Control Today, June 2006. <www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/FissileTreaty.asp?print>
70 Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association, Prepared Testimony for House International Committee, May 11, 2006. p.6.
71 A more workable solution proposed by Micheal Krepon of Stimson Center and Daryl Kimball of Arms Control Association.
24
and Pakistan becomes more logical to make non-proliferation regime more
comprehensive and universal. As DG IAEA in his recent article wrote; “However
fervently we might wish it, none of these three [Israel, India and Pakistan] is likely to
give up its nuclear weapons or the nuclear weapons option outside of a global or regional
arms control framework. Our traditional strategy – of treating such states as outsiders – is
no longer a realistic method of bringing these last few countries into the fold”
72
India and Pakistan cannot join the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and it would be
unrealistic to expect that either of the two would give up their nuclear weapons capability
for any moralistic reasons. At the same time there is a need to integrate Pakistan and
India into mainstream non-proliferation regime, and put both India and Pakistan under
some kind of treaty obligations, which could make them responsible NWS and preclude
any possibility of nuclear proliferation.
To achieve global non-proliferation objectives, the idea of a Regional Non-Proliferation
Regime (RNR) could be explored, which could involve India, Pakistan, and possibly US
and China as guarantors. It is compartmentalization of the problem to deal with the two
non-NPT members, which cannot be resolved without restructuring of the NPT, or both
sides giving up their NWs. Involvement of China and the US in a RNR could ensure that
the nuclear technology provided by these two or other members of the NSG is not
misused for any other purpose. The arrangement though seems complex and difficult to
negotiate but has the potential to address the problem of at least two of the three outliers.
If optimism prevails, similar arrangement could then be extended to the third outlier
Israel, which would make non-proliferation regime universal and more comprehensive.
Learning from the past experiences, RNR shall not have the utopian goals of nuclear
disarmament, which is unlikely to work unless other NWS make sincere efforts towards
global nuclear disarmament. A linkage could however be made between RNR and NPT,
adding an obligation to the members of the RNR to work towards larger objectives of the
NPT. The non-proliferation area is one where both India and Pakistan could have
72 Mohammad ElBaradei, “Rethinking Nuclear Safeguards”, June 14, 2006. <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/13/AR2006061301498_p
25
common interests
73
, as proliferation of nuclear technology to other regional countries
would not be in their collective security interests.
Conclusion
The intense debate following the Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement is reminiscent
of the 1998 debate on the South Asia NWs tests, once India and Pakistan became overt
NWS. The ongoing debate on the implications of the nuclear deal would continue to draw
cynicism, if the proliferation concerns of the international community are not addressed
through transparent actions of the parties involved. The deal if remain unchecked could
once again destabilize the South Asian region having long term implications and lead to
possible transformation of intra and inter regional alliance structures. The nuclear
agreement has also highlighted the need to integrate the NPT outliers into mainstream
non-proliferation regime through innovative approaches such as RNR that could ensure
that non-NPT NWS do not export nuclear technology to other NNWS and in return are
benefited from peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
73 Maj Gen (Retd) Mahmud Durrani, “Areas of Nuclear Cooperation”, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)Conference, Jan 5-6, 2006.
