1167
AMENDMENT 1—RELIGION, FREE SPEECH, ETC.
94
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Madison School District
v. WERC, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974), a divided Court permitted the city to sell commercial advertising space on
the walls of its rapid transit cars but to refuse to sell political advertising space.
95
E.g., the governmental interest in safety and convenience of persons using
public forum, Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981); the interest in preser-
vation of a learning atmosphere in school, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 115 (1972); and the interest in protecting traffic and pedestrian safety in the
streets, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554–55 (1965); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290, 293–94 (1951); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939).
96
Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640, 654–55 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
PSC, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
97
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798, 800 (1989).
98
Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (ordinance void which barred
all picketing around school building except labor picketing); Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455 (1980) (same); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (college rule permit-
ting access to all student organizations except religious groups); Niemotko v. Mary-
land, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (permission to use parks for some groups but not for oth-
ers). These principles apply only to the traditional public forum and to the govern-
mentally created ‘‘limited public forum.’’ Government may, without creating a lim-
ited public forum, place ‘‘reasonable’’ restrictions on access to nonpublic areas. See,
e.g. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983) (use
of school mail system); and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (charitable solicitation of federal employees at work-
place). See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (city may
sell commercial advertising space on the walls of its rapid transit cars but refuse
to sell political advertising space).
99
E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 164 (1939); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Poulos v. New Hamp-
shire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321–25 (1958);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555–58 (1965); Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
mingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–53 (1969). Justice Stewart for the Court described
these and other cases as ‘‘holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license without narrow, objective, and defi-
nite standards to guide the licensing authority is unconstitutional.’’ Id. at 150–51.
of speech,
94
must serve a significant governmental interest,
95
and
must leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information.
96
A recent formulation is that a time, place, or
manner regulation ‘‘must be narrowly tailored to serve the govern-
ment’s legitimate content-neutral interests, but . . . need not be
the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means of doing so.’’ All that
is required is that ‘‘the means chosen are not substantially broader
than necessary to achieve the government’s interest.’’
97
Corollary
to the rule forbidding regulation premised on content is the prin-
ciple, a merging of free expression and equal protection standards,
that government may not discriminate between different kinds of
messages in affording access.
98
In order to ensure against covert
forms of discrimination against expression and between different
kinds of content, the Court has insisted that licensing systems be
constructed as free as possible of the opportunity for arbitrary ad-
ministration.
99
The Court has also applied its general strictures