The most significant constitutional problem is presented by MCL 691.1807(8), the
anticipatory search warrant provision in the ERPO Act, and MCR 3.718(C), the rule
adopted today to implement it. MCL 691.1807(8) provides that if a court issues an extreme
risk protection order and orders the firearms immediately surrendered, the court
shall also issue an anticipatory search warrant, subject to and contingent on
the failure or refusal of the restrained individual, following the service of the
order, to immediately comply with the order and immediately surrender to a
law enforcement officer any firearm or concealed pistol license in the
individual’s possession or control, authorizing a law enforcement agency to
search the location or locations where the firearm, or firearms, or concealed
pistol license is believed to be and to seize any firearm or concealed pistol
license discovered during the search in compliance with 1966 PA 189, MCL
780.651 to 780.659.
Because this provision does not mention probable cause, it may be read as requiring
issuance of an anticipatory search warrant even without a probable cause determination.
However, although the provision was clumsily drafted, a better reading of it—and one that
would avoid any constitutional infirmities—is that a search warrant may only be issued “in
compliance with” our state’s laws governing the issuance of search warrants, i.e., “1966
PA 189, MCL 780.651 to 780.659.”
1
The rule adopted today appears to follow this view.
See MCR 3.718(C) (“If the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe the location or
locations to be searched are places where the firearm(s) or concealed pistol license is
believed to be, the court must issue the anticipatory search warrant.”).
However, while MCL 691.1807(8) may not be facially unconstitutional, it does not
adequately spell out the additional probable cause findings required for anticipatory search
warrants, as distinct from ordinary, run-of-the-mill search warrants. An “anticipatory
search warrant” is “a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some
future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a specified
place.” LaFave, 2 Search & Seizure (6th ed), § 3.7(c). In United States v Grubbs, 547 US
90, 96-97 (2006), the Supreme Court held that anticipatory search warrants are not
categorically unconstitutional. However, the Court held that they are only permissible if
the issuing court makes two specific findings of probable cause: “It must be true not only
that if the triggering condition occurs ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
1
In other words, MCL 691.1807(8) should be read so that the phrase requiring compliance
with 1966 PA 189 governs the issuance of an anticipatory search warrant, not just the latter
phrase in which it appears regarding the authority of a law enforcement agency to conduct
a search. The Legislature appears to have omitted a comma before the word “in,” which
would have made this interpretation flow more naturally. This reading is supported by the
fact that the other two times 1966 PA 189 is mentioned in the act, it is mentioned in
connection with the issuance of a search warrant. See MCL 600.1810(4) and (5).