Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

UNIDIR/95/30

UNIDIR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Geneva

Disarmament and

Conflict Resolution Project

Managing Arms in Peace Processes:

Somalia

Paper: Clement Adibe

Questionnaire Analysis: LTCol J.W. Potgieter,

Military Expert DCR Project

Project funded by: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, The Winston Foundation,

the Ploughshares Fund, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; and the governments of

Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, Finland, France, Austria, the

Republic of Malta, the Republic of Argentina, and the Republic of South Africa.

UNITED NATIONS

New York and Geneva, 1995

NOTE

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this

publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of

the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country,

territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its

frontiers or boundaries.

* *

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not

necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat.

UNIDIR/95/30

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

Sales No. GV.E.95.0.20

ISBN 92-9045-106-8

iii

Table of Contents

Page

Preface - Sverre Lodgaard ..................................... vii

Acknowledgements ...........................................ix

Project Introduction - Virginia Gamba ............................xi

Part I: Case Study ..................................... 1

Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................... 3

1.1 Background: The People, Government

and Politics of Somalia .............................. 4

1.2 The Origins and Character

of Somalia's Political Crisis .......................... 5

1.3 From Crisis to Conflict: The Principal Actors

in the Struggle for Power ........................... 10

Chapter 2: The Evolution of International Responses

to the Somali Conflict: Regional and

International Dimensions .......................... 19

2.1 The Emergence of a Consensus on an International

Emergency Relief Plan for Somalia ................... 25

Chapter 3: The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia ......... 31

3.1 Phase I: The First United Nations Observer Mission

in Somalia (UNOSOM I) ........................... 39

3.2 Phase II: "Option 4", The United States,

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and

"Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia ................. 48

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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The Problem of Transition from UNITAF:

Differing Perspectives from the UN Secretariat

and the United States Government ................ 60

3.3 Phase III: The Second United Nations Operation

in Somalia (UNOSOM II) ........................... 61

Chapter 4: The Task of Implementing the Disarmament

Mandate in Somalia .............................. 69

4.1 Disarmament as a Mission Task in Somalia ............. 70

4.2 The Evolution of an Overall Concept and Plan

of Disarmament in Somalia.......................... 72

4.3 The New Four-Stage Concept of Disarmament .......... 88

4.4 The Consequences of Implementing the New Cost

Saving Concept of Disarmament

in Conditions of Anarchy ........................... 91

4.5 The 5 June 1993 Attack on UNOSOM II

Inventory Team................................... 93

4.6 The 3 October 1993 Attack on UNOSOM II

and its Aftermath.................................. 98

Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion ........................ 101

Biographical Note .......................................... 111

Part II Bibliography ................................. 113

Part III Questionnaire Analysis ........................ 133

Analysis Report: Somalia .......................... 135

Table of Contents

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List of Tables

1.1 The Military Capability of Somalia, 1990 ................... 7

1.2 Principal Actors and Their Role in the Current

Somali Conflict ...................................... 10

3.1 UN Intervention in Somalia: A Chronology of Major Events,

1991-95 ............................................ 31

3.2 Composition of UNITAF as at 7 January 1993 .............. 56

3.3 Composition of UNOSOM II as at 30 April 1993 ............ 65

3.4 Composition of UNOSOM II as at November 1993 .......... 67

4.1 Comparative Statistics of Arms Deliveries to the States

of the Horn and Three Leading Arms Importers

in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1972-1990 (in US $) ................ 71

4.2 The Rules of Engagement for US-UNITAF ................ 75

4.3 The Rules of Engagement for UNOSOM II ................ 84

List of Maps

Somalia ........................................... 129

UNOSOM II Deployment as of September 1993 ........... 130

UNOSOM II Deployment as of September 1994 ........... 131

Document A/C.1/47/7, No 31, 23 October 1992.

Document 50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995.

vii

Preface

Under the headline of Collective Security, UNIDIR is conducting a major

project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR). The project examines the

utility and modalities of disarming warring parties as an element of efforts to

resolve intra-state conflicts. It collects field experiences regarding the

demobilization and disarmament of warring factions; reviews 11 collective

security actions where disarmament has been attempted; and examines the role

that disarmament of belligerents can play in the management and resolution of

internal conflicts. The 11 cases are UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNOSOM and

UNITAF (Somalia), UNAVEM (Angola), UNTAC (Cambodia), ONUSAL

(Salvador), ONUCA (Central America), UNTAG (Namibia), UNOMOZ

(Mozambique), Liberia, Haiti and the 1979 Commonwealth operation in Rhodesia.

Being an autonomous institute charged with the task of undertaking

independent, applied research, UNIDIR keeps a certain distance from political

actors of all kinds. The impact of our publications is predicated on the

independence with which we are seen to conduct our research. At the same time,

being a research institute within the framework of the United Nations, UNIDIR

naturally relates its work to the needs of the Organization. Inspired by the

Secretary General's report on "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and

Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era",

the DCR Project also relates to a great

many governments involved in peace operations through the UN or under regional

auspices. Last not least, comprehensive networks of communication and co-

operation have been developed with UN personnel having field experience.

Weapons-wise, the disarmament of warring parties is mostly a matter of light

weapons. These weapons account for as much as 90% of the casualties in many

armed conflicts. UNIDIR recently published a paper on this subject (Small Arms

and Intra-State Conflicts, UNIDIR Paper No 34, 1995). The Secretary General's

appeal for stronger efforts to control small arms - to promote "micro

disarmament"

- is one which UNIDIR will continue to attend to in the framework

of the DCR Project.

To examine the peace operations where disarmament has been attempted, we

invited scholars from the regions of conflict. This Report on the peace operations

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in Somalia (UNOSOM, UNITAF) was written by Dr. Clement Adibe while

staying at UNIDIR in the winter/spring of 1995. It has been reviewed by Astrid

Arland (the Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Oslo), Steven John Stedman

(Johns Hopkins University, Washington) and by the project staff. It is the first in

a series of UNIDIR Reports on the disarmament dimension of peace operations.

There will be a Report on all of the cases mentioned above.

The authors of the case studies have drawn on the professional advice and

assistance of military officers intimately acquainted with peace operations. They

were Col. Roberto Bendini (Argentina), Lt. Col. Ilkka Tiihonen (Finland) and Lt.

Col. Jakkie Potgieter (South Africa). This Report also benefitted from a number

of briefings by military officers who worked in Somalia, among them Col. Cecil

Bailey (USA) and Gen. Bruno Loi (Italy). UNIDIR is grateful to all of them for

their invaluable contributions to clarifying and solving the multitude of questions

and problems we put before them.

Since October 1994, the DCR Project has developed under the guidance of

Virginia Gamba. Under her able leadership, the project has not only become the

largest in UNIDIR history: its evolution has been a source of inspiration for the

entire Institute.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views or conclusions expressed in the Report.

They are Dr Adibe's. My final word of thanks goes to him: UNIDIR has been

happy to have such a resourceful and dedicated collaborator.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed in these

papers which are those of their authors. Nevertheless, UNIDIR considers that such

papers merit publication and recommends them to the attention of its readers.

Sverre Lodgaard

Director, UNIDIR

Acknowledgements

UNIDIR takes this opportunity to thank the many Foundations and

Governments who have supported the DCR Project. Among our contributors, the

following deserve a special mention and our deep appreciation: the Ford

Foundation; the United States Institute of Peace; the Winston Foundation; the

Ploughshares Fund; the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; and the

governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the

United States, Finland, France, Austria, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of

Argentina, and the Republic of South Africa.

James S. Sutterlin, "Military Force in the Service of Peace", Aurora Papers, No 18,

Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1993, p.13.

Project Introduction

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution

The global arena's main preoccupation during the Cold War centred on the

maintenance of international peace and stability between states. The vast network

of alliances, obligations and agreements which bound nuclear superpowers to the

global system, and the memory of the rapid internationalization of disputes into

world wars, favored the formulation of national and multinational deterrent

policies designed to maintain a stability which was often confused with

immobility. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage

in protest and to challenge recognized authority was limited.

The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxing of this pattern,

generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of

alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak

states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic

tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by

situations of violent intra-state conflicts.

Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive

movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on

human life have, in turn, generated pressure for international action.

Before and since the Cold War, the main objective of the international

community when taking action has been the maintenance and/or recovery of

stability. The main difference between then and now, however, is that then, the

main objective of global action was to maintain stability in the international

arena, whereas now it is to stabilize domestic situations. The international

community assists in stabilizing domestic situations in five different ways: by

facilitating dialogue between warring parties, by preventing a renewal of internal

armed conflict, by strengthening infrastructure, by improving local security, and

by facilitating an electoral process intended to lead to political stability

The United Nations is by no means the only organization that has been

requested by governments to undertake these tasks. However, the reputation of the

United Nations as being representative of all states and thus as being objective and

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trustworthy has been especially valued, as indicated by the greater amount of

peace operations in which it is currently engaged. Before 1991, the UN peace

operations presence enhanced not only peace but also the strengthening of

democratic processes, conciliation among population groups, the encouragement

of respect for human rights, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems. These

achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in Congo, southern Lebanon,

Nicaragua, Namibia, Salvador, and to a lesser extent in Haiti.

Nevertheless, since 1991 the United Nations has been engaged in a number of

simultaneous, larger, and more ambitious peace operations such as those in

Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Mozambique and Somalia. It has also been increasingly

pressured to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly explosions of violence,

such as the one in Rwanda in 1995. The financial, personnel, and timing pressure

on the United Nations to undertake these massive short-term stabilizing actions

has seriously impaired the UN's ability to ensure long-term national and regional

stability. The UN has necessarily shifted its focus from a supporting role, in which

it could ensure long-term national and international stability, to a role which

involves obtaining quick peace and easing humanitarian pressures immediately.

But without a focus on peace defined in terms of longer-term stability, the overall

success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-state conflict will remain in

question.

This problem is beginning to be recognized and acted upon by the international

community. More and more organizations and governments are linking success

to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict society. These

alternatives are mostly of a socio-political-economic nature, and are national

rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the final

resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the

existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatant and

non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of

internal conflict. The reason why weapons themselves are not the primary focus

of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are

viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to

disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as

well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere

existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the

reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders it harmless for the post-

conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability of weapons can, and

does, militarize societies in general. It also destabilizes regions that are affected

by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.

Project Introduction

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xiii

Fred Tanner, "Arms Control in Times of Conflict", Project on Rethinking Arms Control,

Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, PRAC Paper 7, October 1993.

There are two problems, therefore, with the international community's approach

to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the international

community, under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal conflict, has

put a higher value on peace in the short-term than on development and stability in

the long-term; and, on the other hand, those who do focus on long-term stability

have put a higher value on the societal and economic elements of development

than on the management of the primary tools of violence, i.e., weapons.

UNIDIR's DCR Project and the Control of Arms during

Peace Processes (CAPP)

The DCR Project aims to explore the predicament posed by UN peace

operations which have recently focused on short-term needs rather than long-term

stability. The Project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of

weapons during peace operations can be a tool for ensuring stability. Perhaps

more than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to

influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light,

the management and control of arms could become an important component for

the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and

deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in

post-conflict societies.

Various instruments can be used to implement weapons control. For example,

instruments which may be used to support preventive diplomacy in times of crisis

include confidence-building measures, weapons control agreements, and the

control of illegal weapons transfers across borders.

Likewise, during conflict

situations, and particularly in the early phases of a peace operation, negotiations

conducive to lasting peace can be brought about by effective monitoring and the

establishment of safe havens, humanitarian corridors, and disengagement sectors.

Finally, after the termination of armed conflict, a situation of stability is required

for post-conflict reconstruction processes to be successful. Such stability can be

facilitated by troop withdrawals, the demilitarization of border zones, and

effective disarmament, demobilization and demining.

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xiv

Nevertheless, problems within the process of controlling weapons have cropped

up at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most cases,

initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not

generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations

necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action are

often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It

could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally

different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases where peace operations have

attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to

manageable levels - even if achieved - tend to be soon devalued, since most of the

ensuing activities centre on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction

processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes

for sloppy follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in

turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential

to destabilize neighboring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted-for mass

movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the

former warring parties.

The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons has

marked peace operations since 1990. This combination poses new challenges to

the international community and highlights the fact that a lack of consistent

strategies for the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) reduces the

effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long-term

national and regional stability once peace is agreed upon.

The case studies undertaken by the DCR Project highlight a number of recurrent

problems that have impinged on the control and reduction of weapons during

peace operations. Foremost among these are problems associated with the

establishment and maintenance of a secure environment early in the mission, and

problems concerned with the lack of co-ordination of efforts among the various

groups involved in the mission. Many secondary complications would be

alleviated if these two problems areas were understood differently. The

establishment of a secure environment, for example, would make the warring

parties more likely to agree on consensual disarmament initiatives. Likewise, a

concerted effort at weapons control early in the mission would demonstrate the

international community's determination to hold the parties to their original peace

agreements and cease fire arrangements. Such a demonstration of resolve would

make it more difficult for these agreements to be broken once the peace operation

was underway.

Project Introduction

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The co-ordination problem applies both to international interactions and to the

components of the peace operation. A peace process will be more likely to

succeed if there is co-operation and co-ordination between the international effort

and the nations which immediately neighbor the striken country. But co-ordination

must not simply be present at the international level; it must permeate the entire

peace operation as well. To obtain maximum effect, relations must be co-ordinated

among and within the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian groups which

comprise a peace operation. A minimun of co-ordination must also be acheived

between intra- and inter-state mission commands, the civil and military

components at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the humanitarian aid

organizations working in the field; these components must co-operate with each

other if the mission is to reach its desired outcome. If problems with mission co-

ordination are overcome, many secondary difficulties could also be avoided,

including lack of joint management, lack of unity of effort, and lack of mission

and population protection mechanisms.

Given these considerations, the Project believes that the way to implement

peace, defined in terms of long-term stability, is to focus not just on the sources

of violence (such as social and political development issues) but also on the

material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the

implementation of peace must take into account both the future needs of a society

and the elimination of its excess weapons, and also the broader international and

regional context in which the society is situated. In this sense, weapons that are

not managed and controlled in the field will invariably flow over into neighboring

countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, the establishment of viable

stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to

intra-state conflict resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive,

systematic disarmament programme as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2)

the establishment of an arms management programme that continues into

national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of

close cooperation on weapons control and management programmes between

countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.

In order to fulfill its research mission, the DCR Project has been divided into

four phases. These are as follows: (1) the development, distribution, and

interpretation of a Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control,

Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations; (2) the

development and publication of case studies on peace operations in which

disarmament tasks constituted an important aspect of the wider mission; (3) the

organization of a series of workshops on policy issues; and (4) the publication of

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xvi

policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between the control of

arms during peace processes (CAPP) and the settlement of conflict.

Between September 1995 and March 1996, the Project foresees four sets of

publications. The first of these will involve eleven case studies, covering UN

peace operations in Somalia, Rhodesia (1979), Bosnia/Croatia, Central America

(ONUCA and ONUSAL), Cambodia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia and

Haiti. The second set of publications will include nine policy papers, addressing

topics such as Security Council Procedures, Mandate Specificity, Doctrine, Rules

of Engagement, Coercive versus Consensual Arms Control and Demobilization

Processes, Consensus, Intelligence and Media, and Training. A third set of

publications will involve three papers on the relationship between arms and

conflict in the region of Southern Africa. The last of the Project's published works

will be an overarching policy paper summarizing the conclusions of the research

and delineating recommendations based on the Project's findings.

Taking into account the existing material on some of the case studies, the DCR

project has purposefully concentrated on providing more information on the

disarmament and arms control components of the relevant international peace

operations than on providing a comprehensive political and diplomatic account of

each case.

This volume of the DCR series introduces the first of the Project's case studies,

focusing on Somalia. The case study is divided into three sections. The first

section analyzes the way in which three international peace processes (UNOSOM,

UNITAF, and UNOSOM II) struggled with the issue of controlling and managing

light weapons in Somalia so as to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance

to a famished and lawless population. The second section presents a full

bibliography of secondary and primary material used in the making of this study.

Finally, the third section provides an analysis of the responses on Somalia which

were obtained through the Project's own Practitioners' Questionnaire on

Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping

Operations.

Virginia Gamba

Project Director

Geneva, August 1995

Part I:

Case Study

Stephen P. Riley, "War and Famine in Africa", Conflict Studies, No 268, London:

Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994, p.18.

Ibid.

On the notion of "failed states," see, among others, Robert Jackson, "Why Africa's Weak

States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood", World Politics, Vol. 35, No 1, 1988,

p.1; and Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States", Foreign Policy, No

89, Winter 1992/93, p.3.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The collapse of the Somali state and the subsequent degeneration of the society

into anarchy in 1991 contrast sharply with the country's reputation among the

ancient Egyptians as the "Land of Punt, ... a fabled source of wealth and luxury far

beyond the upper reaches of the Nile..."

According to Stephen Riley, Somalia in

the late twentieth century has become "a byword for clan politics... and a symbol

of the hollow promises and contradictions of the "New World Order" in the

1990s."

How did this largely homogeneous and otherwise resourceful society

become an icon of failed states

after barely three decades of independence? The

purpose of this study is to examine in some depth the role of arms in explaining

the current Somali conflict and the difficulties of multinational intervention in

resolving this African tragedy.

This study is presented in five chapters. Chapter 1 briefly discusses the Somali

society and politics and provides the background to the conflict that ensued in

1991. Chapter 2 examines the regional and international contexts of the conflict,

focusing particularly on early efforts to bring the conflict to the attention of the

international community. Chapter 3 traces the involvement of the international

community and the United Nations through various phases. Chapter 4 focuses on

the evolution and implementation of the disarmament concept in Somalia. Chapter

5 discusses the lessons of the Somali experience for future UN involvement in

disarmament and conflict resolution.

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Nii Wallace-Bruce, "The Statehood of Somalia and the United Nations", paper presented

at the 17th Annual Conference of the Academic Council on the United Nations System, The

Hague, The Netherlands, 23-25 June 1994, p.2.

Ibid., p.4.

1.1 Background: The People, Government

and Politics of Somalia

The state of Somalia is the result of the amalgamation of two separately

administered colonies: British Somaliland in the north and Italian Somaliland in

the south. The two colonies were inhabited by ethnic Somalis who may also be

found in Djibouti (French Somaliland), Kenya's Northern Frontier District (NFD)

and in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The majority of Somalis are Sunni Muslims,

but a small proportion are Christians. Unlike many African countries, Somalis are

united by one common language: Somali. In addition to the national language,

other languages widely spoken by segments of the population include Arabic,

English and Italian.

For a brief period during World War II, the "Somali people enjoyed a temporary

and partial

UreunificationU" following Italy's occupation of Ethiopia's Ogaden

region and Italian Somaliland (i.e. Rome's Africa Orientale Italiana) in addition

to British Somaliland in August 1940.

The enforced reunification of Somalia was

subsequently reversed in March 1941 when Britain defeated Italy in the Horn.

With the signing of the Paris peace treaty between Italy and the Allied Powers in

1947, Italy formally renounced title to its African colonies, including Italian

Somaliland. However, in 1949, the United Nations General Assembly, by

Resolution 289, decided to place Italian Somaliland "under the International

trusteeship system with Italy as the Administering Authority."

In 1950 Italy

formally began to administer its former colony, now known as the United Nations

Trust Territory of Somalia (hereafter referred to as the Trust Territory), for a

transitional period of ten years. As part of measures towards Somali independence

before the expiration of that mandate, Italy organised general elections in the Trust

Territory in 1959. That election was won by the Somali Youth League (SYL),

whose leader, Seyyid Abdullah Issa, emerged as the Prime Minister. On 1 July

1960, the Trust Territory joined British Somaliland, which attained its

independence on 26 June 1960, and the Republic of Somalia was formed. At

unification, the parallel institutions of government were merged, with Mr. Aden

Abdullah Osman (formerly president of the Legislative Assembly of British

Somaliland) as president and Seyidd Issa of SYL as Prime Minister. Following his

Introduction

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For a detailed country profile of Somalia, see The Europa World Yearbook, Vol. 1, 34th

edition, London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1993, pp.2358-2368.

Nii Wallace-Bruce, "The Statehood of Somalia and the United Nations", 1994, p.9.

Ibid., p.8. See also David Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a

State, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987, p.66.

This included Somalis in Djibouti, Kenya's NFD and Ethiopia's Ogaden region. The quest

for the reunification of all Somalis would later lead to the militarization of the region and two

major inter-state wars between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964 and 1977/78.

For a comparative perspective, see A.I. Asiwaju (ed.), Partitioned Africans: Ethnic

Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984, New York: St. Martin's Press,

1985.

early resignation, Seyidd Issa was replaced as Prime Minister by Dr. Abdirashid

Ali Shermarke (also of SYL).

The signs of the problems that would seriously impact on the stability of the

new republic were present from the start. According to Nii Wallace-Bruce,

The new Republic could not disguise the stark bi-reality. It had "two different judicial

systems; different currencies; different organization and conditions for service for the

army, the police and civil servants... The governmental institutions, both at the central

and local level, were differently organized and had different powers; the systems and

rates of taxation and customs were different, and so were the educational systems."

In addition, while British Somaliland had been conditioned by the colonial

government to political representation "on the basis of clans," the Trust Territory

was not.

However, these differences notwithstanding, the Somali political elite

was united in their quest for the unification of all Somalis under one state.

1.2 The Origins and Character

of Somalia's Political Crisis

Not unlike many immediate post-colonial African governments, the first

republican government of Somalia ran into severe obstacles soon after

independence because of an intense power struggle among the political elites.

Somalia, however, the intensity of the political struggle took on an added

dimension as a result of the nationalist and irredentist policies of the post-colonial

government. Upon unification, the Shermarke government made strong territorial

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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See Saadia Touval, Boundary Politics of Independent Africa, Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1972; A.I. Asiwaju (ed.), Partitioned Africans, 1985; and Ioan M. Lewis, A

Modern History of Somalia, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988.

"International Implications of the Somali Crisis," n.n., n.d., p.3.

Ibid. See also Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa,

New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980.

claims on its neighbours, especially Kenya and Ethiopia.

British and Western

governments' opposition to such blatant irredentism may have encouraged the

Shermarke government to seek the support of the Soviet Union. In the context of

the Cold War, Moscow seized on the opportunity to establish a politico-military

foothold in the strategic Horn of Africa.

Thus began the progressive expansion of the Somali armed forces through the

massive importation of Soviet arms and equipment. Between 1964-1969 the

national security apparatus grew from 5,000 police personnel to a standing army

of 12,000 persons.

In 1964, fighting broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia

over the Ogaden district, while tension characterised Somalia's relations with its

other neighbours, Kenya and Djibouti. By 1977, when Somalia initiated the

Ogaden War with Ethiopia, the strength of the Somali national armed forces had

increased markedly to 37,000, equipped with sophisticated Soviet land, aerial and

naval conventional weapons systems.

Thereafter (until the conflict of 1992), the

Somali Armed Forces grew to become a comparatively modern fighting force with

a wide range of basic and advanced weapons systems (see Table 1.1).

Introduction

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Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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For a useful discussion of the coup d'état, see Ioan Lewis, "The Politics of the 1969

Somali Coup", The Journal of Modern African Studies, No 10, October 1972, esp. pp.397-400.

For useful insights into the dynamics of Somalia's socialist experiment, see John

Markakis and Michael Waller (eds), Military Marxist Regimes in Africa, London: Frank Cass,

1976; and Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality, London: Zed

Publishers, 1988.

Between 1976 and 1981, the URSS established extensive links with Somalia, the

Mogadishu naval base becoming one of the largest in the Indian Ocean. With this base,

simultaneous with the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975, a wide network for the

support of Soviet naval expansion and control of strategic passes was believed.

For details of Soviet influence and involvements in Somalia, see Robert G. Patman, The

Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. For insightful analysis of the embryonic crisis

in Somalia, see Osman Mohamoud, "Somalia: Crisis and Decay in an Authoritarian Regime",

Horn of Africa, Vol. 4, No 3, 1981.

"International Implications of the Somali Crisis", n.n., n.d., p.3 (emphasis added). For

further details, cf. Robin Theobold, "Patrimonialism", World Politics, No 34, 1982;

Christopher Clapham (ed.), Private Patronage and Public Power, London: Frances Pinter,

1985; Samuel N. Eisenstadt, Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism,

London: Sage Publishers, 1972; Henry Bienen (ed.), Armies and Parties in Africa, New York:

Africana Publishing Company, 1979; and Samuel Decalo, "The Morphology of Military Rule

in Africa", in John Markakis and Michael Waller (eds), Military Marxist Regimes in Africa,

On 15 October 1969, President Shermarke was assassinated in a military coup

d'état. One week later, Major-General Mohammed Siad Barre, the Commander of

the national armed forces, assumed absolute power.

Consistent with the tradition

of military regimes, General Barre decreed the suspension of the Somali

constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and in its place established an all-

military council known as the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). In 1970,

General Barre formally declared Somalia a "socialist state."

In 1976, he

dissolved the SRC and replaced it with the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party

(SRSP) as the sole political party in the country and the vanguard of the "people's

revolution." The members of the SRC became the politburo of the SRSP, with

General Barre as the Secretary-General. Backed by Moscow,

President Barre

sought to replicate the Soviet model and its entrenched patronage system of

nomenklatura in Mogadishu.

According to one study, Barre adapted the Soviet

model to suit his interests and the special conditions prevalent in Somalia. Thus,

for instance, in place of the nomenklatura, General Barre established "a

clanklatura system whereby clan relatives and other political loyalists" were

appointed "into positions of leadership, authority and power within the civil

service, armed forces, academies and institutes and social or civic associations."

Introduction

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London: Frank Cass., 1976.

The major Somali clans are Hawiye, Isaaq, Darod, Dir and Digil-Mirifle. For details, see

Ioan M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988.

See Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response", in Lori F.

Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, New York:

Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, esp. pp.209-211.

Khalif Galaydh, "Notes on the State of the Somali State", Horn of Africa, Vol. 13, Nos 1-

2, 1990, p.26. Government campaigns against the Isaaq resulted in the massive emigration of

about 400,000 Isaaqs into refugee camps in Ethiopia and Djibouti following the destruction of

their principal city, Hargeisa, which is also Somalia's second-largest city. For details, see also

Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia", 1993, pp.209-210.

Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response", 1993, p.210.

See Said Samatar, Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil, London: Minority Rights Group

Report, August 1991.

In the absence of major ethnic or religious cleavages in Somalia, Barre resorted

to manipulating the clan system as part of his overall strategy to maintain political

power despite his regime's deepening crisis of legitimation.

As challenges to his

dictatorship grew stronger, especially after Somalia's defeat by Ethiopia in 1978,

General Barre resorted to a "divide and rule" strategy which, by the late 1980s,

had resulted in several state-orchestrated mass murderings of elites belonging to

opposing clans.

In one such incident involving the massacre of Isaaq

professionals in Jasiira Beach in 1989, Khalif Galaydh recounts that "at least forty-

seven individuals, taken out of their homes in the middle of the night, [were]

confirmed to have been shot in cold blood and put in a mass grave."

According

to Jeffrey Clark, many more thousand Isaaqs who were fleeing the government

crack-down were strafed by Siad Barre's air force.

This heightened level of

violence was caused by an attempted coup d'état staged in 1978 against the Barre

regime by elements of the Somali military belonging to the Isaaq clan. Following

a government reprisal, the leaders of the failed coup fled initially to Ethiopia and

then to England where, in 1981, they formed a resistance movement, the Somali

National Movement (SNM), aimed at toppling the Barre dictatorship.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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1.3 From Crisis to Conflict: The Principal Actors

in the Struggle for Power

Table 1.2: Principal Actors and Their Role

in the Current Somali Conflict

Actor Role Description

General Siad Barre

Somali Army General who seized political

power through a coup d'état in 1969, and

whose rule generated the tensions that led to

the implosion of Somalia in 1991. In the

summer of 1992, he went into exile in Nigeria.

General Mohamed Farah

Aideed

Former General in the Somali Army who

helped defeat General Barre's forces in

Mogadishu as the military commander of the

United Somali Congress (USC). Following a

bitter struggle for power with Mr. Ali Mahdi,

his civilian colleague in the USC, General

Aideed formed the Somali National Alliance

(SNA), which soon became a key player in

Somalia's deepening conflict.

Ali Mahdi Mohamed

A cabinet minister in the First Republic and

prominent Mogadishu businessman, Mahdi

was a central figure in the USC and a key

player in Somalia's political tragedy. After the

exit of General Barre from Mogadishu, Mahdi

was pronounced interim President by the USC

on 29 January 1991 - an act that provoked a

violent power struggle between Mahdi and

General Aideed. Mahdi's faction, the USC

Manifesto Group, once exercised

unchallenged control over economic activities

in Mogadishu harbour and airports.

Introduction

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General Mohamed Said

Hersi (a.k.a. General

Morgan)

General Barre's son-in-law and a prime

beneficiary of the President's patronage,

serving as Defence Minister and head of

national security. In February 1993, General

Morgan captured a substantial part of

Kismayu from pro-Aideed forces led by Col.

Ahmed Omar Jess. This led to violent pro-

Aideed demonstrations in Mogadishu against

UNITAF which, because of its neutrality, was

alleged to have abetted General Morgan's

victory. In the spring of 1993, General

Morgan made a bungled last-ditch military

effort to return his father-in-law to power.

Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess

A pro-Aideed activist from the Ogaden clan

and former leader of the Somali People's

Movement, which was expelled from the

southern part of Kismayu by rival clans in the

Ogaden region.

General Mohamed Abshir

Musa

Former leader of the Somali Salvation

Democratic Front (SSDF), an anti-Aideed

faction. Educated in the US, Gen. Musa is

reputed to have taken sides with UN forces

against Aideed, and is regarded to be the

favourite of the Americans. His local support

base is in the northeast and southern Juba

region of Somalia.

Colonel Abdi Warsame

Leader of the Somali Salvation National

Movement (SSNM), Warsame left the Aideed

camp after Aideed engaged UN forces in

battle.

General Aden Nur Gabiyo

One-time Defence Minister under General

Barre, Gabiyo heads a faction of the Somali

People's Movement which supports Ali

Mahdi. General Gabiyo's forces control

Kismayu.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Mohamed Ali Hamad

Leader of the Somali Democratic Movement,

which draws its support from the Rahanwein

sub-clan based in Baidoa, the famine-ravaged

city in southern Somalia. Not known for his

loyalty to either Aideed or Mahdi, Mohamed

Hamad's relative neutrality may have

influenced the elders of his sub-clan to choose

him as leader of the SDM.

Ali Ismail Abdi

An ally of Aideed's, Abdia heads the Somali

National Democratic Union (SNDU), a

Leelkase Darod-based militia.

Mohamed Ramadan Arbo

Allied with Ali Mahdi's faction of the USC,

Mohamed Arbo leads the fragmented bantu

farming clans who live along the Shebelle and

Juba rivers, long regarded to be Somalia's

breadbasket.

General Omer Haji Maselle

A fellow Marehan-Darod clansman of Barre's

and former commander of Somali Armed

Forces, General Maselle is a prominent

member of the Somali National Front (SNF) -

a pro-Barre movement with strong support

from Barre's clan. Based in the famine-

stricken town of Bardere, General Maselle's

SNF has tried but failed in the past to take

advantage of the factionalization of the USC

to regain political power in Mogadishu.

Awad Ahmed Hashero

Reputed leader of a militia based in two Darod

sub-clans, Dolbahante and Warsengeli.

Introduction

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In a classic statement of this view, Andrew S. Natsios wrote in his "Food Through Force:

Humanitarian Intervention and US Policy", The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No 1, 1993,

p.136, that: "The Somalis are by instinct a remarkably ethnocentric culture..." As evidence, he

cites a Somali proverb, suggesting their world view: "Me and Somalia against the world, Me

and my clan against Somalia, Me and my family against the clan, and Me against the family."

This echoes an earlier description of Somalis by Sir Richard Burton as "a fierce and turbulent

race of republicans" (quoted in Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia," p. 207). The problem,

however, is that this view of the individual Somali as inherently force-prone, an iconic attribute

of the "zone of turmoil" about which relatively little can be done, projects a static view of the

Somali state and, as a consequence, is of limited use for purposes of analysis and prescription.

Umar Arteh Ghalib

A former Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, Ghalib was invited by interim

President Ali Mahdi to form a provisional

government that would prepare the country for

a return to democracy after the fall of Barre's

government. Ghalib accepted the offer and

formed a government on 2 February 1991. His

government was instantly denounced by

General Aideed and many international

observers as an attempt to dominate post-

Barre Somali politics.

Ibrahim Egal

Elected President of the Republic of

Somaliland, formerly British Somaliland in

the north, which unilaterally declared its

independence from Somalia on 17 May 1991.

However, the Republic of Somaliland has yet

to achieve diplomatic recognition from any

member of the United Nations.

The conflict and violence that eventually led to the implosion of Somalia in

1991 is not the product of a "first image" problematique - that is, the warlike and

ethnocentric nature of the Somalis, as some authors have suggested

- but that of

the "second image" par excellence. It is the problem of political governance, in

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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For a discussion of "First" and "Second Images" of the international system, see the

original formulation by Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis,

New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. For further discussions, cf. Michael Doyle,

"Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part I", Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12,

No 3, 1983, pp.205-235; "Liberalism and World Politics", American Political Science Review,

Vol. 80, No 4, 1986, pp.1151-1169; E. Weede, "Democracy and War Involvement", Journal of

Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No 4, 1984, pp.649-664; Francis Fukuyama, "Democratization

and International Security", Adelphi Papers, No 266, London: International Institute for

Strategic Studies, 1991/92; Robert Latham, "Democracy and War-Making: Locating the

International Liberal Context", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 22, No 2,

1993, pp.139-164; Z. Maoz and N. Abdolali, "Regime Type and International Conflict, 1816-

1976", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, No 1, 1989, pp.3-35; and Jack S. Levy, "The

Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence", in Philip Tetlock, et al. (eds), Behavior,

Society and Nuclear War, Vol. 1, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp.209-333.

Mohammed M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia", Irish

Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 5, p.7, 1994 (emphasis added).

For a brilliant historical analysis of Somalia's steady slide towards anarchy, see Mohamed

Osman Omar, The Road to Zero: Somalia's Self-Destruction, London: Haan Associates, 1992.

this case the inherent anarchical tendency of Barre's authoritarian regime.

This

explanation is supported by the accounts of Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun, the former

Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) in

Somalia, which demonstrate that the disintegration of Somalia resulted from

uprisings which were:

fuelled both by clan-based rivalries and by wider political and economic considerations.

The northern part of Somalia, home of a large clan, the Isaak, as well as other smaller

tribes, came to resent the leadership of the southern tribal groups, whom they consider

to have monopolised political power since Siad Barré took over in a coup in 1969. The

inhabitants of the northern regions perceived themselves to be wronged and without the

possibility of democratic redress. Their revolt was led by the Somali National

Movement (SNM). Government forces, unable to prevent the uprising, unleashed a

bloody repression against the civilian population, using aircraft and heavy weapons.

The government's brutality was responded to in kind by the SNM and other

organised resistance movements based mainly in northern Somalia. Guerrilla

activities against government facilities intensified and so did Barre's repression,

thus institutionalising a cycle of violence in Somalia.

However, the government's

campaign of terror against the uprising in the north revealed the weakness of

Barre's army and served to encourage organised southern opposition groups to

take up arms against the regime. In 1989, southern opposition groups came

together under one politico-military umbrella, the United Somali Congress (USC).

Introduction

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Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, 1993, p.210.

See Ioan Lewis, Making History in Somalia: Humanitarian Intervention in a Stateless

Society, Discussion Paper, No 6, London: Centre for the Study of Global Governance, 1993.

Robert G. Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle

Thayer (eds), UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, p.97. For

further detail, see Jonathan Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?", Foreign Policy, Vol. 91,

1993, p.143.

Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, 1993, p.211.

By mid-1990, the political and territorial gains of the opposition forces, led by the

SNM in the north and the USC in the south, had severely weakened Barre's

governmental and military apparatus. In territorial terms, the government was left

with the capital city, Mogadishu, on which it maintained only a tenuous hold.

By now, the government, desperate for political power and control, resorted to

arming the "masses" to delay or forestall the fall of Mogadishu. To this end,

according to Jeffrey Clark, "Siad Barre desperately launched a massive

distribution of weapons and ammunition from his vast arsenals; his power all but

evaporated when he turned his army loose on Hawiye sections of the city,

destroying much of the infrastructure and provoking a violent and deadly uprising

in the process."

By mid-January 1991, the disintegration of Somalia was

completed with the largely unco-ordinated and riotous departure of General Barre

and his loyalists from Mogadishu.

According to Robert Patman,

Siad's retreating troops adopted a scorched-earth policy as they moved through Somalia's

farmland belt, in the Juba valley area, towards the region south of Mogadishu... The

troops slaughtered livestock, plundered crops and massacred local cultivators...

[Consequently], [d]evastation and starvation spread throughout southern Somalia.

Apart from destroying whatever social infrastructure existed in Mogadishu,

Barre and his fleeing loyalists also inflicted a profound psychological blow to the

city, thus leaving behind an urban population seething with inter- and intra-clan

hatred and violence. But, above all else, Barre's exit created a political vacuum in

Somalia. The USC, which played the principal role in defeating Barre's military

in Mogadishu, had splintered into two major factions once the goal of unseating

the government had been accomplished. In the ensuing struggle for supreme

political power, the two key figures in the USC, General Mohamed Farah Aideed

and Mr. Ali Mahdi - described as "a wealthy Mogadishu businessman" - turned

into bitter adversaries.

In the resulting confrontation in Mogadishu - a city which

was by now littered with "more than 500,000 weapons... abandoned by the former

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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M. Sahnoun, Prevention in Conflict Resolution, 1994, p.9.

Ibid., p.8.

Ibid.

Andrew Natsios, Vice President of World Vision and former Assistant Administrator of

the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), quoted in Jeffrey Clark,

Debacle in Somalia, 1993, p.212.

ICRC, Emergency Plan of Action - Somalia, Geneva: International Committee of the Red

Cross, 21 July 1992 (emphasis added).

See Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, 1993, pp.212-213.

Somali army as the civil war reached its peak in January 1992" - the two leading

contenders for power turned to their sub-clans, the Habre Gedir-Hawiye and

Abgal-Hawiye, respectively, for mass support.

At this stage, according to

Mohammed Sahnoun, the power struggle between these two erstwhile allies "laid

waste to large areas of the city in November and December," claiming as many as

30,000 lives, in what has been described as "the worst part of an avoidable civil

war."

The multiplicity of actors and factions (see Table 1.2) and the terror they

unleashed on their society presented to the world the picture of Somalia as in

Hobbes's "state of nature", where life was literally nasty, brutish and pathetically

short. Thousands of Somalis died as much from violence directed by competing

"warlords" as from hunger. According to Sahnoun's account, by March 1992

... at least 300,000 people had died of hunger and hunger-related disease in the country

[of 8 million people]. Some 70% of the country's livestock had been lost and the farming

areas had been devastated, thus compelling the farming community to seek refuge in

remote areas or across the border in refugee camps. Some 500,000 people were in camps

in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.

The severity of the 1992 drought combined with Somali warlords to produce

what has been described as "the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world."

Unlike previous humanitarian emergencies which were limited to parts of a

country, the famine tragedy in Somalia was nation-wide, including the capital city,

Mogadishu. So grave and widespread was the famine that by mid-1992 the

International Committee of the Red Cross was estimating that malnutrition was

afflicting 95 percent of the entire population, "with 70 percent enduring severe

malnutrition."

By September 1992, ICRC estimated that 1.5 million Somalis

were threatened by imminent starvation, while other figures showed that 1.05

million Somalis had fled the country to escape the disaster.

Put simply, months

Introduction

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Ibid., p.213.

Mohammed Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution", 1994, p.9. Sahnoun was

referring to the UN relief programme in Somalia which he criticised for its ineffectiveness.

See Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, 1993, pp.213-214.

after Barre's overthrow, a combination of civil war and famine had reduced

Somalia to a graveyard for the living dead.

While governments pondered and politicked over the Somali tragedy as it was

relayed by the international media, humanitarian relief organisations (HROs)

poured into Somalia on a rescue mission. However, these organisations were soon

overwhelmed by the magnitude of the human suffering and by the sheer

lawlessness that prevailed over the country. According to one description of the

plight of relief workers:

Relief officials were faced with the enormous hurdle of moving a minimally required

60,000 metric tons of emergency rations per month into a country with a destroyed

infrastructure and no functioning government, and were also confronted by the most

intensive looting ever to plague any relief operation.

By November 1992, some 80 percent of relief commodities were being confiscated. The

anarchy and chaos were diminishing the prospects that [the] relief effort would be even

minimally effective, and starvation was claiming in excess of a thousand victims a day

[thereby prompting widespread] reports that the entire relief operation would have to be

suspended, as the risk to the life of relief workers was rising well above acceptable

levels.

Essentially, therefore, Somalia had been thrown into a vicious cycle of famine

and violence. As Mohammed Sahnoun put it: "[t]ragically, not only was the...

assistance programme very limited but it was also so slowly and inadequately

delivered that it became counterproductive. Inevitably fighting erupted over the

meagre food supplied."

The point being made is that, at this stage in Somalia,

... food equalled money and power. Merchants stole food, hoarding it to keep the price

high; warlords stole it to feed armies. Hungry individuals possessing loaded automatic

rifles took (...) food [to feed themselves]. That is, the chaos and the overall shortage of

supplies available to relief groups resulted in a haphazard and uneven distribution of

food among clans; part of the looting was a violent and dangerous redistribution effort.

Paradoxically, however, a secure and orderly environment was required for a

balanced and effective distribution of food aid among Somalis. Such an

environment was lacking, and so the vicious cycle merely continued, with the

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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For detailed theoretical and empirical discussion of this problem, see Lawrence

Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No 1, 1992,

pp.20-37.

result being that more Somalis were dying as much from starvation as from

violence. The central policy challenge that confronted the international

community, therefore, was how to break the vicious cycle in order to restore hope

in Somalia. But to be of any assistance to Somalia, the international community

would first have to recover from its own "crisis fatigue."

Mohammed M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia", Irish

Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 5, 1994, p.6 (emphasis added).

Chapter 2

The Evolution of International Responses

to the Somali Conflict: Regional and

International Dimensions

It has been argued that international intervention in the Somali crisis was

"slow" and pathetically erratic. This is puzzling because, according to

Mohammed Sahnoun,

Somalia, after all, was and remains a member of the League of Arab States [LAS] and

the Organisation of African Unity [OAU]. During the Carter and Reagan

administrations Somalia was a close ally of the United States, receiving hundreds of

millions of dollars in economic and military assistance. Somalia also retained good

relations with the former colonial powers of Britain and Italy, two important members

of the European Community. Finally, Somalia was a member of the UN. Any one of

these actors could have offered their services as mediators or supported the mediation

efforts timidly undertaken by neighbouring countries at various times... When the

international community finally did begin to intervene in early 1992, hundreds of

thousands of lives had already been lost.

The reasons for the sluggishness of international responses to the Somali

crisis are legion, but few are noteworthy. From the regional point of view,

Somalia's history of aggression towards its neighbours and its abiding interest

in "greater Somalia" had severely weakened whatever goodwill had existed

towards it from amongst the states of the Horn. Somalia's irredentist policy had

resulted in several instances of conflict with its neighbours, particularly Kenya

and Ethiopia. As an aspiration, "Greater Somalia" or "Somalia for all Somalis"

was not limited to the state, the elites and the two post-independence regimes.

Rather, it was an aspiration shared by many ordinary Somalis, as was also the

case in many African states where some ethnic groups had been split between

two colonial and post-colonial states. The defeat of Barre's army by Ethiopia

during the Ogaden conflict was seen by many Somalis as a betrayal of their

national cause by an incompetent regime. Not surprisingly, mass

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Aside from the well known case of Mengistu's Ethiopia's military ties with Moscow,

Kenya was also an important military ally of a major power, the US. While prestige and the

geo-strategic imperatives of the Cold War might explain the behaviour of the superpowers, the

explanation for the behaviour of their African allies may be found in the "insecurity dilemma"

imposed on these states by their colonial inheritance of fragmented ethnic groups which

resulted in several cases of manifest and latent irredentism. For details, cf: Brian Job (ed.), The

Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,

1992; Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World", World Politics, Vol.

43, No 2, 1991, pp.257-283; "The New-Old Disorder in the Third World", Global Governance,

Vol. 1, No 1, 1995, p.59-77; and Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, CA:

University of California Press, 1985; Michael E. Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and

International Security, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

disenchantment with the Barre regime became more vocal and more widespread

soon after the end of the Ogaden war. The consequence of Somalia's irredentist

attitude was that it created a nervousness amongst its neighbours who,

concerned about Somalia's potential for mounting a credible aggressive

campaign, sought and maintained close military co-operation with the major

military powers as a form of deterrence as well as insurance.

Logically,

therefore, these states were unwilling to invest their limited resources in any

significant effort to prevent the disintegration of Somalia in 1991.

In addition to the initial lack of enthusiasm on the part of Somalia's

neighbours, there was also the problem of inadequate institutional and financial

capacity for undertaking any serious regional diplomatic or military initiative

to arrest the anarchy and famine in Somalia. Somalia's immediate neighbours -

Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti - are each engrossed with some of the most

difficult problems of nation-building in Africa. Indeed, in 1991, Kenya, the

strongest of these states, was threatened by economic collapse and increased

political instability. Ethiopia was on the verge of collapse as a result of the

military successes of the separatist movement in Eritrea. In the light of this

regional circumstance, it was left to the OAU and LAS to assume the

responsibility for mediating the crisis and, if necessary, intervening to re-

establish some form of order. The OAU did attempt some mediation, but its

limited efforts were characteristically inadequate and lack lustre. On 18

December 1991, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of OAU, issued

a statement condemning the situation in Somalia: "I continue to be gravely

concerned at the continuing fratricidal fighting in Somalia... No differences

whatsoever, much less political differences, can justify the random and wanton

The Evolution of International Responses to the Somali Conflict

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Statement of 18 December 1991 by the Secretary-General of the Organisation of African

Unity Concerning the Situation in Somalia, Document S/23469, New York: The United

Nations Security Council, 23 January 1992,

Annex, p.2, para. 1.

Ibid., para. 2 (emphasis added).

Ibid., para. 3 (emphasis added).

Ibid., para. 4.

Resolution No. 5157 Adopted by the Council of the League at the Extraordinary Session

on 5 January 1992 Concerning the Situation in Somali, Document S/23448, New York: The

United Nations Security Council, 21 January 1992, Annex, p.3, para. 3.

killings we are now witnessing in Mogadishu."

He then appealed to the warring

factions to agree to an immediate cease-fire. In doing so, however, he struck a

raw nerve in Somalia by his reference to Ali Mahdi as president of the Interim

Government. In his own words:

The most urgent task at hand is to bring to a speedy end the mayhem and carnage now

raging in Mogadishu. In this regard, both parties involved in this fighting have

particular responsibility to ensure that there is an immediate cease-fire and normalcy

is restored to the city and thus paving the way to dialogue and a peaceful resolution to

the conflict. I would like to make a solemn appeal to President Mahdi of the Interim

Government and General Aedeed [sic] to exercise leadership and put an end to

violence and self-destruction which is being visited on the Somali people.

There was little indication from Salim's statement of what the OAU planned

to do in the face of the humanitarian disaster if Mahdi and Aideed failed to heed

the organisation's call for an immediate cease-fire. However, there was little

doubt that the organisation itself badly needed the initiative and assistance of the

international community in this regard: "I would... wish to appeal, once more,

to the international community at large to respond to the very urgent

humanitarian needs of the victims of the conflict in all parts of Somalia by

providing assistance especially of food and medicine."

On its part, the OAU

would "facilitate a meeting between all the parties involved... with a view to

elaborating a framework for constructive dialogue."

Following Egypt's request, the LAS took up the Somali problem from where

the OAU left off. At its extra-ordinary meeting held on 5 January 1992, the

organisation reviewed the Somali situation and decided "to provide Somalia

with emergency relief... so as to enable the Somali people to cope with their

tragic plight and avert the spectre of famine that threatens them..."

To this end,

the LAS sought voluntary contributions from its members and the entire Arab

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Ibid., para. 4.

Letter dated 20 January 1992 from the Chargé d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of

Somalia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, Document

S/23445, New York, 20 January 1992, Annex, p.2, para. 3 (emphasis added).

Ibid., p.1 (emphasis added).

world. Accordingly, it instructed its Secretary-General "to open a special

account for Somalia and to take such measures as he may deem necessary to

determine and co-ordinate assistance in kind provided by the Member States,

and ensure orderly distribution."

Surprisingly, and quite in contrast to its

acknowledgement of the urgency of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, the

LAS relied on voluntary contributions rather than drawing from existing

resources. Needless to say that nothing of any significance came out of the LAS

resolution which called for an immediate humanitarian relief operation in

Somalia. Full-scale famine descended on Somalia towards the end of January,

just as the fighting between followers of Aideed and Mahdi intensified.

Any expectation of a regional plan to assist Somalia in any significant way

had evaporated by mid-January 1992. This realisation prompted a letter of

appeal dated 11 January 1992 from Mr. Omer Arteh Ghalib, Mahdi's hand-

picked Prime Minister of Somalia's Interim Government, calling on the United

Nations to rush to Somalia's aid:

I am confident that with the background knowledge of the new Secretary-General Dr.

Boutros-Ghali and his prior commitment to reconciliation in Somalia, the United

Nations will come up with a programme of effective action to end the fighting and

contribute to cementing peace and stability in the country.

In forwarding this letter to the Security Council on 20 January, Mr. Fatun

Mohamed Hassan, Somalia's Chargé d'affaires, added his voice to Mr. Arteh's

appeal by sounding a note of urgency which reflected the increasingly desperate

situation in Somalia and the fear that only a concerted UN-led international

effort could alter the path of anarchy in Somalia. According to Mr. Hassan, "[a]s

the civil war situation in Somalia is worsening by the day, I support Mr. Arteh's

appeal for the Security Council to convene immediately a meeting to consider

the deteriorating human dilemma prevailing in Somalia."

If Somalia's neighbours, the OAU and LAS could not respond quickly and

effectively to the security and humanitarian crises in the Horn, the situation is

even truer for the rest of the international community which first had to recover

from its own "crisis fatigue." Few people seriously expected the OAU or LAS

The Evolution of International Responses to the Somali Conflict

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

For differing perspectives on the promises of the post-Cold War era, cf. Francis

Fukuyama, "The End of History?", The National Interest, Vol. 16, 1989, pp.3-18; John

Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War", The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No 2,

1990, pp.35-56; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No

1, 1991, pp.23-33; and Stanley Hoffmann, "A New World Order and its Troubles", Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 69, No 4, 1990, pp.115-122; Lawrence Freedman (1992), "Order and Disorder in

the New World", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No 1, 1992, pp.20-37; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What

New World Order?", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No 2, 1992, pp.83-96.

Mohammed Sahnoun argues quite passionately that the international community could

have prevented the Somali tragedy. See his Prevention in Conflict Resolution, esp. pp.5-9.

Lawrence Freedman, Order and Disorder in the New World, 1992, p.37.

to intervene in any significant way in Somalia, for neither of these organisations

has had successful experience in this regard. However, expectations were high

regarding the possibility and ability of western powers and the United Nations

to mount an effective operation to save Somalia from total collapse. Such high

expectation was based on the optimistic assumptions of post-Cold War

communitarianism; that is, the "peace dividend" of the "new world order."

That such high expectations of the international community were not

immediately met in Somalia was as avoidable as it was unexpected:

In all this a crisis fatigue may soon set in, for the process will be frustrating and the

results often dispiriting. It is by no means self-evident that the west Europeans have

the staying power to handle even a selection of the challenges thrown up by the

developing disorder in postcommunist Europe, let alone those left in the rest of the

world...

By the time the Somali crisis became leading news in the major press rooms

around the world in the spring and summer of 1992, the international

community was already suffering from "crisis fatigue" as had been predicted by

Lawrence Freedman. In 1992, the world was still coming to terms with the

enormous psychological, material and human costs of the Sudanese civil war

and famine, the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and the

resulting "Operation Desert Storm" and "Restore Comfort" (for Kurdish

refugees). Worse still, the worsening civil strives occasioned by the sudden

disintegration of two major European states, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,

produced the spectre of another Balkan conflict, the historical precursor of the

two World Wars fought in this century. Consequently, the attention of the

leading nations, particularly the only remaining Superpower, the United States,

switched away from Somalia to central Europe. Thus, in explaining his country's

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Cited in Daniel Volman, "Africa and the New World Order", Journal of Modern African

Studies, Vol. 31, 1993, p.7.

Robert Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer

(eds), UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, p. 97. Qat, a local

stimulant eaten widely by East African males, is said to be an addictive drug which empowered

young men in their quest for things physical, including violent crimes and acts of

misdemeanour.

The Secretary-General embarrassed western powers when he accused them of obsessive

preoccupation with the "rich man's war" in the former Yugoslavia, while neglecting the tragedy

in Somalia.

attitude in this regard, former US Ambassador to Somalia, Mr. T. Frank Crigler,

remarked that the United States simply "turned out the lights, closed the door

and forgot about the place."

Not surprisingly, this attitude provided a perfect opportunity for the

protagonists in the Somali crisis to rid themselves of all restraints, except those

imposed by the limits of their ability, in their quest for relative advantages

through military victory. In one description of the anarchy that ensued, Robert

Patman wrote that "looting, random killing and banditry was carried out by

gangs of Qat-chewing, armed teenagers, known as mooryaan."

In no time,

therefore, Somalia was transformed from a land of punt to a land of misery and

death where sympathetic foreign aid workers, photographers and journalists

were the only important visitors. It was the media attention on Somali's waste

and an uncharacteristic public admonition of western states by the UN

Secretary-General that resulted in a concerted international plan of action, led

by the US, for Somalia in the summer of 1992.

The Evolution of International Responses to the Somali Conflict

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Author's interviews with some officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross,

Geneva, 2 May 1995.

Mohammed Sahnoun, Prevention in Conflict Resolution, 1994, p.9. This view was also

echoed by Jeffrey Clark, who strongly criticised the withdrawal of UN agencies from Somalia

at a time when their presence was badly needed by the population. See his Debacle in Somalia,

p.218.

Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, 1993, p.238, fn. 17. See also The New York Times, 11

December 1991.

United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Situation

in Somalia, New York: DPI, March 1994, p.1.

2.1 The Emergence of a Consensus on an International

Emergency Relief Plan for Somalia

International media focus on Somalia generated significant public sympathy

in leading donor countries for Somalia's famine-stricken population. In this

regard, the television media were very instrumental in bringing live pictures of

dying Somalis to the living rooms of their wide audiences around the world.

International response to these gruelling pictures was rapid and intense. The

international humanitarian relief agencies took the lead in reaching the starving

and dying population in Somalia after initial UN humanitarian support teams,

led by UNICEF, pulled out of the country due to what they termed "adverse

security" considerations.

According to Mohammed Sahnoun:

While the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and all the NGOs did their

utmost to enhance their programmes and ventured deep inside Somalia to provide

emergency relief to the population - despite tremendous danger and difficulties - some

UN agencies were arguing that the security situation did not allow a large presence, or

sometimes even any presence at all.

By the end of December 1991, mounting public disapproval of UN

performance in Somalia from the media and NGOs, including an

uncharacteristic criticism of the world body by the ICRC, led to frantic

preparations in New York for a credible UN diplomatic initiative on Somalia.

According to UN sources, then out-going Secretary-General Javier Pérez de

Cuéllar formally informed the President of the Security Council about his

intention to initiate a peace process in Somalia.

As a first step, he despatched

a team of senior UN officials, led by Dr. James O. C. Jonah, then Under

Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to assess the situation on the ground and

recommend an appropriate course of action.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

See, among others, Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, 1993, esp. pp.217-221; and Robert

Patman, The UN Operation in Somalia, 1995, pp.99-102.

Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, 1993, p.218.

Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, 1993, pp.218-219 (emphasis added). See also John

Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?, London: Haan Associates, 1994, pp.39-40.

The Jonah team which arrived in Mogadishu on 3 January 1992 became one

of several visits to Somalia by high level UN officials which resulted in a series

of "debacles."

Jonah's task was to negotiate a cease-fire among the warring

factions. Such a cessation of hostilities would permit the unhindered delivery of

food aid to the starving population by UN and non-governmental relief

organisations. However, the high-powered UN visit got off to a very bad start.

In view of the escalating violence in Mogadishu, occasioned by the

fractionalization of the USC into the Aideed and Mahdi camps, it was decided

that Jonah's team would negotiate separately with the two warlords in their

respective strongholds in the city. Such an arrangement entailed logistical

problems which required extreme caution on the part of the Jonah team and

familiarity with local conditions to avoid any appearance of partiality to one of

the parties to the conflict. Unfortunately, as it turned out, some observers have

noted that the Jonah team did not appear to possess such local expertise.

According to Clark's account:

Two clans neutral in the Aideed/Ali Mahdi clash (the Hawadle and the Murasade)

[had] offered to escort Jonah to both Aideed and Ali Mahdi headquarters, and to serve

as local peacekeepers. Jonah, apparently unaware of the existence of neutral elements

in Mogadishu, made no arrangements to accept the offer. He then fell into a trap set by

General Aideed.

Aideed's forces shelled the airport to prevent Jonah's UN plane from landing and had

it diverted to an airstrip at Balidogley under the [G]eneral's control; there, Jonah was

met by Aideed. Manipulating Jonah's itinerary, Aideed took him on highly visible and

extensive tours of territory under his control. When the Jonah party neared the planned

point of crossing into Ali Mahdi's northern section of Mogadishu, an angry Ali Mahdi

opened an artillery barrage. Jonah fled to Nairobi. The next morning, however, he flew

back to northern Mogadishu to (very) briefly visit Ali Mahdi, then publicly announced

that Ali Mahdi had agreed to UN intervention in the crisis and that General Aideed

stood as the obstacle. Ali Mahdi immediately seconded Jonah's comments, seeing them

as underscoring the legitimacy of his interim presidency. Aideed predictably became

angry and more distrustful - and more violent.

The Evolution of International Responses to the Somali Conflict

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Situation

in Somalia, 1994, pp.1-2.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 733, Document S/RES/733, New York, 23

January 1992, para. 5 (emphasis added).

Ibid., para. 3.

John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?, 1994, p.40.

Upon returning to New York, the Jonah team relayed their verdict to the

Secretary-General: "support for a cease-fire in Mogadishu was expressed by all

faction leaders, except General Aidid. Unanimous support was expressed,

however, for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation."

Based on this report, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the new Secretary-General,

initiated consultations with members of the Security Council on an appropriate

course of action in Somalia. The result of this consultation was the passage of

Security Council Resolution 733 on 23 January 1992 by unanimous vote. In this

resolution, the Security Council urged the Secretary-General to increase UN

humanitarian assistance to Somalia. It also decided, "under Chapter VII of the

Charter of the United Nations, that all states shall, for the purposes of

establishing peace and stability in Somalia immediately implement a general

and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment

to Somalia until the Security Council decides otherwise."

To this end, the

resolution requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the OAU and

LAS, to contact and seek the commitment of all parties involved in the conflict

to: a) cease hostilities, so as to permit the distribution of humanitarian

assistance; b) promote and comply with a cease-fire; and c) assist in the process

of a political settlement.

Thus began a rather precarious relationship between

humanitarian assistance, the maintenance of security and political resolution in

Somalia.

If the first high ranking UN visit to Somalia led by Under Secretary-General

Jonah resulted in a debacle and the heightening of conflict between the warring

factions, subsequent visits by high-ranking UN officials, with few exceptions,

did little to reverse the situation. When Brian Wannop, the UN's Special Co-

ordinator for Somalia, arrived Mogadishu on 5 February 1992 to formally

extend the Secretary General's invitation to Mahdi and Aideed to attend peace

talks in New York, Somalia's anarchy had been worsened by the bad blood

generated by the UN's acceptance, perhaps "by default," of "Mahdi's status as

interim-President."

According to some students of Somali politics, Wannop's

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, 1993, p.219 (emphasis added).

Ibid.

Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia, Document S/23693, New

York, 11 March 1992.

visit further inflamed inter-clan tensions in Somalia by unintentionally

undermining the authority of traditional elders:

No clan leaders or elders were invited to discussions with Aideed and Ali Mahdi about

proposed peace talks in New York. That the UN apparently accorded the clans little

standing made it easier for Ali Mahdi to launch attacks against the smaller clans, which

he did the day after the UN issued invitations to the peace talks.

The continuing violence in Somalia provided further impetus to UN's highest

priority: a formal cease-fire agreement between the leading militia in Somalia.

At talks held in the New York Headquarters of the United Nations, Aideed and

Mahdi agreed on the principles of a cease-fire agreement. Pursuant to this

objective, they further agreed to host in Mogadishu a joint high-level delegation

comprised of officials from the UN, OAU, LAS and the Organisation of Islamic

Conference (OIC). This delegation would finalize and witness the signing of a

formal cease-fire agreement by the two warlords.

The joint delegation which visited Mogadishu between 29 February and 3

March 1992 succeeded in securing Mahdi and Aideed's assent to an Agreement

on the Implementation of a Cease-fire. In this agreement, the two warlords

accepted the deployment of a team of UN security personnel to safely escort

humanitarian convoys. They also consented to the deployment of "20 military

observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the cease-fire."

Aside from

the cease-fire monitoring mechanism, the joint delegation reached an

understanding with the warring factions on the convening of a national

reconciliation conference to decide on the nature and structure of a post-conflict

government in Somalia.

Encouraged by the success of the joint delegation's visit to Somalia, the

Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a plan to implement the

Mogadishu agreement.

This resulted in the adoption of Resolution 746 by the

Security Council on 17 March. This resolution supported the Secretary-

General's decision to dispatch a "technical team" to Somalia which would study

and recommend for establishment a mechanism both for cease-fire monitoring

The Evolution of International Responses to the Somali Conflict

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

UN Security Council Resolution 746, Document S/RES/746, New York, 17 March 1992,

paras. 6 and 7.

Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights",

International Affairs, Vol. 69, No 3, 1993, p.439 (emphasis added).

as well as effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

This move would

precipitate further UN involvement which, according to Adam Roberts, would

result in "a humanitarian relief effort [leading] inexorably to a major military

action..."

It is to the dynamic nature of UN involvement in Somalia that I now

turn.

Chapter 3

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

Once initiated, the United Nations involvement in Somalia took on a life of

its own. The UN intervention in Somalia between 1922 and 1995 may be

categorised into three distinct phases, each with its own mission objective.

These are:

a) The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), an observer

mission which was characterised by the relentless search for a credible

role for the UN in Somalia;

b) The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in which the United States,

empowered by the Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII of

the UN Charter, organised and led a "non-blue-helmeted" multinational

force to enforce peace in Somalia;

c) The second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) which

saw the return of blue helmets for an essentially peace-building operation

in Somalia.

Each of these phases shall be discussed in some detail below.

Table 3.1: UN Intervention in Somalia:

A Chronology of Major Events, 1991-95

Date Description of Events

27 December 1991

After due consultations with in-coming UN

Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, out-

going Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

formally informs the Security Council of his

intention to launch a UN peace process in Somalia.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

3 January 1992

The first high-level UN team, led by Under

Secretary-General James Jonah, arrives in

Mogadishu to discuss UN humanitarian and peace-

building proposals with the leaders of Somalia's

principal warring factions.

23 January 1992

UN Security Council adopts the proposal of the

Secretary-General in the form of Resolution 733

which imposes a complete embargo on the delivery

of weapons and military equipment to Somalia.

12-14 February 1992

General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Mr. Ali

Mahdi, the leaders of the two principal warring

factions in Somalia, meet with officials of the UN,

OAU, LAS and OIC at the UN Secretariat in New

York to discuss the principles of an immediate

cease-fire agreement.

3 March 1992

In Mogadishu, Aideed and Mahdi sign a cease-fire

agreement which provides for a UN security

presence to ensure the safe delivery of

humanitarian supplies to Somalia's famine-stricken

population.

24 April 1992

The Security Council adopts Resolution 751,

establishing UNOSOM as a Chapter VI operation.

Subsequently, the Secretary-General unveils a 90-

day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian

Assistance to Somalia and appoints Mohammed

Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat, as his Special

Representative in Somalia.

27 July 1992

The Security Council adopts resolution 767,

requesting the Secretary-General to "make full use

of all available means and arrangements" to

facilitate UN humanitarian efforts in Somalia. A

few days later, the Secretary-General authorises

airlift relief operations to Somalia. This is followed

immediately with the deployment of an advance

party of 50 unarmed UN observers in Mogadishu.

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

28 August 1992

Security Council adopts Resolution 775 which

authorises the enlargement of UNOSOM by 3,800

troops to stem the deteriorating security situation in

Somalia. Surprised by the move, Aideed reacts

angrily to the news of UN troop reinforcement and

so does Sahnoun who threatens to resign as the

SRSG.

October 1992

Under pressure from his bosses in New York,

Sahnoun resigns as the SRSG and is replaced by

Ismat Kittani, an Iraqi diplomat, amidst rising

violence against UN personnel in Mogadishu and

elsewhere in Somalia.

25 November 1992

Amidst increasing media reports of the Somali

famine and UN bungling of token relief efforts,

Acting US Secretary of State Lawrence

Eagleburger visits the UN to communicate to the

Secretary-General his government's decision to

organise and lead a multinational force to secure

Somalia for effective delivery of humanitarian aid.

3 December 1992

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the

Security Council adopts Resolution 794,

authorising the US-led coalition to use force to

secure a conducive environment for the distribution

of humanitarian aid in Somalia.

9 December 1992

The first elements of US Marines that form the

bulk of the 37,000-strong Unified Task Force

(UNITAF) secure a beach head in Mogadishu at the

start of a complex military/humanitarian mission

code-named "Operation Restore Hope."

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

4-15 January 1993

UN Secretary-General convenes another set of

Somali peace talks in Addis Ababa. Attended by 15

Somali political groups, representatives of the

Countries of the Horn and the Secretaries-General

of OAU, LAS and OIC, the Addis Ababa

conference produces an agreement on the general

disarmament of the warring factions.

27 February 1993

In accordance with its time-table, the US

withdraws part of its forces in Somalia and

promises to follow through with its original plans

to pull out the bulk of its forces by May.

3 March 1993

The Secretary-General reports to the Security

Council the success of the UNITAF mission and

proposes the transition from non-blue helmets to

blue-helmets under UNOSOM II, with Chapter VII

powers. He proposes the expansion of the mandate

of UNOSOM II to cover the whole territory of

Somalia in the following areas: i) cease-fire

monitoring; ii) preventing any resumption of

conflict; iii) maintaining control of weapons

brought to it in accordance with agreements

reached on disarmament; iv) seizing the small arms

of all unauthorised militia in Somalia; v) securing

or maintaining security at all sea- and airports as

well as other lines of communication for the

delivery of humanitarian assistance; vi) protecting

UN and NGO personnel and installations; vii)

clearing mines; and viii) assisting in the

repatriation of refugees.

8 March 1993

Violent inter-clan conflict erupts in Kismayu,

killing more than two dozen Somali civilians and

wounding several more, including humanitarian aid

workers.

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

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9 March 1993

Rtd. Admiral Jonathan Howe assumes

responsibility for the UN operation in Somalia as

the new SRSG. His task is to oversee the transition

of operations from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The

Secretary-General also appoints Lt.-General Çevik

Bir of Turkey as Force Commander of UNOSOM

II.

17 March 1993

Following strong accusations by Aideed of UN

complicity in the capture of Kismayu by anti-

Aideed forces led by General Hersi "Morgan," the

UN suspends national reconciliation talks which

had begun in Addis on 15 March.

26 March 1993

The Security Council adopts Resolution 814,

approving the Secretary-General's proposal for the

transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II with an

enlarged mandate.

4 May 1993

The US formally hands over command of the

multilateral enforcement action to UNOSOM II. It,

however, leaves behind a sizeable number of its

troops and equipment in Somalia and off-shore to

assist UN operations if and when needed.

5 June 1993

24 Pakistani troops on a scheduled disarmament

verification mission are killed in an ambush.

Aideed's faction is implicated in the incident in

which 40 other Pakistanis were wounded, 5 taken

hostage, 35 Somalis killed and 130 wounded. This

marks the return of wide-scale violence against

foreign presence in Somalia. It also becomes a

turning-point for the entire UN operation.

6 June 1993

The Security Council reacts to the ambush of

Pakistani troops with Resolution 837, which

condemns the "treacherous act" and demands "firm

and prompt action" against "the perpetrators of this

crime." This sets the stage for the progressive

escalation of violence in the months to follow.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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12 June 1993

In response to the killing of the Pakistani soldiers,

UNOSOM II begins a series of punitive actions

against Aideed's forces and installations. US Cobra

helicopter gunships are called in to participate in a

series of bombing raids against known and

suspected Aideed force positions and installations,

including Radio Mogadishu.

17 June 1993

SRSG Admiral Jonathan Howe orders the arrest of

General Aideed for his involvement in the death of

Pakistani peace keepers. Thereafter chaos ensues as

Aideed militia successfully seek every opportunity

to frustrate UNOSOM II and to inflict heavy

casualties on the UN peace keepers.

24 June 1993

Frustrated by the inability of his forces to

apprehend Aideed, SRSG Admiral Howe commits

a cultural blunder by announcing a US $25,000

reward for information leading to the capture of

General Aideed. Meanwhile, US choppers engage

in low-level flights searching for Aideed and also

distributing offensive leaflets announcing a ransom

for Aideed's capture. These efforts lead to the

further degeneration of the security environment in

Somalia, which reached an all-time low.

24 August 1993

The US dispatches 400 of its elite Army rangers to

Mogadishu to facilitate the man-hunt for General

Aideed. This action not only increases the US

profile in the exercise but adds urgency to the task

of capturing General Aideed - a task to which the

Force Command devotes much of its military and

political capital.

5-30 September 1993

UN and Somali militia engage each other in a

series of high-profile gun battles resulting in more

casualties suffered by Nigerian, Pakistani, Italian,

American and Malaysian contingents, among

others, including Somali civilians.

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

3 October 1993

Somali militia shoot down two US helicopters

carrying elite US Army rangers on a mission to

capture an unspecified number of top aides to

General Aideed. 5 of the rangers are killed

instantly while 18 others die in an ensuing battle

with Somali militiamen. When the battle is over, 75

US soldiers have been wounded, and Michael

Durant, the pilot of one of the downed choppers,

and Shankali of the Nigerian contingent, are taken

prisoner by Aideed's militia which suffers even

heavier casualties.

4 October 1993

In a move that would have further escalated the

tension in Somalia, the US government responds to

the high-profile downing of its choppers by

ordering the immediate deployment of additional

reinforcements of 5,300 US troops and equipment,

including advanced AC-130 "spectre" helicopter

gunships to Somalia. Soon after, Washington

reverses its policy and begins a downward review

of its objectives and commitment in Somalia - a

process which will result in the unilateral

termination of its involvement and a recourse to

diplomatic solution of the conflict.

10 October 1993

President Clinton announces the appointment of

Robert Oakley as his special envoy to Somalia.

Oakley's mandate is to secure the release of Durant,

and to initiate a diplomatic process for the

resolution of the Somali conflict. Four days after

Oakley's arrival in Mogadishu, and following

extensive discussions with local leaders, Aideed's

militia releases Durant and Shankali. Aideed would

later be flown by US pilots to attend a new round

of peace meetings in Ethiopia.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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29 October 1993

The Security Council adopts Resolution 878,

extending the UNOSOM II mandate to November

to allow more time for the preparation of an "in-

depth" review of the Somali operation.

16 November 1993

The Security Council adopts resolution 885,

authorising the establishment of a Commission of

Inquiry to investigate armed attacks against

UNOSOM II personnel, and the suspension of

arrest actions against General Aideed. Accordingly,

the Secretary-General inaugurates the Commission,

which is comprised of Hon. Matthew S. Ngulube,

the Chief Justice of Zambia, as Chairman; Rtd.

General Emmanuel Erskine of Ghana, member;

General Gustav Hagglund of Finland, member; and

Winston Tubman of the UN Legal Office as

Secretary.

18 November 1993

The Security Council adopts Resolution 886,

extending the mandate of UNOSOM II by six

months.

4 February 1994

The Security Council adopts Resolution 897,

extending the life of UNOSOM II to March 1995

but with a significantly down-sized mandate and

military strength. The new mandate limits

UNOSOM II to "traditional" peacekeeping:

assisting Somali parties in implementing co-

operative disarmament and in reaching a political

settlement; protecting major air- and seaports and

essential infrastructure; providing humanitarian

relief; assisting in re-establishing a Somali civil

police force and judicial system; helping in the

repatriation and resettlement of refugees and

displaced persons, etc.

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

March 1994

The United States completes the withdrawal of its

troops from Somalia, marking the beginning of the

end of the entire UN operation in Somalia. Soon

afterwards, a number of western states, including

Italy, Germany, Turkey and Norway also pull out

their forces from Somalia. This leaves UNOSOM

II psychologically and materially weak even for the

execution of its drastically reduced mandate.

2 March 1995

With logistics support provided by the United

States military, the UN completes the pull-out of its

military and civilian personnel from Somalia, three

weeks ahead of schedule. This event marks the

formal termination of the UNOSOM II operation.

Speaking two weeks earlier in New York about the

pull-out operation, Mr. Kofi Annan, Under

Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations,

said the decision was "deliberate and painful." The

world community, he said, can only "facilitate,

encourage and assist, not impose or coerce peace."

In his reflection on the UN withdrawal from

Somalia, the Secretary-General, speaking in

Vienna, said he believed that the hopes for a new

international order which blossomed at the end of

the Cold War had evaporated. He added that he

foresees the need to "contract out" more operations

to regional organisations or multinational forces

led by major powers with special interests in

disputes.

3.1 Phase I: The First United Nations Observer Mission

in Somalia (UNOSOM I)

The immediate outcome of the visit by the technical team to Somalia was the

Secretary-General's proposal for a 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency

Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, which was presented to the Security

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Document S/23829/Add.1,

New York: United Nations, 21 April 1992.

M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia" Irish Studies in

International Affairs, No 5, 1994, p.9.

UN Security Council Resolution 751, Document S/RES/751, New York: United Nations,

24 April 1992, para. 3.

M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution", 1994, p.9.

Council for consideration and approval.

This proposal came as a response to the

unanimous request by Somalia's warring factions for "an urgent and largely

humanitarian assistance operation, as well as an important recovery

programme."

On 24 April, the Security Council adopted Resolution 751

approving the Secretary-General's plan to establish the United Nations

Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), charged with the responsibility of directing

all UN activities in Somalia. The Resolution also requested the Secretary-

General "immediately to deploy a unit of 50 United Nations Observers to

monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu."

Four days after the passage of the

Resolution, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun, an

Algerian diplomat, as his Special Representative in Somalia.

Upon arriving in Mogadishu in May to commence the implementation of

Resolution 751, Mohammed Sahnoun was confronted with a rapidly

degenerating security situation in Somalia. Rather than the groups of warring

militia fighting against each other for control of Mogadishu, Sahnoun observed

that humanitarian relief workers and their storage depots had become the

principal targets of organised violence. Following extensive discussions with the

different warlords, Sahnoun shared their concern that "they would lose control

of some of the young militia, who might join other unruly youths already

engaged in looting" if nothing was done to stem the famine.

In light of this

concern, therefore, Sahnoun sought to control the availability and use of

weapons through a programme of food-for-arms. Thus began the first major

disarmament initiative to be undertaken in Somalia without any military support.

In explaining the rationale for the food-for-arms initiative, Sahnoun argued

that

Since arms and ammunition were easily available, ... [m]any Somali leaders had

requested UN assistance in disarming the population. However, the Somalis would

voluntarily bring in their weapons only if the food basket was sufficiently attractive.

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Ibid. (emphasis added).

Ibid.

Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Document

S/24859, New York: United Nations, 24 November 1992, p.3 (emphasis added).

See Ioan Lewis, "Misunderstanding the Somali Crisis", Anthropology Today, No 9,

August 1993, p.2; and Robert Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", in R. Thakur and C.

Thayer (eds), UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, p.100.

It was also necessary to use some other forms of inducement, such as temporary

employment or other activities.

For Sahnoun, therefore, the appropriate strategy would be to "flood" Somalia

with food, for "food scarcities further contributed to the atmosphere of general

insecurity that now prevailed within the country."

Accordingly, he proposed to

deliver a minimum of 50,000 metric tons of food per month for the duration of

the Secretary-General's 90-day Emergency Plan of Action. The problem,

however, was that UN humanitarian agencies could not meet the food target, and

even the meagre supplies that were arranged could not be delivered effectively

because of logistical inadequacies. As a consequence, the shortage of food

amidst worsening mass starvation served only to increase the level of violence

in Somalia. According to the Secretary-General's report on the problem:

... in the absence of a government or governing authority capable of maintaining law

and order, Somali "authorities" at all levels of society compete for anything of value

in the country. Armed threats and killings often decide the outcome. Looting and

banditry are rife. Amidst this chaos, the international aid provided by the United

Nations and voluntary agencies has become a major (and in some areas the only)

source of income and as such is the target of all the "authorities," who may sometimes

be no more than two or three bandits with guns. In essence, humanitarian supplies

have become the basis of an otherwise non-existent Somali economy.

On the security front, the implementation of resolution 751 also ran into

serious obstacles. The agreement on the deployment of 50 unarmed UN

observers in Somalia was contingent upon successful "consultations with the

parties in Mogadishu" by the SRSG.

Pursuant to this requirement, Sahnoun

initiated a lengthy process of consultations with the leaders of the major warring

factions as well as the traditional rulers of Somalia's major clans. The purpose

of this approach, which has been referred to as the "bottom-up" strategy, was to

weaken the authority of the increasingly over-demanding warlords by building

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution", 1994, p.10.

Robert Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", 1995, p.100.

Ibid.

For details, see the Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia,

Document S/24343, New York: United Nations, 22 July 1992, esp. pp.3-4.

Mohammed M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution", 1994, p.11. See also the

Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Document S/24343, p.3.

grassroots support for UN activities through the medium of traditional elders.

In Sahnoun's own words:

Our delegation pursued a strategy of putting the clan system to work for Somalia.

Agreements among local elders gradually helped to reduce the fighting and allowed

food deliveries into the interior of the country. After arduous discussions, and with the

help of the elders, we arranged a deal with Ali Mahdi, M. F. Aideed and other faction

leaders for the deployment of 500 Pakistani peacekeepers in Mogadishu.

Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of the bottom-up approach, such as

the confidence and trust it generated amongst the warring parties in the UN

mechanism, even Sahnoun would concede that the strategy proved to be

extremely time-consuming, especially when compared with its results, for "the

warlords, particularly Aideed, were in no mood to passively accept the plucking

of their feathers."

Their success in resisting the gradual erosion of their

authority resulted in a significant loss of time for the implementation of the UN

initiative. For instance, "[i]t took two months just to persuade Mahdi and Aideed

to accept the deployment of the 50 UN observers."

The team of observers,

drawn from Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland,

Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and Zimbabwe, arrived in Mogadishu in July 1992

under the command of Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen of Pakistan as the

Chief Military Observer (CMO) of UNOSOM.

Somalia's warlords took advantage of the two-month gap between the

adoption of Resolution 751 and the deployment of the first elements of UN

observers to rearm and strengthen their military position in anticipation of a

major showdown. In the process, they would further tarnish the reputation and

impartiality of the UN. According to Sahnoun, in one case of rearmament which

occurred in mid-June, "a Russian [Antonov] plane with UN markings, chartered

by a UN agency [the World Food Programme] had delivered currency and

military equipment to the north of Mogadishu, apparently to troops supporting

interim president Ali Mahdi."

According to the Secretary-General's

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

The Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Document S/24343, p.3.

Sahnoun pointed to several incidents of UN chartered flights with "mysterious cargo"

which undermined the impartiality of the organisation and his subsequent pleas for a thorough

investigation of these incidents (which went unheeded by New York). In his own words: "What

is incredible is that although the UN name and reputation were at stake, no serious investigation

was undertaken and no legal action for redress was pursued." See his "Prevention in Conflict

Resolution," p.11.

assessment, this incident had a negative impact on the processes of negotiations

between Mr. Sahnoun and General Aideed (also spelled, "Aidid") for the

deployment of UN observers:

General Aidid's faction thereupon accused United Nations personnel of bias and

suspended the deployment of United Nations observers. United Nations Headquarters

instructed the CMO to remain at his post, whereupon the USC delivered an "expulsion

notice" to him and his party.

The consequence of the clash of wits between the UN and General Aidid was

the rapid deterioration of the political and security environment in Mogadishu.

This was evidenced by the increased hostility towards foreigners, especially UN

and relief workers. Generally speaking, as the frequency and intensity of

violence against humanitarian personnel increased amidst increasingly critical

media scrutiny, UN officials in New York became even more impatient with

Sahnoun's inability to achieve any significant improvement in the humanitarian

and security conditions in Somalia. On his part, Sahnoun stepped up pressure

on UN headquarters to show "good faith" to all the warring parties in Somalia,

especially General Aideed, in view of past and continuing acts which were

eroding the faith and confidence of ordinary Somalis in the neutrality of the

UN.

But he also accelerated discussions with leaders of the major warring

factions for the deployment of UN security personnel to escort humanitarian

convoys, in accordance with Resolution 751. The success of these negotiations

was relayed to the Secretary-General who, on 12 August, informed the Security

Council that he was ready to deploy 500

?blue berets” to Mogadishu as part of

UNOSOM.

Obviously, the co-ordination of logistics and information between field

operations in Somalia and UN headquarters must have been inadequate.

According to a recent report, "Sahnoun was answerable to three UN Under-

Secretaries, and unifying the various UN activities in the field was nearly

impossible. His requests for greater autonomy and flexibility were [also] not

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

The United States Institute of Peace, Restoring Hope: The Real Lessons of Somalia for

the Future of Intervention, Special Report, Washington, D.C.: USIP 1995, p. 7. For a detailed

account, see Mohammed Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities, Washington, D.C.:

USIP Press, 1994.

M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution", 1994, p.13.

Ibid., p.11 (emphasis added).

met...."

In Sahnoun's own words: "I still cannot understand why people in New

York (who knew nothing of the realities in the field) made hasty and uncalled-

for decisions, and still persist in having them implemented despite evidence of

misjudgment and the strong objection of the people in the field."

These gaps

in communication and co-ordination led to a series of miscalculations by the UN

Secretariat, all of which combined to worsen the humanitarian and security

conditions in Somalia. According to Sahnoun:

... the UN headquarters in New York tended to ignore our advice and warnings in

sensitive matters related to security. It took a great deal of time and difficult

negotiation for our team to reach an agreement for the deployment of 500 UN troops.

We were hoping that they would be deployed right away. After all, this was just a

small battalion. There is no doubt that had these 500 troops been fully deployed as late

as a month after the agreement, i.e. the beginning of September, it would have made

an appreciable difference. However, bureaucratic delays (and skirmishes at the

headquarters between different departments) led to total confusion. Hence the 500

troops had not even arrived when an announcement was made in New York that over

3,800 troops would be sent to Somalia. This statement was made without informing the

UNOSOM delegation in Mogadishu and the leaders of the neighbouring countries, and,

worse still, without consulting the Somali leaders and community elders as we had

done before.

The first group of UNOSOM troops, comprising a lone unit of Pakistani

soldiers, arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992 to confront a hopelessly

anarchic environment. Their task was made even more difficult by the fact that

the marauding groups of militia under General Aideed had already considered

them [i.e. UN soldiers] to be anti-Aideed. The reason for this perception was

rooted in the UN's actions since August, which blatantly negated the prior

understanding reached between Aideed and Sahnoun. Robert Patman

underscores the nuances underlying this perception:

Aideed appeared to drag his feet [on the] negotiations [preceding] the deployment of

the UN security force... Mahdi [by contrast] accepted with alacrity... The protracted

discussions reflected Aideed's concern that the introduction of peacekeeping troops

would not only erode his competitive position with Ali Mahdi in Mogadishu - his

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Robert Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", 1995, pp.100-101 (emphasis added).

Ibid., p.102 (emphasis added).

DPI, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, 1994, p.3. See also the Report of

the Secretary-General, Document S/24343, New York: United Nations, 22 July 1992.

faction exercised control over the lucrative Mogadishu harbour and airport facilities -

but also affect his political base elsewhere in Somalia. Eventually, on 12 August, four

months after Resolution 751, Aideed and his SNA allies signed an agreement with

Sahnoun for the deployment of the 500 peacekeepers. As part of the agreement,

Sahnoun stated that any increase in the number of UN troops would require the

consent of Aideed's SNA leadership.

New York's announcement of a major increase in the strength of UNOSOM,

without adequate consultation with the SRSG, would further undermine the

SRSG's credibility in future negotiations with Somalia's warring factions. It

certainly amounted to a breach of the agreement reached earlier between Aideed

and Sahnoun. But, even more fundamentally, that UN headquarters announced

such an increase in UNOSOM's force structure without the prior consent of all

the parties to the conflict in Somalia was a significant move which was bound

to foul the delicate relationship between UN field personnel and local Somali

militia and consequently alter the direction and status of the mission as a

Chapter VI operation. This raises the following question: why did the UN take

such a precipitate action?

As I have mentioned earlier, Sahnoun's "bottom-up" negotiating strategy had

resulted in considerable loss of time without producing the desired impact on the

dire security and humanitarian situation in Somalia. Meanwhile, at the UN

Secretariat some senior officials were not only dissatisfied with Sahnoun's

progress, but were also suspicious of his actions and intentions in Somalia.

According to Patman, "a suspicion existed within the UN Secretariat that

Sahnoun was misreading the Somali situation. With thousands of Somalis dying

from hunger each week and warlords like Aideed effectively exercising a veto

on UN action, the organisation perceived it faced a crisis of credibility."

The Secretariat's response to the crisis of credibility took two forms. First, on

22 July the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council

explaining "the complex political and security situation in Somalia" and a

"comprehensive approach" which the situation required.

I have therefore come to the conclusion that the United Nations must adapt its

involvement in Somalia. Its efforts need to be enlarged so that it can help bring about

an effective cease-fire throughout the country, while at the same time pressing forward

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

The Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Document S/24343,

p.11, para. 56 (emphasis added).

Ibid., pp.11-12, para. 57.

Ibid., p.12, para. 59. (emphasis in the original).

Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Document S/24480, New

York: United Nations, 24 August 1992, p.5, para. 22.

DPI, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, 1994, p.4.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 775, Document S/RES/775, New York:

United Nations, 28 August 1992, para. 3.

with parallel efforts to promote national reconciliation. This will require the

Organization to establish a presence in all regions and to adopt an innovative and

comprehensive approach dealing with all aspects of the Somalia situation, namely the

humanitarian relief and recovery programme, the cessation of hostilities and security,

the peace process and national reconciliation, in a consolidated framework.

This proposal set forth four principal functional objectives for UNOSOM: a)

humanitarian relief assistance; b) cease-fire monitoring; c) security,

demobilisation and disarmament; and d) national reconciliation through

conciliation, mediation and good offices.

These objectives were predicated on

the understanding that "a framework for the security of humanitarian relief

operations is the sine qua non for effective action."

This message was further reinforced in another report submitted a few weeks

later to the Security Council. In view of the worsening famine situation and

widespread looting of relief materials by armed gangs, the Secretary-General in

this report recommended an immediate enlargement of on-going airlift

operations into Somalia and the establishment of "preventive zones" on the

Kenya-Somali border. Because of the massive refugee flows generated by the

Somali conflict, the proposal to establish and maintain preventive zones was

intended to "reduce significantly cross-border movements of people in search

of food" a well as to "contribute to a decrease in frictions that [were] growing

in the border area."

By the Secretariat's own estimate, this proposal would

require the deployment of "four additional United Nations security units, each

with a strength of up to 750, to protect the humanitarian convoys and

distribution centres throughout Somalia."

These requests were approved by the

Security Council in Resolution 775 of 28 August 1992.

One week later, the

Security Council approved yet another proposal from the Secretary-General to

increase the strength of UNOSOM by the deployment of three logistic units

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

For detailed analysis of the deployment of these troops, see Samuel Makinda, Seeking

Peace in Somalia, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993.

See M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution", 1994, p.12.

Robert Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", 1995, p.101.

Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Document

S/24859, New York: United Nations, 24 November 1992, p.1.

On this, Robert Patman, citing a senior UN official, writes that upon arrival in

Mogadishu, Kittani, Sahnoun's successor, "soon reached the conclusion that Aideed would

never agree to a substantial UN peacekeeping presence" (Ibid., p.102). The deterioration of the

security situation afterwards would therefore support the general assessment that Sahnoun's

comprising 719 personnel.

These increases brought the total strength of

UNOSOM to 4,219 persons by 8 September 1992.

In addition to substantially increasing its profile in Somalia through unilateral

measures, the UN Secretariat also effected major changes in its field operations

staff in Somalia. In this regard, Mohammed Sahnoun, who had strongly

protested against the Secretariat's deployment of additional UNOSOM troops

"without proper consultation," was forced to resign his appointment as the

SRSG on 27 October.

His replacement was Ismat Kittani of Iraq whose task

was to cope with increasing demand for co-ordination among expanding UN

agencies as well as national contributions to UNOSOM. Above all, Kittani also

had to contend with the worsening famine and the deteriorating security

environment in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia.

Upon his arrival in Mogadishu in October 1992, Ambassador Kittani met a far

more volatile situation than did his predecessor. As might have been expected,

General Aideed had reacted negatively to the announcement, without prior

consultation, of additional UN troop deployment by New York. Therefore,

"[c]onvinced that the UN announcement contravened his August agreement with

Sahnoun, Aideed threatened to send UN troops home in bodybags."

Like many

Somalis, he saw the announcement as a prelude to UN "invasion" of their

country. In a distress letter dispatched to the President of the Security Council

on 24 November 1992, the Secretary-General underscored the danger to the UN

operation of such a "widespread perception among Somalis that the United

Nations has decided to abandon its policy of co-operation and is planning to

"invade" the country."

This perception, along with Aideed's strong opposition

to increased UN military presence, was strengthened further by the sudden

replacement of Mohammed Sahnoun - ostensibly because of his consensual

diplomatic approach in Somalia - with Ismat Kittani as the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Somalia.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

consultative or consensual bottom-up approach to the conflict had endeared him to the locals,

including the warlords, and that this had contributed to the lack of major war between the

warring factions and UN forces as occurred after his departure. For further details, see Jeffrey

Clark, "Debacle in Somalia", 1993, pp.224-225; Samuel Makinda, Seeking Peace in Somalia,

1993; and Robert Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", 1995 p.102.

Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Document

S/24859, New York: United Nations, 24 November 1992, p.4.

Andrew Natsios, "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and US Policy", The

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No 1, 1994, p.135.

Ibid., p.144, fn. 11. Present at this meeting were President Bush (presiding); General

Colin L. Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Brent Scowcroft, National Security

Adviser; Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense; and Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of

The consequence of this development was that the general security

environment in Somalia rapidly deteriorated at a pace that required a complete

re-evaluation of the principles and methods of UNOSOM. In reporting to the

Security Council the new security challenges brought about by the pervasive

"invasion syndrome" in Mogadishu, the Secretary-General submitted that the

situation could not be halted by the military resources currently available to

UNOSOM, and recommended "the deployment... of the four additional

UNOSOM battalions... as quickly as possible."

3.2 Phase II: "Option 4", The United States,

the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and

"Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia

Despite concerted efforts by officials in Washington to treat the Somali crisis

as a humanitarian issue that was best handled by international relief agencies,

the intensity of American media focus on the failure of on-going UN

humanitarian efforts in Somalia finally brought the subject to the attention of the

White House towards the end of summer 1992. By the beginning of fall, a

consensus began to emerge in Washington (and the UN Security Council as

well) that "[o]nly a dramatic change in the security situation could hold back the

deadly slide toward national self-destruction" in Somalia.

Andrew Natsios,

who served as President Bush's co-ordinator of relief programme in Somalia,

has argued recently that the turning point in US policy towards the Somali crisis

was an Oval Office meeting of the President's National Security team in mid-

November 1992.

At that meeting, President Bush instructed his top national

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

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State.

Ibid., p. 135 (emphasis added).

Initial orders to prepare for possible deployment in Somalia were sent by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff to 1 MEF on 20 November 1992. That gave Lieutenant-General Robert Johnston,

Commander of 1 MEF, 19 days to plan to for the deployment of his forces by 9 December. For

details, see F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia", Parameters: US Army War College

Quarterly, Vol. 23, No 4, Winter 1995, pp.27-41.

DPI, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, 1994, p. 6 (emphasis added).

Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,

Document S/24868, New York: United Nations, 29 November 1992, p.1.

For details, cf. Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, London:

Macmillan Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990; Brian

Urquhart, "Beyond the

USheriff's PosseU", Survival, Vol. 32, No 3, 1990, pp.196-205;

Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping" International

Affairs, Vol. 69, No 3, 1993, pp.451-464; Nigel D. White, Keeping the Peace: The

United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security,

Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1993; and William J. Durch (ed.), The

Evolution of UN Peace Keeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, London:

Macmillan Press, 1994.

security advisers "to do whatever was necessary to stop the starvation in

Somalia."

The outcome of this process was the Bush administration's decision to

dispatch a sizeable contingent of US forces led by the First Marine

Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) to Mogadishu to ensure the safe delivery of

humanitarian aid.

This decision was communicated to the UN Secretary-

General by the US Acting Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, on 25

November 1992. According to UN sources, Mr. Eagleburger informed the

Secretary-General that "should the Security Council decide to authorise Member

States to ensure the delivery of relief supplies, the United States would be

ready to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in

which a number of other Member States would also participate."

On the

strength of this information, the Secretary-General presented to the Security

Council the following set of policy options designed to "create conditions for the

uninterrupted delivery of relief supplies to the starving people of Somalia."

Option 1: Strict adherence to the principles and practices of traditional

UN peacekeeping. This option would force the United Nations to stay the

course of traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the Charter, requiring

the consent of the parties to the conflict.

That being the case, the objectives

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,

Document S/24868, p.2.

Ibid.

Cf. Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping", International

Affairs, Vol. 69, No 3, 1993, pp.451-464; and Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the

USheriff's PosseU*",

Survival, Vol. 32, No 3, 1990, pp.196-205; John Mackinlay, "Powerful Peace-keepers",

Survival, Vol. 32, No 3, 1990, pp.241-250; and Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN

Military Operations: Implementing An Agenda for Peace", The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16,

No 1, 1993, pp.51-66.

Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,

Document S/24868, p.2.

For details, see especially Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra, "Sovereignty Is No Longer

Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention", Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 6,

1992, pp.95-117; David J. Scheffer, "Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian

Intervention", University of Toledo Law Review, No 23, Winter 1992, pp.253-293; and Guenter

Lewy, "The Case for Humanitarian Intervention", Orbis, Vol. 37, No 4, 1993, pp.621-632; and

and practices of the UNOSOM mission would proceed as planned with the

authorised deployment of additional 4,200 blue helmets if an agreement to that

effect was reached with General Aideed. The problem with this option, however,

was that

Several of the de facto authorities, including especially General Aidid, have refused

to agree to the deployment of United Nations troops in areas where the need for

humanitarian relief is most acute. Even when they have agreed, their subsequent co-

operation with UNOSOM has been at best spasmodic and, by their own admission,

they do not exercise effective authority over all the armed elements in the areas which

they claim to control.

Put simply: "[t]he reality is that there are at present very few authorities in

Somalia with whom a peace-keeping force can safely negotiate an agreed basis

for its operations."

Essentially, therefore, traditional peacekeeping does not

and cannot work in a stateless society.

That being the case, the Secretary-

General concluded that Option 1 "would not in [the] present circumstances be

an adequate response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia."

Option 2: Immediate cessation of the experiment in humanitarian

intervention. This option called for the immediate withdrawal of UN military

personnel in Somalia as a first step towards abandoning the idea of using

international military personnel to protect humanitarian activities as envisaged

by proponents of humanitarian intervention.

In the light of initial objections

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

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Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights",

International Affairs, Vol. 69, No 3, 1993, pp.429-449.

Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,

Document S/24868, p.2.

Ibid., p.3 (emphasis added).

Ibid. (emphasis added).

to the introduction of military personnel in Somalia by some humanitarian

NGOs, the Secretary-General reckoned that this option would allow the

humanitarian agencies in Somalia "to negotiate the best arrangements they can

with the various faction and clan leaders."

As in Option 1, the Secretary-

General highlighted the weaknesses of this arrangement. While acknowledging

the merits associated with Option 2, especially in the eyes of some important

non-governmental relief organisations, the Secretary-General rejected it but less

on grounds of practicality than on principle as well as the model's negative long-

term impact. In his own words:

The experience of recent months has been that, without international military

protection, the [humanitarian] agencies have felt obliged to pay what is in effect

protection money to the various factions, clans and sub-clans. If the international

community were to allow this to continue, it would be committing itself to an endless

process in which less and less of the aid it provided would reach vulnerable groups

and in which lawless trading in that aid would become, even more than at present, the

foundation of Somalia's economy. Such an outcome would encourage further

fragmentation and destroy hopes of national reconciliation.

Accordingly, the Secretary-General argued for measures that would involve

a stronger military presence because, in his view, "[t]he current difficulties are

due not to their [i.e. UN military personnel] presence but to the fact that not

enough of them are there and that they do not have the right mandate."

Option 3: Deterrence through the deployment of a massive military force

under UN command and control. This option would allow the UN to deploy

and maintain a significant military presence in Somalia beyond the level

envisaged in any of the existing resolutions. Such a force would have the means

and authority to create the conditions for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief

as well as deter local factions "from withholding co-operation from UNOSOM."

Such massive deployment would be based on the belief that "a determined show,

and if necessary use, of force by UNOSOM would be enough to convince those

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Ibid., p.4.

Report of the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, quoted in Letter from the

Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, Document S/24868, p.4.

Ibid.

who are currently abusing and exploiting the international relief effort that they

should cease their lawless activities."

Essentially, therefore, the purpose of Option 3 was to extract consent from

Somalia's warring factions through intimidation or, failing that, through the

instrument of coercion. If this option smacks of Machiavellian diplomacy, it is

because, as the following report describes it, the military scenario in Somalia

had become one of survival of the fittest.

The troops in the city number several thousand when counting all the clans, sub-clans

and free-roaming bandits. In Mogadishu South alone, there are approximately 150

"technical" vehicles. Each vehicle carries a heavy machine gun or 106 mm RR anti-

tank gun. In each of these vehicles there are 8 to 12 soldiers armed mainly with AK

47s, G3 rifles and anti-armour RPG-7. The local forces have no uniforms and no

communication... The state of training of these troops is unknown but almost all would

have some kind of combat experience and they know how to operate all their weapons.

The condition of their weapons is surprisingly good; ammunition is old but plentiful

and still operational. In addition, they have several operational armoured wheeled

vehicles with cannons of 20 mm and dump trucks with twin 30 mm AA guns. It must

be assumed that the equivalent military force exists in Mogadishu North. Both sides

have indirect fire capabilities (mortars, field guns and free flight rockets).

In the view of the SG, Option 3 suffered from one major defect, and that is

that the United Nations lacked the resources and organisational capacity to

embark on a military operation on a scale wide enough to create "conditions

throughout Somalia for the secure delivery of relief supplies."

Option 4: Recourse to a country-wide enforcement operation undertaken

by a group of Member States authorised to do so by the Security Council.

This option had all the benefits of Option 3 but without its attendant risk of

failure arising from resource as well as command and control limitations.

Barring any difficulties in assembling a group of Member States with the

capacity and willingness to undertake such a mission, Option 4 had the

advantage of accomplishing the mission of providing security for humanitarian

supplies in Somalia with limited financial burden on the United Nations. But it

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

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Ibid., p. 5 (emphasis added).

Ibid. (emphasis added).

also presented its own logistical and legal problems, and risked the possibility

of degenerating into some form of unilateralism.

In light of these limitations, the Secretary-General cautioned that "[i]f the

members of the Security Council were to favour this option, my advice would

be that the Council should seek to agree with the Member States who would

undertake the operation on ways of recognizing the fact that it had been

authorized by the Security Council and that the Security Council therefore

had a legitimate interest in the manner in which it was carried out."

He then

recommended various ways of responding to these weaknesses:

The enabling resolution could underline that the military operation was being

authorized in support of the wider mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General to

provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and reconstruction in

Somalia. The initial authorization could be for a specific period of time and the

Member States concerned could be asked to furnish the Security Council with regular

reports, on the basis of which the Council would, at specified intervals, review the

authority it had given for the operation to take place. It could also be stated in the

enabling resolution that the purpose of the operation was to resolve the immediate

security problem and that it would be replaced by a United Nations peace-keeping

operation, organized on conventional lines, as soon as the irregular groups had been

disarmed and the heavy weapons of the organized factions brought under international

control.

These proposals, aimed at limiting the action and duration of the military

operation undertaken by a group of member states, were based on the

assumption that those states would be willing to commit their forces for an

extended period of time. The events of the weeks that followed the acceptance

of this option would contradict this assumption.

Option 5: Country-wide enforcement action under UN command and

control. This option would underline the collectivity of international peace and

security under the aegis of the United Nations. However, like Option 3, the

reality was that the United Nations lacked the resources, administrative

mechanism and capability for any meaningful independent enforcement action

on a significant scale. According to the Secretary-General, "[t]he Secretariat,

already overstretched in managing greatly enlarged peace-keeping

commitments, does not at present have the capability to command and control

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Ibid.

Ibid., p. 6 (emphasis added).

United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, Document S/RES/794, New York:

United Natios, 3 December 1992, Preamble.

Ibid., para. 10 (emphasis added).

Ibid. Cf. paras. 8, 12 and 18.

an enforcement operation of the size and urgency required by the present crisis

in Somalia."

Because of this weakness, he argued and recommended that:

the Security Council take a very early decision to adjust its approach to the crisis in

Somalia... The focus of the Council's immediate action should be to create conditions

in which relief supplies can be delivered to those in need. Experience has shown that

this cannot be achieved by a United Nations operation based on the accepted principles

of peace-keeping. There is now no alternative but to resort to Chapter VII of the

Charter... If forceful action is taken, it should preferably be under United Nations

command and control. If this is not feasible, an alternative would be an operation

undertaken by Member States acting with the authorization of the Security Council.

In either case the objectives of the operation should be precisely defined and limited

in time, in order to prepare the way for a return to peace-keeping and post-conflict

peace building.

As might have been expected, the Security Council chose Option 4. The

Council's adoption of Resolution 794 by unanimous vote on December 3 1992

marked a watershed in the history of United Nations efforts in the area of

conflict resolution. Based on the argument that the "complex and extraordinary"

character of the Somali conflict called for an "immediate and exceptional

response," the Security Council determined that "the magnitude of the human

tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles

being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat

to international peace and security."

Accordingly, the Council, "[a]cting

under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations," mandated "the

Secretary-General and Member States co-operating to... use all necessary

means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian

relief operations in Somalia."

In accordance with the recommendation of the

Secretary-General, the Security Council ceded command and control of the

forces to "the Member States concerned," but requested the first of regular

reports on the progress of the operation within fifteen days of the passage of

Resolution 794.

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

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The day following the adoption of Resolution 794 by the Security Council,

US President George Bush formally announced the commencement of

"Operation Restore Hope" (ORH) which would be directed by a Unified Task

Force (UNITAF) under the command of Lieutenant-General Robert Johnston of

the US Armed Forces. The first elements of the US military contingent to ORH

landed the beaches of Mogadishu on 9 December 1992, and in no time UNITAF

was able to establish a military presence sufficient enough to deter and punish,

when necessary, the warring factions in Somalia (see Table 3.2).

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Madeleine K. Albright, US Ambassador to the United Nations, Speech to the US

Congress, USIA Wireless Service, 9 March 1995.

Table 3.2: Composition of UNITAF as at 7 January 1993

Country Troop Contribution

United States 21,000

Belgium 572

Botswana 303

Canada 1,262

Egypt 270

France 2,783

Germany 60

Italy 2,150

Kuwait 43

Morocco 1,356

New Zealand 42

Saudi Arabia 643

Turkey 309

United Kingdom

AXIMUM FORCE STRENGTH

37,000 (including 8,000 US troops

stationed at sea)

Troops forming an advance party for UNITAF were also drawn from the following countries:

Australia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, Tunisia and Zimbabwe.

By definition, UNITAF was a "non-blue helmeted" operation, that is, "an

operation in which the Security Council authorises or requests Member States

voluntarily to take certain actions" to maintain international peace and

security.

Usually, the states initiating such operations bear the financial

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

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Ibid. Aside from UNITAF, other examples of "non-blue helmeted operations" cited by

Mrs. Albright include "Operation Turquoise" undertaken in Rwanda by France; "Operation

Desert Storm" by a US-led coalition in Kuwait/Iraq; and "Operation Liberty" undertaken in

Liberia by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These are different

from "blue helmeted" operations which are authorised by the Security Council with an

established UN chain of command under which contributing states agree to place their forces.

These are the more common UN operations; they are funded entirely by the United Nations and

their operational mandates are written and approved by the Security Council.

See contributions on the subject by US officers in Dennis J. Quinn (ed.), Peace Support

Operations and the US Military, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994;

and Dick Cheney and Colin Powell, "US Mission to Somalia is Necessary and Clear", USIA

East Asia/Pacific Wireless File, 4 December 1992, p.12; Andrew Natsios, "Food Through

Force", 1994, pp.139-140. The Powell Doctrine forms the centrepiece of Presidential Decision

Directive 25 (PDD 25) - the official policy of the United States government in matters relating

to US involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. For details see The US State Department,

The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,

Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs,

Publication 10161, May 1994; and Donald C. F. Daniel, US Perspectives on Peacekeeping:

Putting PDD 25 in Context, Newport, RI: US Naval War College, Strategic Research

Department Research Memorandum 3, 1994.

Barry R. McCaffrey, "US Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations", in Dennis J.

Quinn (ed.), Peace Support Operations and the US Military, 1994, p.5.

Andrew Natsios, "Food Through Force", 1994, pp.132.

burden, in exchange for a non-UN command and control structure.

In the case

of UNITAF, the United States wrote the mandate, and it did so with the

advantage of accumulated lessons of experience from previous international

military interventions, particularly Operation Desert Storm. According to

students of US military strategy, the Pentagon plan for UNITAF was based on

the "Powell Doctrine," which calls for the deployment of massive military force

in a US operation adjudged to be "militarily do-able," with a clear political

authority (mandate), and a defined plan for entry and exit.

According to

Lieutenant-General Barry McCaffrey, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for

the US Joint Staff, this doctrine is especially important in cases of "aggravated

peacekeeping" operations, such as in Somalia, which are complicated by the

"intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, poor command and control of

belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy."

Based on

these considerations, the mandate for UNITAF was cautiously drawn up to be

limited in scope, time and objective. Consistent with its mandate, UNITAF's

operational mission statement defined the objectives of Operation Restore Hope

as:

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Barry R. McCaffrey, "US Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations", 1994, p.6.

Details of the activities of the civilian component of "Operation Restore Hope" are the

subject of a forthcoming volume by Robert Oakley and John Hirsch, Somalia and Operation

Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Washington, D.C.: USIP

Press, 1995.

a) securing seaports, airstrips, and food distribution points;

b) providing security for relief convoys and the operations of relief

agencies; and

c) assisting UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in

providing relief to the famine-stricken population.

To accomplish these mission objectives, American military planners

developed a "three-track" approach to the problem of anarchy in Somalia.

According to Lieutenant-General McCaffrey, military actions were planned, in

phases, to focus on the following tasks:

i) Establishing security in Mogadishu and other famine-stricken parts of

Somalia. This would involve a programme of voluntary disarmament and

cantonment of militia in exchange for material rewards and retraining for

civilian life;

ii) Assisting NGOs and private volunteer organisations in the delivery of

humanitarian relief. This would involve providing military escort for

humanitarian relief supplies, thus putting an end to the use of Somali

"technicals" by humanitarian agencies for providing security;

iii) Commencing early efforts to restore some semblance of law and order by

encouraging the creation of an indigenous political authority and police

force. This would involve establishing contact with, and encouraging

dialogue between, the remnants of Somalia's political, religious and

traditional elites as well as the leaders of the military factions. For this

task, the UNITAF military command sought and obtained a visible

civilian equivalent in the form of the US Liaison Office (USLO), headed

by Mr. Robert Oakley.

The US Central Command (USCENTCOM), which was in charge of the

Somali operation, planned ORH in four phases. In the first phase US marine

amphibious forces, assisted by elements of UNITAF, would secure the airfield

and seaport in Mogadishu. Thereafter the forces would move inland to secure

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

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Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United

Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, Document S/24976, 17 December

1992, Annex, p.2.

Ibid.

Ibid. (emphasis added).

Baledogle and prepare for similar operations in Baidoa. The second phase would

involve the deployment of a brigade of US Army and UNITAF forces to secure

the famine-stricken town of Baidoa and three other relief centres: Oddur, Belet

Weyne and Gialassi. During the third phase of ORH, USCENTCOM planned to

advance further south to secure the port and airfield at Kismayo, Bardera and the

land route from Bardera to Baidoa. In the fourth and final phase of the

operation, Washington hoped to "transfer... the responsibility for maintaining

a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief to United Nations

peace-keeping forces."

For reasons of domestic politics, President Bush was unwilling to commit

American troops for an extended period of military action in Somalia. Indeed,

barely one week after the commencement of Operation Restore Hope,

Washington declared its Somali mission a success and began to urge the United

Nations to commence planning for the deployment of blue helmets to take over

from UNITAF as early as March 1993. This request was formalised in a letter

circulated to members of the Security Council by Mr. Edward Perkins, US

Ambassador to the United Nations, on 17 December 1992 - just one week after

the first elements of US forces landed in Somalia. In this letter, the US

government indicated that the Somali operation was "proceeding generally as

planned" and pointed to "positive indications that operations will continue

successfully."

It then suggested that the transfer of responsibility might

proceed ahead of schedule: "This transfer may occur concurrently with other

phases as peace-keeping forces are available to assume responsibility for

secured areas."

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

See especially Robert Oakley and John Hirsch, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope,

1995.

Author's interviews with military personnel who served in Somalia, at UNIDIR,

Geneva, February-May 1995.

The Problem of Transition from UNITAF:

Differing Perspectives from the UN Secretariat

and the United States Government

US Ambassador Perkins's letter to the United Nations was the first official and

public indication of the disagreement between the UN secretariat and the Bush

administration over the objectives and duration of the US-led multinational

operation in Somalia. The disagreement centred on three critical issues: a) the

timing and scope of disarmament; b) the geographical limits of the UNITAF

mission; and c) the duration of Operation Restore Hope. As I stated earlier,

disarmament was not an integral component of US military planning for the

Somali mission. The reason is simply that the political consultations that had

taken place in Washington between the White House and the Congressional

leadership underscored caution, do-ability and the necessity for avoiding

"mission creep" as the defining variables in mobilising the support of the

American public for US military involvement abroad, even in a desperate

humanitarian situation such as Somalia's.

As far as the White House was

concerned, the basis of US political consensus on ORH would be eroded if

disarmament was inserted into the mission mandate. Such a mandate would

increase the length of the US mission as well as the risk factor - that is, the

greater likelihood of American casualties. On account of the latter, the Bush

administration did not want to tarnish its impressive military record with an

ambitious intervention in Somalia with little promise of generating political

capital for his outgoing regime. But the administration also saw the need for

some form of disarmament to be undertaken once the mission was underway. In

that case, the decision of when and to what extent Somalis would be disarmed

will be made in conformity with the military situation on the ground. Put simply,

Washington's view was that disarmament was not a priority but that it might be

undertaken if deemed necessary by the US military in Somalia. If it was

undertaken, it would be limited, voluntary and conducted on an ad hoc basis.

By contrast, the UN Secretariat viewed disarmament as a priority programme

which needed to be accomplished by UNITAF before a transition to UN

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

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On this issue, Adam Roberts has noted correctly that the UN Secretary-General was

"more hawkish than the Pentagon." See his "Humanitarian War", p.440.

Quoted in the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, Document

S/24992, New York: United Nations, 19 December 1992, p.8 (emphasis added). For further

details on the discordant exchange between the Secretary-General and President Bush, see also

Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War", 1993, pp.440-441, fn. 41.

Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War", 1993, pp.440-441.

F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia", Parameters: US Army War College

Quarterly, Vol. 23, No 4, Winter 1993/4, p.40.

command could be effected.

This position was underscored by the UN

Secretary-General in a letter he dispatched to President Bush on 8 December

1992:

... any forceful action by the international community in Somalia must have the

objective of ensuring that at least the heavy weapons of the organized factions are

neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and

gangs are disarmed. Without this action I do not believe that it will be possible to

establish the secure environment called for by the Security Council resolution...

The consequences of these differing positions for the disarmament process in

Somalia will become obvious in the discussions of chapter 4. Meanwhile,

suffice it to mention that preparations for the transition to a post-UNITAF

operation proceeded in spite of the inability of the UN and the US government

to resolve their conceptual and operational differences on this important subject.

Similar disagreements over whether and how to administer Somalia, as well as

the scope and duration of the UNITAF operation, were not resolved until the

transition to the second phase of UNOSOM in the spring of 1993.

3.3 Phase III: The Second United Nations Operation

in Somalia (UNOSOM II)

The challenges facing UNOSOM II in Somalia are much more formidable than those

faced by UNITAF. UNOSOM II has assumed responsibility for disarmament and

nation-building tasks that were outside the scope of the UNITAF mission. The

challenge for UNOSOM II is to accomplish the expanded mission without becoming

embroiled in the factional fighting to the point of backing one faction against the

others. Whether the United Nations will succeed can best be expressed by a phrase

common in the Moslem world: "En Sh

*Allah", - if it is willed by God.

F. M. Lorenz

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Quoted in the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, Document

S/25354, New York: United Nations, 3 March 1993, p.2, para. 6. UNITAF activities were

limited to the southern and central parts of Somalia, which collectively amount to 40 per cent of

the country's territory.

Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, Document S/25168, New York:

United Nations, 26 January 1993, p.4, para. 21.

Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, Document S/25354, New York:

United Nations, 3 March 1993, p.21, para. 100.

For a wider perspective on the extended mandate of UNOSOM II, cf. Boutros Boutros-

Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, New

York: The United Nations Press, 1992.

At the insistence of the United States, the UN Secretariat reluctantly began

planning for a transition from UNITAF to a second United Nations military

operation in Somalia in late January 1993. At that time, the general perception

was that the non-blue helmeted forces had brought some order to Mogadishu

and surrounding areas, thus paving the way for a more effective distribution of

relief aid to the local population. In the words of the UNITAF command, "all

areas [were] stable or relatively stable."

The reality, however, was that the

security situation in Mogadishu and in much of Somalia remained quite dicey.

According to the Secretary-General,

Whilst the general security situation has improved considerably, the security threat to

the personnel of the United Nations, UNITAF and non-governmental organizations

(NGOs) is still high in some areas of the city of Mogadishu and other places, including

Bardera, Bale Doble [sic] and Baidoa. Inter-clan fighting still tends to break out from

time to time, along with sniper attacks.

[In short], the unique features of the situation [in Somalia] continue to prevail. There

is still no effective functioning Government in the country. There is still no organized

civilian police force. There is still no disciplined national armed force. ... [T]he

atmosphere of lawlessness and tension is far from being eliminated.

Given such an environment, a post-UNITAF operation had to assume the

limited security tasks of the multinational force under Operation Restore Hope

in addition to the responsibilities for rebuilding Somali state and society in

accordance with the principles enshrined in Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for

Peace.

This was precisely what the Secretary-General recommended for

UNOSOM II.

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

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Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, Document S/25354, New York:

United Nations, 3 March 1993, p.19, para. 91 (emphasis added).

Ibid., p.13, para. 57.

The UNOSOM II Mission Mandate

The mandate of UNOSOM II is as extensive as the Secretary-General's

analysis of the problem of Somalia. In recommending the mandate for the

approval of the Security Council, the Secretary-General explained that:

The mandate for UNOSOM II... would confer authority for appropriate action,

including enforcement action as necessary, to establish throughout Somalia a secure

environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II would seek to

complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the

restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate would also empower

UNOSOM II to provide assistance to Somali people in rebuilding their shattered

economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional

structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali state based

on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and

infrastructure.

This broad mandate required UNOSOM II to undertake the following military

tasks:

a) to monitor the existing cease-fire agreement between the warring parties;

b) to prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, to take

"appropriate action against any faction that violates or threatens to violate

the cessation of hostility;"

c) to maintain control of the organised factions after their disarmament and

encampment in transition sites;

d) to secure and maintain a register of small arms seized from all

unauthorised armed elements in Somalia;

e) to maintain security of all ports, airports and lines of communication

required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance;

f) to ensure the protection of personnel, installations and equipment

belonging to the UN and humanitarian agencies;

g) to continue the de-mining programme in the most affected areas; and

h) to assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Ibid., p.22, para. 101.

Ibid.

This mandate was given legal backing by the Security Council with the

adoption of resolution 814 of 26 March 1993. UNOSOM II thus became "the

first operation of its kind to be authorized by the international community"

under UN command.

It also became an eloquent expression of the

determination of the international community "not to remain a silent spectator

to the sufferings of an entire people for no fault of their own."

Put succinctly,

UNOSOM II became the first empirical test of Boutros-Ghali's UN-centred

theory of post-Cold War international community as postulated in his Agenda

for Peace. Pursuant to the new mandate, the Secretary-General appointed

(Retired) Admiral Jonathan Howe of the United States as his new SRSG in

Somalia, and Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir of Turkey as the Force Commander

of UNOSOM II.

By April 1993, UNOSOM II had attained a significant level of military

presence following the deployment of about 18,000 multinational forces out of

a projected maximum force capacity of 28,000 troops (see Table 3.3). With

forces contributed by about thirty-three states, UNOSOM II became the largest

multinational force ever assembled under the direct control of the United

Nations Secretary-General. This fact, in addition to the extra-ordinarily wide

mandate entrusted to it, would create enormous problems for the mission,

especially in the area of command and control. Due to a combination of political

misjudgments and military miscalculations, UNOSOM II soon became

embroiled in a series of combat actions with Somali militia from May 1993

onward.

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

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Table 3.3: Composition of UNOSOM II as of 30 April 1993

Country Troops

Australia 67

Bangladesh 940

Botswana 423

Canada 2

Egypt 1,666

India 4,925

Ireland 82

Malaysia 955

Nepal 311

New Zealand 50

Nigeria 702

Pakistan 7,057

Romania 231

Zimbabwe 993

OTAL 18,404

Source: DPI (1994), United Nations Peacekeeping, New York: United Nations Department of

Public Information, p.123.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Security Council Resolution 897, Document S/RES/897, New York: United Nations, 4

February 1994, p.2.

Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, quoted in The New York Times International, 5 March 1995.

Between June and October 1993, UNOSOM II suffered heavy and humiliating

casualties on a wide scale, thereby prompting international pressure to, first,

increase its numerical strength and firepower (see Table 3.4) and, second, to

embark on a complete and critical review of its approach towards the Somali

crisis. The consequence of such a review was the rapid, albeit largely de facto

and unilateral down-sizing of the mission strength and mandate throughout

1994. The withdrawal of many national contingents from the mission, especially

those of the western countries, severely weakened the military and

psychological capability of UNOSOM II to accomplish its objectives in

Somalia. It therefore became only a matter of time before the mission would be

formally terminated. On 4 February 1994, the Security Council passed

resolution 897, "reaffirming the objective that UNOSOM II complete its mission

by March 1995."

The UN pull-out from Somalia was begun and completed

ahead of schedule. By 2 March 1995, all UN personnel had been evacuated from

Somalia, albeit without accomplishing their mission: disarming the factions and

bringing an end to the conflict. In declaring the UN Somali mission closed, the

Secretary-General lamented the failure of the Organisation to achieve its

objective in Somalia: "If there is not the political will among the protagonists,

we cannot achieve peace."

In the section that follows, I shall single out, for in-

depth examination, the implementation of the disarmament programme in the

hope of shedding some light on why the United Nations operation in Somalia

failed.

The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

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Table 3.4: Composition of UNOSOM II as of November 1993

Country Force Nomenclature and Task

Description

Total

Contribution

Australia Movement Control 48

Bangladesh Infantry Battalion 945

Belgium Brigade (BDE) HQ Infantry Battalion 948

Botswana Infantry Company 326

Canada Staff Personnel 4

Egypt Infantry Battalion 1,100

France BDE HQ, Infantry Battalion, Aviation

Unit and Logistical Battalion 1,107

Germany Logistical Units 1,726

Greece Medical Unit 102

India BDE HQ and 3 Infantry Battalions 4,937

Ireland Transport Company 79

Italy BDE HQ, 3 Infantry Battalions, Aviation

Unit, Logistical/Engineering Unit,

Medical Unit 2,576

Kuwait Infantry Company 156

Malaysia Infantry Battalion 871

Morocco Infantry Battalion and 1 Support Unit 1,424

Nepal Security Company 311

New Zealand Supply Unit 43

Nigeria Recce Battalion 614

Norway Headquarters Company 130

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Pakistan BDE HQ, Infantry Battalions, 4 Tank

Squadrons, Signal Unit and Support Unit

5,005

Republic of Korea Engineer Battalion 252

Romania Field Hospital 236

Saudi Arabia Infantry Battalion 757

Sweden Field Hospital 148

Tunisia Infantry Company 142

Turkey Infantry Battalion 320

United Arab

Emirates

Infantry Battalion

662

United States Logistical Units 3,017*

Zimbabwe Infantry Battalion and Signal Company 958

Composite Military Police Company 100

Composite Headquarters Staff 240

RAND TOTAL 29,284

* This figure includes only those US forces under United Nations command. There were also

about 17,700 troops (including the Quick Reaction Force) belonging to the United States Joint

Task Force in Somalia, but under the sole command of the United States.

Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, Document S/25354, para. 100,

New York: United Nations, 3 March 1993, p.22.

Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response", in Lori F.

Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, New York:

Council on Foreign Relations Press, p.231.

Chapter 4

The Task of Implementing the Disarmament

Mandate in Somalia

Disarming the factions and placing their heavy weaponry under international control

for eventual destruction or placement at the disposal of the new national army of

Somalia is, in my view, the most urgent and pressing task for UNOSOM II.

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Any disarmament or political agreement [in Somalia] will rest as much upon the

appearance of alternatives to the thousands of militia members conditioned to

surviving by force as it will upon the restoration of civilian administration of the

country.

Jeffrey Clark

As stated in the preceding section, there were two differing views on

disarmament in Somalia. First, the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat

saw disarmament as central to any international effort at restoring security and

ensuring the efficient distribution of humanitarian aid in Somalia. In other

words, the United Nations held the view that disarmament was the raison d

être

for international military intervention in Somalia. Second, and by contrast, the

United States appreciated the importance of disarmament but not well enough

to have it written into the mission mandate. The consequence of this divergence

was a situation in which the organisation which desired the vigorous

implementation of a disarmament programme in Somalia lacked the capability

necessary to back it up, whereas the body with the capacity to disarm Somali

units and irregulars lacked the will to do so. As the discussions that follow will

soon demonstrate, this disequilibrium between political will and capability had

a profound impact on the conception and implementation of a disarmament

programme in Somalia.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

See UNIDIR's DCR project definition as per Practitioners' Questionnaire, January 1995,

pp.v-vi.

Security Council Resolution 733, Document S/RES/733, para. 5, New York: United

Nations, 23 January 1992, p.2.

4.1 Disarmament as a Mission Task in Somalia

As a concept, disarmament involves deliberate efforts to limit, reduce, abolish

and/or destroy weapons and force structures of real or potential military/combat

value. Such measures include the establishment of weapons exclusion zones, the

collection and/or seizure of weapons for storage or destruction, the imposition

of arms embargoes, demining activities, the imposition of restrictions on the

number and movement of troops, as well as the cantonment and demobilisation

of troops and armed individuals.

In Somalia, all of these elements of

disarmament were mandated and/or implemented as mission objectives with

varying degrees of difficulty and success.

The United Nations disarmament policy and programme in Somalia began

with the adoption of Resolution 733 on 23 January 1992 by the Security

Council. In that resolution, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the

UN Charter, decided that "all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace

and stability in Somalia immediately implement a general and complete

embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until

the Security Council decides otherwise."

International compliance with the

arms embargo relied on the goodwill of Member States. States were merely

enjoined to respect the embargo and to refrain from any action which might

contribute to the escalation of tension in Somalia. However, arms continued to

find their way into Somalia through the country's land and sea borders. With the

sudden collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, Somalia was awash with

weapons which were easily transported by fleeing Ethiopian forces across the

border from the Ogaden region. To put the problem in perspective, Table 4.1

shows the dollar value of weapons that were freely circulating along the

Somali/Ethiopian border as a consequence of the simultaneous collapse of the

Barre and Mengistu regimes. Excluding the lucrative arms trade originating

from Kenya, statistics show that more than US$18.26 billion worth of arms and

ammunitions imported by Ethiopia and Somalia between 1972-1990 had

circulated in and around Somalia since the outbreak of conflict. In comparative

terms, this figure more than doubles the combined dollar value of all weapons

imported during the same period by South Africa, Nigeria and Zimbabwe - the

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see comments in point 7 on "Bottom-Up

Changes: disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission".

three major arms importing states in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 4.1). In the

absence of any significant military presence to monitor borders and enforce the

embargo, these weapons, of varying degrees of lethality, continued to flow

freely into Somalia. This had the effect of rendering the UN arms embargo

ineffective as a means of disarmament in Somalia.

Table 4.1: Comparative Statistics of Arms Deliveries

to the States of the Horn and Three Leading Arms

Importers in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1972-1990 (in US $)

1972-1979 1980-1990

Somalia 1,734 1,108

Ethiopia 4,970 10,449

Kenya 465 729

Nigeria 830 3,598

Zimbabwe 163 846

South Africa 2,144 276

Source: Joseph Smaldone, "Arms Transfers and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: Arms Control and

Humanitarian Implications - A Preliminary Analysis", Paper presented at the 37th Annual African

Studies Association Meeting, Toronto, Canada, 3-6 November 1994, p.9.

The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), which was

authorised in April 1992 by resolution 751, established a United Nations

military presence in Somalia with a token force of 50 observers. Although

additional troop deployment was authorised by subsequent resolutions, the

strength and capability of UNOSOM I remained modest and hopelessly

inadequate even for the limited purpose of policing Somalia's vast land and

coastal borders.

In operational terms, short of relying on the "soft power"

inherent in their physical presence in Somalia, UNOSOM I lacked any coercive

capability to implement their mandate, namely: monitoring the arms embargo

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see comments in point 7 on "Bottom-Up

Changes: disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission".

and the cease-fire agreement between Somali factions; providing security for

UN personnel, equipment and supplies in Mogadishu; and escorting

humanitarian relief supplies to distribution centres. The glaring failure of this

mission in the face of over-armed Somali gangs forced the United Nations to

seriously consider other measures to achieve security through a programme of

disarmament in Somalia. The enforcement powers granted to UNITAF in

December 1992 were designed to enable the multinational forces to establish

security in Somalia, if need be through coercive disarmament.

4.2 The Evolution of an Overall Concept

and Plan of Disarmament in Somalia

The first serious all-party effort to initiate and execute an overall concept and

plan of disarmament on any significant scale in Somalia began in January 1993

following a series of agreements reached by a dozen Somali factions attending

a UN-sponsored peace conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. For purposes of

emphasis, Annex III (Part I) of that agreement, spelling out the modalities for

disarmament, shall be cited in full:

1.1 All heavy weaponry under the control of political movements shall be handed over

to a cease-fire monitoring group for safekeeping until such a time as a legitimate

Somali Government can take them over. This process shall commence immediately and

be completed in March 1993.

1.2 The militias of all political movements shall be encamped in appropriate areas

outside major towns where the encampment will not pose difficulties for peace. The

encamped militias shall be disarmed following a process which will commence as soon

as possible. This action shall be carried out simultaneously throughout Somalia. The

international community will be requested to provide the encamped militias with

upkeep.

1.3 The future status of the encamped militia shall be decided at the time of the final

political settlement in Somalia. Meanwhile, the international community will be

requested to assist in training them for civilian skills in preparation for possible

demobilization.

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament, in Report

of the Secretary-General, Document S/25168, Annex III, New York: United Nations, 26

January 1993, p.14.

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are defined as "the means by which... national Command

Authorities and the military chain of command authorize subordinate commanders to employ

military force" in a theatre of operation. However, "[n]othing in the rules of engagement

negates the commander's right and obligation to act in defense of his unit." See F. M. Lorenz,

"Law and Anarchy in Somalia", Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Vol. 23, No 4,

Winter 1993/94, p.29.

The term "technicals" is "a symbol of mobile destructiveness in Somalia", resulting from

an admixture of human cruelty and technical capacity for destruction. Technical vehicles are

trucks refitted to carry crew-served weapons. According to Lorenz, the term "came from the

humanitarian relief organizations, which justified expenses for gunmen and security guards as

Utechnical assistantsU" (ibid., p.40, fn. 3). See also Questionnaire Analysis

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, point 7 on "Bottom-Up Changes: disputes among the warring parties

arising during the mission".

1.4 All other armed elements, including bandits, shall be disarmed immediately and

assisted through rehabilitation and integration into civil society.

Disarmament Under UNITAF: Mission de Facto

For political and logistical reasons, UNITAF did not seek to oversee or

enforce the implementation of the disarmament programme as envisaged by the

Addis Ababa agreement of 8 January 1993. As stated in Chapter 3, disarmament

was not written into the mandate of the UNITAF mission largely because of US

opposition. The Bush Administration took the view that the task of disarming

Somali irregular and organised militia should be an operational decision to be

made by the Field Commander as and when the need arose. Consequently, in

planning for ORH, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) in Florida

ensured that adequate allowances were made for the possibility that the troops

might take on the task of disarmament as a secondary mission objective. This

was reflected in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) issued to US soldiers at the

start of the operation.

According to Colonel F.M. Lorenz of the United States

Marine Corps, UNITAF ROE were tailored specifically to deal with the "special

circumstances in Somalia," particularly the threat posed to troop security by

armed gangs and "technical vehicles."

In this regard, part of the ROE

specifically stated that:

Crew served weapons are considered a threat to UNITAF forces and the relief effort

whether or not the crew demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

F. M. Lorenz, "Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were They Effective?", draft

manuscript for the Naval Law Review, May 1995, p.2 (emphasis in the original but not in

ROE).

F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia", 1993/94, p.29.

all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew served weapons in their area of

operations... Within areas under the control of UNITAF Forces, armed individuals

may be considered a threat to UNITAF and the relief effort whether or not the

individual demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all

necessary force to disarm individuals in areas under the control of UNITAF. Absent

a hostile or criminal act, individuals and associated vehicles will be released after any

weapons are removed/demilitarized.

Couched in this way, UNITAF ROE provided for flexibility, thereby

permitting the use of personal initiative on the part of the individual UNITAF

field commander and/or soldier in challenging armed individuals and gangs.

Obviously, the ROE singled out technicals as a threat, while armed individuals

were not so clearly perceived. Generally speaking, this distinction between

Somali individual and gangs/groups was evident in the declassified section of

the ROE which was later "issued on a card for all personnel of Unified Task

Force, Somalia" (see Table 4.2, Section C).

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

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Table 4.2: The Rules of Engagement for US-UNITAF

JTF FOR SOMALIA RELIEF OPERATION

GROUND FORCES RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Nothing in these Rules of Engagement Limits Your Right

to Take appropriate Action to Defend Yourself and Your Unit

A. You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or

threats of attack.

B. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a

hostile act.

C. When US forces are attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs,

and/or rioters, US forces should use the minimum force necessary

under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.

D. You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your

mission.

E. Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-

defence.

REMEMBER

1. The United states is not at war.

2. Treat all persons with dignity and respect.

3. Use minimum force to carry out mission.

4. Always be prepared to act in self-defence.

Source: F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia", Parameters: US Army War College

Quarterly, Vol. 23, No 4, Winter 1993/94, p.30.

Although General Johnston, UNITAF Commander, had stated on several

occasions that disarmament was not part of his mission mandate, he did permit

his senior policy staff to experiment with different models for achieving

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Ibid., p.31.

disarmament in Somalia. The first of such experiments was a weapons incentive

programme, involving "food for guns" rather than the more widely known

alternative, "cash for guns," which had been successfully employed to disarm

Panamanian forces in 1990. Two reasons accounted for the choice of the food-

based incentive as a means of disarmament in Somalia. The first was that

UNITAF policy makers feared that the collapse of the Somali state and the

country's porous borders would pose a serious impediment to successful

disarmament through monetary inducements. According to Lorenz,

... the program potentially would have disarmed the hungry people who needed

protection from the bandits. A cash-for-weapons program also would have run the risk

of creating more crime by encouraging bandits to steal weapons to turn in, or providing

incentives for arms dealers to import more weapons from other parts of East Africa.

The second and by far more plausible reason is that because disarmament was

not part of its mandate, UNITAF did not make adequate financial provisions to

support such a resource-consuming programme as a cash-for-arms scheme.

Consequently, in the penultimate week of January 1993, the Force Command

permitted a small-scale experiment with a food-for-weapons program. Under

this program, US Marines issued special receipts for every weapon turned in as

well as for information leading to the location and seizure of weapons and

ammunitions. These receipts conferred on the holders the privileged status of

"the good guys" in the eyes of the Marines. (Under conditions of anarchy, this

intangible gesture could make the difference between life and death). These

receipts also had a tangible benefit: they could be presented to relief agencies

in exchange for bags of wheat. Given the acute famine situation in the country,

many Somalis preferred to cash their receipts for bags of wheat. With so little

food relative to weapons in Somalia, in no time tension began to mount between

humanitarian relief agencies and the UNITAF command. In late January,

General Johnston decided not to extend the weapons incentive programme

beyond its experimental zone, which was only a single sector of south

Mogadishu. This decision left weapons confiscation as the other viable means

of implementing a disarmament programme in Somalia.

UNITAF's weapons confiscation policy derived its authority from: a) the

mission mandate authorising the use of "all necessary means" to assure the

delivery of relief aid; and b) the section of the Rules of Engagement which

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Ibid.

Lieutenant Colonel Sam Butler, interview with the author, 21 March 1995.

On the other hand, questionnaire responses point to circumstances forcing

civilian/military components to work together during UNITAF operations. The arrival of UN

bureaucracy at UNOSOM II generated therefore some resentment and initially restricted

goodwill. See Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, point 20 on "Comments on

Interaction".

defined crew-served weapons (i.e. technicals) and armed individuals as threats

to the individual soldier and to the overall mission. To avoid complicating the

task of the field commanders and troops, the Force Command's weapons

confiscation policy avoided listing categories of weapons covered by the

programme. Consequently, according to Lorenz, "Commanders were justifiably

reluctant to issue complex confiscation rules that required the use of a reference

book or a legal interpretation before a weapon could be taken."

The policy

simply required troops to confiscate "all crew-served weapons and individual

weapons displayed openly or brandished with hostile intent."

In effect, this

meant that individual Somalis could keep weapons at home, and indeed could

carry weapons on them insofar as these weapons were hidden from UNITAF

soldiers. Even where personal weapons were "displayed," the confiscation

policy required individual UNITAF troops to exercise personal judgement in

determining whether the weapons so displayed posed a threat to their life.

Essentially, therefore, the new policy was a middle ground between doing

nothing about disarmament and expending too much political and military

capital on disarmament. Consequently, whilst they were still in awe of the

overwhelming foreign military presence, Somalis took advantage of UNITAF's

rather benign posture and disarmament policy, hiding their weapons in their

homes and other places considered to be safe. The organised militia merely

pulled back to the villages and outlying districts, waiting for an opportune time

to return to the streets. Surprisingly, UNITAF authorities considered this

outcome to be evidence of the success of their disarmament policy. As one

participant quipped in a recent interview: "What if Somalis buried their guns

under their pillows? Insofar as they did not bring their guns out on the streets to

disrupt relief supplies, we think our mission was accomplished."

The initial implementation of the weapons confiscation policy brought

UNITAF and the humanitarian relief organisations on a collision course.

In the

context of Somali anarchy, HROs had, over the years, developed coping

strategies which allowed them to deliver services to ordinary Somalis. One of

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

See Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002 in point 7 on "Bottom-Up Changes:

disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission".

F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia", 1993/94, pp.31-32 (emphasis added).

See Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002 in point 8 on "Protection of the

Population During the Mission".

Ibid., p.40, fn. 11.

these mechanisms involved the recruitment of "technicals" as security guards for

their convoys and storage depots.

In many cases, some of these guards turned

out to be extortionists and bandits whose victims often included goods and

personnel belonging to the HROs. As Colonel Lorenz recounts,

The HROs are the heart of the Somali relief effort, and the mission of UNITAF was

to make the environment secure for the relief organizations to do their work. Before

the arrival of UNITAF, conditions in Somalia made it necessary for HROs to have a

system of

#security guards* to conduct business. In Somalia there is a fine line between

honest labor and extortion, so it was often difficult to distinguish security guards from

bandits. What little economy was left in Somalia was based on the delivery of relief

supplies, and security was a large part of the cost of doing business. The most reliable

security personnel worked and lived in the walled compounds of the HROs. Other

security personnel were

#day hires*; they reported for duty in the morning and left

before dark. There was some concern among UNITAF commanders that many of the

day hires turned to banditry at night. If so, the HROs were unwittingly contributing to

a system that rewarded extortion and made banditry profitable.

Based on this perception, many commanders ordered their troops to crack

down on those bandits who marauded their zones of operation. That meant

disarming every armed individual on sight, even if the individual was in the

service of HROs. In the absence of standardised rules governing weapons

confiscation, every operational zone had its own rules, and this created a

nightmare for relief organisations whose personnel often traversed several

operational zones in the course of their daily missions.

Situations arose

whereby the disarmament of every armed individual was compulsory in one

zone but merely conditional in another. According to Lorenz, "[o]n some

occasions all weapons in a vehicle were confiscated; on other occasions only

weapons that were openly brandished were taken. At times, all occupants of the

vehicles, including HRO officials, were required to exit and stand back from the

vehicles while a detailed search was conducted."

The danger resulting from

such inconsistency in rule-setting and rule-application was that "if a relief

vehicle travelled between sectors and different rules were in effect in each

sector, the relief organisation faced the risk that its weapons would be

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Ibid., p.32.

Ibid.

See Kenneth Allard, Somalia: Lessons Learned, Washington, D.C.: National Defense

University Press, esp. Chapters 1-2, 1995.

confiscated in one sector and its personnel would be defenceless when entering

the adjacent sector," for "it remained impossible to guarantee the security of

HROs, particularly in the outlying areas beyond UNITAF control."

The actual

confiscation of weapons belonging to HRO guards during the early period of

disarmament implementation prompted high-level HRO officials to petition

UNITAF through the Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC).

In mid-January 1993, UNITAF responded to the accumulating petitions by

returning confiscated weapons to the HROs, pending the standardisation of rules

governing the confiscation of weapons. Such reversal of policy in the middle of

programme execution resulted in the asphyxiation of the disarmament process.

In April UNITAF issued a standard weapons policy card in both English and

Somali, which was to be applicable in all sectors under its control. According

to Lorenz, "[t]his card spelled out clearly in words and pictures the few rules

that governed who could possess a weapon, what weapons were prohibited, how

weapons could be carried, and what acts would result in confiscation of a

weapon."

Although this "card finally cleared up most of the confusion,

significantly improving relations between UNITAF and the HROs,"

the

disarmament process lost its steam and did not regain any significant momentum

until the period of transition to UNOSOM II.

Disarmament Under UNOSOM II: Mission de Jure

As the foregoing section has demonstrated, UNITAF embarked on

disarmament as a response to the operational conditions of anarchy in

Mogadishu. Not surprisingly, although some weapons were seized by UN forces

from Somali gangs, especially the "technicals," such seizures were not

widespread, were certainly not country-wide, and were not part of any grand

design for disarmament as a mission goal.

Indeed, it was only in the weeks

leading up to the transition to UNOSOM II that a small policy unit named the

"Future Operations Office," comprised of senior officers drawn from UNITAF

and the Operations Branch of UNOSOM I, was established to develop an overall

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Report of the Secretary-General, Document S/25354, New York: United Nations, 3

March 1993, p.14, para. 61.

Ibid., para. 62.

disarmament concept and plan for UNOSOM II using the Addis Ababa

agreement as a basis.

The overall concept and plan for disarmament which emerged from that

committee was presented by the Secretary-General to the Security Council for

approval. This plan contained the following distinctive features:

i) Disarmament as a continuous and irreversible process. The idea was to

extend the process of disarmament as long as it was considered necessary

or until an effective central government had been formed in Somalia. In this

way, the disarmament process would not expose compliant elements within

the population to the danger arising from mid-course policy reversal;

ii) Disarmament effected through a simple and standardised mechanism.

For purposes of fairness to all parties involved in the disarmament

programme, this provision called for a uniform mechanism for disarming

all factions. This mechanism involved the use of opposing militias within

zones and sites mutually identified and accepted for purposes of

cantonment prior to the commencement of the operation. As a

consequence, "[o]nce a faction had committed itself to disarmament by

placing its heavy weapons in cantonment sites or relinquishing its small

arms at a transition site, it would not be entitled to reclaim those

weapons."

iii) Disarmament as voluntary and consensual, to whatever extent possible.

This provision called for a continuous process of confidence-building

between the United Nations and Somali factions through regular contacts

and meetings with the leaders of the militias. It was envisaged that this

would "place political pressure on factions that [sought] to delay or

fail[ed] to comply with the disarmament process and would provide a

sense of security for the factions complying with that process."

Furthermore, to encourage the process of voluntary disarmament, the

plan called for the provision of individual incentives to Somali factions

and militia. The idea was that the provision of monetary or material

incentives in exchange for voluntary disarmament would provide Somali

warlords with the opportunity to utilise UN resources to effectively

bankroll the retrenchment of their largely undisciplined and potentially

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Ibid., para. 63.

Ibid., para. 65.

Ibid.

Ibid., para. 66.

mutinous militia, the majority of whom received little more than meagre

rations of food and qat in lieu of salary. For the UN, it was calculated that

the benefit of early retrenchment and demobilisation of the militia would

be to hasten the process of peaceful resolution of the conflict, and for that

reason it was worth the cost of the material inducements. Essentially,

therefore, this was the "carrot" factor in the programme;

iv) Disarmament as also enforceable. Regarded as the "stick" factor in the

programme, this provision required that "[t]hose factions or personnel

who fail[ed] to comply with timetables or other modalities of the process

would have their weapons and equipment confiscated and/or

destroyed";

v) Disarmament utilising cantonment and transition sites, to be established

and maintained under UN protection. According to the plan, a

cantonment was defined as "a location where heavy weapons, including

all crew-served weapons and anti-armour weapons/rockets, would be

stored."

Transition sites referred to locations where "factional forces

would be given temporary accommodation while they turned in their

small arms, registered for future governmental and non-governmental

support and received guidance and training for their eventual

reintegration in civilian life."

Put simply, the mechanism provided for

armed Somali individuals or groups to walk into a designated area (i.e.,

a cantonment) and hand in their weapons to UN officials selected for this

purpose. These officials would receive and register the weapons in a log

book, and direct the Somalis to another location - a transition site - where

their security and welfare would thenceforth become the responsibility

of the United Nations until their reintegration into post-conflict life. For

reasons of safety and security, the plan required that "cantonment and

transition sites should be separated from each other to prevent any

temptation by factions or groups to seize the heavy weapons."

weapons placed under UN control could be withdrawn by the militia.

Those weapons and ammunition that had been deemed suitable or

maintainable by UN officials would be stored in the cantonment sites for

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))

Author's interviews with military personnel who served in Somalia, Geneva, March 1995.

the use of a future Somali government. Those adjudged to be

unserviceable or unsuitable would be destroyed by the UN team;

vi) UNOSOM II access to transition sites as unlimited. This was essentially

a verification mechanism which allowed the United Nations to ensure full

compliance with the conditions and provisions of the disarmament

programme by the warring factions in Somalia. It permitted UN teams to

visit the sites regularly, unconditionally and without prior notice to

ensure strict adherence by all parties to the programme.

By the end of April, UNITAF and the UN had completed an operational plan

for a "continuous and irreversible" process of disarmament in Somalia. At this

stage, according to some sources, the Force Command and staff of UNITAF

began to see disarmament as an important, even if unmandated, component of

their mission in Somalia.

This change of perception led to an early effort on

the part of UNITAF to put into operation the new plan for disarmament. This

began with the establishment of a disarmament priority within the Force

Command. Based on this priority, force projection and operational assessments

were made which resulted in the establishment of a Cease-fire and Disarmament

Division within the Force Command. Consequent upon this development, a US

Lieutenant Colonel was appointed as the disarmament chief, with the task of

developing a specialised staff structure for the new division. His

recommendation was that the division required six teams, each comprising 38

troops, for the discharge of its functions. The Force Command decided, albeit

erroneously, to limit the manning of the Disarmament Division based on its own

evaluation that the bulk of disarmament operations might not start until late

summer or early spring (i.e., August/September) l993.

The August/September time-frame for the commencement of disarmament

operations was determined by, among other factors, assessments of logistics

requirements for the operations. The Force Command calculated that there

would be a significant reduction in the number of troops once the transition to

UNOSOM II was underway. Worse still, it assessed that the bulk of the troops

contributed to UNOSOM II would not be deployed until the fall. Accordingly,

the Force Command directed that any decision to embark upon disarmament

operations must be contingent upon the Command's ability to generate forces in

the selected disarmament zones or theatres. It was on this basis that the UNITAF

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

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Force Command rejected the suggestion made jointly by the Political Affairs

Branch and the Somali Cease-fire and Disarmament Committee that the most

urgent task was to disarm militia based around Lower Juba and Kismayo in light

of repeated cases of violence emanating from that region. For the Force

Command, that area was not ripe for disarmament because UNITAF did not

enjoy a military advantage in terms of manpower and firepower.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Table 4.3: The Rules of Engagement for UNOSOM II

1. UNOSOM PERSONNEL MAY USE DEADLY FORCE:

a. To defend themselves, other UN lives, or persons and areas under their

protection against hostile acts or hostile intent.

b. To resist attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force from

discharging its duties.

2. CHALLENGING

a. Whenever practicable, a challenge should be given before using deadly

force.

b. Challenging is done by:

(i) Shouting in English: "UN, STOP OR I FIRE" or

(ii) Shouting in Somali: "UN, KA HANAGA JOOGO AMA WAA

GUBAN"

(iii) Firing warning shots in the air.

3. PRINCIPLES FOR USE OF FORCE

When it becomes necessary to use force, the following principles apply:

a. Action which may reasonably be expected to cause excessive collateral

damage is prohibited.

b. Reprisals is [sic] forbidden.

c. Minimum force is to be used at all times.

4. SPECIFIC RULES

a. UNOSOM Forces may use deadly force in response to a hostile act or

when there is clear evidence of hostile intent.

b. Crew-served weapons are considered a threat to UNOSOM Forces and

the relief effort whether or not the crew demonstrates hostile intent.

Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to confiscate and

demilitarize crew-served weapons in their area of operations.

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

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c. Within those areas under the control of UNOSOM Forces armed

individuals may be considered a threat to UNOSOM and the relief

effort whether or not the individual demonstrates hostile intent.

Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to disarm and

demilitarize groups or individuals in those areas under the control of

UNOSOM. Absent a hostile or criminal act, individuals and associated

vehicles will be released after any weapons are removed/demilitarized.

d. If UNOSOM Forces are attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile

elements, mobs and/or rioters, UNOSOM Forces are authorized to

employ reasonable minimum force to repel the attacks or threats.

UNOSOM Forces may also employ the following procedures: verbal

warnings to demonstrators, shows of force including use of riot control

formations, and warning shots.

e. UNATTENDED MEANS OF FORCE. Unattended means of force,

including bobby traps, mines, and trip guns, are not authorized.

f. DETENTION OF PERSONNEL. Personnel who interfere with the

accomplishment of the mission or who otherwise use or threaten deadly

force against UNOSOM, UN or relief material, distribution sites, or

convoys may be detained. Persons who commit criminal acts in areas

under the control of UN Forces may likewise be detained. Detained

persons will be evacuated to a designated location for turn/over [sic] to

military police.

5. DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are used:

a. SELF DEFENCE

Action to protect oneself or ones [sic] unit against a hostile act or

hostile intent.

b. HOSTILE ACT

The use of force against UNOSOM personnel or mission-essential

property, or against personnel in an area under UNOSOM

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Lieutenant Colonel Sam Butler, telephone interview with the author, 21 March 1995.

Author's interviews with military personnel who served in Somalia, Geneva, February-

May 1995.

c. HOSTILE INTENT

The threat of imminent use of force against UNOSOM Forces or

other persons in those areas under the control of UNOSOM.

d. MINIMUM FORCE

The minimum authorised degree of force which is necessary,

reasonable and lawful in the circumstances.

6. Only the Force Commander, UNOSOM, may approve changes to

these ROE.

Source: UNOSOM II (1993), Rules of Engagement (ROE), Mogadishu (NT3224), Somalia,

021200C May 1993, Appendix 6, Annex C to UNOSOM II OPLAN 1, pp. C-61-C-63.

The policy of initiating disarmament operations only when they were most

likely to take full advantage of the capabilities of the multinational force was

inherited by the new UNOSOM II Force Command which, during the early

phases of the mission, sought to utilise as much of the experiences of UNITAF

as possible.

The new Force Command limited disarmament operations to areas

already under the military and political control of UNOSOM II. In May 1993,

that meant the south-central part of Mogadishu, which it currently occupied

while awaiting the deployment of its complete requirement of forces from troop-

contributing states. According to some sources, the rationale for the limiting

strategy was that if the Force Command initiated disarmament in an area

manned by a relatively immature brigade or contingent, that would increase the

risk to all parties - Somalis and multinational forces alike.

Accordingly, the

operational procedure required that the SRSG and the Force Commander would

jointly determine whether or not the operational situation on the ground was

such that it would guarantee a successful disarmament operation by forces

belonging to UNOSOM II.

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

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Lieutenant Colonel Sam Butler, interview with the author, 21 March 1995.

Author's interviews with military personnel who served in Somalia, Geneva, February-

May 1995.

The deterioration of the security situation in Somalia following the transition

to UNOSOM II forced a revision of the original concept of disarmament in two

significant ways. First, the Force Command took a

#tougher* stand on the timing

and initiation of disarmament operations. This was a direct consequence of

increases in the sporadic outbreaks of violence across Somalia from May 1993

onwards. The renewal of violent clashes between Somali militia and the

multinational forces made it more difficult to determine where and when the

conditions existed for a successful disarmament operation. Consequently, rather

than initiate operations in areas that were already "secured" by UNOSOM II,

Force Command launched disarmament operations in areas that were deemed

to be necessary, even though the attendant risks were much higher. In this

regard, the defining moment was the outbreak of violence in Kismayo in spring

1993, involving 150 members of the SPM-SNA led by Colonel Ahmed Omar

Jess. Angered by widespread suspicions that UNOSOM was supporting General

Mohamed Hersi Morgan's camp in Kismayo, and attempting in the process to

frustrate the Ogadenis and the SPM out of the city, Colonel Jess had ordered the

attack in an attempt to drive pro-Morgan forces out of Kismayo. In the process,

Jess had also inflicted casualties on elements of the Belgian contingent which

had engaged his forces in the city. Thenceforth, UNOSOM Force Command

adopted the position that violations of the disarmament process by any Somali

faction were tantamount to an attempt to disrupt UNOSOM II. Put simply,

"Force Command ceased to treat Somali militias with kids' gloves."

Second, and following from the former, Force Command embarked on a

rethinking of its original concept of disarmament, especially in light of increased

opposition from humanitarian agencies to the idea of "inducements" for

voluntary disarmament. According to some sources, the Director of

Humanitarian Relief in Somalia had notified the Force Command that the

concept of providing factional militia with cash and other incentives was not

"supportable."

The apparent reason for the disapproval was that many donor

agencies believed that the original UNITAF idea was morally repugnant because

it amounted to rewarding the militias and the warlords for their brutality towards

Somalis. This decision, which was based on ethical concerns raised by some

important NGOs, and the serious resource problems posed by the weapons buy-

back scheme from the original disarmament plan, resulted in the issuance of a

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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new directive by the Force Command. The new directive instructed the

Operations Branch of the Cease-fire and Disarmament Division to reassess the

basic concept of disarmament inherited from UNITAF. For reasons of

expediency, this review produced a four-stage evolutionary concept of "limited

disarmament." The new concept was premised on the proposition that the

Somali society could not be completely disarmed. For this reason, the

programme of disarmament would be limited to two modest objectives:

i) minimising the threat of organised violence designed to enhance the

relative position and political objective of one faction vis-à-vis the

others; and

ii) re-establishing as soon as possible some basic institutions of law and

order, especially civilian police and the judicial system.

4.3 The New Four-Stage Concept of Disarmament

Stage 1: Creating an environment for disarmament. At this stage,

operational activities would focus on the selection and preparation of areas or

zones for initiating disarmament operations. This stage would be characterised

by increased civil-military relations involving the personnel of UNOSOM II, the

leaders of local militia, clan elders and other influential figures in the selected

areas of operation. During this phase, the military activities of UNOSOM II

were to be restricted to weapons registration, the identification of cantonment

and transition sites, the selection of an appropriate development project for the

region, and the constitution of functional disarmament teams for the particular

area of operation.

Stage 2: Commencement of overt military action within selected zones to

effect disarmament. In this regard, UNOSOM II would increase the frequency

of its unit operations in specific zones. The main target of these operations

would be factional militia or armed Somalis in general. The activities to be

undertaken at this stage included the preparation of plans for the cantonment of

heavy weapons; increases in the extent and frequency of contacts between the

United Nations and various Somali militia; the training of civil police in areas

of operation; and the conduct of military support operations such as cordon and

search/rescue missions, and supply route and general area reconnaissance

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

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missions. These activities were designed to demonstrate and communicate to

Somali factions the capability and commitment of UNOSOM II to seize all

unauthorised weapons and/or neutralise the dangerous activities of armed gangs

and organised militia.

Stage 3: The threshold of final disarmament. Activities during this phase

of operations were designed to effectively integrate all UN operations conducted

against Somali militia by several brigades in the various theatres of operation

within a specific zone of operation. The types of actions expected at this stage

of the disarmament process included the actual disarming of all militia, the

cantoning of heavy weapons under UN control, the destruction of weapons

adjudged to be useless or unsuitable, the transportation of selected weapons to

predetermined storage sites for eventual use by a future Somali government, the

conduct of large-scale disarmament verification missions, and the ensurance of

security and strict compliance with the UN arms embargo at Somalia's major

ports of entry and other border crossing communities.

Stage 4: The era of consolidation and widespread security through

disarmament in Somalia. The last of the four stages, this phase was to mark the

conclusion of the disarmament process in Somalia under the auspices of

UNOSOM II. The highlight of this stage was the disengagement of the factional

militias in the designated area of operation and the coming into force of the

United Nations weapons policy in the area. In the new secure environment,

nation-building activities by UN agencies and NGOs would become fully

operational, and the majority of the social infrastructure such as schools, potable

water, medical facilities and electricity would have been built or reactivated to

support post-conflict civilian life. At this stage, the cantonment of weapons and

disarmament inspections would have been completed as well, with the UN

assuming responsibility for the security and protection of the disarmed militia

and the returning civilian population. In addition, a civilian police force was

expected to be in place to assume primary responsibility for the maintenance of

law and order in the new society. Getting to this phase was dependent on the

success of the preceding phases as well as the expectation of a high degree of

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see point 7 on "Bottom-Up Changes:

disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission", point 8 on "Protection of the

Population During the Mission", and point 10 on "Force Composition and Force Structure".

The military, however, countered this claim, asserting that the original concept of

disarmament was the product of co-ordinated work between the political branch which

sponsored the Addis Ababa conference, the humanitarian division which provided most of the

participants at the conference and the committees established thereafter, and the military branch

which developed and sponsored the disarmament concept.

Author's interviews, Geneva, February-April 1995.

co-operation among the various UN agencies, including relief NGOs, and

between humanitarian agencies and the Force Command.

As stated earlier, the new four-stage concept of disarmament resulted from the

realisation that the original concept inherited from UNITAF suffered from a

severe "resource flaw." The failure of the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM

II to support the original UNITAF concept, because of what it claimed to be a

lack of prior consultations, ethical difficulties and resource limitations, placed

the Addis Ababa disarmament agreement at great risk.

By establishing

differential tiers of disarmament through a systematic process of regionalisation,

the revised concept was, theoretically speaking, one way of preventing the

troubled Addis Ababa cease-fire and disarmament agreement from total

collapse. According to some participants in, and observers of, the disarmament

process under UNOSOM II, the four-stage plan was essentially an attempt to

conduct disarmament in an "unresourced environment."

The revised disarmament plan was warmly received by the humanitarian

division as well as by the relief and donor community in Somalia when it was

presented to them at the end of May 1993. These groups were attracted by the

plan's regional focus and incremental approach which shifted the resource

burden on the humanitarian agencies to a later stage in the disarmament process.

By so doing, the new plan gave the international relief community sufficient

time to make their own assessments of the situation on the ground and the

timing of their decision to commit resources to development projects. Put

simply, the Humanitarian division and the relief/donor community in Somalia

accepted the new concept of disarmament from UNOSOM II because it was

cheap: the new plan would not tax their material and moral resources in any

significant way. For the military, the new plan responded to the shortage of

manpower and firepower occasioned by the massive withdrawal of American

forces after the expiration of the UNITAF mandate. UNOSOM II Force

Command could now deploy operational units piece by piece, using as few

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

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Technically, these sites could not be called "cantonment" sites because UNOSOM II was

unable to assume physical control of these sites, as provided for by the Addis Ababa agreement.

It has been suggested by General Bruno Loi, the Commander of the Italian contingent to the

multinational force in Somalia, that UNOSOM II, like UNITAF before it, displayed a general

disinterest in deploying in the northern part of Somalia (i.e., former British Somaliland).

Although resource limitation has been adduced as a factor in explaining the virtual

concentration of UN activities in southern Somalia (i.e., former Italian Somaliland), other

plausible explanations emphasise the relative mildness of the famine and security conditions in

northern Somalia, which declared its independence from the rest of Somalia on 17 May 1991.

Author's interviews, Geneva, February-April 1995.

Author's interview with General Bruno Loi, Geneva, 29 March 1995.

combat personnel as possible, even though the security situation had

progressively degenerated after the departure of the core of UNITAF forces.

Given this circumstance, it was only a matter of time before the weaknesses of

the new "cost-saving" concept of disarmament became public knowledge.

4.4 The Consequences of Implementing the New Cost

Saving Concept of Disarmament in Conditions of Anarchy

UNOSOM II began to implement the new disarmament concept in June 1993.

Earlier disarmament measures implemented within the old framework, such as

the establishment and manning of cantonment sites, were standardised to reflect

the new plan. Thus, by June 1993 the bulk of current disarmament operations

were categorised by Force Command as Stage 2 operations. In much of northern

Somalia, voluntary disarmament had progressed smoothly since the signing of

the Addis Ababa agreement on 8 January 1993. Encouraged by his rapport with

UNITAF and US authorities, General Mohamed Abshir Musa, the American-

educated leader of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), had worked

out an arrangement with the UN which enabled him to establish weapons

"concentration sites" in the north-eastern region.

This arrangement continued

largely unhampered even after the transition to UNOSOM II. According to some

sources, the SSDF maintained effective control of these sites, even without UN

military presence in the area.

Indeed, one participant in the disarmament

process has speculated that had UNOSOM II provided incentives and

development infrastructure, in accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement, the

disarmament process in some parts of north-eastern Somalia would have

graduated to Stage 4 by the end of 1993.

It was therefore the failure of

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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F. M. Lorenz, "Rules of Engagement in Somalia", 1995, p.3.

Ibid.

Ibid. (emphasis added).

Ibid.

UNOSOM II to support and source the disarmament programme in the north-

east that led to the disintegration of the concentration sites by December 1993.

Expectedly, the SSDF leadership returned the weapons in these sites to their

supporters.

The state of the disarmament process was far more pathetic in southern

Somalia from the end of May 1993 onwards. It is generally agreed that the

process suffered a major setback after the transition to UNOSOM II. In the 90-

day period provided for the cantonment of heavy weapons under the Addis

Ababa agreement, militia factions belonging to General Mohamed Farah Aideed

and Mr. Ali Mahdi had initially complied by depositing their heavy weapons in

what were then known as Authorised Weapons Storage Sites (AWSS). By the

time of the transition in May, seven active sites containing large but unspecified

quantities of weapons were maintained by UNITAF. Five of these AWSS held

weapons belonging to Aideed's forces, while two contained weapons voluntarily

deposited by Mahdi's militia. These sites could not be effectively monitored by

the UNOSOM II Force Command, however, both because the Command lacked

intelligence capability in general, and because it had received poor information

from UNITAF regarding the sites. With the general deterioration of the security

situation in Mogadishu following the increasing willingness of Somalis to "test

the resolve of the UNOSOM forces," Force Command feared for the status and

safety of weapons in existing cantonments or AWSS.

In response to the

heightened insecurity in Mogadishu, the Force Commander, Lt. General Bir,

"issued

#Frag Order 39* which would greatly expand the ability of UNOSOM

personnel to use deadly force."

The new order, which became part of the ROE,

stated that: "organized, armed militias, technicals and other crew served

weapons [were] considered a threat to UNOSOM Forces and [might] be

engaged without provocation."

According to Colonel Lorenz, "the Frag Order

also included a provision that permitted the attack from the air on

#armed

Somalis in vehicles moving from known militia areas

*..."

Put simply, the

revised rules of engagement gave every troop virtually unlimited powers to

engage any armed Somali anytime, anywhere. With this, the stage was set for

a major confrontation between UNOSOM II and the Somali militia.

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

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Ibid. See also the Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Document

S/26022, New York: United Nations, 1 July 1993, p.2, para. 5.

Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Document S/26022, New

York: United Nations, p.3, para. 5.

4.5 The 5 June 1993 Attack on UNOSOM II

Inventory Team

On 2 June 1993, just days after the issuance of Frag Order 39, intelligence

reports received by the Force Command indicated that weapons were being

moved from General Aideed's AWSS. To verify these reports, Force Command,

on June 5, mobilised and despatched "inspection monitoring teams" to known

cantonment sites in south Mogadishu and the immediate vicinity of Afgoy.

These forces forcefully entered the premises of Radio Mogadishu which had

long been suspected by Force Command to be also serving as General Aideed's

weapon storage site. In the confrontation that ensued, "two Somalis loyal to

Aidid were killed... and this began an escalation of violence directed toward

UNOSOM forces. Shortly thereafter 27 Pakistani peace keepers were killed by

a vengeful Somali mob."

Clearly, Force Command did not utilise the element

of surprise in this operation, for it had informed Aideed of the planned

inspection visit 24 hours earlier.

An official UN account vividly describes the

incident as follows:

On the morning of 5 June 1993, the inspections began. Those at the Afgoy site and two

of the four sites in Mogadishu were conducted without incident. The inspection at Site

5 -

#Mogadishu Radio (Aidid) location* - went smoothly until it was near completion.

At that time several agitators arrived on scene and began to incite the crowd that had

gathered. At Site 4, a major storage site located at the Aidid radio retransmission

facility, the inspection team met some verbal resistance but was allowed to enter and

conduct the inspection. At this site, the team was subjected to sniper fire throughout

the day. It was at Site 3 that a large number of weapons were found, including 62 tow

missiles, 2 Milan missiles and 1 SA-7, which were later removed. Thirteen technical

vehicles and a number of machine-guns previously in storage were no longer present.

At about 10 a.m. in other areas in South Mogadishu, demonstrations began and

UNOSOM II Force Command headquarters was fired on. Pakistani and Turkish

soldiers returned fire. Later, Pakistani units returning from incidents elsewhere in

Mogadishu transited 21 October Road, where they encountered a large, carefully

prepared three-sided ambush that resulted in extensive casualties... At feeding station

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Ibid., paras. 7-8.

Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, point 14 on "Comments on Information,

Public Affairs and Media".

Security Council Resolution 837, Document S/RES/837, New York: United Nations, 6

June 1993, p.2, para. 6 (emphasis added).

Ibid., para. 3.

Ibid., para. 5.

Ibid., para. 7, pp.2-3.

No. 20, a Pakistani unit helping with food distribution was attacked by a carefully co-

ordinated group of gunmen...

In addition to the dead, 10 UNOSOM troops were reported missing and 57

(including 3 Americans) wounded. Although the casualty figures on the Somali

side were not known, they were estimated to have been much higher.

International reactions to the June 5 incident were immediate and intense

and these would significantly affect the course of disarmament embarked upon

by UNOSOM II. The day after the attack on the inventory team, the UN

Security Council adopted resolution 837 condemning the incident. Resolution

837 also contributed to the further escalation of tension in Mogadishu by

empowering the Secretary-General to:

a) urgently "inquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role

of those factional leaders involved;"

b) neutralise militia radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the attack

on UN contingents;

c) "take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed

attacks..., including against those responsible for publicly inciting such

attacks, ... to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and

detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;"

and

d) to ensure the rapid and accelerated deployment of "all UNOSOM II

contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000 men [sic], all ranks,

as well as equipment..."

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

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General Bruno Loi, interview with the author, Geneva, 29 March 1995.

Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Document S/26022, New

York: United Nations, para. 19, p. 5 (emphasis added).

This mandate provided the legal basis for the series of man-hunt operations

launched by UNOSOM II to apprehend General Aideed. Thenceforth,

UNOSOM II embarked on a policy of coercive disarmament which would lead

eventually to a virtual obsession with punitive combat operations directed

principally at General Aideed's militia. Put simply, UNOSOM II declared a

"vendetta-disarmament war" on one of the factions in Somalia, and devoted

much of its resources to prosecuting that war.

In this regard, the carefully-

worded report of the Secretary-General on the incident provides a useful insight

into the conduct of UNOSOM II after the June 5 attack on elements of the

Pakistani contingent:

At 4 a.m. on 12 June, UNOSOM II began the implementation of the first phase of a

programme pursuant to Security Council resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993) to

disarm Mogadishu South. This was an essential step in the light of the fact that the city

was saturated with a vast arsenal of hidden illegal weapons, some of which had been

used during the premeditated attacks of 5 June. In a series of carefully planned

precision air and ground military actions, UNOSOM II disabled or destroyed

ordnance, weapons and equipment located in three previously authorized weapons

storage sites, and a related clandestine military facility used for the ambush of 5

June...

The success of this operation encouraged Force Command to initiate further

strikes at known or suspected military facilities belonging to General Aideed,

for whose capture Rtd. Admiral Howe, the new SRSG, had promised Somalis

a reward of $25,000.

On 13 and 14 June UNOSOM II forces conducted additional precision air strikes on

two clandestine weapons/ammunition storage sites within the SNA/Aidid Mogadishu

stronghold area. One was a heavily guarded weapons, ammunition and vehicle storage

area that held approximately 30 heavy weapons carrier

#technical* vehicles in various

states of repair. The site also served as vehicle repair facility where

#technicals* were

assembled. In addition, the site was reported to contain large numbers of small arms

and crew-served weapons, as well as an ammunition cache that included significant

quantities of large-calibre automatic-weapons ordnance. The other site held technical

vehicles, small arms and ammunition, plus heavy engineering equipment used to

construct barricades. On the morning of 15 June, aerial reconnaissance observed and

destroyed a 122-mm BM21-1 mobile rocket launcher in the stronghold area near the

USC/SNA headquarters...

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Ibid., paras 21-22, p. 6 (emphasis added).

General Bruno Loi, interview with the author, Geneva, 29 March 1995.

Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Document S/26022, New

York: United Nations, para. 28, pp.7-8 (emphasis added).

The actions of 12 to 14 June formed part of a continuing effort... effectively to initiate

the disarmament process and neutralize all heavy weapons. This includes known

USC/SNA weapons and ammunition storage sites and caches. Getting arms under

control is fundamental to the restoration of law and order and public safety.

If coercive disarmament had resulted in the destruction of large quantities of

militia arms in south Mogadishu, it also produced a general climate of fear

which encouraged individual Somalis to hide weapons from UNOSOM II.

Worse still, by focusing on one faction, the prosecution of coercive disarmament

gained notoriety for its blatant partisanship against USC/SNA. It also

unwittingly conferred a hero's status on Aideed and encouraged ordinary

Somalis to rally behind him in resisting further measures aimed at disarmament,

in particular, and

#UN interference* in general.

Simply stated, the disarmament

war waged by UNOSOM II with extra-ordinary vigour produced undesirable

results, such as heavy Somali and UN casualties, general insecurity and

increased visibility of the use of armaments by Somalis as well as UNOSOM II.

There is little indication that the purpose and direction of the

disarmament/war-on-Aideed policy of UNOSOM II during the summer months

were questioned by the UN authority in New York. Quite to the contrary, there

is evidence that the Secretary-General was pleased with the policy and its

implementation. Indeed, he said so in his report of 1 July to the Security

Council:

The skill and courage with which United Nations coalition forces executed the cordon

and the search, clear and disarm operation against USC/SNA enclave and their

professional response to the series of subsequent SNA attacks were impressive. By any

measure, both the planned operation and the counteraction to SNA militia attacks

represented significant successes. The positions of SNA and of General Aidid have

been eroded, in terms of attrition of forces, disruption of

command/control/communications and loss of clandestine weapons and ammunition...

Although still a threat to stability, it is expected that the SNA militia in Mogadishu will

now be less of an impediment to disarmament, political reconciliation and

rehabilitation.

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

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Ibid., para. 30, p.8 (emphasis added).

Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, 1995, p.20.

Clearly, the Secretary-General could not have been more mistaken and, as a

consequence, rather than revert to a disciplined implementation of any of the

pre-existing disarmament concepts or plans, such as the revised four-stage

formula, the political and military authorities of UNOSOM II pressed on with

their ad hoc disarmament war. To this end, they were guided by two factors. The

first was the Secretary-General's assurance that:

... UNOSOM II will continue its initial disarmament effort until satisfied it has

neutralized all known USC/SNA weapons and ammunition storage sites and caches in

and around Mogadishu and any others that threaten the city. After this is complete,

UNOSOM II will undertake an orderly sector-by-sector disarmament of the city.

The second factor concerned the military situation orchestrated by Aideed's

increasingly restless militia. This particular factor put UNOSOM II in the

awkward position of having only to react to real or perceived politico-military

moves by Aideed's militia. This set the stage for the uncontrolled escalation of

violence which continued in Mogadishu and surrounding areas until the

beginning of October. At that time, an ill-fated coercive disarmament operation,

led by the elite US Army Rangers, resulted in the humiliation which followed

"the bloodiest battle of any UN peacekeeping operation" to date.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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Author's interviews, Geneva, February-March 1995.

DPI, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, 1994, p.14.

Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Document S/26738, New

York: United Nations, 12 November 1993, para. 70, p.17.

Robert Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", 1995, pp.107-108.

F. M. Lorenz, "Rules of Engagement in Somalia", 1995, p.4.

4.6 The 3 October 1993 Attack on UNOSOM II

and its Aftermath

As part of its efforts to capture Aideed, UNOSOM II regularly employed the

services of US Rangers whose helicopter gunships routinely bombarded

suspected military installations belonging to the USC/SNA. On 3 October, the

Rangers were dispatched to apprehend suspected members of Aideed's "war

cabinet", who were meeting at the Olympic Hotel in south Mogadishu.

According to some sources, these aides were holding one of their "regular

strategy sessions" at a "secret location" when elements of the Quick Reaction

Force swooped down on them.

In the ensuing battle, Aideed's militia gunned

down two helicopters and engaged the Rangers and supporting UNOSOM II

forces in a fierce encounter. The casualty figures from this incident are high:

several score Somali killed and wounded, 18 US Rangers killed, and 75 US

Rangers wounded. In addition, the USC/SNA captured and detained Durant, the

pilot of one of the downed US choppers, and Shankali, a member of the

Nigerian contingent which was dispatched to rescue the Rangers. What was

particularly significant about this incident was not the apprehension of about 24

Somali

UnotablesU, including two key Aideed aides,

nor the casualty figures on

both sides, but the treatment of the dead and captured multinational troops in the

"most despicable and humiliating manner" by Aideed's supporters.

In the

United States, "[t]elevised images of chanting Somalis dragging a US soldier's

body through the streets and pictures of a distressed helicopter pilot held

hostage" resulted in the immediate collapse of "domestic support for the Somali

operation."

This signalled the beginning of the end of what many observers

have described as one of the most media-driven military missions in recent

history. According to Colonel Lorenz: "It is ironic that the media coverage of

starving children in Baidoa had been a major factor in US involvement in the

first instance. In less than a year, Operation Restore Hope had deteriorated from

a humanitarian effort into a dangerous morass."

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

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Robert Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", 1995, p. 08.

Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, 1995, p.20.

The Economist, London, 4 February 1995, p.40.

The Clinton Administration responded to the 3 October incident in two

opposing directions. First, it took immediate unilateral action to increase

American firepower in Somalia, ostensibly to repair political damages arising

from allegations that his administration had denied repeated Pentagon requests

to send additional reinforcements to Somalia. Elements from the 13th Marine

Expeditionary Unit were rushed into Mogadishu from California days after the

incident to conduct even more strikes against suspected USC-SNA targets and

arrest its leadership. This resulted in more Somali casualties and the subsequent

apprehension of some 740 Aideed followers suspected to have taken part in the

3 October assault. In a complete volte face, this course of action was soon

abandoned for the second: the unilateral cessation of the man-hunt for Aideed

in particular, and "Boutros Ghali's peace enforcement strategy" in general.

this regard, Washington announced the complete withdrawal of US troops from

Somalia by the end of March 1994. Until that date, the involvement of US forces

would be limited to "force protection missions" especially within the confines

of the US embassy in Mogadishu.

Meanwhile, in Washington, the Clinton

administration stepped up its public accusation of UN leadership for being

responsible for the "policy derailment" which resulted in the use of US forces

for the personalised man-hunt operations rather than for humanitarian purposes

as had been originally conceived.

To put the Somali peace process back on track, the Clinton administration cut

out for itself a low military profile in Mogadishu. Subsequently, it despatched

Robert Oakley to resuscitate political negotiations with Somali factions in the

hope of ending the conflict through peaceful means. This policy change ensured

the early release of Durant and Shankali by their captors. It also assured the end

of coercive disarmament and set the UN on the path of complete withdrawal

from Somalia. Resolution 897 of February 1994 formally obliged UNOSOM II

to terminate its mission by the end of March 1995. Many national contingents

pulled out long before that deadline so that by 2 March 1995 when the UN,

"with luck," accomplished an "orderly retreat" from Somalia, the strength of

UNOSOM II had been reduced to a mere 8,000 troops, comprised mainly of

Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Egyptians.

Going by official and unofficial

assessments, the weight of international opinion clearly indicated that

UNOSOM II did not live up to its challenge, namely: "to accomplish the

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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100

F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia", 1993/94, p.40.

expanded mission without becoming embroiled in the factional fighting to the

point of backing one faction against the others."

In this regard, policy

inconsistency, strategic misconceptions and faulty resource distribution emerge

as important independent variables in explaining the failure of the United

Nations operation in Somalia.

The Economist, 4 February 1995, p.40.

Ibid. (emphasis added).

For an insightful analysis of this dimension of the Somali tragedy, see Jonathan

Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?", Foreign Policy, No 91, Summer 1993.

"Can Peacekeeping Survive?", The Economist, 11 February 1995. For details, cf. Stephen

John Stedman, "The New Interventionists: Civil Wars and Human Rights", Foreign Affairs,

Vol. 72, No 1, 1992/93, pp.1-16; and Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, "Saving Failed

States", Foreign Policy, No 89, Winter 1992/93, pp.3-20.

101

Chapter 5

Summary and Conclusion

The [UN] withdrawal... will leave Somalia as vulnerable as it ever was to the havoc

of warlords and the threat of famine.

The complete withdrawal of United Nations troops and personnel from

Somalia on 2 March 1995 marked the formal conclusion of the organisation's

first experiment in enforcement actions under its banner in accordance with the

provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. The last of the UN troops that left

Somalia did so under the protection of heavily armed American troopers and

Special Operation forces. For weeks prior to their evacuation, UN soldiers and

civilian personnel had been camped in the premises of the American embassy

in Mogadishu for their own safety. Even so, according to international media

reports, they were lucky to have escaped Somali gun-fire. The rest of Somalia

was off-limits to the blue helmets as well as other UN personnel and relief

workers. Somalia had indeed reverted to the control of the warlords, the

modern-day condiotierris. This sad situation, laments The Economist, best

summarises the UN mission in Somalia: "the Somali mission, which lasted about

twenty months, ... failed abysmally to impose political order..."

Not only was

the UN unable to restore hope in Somalia, its scurried exit from a stateless

society without an organised army - a mere microcosm of what was envisaged

by the authors of the Charter in 1945 - crushed hopes regarding the ability of the

world body to meet credible threats to international peace and security.

The

failure of the Somali mission also crushed the "vision of the UN's interventionist

powers, born as the Cold War died," thereby casting a cloud of doubt over the

usefulness of UN-led peace enforcement for purposes of conflict resolution.

Much can be learned from the Somali operation for future UN efforts at

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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102

By contrast, Sahnoun has argued that it "would in fact have been much wiser to have

gathered the maximum number of arguments proving the guilt of Aideed or anyone else, and

then to have persuaded the elders and other sub-clan leaders of the need to cooperate with the

UN in bringing the culprits to justice [because] Somali tradition itself requires stern measures

for slaughter and places the highest priority on collective undertaking in the matter": M.

Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia", Irish Studies in

International Affairs, No 5, 1994, p.13.

disarmament and conflict resolution. The purpose of this section of the study is

to highlight some of these lessons.

1. Understanding the nature of the society and the cause(s) of the conflict

is a sine qua non for finding a solution. For purposes of conflict resolution,

international intervention must strike an appropriate balance between cultural

relativism and universalism. The laws of nations govern the decision to embark

on multinational intervention, whilst the norms of the nation should govern

operations on the ground. In Somalia, several blunders were committed, but

perhaps none had more disastrous consequences for the mission than the ill-

fated unilateral decision of the SRSG to declare Aideed a fugitive in "his own

country" and then proceed with the promise of a $25,000 ransom for information

leading to his arrest.

As Sahnoun has argued, no one familiar with, and

sensitive to, the Somali culture would have promised Somalis, indeed any

African, money in exchange for the delivery of their "brother" to a foreign army.

It is a painful reminder of the memories of slavery and, not surprisingly, Howe's

offer bonded Somalis together to resist "foreign invasion." By committing this

cultural faux pas, the UN unwittingly conferred a hero's status on Aideed, thus

making an already difficult mission even almost impossible to accomplish.

The glaring deficiency in the UN's understanding of Somali culture was

matched by a similar lack of knowledge, neglect or misinterpretation of the

causes of the conflict. All too often, international peace operations have been

dispatched to societies in conflict without any conscious efforts to educate the

interveners on the nature, causes and specificities of the particular conflict

which they are mandated to resolve. Sadly enough, in Somalia the result was the

articulation and enforcement of "solutions" which merely intensified the

conflict:

Summary and Conclusion

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103

M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution", 1994, p.12.

See Robert G. Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle

Thayer (eds), UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, esp. pp.99-

102; and John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?, London: Haan Associates, 1994,

pp.39-40.

The UN's neutrality was one of the first casualties in Somalia. Aside from Jonah's hasty

declaration of Aideed as "the bad guy", the UN's image as a neutral arbiter was damaged by

confirmed allegations of secret arms/money cargo-flights into Mahdi-held territory by UN-

chartered "relief" planes. Not surprisingly, some scholars have recently begun to question the

possibility of impartiality in international intervention. For details, see Richard K. Betts, "The

Delusion of Impartial Intervention", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No 6, 1994, pp.20-33.

For example, a decision to disarm one clan, but not all clans at the same time, was a

recipe for continuous civil war in the country. A move to take over and shut down one

radio station belonging to one clan (and not all radio stations of all clans at the same

time) was equally unwise... To look for quick fixes as political solutions without taking

into account the local realities was a nonsense.

The Somali conflict was caused by the imposition of one mode of political

governance by one individual upon the rest of society. The exclusivity of Barre's

dictatorship bred conspiracy and alienation among some segments of the

population, and for a select group of friends and clansmen, privilege and

sycophancy. Mahdi's hasty, untimely and unilateral announcement of his

succession to the presidency of Somalia, albeit on an interim basis, undercut

Aideed, his principal associate in the USC. This triggered the bitter struggle for

power which soon revealed that the major contenders lacked any commitment

to the rule of law. If there had been a proper understanding and appreciation of

the cause and dynamics of the conflict as it evolved, the OAU (through its

Secretary-General's statement of 18 December 1991) and the UN (initially

during Jonah's first mission to Mogadishu and increasingly afterwards) would

not have [unwittingly] accorded a pride of place to Ali Mahdi vis-à-vis the other

contenders for power, especially General Aideed.

By losing the appearance of

neutrality and, even more importantly, impartiality, before the Somali public,

the UN sowed the seeds of its eventual failure in Somalia.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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104

General Bruno Loi, interview with the author, 29 March 1995. According to Loi, this was

the first, and perhaps only, opportunity to successfully push through a programme of

disarmament in Somalia with a minimum commitment of money and personnel.

2. Disarmament need not be initiated in a mission unless there is a will to

see it through. A programme of disarmament is necessary in conflicts

characterised by the reckless use of arms by loosely organised groups, as was

the case in Somalia. However, whenever disarmament is considered to be a

mission objective, be it de facto or de jure, an adequate programme should be

developed and implemented comprehensively, continuously and consistently.

In Somalia, the disarmament programme became a casualty of the indecision of

competing political authorities and Force Commanders. Right from the start, the

Secretary-General proposed that a programme of disarmament was essential to

any international effort to make Somalia secure enough for the distribution of

humanitarian supplies to the famine-stricken population. However, his proposal

for disarming Somali militia and gangs early on during the UNITAF phase was

quietly vetoed by the Bush administration. Consequently, the heavily armed

multinational troops which arrived in Mogadishu in December failed to take

advantage of their power, influence and enormous goodwill vis-à-vis the

Somalis - that is, "the element of surprise" - to quickly collect as many weapons

as possible.

When UNITAF did eventually conceive of and implement a

disarmament plan, it was too limited and haphazard to have any significant

impact on the security situation. This pattern was not broken by UNOSOM II,

for which disarmament was a key objective.

The general consequence of embarking on disarmament in fits and starts was

that the entire programme had the effect of punishing those compliant segments

of the population, some of whom fell victim to gangs because they had been

dispossessed of their weapons in areas where disarmament had been

implemented by UN troops before the commander was replaced, or in areas

where UN troops were ordered to pull out or the programme was scrapped

entirely. Clearly, the lesson from this experience is that once initiated,

disarmament must be followed through with discipline, courage, zeal and

consistency. To abandon a programme of disarmament mid-way because

humanitarian agencies run out of wheat flour - an incentive offered to the local

population in exchange for their guns - or renege on their earlier promise to

source the programme, shows little regard for the safety of those who surrender

Summary and Conclusion

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105

Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see point 7 on "Bottom-Up Changes:

disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission".

See W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict:

The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia", International Peacekeeping, Vol. 1, No 3, 1994,

p.295.

Thomas G. Weiss, "Intervention: Whither the United Nations?", The Washington

Quarterly, Vol. 17, No 1, 1993, p.119.

General Bruno Loi, "Reflections on Italian Participation in Peacekeeping Operations",

paper presented to the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute

for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 30 March 1995, p.8 (emphasis added).

their weapons.

It certainly undermines the credibility of the United Nations

before the local population, who need constant reassurance that the interveners

care about their welfare and safety.

3. Rather than geographical spread, competence and an existing national

human rights record should be requisite conditions for troop participation in

UN peace missions. All too often, the legitimacy of UN intervention in conflict

situations has been anchored on humanitarian needs, the restoration of human

rights and the rule of law. The multinational imperative of these missions has

necessitated conscious, almost extreme, efforts on the part of the UN Secretariat

to include as many Member States as possible, whether or not the soldiers from

these states are well- trained and equipped, and whether or not they show

respect for human rights and the rule of law in their own countries. There is

something suspect, indeed "grotesque," in the expectation that soldiers who

subvert the rule of law in their own countries will respect, let alone establish, a

law-based political authority in a foreign land.

As has been argued recently,

"[t]he importance of collective action is not necessarily in troop composition...

[Indeed] there is no value in multinational composition for the sake of

appearances"

when the task at hand requires "the optimal profile of

psychological abilities" of a soldier, comprised of "military ability... and the

selflessness of a missionary."

4. There is a need for effective co-ordination among field commanders of

national contingents. One of the major practical problems confronting

multinational operations is that they present enormous co-ordination problems

which further weaken the effectiveness of overall command and control. In

UNOSOM II, for instance, there were 33 national contingents of varying size,

capability, language, operational doctrine and esprit de corps. This problem was

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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106

Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see comments at the beginning of point

20 on "Comments on Interaction".

Robert Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", 1995, p.107; The Guardian, London, 17

July 1993.

F. M. Lorenz, "Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were They Effective?", draft

manuscript for Naval Law Review, May 1995, p.4 (emphasis added).

Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see comments in point 10 on "Force

Composition and Force Structure".

highlighted by all of the respondents to a recent UNIDIR questionnaire as one

of the principal difficulties faced by UNOSOM II.

In Somalia, the tension

between General Bruno Loi, the Commander of the Italian contingent, and his

American and Nigerian counterparts became so well known as to warrant the

UN to request that Italy "remove the commander of its peacekeeping

contingent... for refusing to obey orders from the UN military commander."

But an even more serious, though less well known, problem in Somalia was that

overall co-ordination was also hampered by the decentralisation of command

authority even within some national contingents. For instance, the lack of

adequate co-ordination between the commanders of different US units in

Somalia was partly responsible for the ill-fated operation at the Olympic Hotel

to capture Aideed supporters on 3 October 1993. According to Colonel F.M.

Lorenz,

By the time of the incident at the Olympic Hotel, the command relationships were

more complex, and less clearly defined. Special operations forces had arrived in

Mogadishu under the direct control of USSOCENT. Maj. Gen. Montgomery, the

Commander of US Forces, did not have operational control (OPCON) of the Special

Operations force that conducted the Olympic Hotel raid. They reported through a

separate chain of command directly to USCINCCENT.

[Put simply], ... in Somalia [even] the senior US commander did not have control over

operations within his area of responsibility.

The lesson from this incident is that not even the most developed military

machine is immune to the danger of poor command relationships.

The United

Nations may need to strongly assert its right to retain complete command and

control over all aspects of operational decision-making during its missions. In

this way, Member States voluntarily contributing contingents to UN missions

would be required to place their troops under UN control for the duration of

their participation.

Summary and Conclusion

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107

This figure is based on all responses received as of 5 May 1995. This response is

troubling because disarmament was the cornerstone of the mandate of UNOSOM II.

Thomas G. Weiss, "Intervention: Whither the United Nations?", The Washington

Quarterly, Vol. 17, No 1, 1993, p.123.

Ibid.

5. Participating contingents should train together for a period of time

before moving into an operational theatre. Closely related to the imperative

of command co-ordination is the need for common training of the diverse

contingents assembled for a particular mission. Such training would afford the

troops the opportunity to be commonly educated about the culture of the people,

the mission objective, the mission mandate, the rules of engagement, and the

purpose and type of equipment to be used during the operation. Responses to a

recent UNIDIR questionnaire on this subject reveal differing levels of education

for national contingents about the purpose and expectations of the UN mission

in Somalia. For instance, when asked whether the mandate of UNOSOM II

included the disarming of the warring factions, 80% of the respondents said

no.

Such a fundamental problem could be corrected if all the participating

contingents underwent training prior to their deployment in the theatre of

operation.

6. It is necessary to demonstrate staying power once the decision to

intervene has been made. It has been argued recently that "[t]he moral of early

post-Cold War interventions is that hollow gestures can turn out to be worse

than no action at all."

One of the saddest aspects of the Somali mission

concerns the widespread official announcement of the termination date of the

humanitarian mission long before the mission was even started. According to

Thomas G. Weiss,

In the US-led and UN-approved intervention in Somalia in December 1992, ...

Washington wanted out almost before it got in. The announcement was accompanied

by George Bush's suggestion that some GIs might return home before Bill Clinton's

inauguration, then less than two months away. This estimate was woefully inaccurate

and misleading, as was the calculation that a narrowly circumscribed effort - excluding

such essential tasks as disarmament, help in reconstituting a civil society, and

assistance for reconstruction - would be fruitful in restoring hope in this hapless

country.

Such premature announcement of the early termination of the Somali mission

encouraged the principal warlords to play a waiting game in which they were

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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108

Ibid. (emphasis added).

This contrasts sharply with the reasonably successful experiences in Liberia and

Nicaragua/El Salvador, where the regional organisations concerned_the Economic Community

of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Organisation of American States (OAS),

respectively - responded immediately and effectively to the conflicts and later invited the

United Nations to finesse and complement the regional peace initiatives. For details, see W.

Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The

ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia", International Peacekeeping, Vol. 1, No 3, 1994, pp.261-

302; and S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "The United Nations, Regional

Organizations and Human Security: Building Theory in Central America", Third World

sure to win. The current obsession with avoiding "mission creep" and cutting

costs has had the unfortunate consequence of detracting complex peace missions

from the real purpose of accomplishing set objectives. As the Somali experience

has demonstrated, rather paradoxically, such missions tend to last much longer,

involve deeper mission creep and cost so much more in terms of money and

collateral damage that it is arguable whether this situation might not have been

different had the premature announcement of departure dates not occurred. The

international community needs to exercise more patience and provide greater

latitude to field personnel involved in conflict-resolving multinational missions,

rather than imposing unrealistic deadlines for the completion of such mission.

As has been noted by one scholar, the current practice puts the United Nations

in an awkward position:

The United Nations has provided means for governments to appear to be doing

something without really doing anything. The urge to

#do something* in troubled

regions around the world should be resisted unless the measures taken have a

reasonable chance of success.

7. Regional organisations should be strengthened for purposes of

preventive diplomacy, early intervention when conflicts break out, and

effective collaboration with the United Nations in dealing with regionally-

specific threats to international peace and security. The United Nations

peacekeeping operation need not be the first instrument used to deal with

potentially system-threatening civil conflicts. In Somalia, a strong OAU and/or

LAS could have contained the conflict well enough for the United Nations to

have focused on medium- and long-term peace-building and post-conflict

reconstruction. The "timidity" of early efforts by the OAU and LAS to arrest, or

at least contain, the Somali conflict arose from their institutional weakness,

especially in the area of collective security.

Efforts should be made early on

Summary and Conclusion

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109

Quarterly, Vol. 15, No 2, 1994, pp.277-295.

by the United Nations to target potential regional organisations in crisis-prone

areas of the world with a view to instituting (where absent) or strengthening

(where present) a mechanism for responding to crisis situations, even if on a

first-aid basis. This would help avoid the confusion caused by the ad hoc

manner in which regional organisations contact the UN or vice versa only when

multinational forces are about to be assembled for deployment.

111

Biographical Note

Clement Adibe received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Queen's

University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, with specializations in International

Relations and Comparative Politics of Development. Between 1992-1994, he

held a pre-doctoral fellowship in International Peace and Security under the

auspices of the Social Science Research Council, New York, and the MacArthur

Foundation in Chicago. He also held research fellowships at the Center for

International Affairs, Harvard University (1992/93), Watson Institute for

International Studies, Brown University (1993/94), Legon Centre for

International Affairs, University of Ghana at Legon (Summer 1993) and the

Center for International Relations, Queen's University at Kingston (1994/95).

He has published articles in learned journals, including Peace Research,

Futures and the South African Journal of International Affairs, as well

chapters in volumes on foreign policy and international political economy. He

is currently a Killam post-doctoral fellow at Dalhousie University in Halifax,

Nova Scotia, Canada.

113

Part II:

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UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

Document S/23445, Letter Dated 20 January 1992 From the Charge

D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations

Addressed to the President of the Security Council, New York, 20 January

1992.

Document S/23448, Letter Dated 21 January 1992 From the Permanent

Representative of Morocco to the United Nations Addressed to the

President of the Security Council, New York, 21 January 1992.

Document S/23469, Letter Dated 23 January From the Permanent

Representative of Guinea to the United Nations Addressed to the President

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Document S/23693, The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-

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Document S/23829, The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-

General, New York, 21 April 1992.

Document S/23693, The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-

General - Addendum, New York, 21 April 1992.

Document S/24179, Letter Dated 23 June 1992 From the Secretary-General

addressed to the President of the Security Council, New York, 25 June

1992.

Document S/24343, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in

Somalia, New York, 22 July 1992.

Document S/24480, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in

Somalia, New York, 24 August 1992.

Document S/24859, Letter Dated 24 November 1992 from the Secretary-

General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, New York, 27

November 1992.

Document S/24868, Letter Dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-

General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, New York, 30

November 1992.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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126

Document S/24976, Letter Dated 17 December 1992 From the Permanent

Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations

Addressed to the President of the Security Council, New York, 17 December

1992.

Document S/24992, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in

Somalia, New York, 19 December 1992.

Document S/25168, The Situation in Somalia: Progress Report of the

Secretary-General, New York, 26 January 1993.

Document S/25354, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in

Somalia, New York, 3 March 1993.

Document S/25493, Note by the President of the Security Council, New York,

31 March 1993.

Document S/26022, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in

Somalia, New York, 1 July 1993.

Document S/26317, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in

Somalia, New York, 17 August 1993.

Document S/26351, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in

Somalia, New York, 24 August 1993.

Document S/26627, Letter Dated 25 October from the Permanent

Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations Addressed to the

President of the Security Council, New York, 25 October 1993.

Document S/26663, Letter Dated 28 October 1993 from the Secretary-

General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, New York, 29

October 1993.

Document S/26738, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in

Somalia, New York, 12 November 1993.

Document S/1994/12, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in

Somalia, New York, 6 January 1994.

Document S/1994/1068, Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the

Situation in Somalia, New York, 17 September 1994.

Document S/1994/1166, Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the

Situation in Somalia, New York, 14 October 1994.

Document S/1995/1, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of

the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the

United Nations, New York, 3 January 1995.

Document S/RES/733, New York, 23 January 1992.

Document S/RES/746, New York, 17 March 1992.

Document S/RES/751, New York, 24 April 1992.

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127

Document S/RES/767, New York, 27 July 1992.

Document S/RES/775, New York, 28 August 1992.

Document S/RES/794, New York, 3 December 1992.

Document S/RES/814, New York, 26 March 1993.

Document S/RES/837, New York, 6 June 1993.

Document S/RES/865, New York, 22 September 1993.

Document S/RES/878, New York, 29 October 1993.

Document S/RES/885, New York, 16 November 1993.

Document S/RES/886, New York, 18 November 1993.

Document S/RES/897, New York, 4 February 1994.

UNIDIR PRIMARY SOURCES:

Practitioners' Questionnaire numbers:

S006.

S019.

S040.

S041.

S055.

S073.

S099.

S153.

S142.

S145.

S144.

S146.

S148.

S150.

S100.

Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002.

External Reviewers and Experts (phone and personal interviews undertaken

between 1st March and 15 April 1995):

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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128

Col. S. Butler

Col. C. Bailey

Lt. Col. Byrne

Gen. B. Loi

Dr. Astrid Aarland

Dr. Steve Stedman

UNIDIR DCR Project Military Expert Team

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129

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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130

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131

133

Part III:

Questionnaire Analysis

135

DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT

The Disarming of Warring Parties

as an Integral Part of Conflict Settlement

PRACTITIONERS' QUESTIONNAIRE ON:

WEAPONS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND

DEMOBILIZATION DURING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

ANALYSIS REPORT: SOMALIA

COMPILED BY UNIDIR'S MILITARY EXPERT GROUP

COMPLETED BY: LT COL J.W. POTGIETER

DATE: 25 JULY 1995

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Note to Readers: The responses which appear in this analysis have been reproduced directly from

the respondents' answers to the DCR Practitioner's Questionnaire. Changes, if any, have been made

only to correct spelling, grammar, and sentence structure; all efforts have been made to maintain

the integrity of the original responses.

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Reference Number:

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

137

Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires

SUMMARY

1. OPERATION

a. Name of Operation

: UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II

b. Location of Operation

: SOMALIA

2. QUESTIONNAIRES

a. Number of Questionnaires analysed: 16

b. Time Frame Covered by questionnaires: (S006) 01/01/94 - 31/05/94

(S019) 01/03/94 - 31/09/94

(S040) 23/07/92 - 15/03/93

(S041) 23/07/92 - 15/03/93

(S055) 01/12/92 - 30/09/93

(S059) 01/03/93 - 28/02/94

(S073) 21/12/92 - 16/05/93

(S099) 20/10/93 - 06/12/93

(S100) 01/02/93 - 31/07/93

(S142) 01/05/93 - 30/11/93

(S144) 14/11/92 - 30/04/93

(S145) 15/04/92 - 15/08/93

(S146) 01/12/92 - 30/04/93

(S148) 01/04/93 - 31/08/93

(S150) 08/04/93 - 22/08/93

(S153) 01/07/94 - 24/02/94

c. Respondents' Primary Role

UN Civilian Personnel: 01 Chief : 00

Other : 01

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138

Humanitarian Relief Operator/

NGO person: 00

National Official: 00

Military Officer: 15 Commander : 07

Other : 08

d. Respondents' Primary Mission

Military

: 15

HQ Staff : 07 Military Observer : 02

Infantry : 04 Armour : 01

Artillery : 01 Engineer : 00

Medical : 00 Aviation : 00

Transport : 00 Logistics : 00

Mil Police : 00

Civilian

: 00

Civil Affairs : 00 Staffs HQ : 00

Representative : 00 Relief Co-ordinator : 00

Relief : 00 Volunteer : 00

Other : CIVPOL 01

e. Regular Activities:

Convoy Operations : 11 Convoy Security : 10

Base Security : 10 Patrolling : 12

Search Ops : 10 Check Point Ops : 07

Cease Fire Monitor : 06 Cease Fire Violation Investigation : 06

Weapons Inspection : 05 Weapons Inventories : 04

Weapon Collection Vol: 07 Weapons Collection Invo : 06

Weapons Elimination : 06 Cantonment Construction : 04

Cantonment Security : 04 Disarmament Verification : 05

Information Collection: 07 Police Operations (Mil) : 05

Special Ops : 08 Humanitarian Relief : 06

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Other: Civic Action; Medical Support to Local Population, Police

Operations, NGO security, Manning Airport in capital,

Destruction of weapons at storage sites.

SECTION ONE: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

(Note to readers: Two caveats should be kept in mind when surveying the

respondents' answers to the Practioner's Questionaire. First, in answering

the questionaire, respondents were instructed to answer only those questions

which pertained to their specific mission and/or function; as a result, most

respondents did not answer all of the "yes" or "no" questions. The number of

responses for each question, therefore, will not always add up to total number

of respondents. Second, for some questions, respondents provided additional

commentary for questions they should have skipped - they may have answered

a question with "no", for example, and then elaborated on their answer in the

space provided for the "yes" respondents. For this reason, certain questions

may contain more responses than the number expected.)

I. Implementation of the Peace Agreement

Q1.1 Was there a disarmament component in the original peace

agreement and/or relevant UNSC Resolution?

Yes : 11 No : 04

Q1.2 Was the disarmament component a central feature of the

agreement?

Yes : 06 No : 05

(The questionnaire responses pertain to all three operations launched in

Somalia, each of which had a differing relationship to disarmament:

UNOSOM I had a disarmament component in its mandate, but it was not well

defined; UNITAF had no disarmament component in its mandate; and

UNOSOM II did have a disarmament component in its mandate. Responses

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reflect the components of each particular mandate, which is why some

responses are positive while others are negative.)

Q1.3 Describe the desired outcome of the disarmament component

vis-à-vis the peace agreement.

- (S006) Stop the inter-clan fighting and restore a recognizable form of

government.

- (S040) Nil.

- (S041) Same as S040.

- (S055) Rebuil[ding of] social structures and politic[al] institutions.

Rebuil[ding of a] new police [force was] re[assuring] and retained [the]

safety [...] of the humanitarian flow from Mogadishu to the other parts

of the country.

- (S073) Voluntary cantonment of heavy weapons, lowering of tension,

particularly in Mogadishu, [and] no har[...]assment of relief convoys,

[all] leading to a [favourable] atmosphere for a political solution.

- (S099) Disarmament leading to demobilization and reconciliation of

warring factions.

- (S153) Assembly area for heavy weapons, cantonment area for small

weapons, confiscated weapons either destroyed or distributed to the

new national Somalia security forces.

- (S145) [Return] of security in the area.

- (S144) See Report of Secretary General S/24.480, 24 August 1992,

para. 23. See also Resolution 775 para. 11 & 12. As UNOSOM I was

put on hold by 3 December 1992, disarmament became a UNITAF

mission. In Jan. [19]93, a combined UNITAF/UNOSOM working

group was created in order to produce the CF & D concept of

operations. Remark: An agreement signed in Addis-Abeba by 14 out

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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141

of 16 Somali leaders on 15 January 1993 [directed that] disarmament

[be] completed by March 1993 (this was impossible).

- (S146) No "crew served" weapons authorized. Heavy and mobile

weapons stored in Authorized Weapons Storage Sites (AWSS), [...]

where regular control [had to] be conducted.

- (S100) Voluntary and peaceful self cantonment of weapons, inventory

at cantonment, random inspections. Turn over of weapons to Somali

Army when army [is] formed.

- (S142) Assembly area, heavy weapons. Cantonment area, small

weapons. Confiscated weapons either destroy[ed] [or] distribute[d] to

the new national Somali security forces.

- (S059) Factions' (15 separate political elements) militia disarmed and

demobilized. Societal infrastructure r[e]established throughout Somalia

to include NW Somalia (Somaliland).

Q1.4 Was there a timetable planned for implementation?

Yes: 07 No: 03

Q1.5 If yes, did it go as planned?

Yes: 00 No: 08

Q1.6 If no, why? Give three reasons.

- (S006) [Either] clan leaders would not agree, or [they] backed down or

dishono[u]red the agreement later.

- (S055) Too [many] parties present in the area. Large area to control.

[Situation not clear.]

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- (S073) Cantonment of weapons was only partially achieved. [The]

emphasis of the operation was, rightly, the security of humanitarian

relief. If relief operations were not interfered with, there was little

incentive to engage in active disarmament.

- (S099) Humanitarian part of plan could not be supported. NGOs/UN

Humanitarian organizations had no funds for demobilization. Warring

parties not sincere about disarmament.

- (S145) Due to the [inter-]clan struggle.

- (S144) UNOSOM I on hold - UNITAF deployed only in a part of

Somalia. Lack of confidence between Somali factions. Somalis have

always carried weapons as shepherds so why should they turn them in.

Who would protect them against bandits.

- (S100) Voluntary cantonment went well [and was] enforced by

UNITAF. [In the] following cantonment and turn over of the

cantonment sites to the Factional Guard force there was [a] movement

of weapons in and out of the sites.

- (S142) Timetable was never finali[zed] during negotiations.

- (S059) No realistic understanding of [the] mission scope. Diverging

political agendas amongst contributing nations. Lack of integrated

strategy in theater (political, military, humanitarian).

Q1.7 If there were delays in the implementation, summarize their

impact on the disarmament process.

- (S006) Delays allowed more weapons to enter and be distributed.

- (S055) After the end of [the] initial [cease-fire] nobody accept[ed]

disarmament.

- (S073) See 1.6.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S099) Disarmament process collapsed.

- (S144) There has never been a proper disarmament process in Somalia.

Only minor local successes were booked.

- (S146) No major impact on the operations.

- (S059) Delays supported warl[o]rds agenda to undermine UN

staff/command. [The] exasperated populace [...] wanted tangible

benefits [from the] reconstruction.

Q1.8 Did, at any time, the existing agreements hinder you from

conducting disarmament measures?

Yes: 04 No: 06

Q1.9 If yes, mention some of the ways in which you felt hindered.

- (S144) [...] Disarmament phasing [...] to be conducted in the current

UNITAF Area Of Responsibility (AOR) first, then in the central

region, and finally in the northern region. [Difficult to be the first

faction to agree] to start to disarm. They feared the other factions [...]

active in [the] central and northern parts of the country as well as the

bandits spread out all over Somalia.

- (S146) [...] The agreements were related to "heavy" weapons, and not

to all kinds of small weapons.

- (S142) No incentives for disarmament, no disarmament enforcing

measures, [and] agreement signed by faction leaders with no intention

to fulfill their engagements.

- (S059) Disarmament operations require unity of command. In

UNOSOM II, disarmament operations required consensus. Consensus

undercuts [the] military commander.

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Analyst's Comments:

The issue of consent was very much at stake during this operation. Many

respondents indicated that the process of disarmament was derailed or

terminated as soon as one or more of the factions were no longer in

agreement with the process. This is a symptom of many UN operations; the

cause, however, is a political one.

The primary objective of peace efforts in the past has been to achieve a

cessation of hostilities in international conflicts. Today, we primarily find the

UN deploying to internal conflicts within "failed nation states" trying to

establish a lasting peace, to prevent the further spread of genocide and

suffering, and to implement some standard of law and order. It has proven to

be the case consistently, however, that the UN, rather than supporting a

standard of authority to facilitate a local transition, adapts itself to the nature

of local authority. It tends to manoeuvre in the direction of maximum consent

and even accepts restrictions placed on it by the parties. This means that

unless the UN was willing to exercise independent political authority in

Somalia, it became just another Somali faction.

The UN should not have placed the mission on the same level as the

warring factions, but rather on a level above them. In the agreements that

were reached before the deployment of the UN, the belligerents were treated

like other full members of the international community. A primary objective,

therefore, was to achieve a cease-fire, and not to re-establish law and order.

The limitations of this oversight became clear when factional fighting

subsided and was replaced by general lawlessness, banditry and looting.

II. Mandate

Q2.1 At the start of your mission, were you informed of the

mandate part regarding disarmament?

Yes: 06 No: 08

Q2.2 How was the disarmament component expressed in your

mission mandate? (Summarize.)

- (S006) Checked for w[eapons] at entry to [the] airport.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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145

- (S040) There w[as] no disarmament, [...] only [a] cease-fire agreement.

- (S041) Same as S040.

- (S055) Disarming [all] forces opposing [...] the mandate.

- (S073) Security of the relief effort was [of first priority], disarmament

was to be a means to that end, if necessary. This, of course, changed

for UNOSOM II when disarmament became [the] prime task. I was

only involved in UNOSOM II for 10 days or so as our contingent

withdrew.

- (S142) Disarm factions, redistribute weapons [for] new Somali forces.

- (S099) "Provide secure environment for movement and delivery of

humanitarian supplies."

- (S145) In particular through the RoEs, which [directed the mission to]

seize weapons during control operations, to execute [weapons] search

operations, and to destroy weapons in cases of threat.

- (S144) See Resolution 775 of 28.08.92, para. 11 & 12.

- (S146) No "crew-served" weapon[s] authorized. All heavy weapons

stored in AWSS. No specific directives regarding small weapons,

except bandits.

- (S148) I was allowed to collect all weapons [...] found [within] the

limits of the city of Kismayo, [even using military force].

- (S100) It was a key part of the enforcement mission.

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Q2.3 How did you interpret the mandate you received?

- (S006) The airport would be weapons free. Any weapons found [(from

non-military or UN personnel) would be confiscated].

- (S055) Simply, [to] disarm[...] everybody.

- (S073) All heavy and crew-served weapons (i.e., machine guns) were

a threat to be dealt with, by use of force if necessary. Light weapons,

rifles, pistols, etc. were only confiscated if displayed visibly in public,

or detected during car checkpoint [or] building searches.

- (S099) Disarm only those who posed a threat to security.

- (S153) Negotiate inside Somalia disarmament committee, enforce

disarmament when necessary, define weapon policy in co-ordination

with the process.

- S145) To create a secure environment in our AOR, [and] to permit

[increases in] humanitarian relief activities and the resumption of

social and economic activit[ies].

- (S144) [Did not reach actual mission area;] any interpretation of the

mandate was therefore irrelevant.

- (S146) I tried to disarm everybody. [In doing so, I was] supported by

[the] local population, local leaders and later on by [...] events (warring

factions in the same area).

- (S148) [...] [V]ital to collect as [many] weapons as possible to [ensure]

a "secur[e] feeling" [for] the local population.

- (S142) Negotiate [within the] Somali disarmament commit[t]ee,

enforce disarmament when necessary, [and] define weapon policy in

co-ordination with the disarmament process.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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147

- (S100) Open rules of engagement were established based on the

mandate and [on] international law.

Q2.4 Did the way the disarmament component was expressed

hinder your disarming task?

Yes: 01 No: 04

Q2.5 If it was a hindrance, how would you have preferred your

mandate to read?

- (S099) Specifically state disarmament of factions in mission statement.

- (S142) No incentives for disarmament available. Mandate should

include incentives from the develop[...]ing programs.

- (S146) I would [appreciate] clear instructions related to [...] general

disarmament in order to avoid banditry, (re)actions against [the] Allied

Forces, [and] fights between opposed factions.

Q2.6 Were your actions/freedom of action during disarmament

operations influenced by external factors other than the mandate?

Yes: 07 No: 03

Q2.7 If yes, which ones?

- (S006) Reliance on other UN participants to do their job. Some were

not nearly as con[sci]entious as others.

- (S055) The difference between our behavior ([we collected] all the

weapons we could in our sector [...]) and [the other armies' behavior]

in [their] sector (no collection of weapons). For this reason we could

not [collect weapons as thoroughly and as quickly as we needed to].

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- (S073) There was some early press coverage of the disarmament

process, but when it was seen that our policies and procedures brought

security to Baidoa, press interest in the selective disarmament process

dissipated.

- (S099) Disarmament plan required support of humanitarian agencies

to provide incentives to individual warriors to disarm. This support did

not materialize.

- (S142) Somali[an] culture (weapons = dignity), confrontation with

SNA.

- (S145) [The] [s]ituation [differed] in [...] different parts of the AOR.

[We were] [c]oncerned [with] balancing the search operation on both

sides of the opposing clans.

- (S144) A damatic lack of information about the [Somali] people and

their mentality ([they] never say "no", but sometimes "yes" means

"no"). A lack of experience about CF & D techniques within the

UNOSOM I staff which had to be compensated [for] by calling upon

[...] (US) "specialists" (ex-UN peacekeepers in Central America).

- (S100) The threat level influenced the R[o]E and the conduct of the

teams. After the inspection teams were ambushed on 05 June 93, the

sites and weapons were destroyed by demolition and helicopter assets.

III. Subsidiary Disarmament Agreements:

Q3.1 Did the warring factions enter into a separate disarmament

agreement?

Yes: 03 No: 10

(If no, go to question 4.)

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Q3.2 If yes, describe the agreement.

- (S099) Mutual voluntary cantonment of heavy weapons under own

control.

- (S144) After approval by [both UNITAF and UNOSOM I] the SRSG

invited the 16 warring factions to implement [the plan]. On 8 Jan. and

15 Jan. [19]93, 14 out of 16 factions agreed in Addis Abeba to [...] the

proposed plan [...] [with conditions that were unacceptable to the UN].

- (S146) Evolutive agreements related to heavy weapons, [and] small

weapons a) in the streets, b) fixed and mobile bodyguards [and] c) of

militias.

Q3.3 Was the agreement formulated with the mandate in mind or

independent of the mandate?

Mandate-oriented: 02 Independent of mandate: 01

Q3.4 Were there any contradictions between mandate and

agreement?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q3.5 If yes, which ones?

- (S099) Warring factions wanted to retain control/access to own

weapons. Mandate inferred weapons to be under UNITAF/UNOSOM

II control.

Q3.6 What was the impact of the agreement on the mandate?

- (S099) Agreement reached as a result of delay in implementing

mandate. Later, warring factions resisted giving up control of cantoned

weapons, resulting in fire fights with UNOSOM II forces.

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- (S144) See SG's Note (Report) No. S/25.354 dated 03 March 1993,

paragraph. 56.

- (S146) Positive. It was easier to ensure the protection of NGOs and

also easier to distinguish the "bad[ guys" from] the "good guys".

IV. Top-Down Changes: consistency of the mandate and its impact on

the disarmament component:

Q4.1 Did the mandate change while you were engaged in the

UN/national operation?

Yes: 05 No: 07

(If no, go to question 5.)

Q4.2 If yes, what was(were) the change(s)? (Describe the most

important aspects.)

- (S006) Stopped actively confiscating w[eapons] outside of [the] UN

compounds.

- (S055) The use of force became compulsory as the UN decided to

[change] their approach to Somalian problems from the humanitarian

to the strictly military point of view (bombing the town).

- (S073) It changed for UNOSOM II just before the Australian

contingent in Baidoa departed.

- (S099) Disarmament was not priority during UNITAF period; [it]

became priority under UNOSOM II. However, [the] opportunity to

disarm warring factions quickly and with little resistance passed.

Factions [were] much less co-operative under UNOSOM II.

- (S144) Chapter VI to Chapter VII on transition day. See Note

S/25.354, dated 03 March 1993, para. 59-69.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S146) After two months, the city of Kismayo was declared [a]

"weapon free city", [and ] two months later, [so was the] the valley of

the Jubba[h].

- (S059) Post June [19]95 disarmament operations were more coercive.

[They] focused [primarily] on one of [the] 15 factions.

Q4.3 Did this(these) change(s) affect your disarmament

operations?

Yes: 05 No: 00

Q4.4 If yes, how? (Name the three most important effects.)

- (S006) More w[eapons] on the street. Initially only few w[eapons

were] seen on [the] street, but later many [more were] seen.

- (S055) Impossible to convince (the belligerent parties of) our

neutrality. [It became] difficult[...] to continue [with] weapons

collection.

- (S099) Delay caused [an] increase [in the] boldness of warring

factions. Delay eroded trust between UNOSOM and [w]arring factions.

Lack of humanitarian support for demobilization doomed [the] plan.

- (S146) Very clear instructions. No [more differences] between [many

of the] individual cases.

- (S059) Operations became more restrictive. Clans used [the] change in

[the] mission profile as a lever for increased aid. Contributing nations

started working in opposition to one another (competing agenda[s]).

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Q4.5 If disarmament was affected, was it still possible for you to

implement disarmament measures as first envisaged?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q4.6 In the context of 4.5, did you have to change or abandon

procedures?

Change: 02 Abandon: 02

Q4.7 If you changed procedures, what were the changes? (Mention

the three most important ones.)

- (S055) Weapons search[es] and collection [occurred] mainly out[side]

of the town. Control of weapons traf[f]ic [rather than] searching [for]

and collecting [the weapons].

- (S099) More coercive disarmament in some areas. Voluntary

cantonment of weapons in other areas [was under the control of]

warring faction[s]. Gave up on demobilization plan.

- (S059) More search/seize operations. Less contact in [the] interior with

smaller factions. Less factional involvement with planning and

execution.

Q4.8 Were you adequately informed of changes as and when they

occurred?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q4.9 Were you able to implement alternative measures

immediately?

Yes: 01 No: 01

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Q4.10 If no, why not? (Give the three most salient points.)

- (S099) Lack of co-ordination and communication between Political,

Humanitarian and Military branches. Negotiators on ground were not

decision makers. Plans based on untenable assumptions.

V. Bottom-Up Changes: disputes among the warring parties arising

during the mission:

Q5.1 Was there a mechanism or a provision for the settlement of

disputes if and when these emerged?

Yes: 07 No: 05

Q5.2 If yes, what type of mechanism/provision did you have (i.e.

mission, special agreement, the UN process, special commission,

etc.)?

- (S006) [Persons from the UN political department.] Labour meetings.

- (S055) Special agreements among the parties sponsored by our forces.

- (S145) UN process: [E]ncourage[d] and organize[d] meetings by the

civilian UN chief of zone with the support of the military branch of the

UN contingent (security and logistics).

- (S144) The CF Committee - Monitoring Group

(UNITAF/UNOSOM/factions) [...] went to the scene where incidents

had occured [...] and [...] issue[d] conclusions on the investigation.

- (S146) No, but the influence of the fights between faction[s] could

[have a] negative [effect on] the general mission (the protection of

NGOs). So, [in addition to] nego[t]iations, we tried to disarm members

of [the] fighting factions.

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154

- (S150) Meetings between Force Commander, UN representatives and

local authorities of [the] warring parties.

- (S100) The cease-fire and disarmament committee was composed of

representatives of each of the 15 political factions in Somalia. They

investigated the cease-fire violations in Kismayo and other locations

and rendered reports on the investigations.

- (S073) US presidential envoy, and HQ UNITAF staff, particularly J3

(Operations), were used to help iron out disputes. Force was

occasionally used.

- (S142) Cease-fire and disarmament commit[t]ee.

- (S059) Special agreement evolved from the Addis Abeba agreement of

Jan. [19]93 [in] March-April [19]93.

Q5.3 What kind of regulations were agreed between the parties

and the peacekeepers for the collection of arms?

- (S006) On the airfield any arms would be confiscated.

- (S055) We authorized arm[s] [...] only for self defence of [the]

command post, [for] NGO security, [and for] policemen of [the]

parties.

- (S073) There were no regulations per se, but [there was an

understanding] that visible weapons would be confiscated. Note: In

Baidoa the hostile elements were less the faction militia, and more

generally bandits. Policy on display of weapons was passed through

village elder councils.

- (S142) Inventory/storage/maintenance by UN troops under [the]

control of [the] Somali commit[t]ee.

- (S145) Some voluntary transfer[s] of weapons to the UN contingent.

No opposition [of] the parties [towards] search operations.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S144) Factions [...] turn[ed] in their heavy armament [...] to

cantonment sites [...]. Militia members [...] proceed[ed] to transition

sites where they [...] abandon[ed] their small arms, [and registered for

assistance in] returning back to civilian life. After [the] deadline,

[weapon bearers were declared bandits] and could be killed.

- (S146) Heavy weapons stored. Small weapons collected.

- (S150) Designation of a number of weapon free zones (WFZs). Outside

of WFZs, only small arms allowed for self-defence. Destruction of all

"technicals" in AOR.

- (S100) Weapons were confiscated on sight. Guards had their weapons

registered with the Provost.

- (S059) Factions would simultaneously move to militia encampments,

be disarmed and [the weapons] retained by [the] UN (provision of

incentives [was a] key point of [the] accord).

Q5.4 What kind of negotiations/regulations were agreed at the top

and lower levels with respect to the storage of arms?

- (S006) W[eapons] were stored/checked at a building at the entrance.

- (S055) At the top, accord for authorized weapon posts under UN

control. At the lower [levels], [individual] authorizations for NGO

security men.

- (S073) Weapons confiscated in Baidoa were destroyed.

- (S142) Storage sites/inventory. Mechanism/destroy weapons.

- (S145) All weapons seized would be gathered by UN contingent[s].

- (S144) See statement on the report from the CF & D planning group

from UNOSOM/UNITAF, issued in Addis-Abeba 15.03.93.

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- (S146) Storage of small [and heavy] weapons under UN control, [...}

but we were forced to destroy [the heavy weapons] because [of their]

unauthorized use [...].

- (S100) Arms were stored at approved cantonment sites, Authorized

Weapons Storage Sites [...]. The factional militias would voluntarily

store the weapons under UNITAF supervision. UNITAF [made]

inventories [of] the weapons, then turned over security and

maintenance to the faction whose weapons were stored there.

- (S059) Turned over to UNOSOM II for disposition.

Q5.5 Was there a conflict between these new agreements and the

original agreement and/or mandate?

Yes: 03 No: 04

Analyst's Comments:

When the Somali Army was disbanded in January 1991, they abandoned

some 40,000 weapons. As a consequence of the Cold War and military

alliances with a Superpower, the Somali Army was one of the best armed on

the continent in the 1980s. However, due to a lack of preventive and

operational maintenance, a large amoung of the technically-advanced

equipment was not fully operational. The Somali Forces consisted of the

following:

Army:

- 4 x Tank Brigades

- 45 x Infantry Brigades (Mechanized and Motorized)

- 4 x Commando Brigades

- 3 x Field Artillery Brigades

- 1 x Surface-to-Air Missile Brigade

Air Force:

- 3 x Ground Attack Squadrons

- 3 x Fighter Squadrons

- 1 x Counter Insurgency Squadron

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- 1 x Transport Squadron

- 1 x Helicopter Squadron

The air force component simply ceased to operate, and by 1992, the

carcasses of the planes were strewn about airfields everywhere in Somalia.

The weapons, once part of the Army's arsenal, were channelled into the clan

militias and posed a definite threat to internal security and law and order. In

addition to the known arsenal of the Somali Forces, caches of arms and

ammunition were built up from open and black markets. With these facts in

mind, the apparent lack of a consistent disarmament strategy and plan from

the outset of the first UN involvement defies logic, but not the emotions

created by the pictures of starving and dying Somalis. The misery and tragedy

in Somalia distracted the UN strategic planners' attention from the real issues

to the symptoms.

As can be seen from the practitioners' answers, there were as many

interpretations the UN forces' disarmament tasks as there were questionnaire

respondants. This was in fact due to a lack of clear guidelines and mandates

given during the different stages of the UN operation. By the time of

UNOSOM II, the scope of disarmament was a principal point of contention

between the SG and the Forces. Their disagreement effectively centred

around the mandate of Resolution 794: the directive to establish a "secure

environment for humanitarian relief" is as wide as the grace of the gods.

Restrictively it means to protect corridors and convoys, and broadly it means

creating a relatively secure environment in which relief agencies can freely

operate and fulfill their duties. The SG had the intention of accomplishing the

latter. On the ground the mandate was interpreted in its narrower sense, and

a chance to fundamentally alter the environment of anarchy in Somalia was

missed.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

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PROPOSED DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT PLAN

Graphic adapted from Questionnaire No S144.

The UN Force in Somalia had a demobilization and disarmament plan for

UNOSOM II that was based on the consent and co-operation of all of the

different factions.

- Militia and weapons would be grouped in "faction groupment areas" from

where they would move to cantonment sites.

- Heavy- and crew-served weapons would be handed in, registered,

separated from the militia, and inspected. Serviceable weapons would be

stored for use by the proposed Somalian Army; unserviceable and derelict

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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weapons would be destroyed on site. At this stage the militia would still be

in possession of their small arms for security reasons.

- After the deadline (March 1993), the cantoned militia would be moved to

transition sites, with their small arms. Small arms would be handed in,

registered, inspected, and stored or destroyed, depending on their

condition. The militia would then be either integrated into the proposed

Somalian Army, or prepared for civilian life.

This plan did not get off the ground because the belligerent parties could

neither reach an agreement nor honour agreements already made. Again the

question of consent arises, and one can only wonder if the status given to the

warlords (that of states in the international community) was in fact the cause

of this breakdown. If the UN had positioned itself above the warlords, instead

of between them, the picture may have looked different. According to some

respondents, there were also problems relating to mission objectives,

planning on the side of the UN, co-operation between military and civilian

components,etc. (see answers to Q1.6).

- There is a logical sequence to follow in demobilization operations, of which

disarming belligerents is one of the stages. The normal stages of a

demobilization operation are: securing an agreement; establishing and

managing a cease-fire; withdrawing and assembling belligerents;

disarming the belligerents; and, finally, dispersing and rehabilitating the

belligerents. All of these stages are more or less present in the above-

mentioned plan, and in theory it looks as if a "textbook plan" should have

provided the desired results - but this was not the case. The reasons are by

no means simple, but some are very apparent.

- The first and foremost principle is that there can be no peace without a

relative measure of security. A "relatively secure environment" should have

been a prerequisite for all other operations in Somalia. The strategist must

find the "centre of gravity" for an operation - that is, the single most

important event or condition which will stabilize the situation or reverse

the destruction and strife. All effort and resources must then be directed

towards that one identified centre. In the streets of Mogadishu and in the

Somali country-side, anarchy amounted to the biggest bully with the

biggest stick exerting influence over a local area and its population. The

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task of responding to this anarchy was the ultimate challenge of the

international community, and this task should have been the basis of an

overall framework to unwind the spiral of violence. Instead, there was a

tendency to respond primarily to the symptoms of the problem: the centre

of gravity for UNOSOM was the delivery of humanitarian aid to the

hundreds of thousands of starving Somalis (see answers to Q2.3), and the

objective of establishing a relatively secure environment within which this

could take place seemingly played second fiddle. In the end, even the

humanitarian aid organizations had to withdraw from the country, leaving

the impression that the wrong centre of gravity was pursued.

- Another necessary precursor to a peacekeeping force or monitoring

mission's future action is the securing of an appropriate agreement for

demobilization operations. Where no recognizable authority exists, as in

a failed state, a model or template for demobilization and disarmament

should be drawn up and enforced. This agreement/model should also offer

rewards and penalties to motivate compliance. Demobilization operations,

representing in effect the implementation of negotiated settlements, are

therefore a foundational military task in the peacekeeping context. If

demobilization operations had been the foundational military task of

UNOSOM, the creation of a secure environment would also have been high

on the list of things to accomplish, in order to achieve the demobilization

objective. The following characteristics of the conflict and region had an

effect on the outcome of the demobilization effort:

an ill-defined and widespread area of operation wherein opposing

factions were inextricably mixed;

inter-communal violence and atrocity;

difficulty in identifying the parties to the conflict, which were

undisciplined, lacking in restraint, and barely accountable to any central

or recognized authority;

sporadic opposition to the measures of the UN; and

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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restricted movement caused by widespread attacks, unmarked mines, and

residual ordnance.

Not withstanding these characteristics, the local UN authorities opted for

"aid before security". The logic and wisdom of this decision were to be

determined by the end result of the effort.

Operations in Somalia proceeded through three stages: UNOSOM I, a

humanitarian assistance mission; UNITAF, a humanitarian assistance

operation with limited military action; and UNOSOM II, a peace enforcement

operation involving humanitarian assistance and active combat. Conflicting

interests within the mission led to peculiar problems on the disarmament side.

Apparently the military did not have the manpower to provide security to

NGOs and humanitarian aid agencies in the remote parts of the country. The

humanitarian aid agencies had a dire need for protection against bandits,

and because of the lack of protection from the military, they hired

"technicals" (men with guns) to protect them. Some friction between the

military and the humanitarian aid agencies occurred when the military

disarmed the "technicals", thus leaving the aid organizations vulnerable to

attacks by bandits. This issue also had an influence on the outcome of the

disarmament operation which needs further research. Some sort of joint

management system should be implemented between the military, civilian and

NGO components of a mission, to co-ordinate needs and objectives. The

creation and use by the United States forces of the Civil Military Operations

Center (CMOC) in Somalia went a long way towards co-ordinating NGO,

PVO, UN, and humanitarian operations requirements and activities on a

daily basis. This CMOC concept needs to be greatly expanded to include all

parties and organizations that are not considered a threat to UN operations.

VI. Protection of the Population During the Mission:

Q6.1. Did you consider the protection of the population when

negotiating disarmament clauses with the warring parties?

Yes: 09 No: 03

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Q6.2. Did you have the protection of the population as part of your

mission?

Yes: 08 No: 06

Q6.3 If yes, did you have the means to do so?

Yes: 05 No: 04

Q6.4 What were the three most important means at your disposal

to achieve this objective?

- (S055) [Thorough] and continuous control of the situation, obtained by

[...] efficient intelligence work in contact with the population ([largely]

Italian speaking). Operations against bandits. Patr[o]lling [the]

country[side] and villages. Assistance provided to the population on a

non-stop basis in the towns and in the country[side].

- (S073) Foot and mounted patrolling throughout, but particularly in

Baidoa. Main road checkpoints. Presence in town, partic[ularly] in

NGO compounds.

- (S142) UN troops. Assessment of the need[...] of the factions to

maintain their own security when UN troops [were] not available.

- (S145) Military means. Liaison officers and interpreters. Civilian

components of the UN contingents.

- (S144) Own troops (PAKBAT-NORCOY).

- (S146) Dissuasive armament and equipment. Firm intention to impose

peace and to forbid fights. Support of US helicopters and [of the] US

Reaction Force.

- (S148) Two platoon[...] paratroopers, excellent means of

communication, good weapons.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S100) Precision weapon systems (ACI30, Cobra). Loud speaker teams

with Somali translators. Newspaper and radio (CA/PSYOP). Cease-fire

and disarmament committee members from the factions.

Analyst's Comments:

Protective tasks include the safeguarding of individuals, communities and

installations. Protective measures will tend to use up manpower. A

commander should therefore balance protective requirements against the

need for more operational measures. Measures used for protection can be

any one or combination of the following:

- precautionary measures such as basic security safeguards;

- tactical measures such as escorts and pickets;

- contingency measures including such things as evacuation plans, rapid

deployment forces, etc.;

- protected areas which aim to create the conditions under which

communities can respect and observe the law without outside interference

or attack; and

- control measures such as prohibitions and restrictions (curfews,

roadblocks, searches, patrols, etc.) with the aim to:

deter violent or criminal activity

restrict the potential for riotous assemblies

limit the illegal traffic of war supplies or contraband

apprehend wanted persons, and

detect patterns of activity and gain information.

The application of accepted military doctrine for conventional operations,

which was designed around the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to

the protection of victims of war, seems to be a one-sided affair in Africa. The

value of human life and human rights is usually high when one is on the

"receiving" end of the stick, but, as was the case in Somalia, when the faction

leaders were on the "dishing-out" side, they did not value the lives and human

rights of their own people. The very force which was there to protect the

people was manipulated into becoming a force for the aggressors and

offenders. In Africa, two wrongs usually made a right.

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Jonathan T. Howe, "Could Technology Have Made a Difference?", paper presented at the

workshop, Improving the Prospects for Future Peacekeeping Operations, 15 June 1995, Belagio,

Italy: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995, p.7.

During the UNITAF period, Belgian troops watched helplessly in Kismayo while

fighters from one faction (Morgan's) infiltrated in the town and a mixed gender crowd

chased out the supporters of another faction (Jess). Naturally the Belgian troops were

accused by Jess of deliberately allowing this to happen. The truth is that the Belgians

were simply at a loss as how to break up these groups of combatants and non-

combatants.

Swarming was another tactic that was difficult to combat. It was evidently assumed

that if enough people ran at a vehicle or a cordon protecting a search operation, the UN

troops would have the difficult choice of either having to shoot unarmed civilians or

to retreat.

A constant worry in Somalia was how to protect UN civilians and

international relief workers. Protection from shelling was just one of the dangers

they encountered; civilian vulnerability was the Achilles' heel of the operation.

Yet, civilian safety was paramount if the job of facilitating the recovery of the

country was to be accomplished. Military units were organized; they faced

danger as part of their responsibilities, and they had the training and the means

to protect themselves. Civilians, on the other hand, were often assigned to

remote areas where there were no military personnel or units deployed. This

made them vulnerable to criminals and those who wanted to disrupt the UN

operation in the country for political reasons. To better this situation, local

guards, often of uncertain reliability, were hired by civilian organizations to

protect their assets. There were frequent accusations that guards hired by the

NGO's protected them by day and robbed them by night. In the case of civilians

living outside military compounds in Mogadishu, it was decided in mid-May

1993 that the best way to improve their security was to deploy a Nepalese Gurka

battalion to protect them. In spite of the urgency of the situation, however, it

was four months before the first Gurka arrived.

One of the tasks of the military component was to protect what little

infrastructure and fixed assets remained in Somalia, and which were of

importance to the UN mission and the Somalian people. Light mortars shelled

UN facilities on many evenings, wounding civilian and military personnel alike,

and damaging vital equipment such as helicopters on the ground. There was also

concern that terrorist raids would be initiated from inside compounds by

infiltrating personnel and/or explosives carried in on one of the many large

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Somali trucks which frequented the base to bring supplies or to pump fuel or

water.

SECTION TWO: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

VII. Force Composition and Force Structure

Q7.1 Was the force composition unilateral or multilateral for your

mission area?

Unilateral: 03 Multilateral: 11

Q7.2 Describe the three most important advantages in action in the

manner described in 7.1.

Multilateral force composition:

- (S006) [Does not] appear as a unilateral takeover, or [as] one country

forcing its will on another.

- (S019) A part of the UN system. Gives credibility. Use of different

kinds of experi[e]nces.

- (S055) International community solidarity. More operational

capabilities and [...] logistic[al] effort. Not to be easily considered as

neo-colonialist[s].

- (S073) Broaden political consensus. Strong leadership from US.

Variety of capabilities available.

- (S153) [The] different organization and different capabilities of various

contingents [were] suit[ed] to meet different [...] tasks and challenges.

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- (S142) Credibility of the involvement of the [international]

community, size of troops. Credibility of [the] peaceful intentions of

the UN[...]. Variability of culture in [the] way to fulfill the mission[...].

- (S144) Several countries shared the political responsibility to intervene

in Somalia. Only possibility to find enough peacekeepers.

- (S146) [...] BE and US Forces [worked together]. Any attack against

Allied Forces was seen as an attack against US Forces.

- (S100) World support (US, Canada, Australia, Kuwait, Pakistan,

Germany, etc.). Regional representation (Bostwana, Nigeria, Egypt).

Varied experiences and points of view.

- (S059) Took advantage of area expertise. Provided a world solution to

a regional problem. Lessen[ed] the bill for one country in terms of

manpower.

Unilateral force composition:

- (S145) Coherence of the contingents. Unity of language and training.

S[imilar] comprehension of the mission.

- S148) Standardi[z]ation. One commander. [Enables] rapid reactions

[...].

- (S150) Unity of command. [...] [S]ame interpretation of RoE

throughout AOR.

Q7.3 Describe the three most important disadvantages in acting in

the manner described in 7.1.

Multilateral force composition:

- (S006) Communications - language barriers both oral and written.

Work ethic - not strong [for] some nations. Military set up - different

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nations allow [people of] different ranks to [make] decisions; some

militaries require an unusually high rank to [make] a decision.

- (S019) Language difficulties. Many contributing nations send[...]

personnel who do[...] not fulfill [set qualifications]. Differences in

attitudes.

- (S055) Different mentalities and ways of acting and procedures.

[Failure to take responsiblity for] reach[ing] [...] long- term objectives.

Different approach[es] to crisis management situations. Lack of co-

ordination in [...] command and control.

- (S153) Political considerations of the countries who donated troops for

Somalia weighed heavily on their contingents, which in turn affected

their performance.

- (S142) Unequal quality of troops. Different national

involvement/interests. Unanimity of culture in the way in which to

fulfill the missions.

- (S144) No common military background (except for NATO countries).

Difficulties linked to differences [in] race, language, culture, religion

etc.

- (S146) Different background on Africa, [varying approaches to]

execution of the mission [and] different view[s] on the final solution.

- (S100) National agendas. Wide variety of work ethics.

Language/terminology differences.

- (S073) Some clashes with "national agenda". Level of competency

varied widely. Some limitations on employment flowing from 1 and 2.

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- (S059) Diverging national agendas. No unity of command. Time

intensive for deliberate planning.

Unilateral force composition:

- No responses.

Q7.4 If you worked in a multilateral context: how important was

consensus (with peacekeepers from other countries) for the

achievement of disarmament and demobilization components

during the operation?

- (S006) Not important. [What is] important [is] to make them

understand the need [or the] urgency.

- (S055) No disarmament [or] demobilization without consensus.

- (S073) Moderately important, albeit given the semi-autonomous area

assigned to the Australian contingent, agreement with [the] US HQ was

really all that was necessary.

- (S153) Consensus was the only method left [...].

- (S142) Disarmament had a different meaning according to the culture

of the troops (meaning: [the US' perspectives do not equal Europe's,

and Europe's do not equal Asia's, etc.]).

- (S144) Everybody agreed with the idea, but not many [were] directly

involved [...].

- (S146) Consensus was better at the end of our collaboration than at the

beginning.

- (S100) Important but not difficult to achieve.

- (S059) Most essential component. However, caused UNOSOM II the

most problems.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Q7.5. Was there adequate consideration given to the disarmament

component as the mission evolved?

Adequate: 04 Inadequate: 07

Q7.6 If inadequate, explain how this affected your mission

(mention the three most important issues).

- (S006) More weapons appeared. More firefights broke out. More and

bolder banditry.

- (S055) Our action[s] in the North of the country and in Mogadishu

were made more difficult because in the rest of the country

disarmament was [not given] the same consideration by the other UN

Forces.

- (S142) No incentives [...] for disarmament. No co-ord[ination] with

[th]e civilian component. No specific disarmament monitoring teams.

- (S144) No UNOSOM member had [...] previous experience with CF

& D. No UN documentation on the subject was made available or

existed in Somalia. [...] [F}rom the [very] beginning, the [many]

technical teams sent to Somalia [underestimated] the sociological

importance of arms in [...] Somali society.

- (S100) Disarmament was a key to the mandate, but not adequately

staffed initially. The time [frame] for the mandate w[as] unrealistic.

The process was well thought out, but not [sufficiently] manned to

accomplish its objectives.

Q7.7 Did the force composition identify a specific structure to

support the disarmament component of the mandate?

Yes: 01 No: 09

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Q7.8 If yes, what was it?

- (S142) [The] [d]isarmament section of [the operation force in] [...] HQ.

- (S146) [The structure to support the disarmament component of the

mandate was] specific, but in general terms, [there was a] need [for] a

lot of infantry, supported by very mobile and light armoured forces.

- (S100) We were an ad hoc group with a "peripheral mission" until

things [got] out of hand.

- (S059) Cease-fire and disarmament division in U-3 operations branch.

38 personnel [were] organized into 6 teams and a DNC HQ element.

[They] would provide [the] nucleus of [the military observer structure

(those who stayed behind)] after transition to Chapter 6 operations.

Q7.9 Did the force composition allow for verification and

monitoring measures for the control of weapons and disarmament?

Yes: 05 No: 06

Q7.10 If yes, what were they?

- (S055) Periodic sites control by the units.

- (S073) Infantry soldiers and MPs.

- (S099) Disarmament teams were established from within the J-3

(Operations) Staff to verify and monitor disarmament.

- (S144) [...] [A] plan was made by April [19]93 mainly by my

successors. One officer had UNTAC experience.

- (S146) A lot of infantry, supported by armoured forces and

combat/transport helicopters.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S100) Random inspection/verification of w[eapon] sites. [The] first

time [...] the USC/SNA ambushed three teams killing 53 Pakistani

peacekeepers.

Q7.11 Was the chosen force structure appropriate for executing

the mission?

Yes: 07 No: 05

Q7.12 Were the units efficient for the mission given?

Yes: 10 No: 02

Q7.13 Were the units appropriate for conducting the disarmament

operations?

Yes: 08 No: 03

Q7.14 Were your units augmented with specific personnel and

equipment for the disarmament mission?

Yes: 06 No: 05

Q7.15 If yes, what additional capabilities did they provide? (List

the five most important ones.)

- (S055) Armoured vehicles and heavy armament. Helicopters.

Psyc[h]ological support. Intelligence. Patrolling.

- (S073) Counter intelligence section. Squad radios incl[uding] civilian

frequencies. Night vision devices.

- (S099) Loudspeaker teams. Translators.

- (S146) More infantry, more armoured veh[icles] and units, [and] more

helicopters.

- (S150) EOD (explosive ordnance disposal).

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- (S100) Translators/speaker teams. Special operations personnel.

Explosives ordonance disposal teams. Intelligence personnel.

Engineers.

Analyst's Comments:

In its first peace enforcement operation in a failed state, the UN developed

a force along the familiar lines of a peacekeeping force. But in conducting an

operation for which consent from various contesting factions might not be

obtainable and was a prerequisite for entry, added to the highly volatile

internal situation, the force needed a high degree of political and military

cohesion. Organized opposition quickly exposed weaknesses which required

greater mutual protection, co-operation, integration and unity. In preparing

for this operation, the UN selected countries from a wide range of

backgrounds and capabilities. Nations which normally were rivals (e.g.,

Pakistan and India) were thrown together and expected to co-operate. By way

of contrast, the NATO alliance had many political and military weaknesses,

but it had prepared for potential combat through forty years of training

exercises and had developed political-military procedures for co-ordinating

and unifying the policy interests of nations. In addition, it was an alliance of

nations with shared values, and was designed to defend the territory of its

nations, not for intervention in other parts of the world.

For UNOSOM II, some thirty nations were brought together in small units.

When UNITAF left Somalia, responsibilities shifted from a single unified

force to a weak and diverse international organization. Almost all of the

nations involved limited what their troops could do, where they could work

(for instance, some refused to be stationed in Mogadishu), and how they were

to react to various situations. Nations frequently rotated their units, delayed

sending promised troops for months, and arbitrarily pulled them out on short

notice. The UN Military Commander was frequently unable to move ahead

with strategic plans because of the need to cover gaps left by departing units

or to readjust the disposition of forces. The state of training and the quality

of the equipment of the different units varied significantly. In trying to find

replacements, UN headquarters in New York tended to simply count numbers

of troops. But in evaluating soldiers, one does not equal one.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Some units simply did not have the training to do what the Force

Commander required. For example, some troops were uncomfortable

patrolling at night or expanding the perimeters around compounds to help

prevent short-range mortar attacks. When heavier and more capable

equipment was urgently requested by the commander, the UN was dependent

on nations for immediate results. They, however, seemed unable to get out of

their blocks. One such example concerned the attack of 5 June 1993 against

the Pakistani force. The SC called for member states to urgently contribute

armoured personnel carriers and attack helicopters. More than a month later,

8 x old M48 tanks finally arrived for the Pakistanis, their breechblocks

inoperative, useless to the force.

From ammunition to maintenance to language, the inter-operability of this

force, assembled from all over the world, represented a continuing challenge.

Such problems are to be expected. But an even more difficult problem is the

inherent tendency of nations to micro-manage their units from distant

capitals. It is understandable that nations would want to control their units

in dangerous situations, but this inclination presents a nearly insurmountable

obstacle for a commander trying to marshal limited resources and to

implement a coherent strategy. On one occasion a unit was stopped by its

capital from counterattacking in mid-battle. Instead of receiving an important

message, the bandits were emboldened by this action. Some units were even

suspected of colluding with opponents of the UN, at least in the sense of

providing them with a de facto sanctuary. Another problem was that each

nation seemed to have a different political threshold of casualties. No nation

had an easy time justifying casualties in what was basically a humanitarian

situation, but some seemed to believe that a peace enforcement operation still

meant a relatively risk-free operation. When it did not, the result was often

inaction, accommodation or departure. This series of reactions produced a

much less effective force. The UN demonstrated that it is not yet ready for

peace enforcement operations.

Q7.16 If you were a commander, were you briefed by HQ's in

advance of your disarming mission and before you arrived in the

area of operations?

Yes: 04 No: 04

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Q7.17 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for

weapons control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 08 No: 04

Q7.18 If no, what steps were required to establish and maintain a

secure environment?

- (S006) More troops on the streets as a show of force and to enforce

w[eapons] sanctions.

- (S142) Deploy UN troops.

- (S146) To convince local leaders [of] the need for general

disarmament. To convince US Commanders to make a difference in

our area, w[h]ere opposed factions were fighting.

- (S100) We expected trouble going in[to] the A[uthorized] W[eapons]

S[torage] S[ites]. The ambushes occurred after the inspections were

complete[d] and we were [returning] to HQ. Our "collective" guard

was down.

Q7.19 Did these force protection measures positively or negatively

affect the accomplishment of the disarmament operations?

Positively: 05 Negatively: 01

Q7.20 Elaborate on the impact mentioned in 7.19 above.

- (S055) The units gained credibility.

- (S142) UN troops providing secure environment.

- (S100) The ambush and killing of the Pakistanis led to Aideed's arrest

order and the eventual failure of both the political and military

initiatives.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S099) Disarmament was natural extension of force protection mission.

Q7.21 Were command and control/operational procedures

adequate for your task?

Yes: 06 No: 05

Q7.22 If no, mention three examples which demonstrate the

inadequacy.

- (055) Lack of information[...] collection and evaluation. Lack of

communication system[s]. Lack of co-ordination in actions [...].

- (S153) The lack of will was the most important factor.

- (S142) No disarmament monitoring team[...]. No co-ordination [of]

disarmament [at the] local level. [The] weapon[s] policy [was] not

unified.

- (S144) UNOSOM I had [units only] in Mogadishu. Even so,

communications were a problem (no secure radio net [or] telephones).

Somalis were monitoring our motorola net through the use of the fixed

stations they found on our hijacked vehicles. No "operations" as such,

mainly base security. 50 UNMOs without a proper mission for many

weeks, later relocated.

- (S100) Needed better communications on the tactical end and more

responsiveness from the tactical units. Language and national agendas

prevented some contingents from complying with orders from Force

HQ. Peacekeepers from other nations died because of recalcitrance

from certain units/national forces.

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Q7.23 Summarize your salient experiences with command and

control/operational procedures while on this mission.

- (S055) [It was practically] impossible [to] co-operate in operations

with non-NATO forces.

- (S073) UNITAF HQ was a functioning national HQ with attached

other nations LOs (Liaison officers) or national HQs. The UNITAF

HQ was extremely well organized and run, and provided clear

guidance and command and staff support. The flow of information was

excellent. The contrast with both UNOSOM I and II HQs was telling.

- (S153) Contingent [c]ommanders must obey the orders of Force

Commanders without taking into account the political considerations

of their [...] countries.

- (S142) Orders [were] not executed by UN troops. Monitors for

disarmament [were] without [a] secure environment due to [the] lack

of interest in disarmament. Confrontations between factions, SNA and

UN [troops] made any disarmament [...] [un]realistic.

- (S144) The military HQ of UNOSOM I [did not function] properly due

to the lack of personnel combined with the local security level which

forced us to abandon our offices before sunset [until] the next morning.

- (S148) My experiences are probably different [from] those [dealing

with] "Classical UN Operations" because we were not confronted with

[...] classical armies but [...] with armed clans that [have] practise[d]

[...] civil[...] war, [..] stealing, [etc.,] [...] for centuries.

- (S150) On intervention of the US QRF from Mogadishu in our AOR,

there was a fundamental difference of opinion on the establishment of

WFZ's, which could not be solved due to the C2 structure.

- (S100) Better tactical radios would eliminate the excuse. Better LNOs

and the elimination of national agendas would make real combat

operations feasible. National pride [has no] place in a c[ombat]

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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operation. The commander of one unit [died] because he [refused] his

position to be relieved by a for[c]e from another nation.

Q7.24 What additional support (special capabilities/force

multipliers) did you receive which helped the disarmament

mission? List the three most important.

- (S055) None.

- (S073) Nil.

- (S099) Loudspeaker teams. Aerial leaflet drops.

- (S142) US troops [...] secure[d operations which were] outside [the]

UN troops' deployment areas. Log support for [the] disarmament

committee.

- (S145) Mobility: [t]ransport helicopters to move one whole company

anywhere in the AOR. Command and control: observation helicopters.

- (S146) More small armoured vehicles, more helicopter support [and]

more US forces in [the] sector.

- (S150) See 7.15.

- (S100) AC130s. Real Time Intelligence. Helicopters.

Q7.25 Were they adequate?

Yes: 05 No: 01

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Q7.26 If no, what other capabilities would you have needed to

make your mission more effective? (List the most relevant.)

- (S142) Disarmament monitoring teams on a permanent bas[is] in the

areas.

Analyst's Comments:

As the composition of the main body of a force, the command structure also

reflects the speed and efficiency with which a force can act and execute its

mission. Channels of command and staff procedures must be direct and quick.

Force HQ Structure

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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The old military maxim, "if command and control arrangements take more

than 10 seconds to explain, they're not going to work", was forgotten by the

planners of UNOSOM II. The UN chain of command resembled in form that

of a conventional combined peacekeeping operation: Brigade Commanders

reported directly to the UNOSOM II Force Commander, who in turn reported

directly to the SRSG. The SRSG was directly responsible to the SG, who in

turn reported to the SC. This was, however, just the theory.

Annex J to the operational plan confused the issue totally by describing the

command relationship as a coalition force (like UNITAF). Without going into

a detailed discussion about the difference between a coalition and a UN

operation, it is sufficient to say that a unlike a coalition, a UN operation is

collectively mandated and controlled. Despite the proverbial tendency of

contingents in peacekeeping operations to maintain separate lines of

communications with, and to receive orders from, their home capitals, in a

UN operation contingents are supposed to be strictly under the control of the

Force Commander. This is not necessarily true of a coalition operation.

As was discussed, this led to a loose relationship between the contingents,

the Force Commander and the national capitals, which seriously affected

command and control. The US Commander in Chief (USA) retained command

of all the US forces assigned to UNOSOM II, and would assign operational

control to the Commander of the US Forces in Somalia. This meant that the

Commander of the US Forces could override any decision of the UN Force

Commander where US troops were concerned. The Commander of the US

Forces in Somalia was also the Deputy Force Commander of the UN Force.

In reality he was the direct subordinate of the Force Commander, as well as

his indirect superior. As some respondents indicated [Q7.16, Q7.21, Q7.22

(S055, S153), and Q7.23 (S055, S073, S144, and S150)], there were problems

with the efficiency of HQ's and the Command and Control system that were

never solved.

VIII. Operational Procedures/Rules of Engagement

Q8.1 Did you abide by national or UN rules of

engagement/operational procedures during the pursuit of your

mission?

National: 04 UN: 09

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Q8.2 Were these rules/procedures adequate for the performance

of your task?

Yes: 11 No: 02

Q8.3 If no, what other rules should you have had?

- (S144) Chapter VII type RoE's.

- (S146) The authorization to disarm everybody.

Q8.4 If and when the situation changed, were your rules changed

accordingly?

Yes: 07 No: 05

Q8.5 If yes, summarize the relevant changes.

- (S006) Use of lethal [and] non-lethal force.

- (S055) In order to guarantee more security for units.

- (S099) Even though situation changed, RoE remained adequate.

- (S153) Change [from] Chapter 7 to 6 also necessitated the changes in

[the] rules of engagement.

- (S145) Example: after the development of the situation in Mogadishu,

June-July 1993, [we were permitted to fire without warning on]

vehicles which carried [technicals] and, of course, heavy weapon[s]

[...]. We [did not] need to put [the permission to fire] into effect in our

AOR.

- (S146) No weapon[s] authorized in our area (city of Kitmayo, Jubbah

valley).

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S150) Authorization to carry grenades after the even[t] in Mogadishu

of early July.

- (S100) An individual seen in public w[ith] a weapon was an open

target.

- (S059) Once coercive disarmament op[eration]s started, RoE became

more force- protection oriented. Technicians were engaged on-site if

located w[ith] UN soldiers/com[m]and[er]s. Any visible w[ea]p[o]n

constituted a threat.

IX. Coercive Disarmament and Preventive Disarmament

Q9.1 Did you have to use force (coercive disarmament) to achieve

the mission as mandated?

Yes: 09 No: 04

Q9.2 After your experience, is it possible to use coercive

disarmament in these types of operations?

Yes: 11 No: 02

Q9.3 Do you believe that force can and should be used to enforce

the disarmament components of an agreement?

Can: Yes: 08 No: 00

Should: Yes: 12 No: 00

Q9.4 Mention three reasons why force can/cannot and

should/should not be used to enforce the disarmament component

of an agreement.

- (S006) If the mission is to disarm, then whatever steps are necessary

should be taken. People will not willingly give up their arms when they

believe those same arms represent their strength.

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- (S055) To warrant the defence of the unprotected population. To

warrant [...] self defence. To improve peace will. To give [...] authority

to institutions.

- (S073) When disarmament is an adjunct to the greater mission, (i.e. the

security of humanitarian relief), forceful means may be necessary -

[w]hen an agreement, having been obtained, breaks down for [one]

reason or another.

- (S099) Using force initially keeps initiative with peacekeeping forces.

Disarmament is easier in the long run if warlords see resistance is futile

early on. [Coercive] disarmament often has a favourable impact on

local populace.

- (S148) We have to be credible. We must avoid any start of "non

respect" [for] the agreement, and we [must] avoid any physical risks to

our own soldiers.

- (S150) [D]isarmament of dissident elements within the factions.

Credibility of UN forces.

- (S100) Force was not used originally to induce disarmament although

disarmament would not have occurred w[ith]o[ut] the threat of

UNITAF force and demonstrations of their will to use force.

- (S059) Must be able to demonstrate resolve. Force protection.

Implement an agreement (cannot let one belligerent hold accord

"hostage" by inaction).

Q9.5 If fighting was an ongoing process, was it possible for you to

continue with your disarmament tasks?

Yes: 01 No: 09

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Q9.6 If yes, describe how it was possible to continue with your

disarmament tasks.

- (S006) Only on the airfield, which was UN controlled.

- (S146) As soon [as] our mandate foresaw the interdiction to carry

weapons, anybody with a weapon could be arrested and disarmed.

- (S059) Conduct coercive disarmament in Mogadishu and surrounding

areas. Continue dialogue w[ith] participating/non-belligerent factions

in interior.

Q9.7 Were you involved in any preventive deployment operations

(i.e., as an observer, preventive diplomacy official, etc.)?

Yes: 01 No: 11

Q9.8 If yes, was disarmament a major concern of this deployment?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q9.9 If yes, were there already arms control agreements (i.e.,

country where you were operating?

Yes: 00 No: 01

SECTION THREE: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

X. Information: Collection, Public Affairs, and the Media.

Q10.1 Did you receive sufficient relevant information prior to and

during your disarming mission?

Prior: Yes: 02 No: 09

During: Yes: 07 No: 04

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Q10.2 Was information always available and reliable?

Yes: 03 No: 08

Q10.3 How did you receive/obtain your information prior and

during the mission? (Describe the three most important ways.)

- (S006) HUMINT (Human Intelligence) from locals. UN Br[ie]f[ing]s.

- (S055) By national intelligence organization (prior). By national net of

HUMINT (during). By continuous and deep contact with the

population (during).

- (S073) Central Briefings. Operations Orders. Individual instructions.

- (S099) National Intelligence organisations. Media. Local informants.

- (S142) National, UN Mil[itary] info[rmation], UN civ[ilian]

info[rmation].

- (S145) Patrols, observation, liaison officers, contact with soldiers and

population.

- (S144) UNITAF sources only. Later, we received "information" given

by the So[mali] factions themselves [...].

- (S146) Prior: briefing at New York HQ; collection of information[...]

from local NGO[s], Arabic experts, pilots, journalists[, etc.]. During:

long discussions with local intellectuals.

- (S148) Only by receiving [b]riefing[s] from the Intelligence Officer.

- (S150) Prior: debriefing predecessors. During: translators, meeting

with locals, patrolling, check points.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S100) Poor communications capabilities [prevented] up-to-the-minute

information from being transmitted.

- (S059)Humanitarian sources (Somali Nations), UN information

structure, UNIT LNO's.

Q10.4 Was there a structured information exchange between HQ's

and the units in the field?

Yes: 09 No: 02

Q10.5 And between the various field commanders?

Yes: 06 No: 02

Q10.6 Did you use sensor mechanisms for verification/information

purposes?

Yes: 06 No: 05

Q10.7 If yes, list which ones and for what purpose. (Mention not

more than three.)

- (S006) Metal detectors.

- (S142) Airforce, means of troops in the field.

- (S145) Metal detectors, mine detectors, occasionally infra-red

camera[s] (support of Canadian helicopters).

- (S146) Special forces, night vision assets, infrared sensors.

- (S073) Night vision devices - perimeter security. SIG INT -

intelligence.

- (S059) USAWC/PKI to address.

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Q10.7.1 Was the use of on-site and remote sensing an adequate tool

for verifying and monitoring weapons control and disarmament

operations?

Yes: 03 No: 03

Q10.7.2 In your opinion, could sensor systems (acoustic, radar,

photo, video, infrared, etc.) play a useful role in monitoring the

weapons control and disarmament aspects of a peacekeeping

operation?

Yes: 08 No: 01

Q10.7.3 If yes, give some examples of phases of the peacekeeping

process in which such sensors could be used.

- (S006) Remote observation. Density detection.

- (S055) Controlling of known weapons storages. [Control during night

time].

- (S073) Monitoring movement, verifying positions.

- (S099) Video cameras could monitor cantonment sites.

- (S142) Cantonment and assembly air force. Disarmament control:

night-seeing radar.

- (S144) Searching for bivouacs, training camps, caches[, etc].

- (S146) Movement of armed forces (by night). Control at check points,

especially women.

- (S100) Monitoring of cantonment sites after w[ea]p[o]ns have been

stored.

- (S059) Cantonment monitoring, w[ea]p[o]ns movement.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Q10.7.4 What would you suggest about the possible organizational

set-up of the use of such sensor systems (i.e., UN, regional

organization, national, etc.)?

- (S055) National.

- (S073) [It would be] [b]etter to use national organizations detached [to]

UN service.

- (S142) UN.

- (S145) UN and National.

- (S146) National remains the most efficient.

- (S100) Regional or UN - until a viable g[o]v[ernmen]t exists to assume

the mission.

- (S006) Both UN [and] national.

- (S059) Not viable, national resource.

Q10.8 Do you think that normal information collection assets (i.e.,

intelligence) could and should be used for peacekeeping and

disarming purposes?

Yes: 11 No: 00

Q10.9 Why? (List three reasons.)

- (S006) Need reliable HUM INT for local opinion or planned events,

demonstrations, etc.

- (S055) It is the basis of any plan (knowledge of [opposing forces] and

terrain). It is the best way to avoid the use of force or to [limit] it. It is

fundamental for [the security of] our [own] personnel [...].

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- (S073) Without good intelligence, you may as well tie one hand behind

your back and close both eyes.

- (S099) System works.

- (S145) Without information and [...] exploitation, no operation is

possible. Normal information also [forms] the base of knowledge of

the environment in which the mission has to be executed.

- (S144) No military operation is feasible without information on the

"threat" (not to say "the enemy"). UN should listen to local radio[s],

[...] read the local press and pay informants.

- (S146) Lack of background, lack of confidence (from/of the fighting

factions), [and] research for solutions (local).

- (S148) A peacekeeping operation is still a military operation [...].

Avoid risks of surprise. Security of own soldiers.

- (S150) Information is vital in all kinds of "military" undertakings, [and

thus] all resources should be used.

- (S100) To preclude unauthorized movement of weapons. To preclude

ambushes of cease-fire/[d]isarmament [t]eams. To provide a check of

normal monitoring methods.

- (S142) Assess the situation, provide info[rmation] to the factions

(confidence), own security.

- (S059) No viable UN structure[s] exist[...]. Need to verify actions of

belligerents. Service as a force protection multiplier.

Q10.10 Is there a need for satellite surveillance in

peacekeeping/peace enforcing operations?

Yes: 11 No: 01

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Q10.11 Did you use the local population for information collection

purposes?

Yes: 10 No: 01

Q10.12 Did you implement any transparency measures to create

mutual confidence between warring parties?

Yes: 06 No: 04

Q10.13 If yes, did you act as an intermediary?

Yes: 05 No: 01

Q10.14 Was public affairs/media essential to the disarming

mission?

Yes: 09 No: 02

Q10.15 Were communication and public relations efforts of

importance during your mission?

Yes: 11 No: 00

Q10.16 If yes, give three reasons why this was so.

- (S006) Keep population informed of UN goals. Psycho Ops

(psychological operations).

- (S055) To avoid wrong perceptions about our presence and purposes.

To stimulate the incoming information flow from [the] population. To

[let] them know what we were looking for.

- (S073) Confidence of the local population in our efforts was essential

to maintain the momentum. This confidence was gained by numerous

means, public relations being an important one of these.

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- (S099) Confidence-building among warring parties. Notifying

population in advance of activities. Showing measures of success.

- (S142) Disarmament has to be enforced by the population, [and the

population has a] need[ for] info[rmation] [regarding disarmament].

[Any] step[s] forward in the process should be [publicized in order to

motivate population towards] voluntary disarmament.

- (S144) To inform correctly local people about our mission, intentions,

[and] methods.

- (S146) [...] [S]tress the peace effort on one or the other side; [...] better

explain the situation; and [...] [receive] adequate [...] reinforcement[s]

or support from local leaders [in time].

- (S150) Explaining what we were doing. Confidence-building.

- (S100) In alerting and calming the local populations.

- (S145) All military operations in such an environment were risky. To

reduce the risks, it was necessary to gain the confidence and the respect

of the population, via the elders.

- (S059) Need to give Somalis [an] accurate picture of UN actions.

Maintain unbiased view of contributing nation[s]' citizens.

Q10.17 Was there a well-funded and planned communications

effort to support and explain your activities and mission to the

local population?

Yes: 09 No: 02

Q10.18 If not, should there have been one?

Yes: 04 No: 00

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Q10.19 Did media attention at any time hamper or benefit your

disarming efforts?

Hamper: 06 Benefit: 02

Q10.20 Summarize your experience with the media.

- (S006) One UN paper stated [that] many jobs were to be forthcoming,

when in fact they were not. Once the local public discovered they had

been lied to tensions mounted. [At] [o]ther times, clan leaders would

seem to use the[ir] paper to help sway others towards their ideas.

- (S055) The media [did not] have any relevant impact [o]n the Somali

society. Our contact[s] with national media were good and we [did not

have] any problems. Foreign media [was] not always [very] favourable

because they [did not] understand our behaviour.

- (S073) Generally I had a favourable experience with the media,

although at times I found their analysis shallow. They were a

necessary, if frustrating, aspect of the operation.

- (S099) Media helped when it showed success. Media hindered when

it criticized the process or second-guessed delays, thereby giving

support to those against disarmament.

- (S142) Became counterproductive, as suspected by the population to

support new colonialism.

- (S144) Mainly national contacts (although our group was very small).

Contacts with international media were mainly made out of Somalia

(Kenya, Ethiopia).

- (S146) Very good experience. We allowed any media expert to collect

information[...] about our work and about the situation in our area.

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- (S148) [...] [O]nly [...] deal[t] with "occidental" (Western) media that

[solely] wanted to report [on] our military activities. There was no

local media, so it was not possible to use this mean[s] to support our

efforts.

- (S150) Slander campaign by African Rights movement drew a lot of

media attention [...] in Somalia as [well as] outside. This had a bad

influence on the attitude of the average Somali towards us and on the

moral of the soldiers.

- (S100) The USC/SNA played the Western Press like a fine violin.

They properly manipulated a generally liberal press against the UN/US

forces and eventually let Aideed win the "war" in the papers after his

militias had been soundly beaten in the [Oct.] 13 incident at the

Olympia Hotel.

- (S145) Essentially national media came in our AOR. Very good

experience as they [were] fully [...] supported by the Be[lgian] army.

Air transportation, logistics in the AOR and security. Very good

contacts and positive feedback.

- (S059) Aideed planned his actions in accordance w[ith] media impact.

Media supported Aideed as an "underdog" fight[ing] society.

Q10.21 Was there sufficient briefing to the general public in the

conflict area on the disarming process?

Yes: 06 No: 04

Q10.22 If yes, who organized this and who carried it out?

Organized: (S055) Our H[Q's]

(S073) UNITAF HQ

(S099) J-3 Planners

(S146) Local Commanders

(S148) Civilian Affairs

(S150) Field Commanders

(S145) UN contingent

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Carried it out: (S055) G2 and Civilian Affairs [c]ell

(S073) PA staff UNITAF HQ

(S099) Psy[chological] Op[eration]s units

(S146) US Psy[chological] Op[eration]s units

(S148) Commanders in the field

(S150) Field Commanders

(S145) UN contingent

Q10.23 Was there co-operation with the local media in explaining

the steps of disarmament you were carrying out?

Yes: 03 No: 05

Q10.24 Were leaflets distributed?

Yes: 09 No: 02

Analyst's Comments:

a. Information:

For the most part, UNOSOM did not face overwhelming, sustained or even

skillfully executed attacks. The tactics used against the force were typical of

guerilla warfare in many areas of the world. But in an urban environment

such as Mogadishu, these tactics coulf be difficult to combat, even with a

well-trained force. In order to do their jobs, military commanders needed to

be able to detect the movement of opposing forces, to determine the location

of hidden arms caches, and to anticipate the plans of those who might attack

their forces. This required a sound information gathering, digestion and

distribution system. Nearly all respondents mentioned the need for a proper

intelligence system during peace operations. The importance of this

capability cannot be over-emphasised.

Related to good intelligence was the need to be a step ahead of the

opposition and to anticipate their moves. When confronted with periodic

random attacks, it is important to prepare for them by taking proper defensive

measures. Early warning helped, but was often incorrect. Accurate warning

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would have allowed more effective counter-measures and would have

provided an opportunity to disrupt attacks before they are launched. This,

again, requires good intelligence, and the ability to evaluate, disseminate and

react rapidly. Here it is important to indicate that:

- Belligerent parties may perceive information-gathering as a hostile act.

Intelligence operations may therefore destroy the trust that the parties may

have in the peacekeeping force. However, it is reasonable to assume that

the parties will purse their divergent aims by exploiting the presence of the

peacekeeping force (as had indeed been the case during UNOSOM). They

may also attempt to deceive it from time to time. Circumstances may place

the force under direct attack. Such attacks may come from one of the

parties to the agreement, or from extremist elements acting independently.

This poses a serious problem, but whatever the circumstances, the

peacekeepers need information and must have the ability to collect it. The

way in which it is collected is important, and it should as far as possible

not create stones for the belligerent parties to throw back at the

peacekeeping force.

- Threat capabilities are usually the first consideration in determining

information requirements. It is difficult for a commander to make a

decision when the picture is not reasonably clear. There may also be

requirements for the production of economic, political, sociological,

medical and other information. It is therefore unthinkable that an operation

can be successful without proper and shared information-gathering

capabilities.

- The intelligence community must define intelligence requirements for

supporting the military commitment as early as possible. This is crucial

because the re-deployment and planning phases of the operation require

optimum support. Once deployed, a unit or formation should develop its

requirements and information-gathering plan in conjunction with the

operational plan, and submit it along the proper channels of command for

approval. Intelligence support must always focus on operational planning

considerations.

- To ensure the safety of assigned forces, the commander must have the

capability to disseminate critical indications and warnings to all echelons

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quickly. A robust theatre architecture must be in place to provide accurate

and timely all-source information. This information must be formatted

clearly and be at the disposal of the entire deployed force.

- Mission success and the security of the force depends almost entirely on the

observational skills of the personnel and leadership of the small unit. In the

absence of other systems, human intelligence may be the primary source of

timely information. This is also the first line of defence against any threat

and is a critical factor in determining mission success. It must be developed

to its full potential during every military peace operation.

b. Media

As can be seen from the responses to the questionnaires, this is a

challenging subject for a military man to comment on. Peacekeeping

operations are carried out under the full glare of public scrutiny. By using

satellites and other modern communications technology, the press is able to

distribute reports and pictures faster than the proverbial Jack Rabbit. (And

certainly faster than the news can be released by the peacekeeping force HQ,

because the media does not have to double check the news for accuracy).

Incidents, sometimes embellished or slanted toward a partisan view point, are

screened on television the same day and are in the press the next morning, to

excite audiences in the countries that are parties to a dispute and their allies.

The role of the press during delicate negotiations is indeed of incalculable

importance. When information is withheld, journalists fall back on

speculation. Such speculation, although usually inaccurate, is often near

enough to the truth to be accepted as such by large sections of public opinion,

and even by governments (depending upon whether it suits their case or not).

Belligerents may sometimes find it advantageous to leak part of a story to the

press to build public support for their own position. On occasion, such

activities can grow into fully orchestrated press campaigns.

Some of the warring parties in Somalia understood this "weapon" very

well, and staged events to get to the soft underbelly of the democratic world,

public opinion. Long gone were the images of dying and starved Somalis, the

looting of the relief convoys and the banditry committed by the very people

who now are portrayed as the suffering ones. In such circumstances, it was

extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the UN mission in Somalia to set the

record straight without destroying its neutrality.

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- One opposition tactic was to stage a demonstration and attempt to provoke

peacekeepers. Women and children would be deliberately mixed into

organized crowds to complicate the problem of control. An example was the

demonstration staged on 13 June 1993 in front of a Pakistani strongpoint. (Not

by accident, the selected site was located next to the only press centre in the

city). As the crowd was nearing the Pakistani position, shots were fired at the

soldiers from the top of nearby buildings and from the crowd. The Pakistanis

returned fire, wounding some of the civilians. The organizers reached their

goal: presenting an image to the press of a UN out of control, which was sent

to the world within minutes after it had happened. It would have been far

preferable to have been able to disperse this organized crowd using non-lethal

means, thereby preventing a contrived demonstration from becoming

damaging in terms of world opinion.

- Women and children were also repeatedly mixed in with gunmen and used as

shields. On 17 June, they were used to close a Moroccan column to

handgrenade range, resulting in serious casualties to the soldiers. Women and

children were often used to construct roadblocks and were mixed into ambush

groups as well. In one incident, a combination of US engineers and Pakistani

escorts trying to remove a roadblock on a main route were ambushed by

several hundred Somalis. With women mixed into their group, the gunmen

attacked from behind walls and buildings. The resulting defence by tanks and

helicopters, in an effort to extract the soldiers from the ambush, resulted in

heavy casualties amongst the Somali gunmen and civilians alike. (The media

reports were much more damaging to the UN, however.)

- Military peacekeepers must accept the fact that the media plays a major role

in keeping families informed and in determining, to a great extent, how the

world public will perceive the operation. This phenomenon called "media"

can greatly enhance a mission or sink it to the depths of inauspicious public

reaction. The challenge was for the mission commander in Somalia to deal

with the needs of the media, to implement effective information/briefing

sessions, and to build a trust relationship with the journalists. In that way, the

commander could have avoided the successes his rivals had on the battlefields

in the living rooms of the world.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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SECTION FOUR: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

XI. Experiences in the control of weapons and in disarmament during

your mission:

Q11.1 Describe, by order of importance, your specific tasks, if any,

in weapons control and disarmament during this mission.

- (S006) Only to stop the transportation or import of weapons into the

airport.

- (S055) Weapons search and confiscation. Controlling [...] [weapons

[storage]. Elimination of banditry.

- (S073) NGO guards were permitted some weapons which were

registered and periodically checked. All other weapons which were

publically displayed were confiscated. Sweeps for unregistered

weapons were periodically carried out and all weapons confiscated

were destroyed.

- (S099) Develop disarmament plan. Negotiate among warring factions

to accept plan and disarm. Co-ordinate activities of [c]ease-fire and

[d]isarmament [c]ommittee. Investigate [c]ease-fire violations.

- (S142) Negotiate disarmament with factions, provide orders to UN

troops in disarmament, enforce disarmament SNA, and monitor

disarmament [in] other areas.

- (S145) Checkpoints, cordon and search operations.

- (S144) Producing [...] concept of operations together with a UNITAF

team and a civilian member of the political branch of UNOSOM I

(Civilian Affairs). Military advisor on CF & D to the political director.

- (S146) Storage of heavy weapons, check points (fixed and mobile),

patrols (on foot and with v[e]h[i]c[les]), search operations, [and]

negotiations.

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- (S148) Search organized at company or battalion level. Check points.

Security patrols.

- (S150) Establishment of WFZ (check points, patrolling). Searches.

- (S100) Deputy Chief Cease-fire & Disarmament Division, Future

Operations, Force U-3 (COO). Responsible for writing SOP's, Training

Teams, investigating violations, and assisting the Cease-fire and

Disarmament Committee.

- (S059) Conduct of w[ea]p[o]ns inventories. Establishment of

disarmament timelines. Supervise w[ea]p[o]ns turn-in and

[d]estruction.

Q11.2 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for arms

control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 08 No: 04

Q11.3 If no, what steps were required to establish and maintain a

secure environment?

- (S006) More troops visibly on the streets conducting weapons seizures

and maintaining the peace.

- (S019) Organize (re-organize) a local police force, equip and train

them.

- (S142) Provide incentives [...] to convince the populations/factions to

enforce disarmament.

- (S144) Deployment of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, and not only

West of 46

/E, and South of 5/N, with enough troops to block 3500 km

of coast line[...], and three national borders, keeping in mind all

airfields had to be controlled.

- (S146) [...] [C]hange the mandate in order to disarm everybody.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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199

- (S059) After 5 June 1993, disarmament was predominantly conducted

as a part of [the] combat operation. Principal focus was on the larger

belligerent clans/factions. (USC-SNA, SPM Jess, SPM morgar, SNF

Gabio, fundamentalists).

Q11.4 Do you think your weapons control and disarming tasks

could have been handled more efficiently?

Yes: 07 No: 04

Q11.5 If yes, mention three ways in which your task could have

been improved.

- (S006) More con[s]cientious checking by the security forces involved.

- (S073) It must be remembered that we were in an area devoid of

formed militia [...]. Our major threat was banditry.

- (S099) Ensure [h]umanitarian [o]rganizations provide support as

promised.

- (S142) Provide incentives, define and support parts of the populations

which could enforce disarmament. Negotiate disarmament in a

comprehensive way.

- (S145) A more coherent and complete policy at UNOSOM level is the

beginning of the operation.

- (S144) Positive action by the So[mali] intelligentia in exile to install

[...] own government. Deployment of UNITAF [throughout] Somalia.

- (S146) From the beginning, clear, adequate instructions related to all

type[s] of weapons.

- (S100) Manning for the inspection teams. Better security operations on

the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders.

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- (S059) Better co-ordination of Somali leadership. [B]etter co-

ordination [of] coalition partners. Larger disarmament staff utilizing an

integrated strategy.

Q11.6 Were opportunities missed to take advantage of or

implement weapons control and disarmament measures?

Missed: 06 Not missed: 03

Q11.7 If opportunities were missed, mention the main reasons why

this happened.

- (S055) The initial surprise should have been much more exploited; [...]

hesitation has been negative. Also, the other UN forces should have

undertaken our same efforts in disarming tasks.

- (S099) Lack of support from UN [p]olitical rep[resentative]s and

[h]umanitarian [r]ep[resentative]s for demobilization and disarmament.

Treating disarmament as a purely military problem. No formal peace

between warring parties.

- (S142) No incentives available (humanitarian component), negative

attitude [of] SNA, wrong mandate [to] restore hope, no disarmament

while [the] strongest forces in place.

- (S144) UNOSOM I, UNITAF, (and UNOSOM II) [addressed] warlords

but maybe this was not the best attitude to adopt towards them as it

gave them an importance they did not deserve and even never

expected.

- (S146) The lack of will from UN to disarm everybody. During the first

hours and days, it was possible to disarm everybody, but weapons were

given back to NGO[s'] bodyguards, and the militia were not disarmed.

- (S100) Many invitations by the SSDF and other northern-based

factions to expand UNOSOM II operations. We were unable to do this

[because of] USC/SNA local threat/instability and insufficient

manning.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S059) Political games between coalition partners. Basic challenges

resulting from clan/faction structure.

Q11.8 Did you find the national diversity of contributed troops a

problem for command and control during disarmament

operations?

Yes: 05 No: 05

Q11.9 If yes, mention the three problems you considered most

challenging.

- (S006) Language. Work ethic. Religious practices.

- (S055) Different way[s] to interpret the mandate. Different procedures

(language, religion, way of life, [and] civilization). Different ways to

perceive Somali problems.

- (S146) Different view on the mission [and] mandate. Different

background regarding Africa.

- (S150) Differences in interpretation of the concept WFZ.

- (S100) National [a]genda ([f]ormer [c]olonial [i]nterests). Varying

levels of commitment. Varying levels of professionalism/training.

- (S059) Equipment, [n]ational agenda, level of commit[...]ment and

training of soldiers and leaders.

Q11.10 Was the disarmament process reversible (i.e., were there

instances where devolution was foreseen or requested)?

Yes: 05 No: 03

Q11.11 If yes, were there provisions to this effect in the mandate,

mission or agreement?

Yes: 01 No: 04

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Q11.12 Which types of weapons were in use, and by whom (e.g.,

your own unit(s), warring parties, individuals, irregular units,

national officials, etc.)? (If applicable, list the five principal ones

for each category.)

Weapon: Rifles Whom: Warring Parties

Anti Tank Rockets

Mortars

Machine Guns

Mines

Technicals (Civilian pickup trucks armed with machine guns

and/or recoilless guns)

Weapon: Tanks Whom: UN Forces

APC's

Anti Tank Weapons

Machine Guns

Mortars

Weapon: Rifles Whom: Bandits

Pistols

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Other comments:

- (S073) Heavy weapons (mortar, HMG, light AA, artillery) were

confiscated early on, but were never [used] against us.

- (S144) According to UNITAF (U2) intelligence sources, the

So[malian] clans' order of battle showed 61,500 men as of mid-January

1993.

- (S146) Own troops: night vision assets, armoured vehicles, vehicles,

helicopters.

- (S148) We did not have to deal with regular armies. So, we met a lot

of different weapons [of Russian, Chinese, Italian, Belgian, German,

etc. origin].

- (S100) Night [v]ision [d]evices are extremely important. Eyes over

Mogadishu was a good source of intelligence.

- (S142) Mortar[s] used by factions as harassment; [tank +] APC - SNA:

not used, destroyed in their weapon[s] storage sites by UN troops as

[they] enforced disarmament.

- (S059) Th[is] type[...] of information is best gleaned from w[ea]p[o]ns

reports forwarded to UN[-New York] daily during mission period.

Table taken from questionnaire S144. This data is unconfirmed, but it was the

source used for planning purposes.

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No Wpn

System

SDA SDM/

SNA

SNDU SNF

(GEDO)

SNF

GALGA

DUIJ

SPM SSDF SSNM

/SNA

USC USC/

SNA

USF

1 Tanks 4 11 8 4 11 15 55

2APC 3 6 5 21

3 Tech Veh 22 59

4 Artillery 13 4 30 16 7 8 54

5AA

Artillery

9 13 3 4 3 11 33

6Mortars 6 10 3 9 21 8 4

7HMG 1 10

8Rec

Rifles

10 21 2

9RPG's ? 4 3 39 3 8

10 LMG ? 2 500 ?

11 Radar 30

12 Militia 300 0 ? 1,000 8,000 ? 10,000 ? ? 9,300 1,530

Q11.13 Were you given priorities as to the type of weapons you

should disarm first?

Yes: 10 No: 01

Q11.14 If yes, how were priorities assigned (i.e., on what basis)?

(List three reasons.)

- (S055) Technical cars, mortars, guns [and] light weapons.

- (S073) Briefings, operation orders implicit in [Rules of Engagement].

- (S099) Technical vehicles. Crew served weapons. Automatic weapons.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S142) Heavy SNA (factions which did not apply process). Priority

[given] to area[s] w[h]ere weapon[s] policy was the best implemented

(weapon[s] free areas).

- (S144) First, all heavy armament. Then, small arms. For details see

annex B.

- (S146) Anti-air rockets, [anti-tank] rockets, [anti-tank]+anti-pers[on]

mines.

- (S148) Grenades, mines. War rifles. Machine guns.

- (S150) Danger represented by the weapon (first "technicals", then crew

served weapons, lastly small arms).

- (S100) Heavy weapons, technical vehicles, crew served w[ea]p[o]ns.

- (S145) Heavy weapons mounted on vehicles (technicals), small

weapons.

- (S059) Priority was based on [t]hreat (i.e., new served weapons, [a]nti-

armour, artillery, tanks, etc.). Small weapons were lowest priority, but

most proliferate.

Q11.15 At the beginning of your mission, were you able to have

sufficient information on military capabilities in regard to

numbers and quality of equipment used by warring parties?

Yes: 06 No: 05

Q11.16 Did you have the impression that there were hidden caches

of weapons in your sector or adjoining sectors?

Yes: 10 No: 01

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Q11.17 Were illicit weapons a problem for you (illicit as in: not in

your inventories)?

Yes: 09 No: 01

Q11.18 Was there evidence in your sector that the warring parties

continued to have access to weapons through external channels of

supply?

Yes: 11 No: 01

Q11.19 Could you control external channels of weapons supply in

your sector?

Yes: 01 No: 09

Q11.20 How important was the control of external channels of

supply for the success of the mission?

Very Important: 08 Important: 01 Unimportant: 00

Q11.21 In your experience, do weapons continue to flow during the

conflict even after sanctions, inspections, and checks are applied?

Yes: 11 No: 00

Q11.22 Were there any security zones established?

Yes: 07 No: 03

Q11.23 If yes, were you able to control your sector effectively?

Yes: 03 No: 05

Q11.24 Depending on your answer under 11.23, elaborate on How

(i.e., how were you able to control the sector?) and Why (i.e., why

were you unable to control it?).

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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207

- (S055) We were able to control the sector with patrolling, check points,

strong points, observation [posts], intelligence [and] contact with [the]

population.

- (S073) Roadblocks, patrolling, deployed presence in villages, weapons

sweeps and searches.

- (S099) Aggressive inspections of vehicles entering sector reduce[d]

inflow of weapons.

- (S142) [...] [To enforce] disarmament [requires] too [many] troops.

Voluntary disarmament is enforced by the population-the Somali

population was not willing [to] due to their own culture.

- (S146) Control, pat[rol], and search operations. Use of children and

women by warring factions. Very large area with [great] possibility of

infiltration and movement (flat area without obstacles).

- (S148) The city of Kismayo is so typically African, that it was quite

impossible to control it with [only] one infantry battalion.

- (S150) Lack of troops. Terrain suitable for hidden caches and illicit

weapons traffic.

Q11.25 Were you involved in any monitoring of arms

embargoes/sanctions?

Yes: 03 No: 08

Q11.26 What was your experience in this respect?

- (S055) Little.

- (S099) Other nations do not necessarily respect embargoes if there is

a profit to be made. Effective control can only occur if neighbouring

countries police their borders.

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- (S100) Trips to outlying Force [HQ] and discussions w[ith] Special

Forces units [and] border control/observation missions.

Q11.27 Were any weapons collected for cash or land during your

mission?

Yes: 03 No: 07

Q11.28 If yes, comment on the effectiveness of this incentive.

- (S006) Cash for the return of lost or stolen weapons seemed to work.

- (S146) We tried to provide rewards to children for information. US

allowed cash against information.

- (S100) The political and [f]orce sides of UNOSOM supported this

initiative, but the Humanitarian Affairs [s]ide could not get the

incentive packages together in time to make it effective.

Q11.29 Were national police involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 05 No: 07

Q11.30 Were other organizations involved in the collection of

arms?

Yes: 01 No: 10

Q11.31 If yes, which ones?

- (S006) UN forces.

Q11.32 If involved in chapter VI operations (peacekeeping), were

military observers used in the collection of arms?

Yes: 01 No: 08

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Q11.33 If yes, what type of military observer was used (i.e., UN,

regional, other organization, etc.)?

- No responses.

Q11.34 Answer if applicable: Was there satisfactory co-ordination

between military observers and yourself as unit commander/chief

of operation?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q11.35 Were the warring factions themselves involved in the

collection of arms?

Yes: 05 No: 03

Q11.36 Did you use opposite party liaison officers so that all

factions were represented in the collection of arms and the

disarming process?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q11.37 If yes, reflect upon your experiences in this issue.

- (S099) LNO's effective [for] verify[ing] that all sides were disarming.

- (S142) The process went no further than negotiations and reports on

enforced disarmament. Enforced disarmament was carried out without

party liaison officers.

- (S144) No experience at all since UNOSOM I had not the forces, the

structure, or the logistical support to disarm militia members and

bandits. All we noticed was that representatives would accuse

constantly other (So[mali]) members of the CF monitoring group [of]

cheat[ing] [and] [lying].

- (S100) Worked well - verification [w]ise.

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Q11.38 With regard to the UN/national mission you participated

in, do you believe arms can be effectively collected?

Yes: 07 No: 03

Q11.39 Were you involved in the disarming of individuals, private

and irregular units, and/or bandits?

Yes: 10 No: 01

Q11.40 Was the UN police involved in these tasks?

Yes: 03 No: 09

Q11.41 Were local authorities involved in disarming individuals?

Yes: 06 No: 07

Q11.42 If yes, what was their role?

- (S006) Somali Police generally worked under the ausp[i]ces of the UN.

- (S073) Very late in the operation, local police were re-raised and

accompanied us on patrols and weapons searches.

- (S099) Crowd control. Intel[ligence] gathering.

- (S142) Somali police helping UN troops with disarmament sweeps,

Somali officials providing information.

- (S146) Allow us to change the mandate (for local use), [...] provide

some information regarding weapons caches.

- (S100) Village [e]lders, [c]ouncil [m]embers, [c]lan [e]lders, [p]olice.

- (S059) They assisted UN units ecause of the complete break down of

societal structure and the basic clan structure, civil police were not

overly effective.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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211

Q11.43 Were there regulations in the mandate or peace agreement

with respect to how to deal with private and irregular units?

Yes: 00 No: 09

Q11.44 If no, do you think your task would have improved if there

had been such an accord?

Yes: 03 No: 06

Q11.45 Did you suffer sniper problems?

Yes: 06 No: 03

Q11.46 If yes, how did you counter this?

- (S006) Buildings where problems stemmed were taken under UN

control. Own snipers put into guard positions.

- (S055) Positive defence of our personnel. Immediate reaction by our

forces.

- (S099) Firing back. Aggressive RoE. Killing snipers.

- (S142) Neutralize.

- (S146) Determined attitude. Use of force when necessary (returning

fire). Intensive patrols. Negotiations with warring factions.

- (S100) Counter sniper [t]eams w[ith] authority to preemptively engage

individuals w[ith] w[ea]p[o]ns.

- (S059) [T]ried to eliminate through use of counter sniper teams.

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SECTION FIVE: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

XII. Demobilization Experiences

Q12.1 Did the disarmament component of your mission include or

infer demobilization?

Yes: 03 No: 09

Q12.2 If yes, what types of demobilization operations were

conducted during this UN/national operation (i.e., cease-fire

monitoring, weapons cantonment, etc.)?

- (S019) Some weapons were collected voluntarily. Stored in containers

under UN supervision.

- (S099) Demobilization planned but not supported. Plan called for

weapons collection and cantonment, registration of militia members,

retraining/incentive[s] program for demobilized militia members.

- (S144) None.

- (S100) Both [cease-fire monitoring and weapons cantonment].

- (S059) None to speak of. Small efforts were initiated w[ith] about 200

"ex-militia". But it was an immature program which did not address

current militia in the field, such as the USC-SNA or SSDF in [the]

Central region of Somalia.

Q12.3 Was the demobilization process accompanied by a national

reintegration process involving government forces and opposing

forces?

Yes: 03 No: 03

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Q12.4 If yes, were sufficient means available for an effective

reintegration process?

Yes: 00 No: 06

Q12.5 If no, elaborate on the problems you experienced with this

task.

- (S019) There was little interest from the local leaders to demobilize.

- (S099) Demobilization collapsed through lack of support from

humanitarian organizations.

- (S142) UNDP as leading element of the humanitarian component

[intentionally] provided [...] aid [to] factions which refused any

disarmament and not [to] factions which were [prepared] to disarm.

- (S144) The humanitarian branch of UNOSOM I declared [itself]

unable to support our plan. NGO's did not want to [assist us

logistically] as they feared retaliation of the factions [...].

- (S100) N/A. We never got that far in the process.

- (S059) Lack of resources and no agreed plan between Somali factions

and UN made reintegration a virtually impossible task. Also, [a] large

number of clans were moved by famine and civil war into [...] areas

traditionally held by [other] clans.

- (S055)We have [no] experience [regarding] this problem.

Q12.6 Which organizations assisted you in demobilizing (i.e., other

services, international organizations, national organizations, or

nongovernmental organizations)? List by order starting with most

assistance to least assistance.

- (S019) UNOSOM had a branch for demobilizing.

- (S099) UNDP, UNHCR. Everyone else hindered.

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- (S142) None, due to the extrem[e]ly negative attitude of Humanitarian

Affairs.

- (S100) USMC and UNITAF, UNOSOM II predecessors.

Q12.7 Was there a person or a branch responsible for plans for

demobilization?

Yes: 05 No: 01

Q12.8 If yes, who or which branch was it?

- (S099) UNDP.

- (S142) Cease-fire and disarmament branch.

- (S144) Humanitarian branch.

- (S100) Cease-fire and Disarmament Division worked w[ith] the U-3

plans cell at Force HQ.

- (S059) Disarmament, Demobilization and Demining Branch of

UNOSOM II.

XIII. Demining Experiences

Q13.1 Did you experience mine problems?

Yes: 07 No: 06

Q13.2 If yes, what did you do to counteract them?

- (S006) Mines were occasionally placed on UN road[s]. UN engineers

removed or [defused] mines.

- (S019) Avoid[ed] areas, if I was informed by [the] local police that

they were mined.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S099) Mark fields. Train and hire locals to clear mines.

- (S146) Search for mines caches. Intensive use of helicopters[, and]

EOD teams. Local information[...].

- (S148) Localization and marking[...]. [Trust] in the military specialist.

Evacuate and/or destroy.

- (S100) Remote Detonation and Pressure.

- (S145) Demining by professional personnel in the unit.

- (S059) Contracted companies for areas in NW. Units avoided known

or suspected mined areas.

- (S142) Request mine clearance. Destroy mine storage sites.

Q13.3 Was there an exchange of maps of minefields at the outset

when the agreements were signed?

Yes: 01 No: 09

Q13.4 If not, was it feasible to have such maps?

Yes: 03 No: 07

Q13.5 If yes, do you think there should have been an agreement for

the exchange of maps at the outset as part of the agreements

signed?

Yes: 05 No: 00

Q13.6 If no maps were available and it was not feasible to chart the

location of minefields, did you consider yourself adequately

prepared to deal with the demining of haphazard minefields?

Yes: 05 No: 04

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Q13.7 Did your unit play a role in the demining process?

Yes: 03 No: 07

Q13.8 Was the UN involved in demining?

Yes: 04 No: 05

Q13.9 Was the UN interested in becoming involved in demining?

Yes: 04 No: 05

Q13.10 Was the host nation involved in demining or interested in

becoming involved in demining?

Yes: 02 No: 09

Q13.11 Were local groups/militias involved in demining?

Yes: 02 No: 09

Q13.12 Do you think local groups and militias should be

encouraged to undertake demining tasks?

Yes: 09 No: 02

Q13.13 Why?

- (S006) When the UN leaves, those left behind need the knowledge.

- (S019) If and when disarmament/demining agreement is reached, those

with knowledge about [...] local minefields should be involved in

demining.

- (S055) It [is] better to involve local groups and militias in [...] such

activit[ies]. They have a better knowledge of the territory.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S099) They know the area. They have vested interest in demining

their own area. Demining is a form of employment for ex-militias.

- (S142) This is the best way as [a] first step towards peace after cease-

fire. When factions are demining together they are unlike[ly] to re-

mine afterwards.

- (S144) No UN mission will remain forever in a particular mission area.

It is a national problem that has to be solved by the local groups with

the help of UN.

- (S146) After two years [of] civilian war, it would be very difficult to

know which roads [and other] areas were mined and by who[m].

- (S150) They are the only ones who have the relevant information.

- (S100) They [placed] them, they live there. They must be monitored to

ensure accountability of the recovered mines.

- (S145) Because they were concerned about the mining.

- (S059) It is their problem. They had the mines.

Q13.14 Were humanitarian organizations or private firms involved

in demining?

Humanitarian Organizations: Yes: 02 No: 07

Private Firms: Yes: 04 No: 06

Q13.15 In your opinion, who should undertake demining processes

and why?

- (S006) UN for UN goals. Local groups for [the] remainder.

- (S019) Various military units. They have the big resources. Private

firms to be used for specific tasks, outside areas with military

deployment, etc. They are more flexible.

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- (S055) Specialized UN forces, because that is a hard task.

- (S099) Contract private firms to train locals to do it. Peacekeeping

forces should not become involved. Locals have interest in ensuring it

is done right.

- (S142) Local fighters: they know w[h]ere to demine, they are demining

their own land, they will be unlike[ly] to re-mine afterwards, they must

be organized and trained by UNPEN.

- (S144) Local groups with the assistance of UN. Solidarity/credibility.

- (S148) By professional soldiers because it is a part of our task. Good

training.

- (S150) See Q13.12 - Q13.13.

- (S059) UN should contract in conjunction with host nation. Most

member nations [do not] want to become bogged down in this very

dangerous task. Too time- and labour-intensive.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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SECTION SIX: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

XIV. Training

Q14.1 Prior to deployment, did your units undertake specific

training programs related to disarmament operations?

Yes: 08 No: 05

Q14.2 If yes, were these training programs based on guidance from

the UN forces already in the field, from the UN in general, or from

your national authorities?

UN forces in field: 02 UN in general: 03

National authorities: 05 Other: 00

Q14.3 Were your units trained specifically for the collection of

arms and cantonment of factions?

Yes: 01 No: 10

Q14.4 Were you and/or your units trained in on-sight inspection

and observation techniques?

Yes: 04 No: 08

Q14.5 Have you been trained in verification technologies

nationally?

Yes: 02 No: 09

Q14.6 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific weapons

control and disarmament operations (i.e., weapons searches,

inventories, elimination, etc.)?

Yes: 09 No: 03

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Q14.7 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific

demobilization operations?

Yes: 02 No: 10

Q14.8 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demining

operations?

Yes: 05 No: 07

Q14.9 On the whole, did you consider yourself technically and

tactically prepared for the accomplishment of your mission?

Technically: Yes: 09 No: 02

Tactically: Yes: 10 No: 01

Q14.10 Was there anything done at the end of the mission to gather

lessons learned?

Yes: 08 No: 04

Q14.11 Back in your own country, were you debriefed?

Yes: 10 No: 02

SECTION SEVEN: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

XV. Interactions

Given that there are three common elements to a UN mission - the

military, the humanitarian agencies, and the political branch:

Q15.1 Would you consider the relationship between humanitarian

elements/organizations and the military personnel during the

mission to have been very good, adequate, or inadequate?

Very good: 01 Adequate: 03 Inadequate: 11

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Q15.2 If you think it could have been improved, specify three ways

in which it could have been improved.

- (S019) Any UN field operation must have SOP's or other regulation[s]

in order to specify all areas of responsibility. Commander[s]/Chiefs on

regional/local level must have the possibility [of] co-operat[ing].

Information at all levels.

- (S055) Clear agreements between military forces and NGO's. Priority

to the military forces. Co-ordination among NGO's.

- (S073) We developed a very good relationship with the various

NGO[s] in Baidoa. It would be arrogant to suggest that it could not be

improved upon, but at the same time we constantly worked on

maintaining good relations with the NGO[s] without looking at specific

areas for improvement.

- (S099) More co-operation in planning that affects both missions. More

support from [h]umanitarian agencies for demobilization.

- (S153) Everyone [should] have [a] positive attitude. Lack of

understanding of military capabilities by the civilian agencies.

Unnecessary confrontation between civilian and

military set ups.

- (S142) UN humanitarian agencies should be controlled by SRSG and

link their efforts towards disarmament (development [of] incentive[s])

as part of the UN goals in the area.

- (S145) Necessity of gathering information and having contracts with

the different organizations. Necessity for [...] civilian organization[s]

to co-ordinate their work through the UN[...].

- (S144) Co-ordination meetings on a weekly and [...] daily bas[is] at

different levels (planning - current operations). Special branch (civil

affairs) within the military staff. More information on possibilities of

humanitarian agencies and NGOs (cross-border operations, food,

medical, seeds and tools, etc.)

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- (S146) The level: there was no counterpart at Cdr level. The assistance

was not [...] adequate: no tools, no means to [restore] education, local

police, [or] local lawyers; [no means] to vaccinate population and

cattle, etc. There was no co-ordination between NGO's. There was no

control on the action of NGO's.

- (S100) The HA people could not/would not draw the difference

between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 operations. They would not work

w[ith] the Force, nor constrain the operations based on Force

recommendations. They would not support Force disarmament

incentives programs.

- (S059) Integrated planning process at the theatre level. Increased

liaison between Pol-Mil, Mil-HR. Establishing a hierarchical approach

to providinrelief/disarmament/nation-building resources to the country.

Maintaining impartiality (politically).

Q15.3 How was the overall co-operation of the three elements of

the UN components achieved during your mission? Summarize.

- (S019) On regional/zone level by co-location of offices ([P]olitical-

[H]umanitarian-CIVPOL). No military units in the level I served.

- (S055) Not well done.

- (S073) Co-operation of the three elements was obtained by constant

briefings, meetings and addressing [everybody's] concerns. While it

paid dividends with the NGO community, co-operation with the UN

political wing was much harder to obtain. This may have been due to

a lack of priority and resources by the UN political sector.

- (S099) Co-operation between political and military was good. Between

[h]umanitarian and [p]olitical/military less good.

- (S153) Sadly, it was never achieved.

- (S142) [Co-operation was only co-ordinated] on the highest level. This

co-ordination was in fact the confirmation of the unwil[lingness] of

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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some parties to co-ordinate (UNDP, some NGOs, [and] some Somali

[h]umanitarian NGO's).

- (S145) Very good co-operation between political and military branch.

More difficult between humanitarian and military branch. Therefore

we took the task of co-ordination.

- (S144) Contacts between political and military branches seemed [...]

friendly and efficient. Contacts between humanitarian and military

branches [occurred] to my knowledge only a few times. Contacts

between administrative and military branches were bad [...].

- (S146) Political branch: almost nonexistent, except for [a] US

negotiator and later on one agent. Humanitarian: no co-ordination and

[completely] inadequate. Major influence from the military side.

- (S148) [...] [D]aily briefing [enabling] NGOs to inform us of their

need[s], requests, [etc]. They were also informed [of] our military

actions (sometim[e]s afterwards).

- (S150) Close co-operation between UN representative and Force

Commander. Daily co-ordination meetings with humanitarian

organi[z]ations.

- (S100) The [p]olitical and [m]ilitary branches were closely co-

ordinated and worked very well together.

- (S059) Prior to 5 June 1993, relationships were strained at best. Career

UN bureaucrats were perceived as very aloof [towards] their military

counterparts. Additionally, [the UN bureaucrats] did not consider what

[the] force [...] was capable of accomplishing in [its] early stages.

Therefore goals were too ambitious. This caused relationships to be

strained further. After 5 June 1995, co-operation w[ith] HR personnel

eroded tremendously. Military action was viewed as a threat to

individual organisations['] agendas.

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Q15.4 Did co-operation exist between the UN military, private and

irregular elements, and existing police forces (UN or local)?

Yes: 08 No: 02

Q15.5 If yes, describe which components co-operated with whom

and the level of their co-operation.

- (S019) Early in the mission there was [...] co-operation between the

Provost Marshals (battalion/brigade level) and local police in the

forming of an effective local police force. At the same time there was

a lack of co-operation between the UNOSOM Justice division and the

UN [m]ilitary component. At a later stage when a CIVPOL unit was

created within UNOSOM, the[re] was [...] good co-operation on [a]

central level between UNCIVPOL and [the] UN military component

[regarding the] training of local police. [The] US department of Justice,

ICITAP,had a presence in the mission area. This presence was

negle[c]ted by the UNOSOM Justice Division. When UNOSOM

CIVPOL was effective there was good co-operation in [the] training of

local police, [which ended when] the security situation deteri[or]ated.

- (S055) We trained Somali Police.

- (S073) We helped re-raise the local police force and developed close

and co-operative relationships.

- (S099) Military trained, equipped and supported police.

- (S142) Co-ordination between Somali police and MP.

- (S146) Occasionally at a very low level. [In] the beginning, we tried to

[restore] the former local police, but their allegiance to one faction was

not acceptable by the others[...].

- (S150) Police forces (local) were formed and trained by our forces. The

police assisted the UN forces on the check points, they accompanied

the patrols and participated in the searches.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S100) Most of the NGOs went their own way until someone got

killed, [after which] they wanted the [f]orce to [immediately come and]

guard them or their compounds. The whole HA/NGO [part] of the

TRIAD was severely broken.

- (S145) Local police was built up with the support of UNOSOM and

monitored by our unit. Very passive and limited co-operation due to

the lack of balancing of clans in the police corps.

- (S059) Factional militia other than USC-SNA, SPM-SNA, SNF

worked with UN towards disarmament only to the degree it benefitted

their faction or clan agenda. Therefore it was not uncommon for co-

operation to exist one week only to disappear the following week. As

a result, political solutions were eventually impossible to achieve.

Analyst's Comments

The analysis of this section of the questionnaires demonstrates the need for

a joint doctrine/procedure within the UN system to unite the civilian and

military missions, aims, and objectives, and to share the responsibility for

reaching those goals. The levels of liaison between the UN military and

civilian components and NGOs also need some sort of formalization if

successful operations of this kind are to be executed in the future. In Somalia

there was a common goal by force of circumstances amongst NGOs and the

military. This assisted co-operation, which, by the time of the transition phase

between UNITAF and UNOSOM II, had became strained. The arrival of UN

bureaucracy restricted goodwill. As can be seen from the responses to Q15.2

and Q15.3, the interaction between the various actors in the operation was

stressed. This is very much a symptom of the lack of defined structure and

procedure for directing and co-ordinating field operations towards one

common goal.

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XVI. Personal Reflections

On reflection,

Q16.1 What was the overall importance of the disarmament task

for the overall success of the mission?

Very important: 09 Important: 01 Not important: 00

Q16.2 What were the three major lessons you learned from your

field experience?

- (S006) Need control and show of strength to gain respect. All parties

must want to negotiate earnestly. [Cannot] help those who [do not]

want to be helped, or those who try to undermine the system[']s

progress.

- (S055) No humanitarian work without military operations. [...]

[C]ontact[...] with the population [is] essential. It is necessary to

exploit initial surprise. [It is] [n]o[t] good [to have too many different

countries represented in the] Hqs. [...]. [...] RoEs [must be] clear and

reliable [...].

- (S073) [...] It [is should have been] a chapter VII operation, and force

[should have] be[en] used. It [would have been] better managed by

appointing a lead[ing] nation to command the operation. Well-trained

and disciplined [troops] can handle peace[keeping] operations with

little specific training. UN [HQ] in the field suffer[ed] from enormous

bureaucratic and organizational difficulties which seriously limit[ed]

their effectiveness early on.

- (S099) Disarmament should have been part of the mission statement.

Humanitarian Agencies should be brought on board early to support

demobilization and disarming. Disarmament [will not] work without

positive incentives to disarm.

- (S153) There should be [a] clear-cut policy and strategy to achieve the

mission or carry out a mandate. Security Council should evolve this.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Military aspects should be left to force HQ. Member States should not

control their contingents once these have been donated for

peacekeeping operations.

- (S142) Disarmament [...] depend[s] on the ability of the population to

force their own fighters to disarm. This depend[s] on the culture and on

the incentives (economic future). Disarmament should be a major item

in the survey mission (determination of the incentives).

- (S145) Peace is not possible when the involved parties do not [want]

peace. We only can help and support the [peace] process. The military

unit[s] [must maintain] contact with all parties and must gain [their]

respect and confidence. The security of the personnel [should be] the

first priority of the [commander].

- (S144) CF & D are only possible if warring factions find a real interest

in doing so (incentive package for militias). Reconnaissance and

technical teams should keep in mind the sociological background of the

inhabitants (traditions). UN missions should develop an "information

branch,"not just a provost marshall section.

- (S146) There can be no "Peace Keeping Op[eration]s" possible in an

area where factions are fighting. "Peace Making or Enforcing

Op[eration]s" are the best solution in order to establish peace. General

disarmament is needed in order to fulfill the mission.

- (S148) It was quite impossible to disarm everyone in Somalia. If such

a process is started, we [must] bring it [to an] end. We have to be, [and]

to stay, neutral.

- (S150) Information is the key; all possible means must be employed.

Full disarmament is very difficult to achieve and requires a lot of

soldiers.

- (S100) Get the proper mix of forces/nations on the ground (you

[cannot] have units w[ith] national agendas which counter [...] the UN

objectives). Get the Humanitarian Affairs portion of [d]isarmament

incentive programs up front - [they cannot] be an afterthought. Ensure

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[o]btainable objectives are in the mandate. Stay the course, reach your

objectives, and get out. After that, it [is] up to the people -UNTAC

vers[us] UNOSOM. [Do not] deal w[ith] warlords.

- (S019) Do not start a disarmament-demobilization process unless there

is a consensus. You will hardly succeed by force. Security must be

provided.

- (S059) Criticality of integrated planning at theater level. The inability

of UNNY to plan/resource mil[itary] op[eratio]ns (due to donor nation

reluctance to contribute). Preeminent position of "National Agenda"

undercuts FC. Commander to command and control forces in theater.

Q16.3 What other question should we have asked here and how

would you have answered it?

Questions:

- (S006) What went wrong? Why did [the] security problem remain?

- (S153) Was there enough effort made to win over the war lords or the

main political leaders ?

- (S144) Was your UNOSOM experience useful for your UNAMIR

mission?

- (S146) [In this operation,] [w]hat [was] the political will to

[(re)]establish [...] peace?

- (S019) Shall (could) UNCIVPOL have a role in disarmament?

- (S142) [What was the] major difficulty [with] disarmament [which you

encountered]?

Answers:

- (S006) The airport was a specific case and [was] relatively well

controlled by the UN. Most of the outside area (i.e. the city of

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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Mogadishu), was free run by clans [and] banditry. There were areas

where the UN would not go. This undermined the UN's effectiveness

and appearance as a p[o]w[e]r figure. The UN ended up

supporting/protecting itself [against] the nation it was initially trying

to help - a nation which perhaps really did not want the help to start

with.

- (S153) In my opinion, enough effort was not made.

- (S144) Yes, as I better understood [...] concepts like "mandate",

"ROE's", etc. and as I knew more about the UN organization. No, for

CF & D, as the situation in Rwanda also proved - parties again did not

find any interest in complying with agreements, peace talks, and

peaceful settlements of disputes.

- (S146) If the real reason of operation "Restore Hope" was the

protection of NGO's, disturbing factors must be countered. Warlords

and their militia must be disarmed. No decision was made, we know

today the result of the lack of consensus.

- (S019) Yes. In their mission as monitors/observers or advisers they

will come across armed civilians, bandits, hidden weapon[s], etc. A

rule could be that UN military units have the overall responsibility of

disarmament, but UNCIVPOL could take part in 'micro-disarmament'.

[In] my experience (from Cambodia), deserters would rather turn to

UNCIVPOL than to UN military units.

- (S142) [To] convince the fighter (and his leader) to give [up] his

weapons (which [allow] him to survive and to get what he wants) and

to go back to a civilian life. [This] is [...] possible [only] if a decent

future is provided to him (incentive, amnesty, economic future,

education,[ etc.]).

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To be answered only by those who participated in finished UN/national

peacekeeping missions:

Q16.4 Do you think that the disarmament-related tasks which you

undertook had an impact on the national reconstruction processes

which followed the end of the mission?

Yes: 01 No: 05

Q16.5 If yes, briefly explain how and why:

- (S073) The political and military aims in Somalia became

confused[...]. [T]he latter support[ed] the former, with disastrous

results.

- (S099) Reconstruction process failed because of the UN['s] failure to

demobilize and disarm factions. Disarmament failed because of [the]

perception that it was a military problem which only required taking

weapons away. Humanitarian demobilization support was lacking.

There were no incentives to support disarmament.

- (S100) Look at Somalia today. [It is] [February 28th], and the

[m]arines are ashore guarding the withdrawal of the last UNOSOM II

forces. Ali Mahdi and Aideed['s] people are rearmed and ready to fight

for the port and Air Field. We saved hundreds of thousands of lives

only to lose our political backbone, pull the US forces out when we had

broken Aideed's forces (bowing to public relations pressure), and doom

the UN mission to failure. Now the very people we saved from

starvation are strong enough to continue the fight. Western minds

[cannot] fathom the depth of inter-clan/faction hatred that exists in that

region. Aideed is the key to the failure of the mission; his personal

desire to run the country prevented his party from dealing openly in the

political processes being established. His manipulation of the

[W]estern press and correct read[ing] of presidential will drove the US

out. That doomed the mission to marginalize Aideed and [to] stage free

elections. If we had been able to stage elections, we (the UN) would

have been successful.

UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002

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- (S153) If we had undertaken the task, it would have certainly had a

positive impact on the national reconstruction processes.

- (S142) Development[s] [...] [in the mission] made [...] disarmament

[efforts ineffective].