1203
AMENDMENT 4—SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to
justify invasion of a citizen’s private premises or conversation.’’ Thus, what is ‘‘rea-
sonable’’ in terms of a search and seizure derives content and meaning through ref-
erence to the warrant clause. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473–84
(1971). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–58 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967).
19
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–64 (1969) (limiting scope of search
incident to arrest). See also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297 (1972) (rejecting argument that it was ‘‘reasonable’’ to allow President through
Attorney General to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance of persons thought
to be endangering the national security); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(although officers acted with great self-restraint and reasonably in engaging in elec-
tronic seizures of conversations from telephone booth, self-imposition was not
enough and magistrate’s judgment required); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964) (warrantless search of seized automobile not justified because not within ra-
tionale of exceptions to warrant clause). There were exceptions, e.g., Cooper v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (warrantless search of impounded car was reasonable);
United States v. Harris, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (warrantless inventory search of auto-
mobile).
20
See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), Justices
Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall adhered to the warrant-based rule, while
Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger placed greater
emphasis upon the question of reasonableness without necessary regard to the war-
rant requirement. Id. at 285. Justice Powell generally agreed with the former group
of Justices, id. at 275 (concurring).
21
E.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352–53 (1977) (unan-
imous); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 506 (1978); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (unanimous); Ar-
kansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 743, 758 (1979); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
824–25 (1982).
22
E.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search of auto-
mobile taken to police station); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (same); New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search incident to arrest); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982) (automobile search at scene). On the other hand, the warrant-based
standard did preclude a number of warrantless searches. E.g., Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (warrantless stop and search of auto by roving
patrol near border); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrantless ad-
ministrative inspection of business premises); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978) (warrantless search of home that was ‘‘homicide scene’’).
23
Of the 1992 Justices, only Justice Stevens has frequently sided with the war-
rants-with-narrow-exceptions approach. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
be closely contained by the rationale undergirding the necessity for
the exception, and the scope of a search under one of the exceptions
was similarly limited.
19
During the 1970s the Court was closely divided on which
standard to apply.
20
For a while, the balance tipped in favor of the
view that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, with a few
carefully prescribed exceptions.
21
Gradually, guided by the variable
expectation of privacy approach to coverage of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Court broadened its view of permissible exceptions and
of the scope of those exceptions.
22
By 1992, it was no longer the case that the ‘‘warrants-with-
narrow-exceptions’’ standard normally prevails over a ‘‘reasonable-
ness’’ approach.
23
Exceptions to the warrant requirement have