This project was supported, in whole or in part, by cooperative agreement number 2019-CK-WX-K014
awarded to the National Police Foundation by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services. The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) or contributor(s) and
do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Refer
-
-
ences to specific individuals, agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an
endorsement by the author(s), the contributor(s), or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the refer
-
-
ences are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.
The internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of publication. Given that URLs
and websites are in constant flux, neither the author(s), the contributor(s), nor the COPS Office can
vouch for their current validity.
This resource was developed under a federal award and may be subject to copyright. The U.S. Depart
-
-
ment of Justice reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive, and irrevocable license to reproduce, publish, or
otherwise use and to authorize others to use this resource for Federal Government purposes. This
resource may be freely distributed and used for noncommercial and educational purposes only.
Recommended citation:
National Police Foundation. 2021.
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database: 2021 Analysis Update
.
Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
Published 2021
Contents
Letter from the Acting Director of the COPS Ofce ......................................................
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iv
Letter from the President of the National Police Foundation v
Introduction 1
Data Analysis 3
Basic information 3
School information 3
Suspect information 13
Event information 20
Lessons Learned 29
About the National Police Foundation 32
About the COPS Ofce 33
A Preliminary Report on the Police
Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database
iii
Letter from the
Acting Director of
the COPS Ofce
Colleagues:
The COPS Office and the National Institute of Justice provided funding to the National Police
Foundation (NPF) to develop the Averted School Violence (ASV) database, which collects
information on school attacks—completed and averted—with the goal of mitigating and ulti-
mately preventing future injuries in educational institutions. In 2019, the COPS Office and the
NPF published a pair of reports examining data from the database: one a comparison of averted
attacks on schools with a similar number of attacks that were carried out, and the other an
analysis only of averted attacks.
Since the publication of those reports, the ASV database has continued to grow and now
contains more than three times as many cases of averted incidents of school violence as it did in
2019. This report compares the 120 new cases to the 51 cases in the original sample in an
ongoing effort to provide as much information as possible to schools, law enforcement, and
communities to enhance school security and protect our children.
Our schools must be safe and supportive learning environments. On behalf of the COPS Office,
we thank everyone who has submitted reports to the ASV database and who works every day
with students of all ages to make a difference in their communities. I urge everyone to continue to
use the ASV database to report incidents of school violence, both completed and averted, in the
hope that school shootings will soon be a thing of the past. I also thank the staff and leadership
of the National Police Foundation for their work on the ASV database and these publications on
averted school violence.
Sincerely,
Robert E. Chapman
Acting Director
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
iv
Letter from the
President of the National
Police Foundation
Dear colleagues,
Since the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in 2012, targeted school attacks—parti-
cularly those involving firearms—have increased in frequency and lethality, posing a vex-
ing challenge for policy makers, law enforcement officials, school administrators, mental and phys-
ical health practitioners, parents, students, and the communities in which the attacks
are perpetrated.
With funding support from the COPS Office, the National Police Foundation, in collaboration with
school safety subject matter experts and numerous national and state-level organizations, devel-
oped the Averted School Violence (ASV) database as a free resource to serve practitioners and
organizations involved in school safety. The ASV database is an online library of completed and
averted school violence narratives from across the country, containing incident-level information
and lessons learned.
The rationale behind developing the ASV database is that while there are numerous studies of
completed school attacks, fewer studies have been done on averted attacks, leaving a gap in
knowledge. Furthermore, practitioners suggest and open source research supports that averted
attacks happen with greater frequency than completed attacks and contain invaluable insights into
the strengths or potential weaknesses of school safety systems or practices, which if recognized
and addressed early can prevent or mitigate future attacks.
There are now more than 230 cases in the ASV database: more than 170 averted incidents and
more than 60 carried-out attacks. This report reflects a comprehensive analysis of 170 averted
attacks in the database. The vast majority of averted attacks occurred in suburban public high
schools with school populations ranging from 500–1,000 students. In the vast majority of attacks,
one suspect—typically a current student—planned to carry out the attack. A significant life chang-
ing or traumatic event occurred prior to the planned attack. Reasons for planning the attack were
most often tied to hating people, revenge seeking, and bullying. In almost all of the cases, peers
v
discovered the planned attack and reported it to some combination of parents, school officials,
and law enforcement. Firearms, specifically handguns, were the primary weapon to be used in
the
averted attacks.
The report concludes that positive school environments that provide violence prevention programs,
foster trust among students and staff, provide support to all students, and encourage early inter-
vention for students with behavioral challenges are key to averting school attacks. In many cases,
targeted school attacks can be prevented by persons who recognize the indicators of violence and
report their concerns to school and law enforcement officials directly or though anonymous report-
ing systems.
Multidisciplinary behavioral threat assessment teams are the foundation of early identifica-
tion and intervention. In addition, carefully selected, well trained, and properly equipped
school resource officers provide an important resource in the prevention and response to
school attacks.
In the end, efforts to prevent school attacks must be a “whole of community” effort in which school
administrators, teachers, and staff; school-based and community mental health providers; law
enforcement; and parents and students see something, say something, and do something to iden-
tify and extend resources to students in need of our help before they hurt themselves or others.
The National Police Foundation would like to thank the COPS Office for its support of the national
Averted School Violence database, a project that has undoubtedly saved the lives of our children,
teachers, staff, and school administrators.
Cordially,
Jim Burch
President
National Police Foundation
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
vi
Introduction
ALTHOUGH MASS VIOLENCE ATTACKS AT SCHOOLS ARE STATISTICALLY RARE,
their impact far exceeds their occurrences in the communities in which they occur and
across the nation. The U.S. Departments of Justice, Education, and Homeland Security
have dedicated considerable resources to enhancing school security and preventing these
attacks, as well as to studying and understanding mass casualty attacks and the perpetra-
tors who carry them out. There has also been a growing body of literature on completed
school-based mass violence attacks from multidisciplinary perspectives including child
development and psychology, sociology, and criminology. This combined literature has con-
tributed much to the overall understanding of perpetrators of school-based violence, the
types of schools at which attacks are more likely to occur, the social conditions surrounding
school attacks, and other variables that contribute to completed school attacks.
The number of completed attacks is far outnumbered by incidents in which an attack was
planned or was almost carried out but was averted thanks to the actions of persons in the
school or in the community. Individually, these incidents may be dismissed or only have a
short-term localized impact because they did not achieve their goal, because they did not
meet the requirements for a school to document the incident, or because of underreporting
in the media. While there have been a handful of studies conducted to identify common
ways in which planned attacks were discovered, who intervened to prevent a likely attack,
and the extent to which students reported potential planned attacks to authorities, there
remains a considerable gap in the school violence literature surrounding averted attacks
and what lessons can be learned from them regarding school safety and security.
To address this need, in 2014, two U.S. Department of Justice offices—the Office of Com-
munity Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ)—
provided funding to the National Police Foundation (NPF) to develop and maintain an
1
Averted School Violence (ASV) database.
1
The ASV
database collects, analyzes, and publishes averted
and completed acts of school violence that have
occurred since the April 20, 1999 attack on Colum-
bine High School in Littleton, Colorado. The data are
drawn from open source media articles as well as
from law enforcement, school officials, and others
entering reports directly into the ASV database.
The ASV database serves as a resource to law
enforcement, schools, mental health professionals,
and others involved in preventing school violence by
sharing lessons learned regarding the way planned
attacks were identified and prevented. In 2019, the
NPF conducted a preliminary analysis of 51 cases of
averted school violence in the ASV database to iden-
tify basic information about the schools involved, the
perpetrators and suspects, the weapons, and the
plots and incidents.
2
Also in 2019, the NPF con-
ducted a comparison of 51 averted and 51 com-
pleted school attacks from the ASV database to
identify important similarities and differences between
the types of incidents.
3
There are now more than 230 cases in the ASV data-
base: more than 170 averted attacks and more than
60 completed attacks. With more than three times
the number of averted cases as there were when the
2019 preliminary analysis was conducted, this report
leverages the data from the additional cases to con-
duct similar analyses; compare the findings from the
new cases to the initial 51 averted cases; and provide
overarching lessons learned and recommendations
that can be leveraged by school administrators, law
enforcement, and communities to enhance school
safety and security.
1. “Our Mission,” Averted School Violence, accessed February 11, 2021, https://www.avertedschoolviolence.org/.
2. Jeffrey A. Daniels,
A Preliminary Report on the Police Foundation’s Averted School Violence Database
(Washington, DC:
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2019), https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/ric.php?page=detail&id=COPS-W0871.
3. Peter Langman and Frank Straub,
A Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks from the Police Foundation’s
Averted School Violence Database
(Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2019),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/ric.php?page=detail&id=COPS-W0870.
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
2
Data Analysis
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL ANALYSES WERE CONDUCTED ON THE 120 CASES
entered into the ASV database between February 2018 and August 2020. Analyses were
conducted using the same information as in the 2019 preliminary analysis: basic information
about each case, followed by descriptions of the schools in which the attacks were averted,
how the plots were discovered, what actions were taken to avert the potential incident, and
what weapons the perpetrators planned to use.
Basic information
The information used to develop 112 (93.3 percent) of the 120 additional reports on averted
incidents analyzed for this publication was identified by NPF staff and project subject matter
experts from open sources, school websites, and court records. The remaining eight reports
(6.7 percent) were entered by a law enforcement officer or school administrator directly
involved in the averted incident.
School information
As shown in figure 1 on page 4, averted school violence incidents analyzed for this publica-
tion occurred in 39 states throughout the United States. (The 51 incidents in the initial data-
set occurred in 27 states.) As is to be expected with a larger sample, there were more
states in the present dataset (22) than in the initial dataset (14) with more than one
averted incident. In the present dataset, California had 18 averted incidents, Florida 12,
New York 8, Pennsylvania 8, Michigan 5, North Carolina 5, Georgia 4, Kentucky 4, Ohio 4,
Oklahoma 4, Utah 4, Indiana 3, Maryland 3, Missouri 3, Vermont 3, Colorado 2, Illinois 2,
Nebraska 2, New Jersey 2, Oregon 2, Washington 2, and Wisconsin 2. Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming each had
one averted incident. Figure 1.1 on page 4 shows the distribution of incidents in the two
sample sets combined.
3
Figure 1. Distribution of new sample of ASV incidents (n=119)*
* There was one submission in which the state was unknown.
Figure 1.1. Distribution of combined samples of ASV incidents (n=170)
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
4
As shown in figure 2, of the 120 new averted school
incidents, 105 (87.5 percent) occurred in public
schools, eight (6.7 percent) in private schools, three
(2.5 percent) in charter schools, and three (2.5 per-
cent) in faith-based schools.
4
This is similar to the
finding in the preliminary analysis that the overwhelm-
ing majority (94.1 percent) of averted school attacks
occurred in public schools. Together, figure 2.1 shows
the types of schools where violent incidents were
most commonly averted.
Number of incidents
New sample
Figure 2. Types of schools where violent incidents were averted in both samples of ASV incidents
Public school
Private school
Faith-based
school
Charter school
Other afliation
105
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105
48
0
0
0
2
1
8
3
3
105
Preliminary analysis
Figure 2.1. Types of schools where violent incidents were averted in combined samples of ASV incidents (n=170)
Public school
Private school
Faith-based
school
3
Charter school
Other afliation
8
153
5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160
1
Number of incidents
4. There was one submission in which the school type was not listed.
Data Analysis 5
High school
Middle school/
Junior high school
College/University
Elementary
school
Preliminary analysis New sample
Furthermore (see figure 3), as in the preliminary anal-
ysis (see figure 3), attacks were most frequently
averted at high schools (63.3 percent, n=76) in the
new sample. However, whereas the preliminary anal-
ysis had only 11.8 percent of averted incidents (n=6)
at college or university campuses, in the new sample
colleges and universities accounted for 19.2 percent
(n=23) of the averted incidents. Meanwhile, middle
schools and junior high schools accounted for 15.7
percent of the averted incidents (n=8) in the prelimi-
nary analysis but 15.0 percent (n=18) of the averted
incidents in the new sample. Elementary schools
were the intended target of averted incidents in 3.9
percent of incidents (n=2) in the preliminary analysis
and 1.7 percent of incidents (n=2) in the additional
sample.
5
Together, figure 3.1 shows education levels
of schools where violent incidents were most com-
monly averted.
Figure 3. Education level of schools where violent incidents were averted in both samples of ASV incidents
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
Number of incidents
35
8
6
2
2
76
18
23
Figure 3.1. Education level of schools where violent incidents were averted
in combined samples of ASV incidents (n=170)
High school
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160
Number of incidents
111
26
29
4
Middle school/
Junior high school
College/University
Elementary
school
5. There was one submission where the education level was missing.
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
6
Preliminary analysis New sample
cont’d on pg. 8
Number of students,
Kindergarten–
12th grade
500 or less
501–1,000
1,001–2,000
2,001 or more
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Number of schools
16
5
33
18
27
15
11
7
Figure 4 (which continues on page 8) presents the
numbers and percentages for the size of the student
body at the schools where the violent incidents were
averted. Similar to the preliminary analysis, a plurality
of incidents from the new sample (27.5 percent,
n=33) were averted at K–12 schools with student
bodies of between 501 and 1,000 students, and
there was only one averted incident (0.8 percent) at a
college or university with a student body of 1,000 or
fewer.
6
Together, figure 4.1 on page 9 shows the
combined size of the student body at schools where
violent incidents were most commonly averted.
Figure 4. Size of student body at schools where violent incidents were
averted in both samples of ASV incidents
6. There were nine K–12 submissions in which the size of the student body was unknown and one K–12 submission in which this
information was not entered.
Data Analysis 7
Preliminary analysis New sample
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Number of schools
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
5
5
8
0
0
0
2
Figure 4. Size of student body at schools where violent incidents were
averted in both samples of ASV incidents cont’d from pg. 7
Number of students,
Colleges/University
1,000 or less
1,001–5,000
5,001–10,000
10,001–20,000
20,001–30,000
30,001–40,000
Above 40,000
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
8
Figure 4.1. Size of student body at schools where violent incidents were
averted in combined samples of ASV incidents (n=161)
Number of students,
Kindergarten–
12th grade
500 or less
501–1,000
1,001–2,000
2,001 or more
Number of students,
Colleges/University
1,000 or less
1,001–5,000
5,001–10,000
10,001–20,000
20,001–30,000
30,001–40,000
Above 40,000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Number of schools
21
51
42
18
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Number of schools
2
3
2
7
6
9
0
Data Analysis 9
Figure 5 presents the community population clas-
sifications of the schools that were involved in the
new sample of averted violent incidents. Suburban
schools were still the most common intended
targets, but at a much lower rate (40.0 percent,
n=48, down from 68.6 percent in the initial sample).
In addition, while the percentage of rural schools
involved in averted incidents (25.8 percent, n=31)
stayed approximately the same as in the preliminary
analysis (25.5 percent), the percentage of urban
schools increased from 5.9 percent in the initial
sample to 33.3 percent (n=40) in the new sample of
averted school violence reports.
7
Together, figure 5.1
shows the combined population classifications of
communities where violent incidents were most com-
monly averted.
Together, figures 2 through 5.1 suggest that the
model averted school violence incident from the 120
additional cases is similar to the model from the pre-
liminary analysis: a public high school, with a student
body between 501 and 2,000 students, in a subur-
ban community. However, these figures—especially
when added to figure 1—also continue to demon-
strate that threats and planned violent attacks can
occur in any state, in any community, and at any
grade level.
Figure 5. Population classication of communi-
ties where incidents of school violence were
averted in new sample of ASV incidents (n=119)
Rural
26.1%
Suburban
40.3%
Urban
33.6%
Figure 5.1. Population classication of commu-
nities where incidents of school violence were
averted in combined samples of ASV incidents
(n=170)
Urban
25.3%
Suburban
48.8%
Rural
25.9%
7. There was one submission where the population classification was missing.
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
10
Counselors
The ASV case submission form asks about the pres-
ence of at least one counselor at the school. Most
schools did have at least one counselor at the time of
the averted incident. Of the 120 cases in the new
sample, 81.7 percent of the schools (n=98) had a
counselor at the time and it was unknown in 17.5
percent of cases (n=21). None of the cases indicated
that there were no school counselors at the time of
the averted incident.
8
Despite the overwhelming majority of schools having
at least one counselor during the time of the averted
incident, it is difficult to tell in many cases whether the
counselor(s) engaged with the suspect(s) in the inci-
dents. In only 9.2 percent (n=9) of the 120 averted
cases in the new sample was it noted that the coun-
selor(s) engaged with the suspect(s), while in 84.7
percent of cases (n=83) it was unknown. It was only
noted in 6.1 percent of the cases (n=6) that the school
did have at least one counselor but they did not
engage with the suspect(s).
Security systems
The ASV case submission form presents a number of
physical security measures and protocols that are
common at K–12 schools and college and university
campuses, and for each reported case there was no
Table 1. Common security measures used by schools where potential attacks
were averted in both samples of ASV incidents
ASV schools where measure
was used (N)
ASV schools where measure
was used (%)
Security measure
Preliminary
analysis New sample
Preliminary
analysis New sample
Behavior threat assessment team 0 17 0.0 14.2
Blue Light security system 0 12 0.0 10.0
Controlled access to buildings during
school hours
9 29 17.6 24.2
Controlled access to grounds during
school hours
7 6 13.7 5.0
Locked entrance or exit doors 5 22 9.8 18.3
Locker checks 5 6 9.8 5.0
School police department 1 17 2.0 14.2
School staff monitoring hallways 6 8 11.8 6.7
Security cameras used to monitor the school 14 32 27.4 26.7
Security ofcers or police ofcers at/in school 30 55 58.8 45.8
Students required to go through
metal detectors
0 1 0.0 0.8
Teachers and staff required to wear badges/ID 2 9 3.9 7.5
Visitors must be escorted into building 1 3 2.0 2.5
Visitors required to sign in 8 15 15.7 12.5
Visitors required to wear badges/ID 7 13 13.7 10.8
Other 6 6 11.8 5.0
No security measures reported —* 39* —* 32.5*
* Among the schools included in the new sample, 39 did not appear to have any security measures in place. However, it is important
to note that the individuals reporting these cases may have been unable to obtain information on the schools’ security features through
open sources. Data are not available on the number of schools without security measures from the sample in the preliminary analysis.
8. There was one submission in which the indication of whether or not there was at least one counselor was missing.
Data Analysis 11
limit to the number of security measures that could
be selected. Whereas in the preliminary analysis more
than half of the schools involved had a security officer
or a police officer at the school as the primary secu-
rity measure, in the new sample there was no single
security measure that was in use by more than half of
the schools (however, security officers or police offi-
cers at the school were still the primary security mea-
sure). Interestingly, 5.0 percent of schools (n=6)
reported controlling access to school grounds during
school hours—less than in the preliminary analysis
(13.7 percent, n=7). Also, despite many security
experts continuing to recommend that students be
required to go through metal detectors, only one
school (0.8 percent) in the new sample —and none of
the schools in the preliminary analysis—had students
go through a metal detector.
When “Other” is selected, respondents are asked to
indicate what security measure(s) are not accounted
for in the provided checklist that were in place at the
school when the incident was averted. One person
noted that their school has a School Safety Commit-
tee that meets monthly to address safety issues con-
cerns, and one noted that their school has a
25-member Safety and Discipline Committee.
Another noted that not only teachers and staff but
also students are required to wear badges/ID. In
addition, one respondent noted that all students are
required to use clear backpacks, while another noted
that students are not allowed to carry backpacks at
all during the day and must store them in lockers.
One respondent noted that their school has a non-
sworn campus public safety agency and relies on the
local municipal police department for law enforce-
ment services.
Response training
The ASV case submission form also identifies five
response protocols or trainings that are increasingly
common at K–12 schools and college and university
campuses, and for each reported case there was no
limit to the number of protocols or trainings that could
be selected.
Table 2. Common protocols or trainings used by schools where potential attacks
were averted in both samples of ASV incidents
ASV response protocol
or training (N)
ASV response protocol
or training (%)
Response protocol
or training
Preliminary
analysis
Pr
eliminary
analysis New sample New sample
Active shooter trainings 4 19 7.8 15.8
All hazards drills 3 29 5.9 24.2
CIT trainings 0 2 0.0 1.7
Evacuation drills 2 12 3.9 10.0
Lockdown drills 5 20 9.8 16.7
Other 5 2 9.8 1.7
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
12
When “Other” is selected, respondents are asked to
indicate what response protocol(s) or training(s) are
not accounted for in the provided checklist that were
in place at the school when the incident was averted.
One respondent noted that their school had only fire
drills at the time of the averted incident and the other
respondent noted that the school had an emergency
action plan.
Suspect information
This section provides information about the alleged
suspects in the averted school violence incidents.
9
Information about the suspects involved in the new
sample of averted cases includes their age at the
time of the discovery of the plan, their gender, their
race or ethnicity, and their affiliation with the targeted
school. In addition, whether the suspects exhibited
any warning signs or behaviors—such as research-
ing, increasingly pathological preoccupation with a
cause or other acts of violence, an increase in the
frequency or variety of notable activities related to the
target, and communication to a third party of the
intent to do harm—was assessed, as well as addi-
tional warning signs and characteristics. The ASV
case submission form also collects information
regarding mental health and substance use,
life-changing or traumatic experiences, involvement
with the criminal justice system, engagement with
violent media or written materials, and admitted rea-
sons for planning the attack. Involvement in bully-
ing—as a bully, bullied target, or both—was also
assessed. It is also important to note that suspects
involved in planning school-based violent attacks are
not only current or former students, as will be sup-
ported by some of the information that follows.
As figure 6 on page 14 demonstrates, the over-
whelming majority (85.0 percent, n=102) of planned
but averted incidents of school-based violence
involved only one suspect. The next-largest percent-
age of cases (8.3 percent, n=10) involved a pair of
suspects, followed by cases involving three suspects
(4.2 percent, n=5). In the new sample, only 2.5 per-
cent (n=3) involved four or more suspects. Together,
figure 6.1 on page 14 shows the number of suspects
involved in planning school-based violence that were
ultimately averted.
9. The “Plotter information” section of the preliminary report only addressed information about lone or primary plotters, because of low
sample sizes and the presumption that the primary plotter was the “mastermind” of the plot. With more cases and the desire to
understand more about all suspects involved in planning school-based violence, this section treats all suspects as equal and includes
information about all of them. Therefore, some figures have combined information.
Data Analysis 13
Figure 6. Number of suspects involved in plotting attacks in new sample of ASV incidents (n=120)
Number of
suspects
One
Two
Three
Four or more
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Number of schools
102
10
5
3
Figure 6.1. Number of suspects involved in plotting averted attacks in
combined samples of ASV incidents (n=171)
Number of
suspects
One
Two
Three
Four or more
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140
Number of schools
132
22
8
9
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
14
Male
129; 93.5%
Younger
than 18
77; 61.6%
18 and older
48; 38.4%
White
53; 71.6%
Asian/Asian American
Figure 7. Demographics of suspects involved in plotting attacks in new sample of ASV incidents
SEX AGE RACE
Female
9; 6.5%
Middle Eastern
4; 5.4%
* Percentages may not add up exactly to 100 because of rounding.
Figure 7 shows the demographic information of the
suspects involved in the 120 cases in the new sam-
ple of averted attacks. The majority (93.25 percent,
n=129) of the suspects were male and nine (6.5 per-
cent) were female (of 138 total, as 11 of the 149 sus-
pects’ genders were unknown), which is consistent
with the preliminary report data (94.1 percent male
and 5.9 percent female). Ages of suspects—at the
time the incident was uncovered and averted—
ranged from 12 to 62, with the most common age
range being 14 to 18 years old (72.8 percent, n=91)
(of 125 total, as 24 of the 149 suspects’ ages were
unknown) and an average age of 18.6 years old.
Racial or ethnic identities are unknown or were not
provided in the cases of 75 of the 149 suspects. Of
the other 74 suspects, 53 were identified as White,
nine as Latinx, five as Asian or Asian American, four
as Middle Eastern, and three as Black or African
American.
10
Overall, the “typical” suspect is a lone
White male approximately 18 years of age.
5; 6.8%
Black/
African American
3; 4.0%
Latinx
9; 12.2%
Data Analysis 15
10. The ASV submission form allows for multiple selections, so it is possible that (for example) each of the three Black suspects was
also identified as Latinx, with an additional six of nine Latinx suspects being identified with another race or ethnicity (or not). The
total of Latinx, Asian, Middle Eastern, and Black suspects identified is 21, so even if each of those suspects was identified as partly
one of those races or ethnicities and partly White, there would be an additional 32 White suspects not identified with any other race
or ethnicity.
As shown in figure 8, a large majority of the averted
attacks were being planned by students who were
currently enrolled at the school they were plotting to
attack (75.9 percent, n=110) or former students (15.9
percent, n=23).
11
Current school officials accounted
for 2.1 percent of suspects (n=3) and former employ-
ees at the schools they targeted for 1.4 percent (n=2).
The remaining suspects (4.8 percent, n=7) had no
known prior affiliation with the targeted school.
The ASV case submission form collects information
about specific categories of warning signs each sus-
pect may have exhibited during their planning and
allows for multiple selections. Table 3 on page 17
provides each behavior and the number of times it
was selected in the new sample of cases. As is dis-
cussed in the Plot Discovery section, communicating
to a third party the intent to do harm through an
attack is one of the most common warning signs.
Figure 8. School afliation of suspects in new sample of ASV incidents (n=145)
Current student
Former student
Other
School ofcial
Former employee
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140
Number of suspects
2
3
23
110
7
11. There were four suspects whose prior affiliation or nonaffiliation with the school was unknown.
Therefore, the percentages are based on n=145.
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
16
Table 3. Warning signs of suspects in new sample of ASV incidents
Behavior Suspects (n)
Directly communicated threat. The communication of a direct threat to a third party
beforehand. A threat is a written or oral communication that implicitly or explicitly states a
wish or intent to damage, injure, or kill the target or individuals symbolically or actually
associated with the target.
62
Energy burst. An increase in the frequency or variety of any noted activities related to the
target—even if the activities themselves are relatively innocuous—usually in the days or
weeks before the attack.
9
Fixation. Any behavior that indicates an increasingly pathological preoccupation with a
cause, other acts of violence, violent persons/subjects, their grievances, or their effects.
43
Identication. Any behavior that indicates a “warrior mentality,” is closely associated with
weapons or other military or law enforcement paraphernalia, identies with previous
attackers or assassins, or identies oneself as an agent to advance a particular cause or
belief system.
12
Last resort. Evidence of a “violent-action imperative” or “time imperative.” Increasing
desperation or distress through words or actions. The subject feels trapped, with no other
alternative than violence.
10
Leakage. The communication to a third party of an intent to do harm to a target through
an attack.
100
Novel aggression. An act of violence that appears unrelated to any targeted violence
pathway warning behavior committed for the rst time. Such behaviors may be engaged
to test the ability of the subject to actually do the violent act.
2
Pathway. Any behavior that is part of research, planning, preparation, or implementation
of an attack.
105
Data Analysis 17
The ASV case submission form also collects informa-
tion about specific characteristics each suspect may
have exhibited during their planning and allows for
multiple selections. Table 4 provides each character-
istic and the number of times it was selected in the
new sample of cases.
The ASV case submission form also collects informa-
tion related to whether each suspect was ever for-
mally treated for a mental illness or developmental
disorder and whether each suspect suffered from
addiction or substance use—whether formally diag-
nosed or not. The status of a formal diagnosis of
mental illness or developmental disorder was entered
for 20 of the suspects. Of those 20, there were 18
suspects who were formally treated for a mental
illness / developmental disorder and two who were
not. Of the 18 suspects identified as having had for-
mal diagnoses, there were eight about whom more
information was provided: (1) One had schizophrenia
and (2) one was evaluated for potentially having
schizophrenia after being arrested; (3) one was diag-
nosed with depression, anxiety, and a “real sense of
social awkwardness;” (4) one was diagnosed with
Antisocial Personality Disorder and Bipolar 1; (5) one
was diagnosed with depression and suicidal thoughts
or actions; (6) one was diagnosed with a learning dis-
ability; (7) one was diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome and Reactive Attachment Disorder; and
(8) one was diagnosed during the pre-trial but had
not been diagnosed before.
With respect to addiction and substance use, infor-
mation was entered with respect to 12 suspects: Five
suspects were reported to have suffered from addic-
tion or substance use and six were not. Of the five
suspects identified as having had addiction or sub-
stance use issues, more information was provided
Table 4. Characteristics of suspects in new sample of ASV incidents
Characteristic Suspects (n)
Impaired social or emoonal funconing
21
Depressed mood
21
Disregard for authority or rules
16
Social withdrawal or isolaon from peers
15
Easily enraged
14
Lacking empathy, guilt, remorse
14
Does not take responsibility for consequences
7
Hypersensivity (to cricism, failure, etc.)
7
Extreme narcissism
4
Other
7
None of the above
1
Unknown
67
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
18
about all of them: (1) One used methamphetamines,
(2) one used marijuana, (3) one used alcohol, (4) one
used alcohol and controlled substances, and (5) one
used cannabis and other unknown drugs.
Information about involvement in bullying was entered
for 25 suspects. Of those, 12 suspects had been bul-
lied before their planned attack was averted, and
eight had been involved in bullying—as a bully—in
addition to participating in planning an act of school-
based violence. Five of the 22 suspects were not
involved in bullying.
In the new sample of cases, information was entered
about life-changing or traumatic experiences with
respect to 18 suspects. There were 13 suspects who
had such experiences and five who had not. Of the
13 suspects who had experienced a life-changing
event or traumatic experience, two experienced loss
of a job or other financial issues; one experienced
loss of a job or other financial issues and was
harassed; one personally experienced a breakup,
separation, or divorce; one reported that things were
bad at home and they just wanted to end it all; one
had their biological father recently pass away; one
struggled with substance use and their father died by
suicide; one was homeless; and one had a partner
who was hospitalized.
In the new sample of averted cases, information was
entered about previous involvement with the crim-
inal justice system with respect to 48 suspects. Of
those, 26 were previously officially known to the
criminal justice system either as an offender or as a
victim, and 22 were not. For the suspects who had
previous offenses, some included threatening to
assault another person, burglary, previously having a
weapon on educational property, carrying a con-
cealed weapon and altering serial numbers on a fire-
arm, drug possession, stalking, vandalism, an
domestic violence.
One of the common perceptions of individuals who
commit school-based violence is that they frequently
engage with violent media, entertainment, and writ-
ten materials. In the new sample of averted cases,
information was entered with respect to 40 suspects
on this topic: 39 had engaged with violent media, and
Table 5. Suspects’ reasons for the planned attack in new sample of ASV incidents
Reason Averted School Violence Suspects (n)
Hates people
17
Grudge/Seeking revenge
17
Bullying
8
Resentment
5
Paranoid delusions / command hallucinaons
2
Rivalry
1
Envy
0
Did not provide a reason
44
Other
25
Data Analysis 19
one had not. Although multiple selections were
allowed, violent social media and websites were the
most common form of violent media engaged with by
suspects (n=19), followed by violent stories and jour-
nals (n=8) and video games (n=6).
The ASV case submission form also collects informa-
tion about specific reasons each suspect gave for
planning their attack and allows for multiple selec-
tions. Table 5 on page 21 provides each reason and
the number of times it was selected in the new sam-
ple of cases.
The final suspect information that the ASV case sub-
mission form collects is whether each suspect told or
threatened anyone directly and overtly about their
school violence plans—other than co-conspirators—
prior to the discovery of the plot itself. Information
about prior direct and overt threats was entered with
respect to 93 suspects, of whom 72 told or threat-
ened someone and 21 did not.
Event information
The ASV case submission form collects considerable
data about each incident of averted school violence,
including a summary of the incident, how it was
averted, who was involved in reporting the plan
before it could come to fruition, and the behaviors of
the individuals allegedly involved in planning the
attack. The ASV case submission form also collects
information on the weapon or weapons the suspect
or suspects intended to use in each of the alleged
incidents, as well as information about how they
obtained those weapons.
Time between plot discovery and aversion
In 115 of the 120 cases in the new sample, the report
included the number of days between when the plot
was discovered and when it was averted. Of those
115, in an overwhelming majority of the cases (73.0
percent, n=84), the date that the plot was discovered
and the date that it was averted were the same. In an
additional 21.7 percent of cases (n=25) cases, less
than seven days passed between when the plot was
discovered and when it was averted. In 3.5 percent of
cases (n=4), between eight days and two weeks
passed between discovery and aversion. In 0.9 per-
cent of cases (n=1) 18 days passed between discov-
ery and aversion, and in 0.9 percent of cases (n=1)
122 days passed between discovery and aversion.
Who discovered the plot
As demonstrated in figure 9 on page 21, plans of
school violence attacks are generally uncovered by
people in a small number of categories closely asso-
ciated with the school. While it is possible for multiple
people to discover a single plot (and the ASV submis-
sion form allows multiple selections), the majority of
potential school violence incidents were initially dis-
covered and reported by peers of the suspect(s).
School personnel—including an administrator (6 cases),
school resource officer (SRO) (5 cases), teacher (4
cases), counselor (2 cases), other faculty or staff
member (6 cases)—were also key personnel in dis-
covering plots in 23 of the cases in the new sample.
Other law enforcement—not including SROs—initially
discovered a potential incident of school violence in
10 cases. A parent or guardian of the suspect (5
cases) or parent or guardian of another student (4
cases) were also involved in discovering potential
plots of school violence. Other individuals—including
neighbors (2 cases), bystanders (2 cases), coworkers
and supervisors (2 cases), social media followers (6
cases), close relatives (6 cases), doctors and clini-
cians (3 cases), gun store employees (2 cases), or
other connections (8 cases)—were also responsible
for uncovering some of the potential plots in the new
sample. Together, figure 9.1 on page 21 shows the
people who most commonly initially discovered the
plot for averted incidents of school violence.
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
20
10
14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Number of schools
29
8
6
2
2
59
23
31
Peer
School personnel
(including SRO)
Other
Other law
enforcement
(not SRO)
Parent of
other student
Parent of suspect
Preliminary analysis New sample
Figure 9. Who discovered the plot in both samples of ASV incidents
Figure 9.1. Who initially discovered the plot in combined samples of ASV incidents
Peer
Other
School personnel
(including SRO)
Other law
enforcement
(not SRO)
Parent of suspect
Parent of
other student
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Number of schools
88
37
31
Data Analysis 21
4
4
5
7
6
12
10
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Number of averted incidents of school violence
17
10
9
5
56
22
23
13
1
Suspect told
somebody
Suspect mentioned
plans on
social media
Other
Suspect was
overheard
Suspect wrote
about plans
Suspect seen
carrying a weapon
Unknown
Suspect began
shooting/setting off
explosives
Preliminary analysis New sample
Plot discovery
As displayed in figure 10, averted school violence
attacks were discovered in a handful of ways. While it
is possible for a single incident to be discovered mul-
tiple ways, of the cases in the new sample the largest
number of potential school violence plots (56 cases)
were initially discovered by at least one suspect tell-
ing another person—frequently a peer—of their plan,
who then reported it to a school administrator, SRO,
or other law enforcement. In 13 cases, at least one
suspect was overheard talking about their plans and
reported what they heard to a school administrator,
SRO, or other law enforcement. Closely related to
verbally telling someone, in 22 cases at least one
suspect posted about their plan on social media. An
additional 12 plots were discovered after at least one
suspect wrote about their plans and someone found
the note or saw them typing about it somewhere
other than social media. In 10 cases, the potential
attack was averted when the suspect was seen car-
rying a weapon, and in two cases the incident was
averted after the suspect began shooting or setting
off explosives. Together, figure 10.1 on page 23
shows the most common ways plots of averted inci-
dents of school violence were discovered.
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
22
4
4
3
2
Figure 10. Method of plot discovery of averted incidents of school violence
Figure 10.1. Discovery of plots in combined samples of ASV incidents
Suspect told
somebody
Suspect mentioned
plans on
social media
Other
Suspect was
overheard
Suspect wrote
about plans
Suspect seen
carrying a weapon
Unknown
Suspect began
shooting/setting off
explosives
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Number of averted incidents of school violence
32
32
73
18
16
3
14
9
Data Analysis 23
How the incident of school
violence was averted
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Number of averted incidents of school violence
6
19
9
94
48
20
0
1
Arrested/tackled/
otherwise
physically retrained
Had conversation
about plans/violent
threats reported
Had social
media post/entry/
video reported
Other
Changed their
mind of their
own volition
Talked out
of committing
attack
Preliminary analysis New sample
The ASV case submission form collects data regard-
ing how the planned school violence incident was
ultimately averted in each case. As displayed in figure
11, the largest number of cases (94) in the new sam-
ple were averted with the arrest, tackle, or other
physical restraint of the alleged suspect or suspects
involved in the plot. In addition, in 48 cases, the
potential incident of school violence was averted
when the suspect had their conversation—most
commonly with a peer—reported. Closely related to
verbally telling someone, in 20 cases, the incident
was averted when at least one of the suspects had
their social media post, entry, or video reported.
Seven suspects changed their mind of their own voli-
tion and in one instance, the alleged suspect was
talked out of committing their attack. The “Other”
category was also selected for 13 cases. Together,
figure 11.1 on page 25 shows the most common
ways plots of potential incidents of school violence
were averted.
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
24
15
13
7
5
Figure 11. How the incident of potential school violence was averted in both samples of ASV incidents
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Number of averted incidents of school violence
67
29
100
28
Arrested/tackled/
otherwise
physically retrained
Had conversation
about plans/violent
threats reported
Had social
media post/entry/
video reported
Other
Changed their
mind of their
own volition
Talked out
of committing
attack
Figure 11.1. How the incident of potential school violence was averted
in combined samples of ASV incidents
Data Analysis 25
7
6
Weapons
The ASV case submission form collects data regard-
ing the types of weapons suspects in each case of
averted school violence intended to use. Of the 120
cases in the new sample, 113 identified what types of
weapons the suspects allegedly intended to use, but
in some of the cases, the suspect intended to use
more than one type of weapon (for example, they
intended to use a bomb or other explosive device as
a distraction for shooting). As displayed in figure 12,
the most common weapons included firearms,
knives, bombs and other explosive devices, and fire.
Firearms (94) were the most common intended
weapon. Suspects intended to use bombs and other
explosive devices in 29 cases and knives in 13 cases.
Three cases allegedly involved setting a fire or arson,
and one suspect allegedly intended to use a blunt
force object as a weapon. Together, figure 12.1 on
page 27 shows the most common weapons sus-
pects allegedly intended to use in potential incidents
of school violence.
Figure 12. Weapons intended for use in both samples of ASV incidents
Firearms
Bombs/other
explosives
Knives
Other
Fire/arson
Blunt force object
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Number of averted incidents of school violence
1
1
0
Preliminary analysis New sample
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
26
45
94
16
29
7
13
5
11
3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140
Number of averted incidents of school violence
45
20
139
16
4
1
Firearms
Bombs/other
explosives
Knives
Other
Fire/arson
Blunt force object
Figure 12.1. Weapons intended for use in combined samples of ASV incidents
Data Analysis 27
Further analysis was conducted of the 94 cases in
the new sample where firearms were included in the
weapons suspects allegedly intended to use. Of
those 94 cases, the type of firearm was specified in
89 cases. A total of 116 firearms were identified,
meaning that in some of the cases the suspect or
suspects intended to use more than one type of fire-
arm. As displayed in figure 13, handguns or pistols
(38 cases) and rifles (35 cases) were the most com-
mon weapons.
Figure 13. Firearms intended for use in new sample of ASV incidents
Handgun/pistol
Rie
Unknown/missing
Shotgun
Other
0 10 20 30 40
35
9
38
28
6
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
28
Lessons Learned
IN ADDITION TO THE QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS from the 120 cases in the new sam-
ple—and the 171 total cases—of school violence attacks that were averted, there is a series
of important overarching lessons learned that emerged from the data.
Educate all members of the school community on indicators of potenal self-harm
and targeted violence and how to report concerning behavior.
As identified in the analysis, in many cases the suspects had an affiliation with the school
that was the intended target of their planned violent attack. Peers played a significant role in
initially discovering the potential school attacks (88 of the 171 total cases). In 31 cases,
school personnel—including administrators, faculty and staff, and SROs—were also identi-
fied as initially discovering the planned attack. In addition, parents of peers and parents of
alleged suspects were involved in identifying potential attacks.
The importance of educating the school community about how to report concerning behav-
ior is further emphasized by research conducted by the U.S. Secret Service on prior knowl-
edge of potential school-based violent attacks, which showed that at least one other person
was aware of the attacker’s plan in approximately 81 percent of incidents and more than
one person was aware in 59 percent of incidents.
12
In addition, research conducted by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on completed active shooter incidents in the United
States between 2000 and 2015 in prekindergarten through grade 12 (pre-K–12) school
settings, identified that the shooter was a student at the targeted school in 20 of the 30
cases (66.7 percent).
13
Together, these data suggest that it is extremely important to educate all members of the
school community—including administrators, faculty and staff, students, parents and
guardians—on the indicators of potential self-harm or violence directed at others as well as
12. William S. Pollack, William Modzeleski, and Georgeann Rooney,
Prior Knowledge of Potential School-
Based Violence: Information Students Learn May Prevent a Targeted Attack
(Washington, DC: U.S.
Secret Service, 2008), https://rems.ed.gov/docs/DOE_BystanderStudy.pdf.
13. J. Pete Blair and Katherine W. Schweit,
A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–2013
(Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/
active-shooter-study-2000-2013-1.pdf/view; Katherine W. Schweit,
Active Shooter Incidents
in the United States in 2014 and 2015
(Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016),
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/activeshooterincidentsus_2014-2015.pdf/view.
29
how concerning behavior should be reported. Mem-
bers of the school community—particularly peers—
are likely to be attuned to and aware of suspicious
behaviors and comments made by classmates and
have demonstrated success in reporting suspicious
behaviors after being educated about them. For
example, anonymous reporting systems have been
shown to be effective in providing students—and
other members of the school community—to report
potential targeted violence and other concern-
ing behaviors.
14
14. School Safety Working Group,
Ten Essential Actions to Improve School Safety
(Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services, 2020), https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/ric.php?page=detail&id=COPS-W0891.
Averted School Violence (ASV) Database
2021 Analysis Update
30
Relaonships are crical to assessing
the viability of all threats and taking necessary
preventave acon.
Many of the potential incidents of school violence
were initially discovered by a member of the school
community. These cases were then averted after law
enforcement personnel were notified and the alleged
suspects were arrested. Relationships between
stakeholders in a positive and supportive school envi-
ronment can greatly impact the aversion of a violent
incident. In many cases, the time between when the
incident was discovered and when it was averted
was minimal.
Peers are the ones who initially discover plans of
school violence in many of the cases included in the
ASV database. Therefore, it is important for school
officials to ensure that every adult—administrator,
faculty, staff, or SRO—work to develop strong rela-
tionships with students so that students feel comfort-
able reporting concerns about possible threats.
While some school administrators may be concerned
about the restrictions of communicating with law
enforcement based on the federal Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), it is important to
note that sharing information about potential threats
or general concerns about school safety is not pro-
hibited by that law. Also, these relationships can help
establish protocols and processes for identifying,
addressing, and averting potential threats as well as
proactively communicating with staff, faculty mem-
bers, parents and guardians.
Behavioral threat assessment teams
are a crical tool.
Behavioral threat assessment teams are a critical tool
in quickly assessing threats and taking the actions
necessary to address them. Every report of a threat
or potential suspicious activity must be acted upon
as if it is a serious and credible threat, until it has been
investigated and determined to no longer be credible.
While there may be false negatives—cases in which
reports are deemed to not be credible—it is import-
ant to err on the side of caution, especially to ensure
that students continue to feel safe making reports.
It is also critical that there be a multidisciplinary team
in place to whom information can be referred and that
can conduct analysis and take appropriate actions to
connect persons to services well before an attack is
being planned. Behavioral threat assessment teams
staffed by school administrators, teachers, mental
health practitioners, and law enforcement provide an
opportunity to identify the appropriate resources and
interventions to assist students pre-crisis within the
school, family, and community environments.
Alleged suspects may be movated by a range
of things from seemingly insignicant incidents
to a desire to emulate previous mass aackers.
Alleged suspects of school violence are driven to the
precipice of committing a violent attack by a range of
motivations. In some cases, a change in their per-
sonal life (such as their parents getting divorced or a
breakup with a significant other) or academic life
(such as a disciplinary incident or significant change
in grades) can be the impetus for planning a mass
violence attack. In other cases, anniversaries of other
high-profile mass casualty attacks can have signifi-
cance and serve as motivation for those planning
school violence. Similarly, there is some research
pointing to a school shooting “contagion effect,” in
which the immediate aftermath of student suicides or
a completed school violence attack motivates others
to attempt to carry out an attack.
These data suggest, that there is no “profile” of a
school attacker but rather a complex set of personal
and environmental factors that influence a person’s
decision to commit an act of violence. It is clear
that additional research is necessary to identify not
only the factors that contribute to mass violence
attacks but also promising intervention strategies
and practices.
School resource ocers, security personnel, and
law enforcement play a crical role in prevenng
school aacks.
Amidst the national and local discussions regarding
the role of law enforcement in the communities they
serve and in educational environments, it is important
to recognize the role that public safety officers play in
providing mentorship, adult role models, and security
in schools. Carefully selected, well-trained school-
based public safety personnel provide an import-
ant resource in the prevention and response to
school attacks. K–12 schools as well as colleges and
universities should endeavor to engage school
administrators, teachers, staff, parents and students
regarding the role that law enforcement and security
personnel will play in creating safe and secure learn-
ing environments.
Information collected, analyzed, and reported via the
ASV database is critical to improve school safety.
Protecting students and school personnel is a com-
munity responsibility that can be maximized with
information sharing, transparency, and collaborative
communication. The ASV database mission is to
encourage individuals to share their stories and les-
sons learned from ASV incidents to prevent future
injuries and fatalities in educational institutions. The
lessons learned can be used to inform future school
policy and safety procedures. The lessons learned
will help to save lives through interventions before a
school violence event occurs.
Lessons Learned 31
About the National
Police Foundation
The National Police Foundation is a national,
nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to
advancing innovation and science in policing. As the
country’s oldest police research organization, the
National Police Foundation has learned that police
practices should be based on scientific evidence
about what works best, the paradigm of evidence-
based policing.
Established in 1970, the foundation has conducted
seminal research in police behavior, policy, and pro-
cedure and works to transfer to local agencies the
best new information about practices for dealing
effectively with a range of important police opera-
tional and administrative concerns. Motivating all of
the foundation’s efforts is the goal of efficient, humane
policing that operates within the framework of demo-
cratic principles and the highest ideals of the nation.
To learn more, visit the National Police Foundation
online at www.policefoundation.org.
32
About the COPS Ofce
The Office of Community Oriented Policing Ser-
vices (COPS Office) is the component of the U.S.
Department of Justice responsible for advancing the
practice of community policing by the nation’s state,
local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies
through information and grant resources.
Community policing begins with a commitment to
building trust and mutual respect between police and
communities. It supports public safety by encourag-
ing all stakeholders to work together to address our
nation’s crime challenges. When police and commu-
nities collaborate, they more effectively address
underlying issues, change negative behavioral pat-
terns, and allocate resources.
Rather than simply responding to crime, community
policing focuses on preventing it through strategic
problem-solving approaches based on collaboration.
The COPS Office awards grants to hire community
policing officers and support the development and
testing of innovative policing strategies. COPS Office
funding also provides training and technical assis-
tance to community members and local government
leaders, as well as all levels of law enforcement.
Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more
than $14 billion to add community policing officers to
the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technol-
ogy, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide
training and technical assistance to help advance
community policing. Other achievements include
the following:
To date, the COPS Office has funded the hiring of
approximately 130,000 additional officers by more
than 13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 law enforce-
ment agencies in both small and large jurisdictions.
Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, com-
munity members, and government leaders have
been trained through COPS Office–funded training
organizations and the COPS Training Portal.
Almost 500 agencies have received customized
advice and peer-led technical assistance through
the COPS Office Collaborative Reform Initiative
Technical Assistance Center.
To date, the COPS Office has distributed more
than eight million topic-specific publications, train-
ing curricula, white papers, and resource CDs and
flash drives.
The COPS Office also sponsors conferences,
round tables, and other forums focused on issues
critical to law enforcement.
COPS Office information resources, covering a wide
range of community policing topics such as school
and campus safety, violent crime, and officer safety
and wellness, can be downloaded via the COPS
Office’s home page, https://cops.usdoj.gov.
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The National Police Foundation, in collaboration with the COPS Office, implemented the Avert-
ed School Violence (ASV) database to provide a platform for sharing information about averted
incidents of violence in institutions of elementary, secondary, and higher education. The ASV
database defines an incident of averted school violence as a violent attack planned with
or without the use of a firearm that was prevented before any injury or loss of life occurred.
A preliminary report (Daniels 2019) analyzed 51 averted incidents of school violence to begin
to improve our understanding of averted school attacks. This report analyzes an additional
120 averted incidents of school violence, expanding the knowledge base and further develop-
ing lessons learned as our understanding grows of how school attacks are planned, discov-
ered, and thwarted.
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 145
N Street NE
Washington, DC 20530
To obtain details on COPS Office programs, call the
COPS O
ffice Response Center at 800-421-6770.
Visit the COPS O
ffi
ce online at
cops.usdoj.gov
National Police Foundation
1201 Connecticut Ave NW
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20036
Visit the National Police Foundation online
at www.policefoundation.org
e022111977
Published 2021
