Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 54 (2022)
Privacy vs. Identity Rights: A Call for the United States to Adopt the United
Kingdom’s “Open ID” System for Artificial Reproductive Technology
423
This Note argues that, as a social policy issue, the United States
must learn from other countries, specifically the United Kingdom, to
provide a unified and sustainable solution that balances the identity
rights of a donor-conceived child and the protection of the privacy
rights of gamete and embryo donors. This Note examines the
implications of donated genetic material
20
on privacy issues, identity
rights, legal rights, estate planning, and probate litigation. This Notes
also suggests how the United States could benefit from a national
system of regulation as seen in the United Kingdom.
21
Part II of this Note presents a brief overview of ART that is
applicable to this paper. It provides a general understanding of ART
using donors including gamete donation and embryo donation. It also
provides a brief background on the legal systems that regulate ART in
the United Kingdom and the United States.
Part III explains the necessary balance of the rights of a donor and
the rights of a child, born from ART using donated genetic material. It
also examines how the United Kingdom and United States value these
rights differently in light of customs and societal norms, and how
technological advances destroyed donor anonymity.
Part IV compares the United States’ attempt to create a unified
framework in the Uniform Parentage Act,
22
Uniform Probate Code,
23
and American Bar Association state-regulated legislations,
24
with the
20. While there are many forms of ART, this Note focuses on only those
processes that involve donated genetic material. The Note does not explore
issues of traditional surrogacy which may have some limited application on
the issues proposed, but because it is so rarely used today, has little
implications for this research. Posthumous gamete retrieval is also not
included because those cases typically use a “donor” that is the deceased
biological parent and therefore does not create the same issues of privacy
and inheritance rights as typical gamete or embryo donation. See generally
About Surrogacy: What Is Traditional Surrogacy?, S
URROGATE.COM, https:
//surrogate.com/about-surrogacy/types-of-surrogacy/what-is-traditional-su
rrogacy/#:~:text=Traditional%20surrogacy%20is%20now%20much,as%20t
hey%20grow%20their%20families [https://perma.cc/5PBK-NKS4]; Andrew
Joseph, ‘They Don’t Want His Story to End’: Efforts to Save the
Sperm of the Deceased Come with Heartache and Tough Questions, STAT
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/03/13/postmortem-sper
m-retrieval/ [https://perma.cc/CB96-H24].
21. While child support is a relevant factor when analyzing issues of donated
genetic material, it is beyond the scope of this paper and is not discussed
further.
22. U
NIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2017), U.L.A. (2019).
23. U
NIF. PROB. CODE (amended 2020), U.L.A. (2013).
24. ABA Model Act Governing Assisted Reproduction [2019] Resolution, A
M.
BAR ASS’N (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/family_law/committees/art/resolution-111.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/LLP4-EH6L].