Officer-Involved Shooting: Reaction Patterns, Response Protocols

Officer-Involved Shooting: Reaction Patterns, Response Protocols,

and Psychological Intervention Strategies

Laurence Miller

Independent Practice, Boca Raton, Florida

Abstract: Psychologists who work with law enforcement agencies may be called upon to respond to an

officer-involved shooting (OIS). These need not be the most traumatic critical incidents in policing, but

when they are, the reasons usually involve a mix of incident characteristics, officer response styles, and

departmental handling. This article describes some of the psychological reactions experienced by officers

during and following an OIS and provides a model of administrative, legal, mental health, and peer

support services for officers in need. Finally, the article discusses several key roles that the police

psychologist can play in the process of managing an OIS. [International Journal of Emergency Mental

Health, 2006, 8(4), pp. 239-254].

Key words: officer-involved shooting, post-shooting stress, critical incident stress, crisis intervention,

police psychology

The gun. Among all public safety and emergency ser-

vice workers, the unique and ultimate symbol of the law

enforcement officer is the gun. No other nonmilitary service

group is mandated to carry a lethal firearm as part of their

daily equipment, nor charged with the responsibility of us-

ing their own discretion and judgment in making split-sec-

ond decisions to use deadly force in the line of duty.

Although watching any typical TV cop show might con-

vince the viewer that most officers regularly fire off multiple

rounds without a second thought, in reality the firing of

one’s weapon in the line of duty is a profound event that

almost always leaves a psychological trace and, in some

cases, may be traumatic enough to end a career in law en-

forcement.

Correspondene concerning this article should be sent to Laurence

Miller, PhD, Plaza Four, Suite 101, 399 W. Camino Gardens Blvd.,

Boca Raton, Florida 33432(561) 392-8881. Email to:

Cop And Guns: Facts And Stats

Available data indicate that about 600 criminals are killed

each year by police officers in the United States. Some of

these killings are in self-defense, some are accidental, and

others are to prevent harm to others. By comparison, last

year, 152 officers were killed in the line of duty (Mitchell &

Levenson, 2006). In most cases, taking a life occurs in the

context of trying to save a life. The sources of stress at-

tached to an officer-involved shooting (OIS) are multiple,

and include the officer’s own psychological reaction to tak-

ing a life, the responses of law enforcement peers and the

officer’s family, rigorous examination by departmental inves-

tigators and administrators, possible disciplinary action or

change of assignment, possible criminal and civil court ac-

tion, and unwanted attention - sometimes outright harass-

ment - by the media (Baruth, 1986; Bohrer, 2005; Cloherty,

2004; Henry, 2004; Miller, 1995, 1999b, 2000, 2003b, 2005a,

2006, in press-a, in press-c; Perrou & Farrell, 2004; Regehr &

[email protected]

Bober, 2005; Russell & Beigel, 1990).

IJEMH • Vol. 8, No. 4 • 2006 239

In most jurisdictions, the legal test for justification of

legitimate use of lethal force by police officers requires that

any reasonable person with the training and experience of

the involved officer would have perceived a threat to life in

the actions taken by the suspect (Blau, 1986, 1994; Blum,

2000). Line-of-duty deadly force actions are most likely to

occur in the following situations, in descending order of prob-

ability: (1) domestic or other disturbance calls; (2) robbery in

progress; (3) burglary in progress; (4) traffic offense; (5) per-

sonal dispute and/or accident; and (5) stake-out and drug

busts (Blau, 1994; Russell & Biegel, 1990).

Of American police officers who kill a suspect in the line

of duty, 70% leave law enforcement within five years (Horn,

1991). According to McMains (1986a; 1991), by the early

1980s, an estimated 95% of police officers involved in a line-

of-duty shooting had left police work within five years. By

the mid-1980s, large departments had cut that rate to 3%,

while smaller departments were still losing about two-thirds

of officers involved in a shooting. More recent surveys have

showed that less than 15% of officers sampled showed sig-

nificant post-shooting distress and even fewer left law en-

forcement as a direct result of the incident (Honig & Roland,

1998; Honig & Sultan, 2004), and some authorities believe

the psychological disability rate from OISs, and from critical

incidents in general, has been overestimated (Curran, 2003).

One important difference may relate to the level of adminis-

trative and mental health support provided to officers by the

larger departments (either because of broader philosophies

or broader budgets), giving their officers the clear message

that helping them resolve their psychological trauma and

maintain their mental health is a departmental priority. Ac-

cordingly, this has left a greater role for police psychologists

to make a fundamental contribution to officer health and

safety.

Perceptual, Cognitive, And Behavioral

Disturbances

Most officers who have been involved in a deadly force

shooting episode have described one or more alterations in

perception, thinking, and behavior that occurred during the

event (Artwohl, 2002; Honig & Roland, 1998; Honig & Sul-

tan, 2004; Solomon & Horn, 1986; Wittrup, 1986). Most of

these can be interpreted as natural adaptive defensive reac-

tions of an organism under extreme emergency stress.

Most common are distortions in time perception. In the

majority of these cases, officers recall the shooting event as

occurring in slow motion, although a smaller percentage re-

port experiencing the event as speeded up.

Sensory distortions are common and most commonly

involve tunnel vision, in which the officer is sharply focused

on one particular aspect of the visual field, typically, the

suspect’s gun or weapon, while blocking out everything in

the periphery. Similarly, tunnel hearing may occur, in which

the officer’s auditory attention is focused exclusively on a

particular set of sounds, most commonly the suspect’s voice,

while background sounds are excluded. Sounds may also

seem muffled or, in a smaller number of cases, louder than

normal. Officers have reported not hearing their own or other

officers’ gunshots. In a few cases, officers have reported

hearing “the bad guy’s blood drip” (James Sewell, personal

communication). Overall perceptual clarity may increase or

diminish.

Some form of perceptual and/or behavioral dissocia-

tion may occur during the critical event. In extreme cases,

officers describe feeling as though they were standing out-

side or hovering above the scene, observing it “like it was

happening to someone else.” In milder cases, the officer may

report that he or she “just went on automatic,” performing

whatever actions were necessary with a sense of robotic

detachment. Some officers report intrusive distracting

thoughts during the scene, often involving loved ones or

other personal matters, but it is not known if these substan-

tially affected the officers’ actions during the event.

A sense of helplessness may occur during the shooting

episode, but this may be underreported due to the potential

stigma attached (Honig & Sultan, 2004). A very small propor-

tion of officers report that they “froze” at some point during

the event: either this is an uncommon response or officers

are understandably reluctant to report it. In a series of inter-

views, Artwohl (2002) found that most of these instances of

“freezing” really represented the normal action-reaction gap

in which officers make the decision to shoot only after the

suspect has engaged in clearly threatening behavior. In most

cases, this brief evaluation interval is a positive precaution,

to prevent the premature shooting of a harmless citizen. But

in situations where the ostensibly prudent action led to a

tragic outcome, this cautious hesitation may well be viewed

retrospectively as a fault: “If I hadn’t waited to see him draw,

maybe my partner would still be alive.”

240 Miller • Officer Involved Shooting

Disturbances in memory are commonly reported in shoot-

ing cases. About half of these involve impaired recall for at

least some of the events during the shooting scene; the other

half involve impaired recall for at least part of the officer’s

own actions. This, in turn, may be associated with the “go-

ing-on-automatic” response. More rarely, some aspects of

the scene may be recalled with unusually clarity – a flash-

bulb memory. More than a third of cases involve not so

much a loss of recall as a distortion of memory, to the extent

that the officer’s account of what happened differs markedly

from the report of other observers at the scene. In general, it

is common for officers not to remember the number of rounds

they fired, especially from a semiautomatic handgun.

A few cases I’ve interviewed could be described as “tun-

nel memory,” that is, some part of the scene is recalled espe-

cially vividly, while others are fuzzy or distorted. As with

research on eyewitness memory in general (Loftus, Greene,

& Doyle, 1989), one’s subjective vividness of recall is often

uncorrelated with the accuracy of the material recalled. An

administrative implication is that discrepant accounts among

eyewitnesses to a shooting scene should not be automati-

cally interpreted as one or more persons lying or consciously

distorting his or her report (Artwohl, 2002), but may well

represent honest differences of perception and recall.

A general neuropsychological explanation for these con-

strictions of sensation, perception, and memory is that the

brain naturally tries to tone down the hyperarousal that oc-

curs during a critical shooting incident, so that the individual

can function through the experience using his or her “mental

autopilot” responses. In a smaller number of cases, the of-

ficer experiences heightened perceptual awareness of those

features of the scene that are essential for his survival. Simi-

larly, in emergencies the processing of accurate memories for

later use seems to take a neuropsychological back seat to the

mechanisms necessary for getting the subject through the

situation alive, right here and now (Miller, 1990). The implica-

tions for training are that a greater depth, range, and flexibil-

ity of attention and arousal control will allow officers to use

such automatic responding adaptively in a wider range of

extreme situations (Miller, 2006).

Reactions of Fellow Officers

The etiology of post-shooting reactions often lies in the

emotional disconnect between an officer’s expectations of a

heroic, armed confrontation and the reality of most shooting

scenarios, which typically involve petty criminals, mentally

disordered suspects, domestic hostage-barricade situations,

or accidents (Geller, 1982; Miller, 2005b, in press-b; Kennedy,

Homant & Hupp, 1998; Mohandie & Meloy, 2000; Perrou &

Farrell, 2004; Russell & Biegel, 1990).

Post-Shooting Reaction Typologies

Although the reaction to an OIS will necessarily be in-

fluenced by the individual personality and experience of the

officer (Miller, 2003a; Twersky-Glasner, 2005), certain com-

mon factors seem to underlie different types of reaction.

Several analyses (Anderson, Swenson, & Clay, 1995;

Blau, 1994; Blum, 2000; Nielsen, 1991) have suggested a tri-

partite typology of post-shooting reactions, which parallels

the three types of reaction noted to occur in the wake of

traumatically stressful events in general (Bowman, 1997).

These, of course, should be thought of as a continuum rather

than discrete categories. In addition to individual officer

characteristics, the severity of a post-shooting reaction will

be determined by a host of situational factors, such as the

nature of the shooting itself, the post-incident investigation,

reactions of supervisors, peers, and family, and so on. Each

of these reaction types also has its own therapeutic implica-

tions for helping officers in distress.

The first type of reaction involves a transitory period of

post-incident psychological distress, which the officer is able

to resolve within a few weeks, largely by self-coping efforts,

such as talking with colleagues and family, praying and re-

flecting, and reexamining and renewing life priorities and

goals. The psychological distress does not appear to sub-

stantially affect the officer’s daily functioning. Peer counsel-

ing, a critical incident stress debriefing (Miller, 1999a; Mitchell

& Everly, 1996), and perhaps one or two visits with a mental

health professional, clergyperson, or peer support person is

usually the extent of any intervention required.

The second type of reaction is a somewhat more in-

tense, intermediate response, with posttraumatic symptoms

persisting for several weeks or months. The officer’s daily

functioning may be impaired, often with a “good days/bad

days” pattern. In addition to peer support and group

debriefings, short-term crisis counseling with a psychologist

over several weeks may be indicated to help the officer work

through the traumatic elements of the shooting (Blau, 1994;

Miller, 1998, 2000; Wester & Lyubelsky, 2005), as well as to

provide support through any contentious administrative pro-

IJEMH • Vol. 8, No. 4 • 2006 241

cesses that may follow the incident (Bohrer, 2005; Cloherty,

2004; Miller, in press-a).

The third type of reaction is characterized by severe psy-

chological disability, what officers often describe as a “men-

tal breakdown.” Here, the shooting incident has so

traumatized the officer that he is unable to function. In most

cases this kind of severe reaction occurs in the context of

some degree of vulnerability in the premorbid personality of

the officer, often exacerbated by a particularly adversarial

investigation and perceived lack of support from colleagues,

the department, family, and/or the community (Miller, 2003a,

in press-a). Treatment will necessarily involve more long-

term psychotherapy, perhaps with medication. Although some

of these officers will ultimately leave police work, many of

these careers may be salvaged by timely and appropriate

psychological intervention.

Post-Shooting Reaction Phases

Some authorities (Nielsen, 1991; Williams, 1999) have

divided the post-shooting reaction into several basic phases

or stages, starting with an immediate reaction or impact

phase. For officers who have just shot a suspect during a

dangerous confrontation, there may be an initial reaction of

relief and even exhilaration at having survived the encounter.

Later, feelings of guilt or self-recrimination may surface,

especially where the decision to shoot was less than clear-

cut or where the suspect’s actions essentially forced the hand

of the officer into using deadly force, such as in botched

robberies, domestic disputes, or suicide-by-cop (Kennedy et

al, 1998; Lindsay & Dickson, 2004; Mohandie & Meloy, 2000;

Perrou & Farrell, 2004; Pinizzotto, Davis, & Miller, 2005). Or

the officer may simply be confronting the fact that, however

justified his response, he has nevertheless taken a human

life. During this recoil or remorse phase, the officer may

seem detached and preoccupied, spacily going through the

motions of his job duties, and operating on behavioral auto-

pilot. He may be sensitive and prickly to even well-meaning

probing and congratulations by his peers (“How close was

the shooter?” or “Way to go, Bobby – you got the guy”),

and especially to accusatory-like interrogation and second-

guessing from official investigators or the press: “Officer

Jackson, did you really believe you were in fear for your life

from a confused teenager?”

As the officer begins to come to terms with the shooting

episode, a resolution or acceptance phase may ensue, wherein

he or she assimilates the fact that the use-of-force-action

was necessary and justified in this particular instance of the

battle for survival that often characterizes law enforcement

deadly encounters. This resolution process may be compli-

cated by continuing departmental investigations or by im-

pending or ongoing civil litigation. In addition, even under

the best of circumstances, resolution may be partial rather

than total, and psychological remnants of the experience may

continue to haunt the officer periodically, especially during

future times of crisis. But overall, he is eventually able to

return to work with a reasonable sense of confidence.

In the worst case, sufficient resolution may never occur,

and the officer enters into a prolonged posttraumatic phase,

which may effectively end his or her law enforcement career.

In less severe cases, a period of temporary stress disability

allows the officer to seek treatment, to eventually regain his

or her emotional and professional bearings, and ultimately to

return to the job. Still other officers return to work right away,

but continue to perform marginally until their actions are

brought to the attention of superiors (Miller, 2004).

In my experience, many officers who have been trauma-

tized by their own deadly use of force can be effectively

returned to work with the proper psychological intervention

and departmental support (Miller, 2006). Indeed, this type of

support – or stronger forms of encouragement – from the

upper brass is typically what prompts the referral for mental

health counseling in the first place.

Types of Post-Shooting Symptoms and Reactions

Again, the officer’s individual personality and experi-

ence will influence the type of post-shooting reaction he or

she experiences, but certain commonalities emerge from dif-

ferent reports (Anderson et al, 1995; Blum, 2000; Cohen, 1980;

Geller, 1982; Honig & Sultan, 2004; Russell & Beigel, 1990;

Williams, 1999). Some of these will represent general post-

traumatic reactions familiar to psychological trauma workers

(Gilliland & James, 1993; Greenstone & Leviton, 2001; Miller,

1998; Regehr & Bober, 2005), while others will have a specific

law enforcement line-of-duty shooting focus.

Physical symptoms may include headaches, stomach

upset, nausea, weakness and fatigue, muscle tension and

twitches, and changes in appetite and sexual functioning.

Sleep is typically impaired, with frequent awakenings and

often nightmares. Typical posttraumatic reactions of intru-

sive imagery and flashbacks may occur, along with premoni-

242 Miller • Officer Involved Shooting

tions, distorted memories, and feelings of déjà vu. Some

degree of anxiety and depression is common, often accompa-

nied by panic attacks. There may be unnatural and disorient-

ing feelings of helplessness, fearfulness, and vulnerability,

along with self-second-guessing and guilt feelings. Sub-

stance abuse may be a risk.

There may be a pervasive irritability and low frustration

tolerance, along with anger and resentment toward the sus-

pect, the department, unsupportive peers and family, or civil-

ians in general. Part of this may be a reaction to the conscious

or unconscious sense of vulnerability that the officer experi-

ences after a shooting incident. Sometimes this is projected

outward as a smoldering irritability that makes the officer’s

every interaction a grating source of stress and conflict. All

this, combined with an increased hypervigilance and hyper-

sensitivity to threats of all kinds, may result in overaggres-

sive policing, leading to abuse-of-force complaints (Miller,

2004, 2006).

Ultimately, this may spiral into a vicious cycle of angry

and fearful isolation and withdrawal by the officer, spurring

further alienation from potential sources of help and support.

At the same time, some officers become overly protective of

their families, generating an alternating control-alienation

syndrome (McMains, 1986b, 1991), which is disturbing and

disorienting to the family. All this, combined with emotional

lability (“I just get mad or cry at the drop of a hat”) and

cognitive symptoms of impaired concentration and memory,

may lead the officer to fear that he or she is going crazy.

Incident-Specific Factors Influencing the Post-

Shooting Reaction

Apart from the universal reactions and individual per-

sonality and history of the officer, certain features of the line-

of-duty shooting incident itself can affect the severity,

persistence, and impact of post-shooting symptoms and re-

actions (Allen, 2004; Anderson et al, 1995; Blau, 1986; Bohrer,

2005; Honig & Sultan, 2004; McMains, 1986b).

One obvious factor is the degree of threat to the officer’s

life. This can operate in two ways. First, the officer who feels

that he or she was literally about to die may be traumatized by

the extreme fear involved, but may feel quite justified and

relatively guilt-free in using deadly force on a clearly murder-

ous suspect. But where the danger was more equivocal,

there will be less of the fear factor and more second-guessing

about what degree of force was actually necessary. Police

officers pride themselves in their ability to manage a tense

situation and perform under pressure, so they may feel over-

whelmed by doubt and self-recrimination where the situation

abruptly got out of control and turned deadly.

Related factors include the amount of preparation and

warning that existed prior to the shooting and the length of

time the dangerous incident persisted, which also may have

varying effects. On the one hand, officers caught off guard

are unlikely to have even a brief interval to think through

their decision to shoot and may later perceive themselves, or

be perceived by others, as having reacted out of fear, no

matter how justified the shooting is later judged to be. On

the other hand, where the shooting follows a prolonged stand-

off, with a lot of back-and-forth negotiating and maneuver-

ing, as in hostage-barricade or suicide-by-cop scenarios, the

extended period of time the officer spent agonizing over the

decision to use deadly force may later take a deleterious psy-

chological toll.

All of the above factors relate to two important dimen-

sions: the amount of control the officer feels he or she had

over the situation and degree of conflict that exists over the

necessity to take a human life. Generally, the less control and

the more conflict the officer has experienced during the event,

the more severe will be the psychological reaction (Miller,

1998, 2006).

The officer’s reaction to the shooting may also be re-

lated to the characteristics of the suspect. At one extreme is

the armed bank robber who, having been duly warned and

ordered to surrender, brazenly draws down on the officer or

puts a gun to a hostage. In such a case, there is likely to be

universal agreement that the officer had no choice – indeed,

was duty-bound – to fire on the perpetrator in order to save

innocent lives. At the other extreme is the obnoxiously in-

ebriated high school punk who is pulled over for a traffic

violation, exchanges a few sharp words with the officer, and

is shot for refusing to drop an object in his hand that turns

out to be a cell phone. A similar example is the schizophrenic

homeless person who has heretofore been known only as a

noisy neighborhood pest, but now is psychotically waving

around a hammer or a kitchen knife and is shot while lunging

at the officer.

A common reaction is anger at the suspect himself for

forcing the officer to take a life, even if it is the suspect’s own

life. Inasmuch as anger and guilt are often intertwined, greater

anger may be shown toward a relatively more “innocent”

IJEMH • Vol. 8, No. 4 • 2006 243

suspect whose stupid behavior resulted in a totally unneces-

sary shooting – e.g., the psychotic street person or the kid

with the big mouth – than at a suspect who more clearly

“deserves” to get shot – e.g., the armed robber fleeing a bank

who fires at the officer first. Much of this anger may smolder

below the surface and emerge as general irritability, problems

with authority, and family conflicts (Miller, 2004, in press-c).

Degree of control and conflict extend into the post-shoot-

ing phase as well. The amount and kind of attention the

officer receives from his administration, peers, the commu-

nity, and the media will influence his own reaction to the

event (Blau, 1994; Bohrer, 2005; Henry, 2004; Klein, 1991;

Russell & Biegel, 1990; Rynearson, 1988, 1994; Rynearson &

McCreery, 1993; Sewell, 1986; Sprang & McNeil, 1995). Su-

pervisors and administrators are understandably concerned

about the public relations aspect of a shooting and, although

most are generally supportive of their personnel, their effort

to appear objective and unbiased to the public may at times

make it seem that they’re coming down too hard on the of-

ficer.

The reactions of the officer’s peers may help or harm his

attempts to cope with the situation. As noted above, at first

he may receive accolades from his fellow officers for “finish-

ing the job.” Because of the powerful identification factor,

peers may want to hear all about the event, because someday

they may be there too and they want to believe that, in the

breach, they will do the right thing. Many of these peers also

hope that the officer’s guts to pull the trigger will rub off on

them should they encounter a similar situation. However, if

the officer fails to regale them with an uplifting narrative of

struggle and triumph, and instead reveals the conflict, doubt,

and pain he is going through, the contagion effect may cause

his fellow officers to avoid him.

The implied psychological contract of such post-crisis

mutual congratulatory rituals seems to involve a kind of blan-

ket immunity against what Solomon and Horn (1986) call the

mark of Cain and Henry (2004) describes as the death taint:

“You have made real for us the life-and-death situation we all

fear. So you’d better show us how nobly and heroically

you’re dealing with this, throw us a positive spin, or all you’ve

done is shove our mortality in our faces, which freaks us out,

and then to protect ourselves, we’ll will shun you or degrade

you.” This probably accounts for the creepily uncomfort-

able backslapping attaboys that are so commonly inflicted

on the officer by his colleagues after a shooting. Unfortu-

nately, these reactions may only serve to heighten the officer’s

anxiety about what he would really do “next time.”

Even if they won’t admit it to their brother officers, many

officers feel genuinely sad at having had to take a human life,

even if they objectively recognize that they had no choice in

the situation and that the perpetrator clearly asked for it.

Human nature being what it is, police officers and others,

such as soldiers, who are trained to kill when necessary, can-

not just shed their familial, religious, and cultural upbringing

when they don the uniform. An officer may thus become

irritated at his colleagues who want him to play the happy

warrior, while they have no clue as to the turmoil he is going

through. But the officer is hurting and still needs all the

support he can get so, fearing rejection, he may not want to

burst his colleagues’ bubble. He thus feels compelled to put

up a brave facade so as not to alienate this well-meaning, if

lunkheaded, source of support from his peers. Painful as

putting up this false front may be, it’s still better than total

isolation (Miller, 2006).

On-Scene Response

All of the factors noted above have important implica-

tions for productive departmental management and helpful

clinical intervention of OISs at every stage of the event, from

incident response to follow-up resolution. By far, the most

common complaint voiced by these officers concerns their

treatment by their own departments, from the first post-inci-

dent moments onward. Even in uncontestedly “righteous”

shootings, officers often feel demeaned and treated like guilty

suspects, setting up a vicious cycle of suspicion and recrimi-

nation.

The corollary prescription is that every officer who has

risked his life should be treated with basic courtesy and re-

spect. Even if there is suspicion of misconduct, there is

nothing to be gained from an adversarial attitude – indeed,

an officer who is treated decently will be more inclined to

cooperate with investigators (Miller, 2004). Thus, the proper

handling of involved officers begins at the shooting scene

itself.

On-Scene Law Enforcement Response

In many departments, an OIS results in the call-out of

many departmental personnel, including other officers, the

involved officer’s supervisors, the chief of police in some

smaller jurisdictions, paramedics, and typically the depart-

244 Miller • Officer Involved Shooting

ment psychologist, if there is one. I present here a composite

model protocol for on-scene response to officer-involved

shootings culled and amalgamated from a variety of sources

(Baruth, 1986; Blau, 1994; IACP, 2004; McMains, 1986a, 1986b,

1991; Williams, 1991). This model can be adapted and modi-

fied to the needs of the individual police agency. How this

protocol is carried out in practice can make a tremendous

difference in the later psychological adjustment of the in-

volved officers and in department-wide morale.

In the policy-and-procedure planning stages, it should

be decided which personnel respond to what types of critical

incidents, including shootings. As noted above, responders

may include back-up officers, administrative officials, depart-

mental investigators, peer support staff, mental health pro-

fessionals, departmental attorney, media spokesperson, police

chief or division captain, and others. At the time of the shoot-

ing, all designated personnel should respond to the scene.

Reassurance to the involved officer should be provided

by departmental authorities. Reassurance, in this context,

doesn’t have to (and at this early stage, probably shouldn’t)

entail any positive or negative judgment about the officer’s

actions, but should simply communicate an understanding

and appreciation of what the officer has just been through,

and the assurance that the department will support him or her

as much as possible throughout the process. As noted above,

one of the biggest complaints officers have about the post-

shooting departmental response is the feeling that “I’m be-

ing treated like a criminal by my own people.” Especially at

this psychologically sensitive stage, the officer should be

given the benefit of the doubt and treated with respect by

departmental authorities.

The officer should be provided on-scene access to legal

counsel and to a mental health professional. In many juris-

dictions officers may refrain from making any statement to

authorities at the scene until an attorney is present and/or

until they have been assessed by a qualified mental health

professional as mentally fit to make a statement. This pro-

tects the officer’s rights and at the same time makes it difficult

to later challenge any on-scene statements on the basis of

their having been made under mental duress.

The officer’s weapon will almost always be impounded.

This is a fairly standard on-scene policy, but the way it is

carried out will make a big difference in how the officer ad-

justs to the post-shooting aftermath. In the worst case, the

officer is unceremoniously stripped of his sidearm in full view

of his colleagues, and in some cases in front of jeering by-

standers, and is forced to parade around with an empty hol-

ster – the epitome of emasculatory humiliation. In the best

case, the weapon is turned over in private, and in many in-

stances a replacement weapon is provided or the empty hol-

ster removed while the on-scene investigation proceeds.

At some shooting scenes, personnel remain at the site

for hours. This may be necessary for purposes of the inves-

tigation and to deal with community members and the media,

but no one should hang around the scene longer than neces-

sary and everything possible should be done to discourage

the development of a carnival atmosphere. In particular, it is

recommended that the officer be removed from the scene as

quickly as possible. Again, this should be done in a private

and respectful way, perhaps the officer being driven home or

back to the station by a supervisor or a pair of colleagues, to

await further action. They should accompany him to his

door and leave only when he has assured them he is okay.

Of course, when necessary, the officer should be pro-

vided with medical care, either at the scene or at a local hos-

pital. The officer’s family should be notified of the shooting

in person as soon as possible, even if everybody is still on-

scene: the last thing you want is for the family to hear about

the shooting on the radio or TV, or get a call from neighbor

who’s seen or heard the story. If the family is out of town,

every effort should be made to contact them, preferably

through direct contact by a law enforcement agency in that

location.

If media arrive at the scene, the officer should be shielded

from them and any statements should be made through a

departmental spokesperson. Most medium-to-large depart-

ments have a Public Information Officer who is part of the

critical incident response team; in smaller agencies, the Sher-

iff or Chief may have to be the front person. In general, any

statement that could affect the internal investigation or other

legal action should be avoided. Agencies should consult

with their departmental attorneys about local and state regu-

lations as part of the process of developing their own OIS

policies.

On-Scene Psychological Intervention

Encouragingly, at least one study has found that 100%

of large departments and 69% of small departments provide

professional support for traumatized officers (McMains,

1986a; 1986b). As part of the on-scene response team, the

IJEMH • Vol. 8, No. 4 • 2006 245

police psychologist has a specific but important role to play

(McMains, 1991; McMains & Mullins, 1996).

First, the nature of the incident must be determined. When

the call-out psychologist gets the call, he or she should try to

find out as much as possible about the incident and the cur-

rent scene as possible. This may vary, depending on the

timing of the call. Sometimes, the call may come within min-

utes of the shooting incident, in which case there is not much

information to be had, other than the location of the scene.

Other times, the psychologist may be called almost as an

afterthought, hours after the rest of the responders have

arrived, only because someone has suggested that the psy-

chologist be contacted due to unforeseen complications at

the scene. This kind of snafu usually reflects a problem with

the call-out policy at the planning stages or it may occur in a

very dangerous or complex scene where other services, such

as medical or biotox decontamination, may take precedence.

As a rule, however, if there is a call-out psychologist, he or

she should be summoned to the scene as soon as possible.

When the psychologist arrives at the scene, the involved

officer should be identified and his mental status determined.

This may range from extremes of panic, confusion, and dis-

orientation – rare, in my experience – to unnatural calmness

and stoic denial (“I’m okay; no problem”) – a far more com-

mon response. Frequently, emotions will swing at the scene,

the officer blank and icy one moment, then nervous and shaky

the next. As discussed below, validating these reactions as

normal stress responses is an important part of on-scene

intervention.

A comfortable place should be found to conduct the

interview with the officer. “On-scene” doesn’t necessarily

mean standing over a body or pacing back and forth in front

of the news cameras. I’ve conducted on-scene interviews

behind bushes, under trees, behind a throng of officers or a

row of vehicles, in the back seat of patrol cars, and in a SWAT

wagon. As long as the officer stays inside the established

perimeter and can be found by authorities when needed, he

or she is still technically on-scene.

For the visibly upset officer, calming and distraction tech-

niques may be utilized to bring his mental state into a more

rational and receptive mode. For the defensive, sealed-over

officer, what I often find helpful is a one-on-one version of

the critical incident stress management procedure known as

defusing, which follows a basic tripartite structure (Miller,

1999a; Mitchell & Everly, 1996):

First, the officer should be asked what happened. This

will typically elicit a stiff, dry, detail-laden rendition of events,

as if the officer were testifying before a review board or in

court:

Officer: I saw the guy coming out the dark breezeway,

carrying a box or something bulky like that, hugging the wall

like he was trying to hide. I identified myself as a police

officer and told him to stop, put the box down slowly, and

face the wall. He dropped the box and put his hand in his

pocket. I drew my weapon and ordered him to freeze. He

pulled out something metal, which I took to be a blade or a

firearm. He was standing under one of the breezeway lights

and I remember seeing a yellow glint off the object. I drew

down on him in a modified Weaver stance and ordered him to

drop the object. He raised it higher and started coming to-

wards me. In fear for my life, I fired, I think, three or four

times. He fell and was quiet, and the object skidded several

feet away into the grass. I radioed for backup and attempted

to administer aid, but I think he was already dead. I located

the object and found that it was a small, silvery semiauto with

a taped grip.

Listening to the story will give a good sense of the se-

quence of events. Next, the officer should be asked to de-

scribe “what was going on in your mind while it was

happening.” This often elicits clues to the officer’s cognitive

and emotional state:

Officer: The guy and me kind of surprised each other. I

guess neither of us expected the other one to be on the cam-

pus that time of night, so we both sort of jumped when we

saw each other. I could feel the adrenalin jack up my body. I

don’t think I really had time to be nervous, I just kind of went

on automatic and the whole thing had a kind of unreal aspect

to it, you know what I mean? – like it was me doing it, but it

wasn’t me. After I found the gun and called on the radio,

that’s when it hit me I could’ve been killed. Then, shit, sud-

denly I’m shaking like a little girl; it was embarrassing. But I

pulled it together before the other guys got there.

Finally, the officer should be provided with information

and support regarding any disturbing reactions that he may

be having at the scene. It should be remembered that the

goal of on-scene psychological intervention is not to con-

duct psychotherapy: that may or may not come later. Rather,

the immediate goal is to allow the officer to loosen up just

enough to be able to assess his mental status, but be able to

use temporary mental strengthening techniques (Miller, 2006)

246 Miller • Officer Involved Shooting

to help him “keep it together” until the immediate crisis is

resolved:

Psychologist: Hey, man, you’re just following the text-

book. Any time somebody’s in an emergency or crisis mode,

nature puts the nervous system on autopilot so we can con-

centrate of what we need to do to get the job done and live

through the experience. It’s like the adrenalin acts like mental

Novocain to numb you out just enough to survive and let

your survival instinct and training kick in. Then, after this

“Novocain” wears off, you feel all the emotions as a delayed

reaction. So, from what you’ve told me, there’s nothing un-

usual about your response. It’s not my ultimate judgment

call to make, but from how you described it, it sounds like

you did what you had to do.

As noted above, one reason for an accurate assessment

of the officer’s mental status at the scene is for the determina-

tion of mental fitness to make a statement to authorities, which

may be very important for subsequent legal aspects of the

case. Although in my experience this is rare, some officers

may be sufficiently confused, disoriented, emotionally vul-

nerable, and cognitively suggestible to be legally incompe-

tent to understand their legal rights and/or to make a statement

to authorities at the scene – a kind of “temporary insanity”

caused by extreme traumatic stress. In such cases, the psy-

chologist may recommend that investigators wait until the

officer has had a chance to recover some measure of psycho-

logical equilibrium, which may require only a few minutes to

calm down or some basic reassuring intervention at the scene,

or, in the extreme case, may necessitate removal to a safe

facility for further evaluation and treatment.

Psychologists who make the recommendation to post-

pone the on-scene investigation can expect flak from investi-

gators who want to get on with the process, as well as

sometimes from the on-scene departmental attorney, although

the latter will typically support any recommendation that will

prevent unnecessary self-incrimination of the officer. A re-

lated issue is confidentiality. Technically, anything said in

confidence to a licensed mental health clinician is protected

by doctor-patient confidentiality. But this is not as strong as

attorney-client privilege, and, in extremely politically sensi-

tive cases, psychologists’ records and/or testimony may be

subpoenaed if one side or the other is being particularly ag-

gressive in pressing their case. In such circumstances, it is

important to remember that, from a psychological point of

view, the exact details of what happened in the incident are

less important than the officer’s psychological reaction, and

that psychologist’s job as an on-scene mental health profes-

sional is not necessarily to record all the minutiae of the

officer’s recollection or judge the merits of his actions, but to

assess how the incident is affecting his mental status at the

scene.

Following my on-scene evaluation and while still at the

site, I will usually make a recommendation for at least one

follow-up evaluation at my office, scheduled several days

post-incident. This gives the officer a few days to calm down

and loosen up, and allows me to get a better perspective on

how he or she is coping psychologically after the initial shock

of the incident has worn off. This also serves as an informal

fitness-for-duty (FFD) evaluation in a nonconfrontational

setting; additionally, such an FFD evaluation may be for-

mally mandated by some departments as a precondition to

the officer returning to work (Rostow & Davis, 2004). At

follow-up, if the officer is assessed to be experiencing no

unusual signs or symptoms (some degree of residual dis-

tress is normal for a few days or weeks), release to full duty is

usually recommended. Otherwise, a range of recommenda-

tions may be made, such as additional time off with or with-

out subsequent follow-up psychotherapy. Again, police

psychologists should always consult with their departments

regarding protocols for such incidents – ideally, they should

be involved in developing those protocols.

Psychological Management of Officer-

Involved Shootings

Following the original shooting incident and the follow-

up session, some officers may request additional sessions

with the psychologist “to get my head straight about this.”

In other cases, a supervisor may recommend this or may

order it. In still other cases, there may not have been any on-

scene intervention at all, and the follow-up consultation is

the first contact between the officer and the psychologist.

As with any critical incident, it is important that each depart-

ment have in place a system for smooth and nonstigmatized

referral of officers for mental health counseling when they

need it (Miller, 2006).

Principles and Guidelines of Post-Shooting Inter-

vention

A number of authors (Horn, 1991; McMains, 1986a, 1991;

Wittrup, 1986; Zeling, 1986) have developed a set of recom-

mendations for implementing psychological services follow-

IJEMH • Vol. 8, No. 4 • 2006 247

ing an OIS. Thse have been summarized and adapted here.

The reader will note that most of these are, in fact, specialized

and individualized applications of the general principles of

law enforcement critical incident intervention (Miller, 1998,

1999a, 2000, 2006).

The intervention should begin as soon after the shoot-

ing incident as possible, indeed, as noted above, on-scene.

In some cases, an officer’s obvious distress at the scene or

shortly thereafter creates the need for an immediate interven-

tion. In other cases, distress may be suppressed or con-

cealed for hours, days, or weeks, so intervention must await

the time that problems in coping become apparent. In such

cases, intervention should not be rushed, but should be

started as quickly as possible when the need surfaces. In

any event, a departmental policy should be developed that

gives priority to these referrals so that, at a minimum, an

officer can be seen within 24 hours of a request.

McMains (1986a, 1991) believes that the intervention

should occur as close to the time of the shooting as possible

in order to minimize the sensitization to any possible trauma.

This, of course, is the essence of on-scene intervention.

However, I believe that clinical judgment should prevail on a

case-by-case basis, and that in some cases, as just noted

above, the best thing that can be done is to remove the of-

ficer from the scene to prevent heightened sensitization and

continual retraumatization. This is especially true where the

officer’s on-scene distress clearly continues to grow with

each passing minute spent at the site.

Nevertheless, to provide for the most efficient and effec-

tive use of time and resources, subsequent intervention

should be undertaken at a location that the officer finds safe

and nonthreatening, usually an office away from the depart-

ment. Depending on the officer’s shift schedule, a regular

time should be established for the sessions.

Intervention should be short-term and focused on sup-

porting officers through the crisis, as well as returning them

to active duty as soon as possible. The range of issues to be

covered will be determined on a case-by-case basis, depend-

ing on how the incident has affected the officer, his family,

colleagues, and others. But the general guideline is that

post-shooting psychological intervention should be focused

on resolving the critical incident in question.

Clinically, the psychologist should remember that his or

her role in these treatment settings is as therapist and sup-

portive advocate, not investigator or judge. What the psy-

chologist is advocating for is the officer’s mental health and

stability, not any particular side of the case. Accordingly, a

realistically positive atmosphere should prevail during the

course of the intervention. Absent clear evidence to the

contrary, the assumption should be that the officer acted

properly, can successfully manage the current crisis with a

little help, and will soon return to active status. Indeed, dur-

ing particularly contentious investigations, the

psychologist’s office may be the only place the officer does

not feel like a hounded criminal.

Administratively, confidentiality should be respected and

protected by the department, and the only information from

psychological counseling available to outside authorities

should be the psychologist’s written summaries of case sta-

tus, fitness-for-duty, and other administratively-relevant data.

Indeed, to have any credible program of psychological ser-

vices, officers must feel secure that, except insofar as they

relate to a specific departmental referral question, personally

sensitive information, thoughts, and feelings do not leave

the psychologist’s office (Miller, 1995, 1999b, 2000, 2003b,

2006).

Even if the department strives to scrupulously respect

doctor-patient confidentiality, others may not be so accom-

modating. For example, relatives of shooting victims who

bring civil rights violation charges against the officer or file

lawsuits against the department or municipality may try to

subpoena psychological records or testimony to use in their

case. Accordingly, Wittrup (1986) recommends that police

psychologists receive from the jurisdiction a formal, written

statement of referral, along with a save from prosecution

and/or civil litigation document, so that they are relatively

insulated from such assaults on confidentiality. Again, psy-

chologists should be aware of the laws, rules, and regula-

tions of their respective localities.

Post-Shooting Psychotherapeutic Strategies

On initial contact with the officer, the psychologist’s

role may replicate the basic intervention stages of a critical

incident stress debriefing model (Bohl, 1995; Miller, 1999a,

2000; Mitchell & Everly, 1996), applied, in this case, on an

individual level.

First, the facts of the case should be reviewed with the

officer. Similar to the fact phase of a debriefing, this allows

for a relatively nonemotional narrative of the traumatic event.

But in the case of an OIS, it serves a further function. Pre-

248 Miller • Officer Involved Shooting

cisely because of the cognitive and perceptual distortions

that commonly occur in these kinds of incidents, what may

be particularly disturbing to the officer is the lack of clarity in

his own mind as to the actual nature and sequence of events.

Just being able to review what is known about the facts of

the case in a relatively safe and nonadversarial environment

may provide a needed dose of mental clarity and sanity to the

situation. In fact, Solomon (1991, 1995) describes one such

format for this process as going over the incident “frame by

frame,” allowing the officer to verbalize the moment-to-mo-

ment thoughts, perceptions, sensory details, feelings, and

actions that occurred during the critical incident. This format

helps the officer become aware of, sort out, and understand

what happened.

Next, the officer’s thoughts and feelings about the shoot-

ing incident should be reviewed. This resembles the thought

and reaction phases of a debriefing, but may not be as cut-

and-dried as with a typical group debriefing. It should be

remembered that an OIS represents a special kind of critical

incident and it may take more than one attempt for the officer

to productively untangle and reveal what’s going on in his

mind. He should be given extra time or extra sessions to

express his thoughts and feelings, and his reaction should

be monitored so as not to encourage unproductive spewing

or loss of control. One of the most important things the

psychologist can do at this stage is to help modulate emo-

tional expression so that it comes as a relief, not as an added

burden.

The officer should be provided with authoritative and

factual information about psychological reactions to a shoot-

ing incident. The kinds of cognitive and perceptual distor-

tions that take place during an OIS, the posttraumatic

symptoms and disturbances, and the sometimes offputting

and distressing reactions of colleagues and family members,

are likely to be quite alien to the officer’s ordinary experience,

and might be interpreted by him or her as signs of going soft

or crazy. The clinician should attempt to normalize these

responses for the officer, taking a somewhat more personal

and individualistic approach than might be found in the typi-

cal group debriefing’s information-education phase. Often,

just this kind of authoritative reassurance from a credible

mental health professional can mitigate the officer’s anxiety

considerably.

Finally, follow-up services, which may include additional

individual sessions, family therapy, referral to support ser-

vices, possible medication referral, and so on, should be pro-

vided for the officer. As with most cases of critical incident

psychological intervention, follow-up psychotherapy for OISs

tends to be short-term, although additional services may be

sought later for other problems partially related or unrelated

to the incident. Indeed, any kind critical incident may often

be the stimulus to explore other troublesome aspects of an

officer’s life and the success in resolving the incident with

the psychologist may give the officer confidence to pursue

these other issues in an atmosphere of trust (Blau, 1994;

Miller, 1998, 2006).

Peer Support Programs

To augment or supplement professional mental health

services, an increasing number of police departments have

instituted peer support programs for the psychological af-

termath of OISs and other critical incidents.

Rationale of Peer Support

Some general assumptions underlie the use of peers as

counselors (Klein, 1991; Levenson & Dwyer, 2003; McMains,

1991). First, it is assumed that fellow police officers will have

more credibility than mental health professionals because

the former have “been there” and “know the job.” There may

well be legitimate situations where an officer may feel more

comfortable with a fellow officer; however, in my experience

(Miller, 2006), this has not been an issue, and I have not yet

had an officer refuse to see me (that I know of), or hold back

on self-disclosure (as far as I can discern), because I’m not a

sworn officer. In fact, the opposite seems to be true. Many

officers have commented that they are relieved to talk to

someone outside the departmental fishbowl and outside of

law enforcement generally. They already know, or think they

know, the predictable response they’re going to get from

their brass and colleagues, and they’re looking for a fresh

perspective. Additionally, talking to a nonofficer removes

the “competition factor” – that is, no matter how sympathetic

a fellow officer may be, the officer in crisis may still fear ap-

pearing weak or ineffectual before one of his own by reveal-

ing too much about his reactions to the critical incident.

I’ve gotten some feedback from colleagues who are both

licensed mental health professionals and sworn active or re-

tired officers, and even they have experienced a reluctance of

officers to open up because the officer-therapist “is still a

cop at heart.” Other officers have commented that officer-

therapists sometimes take a presumptive attitude that “be-

IJEMH • Vol. 8, No. 4 • 2006 249

cause I am/was an officer, I know what you’re going through,”

even before letting the officer in crisis fully express himself.

Remember, an officer after an OIS is often in a prickly hyper-

sensitive state of “no-you-don’t-friggin-know-what-I’m go-

ing-through,” and may resent even well-meaning expressions

of commiseration by peers. In such cases, a civilian psy-

chologist may actually be a more sympathetic and receptive

audience because he or she doesn’t pretend to know it all

and humbly understands that there is something to learn

from the officer’s experience.

On the other hand, some officers may simply be too

creeped-out by the thought of seeing a “real shrink” to avail

themselves of formal psychological services. Or they may

have had unpleasant experiences with mental health profes-

sionals in the past, either within or outside the context of

their law enforcement careers (Max, 2000). Many officers

just feel more comfortable talking with fellow cops. In par-

ticular, some of the old-timers, who began their careers be-

fore the modern therapy-culture era, may be more used to the

command structure model of discussing problems with a se-

nior officer. And, just because I personally have experienced

little difficulty with officers’ willingness to see me, I’ll never

know how many officers silently declined to make the call

because they felt that I just wouldn’t understand where

they’re coming from, or were just too put off by the prospect

of seeing a mental health practitioner of any kind. Still an-

other consideration concerns the demographics of the law

enforcement community I serve, which may be somewhat

more receptive to mental health services than police depart-

ments in other parts of the country.

For these reasons, I do encourage the development of

law enforcement peer support programs, not because profes-

sional psychologists are necessarily less effective at helping

cops, but because there will be times when another cop is the

best resource, or at least the best initial point of contact, for

an officer in distress. In fact, a fair number of referrals to my

office have come from officers who know me and have en-

couraged other, more skittish cops to “at least give the guy a

shot.” One further advantage of using officer peers as coun-

selors relates to basic bullshit-detection. In a few cases,

some officers, especially if they are under investigation for a

suspicious shooting, may actually prefer talking to a civilian

psychologist precisely because they feel they can do a snow

job on the unsuspecting softie. This kind of dissimulation

may be less successful with a fellow officer peer-counselor

who knows the ropes.

Another assumption of peer counseling is that police

officers don’t usually require extensive mental health ser-

vices because they are a select sample of professionals, at

least somewhat more mentally stable than the general popu-

lation by virtue of their initial screening and training (Klein,

1991; McMains, 1991; Miller, 2003a, 2004). Critical incident

stress responses, including those resulting from officer-in-

volved shootings, are seen as normal reactions to an abnor-

mal situation by relatively normal people, and the goal of

peer counseling is to restore officers’ original psychological

equilibrium, not make fundamental changes in their person-

alities. This, of course, is consistent with the whole philoso-

phy of critical incident intervention (Blau, 1994; Bohl, 1995;

Miller, 1998, 1999a, 2000, Mitchell & Everly, 1996).

Structure of Peer Support Programs

Peer counseling teams almost always consist of volun-

teers who have a good performance history with the depart-

ment, and who have gone through some form of formal

training and certification program, which includes a basic

understanding of psychological stress syndromes; basic cri-

sis intervention and counseling skills; understanding spe-

cial problems encountered with officer-involved shootings

and other critical incidents; and knowing when and how to

refer for professional mental health services when necessary.

In this regard, departments that institute peer counseling

programs should be sure to make professional psychological

backup help available if further treatment is indicated.

Always important is the issue of confidentiality. Offic-

ers may fear unwarranted disclosure, especially with counse-

lors who are peers and not licensed professionals. This issue

cannot be overemphasized because the success of a peer

support programs will stand or fall based on the confidence

officers have in the peer counselors’ discretion and compe-

tence. Again, this fear of the fishbowl and rumor mill is one of

the reasons officers may actually prefer to talk to an outside

clinician. More practically, what happens if the peer-coun-

seled officer admits that he was intoxicated during the shoot-

ing, or expresses a clear racist bias that may have contributed

to his decision to use deadly force? What does the peer

counselor do then? These issues must be carefully worked

out in advance for a peer counselor system to work.

The basic elements of peer counseling are not very dif-

ferent from professional clinical intervention in relatively

noncomplex cases, and include active listening skills; allow-

ing the officer to ventilate and tell his story in a supportive,

250 Miller • Officer Involved Shooting

nonjudgmental atmosphere; provision of reassurance and making any unauthorized statements to the media.”

accurate information about stress syndromes; recommenda-

tion of strategies for handling symptoms and dealing with

other people during the investigation and recovery process;

and referral for professional mental health services, if neces-

sary (Blau, 1994; Klein, 1991).

Model Post-Shooting Intervention Programs

Elsewhere (Miller, 2006), I have reviewed in detail sev-

eral post-shooting intervention programs from around the

country (Antonovsky & Bernstein, 1986; Milgram & Hobfoll,

1986; Solomon & Mastin, 1999; Somodevilla, 1986) that illus-

trate the basic elements of peer support and professional

intervention for OISs. Here I will summarize the key elements

that such successful programs share in common. This model

can be used as a template by police psychologists and the

law enforcement agencies they serve to design, modify, or

adapt their own post-shooting programs and protocols to

the needs of their individual agencies.

Reasonable respect and compassion: “We hear what

you’re going through”.

Departmental reassurance and validation: “We may

not have all the facts yet, but the leadership is behind you.”

Information flow: “Within the limits of departmental

policies and procedures, we’ll do everything we can to keep

you in the loop.”

Removal from the scene: “Let’s go sit in my patrol unit

and go over what happened.”

Replacement firearm: “Here’s a temporary issue till the

investigation is complete.”

Access to an attorney: “The departmental attorney is on

her way to the scene. For later on, here’s how to contact your

PBA rep.

Family welfare: “We’re going to call your family and let

them know you’re all right, and that you may have to stay

past your shift till we’re finished here.”

Shooting folder: “This is a private file, separate from

your regular jacket, kept by the Captain, so we can accurately

collate the facts relevant to this case and communicate only

with those on a need-to-know basis.”

Handling media: “Our departmental spokesperson will

be running interference for you during this process and we

appreciate your cooperation in honoring our policy of not

Administrative leave: “Please understand that this is

not a disciplinary suspension, but that this kind of adminis-

trative leave is part of our departmental policy, both for your

own welfare and to give us time to complete our investiga-

tion.”

Psychological services: “Please feel free to access our

departmental psychologist or any other qualified mental

health professional you choose. This is not a requirement or

a fitness-for-duty exam, but is for your own well-being and is

confidential.”

Peer support: “Would you like to talk to Tony? He’s a

fellow officer who’s been through some critical incidents him-

self; he knows the drill.”

Support from the wider law enforcement community and

concerned citizens: “Hey, we’re getting calls from the depu-

ties over in the next county asking how you’re doing. And

some of the church members on the block where you took

down that crack house have written a nice letter of commen-

dation to the Chief.

Reinforcement of professional competence: “We’re not

pulling you totally out of service, officer. If you’re up to it we

still need your help, so for now you’re reassigned to commu-

nications.”

Opportunity to learn and grow: “We’re gonna make

some good out of this by learning how to keep our officers

safer.”

Overall, successful post-shooting programs share the

important common elements of: (1) flexible access to peer

counselors and/or mental health professionals; (2) mainte-

nance of an attitude of respect for involved officers, backed

up by appropriate actions; and (3) unequivocal support and

encouragement of the peer support program from top levels

of the department or agency.

CONCLUSIONS

Officer-involved shootings (OISs) need not be the most

traumatic critical incidents in policing, but when they are, the

reasons are usually due to a mix of incident characteristics,

officer response styles, and departmental handling. By pro-

viding immediate administrative, legal, psychological, and

peer support services to officers in need, investigators typi-

cally find their jobs easier. Even in the unfortunate case of a

“rogue cop” being found to have negligently or deliberately

IJEMH • Vol. 8, No. 4 • 2006 251

used excessive force, how a department deals with its worst

will be watched very carefully by officers who want to infer

what will happen to the rest among them if they ever have to

fire their weapon in order to discharge their duty to protect.

In the entire process of managing an OIS, police psycholo-

gists have a vital and indispensable role to play.

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