failed to remove debris that clogged the detention
basin and made a deliberate choice to cut trees and
leave them in the vicinity of the detention basin
whereby the tree logs could float into and block the
egress pipe, causing the stream to flood onto the
property. In addition, unlike Pluhowsky, it is unclear
how the logs, branches, tree trunks, and/or debris
made their way to the egress pipe in the Frary
detention basin. Therefore, on the basis of the evidence
submitted by the plaintiffs, there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Meriden participated in the
creation of a nuisance by way of its positive act in
cutting down trees in the Frary detention basin and
leaving the cut tree trunks, logs, branches, and debris
to float in the basin, block and/or clog a pipe, which
resulted in the stream overflowing and flooding the
property.”
• DeMarco v. City of Middletown, Superior Court, Judicial
District of Middlesex, No. MMXCV116006185S (April 3,
2014) (58 Conn. L. Rptr. 4) (2014 WL 1721935). “The
defendant attempts to argue that the holding in Spitzer
does not extend to the type of sewage system involved
here by citing to Rouleau v. Suffield, Superior Court,
judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–06–
5007179–S (January 16, 2013, Sheriden, J.) [55 Conn.
L. Rptr. 372]. The factual situation in Rouleau involved
flooding resulting from rising water levels in Stony
Brook on the upstream side of a concrete structure
because the culvert openings were blocked by water-
borne debris. The plaintiffs alleged negligence in the
design, construction and maintenance of a structure
intended to span and provide passage by vehicles and
pedestrians over an existing stream or watercourse. As
seen from the facts of Rouleau, the court did not face
the issue of governmental immunity in the context of
the type of sewage system that is involved here in this
present matter.” (Footnote 2.)
“The defendant also argues that because of one
particular allegation in the plaintiff’s complaint, the acts
are discretionary. The defendant argues that ‘the
actions of the City in inspecting, fixing, and advising
the plaintiffs about the sewage system were
discretionary acts for which, pursuant to § 52–
557n(a)(2)(B), governmental immunity applies.′ In
support, the defendant cites to cases that have set
forth the broad principle that the exercise of duties
involving inspection are generally considered
discretionary acts entitled to governmental immunity.
Although true, it is worth noting, however, that these
cases are not in the context of sewer systems, and the
principle to which the defendant alludes is a principle of