NATIONAL STRATEGY TO ADVANCE
PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA
SHARING AND ANALYTICS
A Report by the
FAST-TRACK ACTION COMMITTEE ON ADVANCING
PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA SHARING AND ANALYTICS
NETWORKING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL
March 2023
About the Office of Science and Technology Policy
The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was established by the National Science and Technology Policy,
Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 to provide the President and others within the Executive Office of the President
with advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of the economy, national security, health, foreign
relations, the environment, and the technological recovery and use of resources, among other topics. OSTP leads
interagency science and technology policy coordination efforts, assists the Office of Management and Budget with an
annual review and analysis of Federal research and development budgets and serves as a source of scientific and
technological analysis and judgment for the President concerning major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal
Government. More information is available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp
.
About the National Science and Technology Council
The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) is the principal means by which the Executive Branch coordinates
science and technology policy across the diverse entities that make up the Federal research and development enterprise.
A primary objective of the NSTC is to ensure science and technology policy decisions and programs are consistent with
the President's stated goals. The NSTC prepares research and development strategies coordinated across Federal
agencies to accomplish multiple national goals. The work of the NSTC is organized under committees that oversee
subcommittees and working groups focused on different aspects of science and technology. More information is
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/nstc
.
About the Subcommittee on Networking & Information Technology Research & Development
The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program has been the Nation's primary
source of federally funded work on pioneering information technologies (IT) in computing, networking, and software
since it was first established as the High-Performance Computing and Communications program following passage of the
High-Performance Computing Act of 1991. The NITRD Subcommittee of the NSTC guides the multiagency NITRD Program
in its work to provide the research and development foundations for ensuring continued U.S. technological leadership
and for meeting the Nation's needs for advanced IT. The National Coordination Office (NCO) supports the NITRD
Subcommittee and its Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) (https://www.nitrd.gov/about/).
About the Fast-Track Action Committee on Advancing Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and
Analytics
The Fast-Track Action Committee on Advancing Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics is a multi-agency venue for
building a whole-of-government approach, from research and development to pilot projects and adoption, to advance
privacy-preserving data sharing and analytics technologies that enable collective data sharing and analysis while
maintaining disassociability and confidentiality.
About This Document
This National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics is a cohesive national strategy to
advance the research, development, and adoption of privacy-preserving data sharing and analytics technologies. A list of
acronyms and abbreviations used in the document is included as a reference in Appendix A.
Copyright
This document is a work of the United States Government and is in the public domain (see 17 U.S.C. §105). As a courtesy,
we ask that copies and distributions include an
acknowledgment to OSTP. Published in the United States of America,
2023.
Note: Any mention in the text of commercial, non-profit, academic partners, or their products, or references is for
information only; it is not intended to imply endorsement or recommendation by any U.S. Government agency.
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
i
NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL
Chair
Arati Prabhakar, Director, Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP), Assistant to
the President for Science and Technology
Acting Executive Director
Kei Koizumi, Principal Deputy Director for
Policy, OSTP
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NETWORKING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (NITRD)
Co-Chair Co-Chair
Margaret Martonosi, Assistant
Director for Computer and
Information Science and
Engineering, National Science
Foundation (NSF)
Kathleen (Kamie) Roberts, NITRD
National Coordination Office (NCO)
Executive Secretary
Nekeia Butler, NITRD NCO
FAST-TRACK ACTION COMMITTEE (FTAC) ON ADVANCING PRIVACY-
PRESERVING DATA SHARING AND ANALYTICS
Co-Chairs
Tess DeBlanc-Knowles,
Senior Policy Advisor
for Artificial
Intelligence, OSTP
James Joshi, Program
Director, Computer
and Information
Science and
Engineering, NSF
Naomi Lefkovitz, Senior
Privacy Policy Advisor,
National Institute of
Standards and
Technology (NIST)
Katelyn McCall-Kiley,
Program Director, xD,
U.S. Census Bureau
Technical Coordinator
Tomas Vagoun, NITRD NCO
Writing Team Members
Tess DeBlanc-Knowles, OSTP
Dylan Gilbert, NIST
James Joshi, NSF
Naomi Lefkovitz, NIST
Aaron Mannes, DHS
Katelyn McCall-Kiley, Census Bureau
Angela Robinson, NIST
Lisa Wolfisch, GSA
FTAC Members
Gil Alterovitz, VA
Lindsey Barrett, NTIA
Tim Bond, DARPA
Rafael Fricks, VA
Simson Garfinkel, DHS
Elena Ghanaim, NIH
Karyn Gorman, DOT
Michael Hawes, Census
Bureau
Jeri Hessman, NITRD NCO
Kevin Herms, ED
Wu He, NSF
Brian Ince, ODNI
Luke Keller, Census Bureau
Brian Lee, CDC
Steven Lee, DOE
Nicholas Mancini, DOS
Kathryn Marchesini, HHS
Mark Przybocki, NIST
Andrew Regenscheid, NIST
Scott Sellars, DOS
Heidi Sofia, NIH
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
ii
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................... 3
Applications of PPDSA Technologies........................................................................................................................... 4
Privacy Risks and Harms in the Context of PPDSA....................................................................................................... 6
The Need for a National Strategy ............................................................................................................................... 7
1: Vision and Guiding Principles ............................................................................................................................. 8
Vision ......................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Guiding Principles ....................................................................................................................................................... 8
Participants in the PPDSA Ecosystem ....................................................................................................................... 11
2: Current State ................................................................................................................................................... 12
Legal and Regulatory Environment ........................................................................................................................... 12
Key Challenges ......................................................................................................................................................... 13
Overview of PPDSA Capabilities ............................................................................................................................... 15
3: Strategic Priorities and Recommended Actions ............................................................................................... 20
Strategic Priority 1: Advance Governance and Responsible Adoption ....................................................................... 20
Recommendation 1.a. Establish a steering group to support PPDSA guiding principles and strategic priorities ....... 20
Recommendation 1.b. Clarify the use of PPDSA technologies within the statutory and regulatory
environments .............................................................................................................................................................. 20
Recommendation 1.c. Develop capabilities and procedures to mitigate privacy incidents ........................................ 21
Strategic Priority 2: Elevate and Promote Foundational and Use-inspired Research ................................................. 21
Recommendation 2.a. Develop a holistic scientific understanding of privacy threats, attacks, and harms ............... 22
Recommendation 2.b. Invest in foundational and use-inspired R&D for PPDSA technologies ................................... 22
Recommendation 2.c. Expand and promote interdisciplinary R&D at the intersection of science, technology,
policy, and law ............................................................................................................................................................. 24
Strategic Priority 3: Accelerate Translation to Practice ............................................................................................. 26
Recommendation 3.a. Promote applied and translational research and systems development ............................... 26
Recommendation 3.b. Pilot implementation activities within the Federal Government ........................................... 26
Recommendation 3.c. Establish technical standards for PPDSA technologies............................................................ 27
Recommendation 3.d. Accelerate efforts to develop standardized taxonomies, tool repositories,
measurement methods, benchmarking, and testbeds ............................................................................................... 28
Recommendation 3.e. Improve usability and inclusiveness of PPDSA solutions ........................................................ 29
Strategic Priority 4: Build Expertise and Promote Training and Education ................................................................ 30
Recommendation 4.a. Expand institutional expertise in PPDSA technologies ............................................................ 30
Recommendation 4.b. Educate and train participants on the appropriate use and deployment of PPDSA
technologies ................................................................................................................................................................ 31
Recommendation 4.c. Expand privacy curricula in academia ..................................................................................... 31
Strategic Priority 5: Foster International Collaboration on PPDSA ............................................................................ 32
Recommendation 5.a. Foster bilateral and multilateral engagements related to a PPDSA ecosystem ...................... 32
Recommendation 5.b. Explore the role of PPDSA technologies to enable cross-border collaboration ...................... 33
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................... 35
Appendix A: Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................................................... 36
Endnotes.............................................................................................................................................................. 37
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
1
Executive Summary
Data are vital resources for solving societys biggest problems. Today, significant amounts of data are
accumulated every dayfueled by widespread data generation methods, new data collection
technologies, faster means of communication, and more accessible cloud storage. Advances in
computing have significantly reduced the cost of data analytics and artificial intelligence, making it even
easier to use this data to derive valuable insights and enable new possibilities. However, this potential is
often limited by legal, policy, technical, socioeconomic, and ethical challenges involved in sharing and
analyzing sensitive information. These opportunities can only be fully realized if strong safeguards that
protect privacy
1
a fundamental right in democratic societiesunderpin data sharing and analytics.
Privacy-preserving data sharing and analytics (PPDSA) methods and technologies can unlock the
beneficial power of data analysis while protecting privacy. PPDSA solutions include methodological,
technical, and sociotechnical approaches that employ privacy-enhancing technologies to derive value
from, and enable an analysis of, data to drive innovation while also providing privacy and security.
However, adoption of PPDSA technologies has been slow because of challenges related to inadequate
understanding of privacy risks and harms, limited access to technical expertise, trust, transparency
among participants with regard to data collection and use,
2
uncertainty about legal compliance, financial
cost, and the usability and technical maturity of solutions.
3
PPDSA technologies have enormous potential, but their benefit is tied to how they are developed and
used. Existing confidentiality and privacy laws and policies provide important protections to individuals
and communities, and attention is needed to determine how to uphold these protections through the
use of PPDSA technologies and maintain commitments to equity, transparency, and accountability.
Consideration of how individuals may control the collection, linking, and use of their data should also
factor into the design and use of PPDSA technologies.
Recognizing the untapped potential of PPDSA technologies, the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) initiated a national effort to advance PPDSA technologies.
This National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics (Strategy) lays out a
path to advance PPDSA technologies to maximize their benefits in an equitable manner, promote trust,
and mitigate risks. This Strategy takes great care to incorporate socioeconomic and technological
contexts that are vital to responsible use of PPDSA technologies, including their impact on equity,
fairness, and biasand how they might introduce privacy harms, especially to disadvantaged groups.
This Strategy first sets out a vision for a future data ecosystem that incorporates PPDSA approaches:
Privacy-preserving data sharing and analytics technologies help advance the well-being and
prosperity of individuals and society, and promote science and innovation in a manner that
affirms democratic values.
This Strategy then lays out the following foundational guiding principles to achieve this vision:
PPDSA technologies will be created and used in ways that protect privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties.
PPDSA technologies will be created and used in a manner that stimulates responsible scientific
research and innovation, and enables individuals and society to benefit equitably from the value
derived from data sharing and analytics.
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
2
PPDSA technologies will be trustworthy, and will be created and used in a manner that upholds
accountability.
PPDSA technologies will be created and used to minimize the risk of harm to individuals and
society arising from data sharing and analytics, with explicit consideration of impacts on
underserved, marginalized, and vulnerable communities.
Based on the guiding principles, this Strategy identifies the following strategic priorities for the public
and private sectors to progress toward the vision of a future data ecosystem that effectively
incorporates PPDSA technologies:
Advance governance and responsible adoption through the establishment of a multi-partner
steering group to help develop and maintain a healthy PPDSA ecosystem, greater clarity on the
use of PPDSA technologies within the statutory and regulatory environments, and proactive risk
mitigation measures.
Elevate and promote foundational and use-inspired research through investments in
multidisciplinary research that will advance practical deployment of PPDSA approach and
exploratory research to develop the next generation of PPDSA technologies.
Accelerate translation to practice through pilot implementations, development of consensus
technical standards, and creation of user-focused tools, decision aids, and testbeds.
Build expertise and promote training and education through concerted efforts to expand
PPDSA expertise across the public and private sector and foster privacy education opportunities
from K-12 through higher education, with particular attention to capacity building in
underserved communities.
Foster international collaboration on PPDSA through promotion of partnerships and an
international policy environment that furthers the development and adoption of PPDSA
technologies and supports common values while protecting national and economic security.
PPDSA technologies have the potential to catalyze American innovation and creativity by facilitating
data sharing and analytics while protecting sensitive information and individualsprivacy. Leveraging
data at scale holds the power to drive transformative innovation to address climate change, financial
crime, public health, human trafficking, social equity, and other challenges, yet it also holds the potential
to violate privacy and undercut the fundamental rights of individuals and communities. PPDSA
technologies, coupled with strong governance, can play a critical role in protecting democratic values
and mitigating privacy risks and harms while enabling data sharing and analytics that will contribute to
improvements in the quality of life of the American people. This Strategy serves as a roadmap for both
the public and private sectors to responsibly harness the potential of PPDSA technologies and move
together toward the vision that anchors this Strategy.
OSTP, in partnership with the National Economic Council, will focus and coordinate Federal activities to
advance the priorities put forward in this Strategy.
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
3
Introduction
Data drive scientific and technological breakthroughs, underpin policymaking, and power the global
economy. Clinicians use data to identify the best treatments for their patients, farmers use data to
predict and improve farm yields, researchers use data to generate new knowledge about natural and
social phenomena, and public servants use data to create evidence-based policies. Artificial Intelligence
(AI) and other emerging analytics techniques are amplifying the power of data, making it easier to
discover new patterns and insights ranging from better prediction models to understand and mitigate
the impacts of climate change to new methods for detecting financial crime.
Although data enable science, innovation, and insights, balancing the benefits of these data-derived
insights with the imperatives of privacy, security, and other values is a longstanding challenge. For
example, when developing new treatment options, medical researchers may benefit from broad access
to electronic health records. However, those records may contain personal health information related to
individual patients, compromising the privacy and safety of those patients as well as rights under health
privacy laws and regulations on the protection of human subjects. Similarly, when researchers access
authorized data without safeguards on how they access the data, privacy-sensitive information such as
their location or the specific type of information they are accessing may be revealed. In many domains,
collaborations that could improve AI model training and accelerate progress must be balanced with
ethical and legal privacy concerns and intellectual property protection concerns.
Over several decades, privacy researchers, including
statisticians and cryptographers, have been adapting
various anonymization, statistical disclosure
limitation, and private computation techniques to
address privacy or confidentiality needs. As demands
for granular data grow and as the amount of publicly
available data on individuals has proliferated, so have
the challenges to protecting against re-identification
and record-linkage risks in protected datasets or
membership inference attacks on analytical models
built on sensitive data. New solutions to address these
threats are increasingly needed.
Privacy-preserving data sharing and analytics (PPDSA)
solutions include technical and sociotechnical
approaches that employ certain types of privacy-
enhancing technologies (PETs) to generate value from
and enable analytics on data while protecting privacy
and security. Some PPDSA approaches allow users
(e.g., researchers and physicians) to gain insights from
sensitive data without exposing the original data itself
or allow them to access shared data without being
tracked or identified. Other PPDSA approaches enable
data sharing by obscuring personal data or making
synthetic reflections of the original data that preserve the properties of interest in the data while
protecting individual privacy.
What is meant by data?
For the purposes of this strategy, data are
elements or values that convey
information. Data can range from abstract
concepts to physical measurements. They
exist in a wide variety of types (e.g., text,
image, audio, video) and contexts (e.g.,
location, time), including digital and non-
digital forms. Data can vary in complexity
from basic representations of information
and graphs to multimodal, including those
generated by complex human-computer
interactions. Data that convey information
about other data are known as metadata.
Data may represent aggregate
information or derived data. Numerous
data operations, including those involving
metadata, can have privacy implications
for individuals and groups. Examples
include data collection, access, analysis,
sharing, transmission, and retention.
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
4
PPDSA technologies can unlock new forms of collaboration and new norms in the responsible use of
personal data. By enabling the use of more comprehensive and diverse datasets, PPDSA technologies
can help the global community tackle shared challenges and drive solutions in areas such as healthcare,
climate change, financial crime, human trafficking, and pandemic response and achieve more equitable
outcomes for underserved, marginalized, and vulnerable populations.
The Fast-Track Action Committee (FTAC) on Advancing Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
was chartered under the National Science and Technology Council’s (NSTC)
4
Networking and
Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD)
5
Subcommittee in January 2022 to develop
this National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics (Strategy) to advance
the research, development, and adoption of PPDSA
technologies.
6
This Strategy intends to chart a path
forward for the Nation to steward responsible and
accountable development and adoption of these
transformative technologies.
Applications of PPDSA Technologies
Deployments of PPDSA technologies have begun to
show promising results. For example, the Boston
Women's Workforce Council initiated a study of the
Boston-area gender wage gap to assess the compliance
of Boston-area employers with the Equal Pay Act.
7
A
PPDSA technique, secure multiparty computation, was
used to enable the joint analysis of sensitive salary
data across Boston-area employers without disclosing
those data to any party external to the employer. The
2020 U.S. Census used differential privacy, another
PPDSA technique, to publish aggregate statistical data
while protecting the privacy of individuals.
8
In another
example, researchers at the University of Pennsylvania
collaborated with nine other institutions using the
PPDSA technique of federated learning to develop a
machine learning (ML) model to analyze magnetic resonance imaging scans of brain tumor patients and
distinguish healthy brain tissue from cancerous regions.
9
Case Study: Boston Women’s Workforce Council Wage Gap Study
Challenge: The Boston Women’s Workforce Council (BWWC) sought to assess the compliance of Boston-area
employers to the Equal Pay Act by computing the Boston-area gender and race wage gaps. The assessment required
employers to share privacy-sensitive payroll data.
Approach: A traditional approach would have required Boston-area employers to release sensitive information about
employees to a trusted entity for statistical analysis. Instead, the BWWC used secure multiparty computation. Boston-
area employers were able to provide the salary information of their employees in a privacy-preserving way so that
accurate wage statistics were computed even though underlying salary information was never disclosed.
Impact: Sixty-nine employers participated in the 2016 BWWC wage gap report, contributing wage information on
113,000 employees. By 2021, 134 employers contributed information on 156,000 employees' wages. This adoption of
secure multiparty computation has allowed the BWWC to determine whether the gender wage gap is closing in Boston
and track the progress each year.
What are PETs and PPDSA
technologies?
For the purposes of this strategy, PETs
refer to a broad set of technologies that
protect privacy by removing personal
information, by minimizing or reducing
personal data, or by preventing
undesirable processing of data, while
maintaining the functionality of a system.
PPDSA technologies refer to a subset of
PETs that are essential for enabling data
sharing and analytics in a privacy-
preserving manner, such as secure
multiparty computation, homomorphic
encryption, differential privacy, zero
knowledge proofs, synthetic data,
federated learning, and trusted execution
environments, which are discussed further
in the document.
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
5
In the public sector, PPDSA technologies are advancing the Federal Statistical System’s ability to safely
expand access to some of the nation’s most sensitive data as intended under the Foundations for
Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018 (Evidence Act).
10
They can also advance the mission
articulated in the Federal Data Strategy
11
to fully leverage the value of federal data for mission, service,
and the public good
12
by enabling data sharing and analysis across agencies to safely and responsibly
share Federal data for research. They can support national priorities to advance open science by
enabling federally funded researchers to maximize sharing of scientific data while respecting potential
legal and privacy limitations.
13
The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022
14
includes a provision that establishes
a National Secure Data Service (NSDS) demonstration which will, in concert with the statistical system’s
implementation of the Evidence Act, pilot a tiered access system, leveraging PPDSA technologies to
facilitate access to Federal statistical data for evidence-based policymaking. There are also PPDSA
applications in public health, real-time data for emergency response, traffic analysis, improved quality of
human resources information, and urban planning, all of which can benefit from the analysis of sensitive
data.
In the private sector, PPDSA approaches can, for example, enable companies to share data on cyber
incidents without disclosing the identity of the company or competitive details of the company's
operations. Banks can improve fraud detection by using PPDSA technologies for information sharing
across organizational boundaries to identify suspicious patterns while better protecting customers'
privacy. To enable more efficient and climate-friendly management of electricity or traffic through smart
grids and smart cities, PPDSA technologies can facilitate understanding of consumption and travel
patterns while not revealing privacy-sensitive information.
However, challenges related to inadequate understanding of how PPDSA technologies mitigate privacy
risks and harms, limited access to technical expertise, trust, uncertainty about legal and policy
compliance, financial cost, the usability and technical maturity of solutions, as well as how solutions map
to different use cases have slowed adoption of PPDSA technologies.
PPDSA technologies have enormous potential to enable data collaboration, but strong policies and
governance will be needed to ensure that they are developed and used in ways that protect multiple
aspects of privacy, security, civil rights, and civil liberties. Many such safeguards are built into U.S.
confidentiality and privacy laws and policies that apply to the Federal Government’s use of data, and
attention is needed to determine how to advance these protections and the use of PPDSA technologies
together (see for example endnotes
15,16
). For example, PPDSA technologies may not fully resolve
questions of whether data have been legitimately obtained or used and whether the nature or quality of
the data could create harmful bias in the results.
Consideration of how individuals may control the collection and use of their data, including data
deletion requests, should also factor into the design and use of PPDSA technologies. PPDSA technologies
that are poorly designed or deployed could undermine the potential benefits. It is essential that
solutions be applied in a manner that accomplishes the desired privacy goals. If employed without
verifiable performance evaluations, transparency, and accountability, PPDSA approaches could create a
false sense of privacy. In the private sector, deploying PPDSA technologies without appropriate
safeguards could further empower data monopolies, undermining fair markets and increasing inequity
in access. It is imperative that laws, regulations, and policy keep pace with innovations in PPDSA
technologies to ensure that adequate protections are upheld as PPDSA technologies are implemented
and used.
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
6
Privacy Risks and Harms in the Context of PPDSA
Establishing a precise definition of privacy is difficult because privacy is inherently multidisciplinary and
encompasses diverse concepts, including confidentiality, consent, and control over multiple facets of
data and identity.
17
Privacy needs shift with context, time, and individual or cultural differences.
Understanding and defining privacy involves interdisciplinary research that brings together
technologists, social scientists, economists, and privacy and legal professionals, among others. At its
foundation, privacy safeguards basic human values such as autonomy, dignity, freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and freedom to engage in intellectual exploration. Lack of privacy can
undermine individual rights and freedoms and can worsen discrimination against marginalized groups. It
is also important to note that ensuring security is critical to achieving privacy protection goals.
To improve the ability of organizations to assess privacy risks, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) has defined privacy risk as the likelihood that individuals will experience problems
resulting from data processing, and the impact should they occur.
18
These problems can be expressed in
various ways, but NIST describes them as ranging from dignity-type losses, which could include
embarrassment or long-term reputational harm to more tangible harms such as discrimination; financial
harm, which could result from identity theft; and losses in self-determination, which could include life-
altering or threatening situations such as imprisonment or domestic violence.
19
Privacy protection includes addressing various objectives, such as confidentiality, disassociability,
predictability, and manageability.
20
Data confidentiality is well understood as a means of managing
privacy risk and applies to the protection of data from unauthorized access or use, whether about an
individual, group, or entity. Confidentiality protections are written into U.S. statistical laws and are
accompanied by a suite of statistical disclosure limitations and tiered data access solutions. Many of the
PETs that are used for PPDSA are cryptographic techniques that inherently meet the objective of
confidentiality. The distinguishing characteristic of PPDSA approaches is their capability for meeting the
privacy engineering objective of disassociability to prevent even authorized entities from making
linkages between data and people's identities, which further enhances privacy with authorized use of
the data.
For example, these include methods that encrypt data so that a third party can perform analytics on the
encrypted information, those that add noiseto real data or create synthetic datasets to allow for
broad public release and analysis of the data, and those that use hardware-based solutions to protect
data during analysis. Such technologies currently include, but are not limited to, secure multiparty
computation, homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proofs, federated learning, secure enclaves,
differential privacy, and synthetic data generation tools. When deploying PPDSA techniques, it is also
critical to protect privacy in terms of what could be learned through privacy-eroding inferences from the
output of the secure analysis.
21
Privacy risks can arise when privacy objectives are not appropriately met when sharing or analyzing
data. For example, loss of confidentiality may expose privacy-sensitive information. This may be the
disclosure of an individual's identifying information or the privacy-sensitive attribute of a record/person.
Various re-identification, data reconstruction, record linkage, or association attacks are possible even
when some form of de-identification or anonymization technique is used, particularly by combining
auxiliary information that is easily available.
Similarly, insufficient disassociability includes the potential for inferring privacy-sensitive information
related to an individual. For example, from a published ML model, it may be possible to infer that a
particular individual's data was included in the model's training dataset. An adversary may also observe
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
7
a data user’s pattern of access to determine what type of information is being accessed and from where.
In addition, despite the ability of the Onion Router (Tor) browsers to provide anonymous
communication, website fingerprinting attacks can be used to predict a website visited by the user
based on observed traffic patterns.
22
PPDSA solutions are typically designed by considering multiple
threat models that characterize how an adversary may compromise a system. Addressing the possible
risks often includes a combination of PPDSA techniques to safely carry out the analytics and to protect
privacy in released results.
The Need for a National Strategy
As PPDSA technologies begin making the transition to practice and the understanding of their value
grows, it is imperative that the Nation moves forward in a manner that harnesses the opportunities of
these technologies and is grounded in a commitment to uphold democratic values. This Strategy sets
out a vision for the future that responsible research, development, and adoption of PPDSA technologies
can enable, and details a series of priorities and actions the public and private sectors can take to move
toward that vision. Section 1
of the Strategy lays out the vision for a future data sharing and analytics
ecosystem enabled by PPDSA technologies as well as the principles that should guide design,
development, and implementation efforts. Section 2 provides context on the current state of PPDSA
technology development and adoption, including the key challenges that must be overcome for the
broader adoption of such technologies. Section 3 presents five strategic priorities and recommends
actions within each that should be advanced to achieve the vision for the future of the PPDSA ecosystem
defined in
Section 1.
In developing the Strategy, the FTAC consulted a diverse group of participants and experts in the field
from across government, academia, the private sector, non-profit, and civil society entities. Engagement
activities included the following:
A series of virtual roundtables, open to the public, to provide an opportunity for broad input.
Three sessions were attended by nearly 300 total participants.
A request for information
23
was issued on June 9, 2022, and garnered 77 responses
24
from the
public.
A data call to Federal agencies seeking information related to their use of PPDSA technologies.
Informational presentations from a broad range of invited researchers, developers, and
practitioners from government, academia, the private sector, and civil society.
The strategy integrates this broad set of perspectives and experiences to set out an inclusive path
toward a future data ecosystem enabled by PPDSA technologies.
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
8
1: Vision and Guiding Principles
Vision
This Strategy strives to set the country on a path to a future where:
Privacy-preserving data sharing and analytics technologies help advance the well-being and
prosperity of individuals and society, and promote science and innovation in a manner that
affirms democratic values.
This vision of the future applies broadly to individuals, groups, and society at large, including industry,
civil society, academia, and government at all levels.
Guiding Principles
PPDSA technologies offer novel approaches to sharing and processing data to advance the physical and
emotional well-being and prosperity of individuals and groups, as well as innovation-driven economic
growth. However, on their own, PPDSA technologies cannot prevent the results of data analytics from
being used in ways that may undermine democratic values, such as privacy, freedom, equity,
accountability, and civil rights and liberties. These tenets must be reflected in all aspects of the
development life cycle of PPDSA technologies if such technologies are to realize the vision of this
Strategy.
The following principles are intended to guide the development and deployment of PPDSA technologies
in support of progress toward achieving the vision:
PPDSA technologies will be created and used in ways that protect privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties.
PPDSA technologies will be created and used in a manner that stimulates responsible scientific
research and innovation and enables individuals and society to benefit equitably from the value
derived from data sharing and analytics.
PPDSA technologies will be trustworthy and will be created and used in a manner that upholds
accountability.
PPDSA technologies will be created and used to minimize the risk of harm to individuals and
society arising from data sharing and analytics, with explicit consideration of impacts on
underserved, marginalized, and vulnerable communities.
PPDSA technologies will be created and used in ways that protect privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties.
While PPDSA technologies can play an important role in protecting privacy, including confidentiality of
data, they are not a complete solution. Without appropriate safeguards, the results from data sharing
and analytics could be used in ways that degrade or infringe upon the privacy of individuals and groups
or infringe upon core democratic values. Indeed, the confidentiality capabilities of PPDSA technologies
may also make them more difficult to audit than conventional system designs because they restrict the
information that parties can access or obtain. Furthermore, PPDSA technologies may not fully resolve
questions of whether the data have been legitimately obtained or used (e.g., with meaningful individual
consent) and whether the nature or quality of the data could create harmful bias in the results.
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Public trust will hinge on the justified assurance that government, academic, and industry use of PPDSA
solutions will respect privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights. The future PPDSA ecosystem must be
transparent and inclusive and reflect privacy principles and preferences (e.g., individual participation
and consent management). Achieving these outcomes will require developing systems informed by
ethical, social, behavioral, and economic factors as well as human-centered design principles.
Governance around the design, development, and deployment of PPDSA technologies will provide
guardrails and accountability for responsible and ethical use. The Federal Chief Data Officers Council's
adoption of the Data Ethics Framework with civil liberties and privacy inputs provides an encouraging
way forward and helps Federal leaders and data users make privacy-conscious and ethical decisions as
they acquire, manage, and use technology and data in support of their agencies' missions.
25
The
Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights
26
released by OSTP in October 2022 similarly guides the principles that
should guide the design, use, and deployment of automated systems, including in terms of data privacy,
data collection, and data use.
Globally, the Federal Government can leverage partnerships to advocate
for privacy-protecting technical standards and norms within and across international bodies.
PPDSA technologies will be created and used in a manner that stimulates responsible scientific
research and innovation and enables individuals and society to benefit equitably from the value
derived from data sharing and analytics.
This Strategy envisions a future in which PPDSA technologies enable data-driven scientific research and
innovations that will improve health, well-being, and prosperity. Individuals are not the only
beneficiaries. Competing organizations in the market sector will be able to share and process data in
ways not possible today without undermining individual privacy and intellectual property protections.
However, it is imperative that everyone benefits equitably from the insights gleaned from the data. In
keeping with the democratic values of equity and fairness, the entities creating and using these PPDSA
technologies will prioritize equitable access to these benefits.
Ensuring that everyone benefits equitably requires the proper alignment of incentives to foster a data-
enabled inclusive economy. When combined, the power of economies of scale, AI, and network effects
could lead to market concentration or anticompetitive practices that undermine innovation or
incentives for the responsible use of data. PPDSA technologies have the potential to enable smaller
businesses or would-be market entrants to harness data to fuel responsible business models without
being reliant on directly collecting, accessing, or licensing large amounts of data. Appropriate policy and
technical guardrails and approaches to democratize PPDSA technologies and enhance equitable access
to data can address these risks and foster innovation and robust market competition.
PPDSA technologies will be trustworthy and will be created and used in a manner that upholds
accountability.
The use of PPDSA technologies will be built on a foundation of trust. PPDSA technologies need to be
trustworthy, meaning that from a technical perspective, they need to be able to perform as intended. As
PPDSA technologies evolve, it will be necessary to establish a framework for independent verification of
these systems even as the technology continues to mature. To mitigate risk, organizations will need to
have a means to rigorously test, evaluate, and continuously monitor the performance of PPDSA
technologies. The development of risk and performance metrics and diverse testbeds will support such
evaluation. Standards, certifications, frameworks, guidelines, and tools will further support the
trustworthiness of PPDSA technologies, and in turn, provide accountability for their use.
However, accountability for the use of PPDSA technologies requires more than trustworthiness. As
noted, the implementation of PPDSA technologies alone may not prevent the shared data and analytic
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outputs from being used for non-democratic or otherwise harmful purposes. Entities engaging in data
sharing and analytics must be accountable for their decisions and actions. Embedding the design,
development, and deployment of PPDSA technologies in a larger framework that encompasses legal,
regulatory, ethical, and policy mechanisms will help to create this level of accountability. This larger
frame of accountability includes employing environmentally sustainable best practices in the design,
development, and deployment of PPDSA technologies to minimize associated harms such as
unsustainable energy use.
Technologies, laws, and policies that are developed in an open, inclusive, and transparent manner and
leverage the expertise of a broad set of actively engaged collaborators, including the public sector,
industry, academia, and civil society, will support accountability.
27
Design, development, and
deployment of mechanisms to maximize openness and transparency within the technologies themselves
(e.g., open-source software) should be prioritized. Organizations will also need the capabilities and
procedures to respond to incidents in the event of sensitive data disclosures or reidentification risks.
Risk management can be used to support ethical decision-making to derive the benefits described in this
Strategy while minimizing harmful impacts on individuals and society at large. Users of PPDSA
technologies need the requisite knowledge, skills, and techniques to identify, prioritize, and respond to
risks associated with data sharing and analytics activities. Therefore, effective education, awareness,
and training for the responsible and ethical use of data and technologies, including applicable academic
programs, workforce hiring pathways, and relevant government procurement activities will be needed.
Conducting and publishing privacy impact assessments is another way to support transparency,
demonstrate risk mitigation strategies, and maintain public trust. Existing risk management frameworks,
such as the NIST Privacy Framework,
28
Cybersecurity Framework,
29
and AI Risk Management
Framework
30
can be used to support these needs.
PPDSA technologies will be created and used to minimize the risk of harm to individuals and society
arising from data sharing and analytics, with explicit consideration of impacts on underserved,
marginalized, and vulnerable communities.
As noted previously, the use of PPDSA technologies should not contribute disproportionately to
unintended or harmful outcomes for underserved, marginalized, and vulnerable communities. Such
harms may arise in diverse ways. In some cases, the implementation of the technology may create
harm. For instance, adding noise in data to protect privacy while training an ML model typically reduces
the accuracy of the trained model; such accuracy loss can be disproportionately worse for the
underrepresented classes and subgroups in the training data.
31
In addition, when such noising
techniques are used, the bias already present in the original data may be further amplified, which can
lead to disproportionately increased harm to some groups represented in the data.
Ensuring equitable benefits from PPDSA technologies will require the inclusion of diverse viewpoints,
expertise, and perspectives in PPDSA research and development (R&D). This includes domain experts
that can best identify relevant statistics and insights to be preserved or generated from the data to
inform the application of a PPDSA technology to maintain the necessary integrity of those measures.
Taxonomies and methodologies for formal analysis of relevant risks and harms based on empirical
studies will help provide foundations for advances that avoid negative outcomes. Auditing requirements
and criteria, as well as rigorous benchmarks for success, will help facilitate meaningful and accountable
implementation of this principle into the design, development, and deployment of PPDSA technologies.
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Participants in the PPDSA Ecosystem
As noted, organizations that will benefit from an improved ability to share and analyze data include all
levels of government, academia, and all sectors of industry. Relevant parties also include developers of
PPDSA technologies, policymakers, and individuals who are the subject of or affected by data sharing
and analytics. Many contributors within the PPDSA ecosystem can and should partner to design,
develop, and deploy these technologies effectively and responsibly.
With the use of PPDSA technologies, individuals can feel more confident that their privacy will be
maintained and may thus be more likely to participate in data sharing and analysis activities. PPDSA
technology developers and deployers have a responsibility to communicate the technology performance
capabilities and limitations in their systems, including their determinations about acceptable privacy-
accuracy or functionality tradeoffs and any supporting measures to address or help mitigate these
tradeoffs. Researchers, data scientists, or other third-party entities using the data and individuals or
groups who could be harmed, especially already marginalized or vulnerable groups, must have a role in
the design, development, and deployment process to communicate concerns or expose areas where
more research is needed to improve the technologies or implementation solutions. This level of public
participation can be facilitated through capacity building and the provision of tools and frameworks that
facilitate communication and collaboration across technical and non-technical communities.
Civil society organizations and institutions can offer multidisciplinary subject matter expertise and
diverse perspectives to support the activities necessary for achieving the vision put forward in this
Strategy. Organizations dedicated to pertinent issues such as consumer rights, civil and human rights,
privacy, data science, and emerging technologies can provide guidance to help ensure that the
development and deployment of PPDSA solutions follow the guiding principles defined above and move
the ecosystem toward the envisioned future. Civil society organizations also stand to benefit greatly
from the insights that can be gleaned from PPDSA solutions to further public interest missions and goals,
and it will be important to build their capacity to employ and engage with PPDSA technologies.
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2: Current State
The theoretical foundations for many PPDSA tools and techniques (e.g., secure multiparty computation,
homomorphic encryption) appeared in the late 1970s and 1980s alongside many of the advancements in
computer science, networking, and the internet, often supported by Federal research funding. In
parallel, statistical disclosure limitation techniques were advancing within the statistical profession, led
by Federal statistical agencies.
32
As the global internet and advances in computing continued to mature
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, techniques to prevent the identification or re-identification of data
subjects became more relevant. Statistical disclosure limitation techniques are widely used today to
manage the re-identification risk of publicly available data products in statistical organizations within
and outside of government, along with a series of restricted access modalities such as physical and
virtual data enclaves to provide secure access to data when public products are too risky.
33
In the
pursuit of techniques that provide more provable guarantees for privacy, those same organizations are
also investing in PPDSA-related technologies to expand their toolset.
Recent years have seen a dramatic shift in the role of PPDSA technologies more broadly, from generally
beneficial to essential, although the relative maturity of each PPDSA approach varies considerably. As
the value and demand for data continue to rapidly expand, so do privacy risks, creating a need for new
solutions. Further, advances in AI systems have driven demand for data exponentially, with large
language models and generative AI models reaching unprecedented performance through
computationally intensive approaches based on large corpora of training data. Legislation and Federal
initiatives have also elevated and prioritized the use of data for evidence-based policymaking and the
sharing of scientific data from federally funded research. This landscape of technical capabilities,
foundationally based on data, evolves daily and presents a unique moment for the convergence of
techniques that fundamentally enhance privacy with those that are designed to derive insights from
data. At the same time, the proliferation of data protection and privacy regulations and laws around the
world and within the United States creates a complex regulatory environment, which may not account
for new technologies.
The following examination of the current state captures some of the critical aspects of the legal
environment, key challenges in adoption, and capabilities of specific tools and techniques.
Legal and Regulatory Environment
At the Federal level, the use and protection of personal data in the United States are governed by a set
of risk-based, sector-specific laws and regulations that extend to different data types or uses. Some,
such as the Privacy Act of 1974
34
and the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency
Act of 2002,
35
apply to how the Federal government handles certain information. Others, such as the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996,
36
the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1998,
37
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
38
and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act of 1974
39
expand the scope of application to specified private-sector entities to protect specific
types of personal data. Following the enactment of the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018,
40
there
are also an increasing number of state laws that provide more general protections.
Governing a key area for adoption of PPDSA approaches, the HIPAA Privacy Rule protects the privacy of
individually identifiable health information held by covered entities, such as health care providers. The
Privacy Rule requires authorization from individuals or a waiver of authorizations by an Institutional
Review Board (IRB) or Privacy Board to disclose individually identifiable health information.
41
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
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More broadly, the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects,
42
referred to as the “Common
Rule,” sets forth requirements for the protection of human subjects in research.
Globally, data protection regulations have proliferated in the last few years following the introduction of
the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
43
including in countries such as
Brazil,
44
China,
45
Canada,
46
and Singapore.
47
These create a complex regulatory landscape and cross-
jurisdictional issues that add to the challenges of developing and deploying effective PPDSA technologies
for cross-border research and applications.
In response to recent growth in AI and ML research and data-driven consumer products, several
regulatory agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration,
48
the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau,
49
and the Federal Trade Commission, have announced guidance and plans for advanced
rulemaking
50
to address issues related to safety and privacy in the context of AI- and data-based systems
and practices. However, similar regulatory efforts to clarify how PPDSA technologies do or do not meet
various legal restrictions related to data sharing and protection have not yet been announced.
Key Challenges
While some PPDSA technologies have seen initial deployments in commercial products and public sector
uses, others still have technical challenges to overcome to enable broader use (discussed in detail
below). Nonetheless, a set of common challenges have hindered widespread adoption, including:
Limited awareness. Knowledge and understanding about PPDSA technologies in general are sparse
among potential users in the public and private sectors. The capabilities afforded by PPDSA technologies
are not widely known, understood, or appreciated outside of the research community. Furthermore,
many potential users who have heard of the technologies are under the impression that there are no
mature, useable PPDSA technologies.
Inconsistent definitions and taxonomy. An absence of standard definitions or taxonomies related to
privacy and PPDSA technologies makes understanding privacy risks and considerations difficult and
inconsistent among the parties. This has resulted in a lack of clarity about the appropriateness and use
of available PPDSA technologies for various scenarios and how to manage privacy alongside
functionality.
Inadequate understanding of privacy technology risks and benefits. Potential users of PPDSA
technology need a way of understanding and evaluating the risks and benefits that the technology
entails, including potential harms, and mapping technologies to relevant threat models. Few techniques
offer absolute security, meaning that they cannot be compromised by an adversary who has unlimited
computational resources and time. However, most practical techniques are designed to ensure that an
adversary cannot compromise them in a reasonable amount of time. Mitigating risk, therefore, involves
understanding the threat models and adversarial capabilities.
Lack of consensus standards. Few widely adopted standards specifying the mechanisms or use of PPDSA
technologies exist at this time. Although an open initiative led by industry and academia has established
a homomorphic encryption standard
51
and a standard for zero-knowledge proofs
52
is underway, more
standards that specify foundational cryptographic primitives and other PPDSA technologies would
facilitate adoption and trust in solutions. In addition, there are no widely adopted standards for data
formats, application programming interfaces, or system architectures that are necessary to facilitate the
interoperability and deployment of PPDSA technologies. Promotion of consensus standards, however,
should not dissuade those considering PPDSA solutions from leveraging the tremendous flexibility that
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
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many PPDSA techniques offer in terms of customizing implementation to best suit their data and use
cases.
Varying stages of maturity. Existing PPDSA technologies are in varying levels of maturity with some
having achieved initial success in terms of real-world adoption, particularly for simpler applications.
Years of theoretical research in cryptography, for instance, have led to secure multiparty computation
and homomorphic encryption techniques becoming more practical. However, these approaches still
have scalability and efficiency challenges that need to be addressed in the context of a broader set of
threat models to enable wider adoption. This is further complicated by a complex global regulatory
environment with varying compliance requirements for personal data protection. In many cases, a
combination of various PPDSA techniques needs to be employed to ensure end-to-end privacy that is
measurable or formally provable, which remains a research challenge.
Insufficient usability of solutions. Current PPDSA approaches must be tailored to each specific
deployment and require significant technical expertise to implement. There is not an appropriate set of
usable tools and interfaces whose design is informed by human-centric design principles and social,
economic, and behavioral factors that make the solutions easily deployable, configurable, accessible,
and manageable by a diverse set of users with varying levels of capabilities. This hinders broader
adoption among organizations that do not have specialized expertise and creates high deployment
burdens, particularly in sectors that are already overtaxed or have low technical maturity. Even if
significant specialized expertise is used to deploy such a technology, it can become ineffective if it is not
used properly due to usability challenges, inconsistent assumptions about behavioral and economic
issues, or misaligned incentives.
Inadequate implementation assessment capabilities and management of tradeoffs between privacy
and other issues. Approaches that address privacy in a broader context of competing issues are
underdeveloped. For instance, techniques such as differential privacy provide formally provable privacy
guarantees but require more analysis to assess potential impacts on fairness and bias, as well as
tradeoffs with accuracy in different implementations which can affect the degree of utility for data
users. Effectively assessing the implementation of PPDSA solutions in terms of vulnerability in real-
world deployment is another challenge, and the lack of standards makes it difficult for third-party
auditors to evaluate the strength of privacy protections. There is also a lack of mature approaches for
measurement and metrics concerning privacy risks and harms, which could help assess the efficacy of
solutions and for devising risk-aware solutions.
Lack of clarity around regulatory compliance. Cross-functional partners (i.e., security, privacy, and
general counsel) may struggle to determine when or if the use of PPDSA technology is consistent or in
compliance with legal or regulatory requirements. Current laws and regulations do not adequately
envision a role for PPDSA technologies and legal standards for privacy protection and interpretations of
these standards do not directly address the question of whether the use of PPDSA technologies is
sufficient to satisfy their requirements.
Impact on individuals, marginalized groups, and society. The use of PPDSA technology does not
guarantee the safe use of data nor can it control for cases of illegitimate collection of data. Furthermore,
certain approaches could produce analytical results that amplify or introduce bias, and such results
could lead to decisions that are discriminatory or disproportionately harmful to certain subgroups
represented in the data.
PPDSA technologies in the early stages of development may be poorly
understood and deployed or adopted in privacy-invasive and potentially unsafe ways that risk re-
identification.
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
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The above list is not meant to be exhaustive and must also be addressed within the context of today’s
fast-evolving emerging technological landscape.
Overview of PPDSA Capabilities
As a result of years of research, various PPDSA technologies have emerged that show promise for
helping achieve the vision put forward by this Strategy. These include cryptographic and non-
cryptographic techniques and span hardware- and software-based approaches. They address various
privacy priorities, such as pseudonymization or anonymization of sensitive data and statistical disclosure
control and promote confidentiality and disassociability. Table 1 reviews the key existing technical
approaches that are essential for PPDSA and an in-depth discussion follows.
Table 1. Overview of Key Technical Approaches Essential for PPDSA.
Technique
Value
Limitations
K-anonymity
Transforms a given set of k
records in such a way that in the
published version, each
individual is indistinguishable
from the others
Reduces the risk of re-
identification
Vulnerable to reidentification
attack if additional public
information is available
Differential
Privacy
Adds noise to the original data in
such a way that an adversary
cannot tell whether any
individual’s data was or was not
included in the original dataset
Provides formal
guarantee of privacy by
reducing the likelihood of
data reconstruction or
linkage attacks
Limited to simpler data types;
challenge in managing
tradeoff between privacy,
accuracy, or utility of data
Synthetic Data
Information that is artificially
manufactured as an alternative
to real-world data
Preserves the overall
properties or
characteristics of the
original dataset
May still disclose privacy-
sensitive information
contained in the original
dataset; difficult to mirror
real-world data
Secure
Multiparty
Computation
Allows multiple parties to jointly
perform an agreed computation
over their private data, while
allowing each party to learn only
the final computational output
Increases the ability to
compute over distributed
datasets without
revealing original data
Higher computational and
communication
costs/burdens, and difficult to
scale
Homomorphic
Encryption
Allows computing over
encrypted data to produce
results in an encrypted form
Only authorized users can
see original and/or
computed data
Higher computational cost
and time
Zero-Knowledge
Proof
Allows one party to prove to
another party that a particular
statement is true without
revealing privacy-sensitive
information
Increases ability to
validate information
without disclosing
sensitive information
Cost and scalability
Trusted
Execution
Environment
Creates a secure, isolated
execution environment parallel
to the main operating system to
process sensitive data
Allows faster secure
analytics on data
compared to encryption-
based techniques
Introduces other ways
sensitive data can leak
Federated
Learning
Allows multiple entities to
collaborate in building an ML
model on distributed data
without sharing original data
Minimizes data sharing
while training a combined
model
Various data reconstruction
or inference attacks are still
possible; require consistency
across datasets held by
multiple entities
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Data anonymization and statistical disclosure limitation techniques. These techniques address privacy
risks in publishing data by transforming the original data to limit the disclosure of sensitive information
or prevent the re-identification of individuals or groups represented in the data. Challenges inherent in
these approaches relate to how to balance privacy goals and the accuracy of the published data when
used for various types of analysis. The capabilities of anonymization or disclosure techniques are
currently limited to only simpler types of data, such as tabular data.
k-anonymity is an anonymization technique that transforms a given set of k records in such a
way that in the published version, each individual is indistinguishable from the others. Extensive
research in k-anonymity and its extensions has shown that such techniques are vulnerable to
reconstruction or linkage attacks
53
that can lead to the re-identification of a data subject if an
adversary has relevant auxiliary information. k-anonymity has been recently used for the
publication of COVID-19
54
datasets by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
55
Differential privacy, a data perturbation approach, adds noise to the original data in such a way
that an adversary cannot tell whether any individual’s data was or was not included in the
original dataset. Such approaches aim to ensure that statistical information computed using the
published data remains statistically valid. Differential privacy has gained popularity because of
its rigorous mathematical foundation. Initial deployments have not yet produced a generalizable
method of how to best set the privacy parameter to control the strength of the privacy
guarantee while optimizing for accurate analytic results. It has been used by the Census Bureau
in the publication of 2020 Census data (see case study below).
Synthetic data approach involves generating simulated data that preserves the overall statistical
properties or characteristics of the original dataset without revealing its sensitive information.
This approach is increasingly popular for training AI-based applications for image recognition
56
and healthcare,
57
as large volumes of synthetic data can be easily made available for training AI
models. Research shows that synthetic data may still disclose privacy-sensitive information
contained in the original dataset unless techniques such as differential privacy are used.
58
Cryptographic techniques. Years of research have resulted in the development of various cryptographic
techniques that support computation over private data. Scalability and efficiency issues remain key
challenges for the practical deployment of many cryptographic techniques. Computation and
communication costs become challenging for complex analytics (e.g., deep learning) or as the number of
collaborating parties or data sizes increases.
Secure multiparty computation allows multiple parties to jointly perform an agreed computation
over their private data while allowing each party to only learn the final computational output.
Computations can be agreed for a common (public) output, such as everyone learning an
average salary, or can be tailored to distinct private outputs per party.
59
After over 30 years of
theoretical research, secure multiparty computation is increasingly being seen as a viable PPDSA
solution that can be used to support simple privacy-preserving computational tasks such as
computing statistics or regression analysis. A special case of secure multiparty computation is
private set intersection, which identifies overlapping elements from multiple datasets without
revealing any other sensitive data.
Homomorphic encryption allows computing over encrypted data to produce results in an
encrypted form. Then, only users with appropriate keys can extract the result from its encrypted
form. For example, additive homomorphic encryption allows computing a sum of two encrypted
Na
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17
values to produce the encryption of the sum of their original values. Fully homomorphic
encryption supports arbitrary computation over encrypted data. Recent efforts led to the
development of a homomorphic encryption standard in 2018.
60
Zero-knowledge proof is another well-known technique that allows one party, called a prover, to
provide proof to convince another party, a verifier, that a particular statement is true without
revealing privacy-sensitive information.
61
For example, some digital assets use zero-knowledge
proofs to prove statements about transactions and balances without revealing additional
metadata.
62
Zero-knowledge proofs can thus be used to support auditability or compliance
checks. More recently, zero-knowledge proof schemes are being used for convolutional neural
networks
63
to prove that the prediction task was carried out by the model itself, without
disclosing any model information.
Functional encryption allows computing a value of a mathematical function over some data using
the encrypted form of that data. Special cases of functional encryption include identity-based
encryption and attribute-based encryption, which allow encrypted data to be decrypted only by
parties that satisfy specific criteria (identity or attributes).
T
rusted execution environments. A trusted execution environment creates a secure, isolated execution
environment parallel to the main operating system
64
to process sensitive data. It ensures verifiability of
security regarding sensitive data processing or code execution, trusted input-output operations, and
secure storage for data that can be accessed by only authorized entities at any time. Trusted execution
environments may use hardware- or virtualization-based isolation techniques, and they can be made
available on cloud platforms. Trusted execution environments provide a faster alternative to
cryptographic approaches but bring additional privacy risks such as side-channel leakage of information.
Policy-based approaches. The development of machine-readable privacy policies allows a specification
of rules that capture privacy protection requirements based on users’ privacy preferences for sharing or
analytic use of data. Such policies specify who can access, query, or use the privacy-sensitive
information or analytics results for a specified purpose. Access control approaches, such as the purpose-
aware access control approach,
65
and “sticky policies
66
have been used to capture the purpose of data
processing and operation to restrict authorized access to and use of shared data. Similarly, the World
Wide Web Consortium has proposed the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project 1.0 (P3P),
67
which
allows for a Web site to encode its data collection and data use practices in a machine-readable format.
Attribute- or identity-based encryption, mentioned earlier, can be used to enable organizations to
outsource data to third-party cloud service providers to share it with authorized entities in a privacy-
preserving manner.
68
Ongoing research in this area focuses on effectively and efficiently specifying and
enforcing dynamically evolving access and privacy policies. Enforcement of such policies may involve the
application of other cryptographic or non-cryptographic techniques. Natural language processing
techniques are being explored to analyze legal privacy policies to enable a system to understand privacy
protection requirements
69
or generate machine-readable privacy policies that need to be enforced.
Other approaches. In addition to the above, other techniques exist for PPDSA that may use
cryptographic or non-cryptographic approaches or some combination thereof. In many cases, data
about individuals may be distributed across multiple organizations (e.g., different hospitals), each of
which may be available in some anonymized form.
Privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) allows secure and private linkage of data related to an
individual from different datasets. For example, the NIH National COVID Cohort Collaborative
70
h
as created the largest national, publicly available patient-level limited dataset in U.S. history by
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harmonizing electronic health record data from health systems across the US and using PPRL to
connect different COVID-19-related patient data from multiple organizations. Various
techniques including secure multiparty computation or data perturbation approaches can be
used to support PPRL.
71
Private information retrieval is another useful technique that allows a client to retrieve data
from a database server without the server knowing what was retrieved or queried. This protects
a user’s access privacy by making sure the data owner cannot track what content or types of
information the user is accessing. Similar access privacy issues relate to a server learning about
what a user is accessing based on observable access patterns. Oblivious random access memory
is a technique that has been used to address such access privacy issues.
Federated learning allows multiple entities to collaborate in building a machine learning model
on distributed data. It provides inherent privacy protection as participants do not have to share
their raw data. Instead, each participant trains a local model on their data which is then
integrated into the collaborative model. Recent research
72
has identified persistent privacy risks
in federated learning, which are also found more generally in ML, such as model inversion
attacks that can reconstruct the private training data or membership inference attacks that can
identify if a data sample is part of the training dataset. Research is ongoing in combining some
of the above-referenced cryptographic techniques to close these vulnerabilities and create
privacy-preserving federated learning.
Summary and challenges. The techniques mentioned above are some of the key existing technical
approaches relevant for privacy-preserving data publishing or analytics, but not an exhaustive list. The
technologies described are at different levels of maturity with some such as differential privacy or
secure multiparty computation seeing initial, limited success in deployment, and others still in earlier
stages of development. Cross-cutting technical challenges such as those related to understanding and
quantifying disclosure risks, scalability and efficiency, and verification and validation approaches to
ensure the correctness of design, implementation, and deployment present barriers to broader
adoption. Furthermore, in many application scenarios, the integration of various techniques will be
needed to support end-to-end privacy. Additional work is also needed to determine how issues of
fairness, transparency, and accountability can be assured while achieving privacy guarantees.
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Case Study: U.S. Census Bureau 2020 Census
Challenge: Data captured through the census contains valuable information for researchers nationwide. The Census
Bureau is charged with publishing accurate statistics while protecting the confidentiality of personally identifiable
information of any census participants. The Census Bureau sought ways to publish accurate statistics while protecting
the privacy of individuals. In 2018, the Census Bureau conducted a simulated database reconstruction-abetted re-
identification attack on the 2010 Census data and found that it can successfully re-identify a significant portion of the
2010 Census data. 2010 Census data was published using a technique that injected noise into the original data by
swapping records
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for de-identification.
Approach: To address the database reconstruction attack demonstrated on 2010 Census data, the Census Bureau
developed a disclosure avoidance framework
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based on differential privacy for publishing 2020 Census data. The
differential privacy technique adds noise to the original data to obscure the presence or absence of any individual in a
dataset while maintaining the statistical characteristics of the original data. Based on rigorous mathematical
foundations,
differential privacy allows tuning a privacy-loss budget to balance disclosure risk with accuracy loss. This
technique allowed the Census Bureau to limit the disclosure risk for published data while maintaining accuracy.
Impact: The highest standards and emerging techniques in PPDSA technologies are being used to uphold privacy and
disclosure avoidance for the American public. Compared to the use of
differential privacy, the use of legacy statistical
disclosure limitation techniques to comply with the statutory confidentiality obligations would require perturbing data
with noiseat levels that would make the published census data inadequate for many uses.
Differential privacy also
provides provable guarantees against a range of potential privacy attacks and allows the control of disclosure risk
through the use of a privacy-loss budget. An example of the differentially private 2020 Census data is the formulation
of redistricting plans for elected offices from the U.S. House of Representatives to local school boards in compliance
with Federal voting rights laws.
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3: Strategic Priorities and Recommended Actions
PPDSA technologies need to progress from the current state toward a future data ecosystem, where the
envisioned technologies advance well-being and prosperity, promote innovation, and affirm democratic
values. This requires concerted actions across the government, private sector, and civil society. To
achieve this, five strategic priorities and their associated recommendations focus on accelerating
research and maturing and advancing the adoption of PPDSA technologies.
Strategic Priority 1: Advance Governance and Responsible Adoption
PPDSA technologies offer tremendous potential for advancing science and innovation and protecting
privacy. However, the adoption of PPDSA technologies on their own will not achieve the future state
envisioned by this Strategy. Institutional efforts, national-level guidance, and proactive risk-mitigation
measures are needed to ensure the advancement of PPDSA technologies in a manner that adheres to
the Guiding Principles laid out in Section 1.
Recommendation 1.a. Establish a steering group to support PPDSA guiding principles and
strategic priorities
A steering group that includes a broad range of representatives (e.g., public sector, industry, academia,
civil society, and marginalized and vulnerable groups) could serve as a source of policy and technical
expertise. The Federal Government could initially establish the steering group, set milestones, and
measure progress, but over time transition the group to self-sustaining leadership. Multistakeholder
efforts around digital identity that were initiated by the Federal government and eventually transitioned
to community leadership in response to the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace
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serve as a model for similar efforts to advance PPDSA. Ideally, the steering group will serve to convene
broadly representative and inclusive partners to draw the greatest range of expertise in carrying out its
mission and work to develop and maintain a healthy PPDSA ecosystem that will achieve the vision laid
out by this Strategy. This would build a flourishing PPDSA ecosystem that respects democratic values.
The steering group should:
Define the minimum rights and responsibilities of participants in the PPDSA ecosystem in
alignment with the Guiding Principles set out in this Strategy, including:
o addressing concerns about the use of analytic outputs in ways that could undermine
democratic values
o drawing on other frameworks to address broader privacy issues around collecting and
controlling data
o considering how to manage large private datasets to minimize the creation of data
monopolies that could stifle innovation and amplify inequity in data-driven economies
Administer processes for adopting standards and certification mechanisms that underpin the
trustworthiness of PPDSA technologies.
Recommendation 1.b. Clarify the use of PPDSA technologies within the statutory and regulatory
environments
PPDSA technologies are becoming increasingly feasible for real-world applications in many sectors. It is
not clear, however, whether PPDSA technologies meet the requirements of existing privacy laws,
policies, and regulations. These provide essential protections to the public but were primarily enacted
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before PPDSA technologies were viable.
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For example, it has not been determined to what extent
PPDSA technologies meet specific de-identification standards or security safeguards that provide critical
protections to individuals. Nor is it clear how the technologies will coalesce with important legal
definitions or exceptions, such aspersonally identifiable informationor disclosure. In addition,
PPDSA technologies will enable the processing of datasets protected by different privacy laws,
complicating compliance with multiple legal regimes. To address this uncertainty, regulatory bodies
should engage with developers, privacy professionals, and users of PPDSA technologies to ensure a
mutual understanding of how the technologies work within the context of current regulations.
Adoption of PPDSA technologies also requires increased awareness of these technologies among
policymakers and legal professionals. Agencies, professional associations, and legislatures should bolster
their technical expertise to assist with writing laws, regulations, and guidance and assessment.
Education and training should be prioritized to support the application of current laws and regulations,
thus ensuring that any future privacy legislation is informed by technical developments.
Recommendation 1.c. Develop capabilities and procedures to mitigate privacy incidents
PPDSA technologies have great potential to protect privacy, but no technology can ensure that privacy
incidents, such as the disclosure of sensitive data, will never occur. There are existing procedures to
manage privacy incidents, but the technical complexity of PPDSA technologies may lead to situations
where organizations do not realize that a privacy incident has occurred or understand how it happened.
Organizations should undertake continuous monitoring and be prepared to respond to potential privacy
risks or actual incidents. Risk management and active preparation to respond to information leakage are
key components of responsible PPDSA technology implementation, which should be built into policies
and procedures for both government and non-government deployments. As PPDSA technologies are
developed, piloted, and implemented, work is needed to develop robust proactive-risk mitigation
measures and incident response policies and procedures to maintain public confidence in PPDSA
technologies.
Strategic Priority 2: Elevate and Promote Foundational and Use-inspired Research
In complement with Strategic Priority 1, Priority 2 highlights the importance of interdisciplinary research
that combines technology, social science, law, policy, and domain expertise that will enable a
sociotechnical approach to developing and implementing PPDSA solutions. This type of holistic approach
will allow the legal and regulatory environment to evolve in tandem with PPDSA technologies, ensuring
the two augment one another in protecting and preserving privacy rights.
Both foundational and use-inspired PPDSA R&D is necessary to keep pace with ever-growing privacy
risks, the rapid growth of data collection, sharing, and analysis, and the development of emerging
technologies, e.g., smart sensors, advanced wireless networks, AI/ML, and quantum computing. A
successful PPDSA research strategy will enable security and privacy-by-design approaches ensuring
PPDSA technologies are integrated at the earliest stages of system development. The Federal
Government should promote increased engagement with Historically Black Colleges and Universities
(HBCUs), Tribal Colleges and Universities (TCUs), and other Minority-Serving Institutions (MSIs), to
strengthen, sustain, and broaden U.S. PPDSA research capacity and expertise. Through the expansion of
PPDSA research capacity, students will gain knowledge and help create the technical capacity needed to
provide solutions for a wide range of public and private sectors. A recent National Academies
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report
stated that “[m]ost of the current public scientific expertise in algorithm design, cryptanalysis, and other
areas of applied cryptography is outside the United States.” Thus, broadening research expertise is
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critically important to secure U.S. leadership in PPDSA technologies. A broadly inclusive PPDSA research
workforce can help advance goals of inclusion and equity in the privacy field.
Recommendation 2.a. Develop a holistic scientific understanding of privacy threats, attacks, and
harms
It is important to develop scientifically well-founded taxonomies to systematically classify privacy
threats, attacks, and harms in the context of various threat actors. This holistic approach should also
provide a framework for assisting organizations in evaluating benefits alongside privacy risks. These
taxonomies need to draw from the terminological and conceptual differences in key concepts around
privacy between different contributors and disciplines (e.g., computer science, information science, law,
policy, and social science). Interdisciplinary taxonomies are critical to building a systematic knowledge
base and formal methodologies for reasoning about privacy guarantees provided by PPDSA solutions.
Understanding these threats, attacks, and harms should be informed by contextual factors, i.e., socio-
economic, and cultural issues that influence interactions with technology, have impacts on marginalized
and vulnerable groups, and address regulations, including cross-border jurisdictional issues. R&D efforts
should allow for risk- and harm-aware PPDSA solutions and support the development of appropriate
metrics and measurements for privacy risks and harms.
Recommendation 2.b. Invest in foundational and use-inspired R&D for PPDSA technologies
Substantial and sustained investment in both the public and private sectors should support accelerated
R&D that is focused on emerging PPDSA technologies and bold exploratory research targeted to create
the next generation of PPDSA capabilities. Sustained research activities in areas of differential privacy,
secure multiparty computation, homomorphic encryption, and other technologies have led to the
development of PPDSA capabilities that are starting to transition into practice. More research from a
broad set of stakeholders is needed so that the full potential of these PPDSA technologies is investigated
and developed leading to scientifically well-grounded tools, models, methodologies, frameworks, and
evaluation methods. Such advancement will enable data-driven collaborations and responsible data
sharing, including maximizing public access to research data generated by federally funded research
projects. Technical research into PPDSA technologies should be accompanied by research from a
sociotechnical and human-centric design perspective that considers how the technology will interact
with individuals, communities, institutions, and society as a whole.
Recommendation 2.b.1. Accelerate R&D for current and emerging PPDSA technologies. Current PPDSA
capabilities, as presented earlier, include technologies at varying levels of maturity and limitations.
Support for R&D should focus on addressing key challenges:
Complex and heterogeneous datasets. Several PPDSA techniques are limited by the types of data they
can handle. Many of the current and emerging application areas for PPDSA technologies (e.g., social
networks, personalized medicine, augmented and/or virtual reality, and smart cities) will generate
massive amounts of diverse data types, such as multimedia (e.g., text, images, audio, and video),
graphical (e.g., social networks), or real-time streaming data. Datasets to be shared or processed may be
structured or unstructured and include multiple modalities. Significant R&D efforts are needed to
advance PPDSA solutions that can deal with these complex datasets, such as the following:
Research is needed to develop and effectively use techniques that will address tradeoffs
between privacy guarantees, and utility or accuracy. It is also important to develop better
cryptographic primitives and protocols to process multimodal datasets in various application
contexts.
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Effective verification and validation approaches are needed to tackle accuracy and data quality
issues when synthetic data are used. Research should address the effectiveness of such
techniques when different types of datasets, analytics, or AI model training approaches are
considered.
The highly distributed nature of such heterogeneous data introduces significant research
challenges for privacy protection when integrated (e.g., for data synthesis) or used for
collaborative analytics or ML training.
Research is needed to develop more effective approaches for granular specification;
enforcement of access, use, or privacy policies; and the verification of correctness for policies
across a variety of data types and applications. Correct enforcement of such policies may need
to use combinations of cryptographic or non-cryptographic techniques.
Techniques to extract rules from legal and organizational privacy policies or laws and convert
them to machine-readable policies require additional development, especially considering the
broad set of data types. As data objects are shared, effective ways to ensure that unauthorized
sharing is prevented or detected are needed. An associated challenge is privacy-preserving
access that will protect the privacy of a user accessing sensitive information.
Scalability and efficiency. Scalability and efficiency pose significant roadblocks to the practical
deployment of many PPDSA technologies, particularly those that employ cryptographic techniques.
Efficient and scalable approaches are needed to ensure their use in various technological contexts (e.g.,
IoT, edge and cloud platforms, or AI systems). The complexity of computation in emerging applications
further adds to scalability and efficiency challenges, as does complex, real-time, heterogeneous, and
distributed data. While more efficient cryptographic primitives need to be developed, hardware-based
techniques, such as hardware accelerators or trusted execution environment-based approaches are
viable faster alternatives. Sustained research is needed to further mature such hardware-based
approaches.
Programmability and verifiability. An important research area is the development of high-level
programming languages to improve the programmability of various PPDSA technologies (e.g., secure
multiparty computation), which are typically hand-coded and optimized by experts. Such programming
languages and their associated compiler toolchains would provide abstractions across multiple PPDSA
solutions, a critical step to making them more practical. Research areas for innovative verification and
validation are important to support the correctness of PPDSA techniques at design, implementation, and
deployment stages. Many PPDSA techniques also need to be comprehensively investigated by
considering a broader set of emerging threats across various sociotechnical and application contexts. For
instance, in an honest-but-curious model, a server behaves honestly but may try to learn sensitive
information. Existing secure multiparty computation solutions typically assume this type of model,
which may be adequate for some applications. Often PPDSA solutions are developed in a piecemeal
fashion or are standalone, but real-world deployment typically requires integrating different solutions to
ensure comprehensive privacy and security. Integrating such solutions that are potentially designed
from different threat models and then verifying the correctness of the integrated solution is an
important research area. Formal and systems-integration techniques are needed to achieve end-to-end
privacy and performance goals.
Metrics and measurements. Research needs to be accelerated to develop metrics for PPDSA
technologies and effective measurement techniquesquantitative or qualitativefor privacy risks,
accuracy, and associated unintended consequences or harms. Techniques (e.g., differential privacy) use
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a privacy-loss parameter to capture the privacy disclosure that is acceptable, but there remains an
inadequate level of understanding of how privacy parameter values should be set for different
applications. Configuring privacy-related parameters becomes more challenging when different types of
PPDSA techniques need to be integrated for comprehensive solutions, such as in privacy-preserving
federated learning. Based on such metrics, effective assessment techniques are needed to define
privacy risks and harms posed by a PPDSA solution for a specific application.
Fairness, transparency, and accountability. It is important to ensure that PPDSA solutions do not
inadvertently amplify the bias that is already present in the original data. Such bias amplification issues
are possible when certain techniques (e.g., k-anonymity or differential privacy) are used. Research
should consider how PPDSA solutions ensure fairness. Research is also needed to address the lack of
effective techniques to support and emphasize transparency and accountability when PPDSA solutions
are used. For example, some regulations introduce additional data protection requirements, such as the
“right to be forgotten.” Solutions may further be augmented by a suite of innovative privacy auditing or
compliance checking tools. For instance, very nascent research on machine unlearning techniques aims
to address how to remove some training data elements and then retrain the associated AI/ML model
efficiently, all in a privacy-preserving manner. These issues become even more challenging in federated
learning scenarios. As PPDSA solutions are integrated into AI systems, explainability, and transparency
should be emphasized.
Recommendation 2.b.2. Promote future-focused exploratory R&D with transformational goals.
Current and emerging PPDSA technologies may need significant R&D efforts to enable their broader
applicability and adoption. Additionally, concerted R&D should also support the more future-focused
exploration of innovations in PPDSA solutions. The research should be geared towards fundamental
technical approaches that focus on rapidly advancing or emerging technologies, e.g., next-generation AI,
quantum computing, 6G and beyond networking, augmented/virtual reality, and digital assets. These
new advances are expected to make computational and analytics capabilities, and the level of
connectivity that facilitates information sharing to be orders of magnitude higher. While these
environments present unprecedented opportunities for social good, bad actors will be equally
empowered with immense computational, communication, and AI capabilities to infringe upon the
privacy, security, and safety of individuals and communities. In such an anticipated future, it can be
expected that the security and privacy threat landscape, or attack surface, will be substantially enlarged.
Understanding emerging threats and designing appropriate defenses early is critical. Moreover, it is thus
essential to pursue or support long-term, bold, and exploratory R&D efforts that are focused on
developing the next generation PPDSA foundations (e.g., new cryptographic primitives), models,
methodologies, and frameworks that can be resilient against a broad range of privacy threats. Research
should emphasize privacy-by-design approaches that also consider how privacy may conflict with
various other properties, such as security, resilience, and bias/fairness.
Recommendation 2.c. Expand and promote interdisciplinary R&D at the intersection of science,
technology, policy, and law
While R&D highlighted in the preceding recommendations aims to provide key PPDSA technological
foundations, it is important to emphasize that privacy is a highly multidisciplinary field, and significant
R&D efforts should be fostered to develop and implement effective, usable, and socially responsible
PPDSA solutions. PPDSA systems need to be understood as sociotechnical and human-centered systems
grounded on ethical principles that will require foundational and applied research in social, behavioral,
and economic sciences; human-centered design; and ethics, policy, law, and regulations. Sociotechnical
approaches address not only how technology interacts with individuals, but also how it interacts with
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broader social systems, organizations, and society at large. Such research is also needed to better
understand what factors influence end-users and solution developers to adopt various privacy
technologies.
Multidisciplinary research is critical to better understand user behavior, incentives, and privacy
preferences at the individual level and needs at the collective level. Development of interdisciplinary
theoretical foundations, such as the theory of contextual integrity,
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is critical to ensure that PPDSA
research is carried out holistically and incorporates multidisciplinary perspectives. Such sociotechnical
and human factors research is also important to understand the social impact and potential unintended
consequences of PPDSA solutions more comprehensively. Users need effective, usable, and inclusive
tools that help them understand and evaluate the privacy implications of their technological
interactions, ascertain the implications of using PPDSA technologies, and determine how to derive value
from privately sharing data. Significant R&D is needed to design such usable and inclusive tools based on
the insights from multidisciplinary research. Multidisciplinary research and participatory design
approaches are specifically critical to understand how technological solutions can be made equitably
available to various marginalized or under-represented groups, by ensuring that they are not
disproportionately impacted through the use of PPDSA technologies. Sustained research in developing
effective, inclusive, and equitable PPDSA solutions will empower and enable broader participation of
such diverse groups in the PPDSA-enabled data economy and foster democratic values.
Similarly, research to understand how PPDSA solutions will interact or interface with existing
organizational processes and culture is important for their effective design and eventual adoption. One
critical area is collaboration between technical privacy researchers and regulatory entities,
policymakers, and privacy policy experts. The absence of communication and collaboration among these
groups has created a divergence in the way privacy is defined and treated by respective communities.
Existing state-of-the-art system design methodologiesfor both hardware and softwaretypically treat
laws and regulations as external requirements that systems must satisfy; however, such approaches fail
to capture either the intricacies of underlying legal requirements or the dynamic nature of social norms
and expectations. This makes designing systems that support PPDSA technologies challenging since
these systems must handle evolving legal or regulatory landscape, provide provable compliance
guarantees, and support transparency and accountability concerning the regulatory process, while also
satisfying privacy expectations or requirements driven by users’ preferences and social context.
Thus, significant research at the intersection of technology, policy, law, regulation, and social and
economic sciences should be accelerated to foster a more consistent understanding of privacy threats or
risks, harms, and legal implications, as well as other data protection compliance issues. A consistent
understanding of privacy issues is critical to support better design, implementation, and compliant use
of PPDSA solutions in a constantly evolving legal and regulatory landscape. R&D efforts are needed to
ensure real progress toward achieving a future in which PPDSA technologies can be widely adopted for
the benefit of individuals and society. Such research efforts should foster the use or development of
techniques such as boundary objects methods. This allows entities or experts from different disciplines
or technical, social, policy, or regulatory contexts to bring their local perspectives and collaboratively
solve a global problem - to support reasoning about the development and deployment of PPDSA
solutions.
Finally, an often-overlooked area of research that applies across the span of sociotechnical research is
public awareness. For PPDSA technologies to be employed effectively, policymakers, organizations, and
the general public will need an appropriate level of understanding of such technologies. Research is
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needed to identify the most effective ways to communicate and foster public engagement on these
concepts consistently to various audiences.
Different programs within the National Science Foundation
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(NSF) provide potential models to foster
such intensely multidisciplinary PPDSA research. The Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC)
program is promoting broader social, behavioral, and economic research in the context of cybersecurity
and privacy areas. The Designing Accountable Software Systems program also encourages research that
addresses software system design approaches that are accountable within the context of regulatory and
socio-cultural environments and requires multidisciplinary teams in research projects.
Strategic Priority 3: Accelerate Translation to Practice
While foundational and use-inspired R&D is critical for establishing rigorous scientific foundations to
mature PPDSA solutions, it is equally important to cultivate an ecosystem that promotes a timely
translation of theoretical results into real-world implementation and deployment. This requires
significant applied research and engineering and systems development efforts in hardware and software
as well as the promotion of pilot projects and tools. Actions that can establish pathways for translation
and address deployment and adoption challenges are discussed below.
Recommendation 3.a. Promote applied and translational research and systems development
Many emerging PPDSA technologies have tremendous potential, but also have practical deployment
challenges that need to be addressed to facilitate broader adoption. For example, innovative and better
architectural solutions, or efficient and scalable protocols need to be developed for the deployment of
secure multiparty computation, homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proofs, and trusted
execution environments. In many cases, approaches to generate optimized solutions that are
customized to specific application scenarios or constraints need to be developed (e.g., lightweight
protocols for secure multiparty computation for IoT-Edge analytics). Federal funding opportunities and
programs that support translational projects and early-stage startups should be expanded with a focus
on PPDSA technologies to close the gap between theory and practice. NSF programs such as the
Transition to Practice offering within the SaTC program, Innovation Corps, Partnerships for Innovation,
Pathways to enable Open-Source Ecosystems (POSE),
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as well as government-wide small business
innovation research and small business technology transfer programs are important examples of
programs that can be leveraged. Pilot projects, such as those being led by the United Nations PET lab
(see case study in box); prize challenge competitions, e.g., the NIST Differential Privacy challenges
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and US-UK PETs prize challenges (see Strategic Priority 5), and tech sprints, e.g., the Department of
Veterans Affairs AI tech sprints,
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also embody important approaches to accelerate the transition to
practice and maturity of PPDSA technologies.
Recommendation 3.b. Pilot implementation activities within the Federal Government
Federal agencies should explore and identify opportunities to pilot PPDSA technologies and pursue new
forms of data collaboration. For example, Federal statistical agencies could integrate secure multiparty
computation into the implementation of the recently authorized NSDS demonstration, or science
agencies can pilot techniques to safely use electronic health records to drive biomedical research.
Agencies should assess their individual as well as cross-agency data sharing and analytics needs and
opportunities that they are unable to pursue because of privacy concerns or security risks. Pilot projects
allow agencies to demonstrate the value of PPDSA technologies for a specific use case, create and grow
partnerships with technology providers and other participants, gain expertise, and identify gaps that
need to be addressed by policy. However, a pilot project by itself is of limited value if the pilot ends and
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the technology cannot be adopted by an agency. Pilot programs should include plans for how the PPDSA
technologies will be transitioned for a successful deployment.
To complement the existing R&D of the Federal Statistical System to promote and advance PPDSA
solutions, a Federal center of excellence could be established with specialized expertise to provide direct
support to Federal agencies exploring PPDSA technology. The center could support agencies in pursuing
pilot projects, as well as strategic planning, acquisition, and workforce development. There are several
existing centers of excellence within the Federal Government that support the adoption of specific
technologies. These include the General Services Administration’s centers of excellence for AI,
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Cloud
Adoption,
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and NIST's National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence.
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These centers have a track record
of demonstrated success, with NIST's National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence bringing together
industry organizations, government agencies, and academic institutions to address the most pressing
cybersecurity challenges using commercially available products. The General Services Administration's IT
Modernization Centers of Excellence
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reported millions of dollars in cost savings because of their work.
Mirroring existing models, a PPDSA center of excellence would connect private sector innovation with
government services, sharing best practices and expertise from both. To address the challenge of a lack
of awareness of PPDSA technologies, the center could curate and publish a library of exemplary case
studies and use cases and highlight PPDSA solutions’ applicability and benefits to address agency needs.
It would also be beneficial for the center to develop a playbook with a recommended roadmap for
agencies exploring PPDSA adoption. Center of excellence support functions would be informed by the
work of the Federal Statistical System's NSDS demonstration in advancing PPDSA solutions for Federal
data.
Case Study: xD | U.S. Census Bureau and United Nations Privacy-Enhancing Technology Lab
Challenge: The United Nations Statistical Division realized the importance and opportunity of PETs for National
Statistical Organizations across the world. Yet, it is often difficult to test the capabilities and realities of these
possibilities. A small group of countries joined to form the UN PET Lab, a space to pilot the use of these technologies,
experiment, share, and learn together. The Census Bureau represents the United States through its emerging
technologies group, xD.
Approach: In 2022, the UN PET Lab ran a pilot study to test the ability to query data across a network made up of the
countries and the UN without seeing the data itself. They did this by deploying an open-source software called PySyft
and loading in open trade data to de-risk initial testing. Several PPDSA techniques were used including aspects of
remote execution, secure multiparty computation, and differential privacy to enable each country to compare import
and export statistics without fully accessing them. The Census Bureau also utilized aspects of Zero Trust as part of this
deployment.
Impact: This pilot represents one of the first feasibility studies utilizing PPDSA techniques in this way and in an
international context, illustrating the effectiveness and capabilities of PPDSA technologies today and encouraging their
continued adoption and future potential. It also suggests that models like the UN PET Lab may be promising structures
for organizing around PPDSA technologies and continuing to build out what further impact could look like.
Recommendation 3.c. Establish technical standards for PPDSA technologies
Voluntary, consensus-based standards will play a critical role in facilitating the adoption of PPDSA
technologies. Standards for PPDSA technologies remain at a nascent stage of development, as industry,
government, academia, and standards-developing organizations work to assess the maturity of the
technologies and bridge the divide between theory and practice.
Existing sector-specific or use case-specific standards for security and privacy do not describe how
organizations and implementers can or should use PPDSA technologies to meet overall system
objectives. Without such standards, organizations seeking to use or implement PPDSA solutions lack
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clear guidance that could ease deployment or provide confidence that such technologies would be
accepted or meet sector-specific requirements. Further complicating the development of standards is
the quick evolution of the field and the lack of standard taxonomy.
Standards-developing organizations and industry consortia, in collaboration with academia, should
prioritize the creation of technical standards for PPDSA, and ensure that functional standards, protocols,
or other specifications are drafted so that they will not become obsolete when PPDSA technologies are
implemented. Establishing these standards can provide a common framework to guide PPDSA
technologies' adoption, mitigate risks and biases, facilitate development of certifications, and promote
implementation in commercial products and services while facilitating interoperability between
vendors. Formalizing standards can also signal acceptance of PPDSA approaches at a national or
international level and create benchmarks to help organizations evaluate solutions and measure
successful deployments.
The Federal Government should strategically engage with academia, the private sector, and standards
development organizations to study and develop standards for PPDSA technologies. In addition,
participating groups should identify and prioritize use cases associated with PPDSA technical standards.
A variety of application techniques exist across different categories of PPDSA technologies; however,
many must be tailored for particular use cases to provide the necessary properties.
Recommendation 3.d. Accelerate efforts to develop standardized taxonomies, tool repositories,
measurement methods, benchmarking, and testbeds
Having the right resources in place will facilitate and accelerate the responsible adoption of PPDSA
technologies and enable participatory design approaches. Given the complexity and variety of both
PPDSA technologies and privacy issues, a standardized taxonomy is needed to facilitate discussions at
every point in the PPDSA lifecycle. Tools are needed to assist users in configuring and managing PPDSA
solutions (e.g., differential privacy parameter tuning), understanding information leakage or auditing for
privacy violations, visualizing data and analytics results in a privacy-preserving manner, and
understanding privacy versus accuracy tradeoffs, etc.
Open-source software provides organizations the opportunity to build out PPDSA capabilities and
processes to support business goals while gaining expertise in the use and application of PPDSA
technologies. Open-source libraries for PPDSA technology implementations have been developed in
recent years but have varying levels of maturity. Successful PPDSA technology deployments require
high-quality software implementations that are correct, efficient, documented, and well-maintained so
that when vulnerabilities are discovered, they can be rapidly addressed. If available with low-cost or free
licenses via open source, one of the barriers to the adoption of PPDSA technologies could be lowered.
The Federal Government should explore opportunities to fund open-source efforts in support of the
PPDSA ecosystem. For example, with its new POSE program, NSF is supporting organizations that will
facilitate the creation and growth of a sustainable high impact open-source ecosystem around open-
source research products. In addition, when Federal agencies develop PPDSA solutions, they should
make those solutions publicly available whenever possible. For example, the Census Bureau published
the complete code base for its differential privacy solution used for the 2020 Census.
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Accelerating PPDSA adoption will also require building testbeds and testing infrastructure to support
experimentation with and evaluation of PPDSA solutions for different use cases and application
scenarios. Such efforts should include the curation of a variety of datasets representing different use
cases and scenarios that can be broadly applied for testing and exploration of sociotechnical approaches
to testing, evaluation, verification, and validation of AI systems. These approaches connect the
technology to societal values and provide recommended guidance for deployment.
89
The NIST Privacy Framework can serve as an important baseline tool to help identify privacy priorities
and risks, and whether PPDSA technologies can help meet these needs. In addition, the NIST Privacy
Engineering Collaboration Space provides a repository for open-source tools and use cases.
90
However,
additional tools are needed to help assess which PPDSA technologies could help meet privacy needs and
mitigate identified risks. The Federal Government should support the development of tools such as
decision aids and playbooks to guide how PPDSA technologies can be implemented in compliance with
privacy requirements or governance models and facilitate participatory design approaches. For example,
an authoritative PPDSA technology guide could be developed, which would act as a living reference for
what PPDSA approaches are, the maturity levels of specific PPDSA technologies, and for which
applications and problems technologies are well suited. Furthermore, the Federal Government should
regularly collect, curate, and publish case studies of PPDSA solutionsdeployments across the public and
private sectors. A repository of successful deployments for case studies will enable interested parties to
appreciate illustrative examples of how PPDSA technologies can be deployed, made compliant with
privacy regulations and requirements, and managed with minimal privacy risks and harms.
Recommendation 3.e. Improve usability and inclusiveness of PPDSA solutions
Efficient design and implementation of PPDSA solutions, especially when considering making a product
usable and inclusive, can require substantial customization and engineering efforts. Today's PPDSA
technologies and tools are complex in how they are programmed, configured, and managed. They vary
in the privacy-preserving functions and guarantees that are provided across different application
scenarios. For example, addressing privacy concerns in an AI application may require integrating
cryptographic (e.g., secure multiparty computation or fully homomorphic encryption) and non-
cryptographic (e.g., differential privacy) techniques, each of which brings complexities in achieving a
desired level of privacy. Such complexities can affect their usability, which in turn impacts decisions to
adopt PPDSA solutions. Organizations need usable tools that facilitate the understanding of the
performance of the PPDSA technology, the privacy implications of their use, and the value derived from
their use.
Among solution developers and practitioners, usability improvements should focus on users and user
groups with varying capabilities and limitations and should include efforts geared toward improving ease
of use, clarity of results, and accessibility. Ideally, the development community would collaborate to
determine accepted standards on the usability design of PPDSA technologies.
Significant and separate efforts are needed to foster the development of inclusive tools that are
designed and implemented based on human factors and social, behavioral, and economic sciences. It is
important to consider the diversity of participants in the PPDSA ecosystem, with an explicit focus on the
underserved, marginalized, and vulnerable groups. To minimize or mitigate harm, inclusion should be
evaluated throughout the development lifecycle of PPDSA. This might include activities that improve
outreach to underserved communities about their needs for PPDSA solutions, mitigate bias in the data
ingestion, aggregation, and refinement process, and determine what specific usability concerns and
impacts underserved and marginalized groups have.
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
30
For both goals of usability and inclusiveness, human-centric approaches should be adopted and
accelerated when developing PPDSA solutions. In such approaches, design choices consider both users
and user groups with varying capabilities and limitations and specific underserved and marginalized
groups. To achieve this, it is essential to co-design such technologies and tools with users by considering
different user roles for data and their different needs and purposes, such as i) data owners or custodians
who want to understand privacy and functionality parameters; ii) data participants who want to
understand privacy and consent policies; and iii) data consumers who want to derive value from privacy-
protected data.
Strategic Priority 4: Build Expertise and Promote Training and Education
Successful research, design, and implementation of PPDSA technologies require not only advanced
technical knowledge, but also policy, data science, and domain expertise, as discussed above. Pulling
together and cultivating cross-disciplinary expertise to effectively adopt PPDSA technologies remains a
challenge for many organizations. From the decision makers who assess the risk and benefits of
implementing PPDSA approaches to the program management and contracting personnel who manage
the acquisition and evaluation of solutions to the technologists who implement the solutions
organizations need to build awareness and expertise across their workforce to effectively deploy and
manage PPDSA technologies. A skilled, future-ready workforce needs to be strategically developed to
facilitate progress toward the vision set out in this strategy.
Recommendation 4.a. Expand institutional expertise in PPDSA technologies
Federal and non-Federal entities have similar needs for recruiting and training personnel to meet the
opportunities and challenges of adopting PPDSA technologies. Within the government, several agencies
have demonstrated expertise in the application of PPDSA technologies to meet their missions. For
example, the Census Bureau adopted differential privacy for the 2020 Census to modernize its approach
to data protection and meet its requirement to ensure the privacy of respondents. The National
Institutes of Health have been piloting privacy-preserving record linkage to bring clinical health data
together without compromising patient privacy.
91
However, a concerted effort is needed to expand expertise in PPDSA technologies across the Federal
Government and within the private sector. NIST should develop a framework for the privacy workforce
analogous to the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) framework
92
for the
cybersecurity workforce. The NICE Framework provides a set of building blocks for describing the tasks,
knowledge, and skills that are needed to carry out cybersecurity work. It enables organizations to
develop their workforces to perform cybersecurity work, and it helps individuals engage in appropriate
learning activities to develop their expertise. The development of a framework that defines the
analogous set of tasks, knowledge, and skills needed for PPDSA solutions would assist Federal and non-
Federal entities in cultivating expertise across interdisciplinary fields that contribute to PPDSA research
and adoption. The framework could also be used to support direct-hire authorities for Federal positions
with broader privacy expertise, including privacy engineering.
Building capacity across civil society and in communities affected by the use of PPDSA approaches will
also be critical to providing civil society with tools to engage meaningfully in the PPDSA ecosystem and
explore opportunities for employment of PPDSA solutions.
Organizations across sectors can leverage rotational opportunities to grow expertise among
government, academia, and industry. Government programs provide the means to share expertise in
the use of new technologies and approaches to solving governmental problems. The Intergovernmental
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
31
Personnel Act Mobility Program
93
and models for collaboration such as the Presidential Innovation
Fellows,
94
the U.S. Digital Service,
95
and the Census Bureau’s Emerging Technology Fellowship
96
should
be leveraged and promoted to add external expertise to government agencies through permanent or
term-limited appointments. Private organizations should similarly invest in building their internal privacy
workforce by providing training opportunities for employees and establishing rotational programs with
academia or other organizations.
In addition to these opportunities to grow expertise, organizations should consider using certification
programs that have bodies of knowledge inclusive of PPDSA technology, privacy by design, and other
key topics needed to meet workforce development goals for successful PPDSA adoption. These are
available from different associations, institutions, and consortiums.
Recommendation 4.b. Educate and train participants on the appropriate use and deployment of
PPDSA technologies
Privacy concepts are complex, as are PPDSA technologies. In many cases, even data curators are unsure
about the privacy risks and what privacy solutions are best for various data sharing and analytics tasks.
Thus, there is a need to adopt a holistic approach to better educate and train individuals of all ages and
data professionals in all sectors to navigate the PPDSA landscape, building bridges between technical
and non-technical communities.
It is important to develop effective ways to educate and train K-12 students, professionals in the
workforce, members of civil society organizations, and marginalized and vulnerable populations. This
should include the creation of specialized training and educational outreach activities and materials.
Training should cover topics such as data sharing, PPDSA technologies, equity considerations, and
procurement, and be tailored for different groups of participants and practitioners. These efforts should
include and foster critical thinking and promote privacy and ethics literacy. In addition, investments
should be made to support research in educational methods to develop innovative, effective
techniques, or to transition such techniques from the broader field of computer science education to
educate and train future generations on privacy and PPDSA.
Recommendation 4.c. Expand privacy curricula in academia
Privacy education in academia is still in its early stages, typically bundled as a small part of cybersecurity
or computer or information science-related educational programs. Given the growing role of privacy in
society and the pervasiveness of privacy concerns in the socio-technological ecosystem, it is imperative
to significantly promote privacy education in academia, with a particular focus on PPDSA, not only for
those pursuing technical studies but also in the context of ethics, law, social sciences, and other fields.
Educational institutions should inform and integrate the growth of PPDSA-related topics into their
curricula.
Federal agencies should establish incentives and funding mechanisms to foster privacy education. For
instance, NSF has been funding projects focused on curriculum development as well as educational
research in broad areas of cybersecurity for over two decades. Particular attention should be paid to
support privacy education capacity building among HBCUs, TCUs, and MSIs.
In addition, the National Security Agency's Centers of Academic Excellence
97
program for designating
educational institutions that meet cybersecurity educational standards and active research could be
leveraged to build and promote privacy education, including possibly creating a CAE-Privacy designation
program. CAEs have had a significant impact on the growth of formal cybersecurity education over the
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
32
past two decades, and similar approaches could help advance privacy education, including building
ethical considerations into privacy approaches.
Toward fostering the next-generation workforce that can tackle challenges related to realizing the
PPDSA vision, Federal agencies should explore leveraging existing scholarship for service programs and
center-level partnerships with universities to expand and accelerate opportunities to build a PPDSA
workforce. Special attention should be paid to developing PPDSA workforce opportunities within HBCUs,
TCUs, and MSIs.
Strategic Priority 5: Foster International Collaboration on PPDSA
PPDSA technologies hold the potential to bring together governments, companies, and civil society to
solve shared problems such as pandemics and climate change while complying with relevant privacy
laws and regulations and upholding privacy rights. Creating a healthy global PPDSA ecosystem is central
to this vision. To make this type of global collaboration a reality, the U.S. must work with other
governments to develop, implement, and build domestic and international trust in PPDSA technologies.
International cooperation will provide reciprocal benefits and help ensure that PPDSA R&D
accommodates different legal and cultural understandings of privacy.
The Federal Government should cultivate international collaborations that support PPDSA technologies,
open markets for U.S. industries working on PPDSA technologies, and the development and adoption of
PPDSA technologies in a manner consistent with national interests and guiding principles detailed
above. The following actions will promote strategic partnerships with developed and emerging
economies aligned with U.S. interests and values to collaboratively address national and global
challenges.
Recommendation 5.a. Foster bilateral and multilateral engagements related to a PPDSA
ecosystem
The United States currently engages with allies and partners to promote partnerships and an
international policy environment that furthers the development and adoption of PPDSA technologies
and supports common values while protecting national and economic security. Accordingly, the State
Department partners with many other Federal agencies to facilitate engagements with U.S. allies and
partners to support the responsible development, deployment, use, and governance of inclusive and
trustworthy PPDSA technologies.
U.S.-U.K. Privacy-Enhancing Technologies Prize Challenges
98
To mature federated learning approaches and build trust in their adoption, the U.S. and U.K. Governments partnered
on a set of prize challenges designed to strengthen privacy protections across the development and deployment of
federated learning models. Innovators from academia, industry, and the broader public had the opportunity to
participate in up to two separate tracks (improving the detection of financial crime and forecasting an individual’s risk
of infection during a pandemic) as well as the option to design one generalized solution that works for both scenarios
for broader applicability. The challenges have been led by NIST and NSF, in cooperation with OSTP, in partnership with
the U.K.'s Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation and Innovate UK. Participants competed for cash prizes from a total
prize pool of approximately $1.6m/£1.3m and engaged through the challenge with regulators, government agencies,
and global companies.
The Federal Government should increase touchpoints and mechanisms to collaborate with international
partners and allies, from the leadership level down to individual scientists and program managers, to
support PPDSA R&D and adoption activities. Specifically, the Federal Government should do the
following:
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
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Support international workshops and meetings of experts. The U.S. is uniquely positioned to convene
international workshops and build partnerships with private and public sectors, as well as with civil
society organizations, to drive innovation in the technological development and application of novel
PPDSA techniques. These efforts can identify comparative strengths for these technologies through
inclusive engagements and enable allies and partners to develop a common vision and expectations for
the development and adoption of PPDSA technologies.
Pursue pilot projects and research collaborations. These collaborations can include pilot projects that
assess the viability of implementing PPDSA technologies to work out technical and policy challenges in
an iterative fashion, prize challenges and competitions that spur innovators to solve specific technical
problems, and joint funding opportunities for U.S. teams to collaborate with counterparts in another
country. Such initiatives could illuminate where and how PPDSA technologies can overcome existing
barriers to international research collaboration posed by differing regulatory environments governing
data sharing. The State Department engages in dialogues on a bilateral basis that strengthen
partnerships, including through the development and implementation of Science and Technology
Agreements. The State Department should add PPDSA R&D to the portfolios of these relationships and
help Federal research funding agencies to collaborate on PPDSA research with their international
counterparts.
Participate in bilateral and multilateral fora to advance the responsible adoption of PPDSA
technologies. While setting policies to promote the development and adoption of PPDSA solutions
domestically, it is important to recognize the diverse international views on privacy, technology, and
data. PETs will require close international collaboration on technology standards, norms, and R&D. Both
bilateral and multilateral discussions are needed to bring insights and positive examples on how to
facilitate 21
st
-century cross-border data collaborations using PPDSA approaches. The development of
PPDSA technology-focused bilateral discussions and agreements should be prioritized.
The power of data-sharing internationally will be greatest when many states can participate. To this end,
the U.S. must encourage and lead multilateral efforts to develop PPDSA technologies that can operate
under the privacy requirements of many nations. There are promising multilateral initiatives to test and
research PPDSA technologies, and other multilateral groups have expressed interest in the potential of
PPDSA technologies. Greater efforts are needed to create a vibrant international PPDSA ecosystem.
At a September 2022 Roundtable, the Data Protection and Privacy Authorities of the G7
99
recognized
that PPDSA technologies can enable beneficial data sharing and stated their intention to advance their
responsible and innovative use.” Their communique also called for the industry to develop technical
standards and for governments to invest in PPDSA R&D.
Several multilateral fora are also incorporating PPDSA solutions into their agendas, such as the U.S.-EU.
Trade and Technology Council and the Global Partnership on AI. The United States should continue to
actively engage in these venues to facilitate progress on maturing PPDSA approaches, accelerating
adoption, and putting in place guardrails for responsible use.
Recommendation 5.b. Explore the role of PPDSA technologies to enable cross-border
collaboration
The growing internet connectivity and the digitization of the global economy have resulted in rapid
increases in the collection, use, and transfer of data across borders. PPDSA technologies may be able to
enable trusted cross-border data sharing to further enable U.S. practitioners to create a flexible, open
information-sharing environment. This open model recognizes the value of data sharing, both within
and across countries, and seeks to preserve cross-border data flows. PPDSA technologies can help the
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
34
world maintain this open model of data sharing while promoting data security and privacy. Certain
PPDSA technologies can change the traditional conception of data flows by enabling the sharing of
insights without sharing or exposing the actual data. The Federal Government should develop and
enhance international collaborations across entities, sectors, and borders to help tackle shared
challenges, such as health care, climate change, financial crime, human trafficking, and pandemic
response—while mitigating privacy concerns.
A cohesive U.S. national approach for using PPDSA technologies to facilitate trusted cross-border data
sharing will incubate relationships between academia and industry, both early-stage start-ups and
leading technology companies. The Federal Government can build on the collective strengths of this
robust group of innovators to enable the future of data collaboration and data flows that uphold U.S.
core democratic values.
Effective implementation of PPDSA technologies requires not only foundational science and technology
research but also the wider deployment of certification schemes that can both promote privacy and
facilitate cross-border data flows and the development of these systems in a manner that can
incorporate PPDSA technologies. The Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) certification model is an
example of a voluntary certification process that allows companies to establish baseline compliance with
different data protection laws across multiple jurisdictions through adherence to a core set of
internationally-recognized common privacy protections, which can then be effectively enforced across
all member jurisdictions that participate in the CBPR system and thus allow companies to transfer
personal data across all participating jurisdictions. Bringing PPDSA technologies into such arrangements
will build trust in the privacy protections of cross-border data flows, allowing their expansion and their
benefits to be extended to larger and larger communitieswhile protecting fundamental rights.
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
35
Conclusion
PPDSA technologies have the potential to catalyze American innovation and creativity by facilitating
data sharing and analytics while protecting sensitive information. This type of data sharing and analytics,
leveraging advances in privacy-enhancing technologies, can advance research, unlock new insights, and
enhance data-driven decision-making to address climate change, public health, social equity, and other
challenges. Leveraging data at scale holds the power to drive transformative innovation. These
important benefits must be promoted, while work is done to minimize potential problematic outcomes,
i.e., violating individual privacy and undercutting fundamental rights. PPDSA technologies can play a
critical role in protecting these ideals while enabling data analytics that will contribute to improvements
in the quality of life of the American people.
While there are significant barriers to achieving this outcome and bringing PPDSA technologies to a
mature state in which they can realistically be deployed at a large scale, this Strategy provides a path
forward for impactful PPDSA solutions. R&D is needed, both to mature certain capabilities but also to
deploy PPDSA technologies that are advanced but still present implementation challenges. A socio-
technical approach toward PPDSA technologies that examine the interactions between technology and
users, organizations, communities, and society as a whole will be critical to achieving the vision of this
Strategy and upholding its guiding principles. Foundational multidisciplinary research is needed to better
understand the nature of privacy and how PPDSA technologies can best augment privacy. This includes
studying how people understand privacy and PPDSA approaches and how best to communicate these
technical concepts in a manner that encourages their adoption.
There are immediate steps to be taken beyond research. Standards and taxonomies need to be
developed to facilitate adoption. The workforce, particularly privacy professionals, needs to be educated
about PPDSA solutions. Guidance is needed on how PPDSA approaches can meet statutory and
regulatory privacy requirements. Institutions such as a steering group, large-scale privacy research
centers, and centers for excellence will need to be established to ensure there are venues for the
development and responsible adoption of PPDSA technologies. The development and deployment of
PPDSA technology extend beyond U.S. borders making privacy-protecting cross-border data sharing
invaluable as it can fuel global research, safety, security, and commerce. Finally, PPDSA technologies on
their own will not prevent privacy incidents nor the insights derived from data sharing and analytics
from being used in ways that could undermine democratic values. Strong governance and norms around
use must support the growth of the PPDSA ecosystem.
This Strategy serves as a roadmap, providing background on the current state of PPDSA technologies
and a series of recommendations to turn their potential for enabling privacy-protected data sharing and
analysis into reality and fulfilling the vision statement that anchored this Strategy:
Privacy-preserving data sharing and analytics technologies help advance the well-being and
prosperity of individuals and society, and promote science and innovation in a manner that
affirms democratic values.
From here, OSTP, in partnership with the National Economic Council, will focus and coordinate Federal
activities to advance the priorities put forward in this Strategy.
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
36
Appendix A: Abbreviations and Acronyms
AI
Artificial Intelligence
CBPR
Cross-Border Privacy Rules
CDC
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CHIPS
Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors for America
COVID-19
Coronavirus Disease 2019
DARPA
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DOE
Department of Energy
ED
Department of Education
DOS
Department of State
DOT
Department of Transportation
FTAC
Fast-Track Action Committee
GDPR
General Data Protection Regulation
HBCU
Historically Black College or University
HHS
Department of Health and Human Services
HIPAA
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
IoT
Internet of Things
IRB
Institutional Review Board
ML
Machine Learning
MSI
Minority-Serving Institution
NICE
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education
NIH
National Institutes of Health
NIST
National Institute of Standards and Technology
NITRD
Networking and Information Technology Research and Development
NSDS
National Secure Data Service
NSF
National Science Foundation
NSTC
National Science and Technology Council
NTIA
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
ODNI
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OSTP
Office of Science and Technology Policy
P3P
Platform for Privacy Preferences Project
PET
Privacy-enhancing Technology
PPDSA
Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
PPRL
Privacy-Preserving Record Linkage
R&D
Research and Development
SaTC
Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace
TCU
Tribal Colleges and Universities
UK
United Kingdom
VA
Department of Veterans Affairs
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
37
Endnotes
1
While protecting privacy is generally associated with individual persons, many of the data protection challenges
and solutions discussed in this report apply equally to protecting the confidentiality of entities, such as
businesses or other organizations.
2
NIH Workshop on the Policy and Ethics of Record Linkage: Workshop Summary | Data Science at NIH. (2021,
June). NIH Policy and Ethics of Record Linkage Workshop.
https://datascience.nih.gov/nih-policy-and-ethics-of-
record-linkage-workshop-summary
3
Clifton, C. (n.d.). A Roadmap for Greater Public Use of Privacy-Sensitive Government Data: Workshop Report.
arXiv.org. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2208.01636.pdf
4
The White House. (2022, October 4). National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) - OSTP - The White House.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/nstc/
5
The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program. (n.d.). The
Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program. https://www.nitrd.gov/
6
The FTAC also serves as a coordination mechanism for Federal initiatives related to privacy-preserving data
sharing and analytics, as well as other domestic and international efforts that may arise in the near term.
7
Data Boston Women’s Workforce Council. (n.d.). Boston Women’s Workforce Council.
https://thebwwc.org/wage-gap-studies
8
U.S. Census Bureau. (2021, November 18). Statistical Safeguards. census.gov.
https://www.census.gov/about/policies/privacy/statistical_safeguards.html
9
Sheller, M. J., Edwards, et al. (2020). Federated learning in medicine: facilitating multi-institutional
collaborations without sharing patient data. Scientific Reports, 10(1).
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-
69250-1
10
Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018. congress.gov.
https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ435/PLAW-115publ435.pdf
11
Federal Data Strategy. (n.d.). Federal Data Strategy. https://strategy.data.gov/overview/
12
Office of Management and Budget (Executive Office of the President). (2019, June 4). Federal Data Strategy - A
Framework for Consistency. whitehouse.gov.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/M-
19-18.pdf
13
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), & Nelson, Dr. A. (2022, August 25). Ensuring Free, Immediate,
and Equitable Access to Federally Funded Research. whitehouse.gov.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/08/08-2022-OSTP-Public-Access-Memo.pdf
14
CHIPS ACT OF 2022. congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ167/PLAW-117publ167.pdf
15
The Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) Office of Data
Science and Sharing (ODSS). (n.d.). Privacy Preserving Record Linkage (PPRL) For Pediatric Covid-19 Studies.
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD).
https://www.nichd.nih.gov/sites/default/files/inline-files/NICHD_ODSS_PPRL_for_Pediatric_COVID-
19_Studies_Public_Final_Report_508.pdf
16
Office of Science Policy. (2023, February 27). NIH Workshop: Using Public Engagement to Inform the Use of Data
in Biomedical Research.
https://osp.od.nih.gov/events/nih-workshop-using-public-engagement-to-inform-the-
use-of-data-in-biomedical-research/
17
As stated in the National Privacy Research Strategy: “Privacy is surprisingly hard to characterize. A full treatment
of privacy requires a consideration of ethics and philosophy, sociology and psychology, law and government,
economics, and technology. Embodying such broad considerations, the Federal Government’s approach has
been guided by the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), a framework for understanding stakeholder
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
38
considerations utilizing concepts of fairness, due process, and information security.” Office of Science and
Technology Policy (2016). National Privacy Research Strategy.
https://www.nitrd.gov/PUBS/NationalPrivacyResearchStrategy.pdf
18
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2022, June 16). The NIST Privacy Framework: A Tool for
Improving Privacy through Enterprise Risk Management. nist.gov.
https://www.nist.gov/privacy-
framework/privacy-framework
19
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (n.d.). NIST Privacy Framework: A Tool for Improving Privacy
through Enterprise Risk Management. NIST Privacy Framework.
https://www.nist.gov/itl/applied-
cybersecurity/privacy-engineering/resources
20
Disassociability is focused on enabling the processing of data or events without association with individuals or
devices beyond the operational requirements of the system. Manageability is focused on providing the
capability for granular administration of data, including alteration, deletion, and selective disclosure.
Predictability is focused on enabling reliable assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators about data and
their processing by a system, product, or service. National Institute of Standards and Technology. NIST (2020,
January). The NIST Privacy Framework: A Tool for Improving Privacy through Enterprise Risk Management.
https://www.nist.gov/privacy-framework/privacy-framework
21
Big Data UN Global Working Group (n.d.). UN Handbook on Privacy-Preserving Computation Techniques. United
Nations.
https://unstats.un.org/bigdata/task-teams/privacy/UN%20Handbook%20for%20Privacy-
Preserving%20Techniques.pdf
22
Kwon, A., AlSabah, M., Lazar, D., Dacier, M., Devadas, S. et al. (2015). Circuit Fingerprinting Attacks: Passive
Deanonymization of Tor Hidden Services. Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX.
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity15/sec15-paper-kwon.pdf
23
Request for Information on Advancing Privacy-Enhancing Technologies. (2022, June 9). Federal Register.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/09/2022-12432/request-for-information-on-advancing-
privacy-enhancing-technologies
24
Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program. (2022, September 6).
Public Input on Advancing Privacy-Enhancing Technologies. The Networking and Information Technology
Research and Development (NITRD) Program. https://www.nitrd.gov/87-fr-35250-responses/
25
Data Ethics Framework. (n.d.). Data Ethics Framework. https://resources.data.gov/assets/documents/fds-data-
ethics-framework.pdf
26
Office of Science and Technology Policy. (2022). The Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights. whitehouse.gov.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Blueprint-for-an-AI-Bill-of-Rights.pdf
27
Fifth U.S. Open Government National Action Plan. (2022, December). U.S. Open Government Initiatives.
https://open.usa.gov/assets/files/NAP5-fifth-open-government-national-action-plan.pdf
28
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2020, January). The NIST Privacy Framework: A Tool for
Improving Privacy through Enterprise Risk Management. nist.gov.
https://www.nist.gov/privacy-
framework/privacy-framework
29
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (n.d.). Cybersecurity Framework.
https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework
30
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2023, January 26). AI Risk Management Framework. nist.gov.
https://www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework
31
Bagdasaryan, E., Poursaeed, O., & Shmatikov, V. (2019, December). Differential privacy has disparate impact on
model accuracy. ACM Digital Library. https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.5555/3454287.3455674
32
The Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology. (n.d.). Subcommittee on Updating Statistical Methods for
Safeguarding Protected Data. FCMS.gov. https://www.fcsm.gov/resources/safe-guard-data/
National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics
39
33
The Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology. (n.d.). Subcommittee on Updating Statistical Methods for
Safeguarding Protected Data. FCSM.gov. https://www.fcsm.gov/resources/safe-guard-data/
34
Privacy Act of 1974. congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-88/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf
35
Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002. congress.gov.
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