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CHAPTER 5 - USE OF FIREARMS
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 This chapter provides an overview of the Police Service’s use of firearms and the
tactics, training and different capabilities involved, as well as individual officers’
responsibilities in accordance with the law.
2. CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN WEAPONS MAY BE FIRED
2.1 Firearms may be fired by AFOs in the course of their duty only when absolutely
necessary after traditional methods have been tried and failed or must, from the
nature of the circumstances, be unlikely to succeed if tried.
2.2 Police should not normally fire warning shots. There are serious risks associated
with the firing of such shots, which have the potential to cause unintentional death
or injury. They may also lead a subject or other officer to believe that they are
under fire. (Warning shots are not permitted in Scotland)
2.3 An officer will only be justified in resorting to the discharge of a warning shot(s) in
the most serious and exceptional of circumstances, where failure to do so would
result in the loss of life or serious injury. Police officers who discharge a firearm
under any circumstances must give full consideration to public safety.
2.4 The test of using ‘force which is no more than absolutely necessary’ as set out
in Article 2 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, should be applied in
relation to the operational discharge of any weapon.
3. INDIVIDUAL OFFICER’S RESPONSIBILITY
3.1 The ultimate responsibility for firing a weapon rests with the individual officer, who
is answerable ultimately to the law in the courts. Individual officers are accountable
and responsible for all rounds they fire and must be in a position to justify them in
the light of their legal responsibilities and powers. Any discharge of a weapon other
than in training, whether intentional or otherwise, must be reported by the officer
concerned. The pointing of a firearm at any person may constitute an assault and
must also be reported and recorded.
4. ORAL WARNING
4.1 AFOs shall identify themselves as such and shall give a clear warning of their intent
to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warnings to be observed, unless to do so
would unduly place any person at a risk of death or serious harm, or it would be
clearly inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances of the incident.
5. AUTHORITY TO FIRE
5.1 A Gold or Silver Commander can authorise when shots MAY be fired but such
authorisation will not exempt an individual from their responsibility. No general rule
can be laid down and much will depend on the circumstances of individual incidents.
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However, it may also be appropriate for a Commander to direct that shots WILL be
fired. Such a direction will not exempt an individual from their responsibilty and,
therefore, must always be supported by appropriate and necessary information to
justify the firer’s actions. An example of circumstances where directed fire may be
necessary would be in seige or terrorist incidents e.g. suicide bombers.
6. OPENING FIRE
6.1 When it is considered necessary to open fire on a subject, using conventional
ammunition, police officers need to shoot to stop an imminent threat to life. The
imminence of any threat should be judged, in respect to the potential for loss of life,
with due regard to legislation and consideration of necessity, reasonableness and
proportionality. Research has indicated that only shots hitting the central nervous
system (which is largely located in the central body mass) are likely to be effective
in achieving rapid incapacitation. Shots which strike other parts of the body cannot
be depended upon to achieve this.
6.2 Research has also shown that the accuracy of shots fired under training conditions
is generally greater than in operational circumstances. Police officers are therefore
normally trained to fire at the largest part of the target they can see which in most
cases will be the central body mass.
6.3 Alternative points of aim will be appropriate for approved less lethal technologies in
accordance with guidelines, i.e. the use of baton rounds with the intention that they
should strike the lower part of a subject’s body. As no such technology can be
guaranteed as non-lethal, opening fire with such weaponry should only be considered
within existing legislation in respect to necessity, reasonableness and proportionality
and should only be with the intention to stop an imminent threat to life or of serious
injury. This acknowledges that, in law, consideration of proportionality would indicate
that it may be lawful to use less lethal technologies before weapons firing
conventional ammunition. This is not intended to be a hierarchy in respect to use
of force, however, AFOs may be able to justify use of less lethal technologies at an
earlier stage during the escalation of any threat.
6.4 Officers should constantly assess the need for any further action depending on the
threat posed.
7. PUBLIC IMAGE OF POLICE OPERATIONS
7.1 Police operations involving the deployment of AFOs are of particular interest to the
media and the general public. The reputation of the Police Service is always at
stake, and can be affected particularly by the physical appearance and deportment
of armed officers in public. It is important for public confidence that by their bearing
and conduct police officers are seen to be well trained and disciplined in handling
potentially lethal weapons.
7.2 The overriding principle is that officers should be readily identifiable as police officers.
They should therefore, whenever practicable, wear unmistakable Police uniform
but it is recognised that different clothing may be worn for operational reasons.
7.3 As a general rule, camouflage type clothing is required only by Rifle Officers engaged
in surveillance.
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8. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TACTICS
8.1 Police officers are at greatest risk when called upon to deal with armed subjects if
they act upon their own initiative. A form of tactics is necessary in order to minimise
danger, particularly in the early (and probably unarmed) stages of an incident.
8.2 Tactics can be defined as ‘plans and means in carrying out a scheme or achieving
some end’. They should be formed by the application of common sense, reinforced
by teamwork, a knowledge of firearms including their capabilities and limitations,
some special techniques and a knowledge of the law. The tactical options then
used will depend upon the information available and the threat assessment made
(referred to in the Conflict Management Model in Chapter 2 and expanded in Part II
of this Manual).
Aims
8.3 The aim of most operations involving AFOs is to IDENTIFY, LOCATE, CONTAIN,
and NEUTRALISE the threat posed. While conflict management within the Police
Service normally aims to manage / minimise threats, the degree of threat justifying
the deployment of AFOs is such that it must be neutralised (i.e. ensuring no continuing
threat exists).
Investigative Assessment
8.4 Tactics should be sufficiently flexible to take into account situations where the initial
intelligence is insufficient to confirm or negate the nature or existence of a threat. In
such situations further investigation by unarmed officers may be deemed
inappropriate. Consideration should be given to further investigative assessment
(with authorised firearms deployment) being carried out by AFOs in a more discreet
operation with the following aims:
a. To gather sufficient information to either confirm or negate the intelligence in
respect of the nature or existence of a threat.
b. To be in a position to immediately contain the situation should the need arise.
c. To be in a position to neutralise the threat, again, should the need arise.
Right to Life
8.5 It is the duty of the Police Service to safeguard the public.
8.6 In keeping with the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
the rights of all people must be considered, including those of the subject. Each
individual’s right to life is absolute. However, potentially lethal force may be used if
it is absolutely necessary for the legitimate aims outlined in Article 2 of the ECHR.
8.7 Police officers must not be expected to endanger their own lives or the lives of their
colleagues in ill-considered attempts at rescue, or to effect an early arrest. However,
in accordance with the primary aim, an early consideration must be the deployment
of police officers between any threat and the public. Consequently, the availability
and deployment of trained and equipped AFOs provides the service with an
appropriate armed response which meets the aim to safeguard the public.
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9. ENVIRONMENTS
9.1 Each of the following tactical options has the potential to interfere with individuals’
rights under the ECHR and should therefore only be used when it is considered
that the option is lawful and a proportionate response to an identified threat.
Armed Subjects in Buildings
9.2 Police officers constantly visit premises in the course of their normal policing duties
for a wide variety of reasons. These visits are usually carried out by unarmed officers
but there are occasions, when an assessment of the threat level and the application
of the criteria for the issue of firearms means the sending of unarmed officers is not
appropriate.
9.3 The tactics adopted in such cases will be governed by the information available
concerning the potential threat but at the lowest level it may be necessary to do no
more than arm the officers for their own protection when going to a particular address.
In these circumstances, the weapons should usually be carried covertly holstered.
Once the officers have completed their attendance, they will normally leave without
anybody in the vicinity being aware that an operation involving AFOs has taken
place.
9.4 When the threat assessment is greater the tactics used are likely to be more overt.
9.5 A factor for early consideration will be whether the subject is aware of police officers’
presence. Entry into premises by AFOs exposes them and any persons in the building
to a high degree of risk. When practicable the tactic likely to be adopted, once a
subject is aware of police presence, will be one of containment and negotiation
resulting in the subject leaving the premises voluntarily.
9.6 The option is also available to enter premises with the intention of arresting the
subject and securing evidence before they can react if they are not aware of police
officers’ presence. Even so, entry to premises, especially family homes, should
only be attempted after a specific analysis of all the information, all the options, and
a positive decision that entry is the necessary tactic.
9.7 If the subject is aware of police officers’ presence, it may still be necessary for
police to enter premises to save life. These situations may include:
a. A situation involving hostages, where shooting or other extreme violence
commences or is anticipated, and it is believed that lives are at risk.
b. Immediate pursuit of an armed subject, in order to protect lives.
c. A situation where all other means of attempting to establish contact with the
subject or occupants have failed or are not practicable, then entry can be made
to locate the subject. (In these circumstances entry should be slow and
methodical with the sole object of locating the subject).
9.8 It is necessary to distinguish between Dynamic Intervention in hostage rescue
situations, and Dynamic Entry to arrest and secure readily disposable evidence. In
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the former the rescue of hostages is the primary aim, in the latter the benefits of
protecting persons from unlawful violence by securing evidence to place before the
Courts must be considered alongside the risks to all of those involved.
Armed Subjects in the Open
9.9 The particular characteristics of large rural and urban environments present their
own difficulties when pursuing the aims of an operation involving the deployment of
AFOs.
Rural Environment
9.10 Containment of the search area will be the first aim.
9.11 Maps and the full use of local knowledge of the area concerned (together with
aerial photographs if available), should be considered to identify possible places of
concealment / observation.
9.12 The search of open areas, woods, moorland and built up areas is a difficult and
arduous task requiring substantial numbers of people and amounts of equipment.
9.13 The terrain and obstacles will dictate the speed of search operations and the priority
of areas to be searched. The Silver Commander may decide to search obvious
areas of concealment first. Searching during darkness should only be carried out if
absolutely necessary otherwise the area should be secured until daylight. Aerial
observation or technical methods, such as heat sensors may be considered.
Urban Environment
9.14 Subjects in the urban area present particular difficulties for policing operations. The
risk to the public is high because of the density of the population, as is the potential
for the taking of hostages. Police officers’ action must be positive and structured to
quickly contain the location and minimise the risks to all people.
Situations Involving Public Disorder
9.15 There are further considerations which arise where there is a need to deploy AFOs
and/or Baton Gunners amid, or even because of, a threat arising from a situation of
public disorder. These are outlined in Part II of the Manual.
Armed Subjects in Vehicles
9.16 Full account must be taken of the implications for road safety, the ACPO Road
Policing policy on pursuits, and the legal constraints concerning the use of force.
9.17 There are many situations where the police officers may have to deal with armed or
potentially armed subjects in vehicles. Some of which are detailed hereunder:
a. Armed Interceptions
b. Checking stationary subject vehicles
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c. Observation points
d. Static Vehicle Interception Points
e. Proactive Road Checks
f. Armed subjects travelling on motorways
g. Stopping armed subjects at pre-nominated static containment sites
h. The improvised positive road block
9.18 Total physical obstruction of the road is inherently dangerous and should be
implemented only in extreme circumstances and in accordance with individual Force
policies and training. A following operation, regardless of distance, may be preferable
and this should always remain an option.
9.19 Where there are any suspicions that the occupants of a vehicle are in possession
of a firearm, then unarmed police officers should not normally attempt to stop the
vehicle and armed assistance should be sought. However such officers should be
considered to deal with road safety aspects.
9.20 The use of air support, when available, will assist in monitoring the progress of
subjects in vehicles.
Armed Police Interceptions
9.21 The aim of this section is to outline the guidance for operations initiated by the
Police to intercept armed subjects as a result of information that a wanted person
will be in a certain location at a particular time, or that an armed attack is anticipated
on a person, premises, or vehicle.
9.22 The co-ordination of the plan will be of paramount importance to ensure that officers
act in unison, when the Silver Commander decides that the plan will be activated.
9.23 The exposure of officers to the greater degree of risk that this type of operation
entails requires that they be given suitable and adequate protection.
9.24 Uniformed reserves should be available at a discrete distance to quickly respond to
support plain-clothes officers and to deal with members of the public.
9.25 Throughout any operation involving the deployment of AFOs, there is a requirement
to regularly review the need for their deployment. This is particularly important in
interceptions involving armed officers. If as a result of this review, or changing
circumstances it is considered that the armed interception is no longer appropriate,
then the operation should be aborted or modified.
9.26 An alternative to this option is to saturate the area with uniformed officers to deter
the subjects from carrying out their criminal act.
Intention to Arrest / Intercept
9.27 An armed interception during the commission of an offence may increase risks to
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the lives of the people involved. It may even be necessary to abort an operation on
the grounds of public safety
9.28 Factors which may have a bearing on the decision include:
a. The likelihood or otherwise of intelligence or surveillance establishing a better
opportunity / location for arrest.
b. The danger to which people may be exposed while the destination is established,
contained and an arrest plan activated.
c. Availability of sufficient time to plan other options and the prevailing
circumstances at the destination.
d. The necessity of preventing the commission of crimes which may involve danger
to the public on this occasion or in the future.
e. Availability of suitably trained officers and equipment.
9.29 In all circumstances, the risks of employing an option must be balanced with the
risks of not employing it. It should be appreciated that, as in any confrontational
situation, there are inherent dangers. The elements of speed and surprise are
essential in minimising any risk to people.
9.30 If at any time the circumstances which justified an arrest plan/interception change
and the risks involved outweigh the benefits, the operation should be aborted. The
area may be saturated with uniformed officers to deter the subjects from carrying
out their criminal act, but a contingency plan should also be prepared for the
contingency that such saturation may not deter the criminals.
9.31 It may be desirable that opportunities are sought to arrest prior to the commissioning
of an offence (even if this is for lesser offences) rather than putting individuals at
further risk. If this is not possible, then opportunities to arrest following the offence
can be sought.
9.32 See Chapter 3 (Authority to Issue) for the authority level required for the interception
of subjects going to, at or leaving a crime scene.
Surveillance
9.33 Surveillance operations in circumstances that require the deployment of AFOs can
take a number of forms:
a. Where it is not known whether the subject intends to carry out an offence or
conduct a reconnaissance. In these circumstances, the intention will be to
conduct a surveillance operation to gather intelligence / evidence and not
necessarily to effect an immediate arrest.
b. More precise situations where a mobile surveillance operation has been
mounted with the intention of arresting subjects. There are a number of options
available in order to effect the arrest of subjects in these situations, not all of
which involve the enforced stopping of vehicles.
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9.34 In either case, the operation could involve armed mobile surveillance, armed
interception of a mobile subject, or an armed operation in different environments
(e.g. rural/urban). Each of these requires different considerations.
9.35 Command structures should be in accordance with with those already set out in
Chapter 3. The Silver Commander should be located in a position where they are
able to collate, address and react to changing situations. In many circumstances
this will include being positioned in the convoy.
9.36 The location and timing of any vehicle interception is of great importance in ensuring
a successful outcome (with full consideration for people’s safety). It therefore requires
a positive decision by the Silver Commander to implement such a tactic after a
balancing of the likely effects of the different options available.
Waterborne Transportation
9.37 The Police Service does not, unless in extreme circumstances, undertake operations
on water which involve AFOs disembarking at a point where there is an immediate
threat from firearms. Should this be a consideration, a rigorous risk assessment
must be conducted.
9.38 When waterborne transportation crosses Force boundaries, the same protocols
will apply as if the operation was on land.
9.39 The ACPO Diving and Marine Working Group has produced a Code of Practice for
the Construction, Machinery, Equipping, Certification and Crewing of various classes
of “police craft”.
9.40 The responsibility for the safety of the craft, personnel and any equipment on it,
rests at all times with the officer in charge of the craft.
9.41 Marine officers who are being engaged as crew members of the craft, but are also
trained as AFOs should not undertake the latter role during the operation.
9.42 All transportation by water should be conducted from craft owned or operated by
the Police Service, which should be capable of carrying a minimum of four AFOs in
addition to the crew. However, the use of other certified craft may be considered
when the need is merely to convey AFOs by water to a site where there will be no
immediate operational deployment at that site.
9.43 For safety reasons there should never be less than two craft engaged in
transportation by water.
9.44 It is recommended that where Forces have a marine capability or have AFOs they
wish to train for such a capability the syllabus in Part III should be followed.
10. ROLES AND CAPABILITIES
Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO)
10.1 An Authorised Firearms Officer is a police officer who has been selected and trained
in the use of firearms in policing operations. The officer will have reached the required
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level of competency in weapon handling, tactical knowledge, shooting skills and
judgement as required by the Chief Officer of the Force concerned.
10.2 Individual officers may have received training in more than one weapon and/or in a
variety of tactics. There are also a range of specialised roles for which officers will
receive specific firearms and tactical training. All AFOs are subject to refresher
training and re-qualification, the frequency of which is also dependant on role.
Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs)
Definition
10.3 ‘Armed Response Vehicle’ is the term generally used to define a patrolling vehicle
which contains firearms, usually in a secure armoury. The vehicle is crewed by at
least two police officers suitably trained in the use of weapons and equipment to be
carried in the vehicle. Ideally, at least two of the officers should be qualified to drive
the vehicle.
Aims
10.4 To provide an immediate armed response to appropriate incidents with the ability to
use firearms if justified.
10.5 Following the issue of firearms to provide initial containment at such an incident,
pending the arrival of other firearms support, unless exceptional circumstances
necessitate immediate action to save life or prevent harm or injury to any person.
(This is the minimum capability – some forces may choose to train their patrolling
AFOs in further specific operational tactics).
10.6 The role includes:
a. Identifying and locating an armed subject which may involve search techniques.
b. Plans to deal with the armed subject surrendering which may include initial
negotiations.
10.7 In addition to the primary role of ARVs in providing an immediate response to those
firearms incidents of a spontaneous nature, Silver Commanders may wish to consider
the inclusion of ARVs on pre-planned operations involving the deployment of firearms
with due reference to tactical advice and the officers’ level of training.
Deployment
10.8 In deploying ARVs, especially in circumstances beyond containment, consideration
needs to be given to the capability remaining within the force to deal with
spontaneous incidents requiring a firearms response.
10.9 It is important that ARVs are deployed to spontaneous incidents requiring a firearms
response in sufficient numbers to effectively contain the scene of the threat. ARVs
should normally be deployed to a spontaneous incident requiring a firearms response
in pairs. However, there will be occasions when this criterion is impossible to meet
and where only one ARV is deployed initially, every effort should be made to provide
additional armed support.
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10.10 It is also important that supervisors and control room staff are aware of the terms of
reference for ARV deployment.
Dynamic Entry to Buildings
10.11 Dynamic Intervention to rescue hostages should be distinguished from a Dynamic
Entry to arrest and secure readily disposable evidence, both of which are intended
to protect life.
10.12 To be successful, Dynamic Intervention and Dynamic Entry require a high degree
of teamwork and rehearsed methods. Both, by their nature, create a situation in
which decision making under stress becomes critical. Individual officers tasked
with undertaking such an entry require a high level of skill and adaptability.
Rifle Officers
10.13 In certain types of incident the deployment of Rifle Officers will be appropriate in
order to make use of their skills in observation, logging, and concealment in both
rural and urban environments. Their capability in precision shooting will provide a
containment facility over longer ranges and an additional option for consideration
by the Commanders of hostage situations.
10.14 Rifle Officers should be deployed in pairs at each position to enable one officer to
act as observer / radio operator, and the other to provide the rifle cover. This will
provide for a sharing of roles and reduce the isolation and possible vulnerability of
individual officers.
10.15 Factors bearing on the number of Rifle Officers in each Force include:
a. the requirement for sufficient initial cover, including the provision of relief for
the duration of incident which may become protracted.
b. any requirement to provide roof top cover for pre-planned security operations
and the need for a capability to dispatch dangerous escaped animals which
cannot be dealt with by any other means.
Air Support
10.16 Apart from the carriage of officers, weapons and other equipment air support can
provide assistance to the operation in the following ways:
a. Flood lighting of an area.
b. Public address.
c. Thermal imaging.
d. Video down-link (enabling observations from safe distance).
e. Distraction (may distract police officers as well as the subject).
f. Over-flight to give an overview.
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g. Aerial Photography.
Dog Support
10.17 Consideration should be given to the deployment or availability of police dogs at all
incidents involving the deployment of AFOs.
10.18 Police dogs may be attached to any of the groups involved in such an incident i.e.
Cover Group, Entry Team etc. The primary uses of a police dog in these
circumstances are:-
a. Pursuit and apprehension of subjects.
b. Tracking and searching of open ground.
c. Initial search of buildings, vehicles etc.
d. Restraint of Compliant Subjects
10.19 An additional option, where available, is the use of Firearms Support Dogs, which
are trained specifically to assist in operations involving the deployment of AFOs,
and are trained in a greater range of disciplines. Details of the capabilities and
limitations of these dogs are contained within the Police Dogs Training and Care
Manual.
10.20 When deployed as a Dog Handler, this is the officer’s primary role. In these
circumstances, any firearm issued to the officer is for personal protection or
emergency use only. The Dog Handler should not be regarded as part of a firearms
team but should have an appreciation of firearms tactics and participate in training
with AFOs
Protection Officers
10.21 The objective of Protection Officers is to keep alive the person (or ‘Principal’) who
is being protected either by eliminating the possibility, or minimising the effect, of
any attack. In the United Kingdom this has traditionally been achieved in a discreet
and unobtrusive fashion by striking a balance between the Principal’s wishes,
protocol requirements and appropriate security measures, i.e. managing the risk.
10.22 Personal protection may be provided to members of the Royal Family, other VIPs
and others who are at particular risk (e.g. some witnesses).
10.23 Guidance on the role of Protection Officers, the policy and tactics they adopt and
the training required, is to be found in the confidential document – ACPO Manual of
Guidance on Protection Duties.
11. WEAPONS AND SPECIALIST MUNITIONS
11.1 The selection of weapons to be used is a tactical decision which is made taking
various factors into consideration. These factors are listed below: -
a. The level of force required to meet the threat
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b. The type of situation to be dealt with
c. The likely distance between the armed police officers and the threat
d. Information received as to the weapon/s used by the subject
e. The operational environment
f. The training & experience of the AFOs involved
11.2 At short range, revolvers, self-loading pistols and carbines firing handgun ammunition
may be appropriate.
11.3 At greater distances, rifles and carbines using rifle ammunition may be appropriate.
Less Lethal Options
11.4 The term ‘Less lethal options’ is employed to indicate weapons, devices and tactics,
the design and intention of which, is to induce compliance in pursuit of a legitimate
aim by the Police without a substantial risk of serious or permanent injury or death
to the subject on whom they are applied. In other words, the desired effect is to
control and then neutralise a threat without recourse to lethal use of force. Whilst
the actual outcome may, on occasions, be lethal, this is less likely than as the result
of the use of firearms.
11.5 The development of ‘less lethal options’ is an area that requires sustained research.
It is necessary to ensure that any force used is proportionate to the seriousness of
the apparent threat, and appropriate options in this area assist adherence to that
principle.
11.6 The Police Service continually seeks to identify appropriate ‘less lethal options’.
The process is carried out in conjunction with the Police Scientific Development
Branch.
Specialist Munitions/Equipment
11.7 Armed officers have a range of munitions which can be used when carrying out
specific tasks. The equipment can be broken down into three types:
a. Less lethal options (including Incapacitants)
b. Attraction/Distraction devices
c. Entry tools
11.8 It is important to realise that Specialist Munitions have the potential to cause injury
even when used correctly. In some cases the danger is minimal but in others the
injury could prove fatal. Officers handling or using these devices must therefore be
trained in their characteristics and proper use. In particular they should be aware of
the danger from secondary fragments that may be potentially injurious.
12. TRAINING
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12.1 Training is dealt with separately in the document entitled ‘National Police Firearms
Training Curriculum’.
13. DEALING WITH PEOPLE
13.1 Police officers at, or surrounding the scene of an incident involving the deployment
of AFOs may well encounter people in a number of different contexts with an
appropriate response often being a matter of life and death. The following sections
seek to briefly outline the general considerations necessary in the circumstances
outlined.
Handling Suspects
13.2 This section addresses the control and arrest of subjects by armed officers once
they have been located, contained and are apparently submitting to police officers’
directions. All AFOs should receive training in handling suspected armed subjects.
13.3 The close proximity of subjects to officers with firearms at the final stages of an
incident presents risks. These stages are likely to be the most dangerous phase
and constitute the subject’s last chance to escape.
13.4 Officers with firearms are at risk of being disarmed unless care is taken.
13.5 It is important that sufficient officers are present to provide a suitable response. No
action, unless necessary, should be taken to arrest subjects without adequate
resources. Dog Handlers, batons and, where available, incapacitant sprays should
be made available wherever possible to enable the police officers at the scene to
deal with any threat using only such force as is absolutely necessary.
13.6 The general approach to handling subjects in operations involving the deployment
of AFOs should be similar whether the incident is planned or spontaneous.
13.7 Officers must be aware of their arcs of fire at all times, in order to prevent weapons
being pointed at their colleagues or other persons who are unlikely to be subjects
or pose a threat.
13.8 The requirement will be determined by the circumstances of each individual case
but the following arrest procedure should be considered.
13.9 On first verbal contact, officers should:
a. identify themselves as police officers to the suspect and the fact that they are
armed.
b. identify the suspect by name or by an identifying feature.
c. establish control by requiring the suspect to stop moving and put their hands in
view.
d. arrest the suspect in accordance with the provisions of P.A.C.E. and
consideration of Article 5 of ECHR.
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13.10 The exact position to which the suspect will be directed should be made clear to the
officers and the suspect. Full account should be taken of advice in the ACPO
Personal Safety Manual on the positioning of detainees.
13.11 The suspect should be given clear and concise instructions to direct them to the
position in which they can be arrested, searched, and if necessary, handcuffed.
13.12 Ideally, one officer should be responsible for verbal control. If a second officer is
involved, care should be taken not to give conflicting instructions.
13.13 Suspects should not be approached to be physically detained or handcuffed until
the officers are satisfied that all threats have been minimised. Officers should not
hurry to arrest the suspect. Primary concern should be to establish control in a
professional manner taking time to plan the arrest procedure if possible.
13.14 Ideally unarmed officers identified to act as arrest officers should be used to avoid
the risks of cross contamination particularly in cases of arrest of suspects believed
to have carried or used firearms. Armed officers may provide firearms cover while
unarmed officers undertake the arrest and handcuffing. Care should be taken to
transport prisoners in ‘clean’ vehicles. Where possible arresting officers should not
travel with officers who are or have been carrying firearms to avoid cross
contamination. Prisoners should not be transported from the scene with armed
officers.
13.15 With respect to the use of physical force, the case of Ribitsch v. Austria deals with
this issue where it is stated:
“The Court emphasises that, in respect of a person deprived of his liberty, any
recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own
conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set
forth in Article 3 of the Convention.”
Cordons
13.16 The Police Service contains incidents and controls public access to areas by use of
Cordons. These are not established in a random manner, but are deployed according
to specific strategies, in order to ensure Public safety, and to contain the threat.
Special Population Groups
13.17 The term Special Population Group is used to describe a group of people who do
not behave in an expected, rational manner as a result of some form of mental
impairment (either permanent or temporary).
13.18 For example this impairment may be caused by a range of psychiatric disorders or
the consumption of drugs or alcohol. Similar issues may be encountered when
there are communication difficulties such as when the subject is deaf or has a
different first language.
13.19 Failure to recognise why someone is not complying with instructions or the inability
to communicate may escalate the tension of the situation and result in inappropriate
behaviour either from or to the subject.
Revised February 2005
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13.20 Rational individuals are likely to respond to the arrival of armed officers in a more
predictable fashion than members of a Special Population Group, either surrendering
or acting aggressively.
13.21 However, those who are not thinking or behaving rationally may not realise the
seriousness of their own situation, or respond to normal negotiating strategies; nor
may their response to weapons (be they conventional firearms or less lethal options),
be that of the “normal” person.
13.22 It is important that both Negotiators and AFOs have an understanding of how
disturbed people or those who have their perceptions altered through alcohol or
drugs may respond to communications from police officers. It may be necessary to
use language and tactics different to those used when dealing with more rational
individuals.
13.23 Certain factors have been identified, which may give an indication as to whether a
subject is a member of a Special Population Group, and assist in determining the
threat these individuals pose. Some of these factors are listed below: -
a. Alcohol / drugs consumed or present
b. Hopelessness
c. Depression
d. Delusions or hallucinations focused on one person
e. Preoccupation with violence,
f. Delusions of control especially with violence theme,
g. Agitation, excitement,
h. Hostile, suspicious,
i. Low self-esteem,
j. Poor collaboration,
k. Antisocial, explosive temperament,
l. Repetitive threats,
m. De-personalised talk,
n. Statements of suicide or the desire to die.
13.24 However, due to the unpredictable nature of Special Population Groups, these
indicators are purely a guide, and cannot be guaranteed to establish beyond doubt
- either by their presence or absence - whether an individual is in fact a member of
a Special Population Group, or indeed how much of a threat the individual poses.
13.25 Action, which may reduce the risk of a fatal confrontation, includes:
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a. Prior intelligence gathering which may indicate an individual’s intentions. These
indicators may include previous suicide attempts, psychological disorders,
particularly schizophrenia and regular alcohol and drug abuse.
b. Training AFOs in basic negotiating skills so that they can talk with as well as
challenge a subject.
c. Early use of trained negotiators.
d. Contact with appropriate medical / social worker professionals for advice /
intelligence concerning subject’s behavioural patterns.
13.26 It should also be borne in mind that the subject may be trying to force the police
officers into a provoked shooting.
13.27 The term provoked shooting, refers to those incidents in which an individual,
determined on self-destruction, engages in a calculated life-threatening criminal
incident in order to force a police officer or another individual to shoot them.
13.28 The initial application of the basic principles of tactics is in essence no different
from other operations involving the deployment of AFOs. Indeed it is important that
these basic principles are complied with in order to contain the threat as soon as
practicable. However tactical considerations which may be of particular importance
in this type of incident, include:
a. Use of effective cover by police officers,
b. Evacuation of immediate area,
c. Be prepared to back off (if safe),
d. Giving available space and time to the subject when considering containment,
e. Early negotiation.
13.29 This may allow:
a. The tension to diffuse,
b. The effects of alcohol or drugs to wear off,
c. The subjects mental / emotional state to stabilise.
13.30 A rational response from the subject may then result, allowing them to be dealt with
in a controlled manner.
13.31 The fact that the subject is a member of a Special Population Group does not
in any way reduce the harm they may inflict if the incident is not resolved.
Particularly in cases of provoked shootings, the subject may escalate the level of
threat to both the public and the Police in an attempt to provoke a lethal response
to their actions.
13.32 It is the role of the Police to deal with the threat irrespective of any motivation.
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13.33 If a member of a Special Population Group has been dealt with by the deployment
of AFOs, consideration may be given to the holding of a Potentially Dangerous
Offenders or similar meeting with other agencies. The intention would be to prevent
any recurrence of the threat to public, Police Officers, or the subject themselves
Hostages
13.34 It may well be difficult in confused circumstances to separate hostages and subjects
inside a building. It may be necessary to treat all persons in the building as posing
a potential threat until everyone is evacuated and identified at a safe reception
area.
13.35 The age and physical condition of occupants will have a direct bearing on the speed
with which they may be evacuated. Adequate preparation and consideration should
be given to the cases of infants, the elderly, infirm, physically injured or exhausted
persons.
13.36 Whoever they may be, panic on their part is likely and they can not be expected to
be responsive to commands or to think rationally. In certain circumstances hostages
may act with hostility towards their rescuers. In whatever case, they should be
dealt with positively and removed from danger.
Third Parties
13.37 It is acknowledged that during the course of an incident, members of the public
may become caught up in the incident, whilst others are also put at risk because of
their location as the incident develops.
13.38 It is therefore vital that suitable contingency plans are drawn up to allow for these
groups of people to be dealt with in an appropriate manner.
Witnesses and Other Persons Involved
13.39 The same considerations should be observed when dealing with witnesses, and
other persons involved in the incident in order to secure their safe removal from
danger areas. However it should be remembered that such people may be able to
provide information which could be vital in tactical planning by the Police, and also
provide evidence in subsequent investigations. After ensuring their safety, such
information should be sought.
13.40 If it is inappropriate to take full statements from witnesses (including police officers)
during the initial stages of the investigation then a record should be made of their
first accounts in accordance with normal evidential procedures.
13.41 Witnesses’ welfare should always be a prime consideration.
Family Liaison Officer/Witness Liaison Officer
13.42 Another early appointment is that of Family Liaison Officer for the family of any
person who has been injured or died as the result of an incident involving the police
officers’ use of firearms. This should be done sensitively with full consideration of
family wishes. Family Liaison is covered in separate ACPO guidelines and the Host
Force should appoint an appropriately trained Family Liaison Officer from the outset.
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Continued family liaison should be the subject of consultation between the Senior
Investigating Officer and the family. Other sources such as Victim Support can also
be considered.
13.43 In certain cases, perhaps where there are special considerations in terms of minority
or ethnic groups, early consultation can be made with the Metropolitan Racial and
Violent Crime Task Force who have developed some expertise in this area.
13.44 In the case of witnesses, they should be treated as would be the case with a witness
in any prosecution and a liaison officer will often be a helpful appointment.
Explanation / Apology
13.45 There will be occasions when the reason for police action may not be apparent to
members of the public. This may give rise to concern / anxiety, e.g. onlookers,
relatives and neighbours and subjects who were innocent of any wrongdoing.
13.46 In such circumstances the Silver Commander should consider providing a suitable
explanation for the actions taken. This may include visits to people particularly
affected (ideally by a supervisor directly involved in the incident if this does not
cause a conflict of interest), or the distribution of an information leaflet setting out
the circumstances of police action. On occasions some form of apology may be
required.
13.47 Depending on the effect of the operation the police service may wish to ensure that
the person is aware of available support. In appropriate circumstances persons
should be made aware of their options in seeking a remedy (e.g. Police complaints
process).
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