As of October 2020 No-knock Warrants

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As of October 2020

No-knock Warrants – Fourth Amendment Analysis for No-Knock Entry,

Overview of Federal Law, and 50 State Survey

As of October 2020

Prepared by: Beth Vaughan, Senior Policy Analyst ([email protected].gov)

FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARD FOR NO-KNOCK ENTRY

In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that the Fourth

Amendment incorporates the common law requirement that police officers entering a residence must

knock on the door and their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry to execute a search

warrant. However, the Supreme Court also recognized that not every entry must be preceded by an

announcement and that the Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should not

be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement

interests.

The Wilson decision left it to the lower courts to determine the circumstances under which

an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and “simply [held] that although

a search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers enter without

prior announcement, law enforcement interests may also establish the reasonableness of an

unannounced entry.”

The Supreme Court did, however, imply that the knock-and-announce

requirement could “yield under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence” or when police

officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.

In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997), the Supreme Court went on to hold that, in order to

justify a “no-knock” entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing

their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would

inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.

The Court noted that, “[t]his standard – as opposed to a probable-cause requirement – strikes the

appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of

search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries.”

In United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003), the Supreme Court stated that “when a warrant

applicant gives reasonable grounds to expect futility or to suspect that one or another such exigency

already exists or will arise instantly upon knocking, a magistrate judge is acting within the

Constitution to authorize a ‘no-knock’ entry. And even when executing a warrant silent about that, if

circumstances support a reasonable suspicion of exigency when the officers arrive at the door, they

may go straight in.” In that case, the Court found that the interval of 15 to 20 seconds from the officers’

knock and announcement of search warrant until the forced entry was reasonable, given the exigency

of the possible destruction of evidence.

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).

Id. at 936.

Id.

Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).

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In Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the suppression of

evidence is inappropriate when the entry is made pursuant to a search warrant but without a proper

knock-and-announce, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In the Hudson case, the Detroit police,

while executing a search warrant for narcotics and weapons, entered a home in violation of the Fourth

Amendment’s knock-and-announce rule, and Michigan conceded that the entry was a knock-and-

announce violation. In the majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court noted that

the interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement include: (1) the protection of human

life and limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed self-defense by the

surprised resident; (2) the protection of property (i.e., avoiding damage from breaking into a house);

and (3) the elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance. However, the

Court also found that the knock-and-announce rule never protected a person’s interest in preventing

the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant, rendering the exclusionary

rule inapplicable in these circumstances.

FEDERAL LAW REGARDING NO-KNOCK WARRANTS

18 U.S.C. § 3109 provides that an officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house,

or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority

and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in

the execution of the warrant.

Although a federal statute previously authorized no-knock warrants for certain drug searches in the

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Congress repealed that provision in

1974. As described in a 1993 article in the Columbia Law Review:

The “no-knock” experience lasted four years and demonstrated the inevitability of

many of the dangers foreseen in 1970. During the four-year period when “no-knock”

warrants were issued, horror stories were legion. Over one hundred newspaper

articles, reproduced in the Congressional Record, described a repeated scenario:

terrified citizens, thinking themselves targets of burglary or more frightening acts,

discovered that they were instead being searched by law enforcement officers who had

entered their homes without notice.

As the Congressional Research Service noted in a June 23, 2020 analysis on “’No-Knock’ Warrants and

Other Law Enforcement Identification Considerations,” the legal status of federal no-knock search

warrants “is unsettled, although federal officers do sometimes employ no-knock warrants or act

pursuant to no-knock warrants issued by state courts when serving on joint state-federal task forces.”

Recently, members of Congress have made efforts to eliminate federal no-knock search warrants. For

example, one section of the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020 (H.R. 7120) would establish

that search warrants issued in federal drug cases must “require that a law enforcement officer execute

the search warrant only after providing notice of his or her authority and purpose.” The bill would also

require states and localities that receive certain federal funds to “have in effect a law that prohibits

the issuance of a no-knock warrant in a drug case.” Rep. Karen Bass (D-CA-37), the sponsor of H.R.

7120, is the Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus.

Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) introduced the Justice for Breonna Taylor Act (S. 3955), which would provide

that federal law enforcement officers may not execute a warrant without providing notice of authority

and purpose. Sen. Paul’s bill would also prohibit state and local law enforcement agencies receiving

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593-94 (2006).

Charles Patrick Garcia, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM.

L. REV. 685, 705 (1993).

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federal funds from executing warrants that do not require the serving officer to provide notice of

authority and purpose prior to forcible entry.

CURRENT LAW IN GEORGIA REGARDING NO-KNOCK WARRANTS

O.C.G.A. § 17-5-27 states that:

All necessary and reasonable force may be used to effect an entry into any building or

property or part thereof to execute a search warrant if, after verbal notice or an

attempt in good faith to give verbal notice by the officer directed to execute the same

of his authority and purpose:

(1) He is refused admittance;

(2) The person or persons within the building or property or part

thereof refuse to acknowledge and answer the verbal notice or the

presence of the person or persons therein is unknown to the officer; or

(3) The building or property or part thereof is not then occupied by any

person.

However, as the Court of Appeals of Georgia has noted, “where the State demonstrates a reasonable

suspicion that knocking and announcing the officers’ presence would be dangerous or futile under the

particular circumstances, or that it would hinder the effective investigation of the crime by, for

example, allowing the destruction of evidence, a no-knock entry may be authorized.”

Furthermore,

“…the standard for establishing the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a no-knock entry, as

opposed to the standard for establishing probable cause, is not high.”

Nevertheless, generalized statements or beliefs will not be sufficient to justify a no-knock provision in

a search warrant. For example, in State v. Lopez-Chavez, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the

affidavit submitted in support of the request for a no-knock warrant “merely contained a generalized

statement that unspecified evidence might be destroyed if the police announced their presence before

entering, and it does not appear that the officer who presented the affidavit pointed to any specific

items or data that might be destroyed if the no-knock intrusion was not allowed.” Therefore, the

magistrate “was not provided with underlying details that would have allowed him to evaluate

whether these conclusions were based on specific facts or whether they were merely boilerplate based

on speculation and presumptions.” Furthermore, the only recitation in the affidavit concerning

weapons on the premises was based on “an obviously stale, unverified tip that officers received seven

years earlier,” and there was no indication that weapons had been observed on the premises since that

time. Because the no-knock warrant was illegally executed, the Court of Appeals affirmed the motion

to suppress the evidence that was seized.

RECENT LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS IN THE GEORGIA SENATE

1. 2015 Georgia Senate Bill 159 (Did Not Pass)

Senator Jesse Stone was the primary sponsor of 2015 Senate Bill 159, which passed by Committee

Substitute from the Senate Judiciary Non-Civil Committee but did not advance to the Senate floor.

State v. Lopez-Chavez, 768 S.E.2d 816, 819 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (citing State v. Cash, 728 S.E.2d 918 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)).

Lopez-Chavez, 768 S.E.2d at 819 (citing Braun v. State, 747 S.E.2d 872 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Lopez-Chavez, 768 S.E.2d at 819.

The 2015-16 session had two other bills on the topic of no-knock warrants, including Senate Bill 45, sponsored by former-

Senator Vincent Fort (D), and House Bill 56, sponsored by Representative Kevin Tanner (R). However, neither of these bills

made it out of Committee.

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The Committee Substitute for 2015 SB 159 would have, among other things, specifically provided for

the use of no-knock search warrants but only when:

(A) The law enforcement agency that employs the officer seeking such warrant has

adopted written policies for using no-knock that comply with certain requirements

discussed below; and

(B) The affidavit or testimony supporting the no-knock warrant establishes by

probable cause that if an officer were to knock and announce identity and purpose

before entry, such act of knocking and announcing would be dangerous to human life

or would inhibit the effective investigation of an alleged crime by allowing the

destruction of evidence.

The Committee Substitute for 2015 SB 159 also would have required that any law enforcement agency

that may seek a no-knock must adopt guidelines and procedures that include, but would not be limited

to:

(A) Designating the rank or status of an employee who may be qualified to serve as

a supervising officer;

(B) Requiring a supervising officer to review and approve an application for a no-

knock;

warrant which contains a no-knock;

(D) Having an operational plan for the execution of a search warrant which contains

a no-knock; and

(E) Having a training program relevant to applying for a no-knock and executing a

search warrant which contains a no-knock.

2. 2020 Senate Bill 513 (Did Not Pass)

Following the recess for COVID-19 this past session, Senator Harold Jones filed 2020 Senate Bill 513,

also known as the “Georgia Justice Act,” which would have, among other things, provided in statute

that no search warrants will be issued that contain a no-knock provision unless the affidavit or

testimony supporting the warrant establishes by probable cause that if an officer were to knock and

announce presence, authority, and purpose before entry, such act of knocking and announcing would

likely pose a significant and imminent danger to human life or imminent danger of evidence being

destroyed. The bill was filed on June 15, 2020 and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF LAWS IN OTHER STATES REGARDING NO-KNOCK WARRANTS

AND FORCIBLE ENTRY

1. Alabama – knock-and announce is codified, but forcible entry is allowed

under exigent circumstances pursuant to case law

Ala. Code § 15-5-9 provides that, “[t]o execute a search warrant, an officer may break open any door

or window of a house, any part of a house or anything therein if after notice of his authority and

purpose he is refused admittance.”

The Handbook for Alabama Sheriffs (7th ed.) discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson

v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 589-90 (2006), which per the Handbook, “reversed existing case law that

required law enforcement officers to ‘knock and announce’ before entering a building during the

execution of a search warrant.” The Handbook states that Alabama has a statute “that requires law

enforcement to ‘knock and announce;’ thus law enforcement officers in this state continue to be bound

by Ala. Code §15-5-9, and the Hudson decision does not affect Alabama sheriffs.”

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However, non-compliance with the knock-and-announce requirement may be excused in exigent

circumstances, which depends on whether an “emergency situation” exists. An emergency situation

exists “when the officers may in good faith believe that they or someone within are in peril of bodily

harm ... or that the person to be arrested is fleeing or attempting to destroy evidence.”

2. Alaska – knock-and-announce is codified, but forcible entry is allowed under

exigent circumstances pursuant to case law

Pursuant to Alaska Stat. Ann. § 12.35.040 regarding the execution or service of a search warrant, the

officer has the same power and authority in all respects to break open any door or window, to use the

necessary and proper means to overcome forcible resistance made to the officer, or to call any other

person to the officer's aid as the officer has in the execution or service of a warrant of arrest. Pursuant

to Alaska Stat. Ann. § 12.25.100, a peace officer may break into a building or vessel in which the person

to be arrested is or is believed to be, if the officer is refused admittance after the officer has announced

the authority and purpose of the entry.

However, strict compliance with the knock and announce rule is not required when a balancing test

indicates that the exigencies outweigh the hindrance to the dual purposes behind the rule of respecting

individuals' privacy, and minimizing the destruction of property and the possibility of forcible

resistance.

3. Arizona – no-knock warrants expressly authorized by statute, following

earlier state court of appeals decision that statutory authority is needed to

issue such a warrant

In 1974, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that, under Arizona law, there was no authority for the

issuance of a no-knock search warrant, finding that “[w]here the legislature has enacted a statute

dealing with execution of a search warrant which is clear and unambiguous on its face, we as a court

may not weigh the reasons for and against such a statute-that is the province of the legislature.”

The

Arizona Court of Appeals acknowledged that other states with similar statutes to Arizona’s statutory

requirement of announcement of purpose in execution of a search warrant had made judicial

exceptions to allow for the issuance of no-knock warrants. However, “unlike California, this Court has

not by a series of decisions engrafted a judicial exception to the statute.’”

The court declined to

“engage in judicial legislation” and stated that, “[i]f a remedy is needed, it is for the legislature to form

one.”

In 2000, Arizona’s statute on the issuance of search warrants was revised to add a subsection providing

that, “[o]n a reasonable showing that an announced entry to execute the warrant would endanger the

safety of any person or would result in the destruction of any of the items described in the warrant,

the magistrate shall authorize an unannounced entry.”

4. Arkansas – no-knock warrants permitted by case law

Rule 13.3(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure incorporates the knock-and-announce

requirement into the rules governing the execution of a search warrant:

Moore v. State, 650 So. 2d 958, 962–63 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (quotation and citation omitted).

Trosper v. State, 721 P.2d 134, 135 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (citing Sandland v. State, 636 P.2d 1196, 1197 (Alaska Ct. App.

1981)).

State v. Eminowicz, 520 P.2d 330, 332 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).

Id. (quoting State v. Mendoza, 454 P.2d 140, 143 (Ariz. 1969)).

Eminowicz, 520 P.2d at 332.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3915(B), added by 2000 House Bill 2394.

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Prior to entering a dwelling to execute a search warrant, the executing officer shall

make known the officer's presence and authority for entering the dwelling and shall

wait a period of time that is reasonable under the circumstances before forcing entry

into the dwelling. The officer may force entry into a dwelling without prior

announcement if the officer reasonably suspects that making known the officer's

presence would, under the circumstances, be dangerous or futile or that it would

inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction

of evidence. . . .

Arkansas courts permit the issuance of no-knock warrants under case law, but notably, the Arkansas

Rules of Criminal Procedure has a provision that requires a search warrant to be executed between

6:00 AM and 8:00 PM, unless the judicial officer issuing the search warrant finds reasonable cause to

believe that a nighttime warrant should be issued because: (1) the place to be searched is difficult of

speedy access; (2) the objects to be seized are in danger of imminent removal; or (3) the warrant can

only be safely or successfully executed at nighttime or under circumstances the occurrence of which is

difficult to predict with accuracy.

In Holt v. State, 151 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004), the Arkansas Court of Appeals found that the

issuance of a nighttime, no-knock search warrant was justified when the officer testified in the days

just prior to the application for the warrant that a confidential informant obtained methamphetamine

from the residence and saw drug paraphernalia inside the residence, that someone inside the residence

could see law enforcement outside without opening the door, and that the suspects would likely destroy

the evidence before law enforcement could enter the premises.

In 2019, the Little Rock police department came under criticism for the high percentage of no-knock

warrants that they requested and executed.

5. California – no-knock warrants permitted by case law

Cal. Penal Code § 1531 provides that, in the execution of a search warrant, an officer may break open

any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute

the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance. Moreover, the

California Supreme Court held in 1973 that advance judicial approval may not excuse noncompliance

with this statutory announcement requirements to the effect that an officer generally may break open

door or window in the execution of a search warrant.

However, The New York Times reported in 2017 that no-knock warrants are routinely granted in

California. I located California Court of Appeals cases referencing the use of no-knock warrants,

including one from 2004 which cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Banks and in Richards and

went on to note that “exigency may ripen along a continuum of law enforcement activity. It might exist

at the time the warrant is issued, resulting in a no-knock warrant.”

In June 2020, the Long Beach Police Department issued a special order to require officers to seek

approval from a supervisor of the rank of Deputy Chief before seeking judicial approval to serve a no-

knock warrant.

Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.2(c).

Parsley v. Superior Court, 513 P.2d 611 (Cal. 1973).

People v. Murphy, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 269, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review granted and opinion superseded, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal.

2004), and rev'd, 123 P.3d 155 (Cal. 2005).

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6. Colorado – no-knock warrants expressly authorized by statute

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-303 (4) provides, in addition to meeting the requirements for obtaining a

search warrant, a no-knock search warrant

will only be issued if the affidavit for the warrant also

specifically requests the issuance of a no-knock search warrant and has been reviewed and approved

for legal sufficiency and signed by a district attorney. This review and approval may take place as

allowed by statute or court rule or by means of facsimile transmission, telephonic transmission, or

other electronic transfer.

If the grounds for the issuance of a no-knock search warrant are established by a confidential

informant, the affidavit for such warrant shall contain a statement by the affiant concerning when

such grounds became known or were verified by the affiant. The statement shall not identify the

confidential informant.

7. Connecticut – not granted but forcible entry allowed under exigent

circumstances

As reflected in an analysis of no-knock warrant usage by The New York Times in 2017, no-knock

warrants are not generally available in Connecticut, but forcible entries when executing a search

warrant are permitted in exigent circumstances. As the Appellate Court of Connecticut has noted,

“[f]rom early colonial times we, in this jurisdiction, have followed the common-law requirement in the

execution of search warrants that, in the absence of some special exigency, before an officer may break

and enter he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open the doors. . . ."

8. Delaware – case law does not authorize no-knock warrants but allows

forcible entry in exigent circumstances

As stated by the Superior Court of Delaware, “there ‘is no such creature as a no-knock warrant in

Delaware.’ While other jurisdictions acknowledge no-knock warrants, Delaware has not adopted such

a procedure.”

However, the Delaware courts have recognized exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule under

exigent circumstances in which there is a “good faith belief” on the part of the police officers that full

and complete compliance with the rule would have: (1) increased their peril; (2) frustrated the arrest;

(3) or permitted destruction of the evidence.

9. Florida – no-knock warrants not permitted, absent express statute

authorizing such warrants; forcible entry may be allowed under exigent

circumstances

The Supreme Court of Florida held in State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1994) that, in the absence

of express statutory authorization, no-knock search warrants are without legal effect in Florida. The

Court noted that “[a]s a matter of policy, no-knock warrants are disfavored because of their staggering

potential for violence to both occupants and police.” The Supreme Court of Florida also supported this

decision upon the finding that “no-knock warrants are disfavored under the law and limited largely to

those states that have enacted statutory provisions authorizing their issuance.”

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-303 (5) defines the term “no-knock search warrant” to mean a search warrant served by entry

without prior identification.

State v. Huff, 793 A.2d 1190, 1192 (Conn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Ruscoe, 563 A.2d 267 (Conn. 1989), cert. denied, 493

U.S. 1084 (1990)).

State v. Backus, 2002 WL 31814777, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2002) (quoting State v. Cox, No. 0011003431 (Del. Super.

Ct. Dec. 4, 2001)).

Backus, 2002 WL 31814777, at *2-3 (citing Tatman v. State, 320 A.2d 750 (Del. 1974)).

Bamber, 630 So. 2d at 1050.

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Fla. Stat. Ann. § 933.09 provides that “[t]he officer may break open any outer door, inner door or

window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due

notice of the officer's authority and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to

anything therein.”

However, the Supreme Court of Florida also held in Bamber that the police may engage in a no-knock

search of a residence under exigent circumstances, such as where officers have “reasonable grounds to

believe the [contraband] within the house would be immediately destroyed if they announced their

presence.”

10. Hawaii – knock-and-announce is codified, but unannounced entry is allowed

under exigent circumstances pursuant to case law

Regarding the execution of a search warrant, Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 803-37 provides that:

The officer charged with the warrant, if a house, store, or other building is designated

as the place to be searched, may enter it without demanding permission if the officer

finds it open. If the doors are shut, the officer shall declare the officer's office and the

officer's business and demand entrance. If the doors, gates, or other bars to the

entrance are not immediately opened, the officer may break them. When entered, the

officer may demand that any other part of the house, or any closet or other closed place

in which the officer has reason to believe the property is concealed, may be opened for

the officer's inspection, and if refused the officer may break them. If an electronic

device or storage media is designated as the item to be searched, the court may

authorize the officer to obtain technical assistance from individuals or entities, located

within or outside the State, in the examination of the item; provided that the officer

shall submit a sworn statement to the judge or magistrate, certifying the reliability

and qualifications of the individuals or entities and the reason their assistance is

necessary; provided further that no individual or entity shall be compelled to provide

technical assistance without their consent.

The Supreme Court of Hawaii held in a recent case that the officers did not afford the defendant

reasonable time to respond to a demand for entry into a home pursuant to a warrant and noted that

“[t]he ‘knock-and-announce’ procedure is not a mere formality or police tactic; it is an essential

restraint on the power of the State which has deep roots in both the Anglo-American and Hawaiian

legal systems.”

However, exigent circumstances could justify entering the premises earlier than

would otherwise be reasonable; exigent circumstances are those under which “the demands of the

occasion reasonably call for an immediate police response.”

Exigent circumstances exist where there

is an imminent threat of harm to a person, where there is a danger of serious property damage, where

a suspect is likely to escape, or where evidence is likely to be removed or destroyed.

11. Idaho – no-knock warrants permitted under case law

Idaho Code Ann. § 19-4409 provides that an officer may break open any outer or inner door or window

of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his

authority and purpose, he is refused admittance. However, as the Idaho Court of Appeals noted in

State v. Naeole, 470 P.3d 1120, 1124 (Haw. 2020) (citations omitted).

Id. (citing State v. Lloyd, 606 P.2d 913, 918 (Haw. 1980)).

Naeole, 470 P.3d at 1127.

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State v. Ramos, 130 P.3d 1166, 1169 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005), Idaho courts recognize the no-knock

warrant.

12. Illinois – no-knock warrant expressly authorized by statute

725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/108-8 (b) provides that the court issuing a warrant may authorize the

officer executing the warrant to make entry without first knocking and announcing his or her office if

it finds, based upon a showing of specific facts, the existence of the following exigent circumstances:

(1) That the officer reasonably believes that if notice were given a weapon would be

used:

(i) against the officer executing the search warrant; or

(ii) against another person.

(2) That if notice were given there is an imminent “danger” that evidence will be

destroyed.

On July 2, 2020, Illinois Rep. Maurice A. West, II (D) filed House Bill 5807, which would prohibit a

peace officer of other public officer or employee from seeking or executing a no-knock search warrant

or dynamic entry warrant and would also prohibit a court from issuing such a warrant. A peace officer

or other public officer or employee who violates these prohibitions would be guilty of official

misconduct. However, no action has been taken on House Bill 5807 at this time.

13. Indiana – no-knock warrants authorized by case law

Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33-5-7(d) provides that “a law enforcement officer may break open any outer or

inner door or window in order to execute a search warrant, if the officer is not admitted following an

announcement of the officer’s authority and purpose.” The Indiana Court of Appeals has rejected the

assertion that Indiana law should not recognize a no-knock search warrant based on the argument

that this statute “requires” the police to knock and announce their presence and authority, finding

instead that the statute does not expressly prohibit entry without announcing the law enforcement

officer's authority and purpose when there are exigent circumstances or when it would be dangerous

to officers or others to make such an announcement.

The Indiana Court of Appeals concluded:

In summary, Ind. Code § 35–33–5–7 does not expressly prohibit a no knock warrant.

It is well settled in Indiana common law that the knock and announce requirement

need not be followed blindly in all circumstances. The Legislature appears to have

acquiesced in the interpretation that a notice of purpose requirement need not be met

in all circumstances. We conclude that Indiana law supports no knock warrants under

certain circumstances.

In order to justify a no knock warrant, there must be a reasonable suspicion that knocking and

announcing the officers' presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous, futile, or

inhibit the effective investigation of the crime.

For example, in Mack v. State, the Indiana Court of

Appeals found that a no-knock warrant was justified when the officers demonstrated a possible serious

See also State v. Kester, 51 P.3d 457, 459 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (police officers executed a “no-knock” search warrant); State

v. Pierce, 47 P.3d 1266, 1267 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (officers executed a no-knock search warrant at premises believed to be the

location of a methamphetamine lab).

Beer v. State, 885 N.E.2d 33, 41-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In Wilkins v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1144 (Ind. 2011), the Indiana Supreme

Court agreed that this statute governing the execution of search warrants did not prohibit police officers from performing no-

knock entry during execution of search warrant; statute permitted exigent circumstances to justify police to bypass knock-and-

announce requirement and declined to revisit the Indiana Court of Appeals’ decision in Beer.

Beer, 885 N.E.2d at 43.

Id. at 44.

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violent felon was in possession of firearms, the felon had failed to report to his parole officers that he

was staying at a different residence, and (shortly before the application for the warrant), the felon

appeared nervous in the presence of law enforcement.

In July 2020, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department announced that they would voluntarily

end the use of no-knock warrants.

14. Iowa – knock-and-announce is codified, but unannounced entry is allowed

under exigent circumstances pursuant to case law

Iowa Code Ann. § 808.6 codifies the knock-and-announce rule:

1. The officer may break into any structure or vehicle where reasonably necessary to

execute the warrant if, after notice of this authority and purpose the officer's

admittance has not been immediately authorized. The officer may use reasonable force

to enter a structure or vehicle to execute a search warrant without notice of the officer's

authority and purpose in the case of vacated or abandoned structures or vehicles.

2. The officer executing a search warrant may break restraints when necessary for the

officer's own liberation or to effect the release of a person who has entered a place to

aid the officer.

However, exigent circumstances can excuse compliance with the announcement requirements.

15. Kansas – issuance of no-knock warrants supported by case law

The issuance of no-knock warrants in Kansas is supported by case law. For example, in State v. Bell,

410 P.3d 947 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018), a magistrate authorized a no-knock warrant. The trial court found

that the no-knock aspect of the warrant was reasonable because the officer had a valid, reasonable,

and good-faith belief that a suspect with a history of battery against law enforcement and prior

convictions resided at the property and would be present at the time the search was executed. On

appeal, the defendant continued to challenge whether the no-knock nature of the warrant was

unreasonable, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress because

(following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson, even if the no-knock aspect of the warrant

had not been granted, the evidence would not have been excluded due to a failure to knock and

announce prior to executing the search warrant.

Similarly, in State v. Warren, 421 P.3d 259 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018), review denied (Feb. 28, 2019), a no-

knock search warrant was issued by a local magistrate, in light of the suspect’s violent nature as

demonstrated by his criminal history.

In July 2020, the Topeka City Council banned the use of no-knock warrants within the city limits.

However, Topeka’s police chief stated that the department already had a policy against no-knock

warrants in place before the ban was made local law.

16. Kentucky – issuance of no-knock warrants supported by case law

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 70.077 states that:

A sheriff having an order of attachment, or for the delivery of property, may enter any

building or enclosure containing the property, to take it; and, if necessary for this

Mack v. State, 23 N.E.3d 742, 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)).

State v. Cohrs, 484 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

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purpose, may break the building or enclosure, having first publicly demanded the

property.

The issuance of no-knock warrants in Kentucky is supported by case law. For example, in Holsey v.

Commonwealth, the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld a decision to deny a motion to suppress where

the defendant argued that the police had insufficient evidence to request a no-knock warrant, where

the trial court found that a no-knock warrant was justified because: (1) there was sufficient evidence

that drugs were present in the residence, and such could easily and quickly be destroyed; (2) the

defendant had a previous conviction for robbery with a handgun and there was a reasonable

probability that weapons were also present in the residence. Furthermore, “great deference is afforded

the [warrant] issuing judge,” and the Kentucky Court of Appeals found no grounds to disturb his

decision that a no-knock warrant was proper.

In Prescott v. Commonwealth, the detective sought and was granted a no-knock warrant on the basis

of controlled buys of illegal drugs.

In June 2020, the Louisville Metro Council unanimously approved “Breonna’s Law,” which bans no-

knock warrants in the city and requires police to wear body cameras when serving warrants and to

turn on the cameras five minutes before beginning the operation.

Kentucky Senate President Robert Stivers (R) announced in July that he is working on proposed

legislation that would essentially ban standalone, no-knock search warrants. He said the bill he

envisions would make exceptions for no-knock search warrants that are used along with an arrest

warrant or in a hostage situation. Rep. Attica Scott (D) also announced that she will put forth a bill to

ban the use of controversial no-knock search warrants across Kentucky.

17. Louisiana – statute explicitly provides for exception to knock-and-announce

La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 164 provides that a peace officer who executes a search warrant may

use such means and force as is authorized to make an arrest. La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 224

provides that:

In order to make an arrest, a peace officer, who has announced his authority and

purpose, may break open an outer or inner door or window of any vehicle, watercraft,

aircraft, dwelling or other structure, movable or immovable, where the person to be

arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused or otherwise obstructed from

admittance. The peace officer need not announce his authority and purpose when to do

so would imperil the arrest.

In March 2020, prosecutors decided not to bring charges against a West Baton Rouge deputy who

fatally shot a man while executing a no-knock search warrant in 2019.

18. Maine – no-knock warrants provided for in state’s Rules of Unified Criminal

Procedure

Rule 41(f)(2)(C) of Maine’s Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure provides that a search warrant may

direct that it be executed by an officer without providing notice of the officer’s purpose and office if the

court or justice of the peace so directs by appropriate provision in the warrant. The court or justice of

the peace may so direct in the warrant upon a finding of reasonable cause showing that:

Holsey v. Com., No. 2010-CA-001620-MR, 2012 WL 1057941, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2012).

Prescott v. Com., No. 2012-CA-000190-MR, 2014 WL 813109, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2014).

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(1) The property sought may be quickly or easily altered, destroyed, concealed,

removed, or disposed of if prior notice is given;

(2) The escape of the person sought may be facilitated if prior notice is given;

(3) The person sought, the person from whom or from whose premises the property

is sought, or an occupant thereof, may use deadly or nondeadly force in resistance to

the execution of the warrant, and dispensing with prior notice is more likely to ensure

the safety of officers, occupants, or others;

(4) Such facts and circumstances exist as would render reasonable the warrant's

execution without notice

19. Maryland - no-knock warrants expressly authorized by statute

In 2004, the highest court in Maryland held that a judge cannot issue a no-knock warrant in the

absence of a statutory provision authorizing the issuance of such a warrant:

We come out on the side of those courts that, in the absence of valid statutory authority,

refuse to authorize a judicial officer to make an advance determination of exigency. We

hold that a judicial officer in Maryland, under current Maryland law, may not issue a

“no-knock” warrant. Rather, the propriety of a “no-knock” entry will be reviewed and

determined on the basis of the facts known to the officers at the time of entry, rather

than at the time of the application for the warrant.

However, in 2005, the Maryland legislature passed House Bill 577 to add a provision to the statute

regarding search warrants to authorize the issuance of no-knock warrants. This bill became effective

law on October 1, 2005.

Currently, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 1-203(2) (vi) provides that an application for a search warrant

may contain a request that the search warrant authorize the executing law enforcement officer to

enter the building, apartment, premises, place, or thing to be searched without giving notice of the

officer's authority or purpose, on the grounds that there is reasonable suspicion to believe that, without

the authorization:

(1) The property subject to seizure may be destroyed, disposed of, or secreted; or

(2) The life or safety of the executing officer or another person may be endangered.

20. Massachusetts – issuance of no-knock warrants supported by case law

No-knock warrants are recognized under Massachusetts case law. For example, in Commonwealth v.

Fernandez, the defendant contended that the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant application

failed to establish a sufficient risk to officer safety to justify the no-knock provision of the warrant, but

the Appeals Court of Massachusetts found that the defendant’s illegal possession of a deadly weapon

or weapons, combined with his criminal history, including acts of violence and the distribution of

narcotics, established sufficient substantial risk to officer safety to justify a no-knock entry.

In Commonwealth v. Silva, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts also concluded that the magistrate

was justified in authorizing a no-knock entry by police when executing the warrant because the

affidavit explained in some detail the basis for the detective’s concern that the occupants of the

apartment would destroy evidence unless the officers executing the warrant were allowed to dispense

with the knock-and-announce requirement due; the location of the apartment on the third floor, with

Davis v. State, 859 A.2d 1112, 1132 (Md. 2004).

Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 119 N.E.3d 354 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018), review denied, 120 N.E.3d 733 (Mass. 2019).

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a locked entrance door to the building at the ground floor, furnished heightened concern for the

possible destruction of evidence.

However, the Supreme Judicial Circuit Court of Massachusetts has held that:

Even a no-knock entry properly authorized in advance of a search may turn out to be

unlawful if the situation actually encountered by the police at the time of the warrant's

execution is less exigent than what was anticipated. Consequently, the police who

execute a search warrant that dispenses with the knock and announce requirement

must make a “threshold reappraisal” of the actual circumstances they face before they

may disregard the requirement.

21. Michigan – knock-and-announce codified, but exigent circumstances may

allow for forcible entry

Regarding search warrants, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 780.656 states that:

The officer to whom a warrant is directed, or any person assisting him, may break any

outer or inner door or window of a house or building, or anything therein, in order to

execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused

admittance, or when necessary to liberate himself or any person assisting him in

execution of the warrant.

As reflected in an analysis of no-knock warrant usage by The New York Times in 2017, no-knock

search warrants are not granted but forcible entries are allowed under exigent circumstances in

Michigan. However, Michigan’s Governor (D) put forth a proposal on June 29, 2020 to “further limit

the use of no-knock warrants.”

22. Minnesota – no-knock warrants permitted under case law

Minnesota courts have authorized the use of no-knock warrants, but the application for such a warrant

must include a “particularized” showing of dangerousness, not one that is merely possible or

speculative. In other words, the police must have reasonable suspicion of a threat to officer safety or

the likelihood of destruction of evidence, and this reasonable suspicion must be supported by a

particularized showing of dangerousness, futility, or likelihood of destruction of evidence.

However,

to substantiate the need for a no-knock warrant, an officer must establish more than that drugs are

involved.

23. Mississippi – no-knock warrants permitted under case law

A prior version of Miss. Code. Ann. § 41-29-157(c) expressly allowed for a judge to issue a no-knock

search warrant in matters regarding certain drug offenses, if certain circumstances were met; that

subsection was repealed in 1974. However, the fact that Miss. Code. Ann. § 41-29-157(c) is no longer

in effect does not mean that no-knock warrants can never be issued.

Mississippi courts have held

that no-knock warrants can be issued when such a warrant is justified and reasonable.

The Mississippi Court of Appeals recently upheld a $50,000 damages award under the Mississippi

Tort Claims Act regarding the execution of a no-knock search warrant at the wrong address because,

Commonwealth v. Silva, 113 N.E.3d 400, 405 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 119 N.E.3d 297 (Mass. 2018).

Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 780 N.E.2d 2, 6 (Mass. 2002).

State v. Botelho, 638 N.W.2d 770, 778 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).

State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. 2000).

Miss. Prac. Trial Handbook for Lawyers § 27:19 (3d ed.) (search and seizure with a warrant).

See White v. State, 746 So. 2d 953, 956 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

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even though the monetary damages were only $2,850 in medical bills and a $350 bill for a damaged

door, the incident had lasting impacts on the people who were wrongfully detained, including their

sense of security and well-being in their personal home. The Bureau of Narcotics also acted in reckless

disregard of safety and well-being of innocent persons in executing the no-knock search warrant at the

wrong address.

24. Missouri – issuance of no-knock warrants supported by case law

For example, in State v. Bacon, 156 S.W.3d 372, 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005), the circuit court for the

county issued a no-knock warrant allowing the police to search the home based on a detective’s

affidavit that described a drug purchase that occurred earlier that day and noted that the confidential

informant had stated that she had seen the occupants of the residence armed with a handgun in the

past.

25. Montana – state Supreme Court held that judges have no role in determining

whether warrant should be executed with a no-knock entry and that officers

serving the warrant must make that determination based on a reasonable

suspicion of exigent circumstances

As reflected in an analysis of no-knock warrant usage by The New York Times in 2017, Montana

routinely granted no-knock warrants. However, in 2019, the Montana Supreme Court held that under

the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Montana Constitution, “[j]udges

no longer have a role in determining whether officers may execute a warrant via a no-knock entry.

Instead, officers serving a warrant may perform a no-knock entry if they have a reasonable suspicion

of exigent circumstances.”

Furthermore, the officers may base their reasonable suspicion on

information known both before and after the application for search warrant. In reaching this decision,

the Montana Supreme Court noted that “officers must have flexibility when evaluating the

circumstances surrounding execution of a search warrant, including physical threats posed by

knocking and announcing their presence along with any other exigent circumstance” and that “placing

the onus on the judge issuing the warrant to prospectively evaluate exigent circumstances . . . severely

limits the officer’s ability to protect the safety of other persons and property and to secure evidence.”

The Montana Supreme Court also concluded that “Montanans’ enhanced privacy protections do not

compel judicial preauthorization of no-knock entries because the judge's role is to determine probable

cause, not the manner of the warrant's execution.”

26. Nebraska – no-knock warrants expressly authorized by statute

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-411 provides that, in executing a warrant for the arrest of a person charged

with an offense, or a search warrant, or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a

warrant, the officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house or other

building, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he is refused admittance; or without giving notice of

his authority and purpose, if the judge or magistrate issuing a search warrant has inserted a direction

therein that the officer executing it shall not be required to give such notice, but the political

subdivision from which such officer is elected or appointed shall be liable for all damages to the

property in gaining admission. The judge or magistrate may so direct only upon proof under oath, to

his satisfaction that the property sought may be easily or quickly destroyed or disposed of, or that

danger to the life or limb of the officer or another may result, if such notice be given; but this section

Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics v. Hunter, No. 2019-CA-01246-COA, 2020 WL 5089433, at *7 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2020).

State v. Neiss, 443 P.3d 435, 449 (Mont. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 411 (U.S. 2019). The Neiss decision overruled State v.

Anyan, 104 P.3d 511 (Mont. 2004), “to the extent that it requires prior judicial approval for no-knock entries”

Neiss, 443 P.3d at 448.

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is not intended to authorize any officer executing a search warrant to enter any house or building not

described in the warrant.

27. Nevada – no-knock warrants issued, no specific state statute

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 179.055 provides that:

1. The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part

of the house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of authority

and purpose, the officer is refused admittance.

2. The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house for the

purpose of liberating a person who, having entered to aid in the execution of the

officer’s warrant, is detained therein, or when necessary for the officer’s own liberation.

3. All reasonable and necessary force may be used to effect an entry into any building

or property or part thereof to execute a search warrant. In the execution of the warrant,

the person executing it may reasonably detain and search any person in the place at

the time in order to protect himself or herself from attack or to prevent destruction,

disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles or things particularly described

in the warrant.

Case law reflects that no-knock warrants are issued in Nevada. For example, in an unpublished

decision in 2011, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld various convictions stemming from evidence that

the police exercising a no-knock warrant related to methamphetamines.

28. New Hampshire – no-knock warrants granted, without a state statute

As reflected in an analysis of no-knock warrant usage by The New York Times in 2017, New

Hampshire routinely granted no-knock warrants. A 2017 editorial in the Concord Monitor noted that

New Hampshire issues no standards or guidelines governing no-knock raids and called for the state

legislature to debate how and when no-knock warrants should be conducted. I was also unable to

locate a state statute that specifically authorizes the issuance of no-knock warrants.

29. New Jersey – no-knock warrants permitted under case law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey has provided the following tenets for the issuance of a no-knock

warrant:

(1) To justify a no-knock warrant provision, a police officer must have a

reasonable, particularized suspicion that a no-knock entry is required to prevent the

destruction of evidence, to protect the officer's safety, or to effectuate the arrest or

seizure of evidence.

(2) The police officer must articulate the reasons for that suspicion and may base

those reasons on the totality of the circumstances with which he or she is faced.

(3) Although the officer's assessment of the circumstances may be based on his or

her experience and knowledge, the officer must articulate a minimal level of objective

justification to support the no-knock entry, meaning it may not be based on a mere

hunch.

Abbott v. State, 373 P.3d 889 (Nev. 2011).

State v. Johnson, 775 A.2d 1273, 1279–80 (N.J. 2001).

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30. New Mexico – no-knock warrants allowed, without a state statute

I was unable to find a statute in New Mexico that specifically authorizes the issuance of no-knock

warrants. However, I did find cases in New Mexico that reference the use of no-knock warrants.

On September 30, 2020, the Albuquerque Journal noted that the Santa Fe City Council will consider

a proposed ordinance that would ban no-knock warrants and require city police officers to wear body

cameras when executing all warrants.

31. New York – no-knock warrants expressly authorized by statute

N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 690.50 (2) provides that, in executing a search warrant directing a search of

premises or a vehicle, a police officer need not give notice to anyone of his authority and purpose, as

prescribed in subdivision one, but may promptly enter the same if:

(a) Such premises or vehicle are at the time unoccupied or reasonably believed by the

officer to be unoccupied; or

(b) The search warrant expressly authorizes entry without notice.

N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 690.35 (4)(b) also provides that the application for the warrant may include a

request that the search warrant authorize the executing police officer to enter premises to be searched

without giving notice of his authority and purpose, upon the ground that there is reasonable cause to

believe that (i) the property sought may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or (ii) the giving

of such notice may endanger the life or safety of the executing officer or another person, or (iii) in the

case of an application for a search warrant as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision two of section

690.05 for the purpose of searching for and arresting a person who is the subject of a warrant for a

felony, the person sought is likely to commit another felony, or may endanger the life or safety of the

executing officer or another person.

According to a September 28, 2020 article by City & State New York, State Sen. James Sanders Jr. of

Queens plans to introduce Breonna’s Law, a new bill that would ban the use of no-knock search

warrants in all drug cases. While it does not ban no-knock warrants in cases such as murder, drug

cases make up the majority of cases for which such warrants are issued.

32. North Carolina – statute explicitly provides for exception to knock-and-

announce

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-251 provides that an officer may break and enter any premises or vehicle

when necessary to the execution of the search warrant if:

(1) The officer has previously announced his identity and purpose as required by

G.S. 15A-249 and reasonably believes either that admittance is being denied or

unreasonably delayed or that the premises or vehicle is unoccupied; or

(2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the giving of notice would

endanger the life or safety of any person.

See, e.g., State v. Winton, 229 P.3d 1247, 1248 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010) (case in which a search warrant contained a no-knock

provision “for officer safety” based upon the affidavit which stated the subject property contained “drugs, guns, and money”

and that the suspect “was not afraid to shoot someone if necessary.”

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33. North Dakota - no-knock warrants expressly authorized by statute

N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 29-29-08 provides that an officer directed to serve a search warrant may break

open an outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of the house, or anything therein, to

execute the warrant:

(1) If, after notice of the officer's authority and purpose, the officer is refused

admittance; or

(2) Without notice of the officer's authority and purpose if the warrant was issued

by a magistrate who is learned in the law and who has inserted a direction therein

that the officer executing it shall not be required to give such notice.

The magistrate may so direct only upon written or recorded oral petition and proof under oath, to the

magistrate's satisfaction, that the property sought may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of,

or that danger to the life or limb of the officer or another may result, if such notice were to be given.

34. Ohio – no-knock warrants expressly authorized by statute

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.231(B) provides that a law enforcement officer, prosecutor, or other

authorized individual who files an affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant may include in the

affidavit a request that the statutory precondition for nonconsensual entry

be waived in relation to

the search warrant. A request for that waiver shall contain all of the following:

(1) A statement that the affiant has good cause to believe that there is a risk of serious

physical harm to the law enforcement officers or other authorized individuals who will

execute the warrant if they are required to comply with the statutory precondition for

nonconsensual entry;

(2) A statement setting forth the facts upon which the affiant's belief is based,

including, but not limited to, the names of all known persons who the affiant believes

pose the risk of serious physical harm to the law enforcement officers or other

authorized individuals who will execute the warrant at the particular dwelling house

or other building;

(3) A statement verifying the address of the dwelling house or other building proposed

to be searched as the correct address in relation to the criminal offense or other

violation of law underlying the request for the issuance of the search warrant;

(4) A request that, based on those facts, the judge or magistrate waive the statutory

precondition for nonconsensual entry.

Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.231(C), the issuing judge may waive the statutory

preconditions for entry if there is probable cause to believe the allegations in the affidavit. Such a

waiver does not authorize entry of any building other than the one described in the warrant, pursuant

to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.231(D)(1).

35. Oklahoma – no-knock warrants expressly authorized by statute

Regarding the execution of a search warrant, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1228 provides that a peace

officer may break open an outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of the house, or

anything therein, to execute the warrant when:

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.231(3) defines the phrase “statutory precondition for nonconsensual entry” to mean the

precondition specified in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.12 (regarding forcible entry) that requires a law enforcement officer or

other authorized individual executing a search warrant to give notice of his intention to execute the warrant and then be refused

admittance to a dwelling house or other building before he legally may break down a door or window to gain entry to execute

the warrant.

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(1) The officer has been refused admittance after having first given notice of his

authority and purpose; or

(2) Pursuant to an instruction inserted in the search warrant by the magistrate

that no warning or other notice of entry is necessary because there is reasonable cause

to believe that exigent circumstances exist. Exigent circumstances include:

a. such warning or other notice would pose a significant danger to human life,

b. such warning or other notice would allow the possible destruction of

evidence,

c. such warning or other notice would give rise to the possibility of resistance

or escape,

d. such warning or other notice would otherwise inhibit the effective

investigation of the crime, or

e. such warning or other notice would be futile or a useless gesture.

36. Oregon – statute requires the police to announce themselves

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 133.575 (2) provides that “[t]he executing officer shall, before entering the

premises, give appropriate notice of the identity, authority and purpose of the officer to the person to

be searched, or to the person in apparent control of the premises to be searched, as the case may be.”

Furthermore, a magistrate issuing a search warrant no authority to authorize officers to ignore knock-

and-announce requirement.

37. Pennsylvania – state Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for forcible entry

in exigent circumstances

Rule 207 (A) of Pennsylvania’s Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a law enforcement officer

executing a search warrant shall, before entry, give, or make reasonable effort to give, notice of the

officer's identity, authority, and purpose to any occupant of the premises specified in the warrant,

unless exigent circumstances require the officer's immediate forcible entry.

38. Rhode Island – no-knock warrants issued, no specific state statute

Rhode Island courts permit the issuance of no-knock warrants. I could not locate a state statute

specifically authorizing such a warrant. As reflected in 2015 General Order 330.03 from the

Providence Police Department, an officer applying for a search warrant can also request that the judge

grant permission for no-knock entry, which is permissible for officer safety and to prevent the

destruction of evidence. The officer must articulate the reasons, facts, and circumstances that are

necessary to support the request for the no-knock search warrant.

According to a June 15, 2020 article, Rep. Anastasia Williams (D) said she is also working on

legislation to ban no-knock warrants.

39. South Carolina – state Supreme Court issued temporary ban on no-knock

warrants

In an order dated July 10, 2020, the Supreme Court of South Carolina issued a “moratorium upon the

issuance of no-knock warrants by all circuit and summary court judges of this state take effect

immediately and remain in effect until instruction is provided to circuit and summary court judges

State v. Arce, 730 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).

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statewide as to the criteria to be used to determine whether a requested no-knock warrant should be

issued.” This instruction will be provided by the South Carolina Judicial Branch.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina issued the temporary ban on the issuance of no-knock warrants

following a recent survey of magistrates which revealed that most do not understand the gravity of no-

knock warrants and do not discern the heightened requirements for issuing a no-knock warrant and

the discovery that “no-knock search warrants are routinely issued upon request without further

inquiry.”

40. South Dakota – no-knock warrants expressly authorized by statute

S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-35-9 provides that, if a committing magistrate who has been asked to issue

a search warrant is satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that if notice were given prior to

its execution, the property sought in the case may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or

that danger to the life or limb of the officer or another may result, he may include in the warrant a

direction that the officer executing it is not required to give the notice required by § 23A-35-8.

such case, the officer who executes the warrant may, without notice of his authority and purpose, enter

any structure, portion of a structure or vehicle, or anything therein, by whatever means, including

breaking therein.

41. Tennessee – knock-and-announce rule in state Rules of Criminal Procedure

but exceptions recognized by case law allow for the issuance of a no-knock

warrant

Rule 41(e)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that if, after notice of his or her

authority and purpose, a law enforcement officer is not granted admittance, or in the absence of anyone

with authority to grant admittance, the peace officer with a search warrant may break open any door

or window of a building or vehicle, or any part thereof, described to be searched in the warrant to the

extent that it is reasonably necessary to execute the warrant and does not unnecessarily damage the

property.

However, courts in Tennessee have held that “a no-knock warrant is appropriate when ‘the officers

have a justified belief those inside the dwelling are aware of their presence and are engaged in escape

or the destruction of evidence.’”

No-knock warrants may also be issued if law enforcement officers

show that evidence in the property (drugs, etc.) might be destroyed before they could be seized.

In June 2020, the Memphis Police Department decided to stop requesting no-knock warrants following

the fatal shooting of Breonna Taylor in Kentucky. State Senator Raumesh Akbari (D – Memphis) also

plans to file legislation when Tennessee’s legislature reconvenes in January 2021 to end the issuance

of no-knock warrants statewide.

42. Texas – no-knock warrants permitted under case law

Officers are not required to knock and announce their presence before entry if either (1) a magistrate

has authorized the “no knock” entry or (2) the circumstances support a reasonable suspicion of

S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-35-8 provides that:

The officer executing a search warrant may break open any building, structure, or container or anything

therein to execute the warrant if, after giving notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.

An officer executing a search warrant may break open any building, structure, or container or anything

therein for the purpose of liberating a person who, having entered to aid him in the execution of a warrant,

is detained therein, or when necessary for his own liberation.

State v. Perry, 178 S.W.3d 739, 746 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting State v. Curtis, 964 S.W.2d 604, 610 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1997)).

State v. Campbell, No. W201701101CCAR3CD, 2020 WL 1987924, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

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exigency when the officers arrive at the door, although no magistrate has authorized the unannounced

entry.

In determining the applicability of number (2) above, the totality of the circumstances must

be examined.

Texas courts allow “no-knock” warrants if the affiant supplies information indicating

that announcing the presence of officers would be dangerous or futile, or it would inhibit the effective

investigation of a crime.

43. Utah – no-knock warrants authorized by statute, but not solely for suspected

drug possession

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210(3)(a) provides that the officer executing the search warrant may enter

without notice only if:

(1) There is reasonable suspicion to believe that the notice will endanger the life or

safety of the officer or another person;

(2) There is probable cause to believe that evidence may be easily or quickly destroyed;

(3) The magistrate, having found probable cause based upon proof provided under oath

that the object of the search may be easily or quickly destroyed, or having found reason

to believe that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given, has

directed that the officer need not give notice of authority and purpose before entering

the premises to be searched under the Rules of Criminal Procedure; or

(4) The officer physically observes and documents a previously unknown event or

circumstance at the time the warrant is being executed which creates probable cause

to believe the object of the search is being destroyed, or creates reasonable suspicion

to believe that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given.

However, subsection (8) of this statute provides that a warrant authorizing forcible entry without prior

announcement may not be issued solely for the alleged possession or use of a controlled substance or

drug paraphernalia.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210(7)(a) also requires the officer to take reasonable precautions in execution

of any search warrant to minimize the risks of unnecessarily confrontational or invasive methods

which may result in harm to any person. Likewise, subsection (7)(b) of this statute also requires the

officer to minimize the risk of searching the wrong premises by verifying that the premises being

searched is consistent with a particularized description in the search warrant, including such factors

as the type of structure, the color, the address, and orientation of the target property in relation to

nearby structures as is reasonably necessary.

44. Vermont – no-knock warrants issued, without a specific state statute

Vermont permits the issuance of no-knock warrants but does not have a statute specifically addressing

this issue. Following the execution of a no-knock search warrant in 2016 that resulted in the death of

a suspect, the Vermont ACLU called for reform on the state’s issuance of no-knock warrants. As

reflected in an analysis of no-knock warrant usage by The New York Times in 2017, Vermont judges

routinely granted no-knock warrants.

Martinez v. State, 220 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (citing United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36–37 (2003)).

Martinez, 220 S.W.3d at 188 (citing Banks, 540 U.S. at 36; Flores v. State, 177 S.W.3d 8, 14 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).

Jones v. State, 364 S.W.3d 854, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392–94 (1997)).

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45. Virginia – Governor Northam signed bill to prohibit law enforcement officers

from seeking or executing a no-knock search warrant

This fall, Virginia lawmakers were in a special legislative session to address a number of issues,

including law enforcement reform. Governor Ralph Northam (D) took action on several bills that

passed in October 2020 regarding police and criminal justice reform in Virginia, including signing

Senate Bill 5030, which provides, among other things, that “[n]o law-enforcement officer shall seek,

execute, or participate in the execution of a no-knock search warrant.”

46. Washington – forcible entry to execute a search warrant permitted under

exigent circumstances

I was unable to find a statute in Washington that specifically authorizes the issuance of a no-knock

warrant. In 1982, the Court of Appeals of Washington in State v. Spargo opined that “a prior ‘no knock’

authorization is superfluous and that justification of an unannounced entry must be based on specific

facts known to the officers executing the warrant, is a sound one.”

The Court of Appeals in Spargo

cited favorably to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Parsley in 1978, but as discussed above,

these decisions occurred prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Banks and in Richards.

As reflected in an analysis of no-knock warrant usage by The New York Times in 2017, no-knock

search warrants are not generally granted in Washington, but forcible entries are allowed under

exigent circumstances. The Washington Court of Appeals recently found that exigent circumstances

existed to permit immediate entry into a home to execute a search warrant, where the warrant had

been classified as high risk and necessitated SWAT involvement, someone on the porch of the suspect’s

home saw the police arrive, the police were looking for evidence that could easily and quickly be

destroyed, the police had been advised that there was a large dog on the property, and the suspect was

known to carry a firearm.

47. West Virginia – knock-and-announced is codified

W. Va. Code Ann. § 62-1A-5 provides that:

The officer may break into a house, building or structure, or any part thereof, or

anything therein, or any vehicle, vessel or other conveyance, to execute a search

warrant, or commit such breaking as may be necessary to liberate himself or a person

aiding him in the execution of the warrant. If the place to be searched is a dwelling he

shall not attempt a forcible entry until he shall have given notice of his authority and

purpose and shall have been refused admittance.

However, as reflected in an analysis of no-knock warrant usage by The New York Times in 2017, no-

knock search warrants are not generally granted in West Virginia, but forcible entries are allowed

under exigent circumstances.

48. Wisconsin – no-knock warrants authorized by case law

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.14 provides that “[a]ll necessary force may be used to execute a search warrant

or to effect any entry into any building or property or part thereof to execute a search warrant.”

However, as the Wisconsin Legislative Council recently noted in Informational Memorandum IM-

2020-09 regarding no-knock search warrants, this statute does not explicitly authorize or prohibit no-

knock search warrants.

State v. Spargo, 639 P.2d 782, 784 (Wash. App. 1982).

State v. Sexton, No. 52401-5-II, 2020 WL 4463525, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2020).

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The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that judicial officers are authorized to issue no-knock

warrants.

49. Wyoming – no-knock warrants specifically authorized by statute for felony

offenses involving controlled substances

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1045(e) provides that:

Any officer authorized to execute a search warrant relating to offenses involving

controlled substances the penalty for which is imprisonment for more than one (1) year

may, without notice of his authority and purpose, break open an outer or inner door or

window of a building, or any part of the building, or anything therein, only if a district

judge or district court commissioner issuing the warrant: (i) is satisfied that there is

probable cause to believe that (A) the property sought may and, if such notice is given,

will be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or (B) the giving of such notice will

immediately endanger the life or safety of the executing officer or another person; and

(ii) has included in the warrant a direction that the officer executing it shall not be

required to give such notice. Any officer acting under such warrant, shall, as soon as

practicable after entering the premises, identify himself and give the reason and

authority for his entrance upon the premises.

See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 629 N.W.2d 613, 622 (Wis. 2001).