Implied Consent Laws: Theory and Procedure © 2014 School of Government DRAFT: 1/18/2014
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While the United States Supreme Court has not analyzed the reasonableness of searches carried
out under implied consent laws in circumstances in which a person acquiesces to the test,
many state courts have considered the constitutionality of testing carried out pursuant to their
implied consent laws—laws that exist in every state.
Implied-consent statutes typically
require that a law enforcement officer have probable cause to believe that the driver is under
the influence of alcohol or has committed an alcohol-related offense before an officer may
conduct a chemical test
since, “in the criminal context, the reasonableness of a search under
the Fourth Amendment is measured with a “‘probable cause’ yardstick.”
The United States Supreme Court has considered the reasonableness of compelled testing in implied
consent cases in which a person refuses to be tested, holding that compulsory blood testing over a
defendant’s objection may be carried out based on probable cause but without a warrant when, under
the circumstances, the time necessary to obtain a warrant threatens the dissipation of alcohol in the
person’s body. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The court’s holding regarding nonconsensual,
warrantless blood draws is discussed infra in section 2a. ).
See Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013) (plurality opinion) (stating that “all
50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor
vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion
of a drunk-driving offense”); see also Kenneth J. Melilli, The Consequences of Refusing Consent to A Search
or Seizure: The Unfortunate Constitutionalization of an Evidentiary Issue, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 901, 920 n.84
(2002) (citing Matthew J. Dougherty, Casenote, Hays v. City of Jacksonville, 518 So. 2d 892 (Ala. Crim. App.
1987), 19 Cumb. L. Rev. 177, 177 & n.3 (1988)) (citing implied consent statutes in effect in 1988 for “all
fifty states and the District of Columbia”)).
See Elizabeth F. Rubin, Trying to Be Reasonable About Drunk Driving: Individualized Suspicion and the
Fourth Amendment, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1105, 1106-07 (1994) (citing Ga. Code Ann. § 40-5-55 (Michie 1992)
(tests authorized after arrest and with “reasonable grounds”); Iowa Code § 321J.6 (1991) (tests authorized
on “reasonable grounds” and additional condition such as arrest, injury, or death); Minn. Stat. § 169.123
(1992) (tests authorized with “probable cause” and additional condition such as arrest, property damage,
injury, or death); Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-402 (1992) (tests authorized on “reasonable grounds” and after
arrest); N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-14 (1991) (tests authorized on officer's “opinion” of alcohol use); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 23, § 1202 (1991) (tests authorized on “reasonable grounds”); Wash. Rev. Code § 46.20.308
(1991) (tests authorized on “reasonable grounds”)). Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi and Pennsylvania enacted
implied-consent statutes that authorized chemical testing of drivers who were involved in (Georgia,
Mississippi, Pennsylvania) or at fault for (Illinois) an automobile accident involving death or, in some
cases, serious injury, even if the officer did not have probable cause that the driver was under the
influence of alcohol. Ga. Code Ann. § 40-5-55(a) (Michie 1992); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 625, para. 5/11-501.6
(Smith-Hurt 1992); 75 PA. Cons. Stat. sec. 1547 (a)(2) (1992); Miss. Code Ann. 63-11-8(1) (1996). Supreme
courts in those states held that those statutory provisions violated the Fourth Amendment. See Cooper v.
State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003); King v. Ryan, 607 N.E.2d 154 (Ill. 1992); McDuff v. State, 763 So.2d 850
(Miss. 2000); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992). Compare State v. Blank, 90 P.3d 156
(Alaska 2004) (construing similar state statute to be constitutional in context of warrantless searches for
breath or blood in accident cases when probable cause to search exists); State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472,
474 (Maine 1996) (upholding similar state statute which required a showing of probable cause only when
admission of the test result was sought at trial rather than before testing; holding that the justification for
suspicionless testing of drivers involved in fatal accidents is linked to the gravity of the accident as well as
the “evanescent nature of evidence of intoxication and the deterrent effect on drunk driving of
immediate investigations of fatal accidents”). One of the offenses deemed an implied consent offense
under North Carolina law, misdemeanor death by vehicle, is an offense unrelated to alcohol-consumption.
See G.S. 20-16.2(a1) (defining “implied-consent offense” to include a violation of G.S. 20-141.4(a2); G.S.
20-141.4(a2) (defining misdemeanor death by vehicle as unintentionally causing the death of another