Research by Kyle Yoder & April Tan
Center for Election Innovation & Research
https://electioninnovation.org
This brief describes recent eorts by states to provide relief and protection to election
ocials who are being inundated with frivolous, misinformed, or vexatious public
records requests that may disrupt election administration.
While public records requests are an
important mechanism of government
transparency, over the last few years,
election ocials around the country
have reported a sharp increase in the
volume and scope of such requests
received by their oces. In many jurisdictions, this has diverted attention, time, and
resources away from the critical administration of other ongoing election tasks. Many
of these requests appear based on false claims and misunderstandings about election
administration policy, raising additional concerns about a feedback loop with the
potential to further undermine trust in the election process.
CEIR reviewed state laws passed since the 2020 general election and bills considered
but not enacted as part of states’ 2024 legislative sessions as of June 14, 2024. This
review identied four dierent ways that states’ recent eorts have sought to ease the
strain of frivolous, misinformed, and vexatious requests on local election ocials: (1)
processing election-related records requests at the state level, (2) consolidating public
elections records and data into a single public database, (3) granting public ocials
greater leeway to challenge or deny frivolous, vexatious, or misinformed requests, and
(4) specifying what constitutes a “reasonable eort” to accommodate a request. These
approaches are not mutually exclusive, and CEIR’s review identied various pieces of
legislation that appeared to borrow elements of multiple approaches.
Matt Crane, Executive Director,
Colorado County Clerks Association
1
Research by Kyle Yoder & April Tan
Center for Election Innovation & Research
https://electioninnovation.org
In recent years, a growing number of local election oces have reported a substantial
increase in the number of requests received. Many of these requests ask for an
excessively broad range of records, cover a long or unspecied time frame, or both, and
many appear grounded in misinformation about election administration. Such requests
require long hours—sometimes weeks—of dedicated sta time to prepare. For example,
in Wake County, North Carolina, ocials reported a sevenfold increase in the number
of election-related records requests received from 2020 to 2022, leading the county to
increase its budget to hire a new sta member dedicated to processing incoming
requests.
2
In 2022, ocials in Maricopa County, Arizona, reported one request that
required nearly half the election oce’s sta to spend four days sorting and scanning
20,000 documents.
3
This sta time is needed for ongoing and critical functions of
election administration.
These issues are further compounded when some requesters misunderstand or
mischaracterize the records they receive. When false claims are spread about public
records, more requests for more records oen follow. Local election ocials in states
like Florida and Michigan have reported spending anywhere from 25% to over 70% of
their time just on processing public records requests in recent years. Ocials in states
like Virginia have complained that they have been unable to engage in routine tasks like
voter outreach due to the volume of requests received.
4
Ocials have thus characterized these burdensome requests as resembling “a denial-
of-service attack on local government.”
5
With the 2024 general election approaching
and the new widespread availability of generative AI, some experts are now raising
concerns that this issue may only continue to worsen.
6
CEIR’s review of recent state laws and legislation identied two approaches to this issue
tailored to address the specic impacts on local election ocials of burdensome
requests: (1) processing election-related records requests at the state level, and (2)
consolidating public elections records and data into a single public database.
Under a law enacted in the State of Washington in 2023, all requests for records
from the statewide voter registration database or for any standard reports generated by
Research by Kyle Yoder & April Tan
Center for Election Innovation & Research
https://electioninnovation.org
the database must be made to and fullled by the secretary of state.
7
County election
oces are no longer required to produce any records in response to such a request; if
they do receive a request for such information, they must instead promptly direct the
requesting individual to make their request of the secretary’s oce. Instead of 39
dierent counties each elding requests for potentially sensitive voter information—
including lists of registered voters or voter history les—the state is able to centrally
process and respond to such requests in a more ecient manner.
As of June 14, 2024, at least four states—Hawaii, Kansas, Michigan, and New
York—have considered but not enacted bills in their 2024 legislative sessions that would
consolidate elections records and data into free, publicly accessible databases. Bills in
Michigan and New York would establish databases through university partnerships in
their respective states to store and disseminate elections data through a “Voting and
Elections Database and Institute.”
8
Other bills in Hawaii, Kansas, and New York would
require state election entities to publish election-related data and materials on their
websites.
9
Another bill considered in New York would create a general public facing
database of publishable government records.
10
These bills all aim or aimed to alleviate
the burdens of public records requests on election ocials by making most relevant
records readily available at no cost through another statewide entity.
Additionally, CEIR’s review identied two approaches states have taken through
legislation or regulation to expand general protections for government ocials around
public records requests: (3) granting public ocials greater leeway to challenge or deny
burdensome requests, and (4) specifying what constitutes a “reasonable eort” to
accommodate a request. While these laws and regulations are not tailored specically
to election administration, election ocials can still benet from the broader
protections.
Since 2020, at least three states—Maryland, New Jersey, and Tennessee—have
moved to permit government ocials to challenge or deny burdensome requests under
certain circumstances. The State of Maryland permits the State Public Information Act
Compliance Board to consider the requester’s pattern or history of requests when
Research by Kyle Yoder & April Tan
Center for Election Innovation & Research
https://electioninnovation.org
resolving complaints related to alleged frivolous, vexatious, or bad faith requests.
11
Similarly, in Tennessee, if an individual makes repeated requests for public records
“with the intent to disrupt government operations,” ocials overseeing such records
are authorized until July 2025 to petition a court for an order to prevent a person from
making requests for up to one year.
12
As of June 14, 2024, at least two states—New York
and Pennsylvania—have considered but not enacted bills in their 2024 legislative
session that would create similar pathways for relief in those states.
13
In June 2024, New Jersey passed legislation that aims to expand the public’s access to
government records while clarifying ocials’ ability to deny burdensome requests.
14
The new law will require government records, to the extent feasible, to be available
through a publicly accessible website. Ocials will be permitted to direct requestors to
that website for available records. The public may still submit requests for records that
are not available on the website. Ocials are permitted to deny requests that do not
have enough information, requests that contain an excessive amount of information
that requires more than a reasonable eort to clarify, and requests that are identical or
substantially similar to requests already pending before the agency. The new legislation
also permits ocials to ask their county court to issue a protective order against any
requestor found to have sought records with the intent to substantially interrupt the
performance of government function.
Since 2020, at least four states—Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, and Tennessee—
have claried guidelines for what constitutes a reasonable eort by a government oce
to fulll a public records request. A Tennessee law enacted in 2022 specied that
government entities are not required to compile information into a new record.
15
Idaho
now requires requests to be made to the designated custodian of the records and
include sucient detail to identify the correct records. Agencies may require that these
details include a specic date range for when the records were created.
16
Similarly, a
new Alabama law that takes eect on October 1, 2024, species that public ocers are
not required to respond to a public records request that is vague, overly broad, or
unreasonable in scope. This same law also species that public ocers are not required
to create a novel record where one does not already exist or to provide materials that
are not public records in response to any request.
17
As of June 14, 2024, at least one
additional state—Pennsylvania—has considered but not enacted a bill in its 2024
legislative session that would require requests to be suciently specic and would
Research by Kyle Yoder & April Tan
Center for Election Innovation & Research
https://electioninnovation.org
permit ocials to consider the burden of responding to a request in a timely manner as
they evaluate its specicity.
18
In June 2024, Colorado passed a new law that claries reasonable timelines for election
ocials to respond to a request received during the busiest part of the election cycle.
19
Beginning 60 days before Election Day and until the ocial certies the nal results of
the election, any county election ocial who receives a request for public records that
are in active use, storage, or otherwise not readily available may take additional time to
fulll the request. This additional time may extend the timetable for answering the
request from three working days up to 20 working days.
Since the 2020 general election, election oces around the country have faced a major
surge in requests for public records, diverting large amounts of time and resources
away from the work of elections in order to respond to vague—and sometimes
misinformed or hostile—requests for information.
This brief broadly identied four dierent approaches in states’ recent eorts to ease
the strain of burdensome requests on election ocials: (1) processing election-related
records requests at the state level, (2) consolidating public elections records and data
into a single public database, (3) granting public ocials greater leeway to challenge or
deny burdensome requests, and (4) specifying what constitutes a “reasonable eort” to
accommodate a request. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and several
states have considered legislation that draws on elements from more than one.
Lawmakers have an urgent opportunity to provide relief so overburdened election
ocials can continue to administer quality elections while upholding the essential
democratic principles of transparent and accountable government.
This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers
with questions about how the information in this report might apply to them should consider
contacting a lawyer in the relevant jurisdiction.
Research by Kyle Yoder & April Tan
Center for Election Innovation & Research
https://electioninnovation.org
1
Amy Gardner and Patrick Marley, “Trump backers ood election oces with requests as 2022 vote nears,” The
Washington Post, September 11, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/09/11/trump-election-deniers-
voting/
2
Jen Field, “Where’s Celia?” Votebeat, updated October 13, 2023,
https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2023/9/15/23874134/celia-nabor-maricopa-county-arizona-election-fraud-signature-
verication-public-records/
3
Nathan Layne, “Insight: Pro-Trump activists swamp election ocials with sprawling records requests,” Reuters,
August 3, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/pro-trump-activists-swamp-election-ocials-with-sprawling-
records-requests-2022-08-03/
4
Field, “Where’s Celia?”; Jane C. Timm, “Amateur fraud hunters bury election ocials in public records requests,”
NBC News, updated March 23, 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/amateur-fraud-hunters-bury-
election-ocials-public-records-requests-rcna15432
5
Jess Bidgood, “America’s Election Workers Are Leaving in Droves,” The Boston Globe, October 23, 2022,
https://apps.bostonglobe.com/nation/politics/2022/10/democracy-under-siege/election-workers-leaving-in-droves/;
Gardner and Marley, “Trump backers ood election oces with requests as 2022 vote nears.”
6
Vittoria Elliott, “Election Workers Are Drowning in Records Requests. AI Chatbots Could Make It Worse,” WIRED,
April 10, 2024, https://www.wired.com/story/ai-chatbots-foia-requests-election-workers/
7
SB 5459 (2023), Washington State Legislature, accessed September 26, 2023,
https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=5459&Year=2023&Initiative=false#documentSection.
8
SB 402 (2023), Michigan Legislature, accessed September 26, 2023,
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(yy3fstwlosjzaqmpqjt52ej4))/mileg.aspx?page=BillStatus&objectname=2023-SB-0402;
SB 657 (2023), New York State Assembly, accessed September 26, 2023,
https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?bn=S00657&term=2023; AB 885 (2023), New York State Assembly, accessed September 26,
2023, https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?bn=A00885&term=2023.
CEIR Focus Briefs are impartial overviews and analyses of issues, ideas, and innovations in the
elections and democracy policy space. They provide background and practical information that voters,
election ocials, the media, and other stakeholders can use to quickly get up to speed on some of the
most topical, consequential, and oen overlooked issues aecting voter access and election
administration. Other reports can be found at https://electioninnovation.org/research.
The Center for Election Innovation & Research (CEIR) is a nonpartisan nonprot that conducts
elections research and works with election ocials from around the country and both sides of the aisle
to support elections that voters should—and do—trust. We seek to restore trust in the American
election system and promote election procedures that encourage participation while ensuring election
integrity and security.
Research by Kyle Yoder & April Tan
Center for Election Innovation & Research
https://electioninnovation.org
9
HB 1751 (2024), Hawaii State Legislature, accessed March 29, 2024,
https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session/measure_indiv.aspx?billtype=HB&billnumber=1751&year=2024; SB 260
(2023), Kansas State Legislature, accessed March 29, 2024,
https://www.kslegislature.org/li/b2023_24/measures/sb260/; SB 657 (2023), New York State Assembly; AB 885 (2023),
New York State Assembly.
10
AB 6212 (2023), New York State Assembly, accessed March 29, 2024,
https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?bn=A06212&term=2023.
11
Md. General Provisions Code Ann. §§ 4-1B-04 and 4-1A-04; COMAR 14.02.05.05.
12
Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503, as amended by 2021 Tenn. SB 135.
13
SB 3438 (2023), New York State Assembly, accessed September 26, 2023,
https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_d=&leg_video=&bn=SB%252B3438&term=2023&Summary=Y; AB 6831
(2023), New York State Assembly, accessed September 26, 2023,
https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_d=&leg_video=&bn=A06831&term=2023&Summary=Y&Text=Y; HB 99
(2023), Pennsylvania General Assembly, accessed September 26, 2023,
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?syear=2023&sInd=0&body=H&type=B&bn=99; SB 525
(2023), Pennsylvania General Assembly, accessed September 26, 2023,
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?sYear=2023&sInd=0&body=s&type=b&bn=525; HB 302
(2023), Pennsylvania General Assembly, accessed September 26, 2023
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2023&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=302.
14
NJ P.L.2024, c.16 (2024 NJ SB 2930).
15
Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503, as amended by 2021 Tenn. SB 1682.
16
Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503; Idaho Code § 74-102 and 74-103, as amended by 2020 Ida. HB 601 and 2022 Ida. HB 811.
17
Code of Ala. § 36-12-44(c)-(e), as added by 2024 Ala. SB 270.
18
HB 1755 (2023), Pennsylvania General Assembly, accessed April 2, 2024,
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?sYear=2023&sInd=0&body=h&type=b&bn=1755.
19
C.R.S. 24-72-203(3), as amended by 2024 CO SB 210.
