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BEYOND #METOO
D
EBORAH
T
UERKHEIMER
*
The #MeToo movement has ushered in a new kind of sexual misconduct accusa-
tion—accusation leveled through informal channels of communication. A func-
tional analysis shows that unofficial reporting can advance important ends. But the
rise of informal accusation should be of special concern to legal scholars and law-
yers, who generally proceed from certain assumptions regarding the primacy of
formal systems of accountability. These basic assumptions need revision if, by
aiming to satisfy goals that our laws and legal institutions fail to achieve, informal
reporting channels are serving as substitutes for the officially sanctioned mecha-
nisms of accountability that monopolize scholarly attention. Unofficial reporting
pathways are imperfect legal workarounds; their prevalence means that the law of
sexual misconduct has been consigned to a relative state of quiescence. Over time,
survivors, long disserved by the criminal law, by campus disciplinary processes,
and by workplace complaint structures, have mostly turned away from the systems
that have forsaken them. A needed redesign of official complaint channels should
be informed by the benefits of informal reporting, along with a commitment to
awakening law.
I
NTRODUCTION
................................................. 1147
R
I.
F
ORMAL
C
HANNELS FOR
(N
OT
) R
EPORTING
S
EXUAL
M
ISCONDUCT
........................................... 1151
R
A. Criminal Justice System ............................. 1153
R
B. College Campus ..................................... 1159
R
C. Workplace .......................................... 1163
R
II.
T
HE
W
ORKINGS OF
U
NOFFICIAL
A
CCUSATION
.......... 1167
R
A. Unofficial Reporting Channels: A Taxonomy ....... 1168
R
1. Traditional Whisper Network ................... 1168
R
2. Double Secret Whisper Network ................ 1169
R
3. Shadow Court of Public Opinion ............... 1171
R
4. New Court of Public Opinion ................... 1172
R
B. A Functional Analysis of Unofficial Reporting ...... 1174
R
1. Victim Empowerment ........................... 1174
R
2. Group Member Protection ...................... 1177
R
3. Epistemic Justice ................................ 1179
R
4. Norm Evolution ................................ 1181
R
* Copyright
©
2019 by Deborah Tuerkheimer, Class of 1940 Research Professor,
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. I am grateful to Ian Ayres, Danielle
Citron Keats, Sarah Lawsky, Jennifer Long, Melissa Murray, Janice Nadler, and Jide
Nzelibe for their insightful comments on earlier drafts. Tom Gaylord, Faculty Services and
Scholarly Communications Librarian, contributed outstanding research assistance, and the
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law Faculty Research Program furnished gen-
erous support.
1146
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November 2019] BEYOND #METOO 1147
5. Institutional Change ............................. 1184
R
6. Offender Accountability ......................... 1185
R
C. The Future of Unofficial Reporting: A First
Assessment .......................................... 1188
R
III.
T
OWARD A
N
EXT
G
ENERATION OF
F
ORMAL
R
EPORTING
C
HANNELS
................................. 1191
R
A. Criminal Justice System ............................. 1192
R
B. College Campus ..................................... 1197
R
C. Workplace .......................................... 1203
R
C
ONCLUSION
................................................... 1208
R
I
NTRODUCTION
In early October 2017, accusations of sexual assault and harass-
ment against Harvey Weinstein, first published by the New York
Times and The New Yorker,
1
catalyzed the #MeToo movement.
2
As
allegations against Weinstein multiplied in the coming weeks and
months,
3
the media intensified its focus on sexual misconduct
4
by
other powerful men.
5
Soon the coverage of misconduct ranging from
1
See Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment
Accusers for Decades, N.Y. T
IMES
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/
harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html; Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures
to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, N
EW
Y
ORKER
(Oct. 10,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-
assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories.
2
The “Me Too” campaign originated in 2007, when activist Tarana Burke began a
nonprofit to assist victims of sexual harassment and assault. Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman
Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. T
IMES
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html. For a reflection on
when a protest campaign like #MeToo becomes a movement, see Beverly Gage, When
Does a Moment Turn into a ‘Movement’?, N.Y. T
IMES
M
AG
. (May 15, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/magazine/when-does-a-moment-turn-into-a-movement.html.
3
See Sara M. Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein Scandal: A Complete List of
the 87 Accusers, USA T
ODAY
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/
2017/10/27/weinstein-scandal-complete-list-accusers/804663001.
4
“Sexual misconduct” encompasses sexual assault, sexual harassment, and non-
actionable sexual abuse. See Kathryn Casteel & Andrea Jones-Rooy, We Need a Better
Way to Talk About ‘Sexual Misconduct, F
IVE
T
HIRTY
E
IGHT
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://
fivethirtyeight.com/features/we-need-a-better-way-to-talk-about-sexual-misconduct
(explaining the importance of distinguishing between various types of sexual misconduct).
Although the existence of different subordinate categories complicates use of the umbrella
term, the “sexual misconduct” rubric provides a way to identify connections between the
distinct behaviors that fall under its mantle. See infra Section II.B.4 (describing how
understandings of what counts as sexual misconduct can evolve).
5
See Swetha Kannan & Priya Krishnakumar, A Powerful Person Has Been Accused of
Misconduct at a Rate of Nearly Once Every 20 Hours Since Weinstein, L.A. T
IMES
(Dec. 29,
2017), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-sexual-harassment-fallout. Over the course
of several years preceding the Weinstein story, clusters of high-profile sexual misconduct
accusations surfaced against Bill Cosby, Roger Ailes, and Donald Trump, among others,
likely seeding the ground for #MeToo. For one pre-Weinstein perspective, see Lani
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1148 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
boorish to criminal expanded to disparate industries and institutions,
including publishing, fashion, music, sports, entertainment, architec-
ture, advertising, comedy, philanthropy, hospitality, retail, farm, fac-
tory, academia, technology, media, church, and politics.
6
By the close
Seelinger, Trump, Cosby, and Why Being a Woman in 2017 Feels Harder than Ever,
B
USTLE
(June 17, 2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/trump-cosby-why-being-a-woman-in-
2017-feels-harder-than-ever-65066.
6
See, e.g., Patricia Cohen & Tiffany Hsu, Children’s Book Industry Has Its #MeToo
Moment, N.Y. T
IMES
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/business/
childrens-publishing-sexual-harassment.html; Emilia Petrarca, Fashion’s #MeToo
Movement Is Loudest on Instagram, T
HE
C
UT
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/
04/fashions-me-too-movement-instagram-sexual-harassment.html; Marlow Stern, ‘Russell
Simmons Is Just the Beginning’: Music Industry Braces for #MeToo Impact, D
AILY
B
EAST
(Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/russell-simmons-is-just-the-beginning-
music-industry-braces-for-metoo-impact; Juliet Macur, The ‘Me Too’ Movement Inevitably
Spills into Sports, N.Y. T
IMES
(Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/sports/
olympics/mckayla-maroney-me-too.html; Notable Entertainment Figures Accused of Sexual
Misconduct in Wake of Harvey Weinstein, H
OLLYWOOD
R
EP
. (Nov. 30, 2017), https://
www.hollywoodreporter.com/lists/hollywood-media-men-accused-of-sexual-misconduct-
and-harassment-post-weinstein-1057193; Stassa Edwards, Women in Architecture Have
Their Own Shitty Men List, J
EZEBEL
(Mar. 16, 2018), https://jezebel.com/women-in-
architecture-have-their-own-shitty-men-list-1823844222; Amelia Harnish, Advertising’s
#MeToo Movement Picks Up Speed, R
EFINERY
29 (Mar. 13, 2018), https://
www.refinery29.com/en-us/2018/03/193440/times-up-advertising-female-advertising-
executives-sexual-harassment; David Sims, Louis C.K. and Abuse of Power in the Comedy
World, A
TLANTIC
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/
11/louis-ck-sexual-misconduct-allegations/545489; #MeToo Hits the Nonprofit World,
C
HRON
. P
HILANTHROPY
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.philanthropy.com/specialreport/
metoo-hits-the-nonprofit-worl/167; Maura Judkis & Emily Heil, Rape in the Storage Room.
Groping at the Bar. Why Is the Restaurant Industry so Terrible for Women?, W
ASH
. P
OST
(Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/rape-in-the-storage-room-
groping-at-the-bar-why-is-the-restaurant-industry-so-terrible-for-women/2017/11/17/
54a1d0f2-c993-11e7-b0cf-7689a9f2d84e_story.html; Yuki Noguchi, Low-Wage Workers Say
#MeToo Movement Is Chance for Change, NPR (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/
02/06/583428098/low-wage-workers-say-metoo-movement-is-a-chance-for-change; Susan
Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It to Change a Culture of Harassment? Ask Women
at Ford, N.Y. T
IMES
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/
ford-chicago-sexual-harassment.html; Nick Anderson, Academia’s #MeToo Moment:
Women Accuse Professors of Sexual Misconduct, W
ASH
. P
OST
(May 10, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/academias-metoo-moment-women-accuse-
professors-of-sexual-misconduct/2018/05/10/474102de-2631-11e8-874b-
d517e912f125_story.html; Alyssa Newcomb, #MeToo: Sexual Harassment Rallying Cry Hits
Silicon Valley, NBC N
EWS
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/
metoo-sexual-harassment-rallying-cry-hits-silicon-valley-n813271; Jill Disis, The Media
Men Who Have Been Accused of Sexual Misconduct, CNN B
US
. (Nov. 30, 2017), https://
money.cnn.com/2017/11/29/media/media-men-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/index.html;
Harry Bruinius, Churches Struggle with Their #MeToo Moment, C
HRISTIAN
S
CI
. M
ONITOR
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2018/0420/Churches-struggle-
with-their-MeToo-moment; Dan Corey, Here’s a List of Political Figures Accused of Sexual
Misconduct, NBC N
EWS
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-
misconduct/here-s-list-political-figures-accused-sexual-misconduct-n827821.
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November 2019] BEYOND #METOO 1149
of 2017, #MeToo had spawned a massive reckoning with a vast con-
tinuum of sexual abuse.
7
More than a year later, the landscape of sexual misconduct alle-
gations looks markedly different from any that has come before. As
survivors—mostly women
8
—have found strength in numbers and a
growing cultural responsiveness to their claims, the widespread
impetus to disclose abuse has intensified. In this rapidly shifting envi-
ronment, a new system of sexual misconduct accusation has emerged
and quickly become dominant. Yet the ascendance of what I will call
“unofficial reporting channels”
9
—a collection of informal channels
that circumvent the law and law-adjacent institutional structures
10
has been entirely overlooked.
Channels for reporting
11
sexual misconduct that skirt established
complaint pathways should hold special interest for legal scholars and
lawyers, who generally proceed from certain assumptions regarding
the primacy of formal systems of accountability.
12
These basic assump-
7
See Edward Fesenthal, The Choice: TIME’s Editor-in-Chief on Why the Silence
Breakers Are the Person of the Year, TIME (Dec. 6, 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-
the-year-2017-silence-breakers-choice (explaining why the magazine selected for its
“Person of the Year” the women who catapulted the #MeToo movement).
8
At the most extreme end of the sexual abuse spectrum, nationwide survey data
suggest that nearly one in five women have been raped at some point in their lives.
M
ICHELE
C. B
LACK ET AL
., C
TRS
.
FOR
D
ISEASE
C
ONTROL
& P
REVENTION
, T
HE
N
ATIONAL
I
NTIMATE
P
ARTNER AND
S
EXUAL
V
IOLENCE
S
URVEY
: 2010 S
UMMARY
R
EPORT
1 (2011)
[hereinafter NISVS]. For men, the number is one in seventy-one. Id. Transgender people
experience sexual violence at rates of nearly one in two. S
ANDY
E. J
AMES ET AL
., N
AT
L
C
TR
.
FOR
T
RANSGENDER
E
QUAL
., T
HE
R
EPORT OF THE
2015 U.S. T
RANSGENDER
S
URVEY
5 (2016) (in the largest survey of transgender people in the United States, forty-seven
percent of respondents reported having been sexually assaulted). Data on sexual
harassment, while sparse, also shows a steep gender disparity. See Rhitu Chatterjee, A New
Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced Sexual Harassment, NPR (Feb. 21,
2018, 7:43 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/21/587671849/a-new-
survey-finds-eighty-percent-of-women-have-experienced-sexual-harassment (finding that
eighty-one percent of women and forty-three percent of men had experienced sexual
harassment).
9
More fully, “unofficial reporting channels,” used interchangeably with “informal
reporting channels,” are pathways for complaint other than those established by an
institution with authority under the applicable legal framework to process an allegation of
misconduct. See infra Section II.A.
10
See infra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (noting that sexual misconduct may be
regulated by criminal law, by Title IX, and by Title VII, depending on where the
misconduct occurs and what it comprises). As I will explain, with regard to each of these
legal regimes, established procedures for reporting misconduct generally run through law
enforcement officers, campus disciplinary officials, and Human Resources departments,
respectively.
11
Unless otherwise specified, my use of “reporting” throughout this discussion includes
not just formal complaints but informal or unofficial disclosures of misconduct as well.
12
By “formal systems of accountability,” I have in mind the multiple legal regimes
governing sexual misconduct. See supra note 10. Across disparate settings—whether in the
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1150 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
tions need revision if, as I will argue, by aiming to satisfy goals that
our laws and legal institutions fail to achieve, informal reporting chan-
nels are serving as substitutes for the officially sanctioned mechanisms
of redress that monopolize scholarly attention. Moreover, by viewing
unofficial reporting channels as imperfect legal workarounds, we can
better discern what these channels accomplish and where they fall
short.
To make sense of what is currently unfolding, a proposed tax-
onomy classifies informal avenues of complaint into four distinct
types: the Traditional Whisper Network, the Double Secret Whisper
Network, the Shadow Court of Public Opinion, and the New Court of
Public Opinion.
13
A functional analysis of these channels establishes
that unofficial reporting can advance several important ends.
14
Even so, there are limits to what informal accusation can accom-
plish, particularly because it deliberately bypasses official systems of
accountability. To be clear, this shunning of the law of sexual miscon-
duct is not a novel development, nor is it unexpected. Sexual abuse
victims have long been disserved by the criminal law, by campus disci-
plinary processes, and by workplace complaint mechanisms.
15
Over
time, survivors have mostly turned away from the institutions that
have forsaken them.
As the #MeToo movement has gathered force, the law has
remained largely missing in action, with the perceived futility of
invoking formal accountability measures taken as given. But the near
absence of law is too damning to ignore. Rather than remain a domi-
nant feature of our societal approach to sexual assault and harass-
ment, the proliferation of informal complaint underscores the need to
invigorate our systems of formalized redress.
16
Unless we are willing
criminal justice system, on college campuses, or in workplaces—victims must complain
through an established channel in order to initiate the process designed to mete out an
appropriate measure of accountability. Sexual misconduct in the military is not specifically
included in this analysis, although its official systems of accountability (like those discussed
in Part I) are underutilized. See generally Michelle A. Mengeling et al., Reporting Sexual
Assault in the Military: Who Reports and Why Most Servicewomen Don’t, 47 A
M
. J.
P
REVENTIVE
M
ED
. 17, 17 (2014) (“Actual and perceived reporting consequences deter
servicemen from reporting.”).
13
See infra Section II.A.
14
See infra Section II.B.
15
Victims of sexual misconduct come to these different systems with varying needs and
desires. Some victims want the abuser to be deterred from further predation. Others want
the abuser to be punished or removed from a setting that might involve future shared
interaction. Others want an apology or other restorative measures. Still others simply want
to be believed, validated, and supported. On each of these dimensions, established systems
have largely fallen short.
16
To be clear, my claim is not that informal reporting should entirely disappear as
option, but rather that the frequency of formal reporting (in absolute and relative terms)
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November 2019] BEYOND #METOO 1151
to consign the laws that regulate sexual misconduct
17
to a state of per-
petual dormancy, the channels that activate legal consequences must
be reimagined.
18
By creating a next generation of official reporting
channels, we can breathe new life into the law of sexual misconduct,
along with the protections it offers victims and accused alike.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I situates unofficial
reporting in its legal context by highlighting the woeful inadequacies
of formal channels for reporting sexual assault and harassment, first in
the criminal justice system, then on college campuses, and finally in
the workplace. The failings of these formal systems lead victims and
survivors to turn, increasingly, to back channels. Part II analyzes the
functions served by informal reporting and assesses the inevitable
tradeoffs entailed. Part III returns to the law, observing that if most
victims continue to reject formal reporting channels in favor of
informal alternatives, the legal regime governing sexual misconduct
will remain moribund. The proposed solution would reengineer
formal reporting channelsin the criminal justice system, on college
campuses, and in the workplaceby replicating the virtues of unoffi-
cial reporting. The conclusion emphasizes the importance of under-
standing the workings of unofficial reporting if we hope to transform
our collective response to sexual misconduct in this time of extraordi-
nary flux.
I
F
ORMAL
C
HANNELS FOR
(N
OT
) R
EPORTING
S
EXUAL
M
ISCONDUCT
Sexual misconduct is regulated by a set of laws that, broadly
speaking, target particular settings. On college campuses, Title IX for-
bids sex discrimination, which implicates a range of sexually abusive
behavior.
19
In the workplace, Title VII prohibits actionable sexual
should increase. Put differently, perpetual lopsidedness in the official/unofficial response
ratio would be a significant problem. See Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 N
W
. U. L. R
EV
. 825, 872–76
(2019) (arguing that the #MeToo movement cannot achieve its broader policy goals
without the state reforming its mechanisms that address sexual violence).
17
For the sake of simplicity, the body of statutes, regulations and cases that spans the
criminal law (as it relates to sexual assault), Title IX (as it relates to sexual misconduct),
and Title VII (as it relates to sexual harassment) will be described as “the law of sexual
misconduct.”
18
Substantive law reform is also important, but—in contrast to what has been
identified here—this need is widely discussed in existing scholarship.
19
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (2012). For early recognition of sexual harassment as prohibited sex
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1152 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
harassment.
20
The criminal law, which regulates conduct within a set
jurisdiction, is an exception to this institution-based approach.
21
(Even
so, as a practical matter, because sexual assault is widely perceived as
less serious when it is perpetrated by a fellow student or by a co-
worker, the criminal law tends to become less germane in locations
also governed by a separate legal regime.)
Across the range of regulatory systems, one common feature per-
sists: Sexual misconduct is seldom addressed through established
channels.
22
Regardless of who is designated as gatekeeper—police
officer, campus disciplinary authority, Human Resources (HR) repre-
sentative—sexual abuse victims overwhelmingly opt not to formally
report the misconduct. There are many reasons for this but most are
variations on the theme of system failure. Reporting rarely results in
discrimination under Title IX, see Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290
(1998), which discusses teacher-student sexual harassment, and Davis ex rel. LaShonda D.
v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999), which considers peer sexual
harassment. Sexual harassment qualifies as discrimination under Title IX if it is “so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an
educational opportunity or benefit.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. A single instance of rape or
sexual assault by another student may satisfy this standard. See, e.g., Soper ex rel. Soper v.
Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 1999) (rape and sexual abuse “obviously qualif[y] as . . .
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive sexual harassment”). For a discussion of how
Title IX applies to campus sexual misconduct, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their
Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 Y
ALE
L.J.
2058, 2061–67 (2016).
20
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(2012). On the theory of sexual harassment as sex discrimination, see C
ATHARINE
A.
M
AC
K
INNON
, S
EXUAL
H
ARASSMENT OF
W
ORKING
W
OMEN
143–213 (1979). For early
judicial recognition of this understanding, see Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657–61
(D.D.C. 1976), which held that retaliatory actions of a male supervisor, taken against a
female employee for declining his sexual advances, are actionable under Title VII. For U.S.
Supreme Court recognition, see Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986),
holding that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under Title
VII. For a summary of the development of sexual harassment law, see Kimberly A.
Yuracko, Sexual Harassment Law: An Evolution in Theory, Scope and Impact, in E
DWARD
E
LGAR
R
ESEARCH
H
ANDBOOK ON
F
EMINIST
J
URISPRUDENCE
284–302 (Robin West &
Cynthia G. Bowman eds., 2019).
21
Another exception is the civil law. Although the civil rights remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) was declared unconstitutional, state civil remedies remain
generally available. See Krista M. Anderson, Twelve Years Post Morrison: State Civil
Remedies and a Proposed Government Subsidy to Incentivize Claims by Rape Survivors, 36
H
ARV
. J.L. & G
ENDER
223, 238–45 (2013) (surveying state civil remedies for sexual
assault).
22
This failure undermines equal protection norms. See Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. R
EV
. 1287 (2016) (arguing that the
state’s widespread denial of protection to sexual assault survivors, who are predominantly
women, is a hallmark of legal inequality).
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perpetrator accountability, but it often exacts a significant toll on vic-
tims of sexual harassment and assault. On balance, survivors confront
the very real prospect that complaining to authorities will prove costly
and, in the end, useless. The law of sexual misconduct is thus largely
unenforced, in considerable part because it is scarcely even invoked.
23
Formal complaint channels serve as conduits for a mere fraction
of sexual misconduct allegations; informal mechanisms provide the
increasingly attractive alternative. On this view, extra-legal reporting
channels spring from the void left by inadequate systemic responses to
sexual abusea lacuna to which we now turn.
A. Criminal Justice System
A sizeable majority of sexual assault victims choose never to
involve law enforcement officials.
24
According to conservative Justice
Department estimates, the population most vulnerable to sexual
assault—females ages 1824
25
—report to police at rates of only
twenty percent for college students and thirty-two percent for non-
college students.
26
Women of color, both on and off campus, may be
even less likely to report sexual assault than their white
counterparts.
27
23
It is important to emphasize that enforcement-related concerns extend beyond the
underreporting problem. While formal reporting does not necessarily lead to enforcement,
it is a requisite for enforcement. Over time, an increase in formal reporting can be
expected to generate greater enforcement, not only because formal reports bring cases into
the systems with enforcement capacity, but also because an influx of reports may help to
reduce gender bias in the processing of complaints. See infra Section II.B.3 (explaining
how informal reporting can advance epistemic justice). However, boosting the frequency of
formal complaint is not a complete corrective for enforcement problems in the criminal
justice system, on college campuses, or in the workplace.
24
See P
ATRICIA
T
JADEN
& N
ANCY
T
HOENNES
, U.S. D
EP
T OF
J
USTICE
, E
XTENT
,
N
ATURE
,
AND
C
ONSEQUENCES OF
R
APE
V
ICTIMIZATION
: F
INDINGS FROM THE
N
ATIONAL
V
IOLENCE
A
GAINST
W
OMEN
S
URVEY
33 (2006), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
210346.pdf (finding that, among rape victims, 19.1% of adult women and 12.9% of adult
men reported the crime to police); see also David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the
Criminal Justice System, 87 J. C
RIM
. L. & C
RIMINOLOGY
1194, 1222 (1997) (suggesting the
probability that “unreported rapes are, disproportionately, acquaintance rapes,” for
reasons that include survivors blaming themselves, viewing the assault as other than “real
rape,” and wishing to maintain a relationship with the perpetrator).
25
See S
OFI
S
INOZICH
& L
YNN
L
ANGTON
, B
UREAU OF
J
USTICE
S
TATISTICS
, U.S. D
EP
T
OF
J
USTICE
, R
APE AND
S
EXUAL
A
SSAULT
V
ICTIMIZATION
A
MONG
C
OLLEGE
-A
GE
F
EMALES
, 1995–2013, at 1, 5 (2014) (“For the period 1995–2013, females ages 18 to 24 had
the highest rate of rape and sexual assault victimizations compared to females in all other
age groups . . . . College-age male victims accounted for 17% of rape and sexual assault
victimizations against students and 4% against nonstudents.”).
26
Id. at 9.
27
See Colleen Murphy, Another Challenge on Campus Sexual Assault: Getting Minority
Students to Report It, C
HRON
. H
IGHER
E
DUC
. (June 18, 2015), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/Another-Challenge-on-Campus/230977 (describing the reporting gap between white
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To make a police report, a complainant must be prepared to
speak to multiple officers, who may or may not be specially trained in
trauma-informed interview techniques.
28
Depending on the nature
and timing of the allegation, detectives may seek to gather corrobora-
tive evidence, including forensic evidence (colloquially known as a
“rape kit”).
29
Law enforcement officers “typically are prohibited from
submitting victims to polygraph or any other truth-telling test,” and
officers are instructed not to pressure complainants to “make any
decisions regarding their participation in the investigation or prosecu-
tion processes.”
30
Many police departments deviate from recom-
mended practices, however, and even under the best of circumstances,
a police department’s interest in closing the investigation—by either
an arrest or an “unfounded” determination
31
—is often paramount.
This makes a process that is bound to be difficult for complainants
32
even more taxing and potentially traumatic.
33
Apart from these formidable obstacles, one factor that looms
large in the survivors’ reporting calculus is the predictability of a non-
response, which often stems from what I have called “credibility dis-
college women and college women of color and positing that the “layers of privilege”
required to pursue a complaint through the college administrative process are often less
available to minority students). Off campus, commentator Hannah Giorgis has posited that
an “impossible hierarchy of acceptable victimhood” means that “black women who walk
willingly into the rooms of men they call ‘brother’ are considered undeserving of
protection from any violence that happens therein.” Hannah Giorgis, Many Women of
Color Don’t Go to the Police After Sexual Assault for a Reason, G
UARDIAN
(Mar. 25,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/25/women-of-color-police-
sexual-assault-racist-criminal-justice; see also J
ENNIFER
C. N
ASH
, B
LACK
W
OMEN AND
R
APE
: A R
EVIEW OF THE
L
ITERATURE
(2009), https://www.brandeis.edu/projects/fse/
slavery/united-states/slav-us-articles/nash2009.pdf (surveying the literature on black
women and rape, including studies finding that black women are less likely than white
women to report rape).
28
See Karol Ilagan, Reporting to Police: A Guide for Victims of Sexual Abuse, R
EVEAL
(Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.revealnews.org/article/reporting-to-police-a-guide-for-victims-
of-sexual-abuse (describing what to expect from the reporting process).
29
See id.
30
Id.
31
See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text (explaining and contextualizing
“unfounding” determinations).
32
See Ilagan, supra note 28 (“The interview process can be difficult for a victim,
primarily because the detectives will need to ask deeply personal questions. Often, victims
are not familiar with the criminal justice system and find it complicated and
intimidating.”).
33
According to one expert, “When victims do report to the criminal justice system, the
way in which they’re treated is very distressing to [them] . . . . And they do describe it as a
second rape or secondary victimization. Something that exacerbates their post-traumatic
stress symptoms above and beyond the rape itself.” Marisa Kabas, What Is ‘Second Rape’
and What Can We Do About It?, S
PLINTER
(July 7, 2016), https://splinternews.com/what-is-
second-rape-and-what-can-we-do-about-it-1793860078 (quoting psychologist Rebecca
Campbell).
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counting.”
34
At every stage of the criminal process, allegations of
sexual assault are mostly treated with skepticism, especially in cases
involving acquaintances.
35
In short, rape victims often forego the crim-
inal justice system in anticipation of how they believe their case will
be (mis)handled.
Many survivors perceive that the police are unlikely to pursue
allegations of non-stranger rape.
36
Among non-student survivors,
nearly one in five surveyed did not report a sexual assault because
“police would not or could not do anything to help.”
37
This concern is
well grounded. Little has changed since a 1997 survey exposed the
police practice of “unfounding” (or deeming unsubstantiated) rape
complaints at disproportionately high rates.
38
Recent empirical
research on policing establishes the endurance of pervasive police
biases in sexual assault cases
39
—biases that tend to result in prema-
34
For a comprehensive look at the skeptical treatment of sexual assault throughout the
criminal justice system, see Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and
the Credibility Discount, 166 U. P
A
. L. R
EV
. 1 (2017).
35
Id. at 29–30.
36
See Kimberly Hefling, Justice Department: Majority of Campus Sexual Assault Goes
Unreported to Police, PBS N
EWS
H
OUR
(Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
rundown/four-five-acts-campus-sexual-assault-go-unreported-police (quoting a victim’s
rights lawyer as explaining that the massive underreporting of campus rape is significantly
attributable to the fact that victims “know in our society that the only rapes that are taken
seriously are those committed by strangers and are significantly violent”).
37
S
INOZICH
& L
ANGTON
, supra note 25, at 9. The corresponding figure for students is
nine percent. Id. Apart from their perceptions of the likely police response, victims’ own
internalization of the criminal justice system’s longstanding non-pursuit of sexual assault
cases is reflected in the category “personal matter,” which was given as a reason for non-
reporting by twenty-six percent of students and twenty-three percent of non-students. Id.;
see also infra note 86 (exploring why students might define an incident as “not serious
enough to report”). For a discussion of how the identification of serial offenders can
address this concern, see infra note 274 and accompanying text.
38
See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 24, at 1230 (“As with all crimes, the police
decide whether a reported rape actually occurred, and attempt to determine who
committed it. If they want the case to go forward, they ‘found’ the complaint and transmit
the file to the prosecutor’s office.”); id. at 1233 (“[T]he unfounding rate for rape is roughly
four times higher than for other major crimes.”). To make an arrest or “found” a
complaint, the police merely require probable cause, a far lower evidentiary burden than
the standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor must
surmount at trial to convict.
39
Id. at 1243 (“[M]ost observers agree that founding decisions in acquaintance rape
cases are strongly affected by the purported victim’s contributory negligence, and by her
perceived immorality. . . . If police bias does indeed distort founding decisions, this appears
to be the type of case in which most of the distortion occurs.”); see also C
ASSIA
S
POHN
&
K
ATHARINE
T
ELLIS
, U.S. D
EP
T OF
J
USTICE
, P
OLICE AND
P
ROSECUTING
S
EXUAL
A
SSAULT
IN
L
OS
A
NGELES
C
ITY AND
C
OUNTY
: A C
OLLABORATIVE
S
TUDY IN
P
ARTNERSHIP WITH
THE
L
OS
A
NGELES
P
OLICE
D
EPARTMENT
,
THE
L
OS
A
NGELES
C
OUNTY
S
HERIFF
S
D
EPARTMENT
,
AND THE
L
OS
A
NGELES
C
OUNTY
D
ISTRICT
A
TTORNEY
S
O
FFICE
36–82
(2012) (analyzing rapes reported to the Los Angeles Police Department from 2005 to 2009
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ture closings of rape investigations (often at the initial stages).
40
Con-
sistent with the nation-wide data,
41
police have systematically
mishandled sexual assault allegations in jurisdictions including Los
Angeles,
42
Baltimore,
43
St. Louis,
44
New Orleans,
45
New York,
46
Salt
and finding that the existence of a relationship between the victim and the suspect
influenced case processing).
40
See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, R
APE
, A
BUSE
& I
NCEST
N
AT
L
N
ETWORK
,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system (last visited May 13, 2019)
(estimating, based on recent FBI and DOJ figures, that out of every 1000 rapes, 230 are
reported to the police and only 46 lead to an arrest); Alex Campbell & Katie J.M. Baker,
This Police Department Tosses Aside Rape Reports When a Victim Doesn’t Resist “to the
Best of Her Ability, B
UZZ
F
EED
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/
unfounded (identifying eleven police departments with unfounding rates ranging from
twenty-four to fifty-four percent). The FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) provides annual
data on the rate at which certain crimes are closed, or “cleared.” See F
ED
. B
UREAU OF
I
NVESTIGATION
, U.S. D
EP
T OF
J
USTICE
, O
FFENSES
C
LEARED
, C
RIME IN THE
U
NITED
S
TATES
, 2015, at 1 (2016), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/
offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/clearances/clearancetopic_final.pdf (explaining how
law enforcement agencies can clear an offense by arrest or “exceptional means”).
However, the sexual assault clearance rates reported by local law enforcement agencies are
not a good indicator of the likelihood that a report will result in an arrest. One important
reason is that when “[a law enforcement] agency determines that complaints of crimes are
unfounded or false, the agency eliminates that offense from its crime tally through an entry
on the monthly report.” F
ED
. B
UREAU OF
I
NVESTIGATION
, U.S. D
EP
T OF
J
USTICE
,
M
ETHODOLOGY
, C
RIME IN THE
U
NITED
S
TATES
, 2015, at 2 (2016), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-
in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/resource-pages/2015-methodology_final.pdf. Because
crimes categorized as unfounded are not used to determine UCR clearance rates, the
frequency at which sexual assault offenses are unfounded greatly undermines the utility of
the FBI report. See J
OANNE
A
RCHAMBAULT
& K
IMBERLY
A. L
ONSWAY
, E
ND
V
IOLENCE
A
GAINST
W
OMEN
I
NT
L
,C
LEARANCE
M
ETHODS FOR
S
EXUAL
A
SSAULT
C
ASES
20–26
(2007) (discussing methodological issues underlying UCR reports). A separate problem
with the UCR is that law enforcement agencies improperly use the “exceptional clearance”
classification for rape cases, often because a victim is deemed “uncooperative.” Id. at 16.
See Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape
Statistics, 99 I
OWA
L. R
EV
. 1197 (2014) (arguing that law enforcement officials have used a
practice of undercounting rape in official tallies because of cultural hostility to rape
complaints and to create the illusion of success in fighting violent crime).
41
Regarding campus sexual assault allegations in particular, one study of six colleges in
the Midwest found that 171 reports to police resulted in only twelve arrests. Todd Lighty et
al., Few Arrests, Convictions in Campus Sex Assault Cases, C
HI
. T
RIB
. (June 16, 2011),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2011-06-16-ct-met-campus-sexual-assaults-
0617-20110616-story.html.
42
See S
POHN
& T
ELLIS
, supra note 39, at I (finding that the Los Angeles Police
Department cleared only 45.7% of reported rape or attempted rape cases between 2005
and 2009).
43
See Justin Fenton, City Rape Statistics, Investigations Draw Concern, B
ALT
. S
UN
(June 27, 2010), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-md-ci-rapes-20100519-story.html
(reporting that each year, more than thirty percent of cases investigated are “deemed
unfounded,” which is five times the national average, and “[i]n 4 of 10 emergency calls to
police involving allegations of rape, officers conclude that there is no need for a further
review, so the case never makes it to detectives”).
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Lake County,
47
Philadelphia,
48
and Missoula, Montana.
49
Police
responses are particularly defective in cases involving women of color,
immigrants, LGBTQ individuals, women in poverty, and sex
workers.
50
44
See Jeremy Kohler, What Rape?, D
ART
C
TR
.
FOR
J
OURNALISM
& T
RAUMA
(Mar. 3,
2006), https://dartcenter.org/content/what-rape?section=2 (reporting on the police practice
in St. Louis of diverting rape complaints from formal processing channels).
45
See Laura Maggi, NOPD Downgrading of Rape Reports Raises Questions, T
IMES
-
P
ICAYUNE
(July 12, 2009), https://www.nola.com/news/2009/07/nopd_downgrading_
of_rape_repor.html (reporting that most reported rapes were classified as noncriminal).
46
See John Eligon, Panel Seeks More Police Training on Sex Crimes, N.Y. T
IMES
(June
2, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/nyregion/03rape.html (reporting that the
number of forcible rape complaints deemed unfounded had dramatically increased and
that the category of sex crimes classified as misdemeanors had grown by six percent). For a
more recent discussion of the New York Police Department’s inadequate response to
sexual assault, see Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Inside the NYPD Special Victims Unit: Victims
Tell Their Stories, W
ALL
S
T
. J. (May 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-nypd-
special-victims-unit-victims-tell-their-stories-1525780801, which describes a “severely
understaffed” Special Victims Division and survivors’ accounts of insensitive, dismissive
treatment on the part of detectives.
47
See Erin Alberty & Janelle Stecklein, Study: Most Rape Cases in Salt Lake County
Never Prosecuted, S
ALT
L
AKE
T
RIB
. (Jan. 7, 2014), https://archive.sltrib.com/
story.php?ref=/sltrib/news/57323282-78/cases-rape-police-victim.html.csp (reporting on an
audit of 270 rape cases in Salt Lake County which showed that six percent were
prosecuted).
48
See Mark Fazlollah et al., Women Victimized Twice in Police Game of Numbers,
P
HILA
. I
NQUIRER
(Oct. 17, 1999), http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/crime/html/
sch101799.asp (reporting that hundreds of Philadelphia rape cases per year were
“mothballed” by being administratively categorized as an “investigation of person,” and
that such cases were not reflected in crime statistics).
49
See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, &
Michael W. Cotter, U.S. Attorney for the Dist. of Mont., to John Engen, Mayor, Missoula,
Mont. (May 15, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/missoulapdfind_5-
15-13.pdf (finding that “there are significant deficiencies in [the Missoula Police
Department]’s investigations of sexual assault”).
50
See A
M
. C
IVIL
L
IBERTIES
U
NION
, R
ESPONSES FROM THE
F
IELD
: S
EXUAL
A
SSAULT
,
D
OMESTIC
V
IOLENCE
,
AND
P
OLICING
1 (2015), https://www.aclu.org/report/sexual-assault-
domestic-violence-and-policing. The nationwide survey of more than nine hundred
advocates, service providers, and attorneys confirmed “the entrenched nature of long-
recognized, gender-driven biases by police against domestic violence or sexual assault
claims.” Id. at 40. The survey also underscored the problem of police bias against
“survivors of color, and against survivors who are poor, Native American, immigrant, or
LGBTQ.” Id. An intersectional approach to equal protection requires accounting for the
multitudinous ways that bias confronts victims. See N
ASH
, supra note 27, at 1 (“[B]lack
women are less likely to disclose rape, prosecutors are less likely to pursue criminal
charges against an assailant when a black woman is the survivor, and jurors are more likely
to believe that a white survivor’s assailant is guilty than a black woman’s assailant.”);
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 S
TAN
. L. R
EV
. 1241, 1242 (1991) (“[T]he violence that many
women experience is often shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as race and
class.”).
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Overall, the police response to sexual assault is plagued by the
pervasive practice of credibility discounting.
51
But this practice is not
confined to the policing stage of the criminal process. Even when
police substantiate a rape complaint, prosecutors pursue only a frac-
tion of the cases referred.
52
A prosecutor’s determination not to
charge a defendant may encompass not only his or her own personal
skepticism
53
but also the anticipated skepticism of a potential jury.
54
Prosecutorial charging in sexual assault cases, especially those
involving acquaintances,
55
is inexorably linked to concerns that jurors
will downgrade the accuser’s credibility.
56
Research on prosecutorial charging practices reveals the influ-
ence of rampant societal biases surrounding sexual assault.
57
Epito-
mizing this perspective, one prosecutor acknowledged that her office
“does consider jury bias when determining whether to prosecute,”
adding that “[a] lot of the cultural attitudes about sexual assault come
into play in a jury trial and are part of the consideration about
whether or not we would be able to prove it beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
58
This calculus draws on a stock of narratives that “incorpo-
51
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 34, at 27 (“In the field of law enforcement . . . wide-
ranging impulses to downgrade the credibility of rape accusers find a capacious outlet.”).
52
See, e.g., Cassia Spohn et al., Prosecutorial Justification for Sexual Assault Case
Rejection: Guarding the “Gateway to Justice, 48 S
OC
. P
ROBS
. 206, 213 (2001) (finding that
prosecutors in the jurisdiction studied rejected over forty percent of cases at the initial
screening stage, and in just over eleven percent of cases, charges were filed but later
dismissed, meaning that less than half of the cases received by the office were fully
prosecuted).
53
See Jennifer G. Long & Elaine Nugent-Borakove, Beyond Conviction Rates:
Measuring Success in Sexual Assault Prosecutions, S
TRATEGIES
: P
ROSECUTORS
N
EWSL
.
V
IOLENCE
A
GAINST
W
OMEN
(Aequitas, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2014, at 5
(“[P]rosecutors’ determinations of the probability of conviction are easily influenced by
their own biases, misconceptions or experiences. As such, if prosecutors are not regularly
charging, investigating, preparing, and trying seemingly ‘challenging’ cases, they become
incapable of determining whether cases are or are not likely to result in a conviction.”
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
54
For a more extended discussion of “anticipatory credibility discounting,” see
Tuerkheimer, supra note 34, at 37–41.
55
See Spohn et al., supra note 52, at 207–08 (“Several studies conclude that
prosecutors are less likely to file charges if the victim knew the offender. These studies
suggest that a prior relationship with the offender may raise questions about the
truthfulness of the victim’s story . . . .” (citations omitted)).
56
It is difficult to know the extent to which these concerns provide cover for
prosecutors themselves to engage in credibility discounting. Regardless of whether the
prosecutor’s ostensible reliance on the jury’s expected response is genuine or correct,
however, it results in systemic credibility discounting.
57
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 34, at 37–41 (describing how “credibility discounting”
influences the exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
58
See Sofia Resnick, Why Do D.C. Prosecutors Decline Cases So Frequently? Rape
Survivors Seek Answers, R
EWIRE
(Mar. 11, 2016), https://rewire.news/article/2016/03/11/d-
c-prosecutors-decline-cases-frequently-rape-survivors-seek-answers (recounting
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rate[] stereotypes of real crimes and credible victims.”
59
Framed by an
inquiry into how the archetypical juror would assess the complainant’s
account, prosecutorial decisionmaking transposes the popular accept-
ance of rape myths into a rationale for declining to pursue charges.
Given the systemic discounting of complainant credibility at
every stage of the criminal process, it should come as no surprise that
most survivors do not report their abuse to the police.
60
Indeed, the
underreporting phenomenon is as understandable as it is massive.
Unless and until the criminal justice system—including the mecha-
nisms for invoking it
61
—recalibrates, survivors will continue to be
drawn to alternate outlets for reporting sexual assault.
B. College Campus
Women in their late teens and early twenties are especially vul-
nerable to sexual violation.
62
Within this age bracket, although
females who are not students experience even higher rates of victimi-
zation than their student counterparts,
63
the incidence of sexual
assault on campus is alarming.
64
As is true generally, offenders known
impressions on the part of survivors that prosecutors “seemed to disbelieve their stories or
blame them for the alleged assault,” along with a concern that prosecutors were not
“carefully scrutiniz[ing]” the available evidence in their cases); see also Long & Nugent-
Borakove, supra note 53, at 5 (warning prosecutors that “the challenge of sexual assault
cases may appear, to the inexperienced eye, to be unsurmountable, thus creating a self-
perpetuating cycle and a low number of cases being taken forward”).
59
Spohn et al., supra note 52, at 208; see also Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and
Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial
Decisionmaking, 31 L. & S
OC
Y
R
EV
. 531, 537 (1997) (arguing that the prosecutorial
categorization of jurors “reveals how prosecutors maintain and reproduce cultural
stereotypes about race, class, and gender through their decisionmaking practices”).
Relying on an ethnographic study of prosecutorial decisionmaking, Frohmann explains,
“prosecutors orient particularly toward ‘the jury,’ an ideal type formed from a composite
of their previous trial experience, discussions with other prosecutors, and prosecutors’
general cultural knowledge about the norms and mores around sexuality, heterosexual
relations, and violence,” and then decide whether a credible narrative can be told. Id. at
535–36.
60
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
61
See infra Section III.A.
62
See supra note 25 (citing data on rape and sexual assault victimizations).
63
See S
INOZICH
& L
ANGTON
, supra note 25, at 4 (finding that women aged eighteen to
twenty-four who were not college students were 1.2 times more likely to be sexually
assaulted than women in the same age bracket who attended college and that non-students
experienced approximately twice the number of sexual assaults as their student
counterparts).
64
Studies of sexual assault on college campuses indicate that 10.8% of female
undergraduates have experienced sexual penetration by force or incapacitation. D
AVID
C
ANTOR ET AL
., W
ESTAT
, R
EPORT ON THE
AAU C
AMPUS
C
LIMATE
S
URVEY ON
S
EXUAL
A
SSAULT AND
S
EXUAL
M
ISCONDUCT
14 (2015), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/
%40%20Files/Climate%20Survey/AAU_Campus_Climate_Survey_12_14_15.pdf. Surveys
that rely on a broader definition of sexual assault that includes forced kissing and fondling
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to the victim (as a friend, acquaintance, or intimate partner) commit
the vast majority of campus sexual assault.
65
Underreporting is a significant problem on college campuses.
66
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS), for the period 1995 to 2013, only one in
five undergraduate women who experienced rape or sexual assault
contacted the police.
67
The National College Women Sexual
Victimization Study (NCWSVS), a more focused inquiry into why col-
lege sexual assault survivors rarely report through official channels,
68
found that fewer than five percent of completed and attempted rapes
were reported to the police, and fewer still to campus authorities.
69
Among the key findings of the NCWSVS was that college stu-
dents opted to bypass official channels when they perceived it as
unlikely that the complaint would be credited.
70
According to
researchers, “incidents were more likely to be reported to the police
have proven controversial. See Jake New, One in Five?, I
NSIDE
H
IGHER
E
D
(Dec. 15,
2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/12/15/critics-advocates-doubt-oft-cited-
campus-sexual-assault-statistic (describing criticism of the National Institute of Justice’s
2007 Campus Sexual Assault Study for its “broad definition of sexual assault” and that
“[s]ome argue that an unwanted kiss should not be conflated with other kinds of more
severe sexual assault or rape”). Applying this more expansive definition, one in five college
women report having been sexually assaulted. See C
HRISTOPHER
K
REBS ET AL
., B
UREAU
OF
J
USTICE
S
TATISTICS
, U.S. D
EP
T OF
J
USTICE
, C
AMPUS
C
LIMATE
S
URVEY
V
ALIDATION
S
TUDY
: F
INAL
T
ECHNICAL
R
EPORT
73–74 (2016), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
ccsvsftr.pdf (reporting that, among 23,000 undergraduates surveyed, 21% of female
students said that they had been sexually assaulted while in college, while 7% of male
students said the same). Even under a narrower definition of sexual assault, this number
seems to hold. See NISVS, supra note 8, at 1 (finding that one in five women in the United
States had experienced either rape or attempted rape).
65
See S
INOZICH
& L
ANGTON
, supra note 25, at 7 (“College-age female victims knew
their offender in about 80% of rape and sexual assault victimizations, regardless of their
enrollment status.”).
66
Early studies identified this same problem. See, e.g., B
ONNIE
S. F
ISHER ET AL
., U.S.
D
EP
T OF
J
USTICE
, T
HE
S
EXUAL
V
ICTIMIZATION OF
C
OLLEGE
W
OMEN
24 exhibit 12 (2000)
(reporting that fewer than five percent of sexual assaults were reported to the police).
67
S
INOZICH
& L
ANGTON
, supra note 25, at 1. The NCVS definition of rape and sexual
assault includes threatened, attempted, and completed rape and sexual assault but does not
specifically mention incidents in which the victim was “unable to provide consent due to
drug or alcohol use . . . or coerced to engage in sexual contact.” Id. at 2. The NCVS does
not collect information about whether victims reported to campus administrators. Id. at 9.
68
The NCWSVS relied on a national survey administered in the spring of 1997 to 4446
female college students enrolled at 233 postsecondary institutions. Bonnie S. Fisher et al.,
Reporting Sexual Victimization to the Police and Others: Results from a National-Level
Study of College Women, 30 C
RIM
. J
UST
. & B
EHAV
. 6, 17 (2003).
69
Id. at 31 (“[W]omen in our sample also were reluctant to involve campus authorities.
These authorities were notified in only 2.8% of all incidents of victimization and in 3.2% of
all rapes.”).
70
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 34, at 28 (observing that sexual assault victims often
“preempt the deployment of credibility discounts” by declining to report through official
channels).
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when they had characteristics that made them more ‘believable’ (e.g.,
presence of a weapon or assailant who was a stranger).”
71
Given wide-
spread tendencies to blame victims for sexual assault,
72
it is unsur-
prising that alcohol or drug involvement resulted in a “unique effect,”
making students “more likely to disclose their victimization to friends,
but not to campus authorities.”
73
Students resorted to unofficial chan-
nels because they perceived that “proof beyond their testimony was
needed to secure police action, that they would not be protected if
they disclosed their assailants’ identities, and that a sexual victimiza-
tion was something sufficiently embarrassing or shameful that it
should even be kept from their families.”
74
In recent years, the treatment of sexual assault on college cam-
puses has shifted dramatically. In 2011, the Obama Administration
signaled a willingness to more aggressively enforce the dictates of
Title IX.
75
New federal interventions,
76
coupled with notable successes
on the part of campus sexual assault activists,
77
underscored universi-
ties’ obligation to provide educational environments that do not dis-
71
Fisher et al., supra note 68, at 6.
72
See Amy Grubb & Emily Turner, Attribution of Blame in Rape Cases: A Review of
the Impact of Rape Myth Acceptance, Gender Role Conformity and Substance Use on
Victim Blaming, 17 A
GGRESSION
& V
IOLENT
B
EHAV
. 443, 446–49 (2012) (discussing the
effect of gender roles and drug and alcohol use on perceptions of sexual assault victims);
Eliana Suarez & Tahany M. Gadalla, Stop Blaming the Victim: A Meta-Analysis
on Rape Myths, 25 J. I
NTERPERSONAL
V
IOLENCE
2010, 202526 (2010) (summarizing traits
and identities that have a positive relationship with belief in rape myths).
73
Fisher et al., supra note 68, at 6; see also infra note 301 (noting that university
policies related to substance use can provide a disincentive to reporting misconduct).
74
Fisher et al., supra note 68, at 32; see also C
HRISTOPHER
P. K
REBS ET AL
., N
AT
L
I
NST
.
OF
J
USTICE
, T
HE
C
AMPUS
S
EXUAL
A
SSAULT
(CSA) S
TUDY
, at xvii (2007), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf (finding that the most common reasons given
by victims for not reporting to law enforcement were “they did not think it was serious
enough to report,” “it was unclear that a crime was committed or that harm was intended,”
and “they did not want anyone to know about the incident”).
75
See Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf (informing schools of their obligations under
Title IX).
76
For a synopsis of these efforts and their impact, see Michelle J. Anderson, Campus
Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125 Y
ALE
L.J. 1940, 1973–78 (2016),
which provides an overview of actions taken by the Department of Education’s Office for
Civil Rights to enforce Title IX, and Karen M. Tani, An Administrative Right to Be Free
from Sexual Violence? Title IX Enforcement in Historical and Institutional Perspective, 66
D
UKE
L.J. 1847, 1871–78 (2017), which discusses the Title IX enforcement efforts of the
Obama Administration.
77
See Richard P ´erez-Pe ˜na, College Groups Connect to Fight Sexual Assault, N.Y.
T
IMES
(Mar. 19, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/education/activists-at-colleges-
network-to-fight-sexual-assault.html (describing the successes of informal networks of
college student activists in drawing attention to universities’ handling of sexual assault
complaints).
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1162 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
criminate against female students.
78
This mandate, which exists
entirely apart from the criminal justice system,
79
requires administra-
tors to respond to sexual misconduct.
80
Even as federal enforcement
of Title IX has become considerably less robust under President
Trump,
81
college sexual assault survivors must still be given the option
of reporting to campus disciplinary authorities.
82
Yet students remain exceedingly reluctant to invoke their col-
leges’ formal reporting channels.
83
According to the most recent data
from the Association of American Universities, just over a quarter of
victims of physically forced penetration reported the incident.
84
Stu-
dents were even less likely to report incidents of penetration during
incapacitation (13.3%) and incidents of forced sexual contact
(7.0%).
85
Among the most common reasons for not contacting desig-
nated administrators were that the incident was not considered
“serious enough,”
86
that the survivor was “embarrassed, ashamed or
78
See supra note 19 (discussing universities’ Title IX obligations).
79
See supra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text.
80
See supra note 19 (explaining that sexual misconduct in educational settings can
constitute sex discrimination under Title IX).
81
See Erica L. Green, Sex Assault Rules Under DeVos Bolster Defendants’ Rights and
Ease College Liability, N.Y. T
IMES
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/
us/politics/betsy-devos-title-ix.html (describing proposed Title IX regulations under the
Trump Administration and their departure from previous guidance). Even under the
Obama Administration, the success of federal Title IX enforcement efforts was limited. See
Jonah Newman & Libby Sander, Promise Unfulfilled?, C
HRON
. H
IGHER
E
DUC
. (Apr. 30,
2014), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Promise-Unfulfilled-/146299 (“[F]ewer than one
in 10 [Title IX complaints] led to a formal agreement between federal and college officials
to change campus policies.”).
82
See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Educational Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,472–73 (proposed Nov. 29,
2018).
83
College reporting procedures vary. For a distillation of best practices, see Reporting
Violence, K
NOW
Y
OUR
IX, https://www.knowyourix.org/?school-reporting=reporting-
violence (last visited Mar. 29, 2019). For examples of how schools discourage reporting, see
Letter from Fatima Gross Graves, President & CEO, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., to Betsy
DeVos, Sec’y of Educ. 2–4 (July 11, 2017), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/
Letter-to-DeVos-on-Title-IX-Sexual-Violence.pdf.
84
C
ANTOR ET AL
., supra note 64, at 110 tbl.6-1.
85
Id. The Campus Climate Survey employed an expansive list of reporting agencies
that included “agencies concerned with prosecuting offenders (e.g., the Title IX office;
campus or local police) to those concerned with assisting the victim with the consequences
of the incident (e.g., health care providers; victim services).” Id. at 35. “Students were
asked if they reported the victimization to any of these places.” Id.
86
Fisher et al., supra note 68, at 33. This is consistent with earlier research. See K
REBS
ET AL
., supra note 74, at xvii (reporting findings from CSA Study). Regarding how to
interpret these findings, one researcher has noted that “a salient research issue is what
students mean when they define incidents as not serious enough to report.” Fisher et al.,
supra note 68, at 33. These responses may be explained by “a false consciousness expressed
by women acculturated to see their victimization as somehow acceptable,” or,
alternatively, “a rational assessment in which female victims decide that reporting coerced
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[felt] that it would be too emotionally difficult,” and that the survivor
“did not think anything would be done” about the incident.
87
Given
the unlikelihood that a school’s Title IX procedures will result in the
imposition of serious sanctions,
88
most survivors conclude that the
benefits of reporting to campus officials are outweighed by the costs.
89
This does not mean that survivors stay silent about their abuse.
Rather, sexual misconduct on campuslike sexual assault in general
and sexual harassment in the workplace—is typically disclosed
through informal channels.
90
Unless alternative modes of reporting
are introduced on campus,
91
student victims of sexual misconduct will
continue to reject what college disciplinary officials have on offer,
leaving unfulfilled Title IX’s promise of a nondiscriminatory
education.
C. Workplace
Sexual harassment in the workplace is commonplace.
92
Most
recently, a national study of a thousand men and a thousand women
asked about harassment and assault in multiple settings.
93
More than a
sexuality is not worth turning in fellow students when such an act may incur negative
reactions from their peers and no real action from the criminal justice system.” Id.
87
C
ANTOR ET AL
., supra note 64, at 36.
88
See Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of Consequences for Sexual Assault, C
TR
.
FOR
P
UB
.
I
NTEGRITY
(Feb. 24, 2010), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/24/4360/lack-
consequences-sexual-assault (finding that the vast majority of disciplinary measures
imposed by schools were “minor sanctions” such as “reprimands, counseling, suspensions
. . . community service . . . orders that perpetrators write a letter or apology, or make a
presentation to a campus advocacy group, or write a research paper on sexual violence”).
89
See id. (“For [survivors], the trauma of assault can be compounded by a lack of
institutional support, and even disciplinary action. Many times, victims drop out of school,
while their alleged attackers graduate.”). For one detailed account of institutional failure,
see Joseph Shapiro, College Justice Falls Short for Rape Victim, NPR (Feb. 26, 2010, 12:49
PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124111931.
90
See infra Section II.B (providing a taxonomy of unofficial reporting channels).
91
See infra Section III.B.
92
According to the EEOC, “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
this conduct . . . creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” Facts
About Sexual Harassment, U.S. E
QUAL
E
MP
T
O
PPORTUNITY
C
OMM
N
, https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-sex.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2019). For a proposed
reframing that centers “workplace sexism, not sexuality or sexual desire,” see Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 Y
ALE
L.J. F. 22, 24 (2018),
which recasts and updates earlier seminal works.
93
S
TOP
S
TREET
H
ARASSMENT
, T
HE
F
ACTS
B
EHIND THE
#M
E
T
OO
M
OVEMENT
: A
N
ATIONAL
S
TUDY ON
S
EXUAL
H
ARASSMENT AND
A
SSAULT
7 (2018), http://
www.stopstreetharassment.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Full-Report-2018-National-
Study-on-Sexual-Harassment-and-Assault.pdf (finding that eighty-one percent of women
had experienced some form of sexual harassment or assault over the course of their
lifetime). The report is based on a nationally representative survey of approximately one
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1164 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
third of the women respondents reported having been sexually
harassed on the job.
94
Qualitative accounts, particularly those
emerging in the wake of #MeToo, suggest that women who work in
predominantly male industries or with a largely male clientele experi-
ence sexual harassment at especially high rates.
95
The most exhaustive contemporary overview of workplace har-
assment comes from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the
Workplace.
96
According to the Task Force, the reported incidence of
workplace sexual harassment of women varies from twenty-five to
eighty-five percent, depending on the questions posed and the sam-
pling method.
97
When researchers asked randomly selected women
whether they had experienced one or more “specific sexually-based
behaviors, such as unwanted sexual attention or coercion,” the rate of
reported harassment was forty percent.
98
The Task Force was careful to note that workplace harassment is
intersectional, meaning that people can “experience harassment on
thousand women and one thousand men, ages eighteen and up, conducted online in early
2018. Id.
94
Id. at 21 (reporting that thirty-eight percent of women experienced workplace
harassment; the analogous figure for men is thirteen percent). The survey defined sexual
harassment to include verbal and cyber, as well as physically aggressive, sexual harassment.
Id. at 6. “Forced sex acts” were excluded from the definition. Id. LGBT people may
experience harassment at even higher rates. See H
UMAN
R
IGHTS
C
AMPAIGN
F
OUND
.,
D
EGREES OF
E
QUALITY
: A N
ATIONAL
S
TUDY
E
XAMINING
W
ORKPLACE
C
LIMATE FOR
LGBT E
MPLOYEES
21 (2009) (reporting that fifty-eight percent of LGBT respondents in a
national survey had heard jokes or derogatory comments made about LGBT people at
work).
95
See supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing industries and institutions implicated
by #MeToo era misconduct allegations); Stefanie K. Johnson et al., Why We Fail to Report
Sexual Harassment, H
ARV
. B
US
. R
EV
. (Oct. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/why-we-fail-
to-report-sexual-harassment (in a qualitative study of thirty-one women in predominantly
male industries, seventy-five percent of respondents reported having been sexually
harassed at work).
96
C
HAI
R. F
ELDBLUM
& V
ICTORIA
A. L
IPNIC
, U.S. E
QUAL
E
MP
T
O
PPORTUNITY
C
OMM
N
, S
ELECT
T
ASK
F
ORCE ON THE
S
TUDY OF
H
ARASSMENT IN THE
W
ORKPLACE
(2016) [hereinafter EEOC T
ASK
F
ORCE
R
EPORT
], https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/
harassment/report.cfm. In June 2018, the EEOC reconvened the Select Task Force. See
Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, Spurred by #MeToo, a Harassment Task Force Reconvenes,
N.Y. T
IMES
(June 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/us/politics/eeoc-
harassment-task-force.html.
97
EEOC T
ASK
F
ORCE
R
EPORT
, supra note 96, at 8–9.
98
Id. When the measure of harassment includes not only unwanted sexual attention or
coercion, but also “sexist or crude/offensive behavior,” almost sixty percent of women
report having experienced harassment. Id. at 9; see also id. at 10–11 (discussing, relatedly,
gender identity-based and sexual orientation-based harassment).
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the basis of more than one identity group.”
99
Although research in
this area is relatively sparse, one study of these intersectional
dynamics found that women of color were more likely to experience
higher rates of harassment than either white women or men of
color.
100
Notwithstanding the ubiquity of sexual harassment, it rarely trig-
gers established mechanisms of workplace accountability. Indeed, as
with other forms of sexual violation, victims are loath to invoke
formal processes. As the Task Force summarized, “the extent of non-
reporting is striking.”
101
Women who are sexually harassed exhibit a
range of responses that include avoiding the harasser, confronting the
harasser, denying or downplaying the seriousness of the situation, and
attempting to “ignore, forget or endure” the behavior.
102
The most
frequent response is to discuss the problem with family members,
friends, and trusted colleagues.
103
The least common response is to pursue established complaint
channels.
104
In two studies, more than two-thirds of workplace harass-
ment victims opted not even to speak about it with a supervisor, man-
ager, or union representative.
105
Even more rarely do victims lodge
formal complaints.
106
According to the Task Force, “on average, any-
where from 87% to 94% of individuals did not file a formal com-
plaint.”
107
The study explained that employees may choose not to
report harassment because they fear “disbelief of their claim; inaction
99
Id. at 13 (“There is increasing evidence that targets of harassment often experience
mistreatment in multiple forms, such as because of one’s race and gender, or ethnicity and
religion.”).
100
Id. at 14 (citing Jana L. Raver & Lisa H. Nishii, Once, Twice, or Three Times as
Harmful? Ethnic Harassment, Gender Harassment, and Generalized Workplace
Harassment, 95 J. A
PPLIED
P
SYCHOL
. 236, 240–49 (2010)).
101
EEOC T
ASK
F
ORCE
R
EPORT
, supra note 96, at 15. “Non-reporting” in this context
means not reporting through formal workplace complaint channels. For a sample
complaint procedure, see Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM), Anti-
Harassment and Complaint Procedure, https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-
samples/policies/pages/cms_000534.aspx (last visited Aug. 2, 2019).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 16.
104
Id. Moreover, reporting rates appear to vary depending on the type of harassment at
issue. Id. In one study, thirty percent of women who experienced “sexually coercive
behavior” reported it through formal channels, while “gender-harassing conduct was
almost never reported.” Id.
105
Id.
106
Women of color may be especially mistrustful of employer complaint processes. See
Tanya Kater´ı Hern ´andez, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual
Harassment and the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. D
AVIS
L. R
EV
. 1235, 1262
(2006) (noting survey results in which women of color put forth various reasons why they
distrusted internal complaints processes).
107
EEOC T
ASK
F
ORCE
R
EPORT
, supra note 96, at 16.
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1166 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
on their claim; receipt of blame for causing the offending actions;
social retaliation (including humiliation and ostracism); and profes-
sional retaliation, such as damage to their career and reputation.”
108
These concerns are warranted. Employees who complain about
their harassment do often face retaliation, indifference, and hos-
tility.
109
Given the very real prospect of negative consequences, both
professional and personal, it is understandable that most women
decide not to report through official channels.
110
As one expert on
occupational health summarized, “It is actually unreasonable for
employees to report harassment to their companies because minimiza-
tion and retaliation were together about as common as remedies [or
helpful responses by employers] and created further damage to people
who had already been harassed.”
111
Because official procedures for addressing workplace sexual har-
assment complaints have largely failed women, women routinely
resort to informal methods of disseminating information about their
abuse. While enabling the harasser to abuse with impunity and leaving
intact the power structures that perpetuate workplace inequality,
112
informal pathways nevertheless present as more attractive than estab-
lished complaint channels. This will remain the case unless and until
alternative reporting options are made available in the workplace.
113
* * *
Across institutional settingsfrom the criminal justice system, to
college campuses, to the workplacethe law of sexual misconduct is
108
Id.
109
Id. at 16–17 (noting studies showing the high incidence of these negative
consequences). Doctrinal requirements make it exceedingly difficult for employees to
prevail on a Title VII retaliation claim. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570
U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (requiring proof of “but for” causation, not simply that retaliation was
a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision); see also Nicole Buonocore Porter,
Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation, 71 S
TAN
. L. R
EV
. O
NLINE
49, 50 (2018)
(arguing that high barriers to proving retaliation contribute to the problem of harassment).
110
In general, those most likely to be harassed may be the least likely to report. EEOC
T
ASK
F
ORCE
R
EPORT
, supra note 96, at 28 (explaining that power disparities in many
workplaces can create opportunities for “high-status workers” to exploit “low-status”
workers, who may be unaware of how to report harassment or more vulnerable to
retaliation for reporting harassment).
111
Id. at 17 n.68 (“[B]ecause remediating the situation did not make the person
whole . . . and helpful vs. hurtful responses were each found about 50% of the time,
reporting is a gamble that is not worth taking in terms of individual well-being.”).
112
See infra notes 370–71 and accompanying text.
113
See infra Section III.C (describing how official workplace reporting procedures
might be improved).
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seldom invoked.
114
In its stead, unofficial communications channels
have become the default conduits for allegations of abuse.
II
T
HE
W
ORKINGS OF
U
NOFFICIAL
A
CCUSATION
Women have long chosen to share their accounts of sexual abuse
with one another rather than report through formal legal channels.
115
The “whisper networks” that have emerged alongside largely forsaken
formal outlets are often tapped into anonymously or hidden from
view altogether.
116
But neither the secrecy of a network’s very exis-
tence nor the content of information exchanged are inevitable fea-
tures of unofficial reporting channels.
The #MeToo era has revealed these whisper networks to out-
siders for the first time.
117
The movement has also induced the crea-
tion of new types of informal reporting channels that are conceptually
distinct from whisper networks. These channels amplify accusations of
abuse by reaching wider communities and aiming for more conse-
quential ends, often with the help of modern technology.
118
As new
reporting pathways emerge, unofficial reporting has become a force to
reckon with.
114
See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting the larger problem of under-
enforcement).
115
Informal reporting of sexual misconduct can be a form of consciousness-raising. See
infra notes 161–63 and accompanying text; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 H
ARV
. L. R
EV
. 829, 863–64 (1990) (“Consciousness-raising is an interactive
and collaborative process of articulating one’s experiences and making meaning of them
with others who also articulate their experiences.”). On the centrality of the practice to
feminism, see Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An
Agenda for Theory, 7 S
IGNS
515, 519 (1982), which explains that “[c]onsciousness raising is
the major technique of analysis, structure of organization, method of practice, and theory
of social change of the women’s movement.” For historical context, see C
AROL
H
YMOWITZ
& M
ICHAELE
W
EISSMAN
, A H
ISTORY OF
W
OMEN IN
A
MERICA
351–55 (1978), which
documents the rise of consciousness-raising groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
116
I am using “network” to describe a group of interconnected people who disseminate
information, receive information, or both.
117
See Summer Meza, What Is a Whisper Network? How Women Are Taking Down
Bad Men in the #MeToo Age, N
EWSWEEK
(Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/
what-whisper-network-sexual-misconduct-allegations-719009 (“This is the year the whisper
network went viral, with women sharing their allegations and experiences in forums,
spreadsheets, private groups and all over social media.”).
118
See generally Elizabeth Dwoskin & Jena McGregor, Sexual Harassment Inc: How the
#MeToo Movement Is Sparking a Wave of Start-ups, W
ASH
. P
OST
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2018/01/05/sexual-harassment-inc-how-
the-metoo-movement-is-sparking-a-wave-of-startups (noting the proliferation of new start-
ups designing apps to “disrupt” sexual harassment in the contemporary workplace).
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1168 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
A. Unofficial Reporting Channels: A Taxonomy
Unofficial channels for reporting sexual misconduct can best be
categorized along two key dimensions.
119
One is whether the accuser
is anonymous (or not); the other is whether access to the channel is
restricted (or open to the public).
120
I depict the resulting classifica-
tion as follows:
Accuser
Anonymous Named
Restricted Double Secret Whisper Traditional Whisper
Access Network Network
Channel
Shadow Court of Public New Court of Public
Open Access
Opinion Opinion
To understand the evolution of unofficial reporting channels in
the #MeToo era, we begin with the Traditional Whisper Network.
1. Traditional Whisper Network
Whisper networks allow women to share their accounts of sexual
violation with select insiders, while outsiders remain unaware of the
content of the information and often the existence of the network
itself.
121
In contrast to the Double Secret Whisper Network, which
allows for anonymous reports,
122
the Traditional Whisper Network
119
I first proposed this taxonomy of unofficial channels for reporting in Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Unofficial Reporting in the #MeToo Era, 2019 U. C
HI
. L
EGAL
F.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 16) [hereinafter Tuerkheimer, Unofficial Reporting].
Section II.A of this Article recapitulates the analysis of that earlier work.
120
An additional variable is whether the accused is named. For the most part, unofficial
reporting channels allow participants to identify the accused by name. The notable
exception—a #MeToo era channel that expressly prohibits women from naming the
accused—is a publicly available spreadsheet that collects accounts of sexual misconduct in
academia (sometimes referred to as the Academic Men List). See Karen Kelsky, When Will
We Stop Elevating Predators?, C
HRON
. H
IGHER
E
DUC
. (Jan. 1, 2018), https://
www.chronicle.com/article/The-Professor-Is-In-When-Will/242110 (explaining that the
survey’s creator removes names of the accused as soon as they appear in order to avoid
possible legal liability).
121
In their classic formulation, whisper networks allow women to “share secret
warnings via word of mouth.” Jenna Wortham, We Were Left Out, N.Y. T
IMES
M
AG
. (Dec.
13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/13/magazine/the-reckoning-women-
and-power-in-the-workplace.html. Whisper networks can of course be leaky.
122
See infra Section II.A.2.
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transmits the allegations of known accusers.
123
In its classic formula-
tion, this entails face-to-face exchange.
124
The in-person sharing of allegations still occurs in many profes-
sional and educational settings.
125
But the spread of technology has
allowed Traditional Whisper Networks to flourish even in the absence
of face-to-face encounters, as information can be disseminated rapidly
across workplaces and large college populations. For example,
invitation-only Facebook groups
126
allow women to share their
accounts across a geographic divide while keeping their stories within
a private virtual space.
2. Double Secret Whisper Network
The Double Secret Whisper Network relies on technology to
spread anonymous allegations within a closed network. The Media
Men List, for instance, was created so that women in media could not
123
Especially in larger groups of insiders, information may be passed along a chain of
network members—in essence, generating hearsay. At some point, if an accusation
becomes sufficiently attenuated from the original source, it might be considered “rumor”
or “gossip.” See Anne Helen Petersen, Here’s Why So Many Women Knew the Rumors
About Harvey Weinstein
,
B
UZZ
F
EED
(Oct. 8, 2017, 8:12 PM), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/annehelenpetersen/women-believe-other-women (“[T]he
gossip percolating around [Harvey Weinstein] became another form of knowledge, of
currency in the economy of how women protect ourselves and others. . . . For women, that
knowledge, obtained via gossip or whisper networks, isn’t frivolous or titillating. It is a
means of survival.”). Indeed, even if the information received from whisper networks is
understood as gossip, insiders tend to perceive it as useful. See Jia Tolentino, The Whisper
Network After Harvey Weinstein and “Shitty Media Men, N
EW
Y
ORKER
(Oct. 14, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-whisper-network-after-harvey-weinstein-
and-shitty-media-men (“Over time, in my experience, the whisper network always proves
reasonably accurate: firings and settlements and investigations accrue to the names you’ve
been hearing in different anecdotes for years.”).
124
One commentator described the information provided as including such tips as
“don’t be alone with X”; “In case nobody has mentioned it, Y has raped women”; and “I’d
call Z a creep, but I don’t think he’s dangerous in the way W is.” Alex Press, It’s Time to
Weaponize the “Whisper Network, V
OX
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.vox.com/first-person/
2017/10/16/16482800/harvey-weinstein-sexual-harassment-workplace (describing these as
“the kinds of warnings whispered in private among women in work spaces”).
125
For one account, see Tolentino, supra note 123. “[S]hortly after I moved to the city, I
was introduced to the whisper network . . . for New York media. I had encountered these
networks before, in college and grad school and in the Peace Corps.” Id.
126
See Julie Creswell & Tiffany Hsu, Women’s Whisper Network Raises Its Voice, N.Y.
T
IMES
(Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/business/sexual-harassment-
whisper-network.html (noting that through invitation-only Facebook groups, among other
technologies, “women—and some men—are seeking catharsis and validation by sharing
their stories”); Tyler Kingkade, Why Female Comedians Have a Secret World of Facebook
Groups, H
UFF
P
OST
(Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/women-in-comedy-
facebook-groups_n_57c5e82be4b078581f0fe6ba (describing invitation-only Facebook
groups for women in stand-up comedy); see also Press, supra note 124 (mentioning email
and Twitter Direct Messages as conduits for allegations).
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1170 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
only keep the content of the shared information secret from network
outsiders, but also shield the identity of the reporter from network
insiders.
127
Sorority women at Yale University have used Google Docs
in similar fashion.
128
Galvanized by the #MeToo movement, a wave of startups is
designing apps to assist with the anonymous distribution of sexual
misconduct allegations on campus and in the workplace.
129
For
instance, Blind enables employees at more than one hundred compa-
nies, including Amazon and Facebook, to chat anonymously about
workplace issues including sexual harassment and assault.
130
127
See Moira Donegan, I Started the Media Men List, T
HE
C
UT
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://
www.thecut.com/2018/01/moira-donegan-i-started-the-media-men-list.html (describing
Donegan’s creation of a Google spreadsheet called Shitty Media Men in October 2017).
The controversial Media Men List was widely covered by the mainstream press, see, e.g.,
Jaclyn Peiser, How a Crowdsourced List Set Off Months of #MeToo Debate, N.Y. T
IMES
(Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/business/media/media-men-list.html,
and even led to a lawsuit filed by one of the accused men. See infra note 244 (describing
the defamation complaint recently filed against Donegan by an individual accused on the
list).
128
See Abby Jackson, Women at Yale Say They Developed a Secret Way to Protect
Themselves from Dangerous Men Because the School Keeps Failing Them, B
US
. I
NSIDER
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/women-yale-developed-secret-way-
170253829.html (describing a system that uses “anonymous Google forms to compile the
names of men who women say are dangerous, and then prohibit them from attending
certain social events”). Similar electronic networks have arisen in other contexts. See
Cecilia D’Anastasio, As Spreadsheet of Accused Abusers Spreads, Anime Conventions Get
Their MeToo Movement, K
OTAKU
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://kotaku.com/as-spreadsheet-of-
accused-abusers-spreads-anime-conven-1831879237 (“A spreadsheet containing the names
of alleged abusers and harassers who attend U.S. anime conventions is making its way
around social media as part of a small #MeToo movement in the niche community.”); Chris
Quintana, Anonymous Website Aims to Out Sexual Assaulters at U. of Washington,
C
HRON
. H
IGHER
E
DUC
. (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Anonymous-
Website-Aims-to-Out/244755 (describing “Make Them Scared” as a “wiki dedicated to
exposing the names of sexual harassers/attackers created in the University of Washington
Seattle area”).
129
See Dwoskin & McGregor, supra note 118 (discussing “a wave of businesses
emerging in the wake of widespread revelations of sexual misconduct in workplaces” and
observing that “[t]he startups, many of which have female founders or co-founders, want to
disrupt a costly and persistent problem”); Kari Paul, New Apps Help Victims of Sexual
Assault and Harassment File Anonymous Reports, M
ARKET
W
ATCH
(June 5, 2018, 1:27
PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/post-weinstein-new-apps-aim-to-out-predators-
before-they-become-serial-abusers-2018-01-24 (“Against the #MeToo movement
backdrop, a new crop of apps and secure social networks are emerging to help victims
report and address sexual harassment and assault. They aim to put the power in women’s
hands—and on their phones.”).
130
See Sarah Buhr, Uber Employees Are Chatting with Each Other About Uber’s
Leadership on Anonymous Workplace App Blind, T
ECH
C
RUNCH
(Feb. 25, 2017), https://
techcrunch.com/2017/02/25/ubersecret (“[Blind] works by only allowing those within the
same company to chat anonymously with each other. . . . There is also a portion of the app
called the Tech Lounge where anyone verified to use the app for their workplace can
commiserate with other tech workers from other companies.”).
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A variation of the Double Secret Whisper Network—one created
as an information escrow
131
—narrows the intended audience of an
anonymous report to victims of the same perpetrator.
132
Rather than
disseminate their accounts to other likely targets (that is, to all desig-
nated group members), users share their information even more selec-
tively (that is, exclusively with survivors of an in-common
perpetrator).
133
3. Shadow Court of Public Opinion
Open access avenues for reporting abuse are an alternative to the
network model. When allegations are made anonymously in publicly
available channels, they fall into the murky Shadow Court of Public
Opinion. Anyone can access these forumsfar-flung distribution is
intended—but the accuser remains unidentified, making the informa-
tion more difficult to assess.
134
Even so, unrestricted channels for anonymously sharing accounts
of sexual misconduct are becoming widespread.
135
In public comment
threads
136
and Instagram posts,
137
unnamed women have recently
exposed alleged predators in children’s literature,
138
advertising,
139
131
See Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 M
ICH
. L. R
EV
. 145, 188–91
(2012) (proposing the use of information escrows to mitigate a first-mover disadvantage
that surrounds the making of sexual misconduct accusations). Information escrows are
mechanisms by which harassment allegations are not forwarded until the escrow agent has
received a prespecified number of complementary allegations. Id. at 147.
132
See infra notes 316–18 and accompanying text (discussing the functioning of
Callisto).
133
See infra notes 316–18 and accompanying text.
134
See Jenny Kutner, Sexual Assault Survivors Are Outing Their Rapists on the
Anonymous Corners of the Internet, M
IC
(Apr. 13, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/140607/
sexual-assault-survivors-are-outing-their-rapists-on-the-anonymous-corners-of-the-internet
(“These apps and sites are typically viewed as backwaters of the internet, defined by seedy
rumors and anonymous backbiting. However, many survivors of sexual assault use them to
expose their attackers, allowing victims to take control of their experiences.”).
135
See id. (“Due to the stigma associated with sexual assault and the fear of being
victim-blamed . . . many survivors feel uncomfortable coming forward with their stories.
That’s given rise to reports of rape on anonymous online forums like Yik Yak, Whisper,
College Confessions and campus-specific confessional Facebook groups.”).
136
See Cohen & Hsu, supra note 6 (noting that certain details about sexual harassment
allegations in the children’s book industry first appeared in comments to a post on
Medium).
137
See Sapna Maheshwari, Ad Agencies’ Reckoning on Sexual Harassment Comes on
Instagram, Anonymously, N.Y. T
IMES
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/
business/media/diet-madison-avenue-instagram.html (describing allegations in the
advertising industry made by Instagram account @DietMadisonAvenue); Petrarca, supra
note 6 (describing allegations in the fashion industry made by account @ShitModelMgmt).
138
See Cohen & Hsu, supra note 6.
139
See Maheshwari, supra note 137.
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1172 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
and fashion.
140
While these platforms remain controversial
141
and gen-
erate questions of legal liability,
142
accusers who choose to publicly
expose their abuser without identifying themselves may do so in the
Shadow Court of Public Opinion.
4. New Court of Public Opinion
The New Court of Public Opinion features allegations against
individuals named by accusers who, unlike in the Shadow Court of
Public Opinion, are also identified. While there has long existed an
outlet for popular judgments outside the court of law, the public’s
openness to claims of sexual misconduct—and relatedly, accusers’
willingness to bring these claims forwardhas cultivated a Court of
Public Opinion that is entirely new.
The #MeToo movement catapulted sexual misconduct into public
view through blockbuster reporting on the Harvey Weinstein story by
the New York Times and The New Yorker.
143
The women in those
accounts, many of whom were willing to speak on the record, came
forward after years, even decades, to unofficially report their abuse.
Since then, in catalytic fashion, many women with allegations against
high-profile menwomen who, for myriad reasons, opt not to report
through formal legal channels
144
—have done the very same.
145
The
140
See Petrarca, supra note 6.
141
See, e.g., Karen McKibben, Opinion, Diet Madison Avenue Is Creating a Culture of
Fear. There’s a Better Way, A
D
A
GE
(Mar. 5, 2018), https://adage.com/article/agency-
viewpoint/diet-madison-avenue-creating-culture-fear-better-way/312617 (relating that a
group of women in advertising released an open letter criticizing the Instagram account for
creating a culture of fear); Petrarca, supra note 6 (noting that the owner of one Instagram
account took down her “Blacklist” website because she felt it was spiraling out of control).
142
See infra notes 242–46 and accompanying text (discussing the law of defamation).
143
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
144
After reporting unofficially, several accusers then opted to cooperate with official
investigations. See, e.g., Ronan Farrow, Behind the Scenes of Harvey Weinstein’s Arrest,
N
EW
Y
ORKER
(May 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/behind-the-
scenes-of-harvey-weinsteins-impending-arrest (explaining that Lucia Evans was contacted
by New York Police Department detectives the day after her allegations of sexual assault
by Harvey Weinstein were publicly reported in The New Yorker; she ultimately agreed to
cooperate with Weinstein’s prosecution); Special Prosecutor Interviewing Women Who
Accused Eric Schneiderman of Abuse, N.Y.L.J. (May 23, 2018, 7:37 PM), https://
www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/05/23/special-prosecutor-interviewing-women-who-
accused-eric-schneiderman-of-abuse (describing prosecutors’ ongoing interviews with
women who first disclosed allegations of abuse by Attorney General Eric Schneiderman in
The New Yorker); see also Sandra Gonzalez & Emanuella Grinberg, ‘Surviving R. Kelly’
Spurs Follow-Up Calls from DA, Attorney for Alleged Victim’s Family Says, CNN (Jan. 9,
2019, 6:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/08/entertainment/r-kelly-investigation/
index.html (detailing outreach to accusers by prosecutors in Chicago and Atlanta following
the airing of a documentary that publicized multiple allegations of sexual abuse against the
singer).
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movement is at once fueled by and fueling public allegations of sexual
violation.
Women whose abusers are not the subject of intense public
interest,
146
however, cannot typically turn to the mainstream media.
147
For most accusers wishing to publicly report abuse extra-legally,
Twitter—with its hashtag usage that gave the #MeToo movement its
name—is emerging as a central repository for sexual misconduct accu-
sations.
148
Survivors without access to the mainstream media are also
using public Facebook posts and blog entries to circulate their allega-
tions in the New Court of Public Opinion.
149
145
See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Anderson Cooper, Mario Batali
and the Spotted Pig, CBS N
EWS
: 60 M
INS
. (May 20, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
mario-batali-and-the-spotted-pig-nyc (noting allegations against the famous chef); Jim
DeRogatis & Marisa Carroll, “He’s a Predator”: Two More Women Speak Out About R.
Kelly’s Alleged Sexual Abuse, B
UZZ
F
EED
N
EWS
(May 4, 2018), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jimderogatis/r-kelly-sexual-abuse-allegations-lizzette-
martinez-times-up; Jane Mayer & Ronan Farrow, Four Women Accuse New York’s
Attorney General of Physical Abuse, N
EW
Y
ORKER
(May 7, 2018), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/four-women-accuse-new-yorks-attorney-general-of-
physical-abuse.
146
#MeToo’s attention to allegations of sexual misconduct by prominent men has
unleashed a torrent of disclosures that generate zero public attention. About a month after
allegations against Harvey Weinstein were reported in the New York Times, Rebecca
Traister, a prominent feminist commentator, wrote, “Since the reports of Weinstein’s
malevolence began to gush, I’ve received somewhere between five and 20 emails every day
from women wanting to tell me their experiences: of being groped or leered at or rubbed
up against in their workplaces.” Rebecca Traister, Your Reckoning. And Mine., T
HE
C
UT
(Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/11/rebecca-traister-on-the-post-weinstein-
reckoning.html.
147
Id. Even if it were an option, not all women would want their allegations of
misconduct publicly reported. See Michelle Toglia, Why Did Some Women Choose Not to
Post a “Me Too” Story? Women Share Why They Didn’t Participate in the Movement,
B
USTLE
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/why-did-some-women-choose-not-to-
post-a-me-too-story-women-share-why-they-didnt-participate-in-the-movement-2961946;
see also Laura Gianino, I Went Public with My Sexual Assault. And Then the Trolls Came
for Me., W
ASH
. P
OST
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
posteverything/wp/2017/10/18/i-went-public-with-my-sexual-assault-and-then-the-trolls-
came-for-me (describing the author’s experience of being attacked on and offline after she
told her story).
148
See, e.g., Alison Flood, Three Women Go Public with Sherman Alexie Sexual
Harassment Allegations, G
UARDIAN
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/books/
2018/mar/07/three-women-go-public-with-sherman-alexie-sexual-harassment-allegations
(describing accusations that first surfaced on Twitter); Kristine Phillips, Pulitzer Prize-
Winning Author Junot Diaz Accused of Sexual Misconduct, Misogynistic Behavior, W
ASH
.
P
OST
(May 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/
2018/05/05/pulitzer-prize-winning-author-junot-diaz-accused-of-sexual-misconduct-
misogynistic-behavior (same).
149
See, e.g., Kate Thayer, Sexual Assault Survivors Are Publicly Accusing Attackers on
Social Media. But at What Cost?, C
HI
. T
RIB
. (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.
com/lifestyles/ct-life-facebook-sex-assault-allegations-20181212-story.html (relating that a
woman used Facebook “to describe, in graphic detail, how a man she knows tried to rape
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* * *
In the #MeToo age, victims of sexual misconduct are increasingly
drawn to informal accusation. Before advocating reform that incen-
tivizes greater reliance on formal complaint mechanisms,
150
I first con-
sider the functionality of unofficial complaint channels.
B. A Functional Analysis of Unofficial Reporting
Informal reporting advances important ideals while falling short
along a number of key dimensions. These shortcomings can best be
addressed by the law of sexual misconduct, which is too rarely
invoked. To this end, I will argue for a redesign of formal complaint
channels that incorporates many of the functions of informal
reporting.
151
1. Victim Empowerment
Victims of sexual misconduct often turn to informal reporting
channels for reasons that can be grouped under the rubric of empow-
erment. Notwithstanding variations in the particulars, this is true
across all four categories of unofficial reporting: the Traditional
Whisper Network, the Double Secret Whisper Network, the Shadow
Court of Public Opinion, and the New Court of Public Opinion. For
present purposes, empowerment can be understood as encompassing
three distinctive dynamics: catharsis (emotional relief), validation
(affirmation of worth and lived experience), and solidarity (group-
based empowerment).
First, informal reporting channels provide a mechanism for
women to name their abuse, which can itself be a form of release.
152
Especially because victims of sexual assault and harassment often
were, and continue to be, blamed for what happened to them, the act
of identifying misconduct—whether anonymously or not, to a select
group or to the general public—can itself be cathartic.
Second, women alleging sexual abuse via unofficial channels can
find their accounts validated in important ways. As restricted access
channels, both the Traditional Whisper Network and the Double
her, naming him and including his photo in a post that was shared more than 1,000 times in
a matter of days”).
150
See supra note 16 (emphasizing that the problem is a lopsidedness in the official/
unofficial response ratio rather than unofficial reporting per se).
151
See infra Part III.
152
See, e.g., Kelsky, supra note 120 (describing how one contributor to the spreadsheet
remarked that it “was the first time that I have told the full account of what happened to
me to anyone, and it has been hugely therapeutic in helping me to process the
experience”).
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Secret Whisper Network tend to function as survivor-friendly spaces.
These supportive environs reinforce the message that the alleged mis-
conduct is wrong and the reporter is not at fault.
153
This is not neces-
sarily true of open access networks—women’s public allegations of
sexual violation are frequently treated with hostility, disdain, and dis-
belief.
154
But the #MeToo movement may be changing this default
response,
155
which has made open access channels (namely, the
Shadow Court of Public Opinion and the New Court of Public
Opinion) increasingly likely sources of victim support.
Validation has yet another dimension. By facilitating the flow of
information regarding sexual misconduct, informal reporting channels
aggregate complaints, allowing participants to discover previously
hidden patterns. These patterns can be individuated, as when a cluster
of allegations centers on the same person.
156
The patterns exposed
through informal reporting can also be generalized, revealing com-
monalities in a workplace or industry.
157
More globally, patterns of
sexism and misogyny can be connected across disparate sectors of our
society,
158
and even throughout the world.
159
153
See, e.g., Donegan, supra note 127 (characterizing the Media Men List as “a place for
women to share their stories of harassment and assault without being needlessly
discredited or judged”). Jess Ladd, the founder of third-party reporting platform Callisto,
explained, “When you learn that you’re not the only victim of sexual harassment or assault,
you feel less ashamed about your experience and you feel more empowered to share your
experience with others.” Bouree Lam, Can Tech Make the Whisper Network Legitimate?,
R
EFINERY
29 (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2018/02/181277/jess-ladd-
callisto-app-sexual-assault. In the words of one contributor to the Media Men spreadsheet,
“I just needed one space where I didn’t have to pretend, downplay, excuse, or minimize the
harassment.” Kelsky, supra note 120.
154
See generally Tuerkheimer, supra note 34, at 3 (describing pervasive practices of
credibility discounting); see also Gianino, supra note 147 (describing one woman’s negative
experiences in the wake of a #MeToo disclosure); Toglia, supra note 147 (relating accounts
of women who chose not to come forward with their #MeToo allegations).
155
See infra Section II.B.5 (describing institutional change in the wake of #MeToo).
156
For example, one woman who learned that she had been victimized by the same
workplace harasser as other women recounted that “it was kind of reassuring to know we
weren’t alone.” See Creswell & Hsu, supra note 126.
157
See, e.g., Donegan, supra note 127 (describing how #MeToo precipitated new
conversations about sexual harassment patterns in the media industry); Petrarca, supra
note 6 (discussing newly revealed patterns of abuse in the fashion industry); Ben
Schamisso, These Women Are Exposing the Scale of Sexual Misconduct in Academia,
N
EWSY
(Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.newsy.com/stories/medill-metoo-movement-exposes-
harrasment-in-academia (describing increased awareness of the scale of harassment in
academia).
158
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
159
See Me Too Rising: A Visualization of the Movement from Google Trends, G
OOGLE
T
RENDS
, https://metoorising.withgoogle.com (last visisted Apr. 1, 2019) (depicting “Me
Too” search trends across different cities around the world through an interactive website).
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Third, the communal properties of informal reporting channels,
whether closed or open, enable victims of sexual violation to locate
their experiences within a larger context. Through the shared exper-
iences of others, women are able to confirm both the accuracy of their
understanding of the violation
160
and the gravity of their complaint.
161
This can be individually validating;
162
it can also enhance group soli-
darity, a collective form of empowerment. By connecting her own vio-
lation to those of others, a victim of misconduct can better discern that
she is far from alone.
163
This in turn can encourage identification with
other members of the subordinated group or groups.
The solidarity enhancing function of informal reporting is limited,
however, when network access is restricted, particularly—as is often
the case—when it is restricted to the more privileged members of a
group.
164
An intersectional approach to understanding the operation
of power
165
explains why information sharing in whisper networks
tends to exclude those with comparatively less advantage.
166
In con-
trast, open access channels have the potential to highlight commonali-
160
See infra notes 186–91 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
hermeneutical injustice); Donegan, supra note 127 (observing that “[a]mong the most
potent of these powers [that women have] is the knowledge of our own experiences”).
161
See supra note 115 (discussing consciousness-raising methodology).
162
See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text (discussing how women have
responded to seeing others report their experiences).
163
See, e.g., Colleen Flaherty, ‘Holding Space’ for Victims of Harassment, I
NSIDE
H
IGHER
E
D
(Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/12/08/what-can-
crowdsourced-survey-sexual-harassment-academia-tell-us-about-problem (explaining that
the Academic Men List was created to “give victims a place to share their stories, to know
they are not alone and to realize the systemic, institutional and patterned natured of sexual
abuse in the academy”); Petrarca, supra note 6 (noting that since publication of the list of
accused harassers, models “know they are not alone”). One woman, describing the impetus
for participating in a Twitter exchange regarding harassment allegations against a
particular publicist, said “The minute I saw [the Tweets], I felt a surge of—corny as it
sounds—sisterhood, and I wanted to let her know that she wasn’t alone.” Rebecca
Haithcoat, ‘I Felt So Trapped’: In Indie Music, Sexual Harassment Is an Accepted
Nightmare, B
ROADLY
(Feb. 26, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/
qkgyjx/i-felt-so-trapped-in-indie-music-sexual-harassment-is-an-accepted-nightmare; see
also Paul, supra note 129 (“Seeing the editor who forced himself on me on the Shitty
Media Men list—I didn’t put him there—was one of the moments I felt the least alone in
my life . . . .”).
164
See S.E. Smith, Who Hears the Whisper? The Shitty Media Men List Excludes So
Many, B
ITCH
M
EDIA
(Jan. 18, 2018, 1:28 PM), https://www.bitchmedia.org/article/who-
shitty-media-men-leaves-out (“Whisper networks can be incredibly powerful, but only
when the signal carries throughout a community, not just among those who already occupy
positions of comparative privilege.”).
165
See generally Crenshaw, supra note 50 (highlighting the various ways in which race
and gender interact to create structural, political, and representational violence against
women of color).
166
See Smith, supra note 164 (“If a whisper network highlights the power of a
sisterhood, it also underscores the exclusionary nature of sisterhood.”).
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ties between group members, broadly defined
167
(although the Courts
of Public Opinion are not without their own set of drawbacks, as we
will continue to see).
168
2. Group Member Protection
Women who report sexual misconduct through informal channels
often describe a desire to protect others from similar abuse.
169
This
impulse stems from the notion that sharing information with potential
victims of misconduct—especially in the workplace or on campus
170
disseminates knowledge that is useful for avoiding a similar
experience.
171
167
For example, female farmworkers wrote a letter to Hollywood victims of sexual
harassment, noting that “[e]ven though we work in very different environments, we share a
common experience of being preyed upon by individuals who have the power to hire, fire,
blacklist and otherwise threaten our economic, physical and emotional security.” 700,000
Female Farmworkers Say They Stand with Hollywood Actors Against Sexual Assault,
TIME (Nov. 10, 2017), http://time.com/5018813/farmworkers-solidarity-hollywood-sexual-
assault.
168
See supra note 147 (noting survivors’ reasons not to disclose publicly); see also infra
Section II.B.6 (discussing accountability in the informal reporting context).
169
See, e.g., Whitney Bauck, Instagram Account @shitmodelmgmt Posts ‘Blacklist’ to
Protect Models from Sexual Assault, F
ASHIONISTA
(last updated Mar. 5, 2018), https://
fashionista.com/2018/02/shit-model-management-fashion-photographers-sexual-
misconduct-list (stating that the public list of alleged harassers in the industry is “intended
to help models make informed decisions about who to work with—or not”); Donegan,
supra note 127 (describing the Media Men List as an “attempt at solving what has seemed
like an intractable problem: how women can protect ourselves from sexual harassment and
assault”); Petersen, supra note 123 (“[W]e’ve become dependent on unofficial modes of
communication to protect ourselves.”).
170
Beyond the confines of a closed community, it is generally more difficult to protect
would-be victims. But see, e.g., Brandon Griggs, #MeToo Is Succeeding Where Others
Failedto Mute R. Kelly, CNN (May 10, 2018, 10:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/
10/entertainment/r-kelly-mute-movement-spotify-trnd/index.html (describing the many
allegations of sexual assault lodged against R. Kelly over decades that went largely
unaddressed until recently); William Lee, R. Kelly’s Fall Comes as Chicago, Black Women
Finally Turn Their Back on Star, C
HI
. T
RIB
. (May 23, 2018, 12:25 PM), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/music/ct-ae-rkelly-reaches-metoo-moment-0523-
story.html (describing how R. Kelly’s hometown of Chicago led the #MuteRKelly
campaign). In the wake of the #MuteRKelly campaign and the release of Surviving R.
Kelly, a documentary series first aired in January 2019, R. Kelly was indicted on a range of
sex offenses by offices in both Chicago and New York. See Jason Meisner, Madeline
Buckley & Megan Crepeau, R. Kelly Hit with Federal Indictments in New York, Chicago;
Faces New Racketeering, Sex Crime Charges, Allegations He Paid to Recover Sex Tapes and
Cover Up Conduct, C
HI
. T
RIB
. (July 12, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/criminal-justice/ct-r-kelly-arrested-federal-charges-20190712-
6ghntysw3zf3lpncn4owcfzyje-story.html (summarizing the criminal charges pending against
R. Kelly).
171
More broadly, by facilitating access to fuller information regarding the conduct of
fellow community members, informal channels can promote the right of informed
association. I thank Ian Ayres for raising this possibility.
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1178 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
At times, warnings spread through unofficial channels yield con-
crete strategies for minimizing the likelihood of victimization by an
alleged abuser. So-called “survivor tips”
172
for the workplace gener-
ally involve minimizing time alone with the abuser, which (depending
on the employment context) can mean not working late, leaving in
groups,
173
remaining in open areas of the workplace,
174
not answering
a knock on the hotel room door when traveling,
175
and carefully man-
aging parties and other off-site events.
176
On campus, unofficial
reports of abuse result in analogous efforts on the part of warned
group members to avoid one-on-one time with an alleged abuser and
even to restrict an abuser’s social access to the group altogether.
177
Despite the significance attached to protection as the rationale
for informally reporting misconduct, the shielding capacity of unoffi-
cial reporting channels is limited in several respects.
178
Most impor-
tantly, with regard to the Traditional Whisper Network and the
Double Secret Whisper Network (both restricted access channels),
only women who receive the warnings can take action to protect
themselves, leaving those without the information just as vulnerable
and arguably even more vulnerable
179
—to abuse. Even women who
are privy to the report can remain at risk, as strategies for avoiding
alone time with an alleged abuser are often unviable.
180
Last, the protection rationale for unofficial reporting is premised
on the assumption that men who engage in sexual misconduct are
prone to reoffend.
181
Unless this tendency is somehow curtailed,
172
See, e.g., Creswell & Hsu, supra note 126 (describing both the informal and online
networks through which women share firsthand knowledge of abusers).
173
See e.g., Robin Pogrebin, Women Say Richard Meier’s Conduct Was Widely Known
yet Went Unchecked, N.Y. T
IMES
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/arts/
design/richard-meier-sexual-misconduct-allegations.html.
174
See, e.g., Creswell & Hsu, supra note 126.
175
See Unsolicited E-mail from confidential source to author (Feb. 23, 2018, 1:47 PM)
[hereinafter Unsolicited E-mail to author] (on file with author) (“A key piece of advice
was not to answer the hotel room door to let [a law firm partner known for harassing
behavior] in when he came looking for documents he wanted to review at midnight.”).
176
See id. (describing the lessons learned by a junior associate after she was harassed by
an equity partner at a law firm holiday party).
177
See Jackson, supra note 128 (describing whisper networks at Yale University).
178
See infra note 371 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B.6 (discussing
limited accountability in the informal reporting context).
179
See supra note 164 (noting that restricted access channels tend to serve those with
comparative privilege).
180
This is particularly likely to be the case for employees with relatively less power
within a workplace.
181
See Test Rape Kits. Stop Serial Rapists., E
ND THE
B
ACKLOG
(last visited Mar. 31,
2019), http://www.endthebacklog.org/backlog-why-rape-kit-testing-important/test-rape-
kits-stop-serial-rapists (using case studies to argue that rapists are often serial offenders);
Colin McEwan, New Research Shows What We Know (and Don’t) About Serial Rapists,
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either because abusers are deterred from further wrongdoing,
reformed, or incapacitated, they will more than likely find new
victims.
3. Epistemic Justice
Chief among the functions served by unofficial reporting is the
correction of epistemic injustice, a distinctive type of injustice in which
a person is wronged in her capacity as a knower.
182
Epistemic injustice
encompasses testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice: Testi-
monial injustice, the injustice of disbelief, entails the downgrading of a
speaker’s perceived trustworthiness due to prejudice; hermeneutical
injustice, the injustice of misinterpretation, prevents a person from
making sense of her experience and protesting it in comprehensible
form.
183
Broadly speaking, when a credibility assessment results from
prejudice, a testimonial injustice has occurred.
184
Consider, for
instance, a police officer’s resort to a gendered misconception to eval-
uate a rape accuser’s credibility. If the initial report is perceived as
false, there may be no further investigation; the case will be closed
based on faulty factual premises. Even apart from the informational
disadvantage that flows to the police officer (and the criminal justice
system as a whole), the accuser is significantly harmed “in [her]
capacity as a knower” when she experiences testimonial injustice.
185
A second branch of epistemic injustice—hermeneutical injus-
tice—undermines one’s ability to make sense of one’s experiences
that are not often shared by those with capacity to shape the realm of
D
AILY
(Mar. 27, 2018), https://thedaily.case.edu/new-research-shows-know-dont-serial-
rapists (summarizing research on newly tested sexual assault kits in Cuyahoga County,
Ohio). The suggestion that serial perpetrators commit most sexual assault remains
contested. See MacKinnon, supra note 19, at 2053–55 (evaluating the evidentiary basis for
the claim).
182
See generally M
IRANDA
F
RICKER
, E
PISTEMIC
I
NJUSTICE
: P
OWER
&
THE
E
THICS OF
K
NOWING
(2007) (exploring the ways in which a person can be wronged “in their capacity
as a knower”). It is important to recognize that epistemic injustice has long been an issue in
black feminist thought, even prior to Fricker’s description of the term. See Rachel
McKinnon, Epistemic Injustice, 11 P
HIL
. C
OMPASS
437, 438 (2016).
183
For a more extensive discussion, see Tuerkheimer, supra note 34, at 41–50.
184
See F
RICKER
, supra note 182, at 1 (“Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice
causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word.”). The use of
“testimony” in this context does not correspond to its legal meaning; it simply refers to the
effort to communicate a factual assertion.
185
Id. When a person is treated as incapable of communicating or giving knowledge
appropriately, she is objectified. See id. at 139 (“Objects do not speak. When they do, they
are by then regarded as objects, not as humans which is what it means to have no
credibility.” (quoting C
ATHARINE
M
AC
K
INNON
, F
EMINISM
U
NMODIFIED
: D
ISCOURSE OF
L
IFE AND
L
AW
182 (1987))).
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interpretation.
186
This is commonly experienced as “gaslighting.”
187
In
this regard, consider that women are often met with resistance to
understanding an experience of nonconsensual penetration as sexual
assault—particularly where an acquaintance is the perpetrator and a
weapon is not used.
188
Even today, survivors may be led to doubt
whether what they experienced as sexual assault qualifies as such.
189
A police officer (or anyone else, for that matter) who responds to a
woman’s report of nonconsensual penetration by suggesting that it is
not “really rape” compounds this injustice.
190
This dynamic is vividly portrayed by Susan Estrich’s reflections
on having been sexually assaulted by a stranger with an ice pick:
I learned, much later, that I had “really” been raped. Unlike, say,
the woman who claimed she’d been raped by a man she actually
knew, and was with voluntarily. Unlike, say, women who are
“asking for it,” and get what they deserve. I would listen as seem-
ingly intelligent people explained these distinctions to me, and
marvel; later I read about them in books, court opinions, and empir-
ical studies. It is bad enough to be a “real” rape victim. How terrible
to be—what to call ita “not real” rape victim.
191
Because social power influences the ability to participate in the
construction of social experience,
192
membership in a marginalized or
subordinated group tends to correspond to a distinct disadvantage:
186
See F
RICKER
, supra note 182, at 1 (“[H]ermeneutical injustice occurs . . . when a gap
in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes
to making sense of their social experiences.”); see also McKinnon, supra note 182, at 441
(“[Hermeneutical injustice] is where a socially disadvantaged group is blocked . . . from
access to knowledge, or access to communicating knowledge . . . due to a gap in
hermeneutical resources, especially when these resources would help people understand
the very existence and nature of the marginalization.”).
187
See Kelsky, supra note 120 (“Part of being socialized in a patriarchal society is a
mechanism of internalized gaslighting in which women are conditioned to second-guess
themselves, to doubt, to minimize, to do the emotional labor of both defusing situations
and reinterpreting them in such a way as to exculpate their harassers . . . .”).
188
The traditional definition of rape required the use of excessive physical force,
meaning that nonconsensual penetration simpliciter did not constitute sexual assault; this
remains the law in about half the states. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of
Rape, 35 L
AW
& I
NEQ
. 335, 342–43 (2017) (“In almost half the states, sexual penetration is
not a crime unless there is both non-consent and some sort of force. Penetration without
consent is not, in itself, a crime.”). For a summary of reform efforts, see Schulhofer, supra.
189
As Fricker puts it, members of subordinated groups can be prevented from
“mak[ing] communicatively intelligible something which it is particularly in [their] interests
to be able to render intelligible.” F
RICKER
, supra note 182, at 162.
190
See supra note 24 (describing how endurance of the “real rape” paradigm leads to
under-reporting).
191
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Y
ALE
L.J. 1087, 1088 (1986).
192
See F
RICKER
, supra note 182, at 148 (“[T]he powerful tend to have appropriate
understandings of their experiences ready to draw on as they make sense of their social
experiences, whereas the powerless are more likely to find themselves having . . . at best ill-
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Experiences not shared by the powerful find no meaningful outlet in
collective notions of reality.
193
This problem is especially acute in cer-
tain areas of social lifeso-called hermeneutical “hotspots”
194
—that
are already defined by unequal participation in the construction of
meaning.
195
In the #MeToo era, the proliferation of sexual abuse allegations is
seeding greater epistemic justice. As women in the #MeToo era infuse
the collective with new accounts of misconduct, they begin to dis-
mantle the default to doubt that has long characterized societal
responses to sexual violence. With more and more accusers coming
forward in the Courts of Public Opinion with allegations of abuse
(many of which are corroborated and many of which are acknowl-
edged by the perpetrator), it becomes exceedingly difficult to sustain
the proposition that most accusations are false.
196
Moreover, in a vir-
tuous cycle, as more women are believed, more become willing to
report their abuse. Open access channels thus provide a means of
advancing testimonial justice.
Informal reporting channels of all kinds can also promote herme-
neutical justice, as women piece together new interpretations of their
experiences. Sometimes this takes place within the confines of
Whisper Networks. But society writ large may also be on the cusp of
incorporating new understandings of sexual violation and its harm.
This is because women, in burgeoning numbers, are accessing the
Courts of Public Opinion.
197
4. Norm Evolution
Unofficial reporting not only advances epistemic justice; it also
fosters new norms surrounding a continuum of sexual misconduct. By
fitting meanings to draw on in the effort to render them intelligible.”). As Fricker notes,
this recognition is a tenet of feminist theory. Id. at 147.
193
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 34, at 48 (describing how an individual who lacks power
in a community may have trouble understanding her own experience or conveying it to the
larger community in a form that the community can comprehend).
194
F
RICKER
, supra note 182, at 152 (defining hotspots as “locations in social life where
the powerful have no interest in achieving a proper interpretation, perhaps indeed where
they have a positive interest in sustaining the extant misinterpretation”); see also id. at 151
(stating that hermeneutical disadvantage renders a subject “unable to make sense of her
ongoing mistreatment, and this in turn prevents her from protesting it, let alone securing
effective measures to stop it”); Tuerkheimer, supra note 34, at 46–48.
195
See F
RICKER
, supra note 182, at 153 (“[W]hen there is unequal hermeneutical
participation with respect to some significant area(s) of social experience, members of the
disadvantaged group are hermeneutically marginalized.”).
196
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 34, at 17–20 (summarizing the best available research
on false reporting of sexual assault).
197
See supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.
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sharing their accounts of abuse, women lay bare not just the ubiquity
of conduct already defined as sexual violation, but also the violative
nature of behaviors not yet perceived as problematic.
Norms can of course evolve within a networked community—that
is, within the directly affected group. Ultimately, however, enduring
normative transformation seems to require a degree of consensus that
extends beyond members of the group harmed by the conduct at
issue, outward to those who occupy positions of relative social power.
For this reason, open access reporting channels (the Courts of Public
Opinion) destabilize settled understandings of what counts as miscon-
duct in ways that restricted access channels (Whisper Networks) do
not.
198
In the time of #MeToo, mention of non-actionable sexual miscon-
duct has occasionally become a flashpoint of controversy, even among
feminist commentators.
199
But for many accusers, the inclusion of
infractions not currently prohibited by law, or even by custom, is a
feature—not a bugof the movement.
200
Without denying the exis-
tence of different categories of sexual misconduct, women who have
been victimized by overlooked kinds of abuse are nevertheless
insisting that it is wrongful.
201
This move does not collapse categories
of misconduct, nor does it equate their varying levels of harm and
culpability. What it does is connect the sexist, often misogynistic,
strands that run through sexual violation from its most to its least
extreme.
To understand how engagement in the Courts of Public Opinion
can challenge established norms, consider the story of a woman
known as Grace and the comedian Aziz Ansari. In early 2018, Grace’s
allegation of an unwanted sexual encounter with Ansari was published
198
“Courts of Public Opinion” refers to both the Shadow Court of Public Opinion and
the New Court of Public Opinion, while “Whisper Networks” refers to both the Traditional
Whisper Network and the Double Secret Whisper Network.
199
See, e.g., Caitlin Flanagan, The Humiliation of Aziz Ansari, A
TLANTIC
(Jan. 14,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/01/the-humiliation-of-aziz-
ansari/550541 (critiquing the handling of the Aziz Ansari sexual assault allegations).
200
See Donegan, supra note 127 (describing the Media Men List, a spreadsheet that
“collected a range of rumors and allegations of sexual misconduct,” including infractions
not covered by law, within the publishing industry).
201
See, e.g., Schamisso, supra note 157 (explaining that the Academic Men List includes
“things as small as an offhand comment, like, ‘I love it when you wear a skirt in the lab’ ”);
see also Laura Tucker, Sharing Something from 2013, M
EDIUM
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://
medium.com/@laura__tucker/jan-10-2018-5d5bbf79f97b (publicly accusing then-L.A.
Times Beijing Bureau Chief and President of the Foreign Correspondents Club of having
pressured her into sex over her expressed lack of consent, and emphasizing the
blameworthiness of this conduct).
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online.
202
Rather suddenly, a public in the throes of grappling with
sexual assault and harassment was confronted with untold “stories of
gray areas.”
203
Grace’s account—a “Rorschach test” of sexual norma-
tivity
204
—came to stand in for these stories, prompting a range of
reactions.
205
Even the appropriate vernacular to describe the
encounter with Ansari was confusing.
206
Amidst a fraught effort to begin grappling with sex that results
from “pressured consent,”
207
what emerged was a nearly universal
consensus that Grace’s account was one with which women were
exceedingly familiar.
208
As Jessica Valenti tweeted in the story’s
immediate wake: “A lot of men will read that post about Aziz Ansari
and see an everyday, reasonable sexual interaction. But part of what
women are saying right now is that what the culture considers
‘normal’ sexual encounters are not working for us and [are] often-
times harmful.”
209
202
See Katie Way, I Went on a Date with Aziz Ansari. It Turned into the Worst Night of
My Life., B
ABE
(Jan. 13, 2018), https://babe.net/2018/01/13/aziz-ansari-28355.
203
See James Hamblin, This Is Not a Sex Panic, A
TLANTIC
(Jan. 17, 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/01/this-is-not-a-sex-panic/550547
(summarizing Grace’s account and its aftershocks). Surveying this muddled frontier, one
commentator observed that “[t]here is a sizable chasm between an ‘awkward sexual
experience’ and sexual assault and its topography is largely unmapped.” Stassa Edwards,
It’s Time to Map the Wilderness of Bad Sex, J
EZEBEL
(Jan. 19, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://
jezebel.com/its-time-to-map-the-wilderness-of-bad-sex-1822171954.
204
See Hamblin, supra note 203 (“The story of Aziz Ansari and ‘Grace’ is playing out as
a sort of Rorschach test.”).
205
Caroline Framke, The Controversy Around Babe.net’s Aziz Ansari Story, Explained,
V
OX
(Jan. 18, 2018, 10:09 AM), https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/1/17/16897440/aziz-
ansari-allegations-babe-me-too (describing the wide range of responses to Grace’s story,
with some finding the account “painfully relatable,” and others critiquing it as
“unforgivably irresponsible”).
206
See, e.g., Jenny Hollander, You’re Right, Everything Aziz Ansari Did Was Legal,
B
USTLE
(Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/youre-right-everything-aziz-ansari-did-
was-legal-7923237 (“What do we call it when a man repeatedly pressures a woman to
engage in sexual acts? What do we call it when a [sic] someone says ‘no,’ but then appears
to change their mind? What do we call it when someone feels violated after a sexual
encounter?”).
207
See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sexual Violation Without Law: Evidence from #MeToo,
N.Y.U. A
NN
. S
URV
. A
M
. L. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 17–19) (on file with author).
208
See, e.g., Anna North, The Aziz Ansari Story Is Ordinary. That’s Why We Have to
Talk About It., V
OX
(Jan. 16, 2018, 10:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/1/16/
16894722/aziz-ansari-grace-babe-me-too (“[T]he sheer commonness of Grace’s
experience . . . makes it so important to talk about.”). Even commentators unsympathetic
to Grace’s plight acknowledged the normality of the incident. See, e.g., Bari Weiss, Aziz
Ansari Is Guilty. Of Not Being a Mind Reader., N.Y. T
IMES
(Jan. 15, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/opinion/aziz-ansari-babe-sexual-harassment.html (remarking
that “every adult woman I know” has had similar “lousy romantic encounters”).
209
Flanagan, supra note 199 (quoting Jessica Valenti (@JessicaValenti), T
WITTER
(Jan.
14, 2018, 7:50 AM), https://twitter.com/JessicaValenti/status/952568652066443264 [https://
perma.cc/FBK9-GXDJ]).
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Jill Filipovic emphasized the limits of rape as a proxy for prob-
lematic sex, noting that we live in a society that “still sees sex as pri-
marily about male pleasure; that continues to position women’s bodies
as sexual objects, receptacles and stand-ins for sex itself; and that
encourages sexual aggressiveness in men and congeniality and pas-
sivity in women.”
210
In short, as a reckoning with sexual assault and
harassment morphed to implicate “our broken sexual culture” writ
large,
211
we witnessed how informal reporting can contest entrenched
cultural norms.
This is not to suggest that consensus around new sexual norms is
readily forged, even when women utilize unofficial reporting channels
to stretch the boundaries of the unacceptable. Rather, a recalibration
can only unfold over time. But #MeToo portends that when women
come forward with their yet unaccounted-for experiences of violation,
more robust normative frameworks will eventually materialize.
5. Institutional Change
Of late, unofficial reporting through open access channels is
being used to induce institutional change.
212
The Academic Men List,
for example, does not identify alleged perpetrators by name, but was
deliberately designed to focus attention on the universities and
departments where the misconduct was said to occur.
213
Likewise, in
the wake of the Weinstein scandal,
214
women in Hollywood have
mounted a concerted effort to address sexual harassment in the
entertainment industry, for instance, by crafting a standard contract
clause prohibiting sexual misconduct.
215
And in the judiciary, after
misconduct accusations against Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski
(accusations leveled in the New Court of Public Opinion) led to his
210
Jill Filipovic, The Poorly Reported Aziz Ansari Expos´e Was a Missed Opportunity,
G
UARDIAN
(Jan. 16, 2018, 9:16 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/
jan/16/aziz-ansari-story-missed-opportunity.
211
Weiss, supra note 208.
212
In contrast, both the Traditional Whisper Network and the Double Secret Whisper
Network are unlikely to accomplish this end.
213
See Kelsky, supra note 120. As the creator of the Academic Men List explained,
“I . . . hope [the List] removes all plausible deniability from academic institutions. You are
all on notice.” Id.
214
See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
215
See, e.g., Trey Williams, Women in Hollywood Are Fighting to Change the Culture of
Sexual Harassment, M
ARKET
W
ATCH
(Jan. 3, 2018, 9:56 AM), https://www.marketwatch.
com/story/how-hollywood-is-aiming-to-change-its-culture-of-sexual-harassment-2017-12-
28; see also Sarah Spellings, Models Want a Legally Binding Contract Against Sexual
Harassment, T
HE
C
UT
(May 16, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/05/how-model-
alliance-anti-sexual-harassment-program-would-work.html (describing similar efforts in
the fashion industry).
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resignation,
216
Chief Justice John Roberts announced a review of the
federal bench’s response to sexual harassment.
217
It is too soon to say whether the institutional corrections
prompted by informal reporting will prove meaningful and lasting. To
be sure, there is good reason to remain cautious about exclusive reli-
ance on the Courts of Public Opinion as a force for change.
218
Even
so, unlike networks that restrict access to group members (the
Traditional Whisper Network and the Double Secret Whisper
Network), open access reporting channels (the Shadow Court of
Public Opinion and the New Court of Public Opinion) present the
prospect of victims leveraging their experiences to reform the univer-
sities, workplaces, professions, and industries that have dismally failed
to address sexual misconduct.
6. Offender Accountability
Whisper Networks sacrifice the pursuit of offender accountability
in the interest of achieving other benefits. For women who report
through restricted access channels, whether anonymously or not, this
tradeoff is generally accepted as an inherent feature of the network
model.
219
Since the recipients of the report are members of the vulner-
able community, rather than those in positions of power over the
abuser, it is not expected that any mechanisms of accountability will
be triggered by a victim’s unofficial complaint.
216
See Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After Sexual
Harassment Allegations, N.Y. T
IMES
(Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/
us/alex-kozinski-retires.html.
217
See Valerie Volcovici, Chief Justice Orders Review of Sexual Harassment Standards in
U.S. Judiciary, R
EUTERS
(Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-
harassment/chief-justice-orders-review-of-sexual-harassment-standards-in-u-s-judiciary-
idUSKBN1EP0MP; see also R
EPORT OF THE
F
EDERAL
J
UDICIARY
W
ORKPLACE
C
ONDUCT
W
ORKING
G
ROUP TO THE
J
UDICIAL
C
ONFERENCE OF THE
U
NITED
S
TATES
(2018), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/workplace_conduct_working_group_final_report_
0.pdf. In March 2019, the Judicial Conference adopted a new set of workplace conduct
rules governing, among other prohibited behaviors, sexual harassment. Judicial Conference
Approves Package of Workplace Conduct Reforms, A
DMIN
. O
FF
. U.S. C
TS
. (Mar. 12,
2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2019/03/12/judicial-conference-approves-package-
workplace-conduct-reforms.
218
See A
M
. P
SYCHOL
. A
SS
N
, W
ORKPLACE
S
EXUAL
H
ARASSMENT
: A
RE
E
MPLOYERS
A
CTUALLY
R
ESPONDING
? 3 (2018), http://www.apaexcellence.org/assets/general/2018-
sexual-harassment-survey-results.pdf (finding that the #MeToo movement prompted only
ten percent of employers to add new sexual harassment trainings and just eight percent to
implement a more stringent sexual harassment policy).
219
Indeed, for some women, the lack of accountability is a chief benefit. See Donegan,
supra note 127 (“[T]he value of the spreadsheet was that it had no enforcement
mechanisms: Without legal authority or professional power, it offered an impartial, rather
than adversarial, tool to those who used it. It was intended specifically not to inflict
consequences, not to be a weapon . . . .”).
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The growing use of open access channels complicates this non-
accountability story. When named women come forward in the New
Court of Public Opinion, consequences may result.
220
Relatedly, when
anonymous women make accusations in the Shadow Court of Public
Opinion, these accusations can launch formal processes that may also
lead to consequences if an accuser can be identified.
221
In the age of
#MeToo, men accused of misconduct in the Courts of Public Opinion
have faced job loss,
222
suspension,
223
honors revocation,
224
and eco-
nomic penalties imposed by businesses and consumers alike.
225
They
have also been disgraced in the eyes of family, friends, and the general
public (although the longevity of sexual abuse-based stigma is
questionable).
226
220
This prospect may implicate concerns for process. See infra notes 237–41 and
accompanying text (discussing this critique); see also supra note 144 (explaining that
informal reporting can trigger formal processes).
221
While the contours of these formal processes are often opaque, a sanctioning body is
unlikely to impose a penalty based only on an anonymous accusation. This scenario may
change if an anonymous accusation triggers an investigation that generates corroboration
of the anonymous account—for instance, a witness, electronic evidence, or an admission by
the accused.
222
See, e.g., Sarah Almukhtar et al., After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused of Sexual
Misconduct and Their Fall from Power, N.Y. T
IMES
(Feb. 8, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/10/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct-
weinstein.html (listing men “fired or forced to resign after accusations of sexual
misconduct that ranged from inappropriate comments to rape”).
223
See, e.g., id. (listing men who have faced “[s]uspensions and [o]ther [f]allout”).
224
See Susan Adams, Steve Wynn Loses Naming Rights at U Penn After Sexual
Misconduct Allegations, F
ORBES
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/
2018/02/01/the-university-of-pennsylvania-is-stripping-steve-wynns-name-from-a-campus-
plaza; Louis Lucero II, Charlie Rose Has Honors from Two Journalism Schools Rescinded,
N.Y. T
IMES
(Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/us/charlie-rose-
awards.html; Jane C. Hu, In the Aftermath of #MeToo, Which Names in Science Should be
Replaced?, Q
UARTZY
(Sept. 19, 2018), https://qz.com/quartzy/1394785/replacing-names-in-
science-after-metoo.
225
See, e.g., supra note 170 (describing post-#MeToo responses to longtime sexual
misconduct allegations against R. Kelly); see also Ben Sisario, R. Kelly Dropped by RCA
Records After Documentary Furor, N.Y. T
IMES
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/01/18/arts/music/r-kelly-rca-sony.html.
226
See, e.g., Amanda Arnold, The Men Who Are Plotting Their Post-#MeToo
Comebacks, T
HE
C
UT
(Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/04/comeback-men-
sexual-harassment-me-too.html (describing efforts on the part of Charlie Rose, Mario
Batali, Lorin Stein, Matt Lauer, Garrison Keillor, Louis C.K., and Al Franken to make a
comeback); Brooks Barnes, John Lasseter, Ousted from Pixar in #MeToo Wave, Finds New
Hollywood Home, N.Y. T
IMES
(Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/09/
business/media/john-lasseter-skydance.html (reporting on powerful entertainment
executive’s comeback within months of resigning from the company he founded due to
allegations of workplace sexual harassment); see also Stassa Edwards, Redemption Is
Inevitable for Powerful Men, J
EZEBEL
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://jezebel.com/
setsession?r=https%3A%2F%2Fjezebel.com%2Fredemption-is-inevitable-for-powerful-
men-1825364533&sessionId=9017dffb-9d1c-4b50-8bb2-4730357f21a5 (positing the
inevitability of “redemption narratives” for men accused of sexual misconduct).
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Setting aside whether these consequences are appropriate in any
individual case,
227
it is useful to observe that the consequences stem-
ming from the Courts of Public Opinion may qualify as only partial
accountability. One precondition for full accountability might be a
degree of proportionality between the infraction and the attendant
repercussion. Another might entail a level of transparency that
enables those harmed by the misconduct to feel vested in the abuser’s
penance. Perhaps accountability requires a mechanism for conveying
collective condemnation of the transgression.
My aim here is not to offer a comprehensive theory of accounta-
bility but to gesture at the kinds of considerations that might come
into play when we assess what may be missing even when unofficial
reporting yields consequences.
228
Further to this concern, most com-
mentators have implicitly presupposed that individual accountability
can be analyzed without regard to the relevant legal framework.
229
In
my view, it cannot. Although not all sexual misconduct is regulated by
law, most of the misconduct being disclosed in the #MeToo era is pro-
hibited by criminal law, Title IX, Title VII, or some combination of
the three. When this conduct results in only extra-legal consequences,
we should be troubled by the gap between the available (formal)
redress and the outcome imposed instead. In other words, the mea-
sure of accountability cannot be abstracted from what is dictated by
our system of laws.
In the New Court of Public Opinion, the limits of accountability
are compounded by the problem of inequity. Access to channels that
hold the greatest promise of generating some consequence, however
inadequate, is markedly unequal. Most victims of sexual assault and
harassment do not have connections to mainstream media reporters.
Moreover, for women whose abusers are not the subject of intense
public interest,
230
resort to traditional media outlets is typically not an
option.
231
In sum, those especially vulnerable to workplace sexual mis-
conduct—women of color and women in low-wage jobsare cut off
227
See Katie J.M. Baker, What Do We Do with These Men?, N.Y. T
IMES
(Apr. 27,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/opinion/sunday/metoo-comebacks-charlie-
rose.html (calling for a discussion of “alternatives to exile” for those accused of sexual
misconduct).
228
See generally Lesley Wexler, Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Colleen Murphy, #MeToo,
Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. I
LL
. L. R
EV
. 45 (applying theories and practices
of transitional justice to the #MeToo movement).
229
Cf. supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (noting that legal scholarship has largely
overlooked the significance of unofficial reporting channels in responding to sexual
misconduct).
230
See supra note 146.
231
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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from mechanisms of informal reporting that, among the unofficial
options, offer the greatest hope of prompting a semblance of offender
accountability, however imperfect.
232
C. The Future of Unofficial Reporting: A First Assessment
With the spread of #MeToo, the costs and benefits of divulging
abuse have begun to shift in appreciable ways. Assuming this trajec-
tory is maintained, we should expect to see increased activity in the
matrices that extend beyond the confines of the Traditional Whisper
Network: the Double Secret Whisper Network, the Shadow Court of
Public Opinion, and the New Court of Public Opinion. Victims will be
especially drawn to channels that allow them to aggregate allegations
against a particular individual—in essence, to use one another’s
accounts to bolster the credibility of all accusers.
233
Yet there is reason to be cautious about the rise of informal accu-
sation.
234
As we have seen, there are meaningful limits on what unoffi-
cial reporting can accomplish, especially with regard to perpetrator
accountability.
235
Two additional concerns are worthy of mention.
236
First, informal accusation is characterized by a lack of formal pro-
cess. While this observation is often harnessed by politicians and com-
mentators who tend to sympathize with the accused,
237
many who
232
Even social media, which is more accessible than mainstream media to victims of
sexual misconduct, may be effectively off limits to many members of marginalized
communities. As California Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez put it, “The MeToo
movement . . . can’t just be for women who have a Twitter account.” Charisse Jones, When
Will MeToo Become WeToo? Some Say Voices of Black Women, Working Class Left Out,
USA T
ODAY
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/10/05/metoo-
movement-lacks-diversity-blacks-working-class-sexual-harassment/1443105002.
233
I have called this “credibility in numbers.” Deborah Tuerkheimer, What If Only One
Woman Had Accused Harvey Weinstein?, G
UARDIAN
(Oct. 22, 2017), https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/22/harvey-weinstein-bill-cosby-allegations.
The aggregation of complaints represents an efficient mode of delivering the validation and
solidarity long enabled by the Traditional Whisper Network. See supra notes 153–57 and
accompanying text. Aggregation also provides a partial antidote to the credibility
discounting that sexual abuse victims have long endured. See supra notes 34–35 and
accompanying text. Unfortunately, however, the lone accuser remains relegated to a far
more tenuous status, informally perpetuating once-codified legal requirements unique to
sexual assault cases. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 34, at 21–23 (describing legal rules that
expressly embodied a stance of deep skepticism toward rape accusers).
234
My solution is to adapt formal reporting channels to better account for the needs of
survivors. See infra Part III.
235
See supra Section II.B.6.
236
For a more thorough discussion of these concerns, see Tuerkheimer, Unofficial
Reporting, supra note 119 (manuscript at 27–34).
237
Around the time of then-Judge Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing, President Trump
captured and advanced this line of thinking as follows: “[I]t’s a very scary time for young
men in America when you can be guilty of something you might not be guilty of. This is a
very difficult time. . . . [S]omebody could accuse you of something and you’re automatically
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tend to sympathize with the accuser also worry about a world in which
established procedures for investigating and adjudicating allegations
of abuse are supplanted by pervasive public shaming and
vigilantism.
238
Although the process critique is often exaggerated,
239
the proce-
dural void that characterizes unofficial reporting matters.
240
Formal
investigative procedures are of independent value.
241
At least with
respect to contested allegations of abuse, processes triggered by the
formal reporting of abuse, assuming they are fair, are generally prefer-
able to adjudication in the Courts of Public Opinion.
A second concern relates to the silencing effects of a weaponized
defamation law.
242
When a person makes an unofficial allegation of
sexual misconduct, she becomes the potential target of a defamation
claim by the individual accused.
243
With the proliferation of reporting
in the New Court of Public Opinion and the Shadow Court of Public
Opinion, this threat has grown far more significant.
244
Of course, if an
guilty.” Dara Lind, Trump: “It’s a Very Scary Time for Young Men in America, V
OX
(Oct.
2, 2018, 2:02 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/2/17928800/trump-women-doing-great-
kavanaugh. Trump then added, “Women are doing great.” Id. For a contextual analysis, see
Mary Anne Franks, Witch Hunts: Free Speech, the First Amendment, and the Fear of
Women’s Words, 2019 U. C
HI
. L
EGAL
F. (forthcoming 2019).
238
See, e.g., Shira A. Sheindlin & Joel Cohen, After #MeToo, We Can’t Ditch Due
Process, G
UARDIAN
(Jan. 8, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2018/jan/08/metoo-due-process-televictions (arguing for a “swift and fair process” for the
accused); see also Masha Gessen, When Does a Watershed Become a Sex Panic?, N
EW
Y
ORKER
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/when-does-a-
watershed-become-a-sex-panic (warning of #MeToo turning into a “sex panic”); Caitlin
Flanagan, The Conversation #MeToo Needs to Have, A
TLANTIC
(Jan. 29, 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/the-right-conversation-for-metoo/551732
(discussing increased due process protections and proportionality as part of the “rocky
path that #MeToo must travel if it is to grow from a vehicle of outrage to a mechanism for
lasting change”).
239
See Tuerkheimer, Unofficial Reporting, supra note 119 (manuscript at 2730)
(identifying where process-related concerns have been overblown and where they have
traction).
240
Apart from substantive concerns, the procedural void matters strategically, since it
helps fuel opposition to #MeToo.
241
A vast literature describes the virtues of procedural justice. See, e.g., E. A
LLAN
L
IND
& T
OM
R. T
YLER
, T
HE
S
OCIAL
P
SYCHOLOGY OF
P
ROCEDURAL
J
USTICE
(1988).
242
Defamation is a common-law tort consisting of a false statement of fact that injures
the subject’s reputation. R
ESTATEMENT
(S
ECOND
)
OF
T
ORTS
§ 558 (A
M
. L
AW
I
NST
. 1977).
243
Accusers may also be sued for statements made in the course of campus disciplinary
proceedings. See Tyler Kingkade, As More College Students Say “Me Too,” Accused Men
Are Suing for Defamation, B
UZZ
F
EED
(Dec. 15, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tylerkingkade/as-more-college-students-say-me-too-
accused-men-are-suing.
244
The first high-profile defamation suit in the #MeToo era was filed in October 2018,
when Stephen Elliott, a writer accused of sexual assault and harassment in multiple entries
on the Media Men List, sued Moira Donegan, creator of the list, and thirty anonymous
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allegation of abuse is truthful, a defamation defendant should ulti-
mately prevail. Even so, the prospect of being sued for libel is—or
should be—a meaningful deterrent to publicly accusing one’s abuser.
Most sexual misconduct victims cannot afford the financial cost of
defending a lawsuit, even apart from the psychic toll this effort exacts.
Moreover, the confused state of defamation law
245
means that litiga-
tion costs in this area are highly uncertain.
246
For the anonymous sexual abuse complainant whose identity is
revealed in the course of defending a defamation claimas well as for
the accuser named at the outset—the defense of truth may allow for
ultimate vindication. Even so, prevailing in the end hardly seems satis-
fying. In an ironic twist, a survivor who deliberately eschews formal
reporting channels for whatever reason (but often, to avoid the credi-
bility discount) may eventually wind up in a courtroom anyway, telling
her story under the most formal conditions possible, having expended
enormous resources along the way, in exclusive service of beating
back a claim that she lied about her abuse. With defamation law
lurking in the background, no survivor could be faulted for deciding to
forsake unofficial reporting altogether and to keep silent about her
abuse.
Concerns related to process and to the silencing effects of defa-
mation law are unlikely to dissipate. Still, absent significant improve-
ments to the official alternatives,
247
extra-legal remedies will remain
more attractive to most survivors than a turn to law.
248
As we have
seen, informal reporting may well be the best option for an individual
survivor and, in the aggregate, unofficial complaint has propelled a
powerful movement for gender justice.
249
Yet the rise of informal
accusation cannot substitute for a functional legal response.
250
Put dif-
ferently, working around law’s failures is an unacceptable end point.
Jane Does for $1.5 million. See Elliott v. Donegan, No. 1:18-cv-05680-LDH-SJB, 2018 WL
4940326 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2018); see also supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text
(discussing Media Men List and other anonymous spreadsheets). For analysis of the
Donegan lawsuit, see Tuerkheimer, Unofficial Reporting, supra note 119 (manuscript at
32–34).
245
See Amy Kristen Sanders & Holly Miller, Revitalizing Rosenbloom: The Matter of
Public Concern Standard in the Age of the Internet, 12 F
IRST
A
MEND
. L. R
EV
. 529, 542
(2014) (“Many scholars agree that current defamation standards are confusing, often
contradictory, and offer little predictability for parties.”).
246
For elaboration on the doctrinal complexities that contribute to this confusion, see
Tuerkheimer, Unofficial Reporting, supra note 119 (manuscript at 33–34).
247
Here I focus on the task of reforming official reporting channels rather than the
substantive laws they trigger.
248
See supra Part I.
249
See supra Section II.B.
250
See supra note 22 (highlighting the equality norm at stake).
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Without upgrading the complaint channels that activate the law
of sexual misconduct,
251
most reporting will continue to bypass formal
mechanisms of process and accountability, to the detriment of both
accusers and accused.
III
T
OWARD A
N
EXT
G
ENERATION OF
F
ORMAL
R
EPORTING
C
HANNELS
The #MeToo movement has ignited a new age of informal accusa-
tion, which until now has gone unnoticed. Legal scholars and practi-
tioners have special cause to attend to this development, as it bears
directly on the relevance of law to address sexual misconduct.
252
If
most victims of abuse continue to reject formal reporting channels in
favor of Whisper Networks and the Courts of Public Opinion, law
risks virtual obsolescence in the sexual violence space.
My contention is not simply that we should find this prospect of
interest,
253
but that the widespread abandonment of legal mechanisms
for redressing sexual misconduct ought to trouble us. Our laws gov-
erning sexual misconduct—primarily statutes criminalizing sexual
assault, Title IX, and Title VIIare not perfect; far from it. To accept
their current levels of disuse, however, is to relinquish far too much.
Now is an opportune moment for institutions charged with imple-
menting sexual misconduct laws to leverage the burgeoning appeal of
unofficial reporting. #MeToo has generated newfound receptivity to
allegations of abuse.
254
But for this transformation to impact the
workings of law, official channels for reporting abuse must evolve to a
multi-tiered system, bringing more misconduct into formal systems for
processing.
255
These formal systems, however flawed, instantiate the
legal norms that prohibit sexual misconduct; they offer redress for
accusers while protecting those accused of misconduct, and they do so
251
This is not meant to minimize the importance of reforming substantive laws,
doctrines, and enforcement practices, but to surface an area of needed change that has not
been identified.
252
Lawyers and legal scholars should also be particularly attentive to process-related
concerns. See supra notes 237–41 and accompanying text.
253
See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text (noting that unofficial reporting
should be of particular interest to legal scholars and practitioners).
254
See supra Section II.A.4. For present purposes, it is useful to observe that actors with
designated responsibilities for investigating and adjudicating abuse allegations are part of
this ongoing transformation.
255
See supra note 23 (describing various facets of the under-enforcement problem).
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1192 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
in myriad ways not provided for by unofficial reporting
mechanisms.
256
Informed by the benefits and drawbacks of informal accusation
for survivors of abuse, we turn now to the design of a next generation
of formal reporting channels. Like their informal counterparts, these
improved complaint channels would prioritize victim empowerment
while more effectively advancing the goals of group member protec-
tion, offender accountability, and institutional change. Refurbished
formal channels would draw on central features of informal accusa-
tion—namely, options to report anonymously, to report confiden-
tially, and to escrow the reportin order to bring more allegations
into established systems. As I will show, a multi-tiered approach to
formal reporting would capture much of the allure of informal accusa-
tion, promising to newly invigorate the law of sexual misconduct.
A. Criminal Justice System
More often than not, as we have seen, victims of sexual assault do
not report the crime to police.
257
Without minimizing the related need
for improvements in the criminal justice system’s downstream
response to sexual violence,
258
my focus here remains on the point of
access—that is, on the mechanisms in place for survivors to initiate a
criminal investigation and for potential adjudication of their
allegations.
259
The traditional pathway for reporting to law enforcement is, at
least in theory, fairly straightforward.
260
Once a complainant makes
an accusation, the police are responsible for investigating the facts in
order to determine whether there is sufficient cause to proceed with
256
The protections offered to those accused of misconduct vary depending on the type
of allegation, with the criminal justice system providing the most expansive rights and
processes, followed by college campuses and workplaces. My point is not that the process
that is “due” in these disparate contexts is necessarily sufficient as a practical matter but
that formal institutional processes provide some measure of protection for the accused,
while informal complaint channels do not.
257
See supra Section I.A.
258
My own work has often focused on this need. See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape
On and Off Campus, 65 E
MORY
L.J. 1 (2015) (critiquing the criminal law’s problematic
construction of sexual consent); Tuerkheimer, supra note 22 (discussing federal
intervention to combat systematic underenforcement).
259
Most sexual assault allegations, even those reported to the police, do not result in a
criminal conviction. See generally Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne Archambault, The
“Justice Gap” for Sexual Assault Cases: Future Directions for Research and Reform, 18
V
IOLENCE
A
GAINST
W
OMEN
145, 154–57 (2012) (documenting the attrition of rape
allegations as cases progress through the criminal justice system).
260
See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
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November 2019] BEYOND #METOO 1193
an arrest.
261
Beginning with the first encounter, interactions between
the police and the alleged victim are framed by an overarching need
on the part of law enforcement officers to “clear” the case in one way
or another.
262
From the perspective of complainants, this process is typically
unsatisfying. To see why, consider the contrasting appeal of informal
reporting. As we have seen, unofficial channels can empower survi-
vors; they can offer a form of protection to would-be victims; they can
promote advances in collective knowledge, norms, and institutional
responsiveness; and they can hold out the prospect of a measure of
accountability, however incomplete.
263
In most cases, complaining to the police in order to initiate the
criminal justice process offers sexual assault survivors none of these
advantages. Admittedly, the criminal justice system is not meant to
serve the needs of crime victims alone. At times, law enforcement
officers (both police and prosecutors) act contrary to the expressed
wishes of a victim and appropriately so—public safety or the interest
of justice may dictate a course of action more or less lenient than that
envisioned by the complainant. Accordingly, importing survivor-
centered approaches to reporting into the criminal process, as I advo-
cate, raises tensions. Even so, a system that is vastly underutilized vis-
a-vis sexual violence cannot effectively serve its intended functions. To
further the many aspirations of the criminal justice system, which has
a unique set of imperatives, law enforcement’s complaint channels
must become more enticing to sexual assault victims.
When constructing this architecture, a chief lesson of informal
reporting is that accusers should be given more control over their
reports. Survivors must always retain the traditional option of initi-
ating a standard investigation with its corollary focus on case clo-
sure.
264
But a wider array of pathways must be made available.
Piloting of options in the reporting space is already underway in
select police departments around the country.
265
In these depart-
261
For a discussion of truncated sexual assault investigations, see Tuerkheimer, supra
note 34, at 28–36.
262
See F
ED
. B
UREAU OF
I
NVESTIGATION
, U.S. D
EP
T OF
J
USTICE
, C
RIME IN THE
U
NITED
S
TATES
, 2013, at 1 (2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-
u.s.-2013/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/clearances/clearancetopic_final.pdf
(providing an overview of various clearance classifications).
263
See supra Section II.B.
264
See supra notes 261–62 and accompanying text.
265
See, e.g., Avery Lill, Oregon Detective Pioneers New Sexual Assault Reporting
Program, NPR (Sept. 2, 2016, 8:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/09/22/491932615/
oregon-detective-pioneers-new-sexual-assault-reporting-program (discussing Oregon’s
“You Have Options” Program). For a listing of the law enforcement agencies participating
in the “You Have Options” Program, which launched in Ashland, Oregon in 2013, see
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1194 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
ments, mirroring aspects of the Traditional Whisper Network, com-
plainants are permitted to relay an account confidentially and without
consequence to the alleged perpetrator.
266
As an alternative, com-
plainants can authorize a limited investigation aimed at assessing not
only the strength of the case (by the gathering of additional evidence),
but also the likelihood that the accused is a serial offender.
267
At any
time, complainants can ratchet up or down the intensity of the investi-
gation and, relatedly, its potential impact on the alleged
perpetrator.
268
By offering options short of full-blown investigation, police
officers are able to better respond to survivors’ varying interests
269
interests that are currently being pursued, for the most part, outside
formal reporting channels. For instance, with regard to victim empow-
erment, the confidential reporting alternative gives a survivor time to
consider how she would like to proceed,
270
while at the same time
Report, Y
OU
H
AVE
O
PTIONS
P
ROGRAM
, https://www.reportingoptions.org/report (last
visited Apr. 1, 2019). See generally K
IMBERLY
A. L
ONSWAY
& J
OANNE
A
RCHAMBAULT
,
E
ND
V
IOLENCE
A
GAINST
W
OMEN
I
NT
L
(EVAWI), A
LTERNATIVE
R
EPORTING
M
ETHODS
:
E
SSENTIAL
C
ONCEPTS AND
C
OMPONENTS
(2015), https://www.evawintl.org/Library/
DocumentLibraryHandler.ashx?id=593 (summarizing commonplace attributes of
alternative reporting mechanisms). See also S
EEK
T
HEN
S
PEAK
, https://www.
seekthenspeak.org (last visited Aug. 29, 2019) (offering a digital aid that gives survivors the
option to remain “in control of the information you share, who you share it with, and what
you want to happen with it”).
266
Explore Your Options, Y
OU
H
AVE
O
PTIONS
P
ROGRAM
, https://www.
reportingoptions.org/reporting-options (last visited May 23, 2019) (“An Information Only
report includes any report of sexual assault where at the reporting party’s request no
investigative process beyond a victim interview and/or a complete or partial Inquiry into
Serial Sexual Assault (ISSA) is completed.”); see also infra notes 270–78 and
accompanying text.
267
See Explore Your Options, supra note 266 (explaining that a limited investigation
may go beyond interviewing the victim and assessing whether the accused is a serial
offender to include “interviewing of witnesses and collection of evidence such as a sexual
assault forensic examination (SAFE) kit”).
268
In certain situations, law enforcement agents may be under a legal obligation to pass
along a confidential report—where, for instance, the report involves child abuse
allegations, threatens public safety, or triggers Title IX requirements. See Roles and
Responsibilities of a Participating Law Enforcement Agency, Y
OU
H
AVE
O
PTIONS
P
ROGRAM
, https://www.reportingoptions.org/roles-and-responsibilities (last visited Apr. 9,
2019) (noting that participating law enforcement agencies should take reasonable steps to
inform complainants prior to a report being made when their confidentiality may be legally
impermissible).
269
See supra note 15.
270
Victims often need time to decide how to proceed and may want to speak to family
and friends about the incident before lodging a formal (public) complaint. See Katie Van
Syckle, The Tiny Police Department in Southern Oregon that Plans to End Campus Rape,
T
HE
C
UT
(Nov. 9, 2014), https://www.thecut.com/2014/11/can-this-police-department-help-
end-campus-rape.html (describing how the “You Have Options” initiative developed in
response to these needs).
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preserving evidence that could become critical should the case ulti-
mately proceed.
271
Moreover, depending on the listener’s reaction,
describing the assault can prove cathartic for a survivor.
272
Especially
if police officers are freed from the need to immediately lapse into
case building-or-breaking mode, there may be a greater tendency to
validate an accuser when she relates her experience.
273
The desire to protect others can likewise be satisfied by a multi-
pronged reporting system. With even limited information, police may
discover that an individual is suspected of other assaults, increasing
the odds that the alleged perpetrator, if unpunished, will continue to
re-offend.
274
When they join forces,
275
survivors gain the credibility
that often requires numbers.
276
Complainants can also take comfort in
knowing that, regardless of whether a confidential report or partial
investigation is ultimately converted into a full investigation,
277
law
enforcement is able to store reliable intelligence for the future.
278
Apart from enhancing survivor empowerment and group member
protection, alternative formal reporting channels facilitate perpetrator
271
Should a case ultimately proceed to trial, a complainant’s exercise of the confidential
reporting option would allow prosecutors to blunt a typical line of cross-examination that
focuses on delay in bringing allegations to the police.
272
See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the catharsis enabled by
unofficial reporting).
273
See Sirin Kale, The Cop Pioneering a New Approach to Reporting and Investigating
Sexual Assault, V
ICE
(Sept. 29, 2016, 1:21 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/evg4wn/
the-cop-pioneering-a-new-approach-to-reporting-and-investigating-sexual-assault (quoting
the detective who founded “You Have Options” as explaining: “[W]hat we need to be
saying is, ‘Hey, I recognize that’s stuff you’re not ready to talk about yet, so how about we
just talk about what you can today and we can come to the other stuff later?’”).
274
When an accused individual is identified as a potential serial offender, accusers who
were initially reluctant to proceed with a formal criminal complaint may become convinced
of the need to punish a perpetrator. See supra note 156 and accompanying text; see also
infra notes 316–22 (discussing Callisto’s matching function).
275
See supra text accompanying notes 160–68 (describing how unofficial reporting
channels can generate feelings of solidarity in survivors). When survivors learn of an
accused’s other victims only after recounting the assault (in contrast to the typical
chronology of informal reporting), later attacks on complainant credibility may be
somewhat less effective.
276
See supra note 233 and accompanying text (describing “credibility in numbers”);
infra note 322 and accompanying text (discussing the first-mover reporting disadvantage).
Later in the criminal process, the general prohibition on character evidence at trial tends to
complicate the strength-in-numbers approach to bolstering credibility. See F
ED
. R. E
VID
.
404(b)(1). The admission of “other acts” testimony for a non-propensity purpose in sexual
assault prosecutions is beyond the scope of this discussion.
277
See supra note 264 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the complainant should
at all times retain this option).
278
See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the protection rationale for informally
reporting). Outside the sexual assault context, the use of both anonymous tips and
confidential information is standard practice for police departments. The implications for
public safety are complex.
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1196 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
accountability. Providing options brings more reports into the
system,
279
leading to more arrests and more prosecutions.
280
As
important, if less obvious, the availability of several reporting options
can strengthen cases that enter the system, enhancing the prospect of
a successful prosecution.
281
When survivors come forward with their
accusations early, even if only to lodge a confidential report or to
prompt a partial investigation,
282
corroborative evidence can more
readily be gathered. In addition, liberated from the need to respond to
law enforcement officers bent on case closure, survivors may be
afforded the best opportunity to provide an accurate account.
283
Unlike Whisper Networks, which produce no accountability,
284
and the Courts of Public Opinion, which result in partial accounta-
bility at best,
285
a functioning criminal justice system can hold abusers
to account. Official reporting options that offer survivors flexibility
further this end.
286
As more sexual assault reports enter the system, police and pros-
ecution responses can be expected to improve.
287
This progress will
come from a deepening of law enforcement’s understanding of the
dynamics of sexual violation,
288
especially sexual assault that deviates
from the stranger rape paradigm.
289
Over time, de facto impunity for
279
See Van Syckle, supra note 270 (noting that since the Ashland Police Department
launched “You Have Options,” the number of reports more than doubled).
280
Although we can expect increased reporting to result in more arrests and
prosecutions, it will not likely lead to a proportional rise in arrests and prosecutions. See
supra note 23 (describing gender bias in the criminal justice system). To my knowledge,
researchers have yet to examine the downstream effects of increasing reporting.
281
See J
OANNE
A
RCHAMBAULT
& K
IMBERLY
A. L
ONSWAY
, D
IRECT
A
NONYMOUS
R
EPORTING
: M
ULTIDISCIPLINARY
P
ROTOCOLS
O
FFER
A
LTERNATIVE
O
PTION FOR
V
ICTIMS
7–8 (2011) (on file with author) (emphasizing the importance of victim cooperation in
sexual assault cases and explaining why the “victimless” or “evidence-based” approach to
prosecution sometimes used to treat domestic violence cases is not appropriate for
handling sex crimes).
282
See supra notes 266–68 and accompanying text (explaining these alternative
reporting options).
283
See Kale, supra note 273 (describing how, when formal complaints were the only
option, complainants’ first descriptions of sexual violence were not always as accurate as
they could be).
284
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
285
See supra notes 220–32 and accompanying text.
286
Although an increase in reports might raise concerns for the capacity of any given
law enforcement agency to respond appropriately, it suffices for present purposes to note
that resource allocation will always reflect departmental priorities.
287
See supra Section II.B.5 (discussing how informal reporting can advance institutional
change).
288
See supra notes 18296 and accompanying text (discussing how informal reporting
can bring about greater epistemic justice).
289
For an early challenge to the stranger rape paradigm, see Estrich, supra note 191, at
1092.
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even the most egregious sexual misconduct
290
will erode, and collec-
tive notions of what counts as criminal can evolve.
291
B. College Campus
As we have seen, college reporting channels are vastly underutil-
ized by student survivors of sexual assault, most of whom never relate
the incident to disciplinary authorities.
292
There are many reasons for
this widespread reluctance to lodge a formal complaint,
293
but because
standard reporting systems do little to address survivors’ concerns,
pervasive underreporting persists.
Universities have adopted a range of procedures designed to
comply with Title IX requirements and, loosely speaking, to advance
their educational mission.
294
Yet across institutions, the rigidity of the
formal reporting process
295
is often a deterrent for victims contem-
plating their options, especially in the immediate aftermath of an
assault.
296
While the formal complaint process must remain in place,
other avenues should be available to meet the needs of those not
willing, or not yet ready, to initiate a full-blown investigation and
adjudication.
297
290
See supra Section I.A (describing the under-enforcement of laws prohibiting sexual
assault); see also Ricardo Lopez, Me Too Founder Says Looming Weinstein Arrest Is
‘Cathartic’ for Survivors of Sexual Assault, V
ARIETY
(May 24, 2018), https://variety.com/
2018/film/news/tarana-burke-harvey-weinstein-1202821447 (quoting Tarana Burke on the
prosecution of Harvey Weinstein as “super cathartic for a bunch of the survivors, or even
survivors who are not necessarily victimized by him”). One Weinstein victim explained her
decision to cooperate with the Weinstein prosecution: “I know how this has changed my
life for the worse. How he took away my self-esteem and personal power. And knowing I
can take it back, and stop him from doing that to another woman, I couldn’t let that go.”
Farrow, supra note 144.
291
See supra Section II.B.4 (discussing the possibility of normative shift).
292
See supra Section I.B.
293
See supra Section I.B.
294
See supra note 83 (describing college reporting procedures).
295
This rigidity may stem in part from legitimate concerns on the part of college
administrators (and their lawyers) regarding compliance with regulations and guidance
under Title IX. See Eric Kelderman, College Lawyers Confront a Thicket of Rules on
Sexual Assault, C
HRON
. H
IGHER
E
DUC
. (June 25, 2014), https://www.chronicle.com/article/
College-Lawyers-Confront-a/147349 (describing the legal terrain under Obama); see supra
note 81 (describing Title IX enforcement under the Trump Administration).
296
See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
297
A draft of the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law, Student Sexual
Misconduct: Procedural Frameworks for Colleges and Universities (which has not yet been
approved by ALI membership) is consistent with this approach. The draft (on file with
author) reads: “In order to facilitate reporting of sexual assault and related misconduct,
multiple avenues of reporting and efforts to allow the alleged victims of such misconduct
substantial influence over whether their reporting is made known to the alleged
perpetrators are widely believed to be helpful.” P
RINCIPLES OF THE
L
AW
, S
TUDENT
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Sexual misconduct on campus undermines a victim’s access to an
equal education—it is a problem of sex discrimination, as the gov-
erning legal framework recognizes.
298
Alternative reporting options
should take into account the benefits of unofficial reporting, with a
particular emphasis on the empowering potential of informal com-
plaint.
299
Complaint channels that prioritize catharsis and validation
can help to mitigate the subordinating effects of sexual violation.
For instance, one central aim of any reporting system must be to
provide survivors with confidential support and counseling. While col-
leges have struggled with how widely to impose mandatory notifica-
tion duties,
300
confidential resources (counselors, social workers,
psychologists, health care providers) are exempted from the obliga-
tion to report allegations to the Title IX office. Victims who speak
with confidential resources may of course choose also to report
through the standard channels. But these channels, again, are unat-
tractive to most survivors. More innovative reporting systems can be
designed to embed empowering features.
301
Rather than exclusively
rely on a separate apparatus to provide victims with confidential sup-
port, universities should create a formal complaint channel that can
fulfill this function, while at the same time fostering community pro-
tection, offender accountability, and institutional change.
302
Technology can assist in achieving these ends. For example,
Callisto is a platform created in 2016 “by survivors, for survivors.”
303
It offers users three options, which can be exercised at any time:
create a time-stamped record of an incident, to be stored for future
S
EXUAL
M
ISCONDUCT
: P
ROCEDURAL
F
RAMEWORKS FOR
C
OLLEGES AND
U
NIVERSITIES
§ 3.1 reporters’ notes (A
M
. L
AW
I
NST
., Discussion Draft 2018).
298
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
299
See supra Section II.B.1.
300
See Merle H. Weiner, A Principled and Legal Approach to Title IX Reporting, 85
T
ENN
. L. R
EV
. 71, 73–84 (2017) (describing the pervasiveness of wide-net policies and the
downsides of that approach).
301
The failure on the part of many colleges and universities to provide “amnesty” for
students allegedly assaulted while engaging in a violation of the disciplinary code (for
example, using drugs) is a deterrent to reporting that is worthy of separate attention.
302
See supra Section II.B.
303
See About, C
ALLISTO
, https://stanford.callistocampus.org/about/who-we-are (last
visited Feb. 23, 2019). Callisto’s mission is “to combat sexual assault, empower survivors,
and advance justice. . . . by enabling survivors to make the reporting decision best for them
and by improving the outcome of reports.” Id. Callisto is already partnering with fourteen
institutions of higher education, including Stanford University, the University of Oregon,
and the University of Southern California, and the non-profit is expected to expand.
C
ALLISTO
, Y
EAR
3: 2017–2018 A
CADEMIC
Y
EAR
R
EPORT
, at 3, 16 (2018) [hereinafter
C
ALLISTO
Y
EAR
3 R
EPORT
], https://www.projectcallisto.org/Callisto_Year_3_final.pdf.
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use or deleted;
304
submit the report directly to the school’s Title IX
office;
305
or commit to reporting if another student names (or has
named) the same perpetrator.
306
While Callisto is still in relatively
early stages of implementation,
307
preliminary data suggests that, on
campuses that have adopted the platform, students are creating a
record sooner and more often choosing to relay the report.
308
Several features of the system explain its appeal.
309
To incorpo-
rate the advice of experts on trauma-informed interview techniques,
Callisto’s website bakes in empathy, using language that is “soft, com-
forting, understanding and compassionate.”
310
Users are
“encourage[d] . . . to take breaks so they do not feel pressured to
finish or write something with which they are uncomfortable.”
311
An
effort is made to “[e]xplain the risk and benefits of using the form for
reporting,”
312
and to “[p]rovide transparency throughout the form.”
313
Overall, Callisto seeks to effectuate its mission—which expressly
includes empowering survivors
314
—with a “survivor-centered
approach [that] increases the chances that a survivor will report, and
304
The creation of the record is guided by a series of prompts meant to elicit details that
will be helpful to any later investigation; instead of sequential questions, users respond to a
“flow of questions [crafted] for memory retrieval and reconsolidation.” See C
ALLISTO
,
Y
EAR
2: 2016–2017 S
CHOOL
Y
EAR
R
EPORT
11 (2017) [hereinafter C
ALLISTO
Y
EAR
2
R
EPORT
], https://www.projectcallisto.org/Callisto_Year_2_highres.pdf.
305
Callisto claims that reports submitted to the Title IX office through its system “led to
more rapid and thorough investigation and reduced the chances for human error.” Id. at 5.
306
Id. at 3. Notably, if an accused student is named by a second individual, both
complaints are forwarded to the Title IX office. A different matching function model might
inform each accuser about the additional allegation without requiring either to formally
report. Given that protecting others is a main impetus for reporting, students may be
especially likely to report where a perpetrator is believed to be a repeat offender—that is,
where the danger to others is perceived as more urgent. See infra notes 36061 and
accompanying text.
307
See supra note 303.
308
C
ALLISTO
Y
EAR
3 R
EPORT
, supra note 303, at 3 (“Survivors who visited Callisto
were six times more likely to report than those who did not.”); see also C
ALLISTO
Y
EAR
2
R
EPORT
, supra note 304, at 6 (noting that, “on average, students using Callisto created a
record 3 months after the incident and reported four months after,” as compared to
students in schools without Callisto, who, on average, reported in month eleven).
309
According to its most recent report, “100% of sexual assault survivors who visited
Callisto would recommend it to a friend who was sexually assaulted.” C
ALLISTO
Y
EAR
3
R
EPORT
, supra note 303, at 3.
310
Id. at 13. In addition, Callisto uses “light, soft colors, young iconography, and pillowy
drop shadows to create a calming, approachable design.” Id.
311
Id.
312
Id. For users who indicate that they are not “ready” to report, the site provides
information regarding counseling options. Id. at 6, 16.
313
Id.
314
Id. at 3.
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that they will experience positive emotional and adjudicative
outcomes.”
315
To augment the odds that a survivor will report, Callisto allows
victims to select a “match” option, which places the account in an
information escrow.
316
If another account names (or has already
named) the same perpetrator, the complainants are notifiedin
essence, creating a fully customized network—and a report is for-
warded to the Title IX office. The match can provide added assurance
to each survivor that the incident is “serious,”
317
insofar as the perpe-
trator is an alleged repeat offender.
318
A match can also provide vali-
dation
319
and solidarity,
320
as well as enhance the credibility of
another victim.
321
In short, because the many obstacles to leveling a
sexual misconduct accusation create a “first-mover disadvantage to
reporting,”
322
the matching function works to eliminate this
disadvantage.
315
Id. Whether adjudicative outcomes will improve remains to be seen. In theory,
earlier reporting and more accurate memorializing of a complainant’s account might well
enhance credibility in later proceedings, but there are reasons to be cautious about drawing
this conclusion. In particular, the effects of criminal discovery requirements and student
privacy rules (including the Family and Educational Rights and Privacy Act, or FERPA)
could complicate the adjudicative landscape.
316
See Ayres & Unkovic, supra note 131, at 147 (explaining the role of a matching
escrow agent); see also A
NJANA
R
JAN ET AL
., C
ALLISTO
: A C
RYPTOGRAPHIC
A
PPROACH
TO
D
ETECT
S
ERIAL
P
REDATORS OF
S
EXUAL
M
ISCONDUCT
1 (2018), https://
www.projectcallisto.org/callisto-cryptographic-approach.pdf (describing Callisto’s
matching escrow technology).
317
See supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that many survivors choose not to
report because they perceive the incident as insufficiently serious); see also supra note
35–37 and accompanying text (describing a similar dynamic in the criminal justice context).
318
Callisto contends that ninety percent of assaults are committed by repeat offenders,
who perpetrate an average of six assaults. C
ALLISTO
Y
EAR
3 R
EPORT
, supra note 303, at 5.
Research on serial sexual offense is limited and conflicting. See MacKinnon, supra note 19,
at 2053–55 (evaluating the evidence); see also Ian Ayres, Michael Chwe & Jessica Ladd,
Act-Sampling Bias and the Shrouding of Repeat Offending, 103 V
A
. L. R
EV
. O
NLINE
94, 95
(2017) (arguing that low reporting rates obscure the prevalence of repeat offending).
Regarding its matching system, Callisto reports that about fifteen percent of users who
enter the system are “matched” with a victim of the same offender. What We Do,
C
ALLISTO
, https://www.projectcallisto.org/what-we-do#campus (last visited May 9, 2019).
319
See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text.
320
See supra notes 160–68 and accompanying text.
321
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
322
See Ian Ayres, Is There a First-Mover Disadvantage to Reporting Sexual Assault?,
F
ORBES
(Oct. 18, 2015, 10:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/whynot/2015/10/18/is-
there-a-first-mover-disadvantage-to-reporting-sexual-assault (describing survivors’ fear of
“negative social consequences,” concerns that their assaults were not “serious enough to
report,” and confusion over “where to go or who to tell” as obstacles to reporting); see also
Ian Ayres, Meet Callisto, the Tinder-Like Platform that Aims to Fight Sexual Assault,
W
ASH
. P
OST
(Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/using-game-theory-
technology-to-fight-sexual-assault/2015/10/09/f8ebd44e-6e02-11e5-aa5b-
f78a98956699_story.html (explaining that survivors often decline to report due to fear of
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In cases not involving known serial offenders, the first-mover dis-
advantage remains untouched.
323
A more global concern is that the
promise of matching reifies a longstanding belief that one woman’s
account alone is not enough to establish a violation.
324
A narrowly
defined “match” option overlooks the commonalities that connect
seemingly disparate sexual assaults, enabling victims, other students,
and college administrators to persist in the view that a single accusa-
tion is suspect.
325
At the same time, it is also likely (albeit not inevi-
table) that, over time, the increased number of complaints generated
by alternative reporting channels
326
will result in greater offender
accountability.
327
If so, more survivors will presumably be encouraged
to come forward.
328
Holding offenders responsible for sexual misconduct is one main
component of a college’s Title IX obligation to its students.
329
But pre-
vention efforts are also crucial to providing a nondiscriminatory edu-
cational environment.
330
In this regard, colleges often turn to campus
climate surveys,
331
which vary considerably in their approach to col-
retaliation, fear of negative social consequences, and fear of being accused of fabricating
their assault).
323
Separate constellations of concern cluster around the system’s reliance on Facebook
for matching and the risk of exposing confidential information—a security threat that
cannot be entirely eliminated by encryption. The cost of partnering with Callisto (or other
similar platforms) may also be an obstacle for some institutions. See Sara Ashley O’Brien,
She Wants Her Rape Reporting Software to Be Universal, CNN B
US
. (Mar. 31, 2017, 12:44
PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/03/31/technology/callisto-sexual-assault-software (noting
that Callisto charges a setup fee of $5000 to $10,000, plus an annual subscription).
324
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
325
Information escrows of this kind may not directly advance the epistemic justice and
norm related functions of informal reporting, although over time they may contribute to
progress on these fronts. See discussion supra Sections II.B.3, II.B.4.
326
See supra note 308 and accompanying text (describing one alternative reporting
channel that has generated more reporting).
327
See supra Section II.B.6.
328
See supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text (identifying a reporting/belief
feedback loop); infra notes 369–70 and accompanying text (describing the relationship
between reporting and accountability in the workplace context).
329
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
330
See Jake New, ‘Do Not Step Away, I
NSIDE
H
IGHER
E
D
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/26/college-leaders-discuss-future-title-ix-sexual-
assault-prevention-efforts (explaining the importance of continued prevention efforts in an
era of relaxed federal enforcement of Title IX).
331
The use of climate surveys was a key recommendation in the 2014 “Not Alone”
report from the White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault. See
W
HITE
H
OUSE
T
ASK
F
ORCE TO
P
ROTECT
S
TUDENTS FROM
S
EXUAL
A
SSAULT
, N
OT
A
LONE
7–8 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/905942/download. In October 2016, the
Justice Department issued similar guidance for Title IX Coordinators. See Bea Hanson,
Best Practices: Campus Climate Surveys, D
EP
T OF
J
USTICE
(Oct. 14, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/archives/ovw/blog/best-practices-campus-climate-surveys.
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lecting data.
332
At their best, such surveys can be used to guide the
design of education and safety efforts,
333
but more granular informa-
tion about sexual misconduct incidents, conveyed in near-real time to
the Title IX coordinator, would be additionally valuable.
334
To this end, colleges might consider offering—in addition to a
standard reporting channel
335
and a multi-tiered reporting option
336
an anonymous reporting mechanism designed to collect pertinent
information about alleged misconduct, excluding the identity of the
perpetrator.
337
An anonymous report of this kind would not initiate a
formal investigation into any particular individual (who, again, would
remain unnamed).
338
But, along with other similar reports, it could
potentially focus the university’s attention on geographic hotspots,
problematic days and times, patterns of offending, and relevant demo-
graphic characteristics of alleged victims and perpetrators. College
administrators should welcome this particularized data, which could
then be used to target prevention efforts.
In sum, the availability of alternative reporting options on college
campuses can further the goals of institutional change, survivor
empowerment, community protection, and offender accountability.
332
See Jake New, Creating the Right Campus Climate Survey, I
NSIDE
H
IGHER
E
D
(July
29, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/07/29/campus-climate-surveys-
abound-does-disagreement-over-what-works-best (describing disagreement over the
merits and shortcomings of different campus climate surveys).
333
See E
VER
F
I
, S
EXUAL
A
SSAULT
C
AMPUS
C
LIMATE
S
URVEY
G
UIDE
: B
EST
P
RACTICES
R
ECOMMENDATIONS
, T
EMPLATES
,
AND
S
AMPLE
S
URVEY
3 (2017), https://everfi.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Sexual-Assault-Campus-Climate-Survey-Best-Practices-
Recommendations-Templates-and-Sample-Survey.pdf (noting that climate surveys can
help campuses “define the problem,” “set appropriate goals,” encourage them “to be more
intentional in their prevention efforts,” deliver “more targeted, impactful, and cost-
effective programming,” and “garner additional resources and broader institutional
commitment”).
334
Callisto reportedly aggregates information for colleges but does not specify the type
of information conveyed, apart from the gender of users, the class standing of users at the
time of the incident, and the time (season and hour) of platform use. See C
ALLISTO
Y
EAR
3
R
EPORT
, supra note 303, at 3, 4, 11, 13.
335
See supra notes 292–96 and accompanying text.
336
See supra notes 297–322 and accompanying text.
337
See supra note 120 (discussing the Academic Men List, a spreadsheet containing
allegations of harassment in academia, with named institutions and unnamed
perpetrators).
338
Laws in Minnesota, Connecticut, and Texas require colleges to provide for
anonymous reporting of a sexual assault, including identification of the accused. See Alex
Samuels, Measures Targeting Sexual Assault on College Campuses Get Legislative
Approval, T
EX
. T
RIB
. (May 28, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/28/
measures-target-sexual-assault-college-campuses-gets-legislative-appro; Kim Soffen, How
One State Is Giving More Power to Students in Reporting Sexual Assaults on Campus—
Anonymously, W
ASH
. P
OST
(Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2016/08/02/how-one-state-is-giving-more-power-to-students-in-reporting-
sexual-assaults-on-campus-anonymously.
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But these advantages cannot be realized if most incidents of sexual
misconduct remain outside the purview of those with the responsi-
bility to address it.
C. Workplace
As in the law enforcement context, procedures for reporting
sexual misconduct in the workplace are generally single-tracked,
339
and this rigidity has become ossified.
340
To the extent employers pro-
vide alternative reporting mechanisms, they tend to do so simply by
designating more than one possible recipient for the complaint.
341
(Because a supervisor may also be an offender, employers must iden-
tify multiple complaint recipients.
342
) But this allowance has done
little to incentivize reporting.
343
As we have already seen,
344
the vast
majority of sexual harassment victims never invoke official channels.
For this dynamic to change, established workplace channels
should be reconfigured to reflect the lessons learned from informal
reporting. Women turn to Whisper Networks and the Courts of Public
Opinion because of the benefits they provide (and the costs of the
more established options). A range of workplace reporting options
deliberately crafted to achieve these same ends
345
—and even to
339
See Anti-Harassment Policy and Complaint Procedure, S
OC
Y FOR
H
UMAN
R
ESOURCE
M
GMT
., https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/policies/
pages/cms_000534.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (“Complaints should be submitted as
soon as possible after an incident has occurred, preferably in writing. The HR director may
assist the complainant in completing a written statement or . . . the HR director will dictate
[a] verbal complaint.”).
340
For objections to the legal requirement that, unless they suffer a concrete
employment consequence, victims of hostile work environment harassment must first
report through an internal complaint channel, see Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual
Harassment from Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 S
TAN
. L. R
EV
. O
NLINE
17,
42–43 (2018).
341
See EEOC T
ASK
F
ORCE
R
EPORT
, supra note 96, at 38 (explaining that effective
harassment policies include “[a] clearly described complaint process that provides multiple,
accessible avenues of complaint” (i.e., alternative individuals to whom the complaint can
be made other than the immediate supervisor)).
342
See Allan H. Weitzman & Marissa A. Mastroianni, The Faragher Legacy: Still Going
Strong After Twenty Years of Attacks and Counter-Measures, 68 L
AB
. L.J. 143, 147 (2017)
(“[A]t a minimum, a complaint procedure should ‘encourage victims of harassment to
come forward [without requiring] a victim to complain first to the offending supervisor.’
(alteration in original) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998))).
343
For a more global critique of “barriers to rights mobilization” by victims of
workplace harassment (sexual and other), see L
AUREN
B. E
DELMAN
, W
ORKING
L
AW
:
C
OURTS
, C
ORPORATIONS
,
AND
S
YMBOLIC
C
IVIL
R
IGHTS
159–61 (2016).
344
See supra Section I.C.
345
See, e.g., infra note 354 and accompanying text.
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extend beyond what informal reporting delivers
346
—can best fulfill
the promise of Title VII.
347
A multi-tiered reporting system might include several avenues for
complaint,
348
depending on the size and organizational structure of
the business.
349
While preserving the traditional reporting pathway,
which allows a victim to formally initiate a full-blown investigation
(typically by the HR department), employers should also offer both
anonymous and confidential reporting options.
For instance, a company might create an anonymous
whistleblower-type hotline specifically meant for reporting harass-
ment.
350
As in the corporate compliance context, where such hotlines
are commonplace,
351
an anonymous report—or a series of reports col-
lected over time—might be sufficiently specific to allow for an
investigation.
352
In the #MeToo era, a variation on this process has unfolded
repeatedly, albeit in an ad hoc manner, as anonymous accusations
made in the Shadow Court of Public Opinion have sparked related
346
See infra notes 370–71 and accompanying text.
347
See supra note 20 (describing Title VII’s protections against sexual harassment).
348
See EEOC T
ASK
F
ORCE
R
EPORT
, supra note 96, at 41. The Task Force reported
“broad support for reporting systems that are multifaceted, including a choice of
procedures, and choices among multiple ‘complaint handlers.’ Id. A “robust reporting
system might include options to file complaints with managers and human resource
departments, via multi-lingual complaint hotlines, and via web-based complaint
processing,” along with “various mechanisms for addressing the situation, depending on
the type of conduct and workplace situation.” Id.
349
The Task Force recognized that the operational needs and resources of small
businesses, start-up ventures, and the like, will differ significantly from large, established
employers with dedicated human capital systems or “C Suites of senior leadership.” Id.
Nevertheless, “the principle of offering an accessible and well-running reporting system
remains the same.” Id. Unions can also play an important role in facilitating the reporting
of sexual harassment by ensuring that the employer’s policies are supportive of victims and
fair toward the accused. Id. at 40–41.
350
See Linklaters Responds to #MeToo with Whistleblowing Hotline, L
AW
. F
IRM
N
EWS
(May 2, 2018), https://lawyerfirmnews.com/2018/05/02/linklaters-responds-to-metoo-with-
whistleblowing-hotline.
351
See Kobi Kastiel, Elements of an Effective Whistleblower Hotline, H
ARV
. L. S
CH
. F.
ON
C
ORP
. G
OVERNANCE
& F
IN
. R
EG
. (Oct. 25, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2014/10/25/elements-of-an-effective-whistleblower-hotline (“[A]n internal whistleblower
hotline is a critical component of a company’s anti-fraud program, as tips are consistently
the most common method of detecting fraud.”). To comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
“99% of surveyed publicly traded companies offer an anonymous hotline to employees as
a means of reporting suspected unethical or potentially unlawful activity.” Id. There are
obviously important differences between the investigation of sexual misconduct and the
investigation of corporate fraud.
352
Any remedial measures that result would necessarily depend on the findings of the
investigation.
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workplace investigations.
353
Providing a whistleblower hotlineor,
currently in development, an internet-based equivalent
354
—would for-
malize these procedures, allowing all employees the same access cur-
rently afforded those with high-profile accusations. This development
would have the added benefit of signaling that employers are open to
receiving
355
and, wherever possible, acting upon anonymized
information.
356
For victims who prefer to maintain control of their report, at least
at the outset, employer-sanctioned confidential reporting to an online
third-party platform may be an attractive option.
357
Although still in
early stages of application to the workplace, Callistoa type of infor-
mation escrow, as mentioned above
358
—enables an employee to input
a time-stamped description of the alleged misconduct, which is held in
abeyance unless and until she chooses to share it.
359
To this end, the
platform includes a matching function that notifies victims if another
353
See supra notes 22023 and accompanying text; see also Paula M. Weber & Caron
Gosling, A Sexual Harassment Sea Change for Employers?, P
ILLSBURY
W
INTHROP
S
HAW
P
ITTMAN
LLP (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/a-sexual-
harassment-sea-change-for-employers.html (“[S]ocial media supercharges the potential for
sexual harassment allegations against work colleagues and could lead to consequences for
employers who fail to act quickly and appropriately.”).
354
See, e.g., Dwoskin & McGregor, supra note 118 (explaining how the website and app
tEQuitable offers employees a channel for confidentially discussing complaints while
providing employers with data that allows them to “uncover systemic patterns” and
“improv[e] . . . workplace culture”); Laurie Segall, Startup Offers Anonymous Harassment
Reporting Tool, CNN B
US
. (Nov. 16, 2017, 9:20 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/15/
technology/allvoices-sexual-harassment-reporting-tool/index.html (describing AllVoices, a
third party platform that allows employees to anonymously report harassment directly to
the company’s CEO or board).
355
See Palmer Morrel-Samuels, Getting the Truth into Workplace Surveys, H
ARV
. B
US
.
R
EV
., Feb. 2002, https://hbr.org/2002/02/getting-the-truth-into-workplace-surveys (noting
that companies can benefit from anonymous workplace surveys, although many
assessments are poorly designed).
356
The investigation would likely rely on interviews with multiple employees with
whom the alleged harasser works (any one of whom, unbeknownst to HR, could be
responsible for the anonymous report).
357
The workplace application of Callisto is currently being piloted in the tech space. See
supra notes 316–22 and accompanying text; see also Lux Alptraum, Can Callisto
Transform How Silicon Valley Deals with Sexual Harassment?, V
ERGE
(Apr. 17, 2018, 1:54
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/17/17247566/callisto-platform-silicon-valley-sexual-
harassment.
358
See Ayres & Unkovic, supra note 131 (explaining information escrows).
359
The EEOC has recognized the potential merits of such “information escrow”
systems. See EEOC T
ASK
F
ORCE
R
EPORT
, supra note 96, at 41 n.180 (“[We] encourage
employers and other stakeholders to seek out and explore new and creative methods like
these for the prevention of harassment, and encourage researchers to further examine
escrow systems and gather evidence of their utility.”).
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employee identifies the same perpetrator,
360
on the theory that an
employee will be more willing to pursue a formal complaint if joined
by a fellow survivor.
361
If well implemented, each of these alternative complaint mecha-
nisms—anonymous reports to HR or management and confidential
reports to a third party, held in escrow—can satisfy many of the func-
tions currently served by Whisper Networks and the Courts of Public
Opinion.
First, with respect to victim empowerment, multiple avenues for
complaints increase the likelihood that accusers will be willing to iden-
tify and describe their abuse, thereby enhancing the prospect of
catharsis.
362
Second, procedures that disaggregate the memorialization
of an accusation from any ensuing investigation can more readily vali-
date the victim’s experience and her decision to report the incident.
363
Third, with respect to empowerment, the matching feature of a third-
party reporting platform can boost solidarity,
364
as can a fruitful inves-
tigation launched in response to an anonymous tip.
365
While not as communal as Whisper Networks or as public as the
Courts of Public Opinion, anonymous and confidential reporting sys-
tems can also advance epistemic
366
and normative
367
conceptions of
harassment. Apart from leading to more workplace investigations,
these alternative forms of reporting may facilitate more expansive
thinking about the very meaning of harassment.
368
Information about
what is occurring in the workplace, regardless of whether it leads to a
formal complaint, is essential for any institution committed to moni-
toring and improving its culture. More flexible reporting channels can
ultimately occasion new understandings on the part of employers and
employees alike.
369
360
See supra notes 316–22 and accompanying text (discussing the platform’s matching
function).
361
See supra notes 233, 274, 317 and accompanying text (analyzing the benefits of
matching).
362
See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
363
See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
364
As compared to the Traditional Whisper Network, matching systemizes the process
that allows victims of the same offender to find one another, but it does not surface
patterns of harassment that extend beyond an individual perpetrator.
365
See supra notes 350–52 and accompanying text.
366
See supra Section II.B.3.
367
See supra Section II.B.4.
368
See Schultz, supra note 92, at 27 (“To create lasting change requires an informed
theory of sexual harassment: What is harassment? What’s in it for the harassers? What
causes harassment? What must change?”).
369
On the difficult problem of workplace secrecy and recent legislative efforts to
address it, see Stephanie Russell-Kraft, How to End the Silence Around Sexual-Harassment
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November 2019] BEYOND #METOO 1207
Perhaps the greatest appeal of alternative complaint channels lies
in the promise of accountabilityboth individual and institutional. In
the workplace setting, the two are inexorably linked. As the EEOC
Task Force explained: “An employer that has an effective anti-
harassment program, including an effective and safe reporting system,
a thorough workplace investigation system, and proportionate correc-
tive actions, communicates to employees by those measures that the
employer takes harassment seriously,” thereby incentivizing reporting
and enabling the employer to put an end to the misconduct.
370
Without overhauling workplace reporting, this positive cycle will
remain aspirational. Whisper Networks in particular cannot induce
durable institutional change. Quite the opposite: Absent viable chan-
nels for complaint, women are presented with a seemingly intractable
status quo—one defined by steep and gendered hierarchies that
enable a range of sexual harassment while protecting perpetrators
from consequences. Unless the current backdrop of pervasive non-
reporting is upended, women will continue to be reminded that they
are less than equal in the workplace.
One female lawyer, who practiced for decades with multiple law
firms, described this reality as follows:
There is a cultural phenomenon in large law firms where some of
the more senior women seek to protect the younger female targets
from the worst behavior of their male colleagues. This protective
behavior can be both good and bad. In my experience, it prevents
the most severe and immediate harm—rape or assaultbut also
sends all the wrong messages because no one is openly confronting
the bad guy or making him stop. I learned as a very young associate
that unwanted sexual attention from men in a position of power was
going to be a normal part of my professional life, that it was a
normal part of being a woman in a law firm, that it was not accept-
able to confront it directly, and that not only was I powerless to
make it stop, but that none of the women who did their best to warn
me behind closed doors had any power to make it stop. In the end,
that’s an extremely belittling message. Even the women who would
otherwise be my role models had no power in any meaningful sense
because they couldn’t stop their male partners from touching me
inappropriately or assure me that my career would be safe if I stood
up for myself. If I wanted a successful career as a lawyer, I had to
learn how to bob and weave, while pasting a smile on my face, so
Settlements, N
ATION
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-to-end-the-
silence-around-sexual-harassment-settlements.
370
EEOC T
ASK
F
ORCE
R
EPORT
, supra note 96, at 34 (emphasis added). The Report
calls this “a positive cycle that can ultimately reduce the amount of harassment that occurs
in a workplace.” Id.
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1208 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1146
that no man’s ego would get bruised in the process of me refusing to
have sex with him.
371
Formal reporting channels, successfully reengineered, hold the
promise of more effectively challenging this systemic discrimination.
For victims of sexual harassment, workplace equality requires, at min-
imum, feasible mechanisms for complaint.
C
ONCLUSION
Victims of sexual misconduct who are newly stepping forward to
report their abuse are reshaping the #MeToo landscape. As women
find strength in numbers and a growing cultural responsiveness to
their claims, the widespread impetus to disclose misconduct is intensi-
fying. In this rapidly shifting environment, the rise of informal accusa-
tion has gone little noticed.
Unless we are willing to accept a state of perpetual dormancy in
the law governing sexual misconduct,
372
the pathways that activate
legal redress must be reimagined.
373
By creating a range of options,
institutions can replicate many of the benefits of informal reporting,
which in turn will lead more survivors to invoke formal systems. Over
time, greater openness to allegations of sexual misconduct outside the
law should produce greater receptivity to allegations of sexual miscon-
duct within the law.
Women have always found outlets for recounting their exper-
iences of abuse. Whether behind closed doors, in small groups of simi-
larly situated women or now, increasingly, in wide-open spaces using
hashtags and mainstream media, survivors are insisting that their vio-
lation matters. The law should no longer remain, for all practical pur-
poses, outside their reach.
371
Unsolicited E-mail to author, supra note 175; see also Pogrebin, supra note 173
(describing women in Richard Meier’s firm as having “been disturbed by a sense of
helplessness” induced by the fact that Meier’s behavior “was common knowledge . . . but
no one seemed to have the power to stop it”).
372
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
373
It is worth underscoring that substantive law reform is also necessary, but—in
contrast to the imperative that has been identified here—this is widely discussed in existing
scholarship. See supra note 18.