(1913), where a bare majority of the court held that the entry of a judgment
contrary to the verdict was a violation of the constitutional right to jury trial
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. A later case, Baltimore & Carolina Line
v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 55 S.Ct. 890 (1935), found an escape from Slocum
through the device of having the trial judge expressly reserve decision on the
motion for directed verdict before submitting the case to the jury. If this was done
the court could dispose of the case after verdict just as it might have done by
granting the directed verdict motion. Federal Rule 50(b) made this express
reservation of the point unnecessary by writing into the rule that the judge was
"deemed" to have reserved the point. By this fiction the reservation was made
automatic, and any constitutional difficulty such as that raised in the Slocum case is
avoided. Our Rule 50(b) uses the same device of the "deemed" reservation of the
point, although the Slocum case is not controlling upon a state court in interpreting
its state constitution, and several states have rejected its reasoning and upheld a
judgment notwithstanding a contrary verdict. See, e. g., Bothwell v. Boston
Elevated Ry., 215 Mass. 467, 102 N.E. 665 (1913).
Rules 50(b) and (c) have departed from the Federal rule in some respects
because of the difference between the standard for the direction of a verdict in
Maine and the accepted standard in the Federal courts and the majority of state
courts. In Maine the rule is that a verdict should be directed whenever a contrary
verdict could not be permitted to stand. Ward v. Cumberland County Power &
Light Co., 134 Me. 430, 187 A. 527 (1936). And exceptions to the refusal to direct
a verdict raise the same question as a motion for a new trial. Blacker v. Oxford
Paper Co., 127 Me. 228, 142 A. 776 (1928); Mills v. Richardson, 126 Me. 244,
137 A. 689 (1927). This means that there is no such thing as a case where a
directed verdict would be improper and the grant of a new trial on the law and
evidence would be proper. In the Federal courts, the contrary is true. A verdict
may be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence and a new trial granted
in many cases where a directed verdict would be impossible. See 5 Moore
[Moore’s Federal Practice] § 50.03, 2 B & H [Barron & Holtzoff] § 1080.
There is no intention to change the present test for the direction of a verdict.
That being so, the elaborate procedure in Federal Rule 50(b), as explained in
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 61 S.Ct. 189 (1940), for filing
motions in the alternative for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new
trial on the law and evidence and requiring the trial judge to pass on both motions
simultaneously would have no place in Maine practice, since the decision on both
motions would have to be the same.