ii. Manslaughter
1. Involuntary manslaughter: Grave danger to others must have been apparent and defendant must have chosen to run the risk
rather than alter his conduct so as to avoid the act or omission which caused the harm. Depends on if ordinary man under
the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger (Welansky)
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If negligence is sufficient, must be more than mere ordinary or simple negligence
b. MPC:
i. Murder
1. Felony murder equivalent 210.2(b): Joins depraved heart with felony murder. Recklessness (extreme indifference to human
life) presumed if actor is engaged/is an accomplice in the commission of/attempt to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual
intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping, felonious escape
2. Depraved heart 210.2(b): Unintended killing is murder when it is committed recklessly and under circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life (Malone, Fleming -- drunk driving case)
ii. Manslaughter/Negligent homicide
1. Manslaughter (requires recklessness) 210.3(1)(a): Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when it is committed
recklessly.
2. Negligent homicide (negligence is okay) 210.4(1): Depends on whether defendant was aware of the unwarranted risk he was
creating. Manslaughter if actor was “reckless.” (Hall: consciously disregarded substantial and unjustifiable risk) Negligent
homicide if actor should have been aware of such a risk, but was not (Hall; Williams -- omission amounted to gross
negligence).
3. Causation
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Causation comes in for any crime that has a result element. Each element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Mere possibility of survival is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt in many jurisdictions (Murrow)
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But-for cause: but for actor’s conduct no harm would have occurred.
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Proximate cause (categorical question): Conduct must be a sufficiently direct cause of death, and ultimate harm is something which
should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to his actions (Kibbe, Stewart)
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Does an intervening actor break the chain of causation?
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Medical malpractice
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Generally death results from the injury inflicted by defendant. Unless it can be said that original wound is merely a setting in
which other cause operations can it be said that the death does not result from this wound.
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Even if medical malpractice contributed to the death, defendant will not escape liability unless the malpractice was the sole
cause of the death (Shabazz)
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Subsequent intentional human actions:
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Intended to produce the result:
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Law does not treat human action that follows from defendant’s initial conduct as caused by that actor, even when
subsequent human action is entirely foreseeable.
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Even if result is exactly what the defendant wanted to happen, defendant did not cause the death if victim was intervening
actor who chose to kill himself (Campbell)
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Involvement in events leading up to the commission of the final overt act do not negate the intervening human actor
committing suicide (Kervorkian) UNLESS actor could not have committed suicide but for defendant’s help (Roberts)
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Subsequent acts constrained by duty, duress, exigency, etc can break the causal chain (Stephenson)
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Intervening actor must make a knowing, intelligent, intentional, voluntary decision to break causation chain.
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Length of time is really relevant here
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Subsequent victim behavior: defendant takes the victim as found
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Subsequent actions that recklessly risk the result:
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Subsequent actor’s risky choices do not negate the liability of the first actor, when those choices are the result of a predicament
created by the first actors (Kern)
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Jurisdictions differ when subsequent actor’s behavior was merely reckless or negligent (Root, McFadden, Atencio)
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Root: Drag racing case; defendant’s reckless conduct was not a sufficiently direct cause to competing driver’s death
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McFadden: Drag racing case; foreseeably is enough to determine proximate cause
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Atencio: Russian Roulette; participation in the game (active engagement) was enough to sutisfy causal link
RAPE
1. Actus reus
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Majority of states require physical force. Varying requirements of resistance (see statute).
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Psychological force does not substitute for physical force (DiPetrillo, Thompson, Mlinarich)
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Consent must be freely given (must be voluntary)
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Some states draw a bright line specific age of consent
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Lack of consent is often established through proof of resistance/failure to resist because of fear (Rusk)
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All states impose liability for rape when defendant has intercourse with person who was completely unconscious; nearly all impose
liability when defendant has intercourse with a person who was incapacitation by drugs he gave her without her knowledge.
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Many states do not impose liability if someone other than the defendant drugged the victim.
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Fraud
CRIMINAL LAW: ATTACK OUTLINE
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