The Paradox of Redistribution 8
"intervening variables" (cf. Lazarsfeld 1962), on the one hand reflecting causal factors
such as actions by coalitions of interest groups, and, on the other hand, potentially
having feedback effects on distributive processes via their effects on the formation of
interests, preferences and coalitions among citizens. It would therefore appear to be a
fruitful hypothesis that, while the institutions of the welfare state are to an important
extent shaped by different types of interest groups, once in place they tend to influence
the long-term development of definitions of interests and thereby coalition formation
among citizens. This, consequently, makes it likely that institutional structures will have
significant effects on redistributive processes and on the reduction of inequality and
poverty.
The paper begins with a discussion and presentation of a welfare state typology
based on social insurance institutions and the strategies of equality which they can be
seen as embodying. Data and the problems of measuring inequality and poverty are
discussed as a preparation for empirical analyses of the relationships between, on the
one hand, institutional types, and on the other, outcomes in terms of inequality and
poverty in the various stages of the redistributive processes. The results are discussed in
the final section. The empirical parts of the paper are based on two new data sets. One is
the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP) containing information on the
development of social insurance programs in 18 OECD countries, namely Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
2
The other data set is the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), which
contains micro-data on income distribution in a number of countries.
3
These two data
sets represent major advances in the opportunity for the comparative study of social