91
WNE.FA.RU
ORIGINAL PAPER
DOI: 10.26794/2220-6469-2021-15-1-91-99
UDC 339.923(045)
JEL F43, F15
Crisis Phenomena in the European Union Economy


Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, Russia
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3735-0066
ABSTRACT
The article reveals the main problems related to the EU economy’s state and the prospects for its further
development. This topic is extremely important for Russia since the European Union is its leading foreign trade
partner. The article states that the EU is the largest integration grouping globally in terms of its economic
potential. Simultaneously, the lack of significant reserves of natural resources and dependence on their external
supplies does not allow the EU to realize its economic opportunities fully. At the same time, the export-oriented
model of the economies of its leading member countries makes them sensitive to fluctuations in the conjuncture
of foreign markets, and the growing public debt contributes to the development of disintegration processes.
Besides, the growth of migration flows, the increase in socio-economic tensions, especially during the coronavirus
period, also do not allow the EU to solve the accumulated problems. Simultaneously, excessive dependence on
the United States in geopolitical and geo-economic relations hinders the development of mutually beneficial
economic ties with Russia and other countries. The article presents various opinions about the future of the EU
and notes that many authoritative political figures and experts consider that due to these reasons, it cannot be
preserved as a whole.
Keywords: EU; USA; economic development; energy resources; social sphere; disintegration processes
For citation: 
Mir novoi ekonomiki = The World of New Economy
WORLD ECONOMY
CC BY 4.0
©
© Sekacheva А. B., 2021
92
World of New Economy Vol. 15, No. 1’2021
FEATURES OF THE CURRENT STAGE

The European Union’s economic potential
is characterized by the fact that many of its
countries have virtually no signicant natural
resource endowments. This is one of the
reasons why the EU does not fully claim to be
the global center of power in world politics
and economics.
For example, Europe’s energy resources
constitute a small part (nomore than 12%) of
the world’s energy potential. For hydrocarbons,
central European countries Germany,
Poland, and Czech Republic have sufcient
coal reserves, but together they do not exceed
20% of the world’s known reserves. This is
why the EU has to import a large amount of
energy up to 90% oil and up to 70% natural
gas (https://ria.ru/20181205/15435 40738.
html). Russia supplies 34 per cent of the EU—
33% of Middle East and African countries, and
Norway 20% of all energy imports.
As a consequence, the new EU energy policy
focuses on the development of renewable
energy (RE). This in turn implies a sharp
reduction in Europes dependence on primary
energy imports. The European Union Energy
Strategy 2018 states that oil and gas imports
together account for more than 55% of energy
consumption, with the target to be reduced to
20% by 2050.
1
In some EU member countries, this
dependence is particularly pronounced, with
Russia accounting for 51.6% of natural gas
imports in Germany in 2019 and 72% of
external energy requirements in total [1].
Therefore, all energy programs, in particular
the “European Green Deal”
2
strategy
developed in 2019, are aiming to achieve
1
A Clean Planet for all A European strategic long-term vision for
a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy.
URL: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2050_en.
2
A European Green Deal. Striving to be the first climate-
neutral continent. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/
priorities-2019–2024/european-green-deal_en.
climate neutrality” by 2050. This will require
a phased reduction of hydrocarbons and
an increase in the share of RE in EU energy
consumption. But, since the development of
the “green” energy is largely determined by
the presence of non–ferrous and rare earth
metals, their small number in the EU countries
calls into question the feasibility of these
programmes. For example, of the 25 species,
lead alone provides 80 per cent of the energy
demand, with imports of the remaining metals
(aluminium, cobalt, silver, zinc, etc.) ranging
from 30 to 100%.
3
US Secretary of State
M. Albright’s remarks (1997–2001): “Russia
has too much natural wealth. That’s not fair”
[2] was to some extent a signal not only to
the US, but also to the EU. This implies the
need to ensure unhindered access to Russian
resources on the basis of the best possible
conditions for Western countries.
In general, the EU imports uranium
concentrates, manganese and iron ore, nickel,
tin, copper, molybdenum, tungsten, bauxite,
oil and other inputs. This allows it to produce
high–value–added products based on state–
of–the–art industrial technologies. In this
context, the import and export orientation of
the national economies of many EU countries,
especially Germany, makes them vulnerable
to uctuations in external markets, especially
during the coronavirus pandemic. The
European Union is now the principal trading
partner for 80 countries. In comparison, the
US is such a partner for just over 20 countries.
4
The economic situation in this integration
grouping has a direct impact on Russia as it
is its main economic partner. The share of
the EU in the foreign trade turnover of our
country, according to the data of FCS of the
Russian Federation, was approximately 50% in
3
European Political Strategy Centre study: “10 Trends reshaping
Climate and Energy”. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
strategies/2050_en.
4
EU position in world trade. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/trade/
policy/eu-position-in-world- trade/.
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WNE.FA.RU
the 2000s, and from 2008 to 2019 it decreased
from 52.1 to 41.7%. But according to Eurostat
data, Russia’s share in EU foreign trade in
2019 was 6.1% (https://madb.europa.eu/madb/
statistical_form.htm), which is a lot less than
his other partners.
As can be seen from the table, the US is the
main external trading partner of the EU so far,
allowing it to inuence its development in a
benecial direction.
THE US IMPACT ON THE EU ECONOMY
These factors, in particular heavy reliance
on external suppliers and consumers, ensure
US influence over the EU. This situation has
historically existed, but the creation of a
united Europe was primarily aimed at concrete
geopolitical goals, namely— to confront the
Soviet Union and then Russia. Therefore, US
undisguised pressure on the EU is linked
(and must be emphasized) primarily to that
country’s geopolitical interests. But it should
also be noted that the postWorld War II
relationship between the United States and
Western European countries is determined not
only by a common ideology, common values
and the existence of a NATO military–political
bloc, but also by close economic ties. Thus,
the EU’s external trade surplus with the US in
2019 was 177.9 billion dollars, i. e. the US is the
largest market for European goods.
Among EU member— states, US pressure
on Germany is particularly strong, especially
in the context of its cooperation with Russia.
Therefore in the appeal of the German
political party “Alternative for Germany” to
the Federal Government in November 2019
(that is, immediately after the United States
imposed sanctions on the “Nord Stream 2”)
it is stated that the US attempt to impose its
liquefied natural gas instead of the Russian
constitutes an unacceptable act of aggression”
[3]. The German business, which has already
lost due to anti Russian sanctions, is
estimated to have lost up to 100 billion euros,
does not intend to incur further financial
losses as a result of this US stance. This view
is shared by many members of the German
political elite as well as the EU leadership.
The European Union’s desire to move away
from a one sided focus on the United States
was reflected in the conclusion, at the end
of 2020, of negotiations on an investment
agreement between the European Union and
China, which had been under way since 2013.
It is clear that such EU policies have provoked
a barrage of criticism from the United
Kingdom and the United States. In those
countries, it’s seen as a blow to transatlantic
cooperation. As highlighted in The Times,
the EU— China agreement demonstrates
the existing gap between the EU’s declared
foreign policy goals and reality. The European
Commission (EC) claims to be “geopolitical”.
In 2019, it referred to China as a “strategic
rival”. However, the mercantilist inuence of
big business, especially in Germany, weighs
on root any concern about “morality and
security”. Further, among other reasons for
this decision, the EC in the newspaper is
Table

 USA China  Russia
2018 674 (17.1) 605 (15.4) 265 (6.7) 254 (6.4)
2019 744 (18.4) 645 (15.9) 292 (7.2) 248 (6.1)
Source: Trade. URL: https://madb.europa.eu/madb/statistical_form.htm (accessed on 22.04.2020).
A. B. Sekacheva
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World of New Economy Vol. 15, No. 1’2021
called “French vanity”, because in the UK
traditionally consider France a supporter
of European “strategic autonomy” to the
detriment of the alliance with the US
[4].
But even the author of this article, E. Lucas,
must admit that the EU is largely right: “As
Europeans note, their deal with the Chinese
is basically similar to “Phase One of the
reciprocal market access agreement between
the Trump administration and China last
January. Why should European companies
suffer, and American companies are legally
protected?”
[4]. That’s a legitimate question,
which we believe is on the surface. But,
as E. Macron noted, Frances desire to be
independent is not so much about politics as
about innovation: “Europe needs to build its
own solutions and not depend on American
and Chinese technology”.
5
EU SOCIO
ECONOMIC

Lack of necessary natural resources, strong
export orientation of national economies and
dependence on imports partly contributed
to the EU’s re –industrialization processes,
i. e. emphasis on the development of a
predominantly tertiary service sector (70.9%
of GDP in 2017).
6
Many European corporations
have found it more profitable to relocate
production to China and other Asian or
Latin American countries, where they can
make higher prots. Moreover, the European
Union’s energy strategy for RE development,
because of their higher cost, makes industrial
production less protable. This has resulted
in many enterprises being forced to shut down
or relocate to other countries. In parallel, the
European Union is closing down extractive
industries. In December 2018, the country’s
last coal mine was closed in the Ruhr district.
5
La doctrine Macron: une conversation avec le Président français.
URL: https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2020/11/16/macron/.
6
THE WORLD FACTBOOK. URL: https://www.cia.gov/the-world-
factbook/countries/ european-union/.
The Government of Germany plans to phase
out coal–red power plants entirely by 2038,
until which time coal will be purchased from
abroad.
7
Thus, in 2018, German hard coal mining
was completely stopped, and brown coal
mining has also fallen markedly in recent
years. At the same time, domestic oil and
gas production declined owing to depletion.
“The development of RE has not been able to
compensate for the shortage of other energy
sources. It was therefore uncertain how the
country would address the problem”
[1].
All these activities were carried out under
the pretext of environmental protection and
the need to combat climate warming. In line
with this global framework, the European
Investment Bank has decided that it will
cease lending to the oil and coal industries
as of the end of 2021. This also applies to gas
projects without carbon capture technologies
(http://www.nmarket.ru/news/5118094). In
2018, the Danish Pension Fund terminated
its cooperation with 35 major oil and gas
companies, of which three were Russian.
The reason for this decision was named their
“inability to meet the objectives of the Paris
Climate Agreement” [5].
Rising public debt poses a major challenge
to the EU economy. The consequences of the
2010 debt crisis, which rst affected peripheral
EU countries (Greece, Ireland) and then the
entire euro area, have not yet been eliminated.
The EU public debt, according to Eurostat
data, was 77.8% of total GDP in 2019, and even
higher in the euro area at 84.1%, well above
the value established in the Maastricht Treaty
(60%).
With these factors in mind, the EU is
betting on an accelerated transition to a
new technological order, particularly the
digitization of the economy. But, as UNCTAD
7
Mehr als nur Kohle. URL: https://www.sueddeutsche.de/
wirtschaft/ruhrgebiet-kohle-ausstieg- 1.4253414.
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WNE.FA.RU
experts point out, the digital revolution
can create “both huge opportunities and
enormous challenges” (https://unctad.org/
en/PublicationsLibrary/der2019_overview
_ru.pdf.). The European Union is not a
leader in ICT— technology, and the US is
a leader. For example, the capitalization of
the largest American FAMGA corporations
(Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon)
amounts to more than 4 trillion dollars.
8
In
total, according to UNCTAD, these ve super
platforms, as well as two Chinese companies
Alibaba иTencent— account for two thirds
of the total capitalization of the global ICT—
market. Therefore, as UNCTAD experts rightly
point out, in the global value chain, many
countries may find themselves in a position
of dependence because of “that value creation
and data are largely controlled by only a few of
these global superplatforms”.
9
Such a monopoly is highly disadvantageous
to the EU. So, according to the European
Commission (EC), Google pays less than 1%
of its revenue in the EU. The USA resisted
attempts to introduce a “digital” tax, but
since January 2020 it has been introduced in
France, Austria, Hungary, Italy and Turkey,
and 9 European countries are preparing
to introduce it [6]. In such circumstances,
some Western experts are considering the
option of integrating Europe into Chinese
technological standards (5G), which would
exclude the US and deprive the West of
a technological advantage
[7]. In order
to prevent such a turn of events, the EC
adopted the EU Digital Strategy in February
2020, whose main objective, as stated in the
document, is to achieve world leadership in
the eld of articial intelligence (AI).
10
How it
8
Welcome To The World Of FAMGA. URL: https://www.signs.com/
blog/famga/.
9
UNCTAD. Digital Economy Report. 2019. Value creation and
benefits: implications for developing countries. URL: https://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/der2019_overview_ru.pdf.
10
The European Digital Strategy. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
will be implemented is difcult to determine,
as economic difficulties in the EU are only
increasing.
Its growth slowed as early as 2019— real
GDP grew by 1.5%, 0.6% less than in 2018. The
decline in the economic performance of EU
Member States resulted in a 0.9% increase in
the State budget deficit and a 1% decrease
in industrial production.
11
The economic
situation as a result of the coronavirus
pandemic deteriorated significantly in 2020,
EC predicted that eurozone GDP would shrink
by 8.7% in 2020 and grow by 6.1% in 2021,
and the EU economy will shrink by 8.3% in
2020 and grow by 5.8% in 2021. The European
Commissioner for Economics, P. Gentiloni,
noted in July 2020 that in every European
country there would be a decline in GDP, but
that growth is expected in 2021[8].
The economic and social situation is also
steadily deteriorating. The EU Social Model,
operated by EU rule of law and subsidiarity
provided by supranational structures, is in
crisis. The benets previously enjoyed by EU
citizens through the common market, the
absence of borders and the protection of
rights throughout its territory are now largely
offset. Yet in the US and the UK consider, that
social spending in the EU, which accounts for
about 50% of global spending, is unacceptably
high and causes national economies to lose
competitiveness [9]. In addition, transition to
a “green” economy, which is actively pursued
in the EU, has little regard for social aspects.
L. Triangle, Secretary–General of the
European Branch of the International
Federation of Trade Unions IndustriAll,
rightly states that up to 11 million jobs will
be lost in the coming years in the extractive
and energy— intensive sectors, as well as
in the automobile industry of the European
Union. Moreover, Triangle has expressed
single- market/en/ content/ european-digital-strategy.
11
Eurasian Economic Integration 2020. P.29. URL: https://
docviewer.yandex.ru/view/ 0/?pageru.
A. B. Sekacheva
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World of New Economy Vol. 15, No. 1’2021
the view, that the partition within the EU is
so significant, that if the “green” transition
continues to neglect the social dimension,
that is, there is a serious risk of seeing the EU
break–up before it is decarbonized”
[10].
Indeed, the European media makes
little reference to the increasing social and
economic differentiation within the EU
and the decline in the standard of living
of the poor as a result of such policies. At
the same time, undue attention is paid to
environmental protection issues. According
to Swiss expert L. Scholz, “this is a terrible
injustice that the environmental movement
has never really been interested in” [11].
Increasing flows of migrants to the EU
are a major social challenge. The migration
crisis in the EU is believed to have peaked
in 2015, after which its leadership has taken
a number of measures to improve controls
at external borders and reduce migration
flows. As officially announced, as a result of
these actions, the number of illegal entries
into the EU has decreased by more than
90% (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headquarters–homepage_ru/54681/). But
it is important to note that statistics on the
counting of migrants in the EU are largely
unreliable and do not reect actual reality.
DISINTEGRATION PROCESSES

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES
Due to the above–mentioned crises,
disintegration processes in the EU are
gaining momentum, as exemplified by the
withdrawal of the United Kingdom (Brexit)
in the 2016 referendum. But it was not until
the end of 2020 that the country and the EU
negotiated a compromise agreement on trade
and economic cooperation. It provides for
free trade, unrestricted access to each other’s
territory, but also for the discontinuation
of coordination of defence, external and
sanctions policies.
Another catalyst for disintegration in the
EU in 2020 was the coronavirus pandemic and
its related economic crisis. The abandonment
of the free operation of the Schengen area,
the discussions on the EU budget, as well as
on the nancial support of individual national
economies, are evidence of the growing
controversy within this integration grouping.
They were particularly sharp in the relations
between the “old and “new” members, in
particular between France, Germany, Austria
on the one hand, and the countries of the
Visegrad group— on the other hand [12].
Some EU Member States complain about the
leaderships policy of crisis solidarity”. For
example, in Germany it is perplexing that
“Poland has been allocated more funds than
the whole of Europe combined in the Marshall
Plan”. From 2004 to 2014, it received 101.3
billion euros from the EU through various
specialized programmes and plans to continue
to receive 11–18 billion dollars annually
[13].
But there is another, opposing view.
In the opinion of the Russian scientist
N. K. Arbatova, the EU is currently focused
on solidarity among member countries,
recovery from the crisis and the elaboration
of a post–crisis strategy. “The initial shock
of the pandemic prompted member states to
close their borders, which in turn triggered
a series of apocalyptic scenarios about the
future of the European Union. In fact, there is
nothing new in predicting the EU’s imminent
collapse. Further, she quotes a EC Chairman
U. von der Leyen, who said that “there can
be no half measures to overcome this crisis
until we bring our economy out of the crisis
depression. To do that, we will need huge
investments in the form of a Marshall Plan for
Europe. This should be based on a strong new
EU budget. Arbatova concludes: “whether
the European Union will be able to deliver
on what has been set, the time will come.
But, in her opinion, “it is already obvious that
the European Union’s economic response
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to COVID-19 was the strongest in the world”
[14]. It’s a very controversial point of view, but
it has many supporters in both Russia and the
EU itself.
The Ambassador of Germany to Russia, G.
A. von Geir, dedicated his article to criticizing
the concepts in which the idea of the EU’s
dissolution takes hold. He pointed out that
in many media publications, the European
Union appears to “have lost its moral
compass and/or led its foreign policy solely
at the behest of American”. He goes on to say
that “Brexit is presented as proof that the
idea of Eurointegration has no appeal, and
migration will destroy European identity”. Yet,
according to von Geir, “the credibility of the EU
partnership remains today, as expressed in a
large number of countries willing to cooperate
with the EU or even aspiring to membership…
And since then this is my impression these
twenty–seven countries have come together
even more closely than before “Brexit [15].
This view is not shared by all politicians
and statesmen in Germany itself. For example,
former Chancellor G. Schroeder has taken a
very pessimistic view of the future of the EU:
“Europe is at a crossroads. America’s political
self–destruct, its once–key partner, confusion
with Russia and China, the economic problems
associated with the coronavirus, and the lack
of real coordination in the pandemic— all
caused a deep crisis in the European Union”
(https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/
gastbeitraege/).
Director of Crisis Research Institute by
Oxford University M. Almond takes an even
sharper view: “The European project in deep
crisis, it is bankrupt, both economically and
morally. Its governance model is outdated
and does not meet the challenges of 21
th
century”
[9].
And such allegations are well founded.
Since 2016, euro–skepticism is gaining
momentum: according to some reports, one
in three voters now supports parties that are
critical of or directly hostile to the integration
entity. So the collapse of the EU, according
to the famous nancier J. Soros, is inevitable
(https://www.9111.ru/questions//). With the
prediction that the coronavirus is a harbinger
of the break–up of the European Union
according to the scenario of the former Soviet
Union, the famous leader of the French party
“National Association” Marin Le Pen spoke.
The former President of the European
Council, D. Tusk, also does not exclude the
possible disintegration of Europe due to the
coronavirus pandemic crisis. In an interview
with Der Spiegel, he called for a “blitzkrieg”
in the EU economy to reduce the impact of
the epidemic. At the same time, he believes
that the financial burden in times of crisis
should be borne by the richest EU countries:
“Those with more must give more. That is
the principle of true solidarity. Germany is
nancially strong and can protect its industry
and its companies. Other EU countries do not
have this option”
(https://www.gazeta.ru/
politics/2020/04/24_a_13061731.shtml//). The
President of France, E. Macron, holds a similar
view. In his view, without the assistance of
Germany and the Netherlands to the countries
of southern Europe, the whole association
could be threatened. In doing so, according
to some French experts, Germany should
also help France “by replenishing its post
coronavirus treasury. French debt is twice as
high as German (140% of GDP versus 70%) and
banks may face bankruptcy … Germany will
have no other solution if it wants to survive a
crisis that could turn into a systemic one
[16].
Certainly, in Germany itself such approach
does not nd understanding, and nostalgia for
the good, old mark” there feels clearly.
The future of the EU depends largely on
US policy. New administration of President
USA J. Biden is likely to have to change her
attitude, given the rise of anti–American
sentiment in Europe. For example, a
sociological survey commissioned by the
A. B. Sekacheva
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World of New Economy Vol. 15, No. 1’2021
EC showed that the US actions against
coronavirus negatively affected their
image. 71% of Danes, 68% of French, 65%
of Germans, and 38% of Poles have said
that their attitudes towards the US have
worsened since the COVID-19 pandemic
[17]. In the leading English newspaper The
Times, an article by E. Lucas (January 2021)
states “Brussels is tired of years of hasty and
unilateral American decisions” [4].
In connection with this, EC Chairman
U. von der Leyen, congratulating J. Biden
on winning the election, announced a
renewed partnership” between the two sides.
J. Biden himself campaigned as a friend of
NATO and a staunch supporter of preserving
and strengthening transatlantic ties. In
his opinion, “the most effective way to
solve this problem— is to create a united
front of US allies and partners to counter
China’s brutal behavior and human rights
violations”. Meanwhile, J. Biden stressed that
in many areas of interaction he was willing to
negotiate with China. But the main danger to
so–called Euro–Atlantic solidarity he called
the “Russian threat”: “We must place real
responsibility on Russia for its violation of
international norms and stand on the side of
Russian civil society, which time and again
bravely opposes kleptocratic authoritarian
system of President Vladimir Putin”
[18].
To oppose Russia, according to his
statement, “The United States is ready to
provide economic support to European
countries and to strengthen common values”
[19].
However, many transnational businesses
are interested in the disintegration of the EU,
as it’s believed to have fulfilled its historic
role. In particular, K. Schwab and T. Mulleret,
referring to the famous American scientist
N. Ferguson, declare the US, China, and
the EU extremely disadvantaged”, as the
coronavirus pandemic has exposed their
bankruptcy, emphasizing the success of
small states”
[20].
Thus, in the face of growing global
instability, the future of the EU is in doubt.
Whether it will exist in its present form or
disintegrate— is difficult to predict. But
one thing is certain the EU’s leading—
member states will continue to hold
important positions in world politics and
economics.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Alla B. Sekacheva Cand Sci. (Econ.), associate Professor, Department of World
Economy, Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow,
Russia
aline_ph@rambler.ru
The article was received on 15.12.2020; revised on 20.12.2020 and accepted for publication on 15.01.2021.
The author read and approved the nal version of the manuscript.
A. B. Sekacheva