Convention. On the contrary, it is clear from the travaux préparatoires of
the Convention that several attempts to incorporate a definition of
‘investment’ were made, but ultimately did not succeed. In the end, the
term was left intentionally undefined, with the expectation (inter alia) that
a definition could be the subject of agreement as between Contracting
States. Hence the following oft-quoted passage in the Report of the
Executive Directors: … (citations omitted).
Given that the Convention was not drafted with a strict, objective,
definition of ‘investment’, it is doubtful that arbitral tribunals sitting in
individual cases should impose one such definition which would be
applicable in all cases and for all purposes. As noted by one commentator:
‘There is no multilateral grant of authority over objective
interpretation granted to individual tribunals sitting in cases of
particular investor-State disputes.’ [citing D. Krishan, ‘A Notion of
ICSID Investment’ in I
NVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: A
DEBATE AND DISCUSSION (T. Weiler, ed. 2008).]
Further, the Salini Test itself is problematic if, as some tribunals have
found, the ‘typical characteristics’ of an investment as identified in that
decision are elevated into a fixed and inflexible test, and if transactions are
to be presumed excluded from the ICSID Convention unless each of the
five criteria are satisfied. This risks the arbitrary exclusion of certain types
of transaction from the scope of the Convention. It also leads to a
definition that may contradict individual agreements (as here), as well as a
developing consensus in parts of the world as to the meaning of
‘investment’ (as expressed, e.g., in bilateral investment treaties). If very
substantial numbers of BITs across the world express the definition of
‘investment’ more broadly than the Salini Test, and if this constitutes any
type of international consensus, it is difficult to see why the ICSID
Convention ought to be read more narrowly.
Equally, the suggestion that the ‘special and privileged arrangements
established by the Washington Convention can be applied only to the type
of investment which the Contracting States to that Convention envisaged’
does not, in this Arbitral Tribunal’s view, lead to a fixed or autonomous
definition of ‘investment’ which must prevail in all cases, for the ‘type of
investment’ which the Contracting States in fact envisaged was an
intentionally undefined one, which was susceptible of agreement (citation
omitted).
The Arbitral Tribunal therefore considers that a more flexible and
pragmatic approach to the meaning of ‘investment’ is appropriate, which
takes into account the features identified in Salini, but along with all the
circumstances of the case, including the nature of the instrument containing
the relevant consent to ICSID.