Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Template

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A

See Configuration Management System for approval history.

The National Ecological Observatory Network is a project solely funded by the National Science Foundation and managed under cooperative

agreement by NEON, Inc. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do

not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

Title: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Template Author: Byron Murray Date: 5/29/2013

NEON Doc. #: NEON.DOC.000015 Revision: B

PREPARED BY (Name )

ORGANIZATION

DATE

Byron Murray

SYS

5/29/2013

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Template

APPROVALS (Name)

ORGANIZATION

APPROVAL DATE

Laura Newton CCB DIR SE 6/11/2013

Javier Marti CCB Chair 6/12/2013

Krista Laursen

CCB Chair

6/11/2013

Mike Stewart

CCB SE

6/12/2013

RELEASED BY (Name)

ORGANIZATION

RELEASE DATE

Stephen Craft

CCB Admin

6/12/2013

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A

NEON Doc. #: NEON.DOC.000015

REVISION DATE ECO#

A 1/1/2012 ECO-00299

B 6/12/2013 ECO-01114

Date: 5/29/2013

Revision: B

Author: Byron MurrayTitle: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Template

Change Record

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE

Initial Release

Update examples and add DFMEA Checklist

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

Definitions and Instructions

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A

Page 3 of 18

FMEA Purpose: The purpose of FMEA analysis is to provide a systematic analysis method

to identify potential failure modes of systems, components and/or assemblies. The analysis

provides input to the design team on how to mitigate the risk of potential failures to an

acceptable level. Failures should be prioritized according to how serious their consequences

are, how frequently they occur and how easily they can be detected. Action to eliminate or

reduce failures should begin with those with the highest priority.

FMEA – Item / Function Column:

Item: Description for the System/Assembly/Component

Function: What is the design supposed to do?

Write in physical, technical and measureable terms. May reference specification(s).

FMEA - Potential Failure Mode(s) Column:

How can the design fail to meet requirement(s)? Modes can be broken down into the

following categories: Total failure, partial failure, intermittent failure, over-function and

unintended function.

Example for a touch screen interface: Total Failure - Does not accept user input, Partial

Failure - Some screen areas function while other do not, Intermittent Failure - Difficulty

interpreting user entries, Over Function - Interprets single input as double press, Unintended

Function - Misinterprets user entry. Failure modes should be specific, avoiding subjective

terms like “bad”, “not right”, “too loose/tight”, “and improper”, etc. Reference requirement(s)

where possible.

FMEA - Effects of Failure Column:

What is the effect(s) of the failure? To determine the effect(s), view the failure from the eyes

of the end user and list effects in a manner that the customer would describe them. Here are

examples of effects that might be encountered:

Customer effect: noisy; premature failure; intermittent output; unable to output full

power; unacceptable appearance; will not maintain power setting.

FMEA - Severity (SEV) Columns:

How severe is the failure? Severity is a numeric ranking of the seriousness of the failure.

The number shall be assigned using the definitions given in the ratings table found on the

Rating & Scoring Guide tab. Each category covers a range of events. The severity shall be

evaluated relative to the pre-mitigation result and post-mitigation result.

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

Definitions and Instructions

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A

Page 4 of 18

FMEA - Potential Cause(s) of Failure Column:

What is the cause or mechanism of the failure? In this column we list at least one specific

cause for each failure mode. Often there are multiple or many causes for any given failure

mode, be sure to include all plausible causes. Be sure to identify the causes for the failure

mode and not the individual effect.

FMEA - Occurrence (OCC) Columns:

How often do we expect to see the failure? Occurrence is a numeric ranking of the probability

of the cause for the failure occurring. This ranking is assigned using definitions given in the

ratings table found on the Rating & Scoring Guide tab. Each category covers a range of

probabilities. The occurrence shall be evaluated relative to the likelihood of the failure

occurring when it is caused by the “cause”. If multiple causes are listed, the occurrence shall

be based on the cause which would result in the highest occurrence rating.

FMEA - Control Column:

List the current system controls in place to prevent the failure mode. There are two types of

design controls to consider:

Prevention: Prevent the cause/mechanism of failure or the failure mode from

occurring, or reduce the rate of occurrence.

• For prevention controls, place a 'P' before each prevention control listed.

• Examples of preventative controls: What has been done to prevent the failure?

Design Reviews, DFM (Design for Manufacturability), Engineering Builds, Drawing

Control Notes (i.e. critical dimensions, coating/finishes, cleanliness, materials), Finite

element analysis, Tolerance stack-up analysis, Simulations, Self-test/diagnostics,

Redundancy, etc.

Detection: Detect the cause/mechanism of failure or the failure mode, and lead to

corrective action(s).

• For detection controls place a 'D' before each detection control listed.

• Examples of detection controls: What tests will be run to assess the likelihood of a

failure? Simulation and verification testing… Functional, Life, HALT (Highly

Accelerated Life Test), HASS (Highly Accelerated Stress Screen), etc.

FMEA - Detection (DET) Column:

How likely will the failure be detected? Detection is a numeric ranking of the ability of the

design to detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. This ranking is

assigned using definitions given in the ratings table found on the Rating & Scoring Guide tab.

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

Definitions and Instructions

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A

Page 5 of 18

FMEA - Scoring the SEV/OCC/DET Columns:

Now that the modes of failure and the effects have been determined, it will be necessary to

decide which of these to focus upon for resolution. It would be inefficient to work on every

failure mode and its potential effect, so a method of prioritization will include:

Severity of the effect (SEV)

Probability of the failure mode occurring (OCC)

Probability of failure detection (DET)

Within the FMEA Score Sheet is a tab containing the ranking criteria for the SEV (Severity),

OCC (Occurrence), and DET (detection). The FMEA team agrees on the appropriate number

for each column score, taking into account the perspective of the customer (internal or

external).

FMEA – Scoring the RPN Column:

This index, called the Risk Priority Number (RPN), helps prioritize our actions for problem

resolution (though safety issues must always receive attention and are indicated by a Severity

(SEV) score of 4 or 5). The RPN is calculated automatically in the form; multiplying the SEV,

OCC and DET:

Risk Priority Number (RPN) = SEV x OCC x DET

FMEA – Scoring the CRIT Column:

This index, called the Criticality Index (CRIT), helps further prioritize our actions for problem

resolution given greater emphasis to the Severity and frequency of Occurrence. The CRIT is

calculated automatically in the form; multiplying the SEV and OCC:

Criticality (CRIT) = SEV x OCC

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

Definitions and Instructions

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A

Page 6 of 18

FMEA - Analysis and Recommended Corrective Actions Column

The Risk Priority Number (RPN) and Criticality Index act as tools to help prioritize and focus

the reduction of the overall risks associated with potential failure modes. Once all the RPNs

are calculated, the FMEA team will outline recommended action(s) that should be taken to

reduce the overall RPN for failure modes that are deemed unacceptable and whereby

action(s) are feasible. The risk associated with each failure should be reviewed to ensure it is

ALARP (As low as reasonably practicable). This may include evaluating the feasibility of

each potential corrective action by comparing the cost associated in reducing risk further

versus the potential benefit gained. Reduction of the RPN can be accomplished by lowering

any of the three rankings (severity, occurrence, or detection) by the following methods:

A reduction in the Severity ranking (SEV) is often the most difficult to attain and will most

likely require a design change.

A reduction in the Occurrence ranking (OCC) may accomplished by removing or controlling

the potential cause/mechanisms of failure.

A reduction in the Detection ranking (DET) is accomplished by adding or improving prevention

or detection controls.

In general practice, when a Criticality rating 15 to 25 or a Severity rate of 5 is assigned,

special attention must be given to ensure the risk is addressed through design

actions/controls regardless of the RPN. In all cases (Severity rankings of 4 or 5) where the

effect of an identified potential failure mode(s) could be a potential hazard and cause injury,

preventative/corrective actions shall be taken to avoid the failure mode by eliminating or

controlling the cause(s), or appropriate operator protection should be specified. For these

cases the failures will need to be addressed in the PHA process.

Guideline to Recommended Corrective Actions

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

Definitions and Instructions

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A

Page 7 of 18

FMEA - Work Team and JIRA #

Who should resolve the issues?

The FMEA team shall establish the ownership of the work team that will be responsible for

the implementation of the specified corrective action(s). Upon assignment of responsibility,

an entry will be made into JIRA to track the required corrective action(s) through resolution.

The accountable work team and associated number assigned within JIRA shall be recorded

onto the FMEA form.

Note: Work Team and JIRA #s shall only be required for failures where the FMEA team

deems that corrective action will be required.

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

Rankings and Scoring Guide

Critical: Safety issue and/or non-compliance with a government regulation, failure may cause serious injury or death to

the customer or an employee.

Serious: Failure results in a loss or reduction of primary function and renders the product inoperable causing a high

degree of customer dissatisfaction or may cause minor injury to the customer or an employee.

Moderate: Failure results in a partial malfunction of the product, the performance/functionality loss causes customer

dissatisfaction.

Minor:

Failure may not be readily apparent and/or may create a minor nuisance to the customer, but would have minor

effects on the customer’s satisfaction.

Negligible: No discernible effect, the failure would not be noticeable to the customer and would not affect the

customer’s process or product.

Frequent: One occurrence every month

Probable: One occurrence every 1-12 months

Occasional: One occurrence every 12 months to 5 years

Remote: One occurrence every 5 to 10 years

Improbable: One occurrence in greater than 10 years

Very Remote: chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

Low: chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

Moderate: chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

High: chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

Almost certain: chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

Risk Priority Number Criticality Index

Severity (1-5) x Occurrence (1-5) x Detection (1-5) Occurrence (OCC)

Frequent 5 5 10 15 20 25

Probable 4 4 8 12 16 20

Intolerable ( 75 - 125 ) Occasional

3 3 6 9 12 15

Review to determine if risk is ALARP ( 25 - 74) Remote

2 2 4 6 8 10

Acceptable ( 1 - 24 ) Improbable 1 1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5

Severity (SEV)

Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Critical

Intolerable ( 15 - 25 and for all failure modes resulting in a SEV of 5)

Review to determine if risk is ALARP ( 4 - 14 )

Acceptable ( 1 - 3 )

Severity Rankings: (Rankings of 4 or 5 will be carried over to the PHA due to potential for injury!)

Occurrence Rankings (Likelihood of occurrence across the entire Observatory):

Detection Score:

RPN = (SEV)x(OCC)x(DET)

This value should be used to rank order the concerns in the process. Regardless of RPN, special attention should be given when

severity and occurrence are high which is reflected by the Criticality Index (CRIT). Refer to the tables below for guidelines on the

levels for recommendations for corrective actions/mitigation. Note: Whenever a failure poses a potential hazard to personnel,

corrective action shall be taken and failures shall be addressed in a separate Hazard Analysis. To reduce Occurrence and increase

Detection, process and/or design revisions are often required. In most cases, only design revisions can reduce the Severity

ranking.

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A Page 9

Document #: ________________ Doc Date (Orig): _______________ Doc (Rev): __________ Facilitator: __________________________

Type:

____________________________________ Rev: __

Team Members:

Ref # Item Description / Function Potential Failure Mode Effects of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure OCC Control DET RPN CRIT

Analysis & Recommended

Corrective Actions

Work Team JIRA # SEV OCC DET RPN Comments

0 0 0

0 0

Pre-Corrective Action Post Corrective Action

SYSTEM

ASSEMBLY

COMPONENT

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A Page 10

Document #: __NEON.DOC.000808_______________ Doc Date (Orig): ___1/23/2013____________ Doc (Rev): __________ Facilitator: ____Byron Murray______________________

Type:

________________Soil-Water Content Profile____________________ Rev: __FPDR____4/23/2013

Team Members: Aaron Joos ; Ed Ayres ; John Haywood ; Brad Jarvis; Asa Akers ; Hanne Buur ; Laura Leyba-Newton ; Lloyd Banta ; Alexander Cooper; Robin Hodson; Nicholas Applegate ; Michael Pursley ; Ty Guadagno

Ref # Item Description / Function Potential Failure Mode Effects of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure OCC Control DET RPN CRIT

Analysis & Recommended

Corrective Actions

Work Team JIRA # SEV OCC DET RPN Comments

Assembly, Soil Water Content

Profile, CF00800000 / sensor

assembly for soil water content

profile

Parts will not fit together and

mount properly Not able to assemble 3

Mount holes under over sized,

miss located or missing

Tolerance Analysis

Completed, Inspection

Procedures

1 3 3 1 3 3 9

5 tubes per site, 1 per soil plot, Geo probe for

most installations, site specific requirements,

pvc pipe stays in the ground, edge of soil pit,

near arbor. Grape will be installed on unistrut

at the arbor. 2 to 16 sensors per tube with 8

sensors as the average.

0 0 0

Assembly, Soil Water Content

Profile, CF00800000 / sensor

assembly for soil water content

profile

Assembly not properly aligned,

assembly damaged, cables

damaged

Data loss / invalid data 4

Assembly components

under/over sized/missing /miss

aligned/sensor

failure/component failure/miss

calibrated

Material analysis & callout,

Cable Routing and anchor

points, Locking hardware, Cert

of compliance will be

requested, CVAL, Eng, SE,

and mfg testing, Maintenance

Procedures, Armored cables

from sensor to Grape

1 12 12

Action Item: Owner

Deployment, Reporter B

Murray, DFMEA Soil Water

Content Profile, Assembly Soil

Water Content Profile

CF00800000, Installation tool

investigation for install and

verification to ensure vertical +-

3 degrees.

4 2 1 8

The pn 0318950000 (Sensor TriSCAN Soil

Water Content and Salinity Sensor) applies

only to the actual blue sensor part of the entire

assembly. Similarly, the other components

have their own pns assigned and can be

found in Agile under Sentek. Because each of

the actual deployed assemblies will be unique,

some to their individual plot, Angelo plans on

assigning each completed sensor assembly

for each plot its own assembly number. In the

mean time I will make a dummy sensor

assembly using the previously stated

assembly number (CF00800000) and Lloyd

and myself will start populating the BOM for

that item.

0 0

Action Item: Owner

Engineering, Reporter B

Murray, DFMEA Soil Water

Content Profile, Assembly Soil

Water Content Profile

CF00800000, Design

connector/cable to be field

replaceable and make the part

a FRU.

0 0

Action Item: Owner

Engineering, Reporter B

Murray, DFMEA Soil Water

Content Profile, Assembly Soil

Water Content Profile

CF00800000, Field

Deployment to drill Soil Water

Content Holes at first arrival on

site to allow for Science,

manufacturing, CVAL,

shipment of the configured

sensors.

0 0 0

Pre-Corrective Action Post Corrective Action

SYSTEM

ASSEMBLY

COMPONENT

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A Page 11

Ref # Item Description / Function Potential Failure Mode Effects of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure OCC Control DET RPN CRIT

Analysis & Recommended

Corrective Actions

Work Team JIRA # SEV OCC DET RPN Comments

Assembly, Soil Water Content

Profile, CF00800000 / sensor

assembly for soil water content

profile

Assembly becomes damaged

or becomes unlevel from

original installation or is not

installed optimally

Loss or invalid data 4

1) Insufficient Material strength

2) Service/Installation (Over

torque-Breakage, Under

torque - Loss of hardware)

3) Corrosion

4) Stress Fatigue/Wear

5) Collision

6) Lightning Strike

7) Voids in the soil

8) Rocks against tube

1) Material Analysis & Callout

2) Locking hardware

3)Anchoring

4) Torques/Pattern specified

on drawing

5) controlled installation

process and tools

1 16 16

Action Item: Owner

Engineering/Operations

Reporter: B Murray, DFMEA

Soil-Water Content Profile,

CF008000000, Operations

procedure to check oring every

x number of years.

4 2 1 8

Action Item: Owner

Engineering/Operations

Reporter: B Murray, DFMEA

Soil-Water Content Profile,

CF008000000, Operations

procedure / process to have

shop vac to clean and

maintain sensor tube.

0 0 0

Assembly, Soil Water Content

Profile, CF00800000, PCBA

that NEON will be modifying

with the One Wire Chip /

sensor assembly for soil water

content profile

PCBA Damage Data loss / invalid data 3

NEON Assembly of One Wire

Chip onto the pins of the

backside of a connector

Certified Operators and

Inspection, Epoxy of the chip,

Conformal Coating of the

PCBA.

2 18 9

Action Item: Owner Science,

Reporter: B Murray, DFMEA

Soil-Water Content Profile,

Assembly, Soil Water Content

Profile, CF00800000, PCBA

that NEON will be modifying

with the One Wire Chip. Need

to pursue permission /

warranty information / update

to contract / agreement/ that

NEON will be adding the One

Wire Chip to a PCBA on the

assembly.

3 2 2

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A Page 12

Document #: ________NEON.DOC.000309_______ Doc Date (Orig): __05/25/2012__ Doc (Rev): ____A____ Facilitator: _______Asa Akers_________________5/2/2013

Type: System Spectral Photometer Rev: __Engineering Final Design Review__

Team Members: John Staarmann, Drew Schrupp, Aaron Joos, Ken Franzel, Tim Lucera, Guillermo Oviedo, Matt Ventimiglia, Asa Akers, Santiago Bonarrigo, Alan Tennery

Ref # Item/ Function Potential Failure Mode Effects of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure OCC Control DET RPN CRIT

Analysis & Recommended

Corrective Actions

Work Team JIRA # SEV OCC DET RPN

Comments

Assembly Spectral Photometer

System, CD03060000, Highest level

assembly of the Spectral Photometer

Parts will not fit together /

mount properly in location

Inability to assemble / install

correctly

Assembly components are

undersized / oversized /

mislocated / missing.

Tolerance Analysis Completed,

Inspection Procedures

1 3 3

Assembly Spectral Photometer

System, CD03060000, Highest level

assembly of the Spectral Photometer

Hardware falls from tower

Safety Issue / Loss or invalid

data

1) Insufficient Material strength

2) Service/Installation (Over

torque-Breakage, Under torque

- Loss of hardware)

3) Corrosion

4) Stress Fatigue/Wear

5) Mechanical damage to

assembly - environmental

1) Material Analysis & Callout

2) Torques/pattern specified on

drawing

3) Material compatability

analysis

4) Material analysis, inspection

5) Upon failure, hardware may

be secured by cable / locking

hardware

1 10 10 0 Will be addressed in PHA

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Control Mounting System,

CD03060300, Mount for sensor

control enclosure and associated

hardware (w/ East shield) (

)

Parts will not fit together /

mount properly in location

Inability to assemble / install

correctly

Assembly components are

undersized / oversized /

mislocated / missing.

Tolerance Analysis Completed,

Inspection Procedures

1 3 3

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Control Mounting System,

CD03060300, Mount for sensor

control enclosure and associated

hardware (w/ East shield) (10)

Assembly not properly aligned

or damaged

Loose hardware, cable strain,

data loss

1) Assembly components are

undersized / oversized /

mislocated / missing

2) Hardware failure (strength,

torque, corrosion, fatigue)

3) Mechanical damage to

assembly - environmental

1) Tolerance Analysis

Completed, Inspection

Procedures

2) Material compatability and

strength analysis

3) Procedures in place for

install/removal/maintenance

1 8 8

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Control Mounting System,

CD03060300, Mount for sensor

control enclosure and associated

hardware (w/ East shield) (10)

Assembly/components fall from

tower

Loss or invalid data / Safety

Issue

1) Insufficient Material strength

2) Service/Installation (Over

torque-Breakage, Under torque

- Loss of hardware)

3) Corrosion

4) Stress Fatigue/Wear

5) Mechanical damage to

assembly - environmental

1) Material Analysis & Callout

2) Torques/pattern specified on

drawing

3) Material compatability

analysis

4) Material analysis, inspection

5) Upon failure,components

may be secured by locking

hardware

1 10 10 0 Will be addressed in PHA

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Robots, Mount, CD03060200, Corner

mount arm/bracket and azimuth robot

(20)

Parts will not fit together /

mount properly in location

Inability to assemble / install

correctly

Assembly components are

undersized / oversized /

mislocated / missing.

Tolerance Analysis Completed,

Inspection Procedures

1 3 3 0

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Robots, Mount, CD03060200, Corner

mount arm/bracket and azimuth robot

(20)

-Assembly not properly

installed / aligned

-Motor Assembly internally fails

/ damaged

-Cables damaged

Data loss / invalid data 4

1) Assembly components are

undersized / oversized /

mislocated / missing

2) Hardware failure (strength,

torque, corrosion, fatigue)

3) Mechanical damage to

assembly - environmental

4) Improper routing of cabling

1) Tolerance Analysis

Completed, Inspection

Procedures

2) Material compatability and

strength analysis

3) Procedures in place for

install/removal/maintenance

4) Cables routed away from

potential pinch/shear points

and anchored. Strain relief in

place.

1 8 8

Owner: Engineering, Reporter:

B. Murray, Operations

procedure for leveling Spectral

Photometer

Owner: ENG, Reporter: A.

Akers, Specify how cables will

be secured near mount arm to

standardize routing.

Pre-Corrective Action

Post Corrective Action

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A Page 13

Ref # Item/ Function Potential Failure Mode Effects of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure OCC Control DET RPN CRIT

Analysis & Recommended

Corrective Actions

Work Team JIRA # SEV OCC DET RPN

Comments

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Robots, Mount, CD03060200,

Corner mount arm/bracket and

azimuth robot (20)

Robot parks in undesirable

state (not at nadir)

Precipitation / animal

contamination enters

collimators (Calibration

traceability issue)

1) Power failure to assembly

during automatic routine

2) Disconnection /

intermittent connection of

power cables

1, 2) Loss of power to a

sensor/grape/POE switch

*may be* detected by a SOH

scheme. What will be

checked and what will not be

checked is TBD.

3 24 8

JIRA New Feature request.

Owner: ENG, Reporter: A.

Akers, During power

failure/UPS controlled

shutdown, institute a

process to prevent the

sensor from stopping in a

non-parked position.

Added after PIDR based on discussion

during the review.

Any ability to falsify a "Wet Detection"

signal to force sensor to park if the Site

power fails (running on UPS)?

From EFDR DFMEA: ENG's preferred

method is, upon power failure and UPS-

powered shutdown, to determine when

the sensor is parked, then shut off

power to the unit before all site power

is lost.

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Robots, Mount, CD03060200, Corner

mount arm/bracket and azimuth robot

(20)

Assembly/component falls from

tower

Loss or invalid data / Safety

Issue

1) Insufficient Material strength

2) Service/Installation (Over

torque-Breakage, Under torque

- Loss of hardware)

3) Corrosion

4) Stress Fatigue/Wear

5) Mechanical damage to

assembly - environmental

1) Material Analysis & Callout

2) Torques/pattern specified on

drawing

3) Material compatability

analysis

4) Material analysis, inspection

5) Upon failure,components

may be secured by locking

hardware / cable

1 10 10

Owner: Engineering, Reporter:

B. Murray, Investigate Aeronet

braided sleeving cable

recommendation

0 Will be addressed in PHA

Sensor Acsry CIMEL Head,

0303660002, Spectral Photometer

head (collimator, zenith motor, optics)

(30)

Parts will not fit together /

mount properly in location

Inability to assemble / install

correctly

1, 2) Damage to mounting

surfaces

3) Sensor head is not keyed

when placed in clamp - can

be misinstalled

1) COTS part, assembly and fit

would have been checked

during MFG.

2) Components packaged

securely for shipping

3) Documentation?

1 3 3

Owner: MFG, Reporter: A.

Akers, Retain original shipping

box from CIMEL for future

shipping needs to prevent

damage to sensor.

Owner: ENG, Reporter: A.

Akers, Confirm CIMEL

interface cable with 1-wire can

be left at tower / CI isn't

needing matching between

chip and a specific sensor unit.

Owner: ENG, Reporter: A.

Akers, Create sensor head

installation and alignment

procedure for OPS as a part

of UAT.

1-wire chip is in cable CA03070000 and

will be left in control enclosure when

sensor is swapped out. Chip will not

follow a specific sensor.

Added after PIDR based on discussion

during the review.

Sensor Acsry CIMEL Head,

0303660002, Spectral Photometer

head (collimator, zenith motor, optics)

(30)

Sensor broken / internally fails Loss of data / invalid data 4

1) Cable migration / pinching

2) Micro-switch for 'Park'

position misadjsuted

3) Drive belts too loose

(backlash gear adjustment)

4) Back-up nuts for motor arms

loosen

5) Inconsistent filter quality

(supplier/lot effects)

COTS part, "Full Swap Out"

Any field servicable activities?

2 24 12

Owner: ENG, Reporter: A.

Akers, Document which

portions of sensor assembly

should be removed/returned for

various expected failures (e.g.,

motion issue may require both

robots).

Sensor Acsry CIMEL Head,

0303660002, Spectral Photometer

head (collimator, zenith motor, optics)

(30)

Collimator field of view

insufficient

Invalid data 4

1) Animal activity (bird

droppings, spiders, leaves,

nest(?))

2) Human activity (people on

tower top during measurement,

new buildings in area)

3) Canopy height growth over

time

4 3 48 16

Owner: ENG, Reporter: A.

Akers, Specify cleaning

procedure for collimator (not to

disturb lenses)

Collimator cleaning procedure (soft bottle

brush) - what can / can't be cleaned?

Lenses need to be left dirty for post-

deployment cal correction

Method to flag spectral photometer data if

people activity is on top ML? (other than

shut off ML)

What can be done about a change in

canopy height 20 years out?

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A Page 14

Ref # Item/ Function Potential Failure Mode Effects of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure OCC Control DET RPN CRIT

Analysis & Recommended

Corrective Actions

Work Team JIRA # SEV OCC DET RPN

Comments

Sensor Acsry CIMEL Head,

0303660002, Spectral Photometer

head (collimator, zenith motor, optics)

(30)

Sensor head / component falls

from tower

Loss or invalid data / Safety

Issue

1) Insufficient Material strength

2) Service/Installation (Over

torque-Breakage, Under torque

- Loss of hardware)

3) Corrosion

4) Stress Fatigue/Wear

5) Mechanical damage to

assembly - environmental

1) Material Analysis & Callout

2) Torques/pattern specified on

drawing

3) Material compatability

analysis

4) Material analysis, inspection

5) Upon failure,components

may be secured by locking

hardware / cable

2 10 5

Owner: ENG, Reporter: A.

Akers, Create

inspection/replacement

procedure for sensor head

clamp since it will remain in

field indefinitely

Will be addressed in PHA

Lanyard for the sensor head was

recommended to prevent falling, but not

being adopted by ENG

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Control System, CD03060310,

Enclosure and components for

Spectral Photometer control and DAQ

(40)

Parts will not fit together /

mount properly in location

Inability to assemble / install

correctly

Assembly components are

undersized / oversized /

mislocated / missing.

Tolerance Analysis Completed,

Inspection Procedures

1 3 3 0

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Control System, CD03060310,

Enclosure and components for

Spectral Photometer control and DAQ

(40)

Assembly falls from tower

Loss or invalid data / Safety

Issue

1) Insufficient Material strength

2) Service/Installation (Over

torque-Breakage, Under torque

- Loss of hardware)

3) Corrosion

4) Stress Fatigue/Wear

5) Mechanical damage to

assembly - environmental

1) Material Analysis & Callout

2) Torques/pattern specified on

drawing

3) Material compatability

analysis

4) Material analysis, inspection

5) Upon failure,components

may be secured by locking

hardware / cables

1 10 10 0 Will be addressed in PHA

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Control System, CD03060310,

Enclosure and components for

Spectral Photometer control and DAQ

(40)

Corrosion on unprotected

electrical components inside

enclosure

Loss of data / invalid data 4

Enclosure moisture seal points

are insufficient / degrade

1) Box was initially NEMA4

rated;

2 16 8 0

Environmental testing needed? What are

the mositure protection ratings of the

Serial to Ethernet Bridge and the CIMEL

white control box / roxtec board?

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A Page 15

Ref # Item/ Function Potential Failure Mode Effects of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure OCC Control DET RPN CRIT

Analysis & Recommended

Corrective Actions

Work Team JIRA # SEV OCC DET RPN

Comments

Sensor Acsry CIMEL Electronic Box,

0303660003, Control box for Spectral

photometer (white)

Spectral Photometer doesn't

GoSun correctly

Will it still use the Quadcell

to track and find the sun

even if grossly out of

position?

1) Incorrect lat/long setting

2) Incorrect Day/time setting

1) Lat /long will be verified as

part of acceptance. What

happens with replacement

boxes?

2) LC sets time of day - should

always be correct to 1 second

2 12 6

Owner: CVAL, Reporter: A.

Akers, Define process that

will be used to

configure/reconfigure

Lat/Long values on CIMEL

control boxes for duration of

NEON project (including

future TBD relocatable sites).

Owner: CVAL, Reporter: A.

Akers, Create site-specific

sheet to live inside

enclosure door with CIMEL-

formatted Lat/Long

coordinates for that site

procedure to check/update.

JIRA New Feature request.

Owner: ENG, Reporter: A.

Akers, Write utility to allow

field-verification of CIMEL

Lat/Long for OPS usage

during a control box swap

out.

Owner: S. Bonarrigo (LC),

Reporter: A. Akers, Create

SOH functionality to verify

Lat/Long values in K7 data

files matches expected Site

Lat/Long values.

Lat/Long will be set and checked at

Site acceptance - what happens when

control Boxes get swapped - how will

the Lat/Long values for each site be

stored and checked that they are

entered into the box? Who will do this

config?

Sensor Acsry CIMEL Electronic Box,

0303660003, Control box for Spectral

photometer (white)

Daughter interface board

becomes disconnected

Loss of signal/control of

instrument.

Loss of data/damage to sensor

4 Thermal cycling 3

1) Unplug / replug in sensor

cable and connector panel

1 12 12

Owner: ENG, Reporter: A.

Akers, Interface board on

CIMEL control box can become

unseated (common issue).

Create OPS procedure to

identify this failure and correct

as needed.

Sensor Acsry CIMEL Electronic Box,

0303660003, Control box for Spectral

photometer (white)

Battery charge insufficient

(4.8V)

Loss of data 4 Internal battery failure 3

1) Preventive Maintenance

during Annual Calibration

1 12 12

Action Item: Owner:

Engineering, Reporter B.

Murray Replace 4.8V battery

1X per year during Assy,

Spectral Photometer Control

System CVAL.

Sensor Acsry CIMEL Electronic Box,

0303660003, Control box for Spectral

photometer (white)

Known' bug on Cimel units

model CE318, LCD window

displays only `noise' and the

unit is not operational.

Sensor won't function, loss of

data

4 3 1) Swap out Control box 1 12 12

http://ptr.neon.local/jira/b

rowse/NCP-145

This is a known bug ! It arrives to the start

up, supply on. Normally it doesn't arrive in

field.

What you have to do :

remove the batteries and charger (if any)

remove the circuit the RAM memory U7

62256 ( see the photo )

Sensor Acsry CIMEL Electronic Box,

0303660003, Control box for Spectral

photometer (white)

Internal Storage fills up Missing data 4

1) Extended loss of power to

DAS

2) DAS comm issue

1) External Site generator can

be brought to site

1 12 12 0

Added after PIDR based on discussion

during the review.

What is duration that storage will keep?

How will it handle data in excess of this?

Answer: it will handle roughly one day's

worth of data before it begins scrolling off

the oldest files

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)

NEON.DOC.000015 Rev A Page 16

Ref # Item/ Function Potential Failure Mode Effects of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure OCC Control DET RPN CRIT

Analysis & Recommended

Corrective Actions

Work Team JIRA # SEV OCC DET RPN

Comments

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Wetness probe, CD03060400,

Detects wetness to prevent

photometer collimator from filling with

precipitation (60)

Sensor fails to detect

precipitation event

invalid data, potential

equipment damage (water

buildup in collimators)

1) Gland nut looses, probe

rotates/faces down

2) Probe blocked from seeing

mositure from foreign object

(bird droppings, spider web,

leaves, etc.)

3) Sensor fails (how?)

0 0

Owner: A. Akers:/ENG,

Reporter A. Akers, Identify how

to detect if wet sensor is not

functioning; create design

improvements/procedures to

minimize occurences.

Owner: D. Schrupp, Reporter

A. Akers, Review design to

determine benefit of installing

Wet Sensor at an angle per

CIMEL recommendation (to

induce beading on tip)

Robustness tests: Can Wet Sensor fail to

not show when precipitation is occuring

(false negative)? Is this good design

feature to have (instrument protection over

data collection)?

Can Wet Sensor fail to indicate

precipitation when there is none (false

positive)?

How does the system control if it's

unplugged?

What effect would mechanical damage to

probe cause?

Assembly, Spectral Photometer

Wetness probe, CD03060400,

Detects wetness to prevent

photometer collimator from filling with

precipitation (60)

Sensor incorrectly reports

precipitation event

Loss of data (sensor never

attempts data acquisition)

1) Excessive humidity /

condensation in area

(Is probe

generally exposed to line of

sight of sun?)

0 0

Owner: ENG, Reporter A.

Akers, Create wet sensor

cleaning procedure (most

critical in salty/humid

environments)

EFDR DFMEA: Guillermo reported the

wet sensor may not be effective during

some snow events. It can also

permenantly be triggered in humid,

salty environments where conductive

buildup is on tip. Cleaning is critical!

Assembly, Shield West Spectral

photometer, CD03200000, radiation

shield for control enclosure (50)

Parts will not fit together /

mount properly in location

Inability to assemble / install

correctly

Assembly components are

undersized / oversized /

mislocated / missing.

Tolerance Analysis Completed,

Inspection Procedures

1 3 3 0

Assembly, Shield West Spectral

photometer, CD03200000, radiation

shield for control enclosure (50)

Assembly falls from tower

Exposure of Control Enclosure

to direct sunlight / Safety issue

1) Insufficient Material strength

2) Service/Installation (Over

torque-Breakage, Under torque

- Loss of hardware)

3) Corrosion

4) Stress Fatigue/Wear

5) Mechanical damage to

assembly - environmental

1) Lanyard secures shield to

main assembly

1 10 10 0 Will be addressed in PHA

Bridge, Ethernet to Serial with PoE,

XXXXXXXXXX, converts Serial to

Ethernet (short term solution until

Grape is enabled to do this)

Bridge damaged / broken Loss of data 4 1) Internal failure (MTBF) 2

1) COTS part

2) MFG testing

1 8 8

Owner: ENG, Reporter A.

Akers, If assemblies will be

deployed with a Serial to

Ethernet Bridge, specify

applicable configuration

procedure.

Can be

deleted? Ask

Santiago.

0 Will this fit in Enclosure CD03060310?

PoE splitter, 48VDC output to both

Grape and Bridge

Splitter damaged broken Loss of data 4 1) Internal failure (MTBF) 2

1) COTS part

2) MFG testing

1 8 8

Can be

deleted? Ask

Santiago.

0 Will this fit in Enclosure CD03060310?

Stage

Task

Subsystem #1 Subsystem #2 Subsystem #3

NEON.DOC.xxxxxx NEON.DOC.xxxxxx NEON.DOC.xxxxxx

Schedule DFMEA one week prior to CDR (Enter Date held)

m/d/yy m/d/yy m/d/yy

Review Sensor Requirements

Browse sensor Data Sheet

Discuss initial design concepts with ENG (Mechanical, Electrical)

Get any conceptual drawings from ENG to use for DFMEA meeting

Prepare "DFMEA Initial (CDR).xls" file. See comments for things to consider.

One day prior to DFMEA meeting, e-mail file out to team

Print out "DFMEA Initial (CDR)" (approx 10 copies)

Hold DFMEA meeting, take notes

Integrate notes into "DFMEA (CDR)" file

Create blank Critical Parts file, populate with any known Part numbers (Optional)

Create DFMEA slides for review

Back up files in N:/SYS Meas Sub-system folder

Integrate slides into CDR presentation

Present DFMEA at CDR, note suggested changes

Incorporate any changes into "DFMEA (post-CDR)"

Prior to checking file into Agile remove the NEON Cover Sheet, Examples, and DFMEA

Checklist. The DFMEA checklist should be saved off as a separate file so that you can track

your DFEMEAs

Obtain a document number and Check file into Agile using NEON.DOC.004254 as a guide.

Send Action Items to admin contact for addition into 'the file'

Schedule DFMEA one week prior to PIDR (Enter Date held) m/d/yy m/d/yy m/d/yy

Check CDR DFMEA out of Agile and review for familiarity. x

Request assembly and component Part Numbers from ENG for reference in DFMEA.

Review CDR DFMEA Action Items for familiarity.

Review Critical Parts file.

Print out "DFMEA (CDR)" or "DFMEA (post-CDR)" whichever is most recent (approx 10

copies).

Hold DFMEA meeting, completing the following:

- Review CDR as-left design - ask ENG for any changes to this.

- Review CDR DFMEA action items - ask for updates

- Review Critical Parts list - get a list of all Part Numbers from ENG

Integrate notes into new "DFMEA (PIDR)" file.

Update Critical Parts file (confirm with Byron for 'Quality' vs 'Technical' parts).

Create DFMEA slides for review.

Back up files in N:/SYS Meas Sub-system folder

Integrate slides into PIDR presentation.

Present DFMEA at PIDR, note suggested changes.

Incorporate any changes into "DFMEA (post-PIDR)".

Check file into Agile.

Send Action Items to admin contact for addition into 'the file'.

Schedule DFMEA one week prior to PIDR. (Enter Date held) m/d/yy m/d/yy m/d/yy

Check PIDR DFMEA out of Agile and review for familiarity. x

Request any new assembly and component Part Numbers from ENG for reference in DFMEA.

Review PIDR DFMEA Action Items for familiarity.

Review Critical Parts file.

Print out "DFMEA (PIDR)" or "DFMEA (post-PIDR)" whichever is most recent (approx 10

copies).

Hold DFMEA meeting, completing the following:

- Review PIDR as-left design - ask ENG for any changes to this.

- Review PIDR DFMEA action items - ask for updates

- Review Critical Parts list - get a list of all Part Numbers from ENG

- Add Post-Corrective Action Scoring where possible

Integrate notes into new "DFMEA (EFDR)" file.

NEON Doc #

CDR

PIDR

EFDR

To add more subsystems, Insert columns between existing subsystems to

copy all formatting.

Notes

Enter an "x" in each cell as that task is finished; cell with turn green.

Update Critical Parts file (confirm with Byron for 'Quality' vs 'Technical' parts).

Create DFMEA slides for review.

Back up files in N:/SYS Meas Sub-system folder

Integrate slides into EFDR presentation.

Present DFMEA at EFDR, note suggested changes.

Incorporate any changes into "DFMEA (post-EFDR)".

Check final revision of DFMEA excel file into Agile.

Review Action Item Excel file for resolution of AIs and create list of AIs that need a JIRA ticket

Create Post-corrective action scoring values

Open JIRA tickets for any unresolved Action Items

Set flags for all Quality Critical Parts in Agile

Do 'Unknown Action' for all Technical Quality Parts