FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ONEXTREMISM IN FRAGILE STATES
February 2019
PREVENTING
EXTREMISM IN
FRAGILE STATES
A New Approach
Members of the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Cochairs
Governor Thomas Kean
Former Governor of New Jersey;
former 9/11 Commission Chair
Representative Lee Hamilton
Former Congressman from Indiana;
former 9/11 Commission Chair
Task Force Members
Secretary Madeleine Albright
Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group;
formerU.S.Secretary of State
Senator Kelly Ayotte
Board of Directors, BAE Systems, Inc.;
formerU.S. Senator from New Hampshire
Ambassador William Burns
President, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace; former Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador Johnnie Carson
Senior Advisor to the President, United States
Institute of Peace; former U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for African Aairs
Ambassador Paula Dobriansky
Senior Fellow, The Future of Diplomacy Project,
Harvard University; former Under Secretary
ofState for Global Aairs
Ambassador Karl Eikenberry
Director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative,
Stanford University; former U.S. Ambassador
toAfghanistan
Dr. John Gannon
Adjunct Professor at the Center for Security
Studies, Georgetown University; former
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
The Honorable Stephen Hadley
Chair of the Board of Directors, United States
Institute of Peace; former U.S. National
SecurityAdvisor
Mr. Farooq Kathwari
Chairman, President and CEO,
EthanAllenInteriors Inc.
The Honorable Nancy Lindborg
President, United States Institute of Peace
The Honorable Dina Powell
Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Future
ofDiplomacy Project, Harvard University;
former U.S. Deputy National Security
AdvisorforStrategy
The Honorable Rajiv Shah
President, The Rockefeller Foundation;
formerAdministrator, U.S. Agency for
International Development
Mr. Michael Singh
Senior Fellow and Managing Director,
TheWashington Institute; former Senior Director
forMiddle East Aairs, National Security Council
Senior Advisors
Ambassador Reuben E. Brigety II
Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on
ForeignRelations
Mr. Eric Brown
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Dr. Susanna Campbell
Assistant Professor, School of International
Service, American University
Ms. Leanne Erdberg
Director of Countering Violent Extremism,
United States Institute of Peace
Mr. Steven Feldstein
Nonresident Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace; Frank and Bethine Church
Chair, Boise State University
Dr. Hillel Fradkin
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Ms. Alice Friend
Senior Fellow, International Security Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Dr. George Ingram
Senior Fellow, Global Economy and
Development, Brookings Institution
Dr. Seth G. Jones
Director of the Transnational Threats Project
and Senior Advisor to the International
SecurityProgram, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Dr. Mara Karlin
Associate Professor of the Practice of Strategic
Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies
Dr. Homi Kharas
Interim Vice President and Director of the
GlobalEconomy and Development Program,
Brookings Institution
Mr. Adnan Kifayat
Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund
andHead of Global Security Ventures,
GenNextFoundation
Dr. Rachel Kleinfeld
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment
forInternational Peace
Mr. Christopher A. Kojm
Visiting Professor of the Practice of International
Aairs, George Washington University
Mr. Michael Lumpkin
Vice President of Human Performance
andBehavioral Health, Leidos Health
Mr. Robert Malley
CEO, International Crisis Group
Dr. Bridget Moix
Senior U.S. Representative and Head
ofAdvocacy, Peace Direct
Mr. Jonathan Papoulidis
Executive Advisor on Fragile States, World Vision
Ms. Susan Reichle
CEO and President, International
YouthFoundation
Mr. Tommy Ross
Senior Associate, International Security Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Dr. Lawrence Rubin
Associate Professor, Sam Nunn School
ofInternational Aairs, Georgia Institute
ofTechnology
Mr. Andrew Snow
Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace
Dr. Paul Stares
Senior Fellow for Conflict Prevention and
Director of the Center for Preventive Action,
Council on Foreign Relations
Ms. Susan Stigant
Director of Africa Programs, United States
Institute of Peace
Dr. Lauren Van Metre
Senior Advisor, National Democratic Institute
Ms. Anne Witkowsky
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defensefor Stability and Humanitarian Aairs,
U.S. Department of Defense
Ms. Mona Yacoubian
Senior Advisor for Syria, Middle East, and
NorthAfrica, United States Institute of Peace
Project Sta
Mr. Blaise Misztal
Executive Director
Mr. Michael Hurley
Advisor to the Cochairs
Dr. Corinne Gra
USIP Senior Advisor for Conflict Prevention
Dr. Daniel Calingaert
Lead Writer
Dr. Nathaniel Allen
Policy Advisor
Dr. Michael Marcusa
Policy Advisor
Mr. Philip McDaniel
Policy Advisor
Ms. Alyssa Jackson
Program Manager
Acknowledgments
The Task Force is grateful to the U.S. Congress, particularly Senator Lindsey Graham,
for entrusting it with this important mission. It is deeply appreciative of the support it has
received from the United States Institute of Peace and the Bipartisan Policy Center, on whose
earlier work this eort builds. The work of the Task Force would not have been possible
without the deep expertise, time commitment, and guidance that the Senior Advisors have
generously provided. Many experts at the United States Institute of Peace also contributed
their knowledge to guide our eorts. In addition, the Task Force wishes to acknowledge and
thank the many institutions and individuals who have provided valuable advice and feedback
throughout the course of the Task Force’s deliberations. These include U.S. government
representatives; foreign government ocials; international organizations; research
institutions; nonprofit organizations; and private sector organizations. In particular, the Task
Force is deeply grateful to the Secretariats of the g7+ and the International Dialogue on
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, the Aspen Ministers Forum, the Alliance for Peacebuilding,
the Brookings Institution, InterAction, the International Republican Institute, the National
Democratic Institute, and The Prevention Project for allowing the Task Force to present its
thinking and for providing valuable feedback.
Disclaimer
This report represents the consensus of a bipartisan Task Force with diverse expertise and
aliations. No member may be satisfied with every formulation and argument in isolation.
The findings of this report are solely those of the Task Force. They do not necessarily
represent the views of the United States Institute of Peace or the Senior Advisors.
Contents
Letter from the Cochairs 1
I. Executive Summary 3
II. The Imperative of Prevention 6
The Unsustainable Costs of the Cycle of Crisis Response 9
Beyond the Homeland: The Evolving Threat of Extremism inFragile States 11
Changing the Paradigm: The Case for Prevention 13
A Dicult Road: Getting to Prevention 15
Recommendations for a New Approach 18
III. A Shared Framework for StrategicPrevention 19
The Conditions for Extremism: Political and Contextual 19
Addressing the Conditions for Extremism: Country-Led andInclusive Programs 21
Strategic Criteria for Prevention 22
Preventive Approaches in Fragile States: Partnerships, Opportunities, Risks 23
IV. U.S. Strategic Prevention Initiative 26
V. Partnership Development Fund 28
Demonstration Project 29
VI. Conclusion 30
Appendices 31
Appendix 1: Authorizing Legislation 31
Appendix 2: The Conditions for Extremism 32
Appendix 3: Principles for Preventing Violent Extremism 36
Appendix 4: A Global Fund for Prevention 43
Appendix 5: Prevention Program and Policy Priorities 46
Appendix 6: Aligning Security Sector Cooperation with Prevention 50
Appendix 7: Consultations 54
Notes 57
Letter from the Cochairs
Since September 11, 2001, the courage and skill of our military, intelligence, and law
enforcement professionals have prevented another mass-casualty terrorist attack on U.S.
soil. American diplomats and development professionals have also dedicated great eort
to improving conditions in the dangerous places that give rise to terrorism. Yet all of us
recognize that challenges remain. Our success in defeating terrorists has not been matched
by success in ending the spread of terrorism.
It is to address this shortcoming that Congress tasked the United States Institute of Peace
to “develop a comprehensive plan to prevent the underlying causes of extremism in fragile
states.” We have been honored to lead this eort—working with a bipartisan Task Force
comprising thirteen of America’s most talented foreign policy professionals. Each of us on
the Task Force understands the importance of the problem as well as the diculty of finding
asolution. We have endeavored to learn from previous administrations that have wrestled
withthis challenge.
Our principal recommendation is both simple and daunting: Prevention should be our policy.
Preventing the underlying causes of extremism is possible but requires us to adopt a new
way of thinking about, structuring, and executing U.S. foreign policy.
The challenge is not that we lack the tools for prevention. Rather, our prevention eorts are
fractured. The relevant capabilities and expertise are spread across the U.S. government,
with no shared criteria for when to use them, no policy guidance for how to use them, and
no mechanism for coordinating them. When tried, prevention eorts have been disjointed,
piecemeal, and intermittent.
What we need is a sense of urgency. We need a high-level political commitment to undertake
prevention. We need a coherent, coordinated, and committed focus to prevent the underlying
causes of extremism in fragile states. This will require all U.S. departments and agencies with
national security responsibilities to adopt a shared understanding of how to stop the spread
of extremism. It will require the Congress to grant U.S. diplomacy, development, and defense
professionals greater flexibility in the field, while faithfully executing its oversight role. Most
important, it will require the United States to convince otherinternational actors to join and
support prevention eorts.
1 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
We recognize that this is no easy task. It will take time. It will not succeed everywhere. There
will be failures. We will have to make adjustments along the way based on lessons learned.
But if we can do it right—engaging the energy, creativity, and resourcefulness of our foreign
service, development, and military professionals—our policy will be more aordable and
more sustainable. We also believe that this policy will save lives in the years ahead.
This is the right moment for a new approach. After 9/11, U.S. ocials rightly focused on
imminent threats to the homeland. There was little understanding of how to go about
preventing violent extremism. We have learned much since. The weakening of the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria creates an opportunity to focus on prevention. The threat that
it could reestablish itself in another fragile state underscores prevention’s importance.
Manyinternational actors share our view; we should harness this emerging consensus.
A preventive strategy is neither passive nor naive. The United States always reserves the
right to use force and should do so to confront imminent terrorist threats. The broader
challenge before us is to prevent future threats from emerging. We want to foster resilient
societies in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel that are capable of resisting
thespread of extremism. We want not only to defeat today’s terrorists but also to alleviate
theconditions that spawn tomorrow’s.
We urge Congress and the administration to take up the recommendations in this report,
andwe look forward to working to implement them.
Governor Tom H. Kean Representative Lee H. Hamilton
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 2
I. Executive Summary
We need a new strategy to prevent the spread of extremism, which threatens our homeland,
our strategic interests, and our values. Our current focus on counterterrorism is necessary,
but neither sucient nor cost-eective. Congress has charged this Task Force with
developing a new approach, one that will get ahead of the problem.
We need a new strategy because, despite our success protecting the homeland, terrorism
is spreading. Worldwide, annual terrorist attacks have increased fivefold since 2001.
Thenumber of self-professed Salafi-jihadist fighters has more than tripled and they are
nowpresent in nineteen countries in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Near East.
We need a new strategy because the costs of our current approach are unsustainable. Over
the last eighteen years, ten thousand Americans have lost their lives and fifty thousand have
been wounded fighting this threat, at an estimated cost of $5.9 trillion to U.S. taxpayers.
1
We need a new strategy because terrorism is not the only threat we face. Terrorism is a
symptom, but extremism—an ideology calling for the imposition of a totalitarian order intent on
destroying free societies like ours—is the disease. Extremism both preys on fragile states and
contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that kills innocents, drains U.S. resources, forecloses
future market opportunities, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors.
To reduce our expenditure of blood and treasure, protect against future threats, and preserve
American leadership and values in contested parts of the world, we must not only respond
to terrorism but also strive to prevent extremism from taking root in the first place. This does
not mean seeking to stop all violence or to rebuild nations in vulnerable regions of the world.
Instead, it means recognizing that even modest preventive investments—if they are strategic,
coordinated, and well-timed—can reduce the risk that extremists will exploit fragile states.
The objective of a preventive approach should be to strengthen societies that are vulnerable
to extremism so they can become self-reliant, better able to resist this scourge, and protect
their hard-earned economic and security gains.
This imperative for prevention is not new. Back in 2004, the 9/11 Commission argued that
counterterrorism and homeland security must be coupled with “a preventive strategy that
is as much, or more, political as it is military.”
2
That call has not been answered. And so the
threat continues to rise, the costs mount, and the need for a preventive strategy grows
morecompelling.
Progress has undoubtedly been made since 9/11. The U.S. government has a better
understanding of what works. There is bipartisan agreement in Congress that a new
approach is needed. However, the United States cannot —nor should it—carry this burden
alone. U.S. leadership is needed to catalyze international donors to support preventing
extremism. And the international community—both donor countries and multilateral
organizations, such as the World Bank—are increasingly willing to engage these problems
withus, including through the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
But challenges persist. There is still insucient prioritization, coordination, or agreement
onwhat to do, both within the U.S. government and across the international community.
3 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Our Task Force oers three recommendations to build on emerging opportunities and
overcome persistent hurdles to preventing extremism eectively (see figure 1, “Summary
ofTask Force Recommendations”).
First, there must be a new eort to unite around a joint strategy aimed at preventing the
underlying causes of extremism. The United States should adopt a shared framework for
strategic prevention that recognizes that extremism is a political and ideological problem.
The framework should also identify building partnerships with leaders, civil society, and
private sector actors in fragilestates who are committed to governing accountably as
the best approach to preventing extremism. Extremists’ attempts to, in the Middle East
and Africa, establish an absolutist state ruled by a rigid, twisted, and false interpretation of
Islam resonate only in societies where the existing state has failed its people. The antidote
to extremist ideology, therefore, must be political. But inclusive institutions, accountable
governments, and civic participation cannot be imposed from the outside. What the United
States can do is identify, encourage, and build partnerships with leaders in fragile states
including nationally and locally, in government and civil society with women, youth, and the
private sector who are committed to rebuilding trust in their states and societies. However,
bitter experience teaches that where such leaders are lacking, the United States stands little
chance of furthering its long-term interests. In such cases, it must seek to seize opportunities
where possible and always mitigate the risk that its engagement, or that of other actors,
could do more harm than good.
Second, to ensure that agencies have the resources, processes, and authorities they need
to operationalize this shared framework, the Congress and the Executive Branch should
launch a Strategic Prevention Initiative to align all U.S. policy instruments, from bilateral
assistance to diplomatic engagement, in support of prevention. TheInitiative should set
out the roles and responsibilities of each department for undertaking prevention. Its principal
objective should be to promote long-term coordination between agencies in fragile states.
Itshould grant policymakers new authorities to implement a preventive strategy. In particular,
because local conditions and needs dier widely, it is important that U.S. diplomats and
development professionals on the ground in fragile states be given direct responsibility,
flexibility, and funding to experiment with and develop eective and tailored solutions.
However, the United States neither can nor should prevent extremism by itself. It is not the only
country with a vested interest in doing so and can build more eective partnerships with fragile
states if other countries cooperate. Thus, our Task Force calls on the United States to establish
a Partnership Development Fund, a new international platform for donors and the private
sector to pool their resources and coordinate their activities in support of prevention.
This would ensure that the work being done by the United States as part of the Strategic
Prevention Initiative is matched by other international donors working jointly toward the same
goals. Itwould create a mechanism for other countries to share the burden and incentivize
an enterprise-driven approach. A single, unified source ofassistance might also entice fragile
states that would otherwise look elsewhere for help.
A preventive strategy will not stop every terrorist attack. It will take time to produce results. It
will require us to recognize the limits of our influence and work hard to leverage our resources
more eectively. And it is not something that we can implement alone—our international
partners should do their fair share. But it oers our best hope. Neither open-ended military
operations, nor indefinite foreign assistance, nor retrenchment oers a better alternative.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 4
Through targeted, evidence-based, strategic investments where the risks are the highest, our
interests the greatest, and our partners the most willing, prevention provides a cost-eective
means to slow, contain, and eventually roll back the spread of extremism. The United States
needs toenable fragile states and societies to take the lead in averting future extremist
threats. Ifwe succeed, our children and grandchildren will live in a more peaceful world.
Figure 1. Summary of Task Force Recommendations
OBJECTIVESRESULTS RECOMMENDATIONS
Adopt a shared
understanding of how
to prevent violence
andextremism.
Operationalize
the prevention
frameworkwithin
theU.S. government.
Rally the international
community in support
of locally-led eorts
toprevent extremism.
Shared Framework for
StrategicPrevention
Strategic Prevention
Initiative
Partnership
Development Fund
• U.S. government (USG)
adopts a government-
wide understanding
of extremism
asapolitical and
ideologicalproblem.
• USG prioritizes
partnerships with
foreign leaders
committed to governing
accountably.
• Executive Branch
establishes clear roles
and responsibilities
for each department
undertaking prevention.
• Congress grants new
authorities for flexible,
long term funding for
field-based sta.
• Executive Branch aligns
security assistance with
prevention priorities.
• State Department
and USAID negotiate
with international
partners toestablish
new platform to
coordinate activities
and pool resources to
promoteprevention.
• Ensures other donors
and fragile states
contribute their
fairshare.
Ensures greater unity
ofeort around a joint
strategy for addressing
the underlying
conditions of extremism.
Provides the
authorities, procedures
and resources
needed by agencies
to align eorts and
empower committed
localpartners.
Leverages the
resources ofour
international partners
and promotes
coordination among
the U.S., international
donors, and
partnerstates.
5 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
II. The Imperative of Prevention
On September 11, 2001, nineteen young men from the Salafi-jihadist network of al-Qaeda
perpetrated the worst terrorist attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor. The attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which claimed the lives of nearly three thousand people,
have defined the course of U.S. national security policy for the better part of a generation.
That policy has focused on disrupting, degrading, dismantling, and decimating terrorist
networks overseas through a variety of means, but primarily militarily. Yet, despite U.S.
success on the battlefield, extremist groups, exploiting exclusionary governance, political
instability, and local conflicts, not merely persist but thrive. Since 9/11, jihadist groups have
participated in major insurgencies in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Yemen, Nigeria, and Mali
(see figure 2, “The Cycle of Crisis Response: Jihadist Insurgencies and U.S.-Supported
Interventions”). In none of these conflicts has the United States and its partners been able
to completely contain or mitigate the threat. Instead, after each supposed defeat, extremist
groups return having grown increasingly ambitious, innovative, and deadly.
Figure 2. The Cycle of Crisis Response: Jihadist Insurgencies
and U.S.-Supported Interventions
This figure displays the conflict trajectories of major jihadist insurgencies where U.S.-led or supported interventions have
occurred. Major jihadist insurgencies are conflicts with the participation of an ISIS or al-Qaeda aliated group with at least ten
thousand battle deaths (as in the cases of Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen), or where such groups have seized control
of major population centers (as in Mali and Libya). U.S.-led military interventions are those where the United States intervened
with ground forces, air strikes, drone strikes, or special forces during a conflict (as in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen).
U.S.-supported interventions are those where the United States provided military equipment, training, intelligence, or logistical
support to major combatants in confronting jihadist groups. Source on conflict-related deaths: UCDP / PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/#d8, Therése Patterson and Kristen Eck, “Organized Violence,” Journal of Peace Research
55, no.4 (2018), (accessed January 10, 2019). Data on U.S.-led or supported interventions compiled from secondary sources.
NIGERIA
5,000
0
LIBYA
2,500
0
SOMALIA
3,000
0
SYRIA
70,000
0
YEMEN
7,000
0
Yearly battle-related deaths
MAJOR JIHADIST INSURGENCIES
U.S.-LED OR -SUPPORTED MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
This gure displays the conict trajectories of major jihadist insurgencies where U.S.-led or supported interventions have occurred. Major jihadist insurgencies are
conicts with the participation of an Islamic State or Al-Qaeda aliated group with at least ten thousand battle deaths (as in the cases of Iraq, Syria, Nigeria,
Somalia, and Yemen), or where such groups have seized control of major population centers (as in Mali and Libya). U.S.-led military interventions are those where
the United States intervened with ground forces, air strikes, drone strikes, or special forces during a conict (as in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia and Yemen). U.S.-sup-
ported interventions are those where the United States provided military equipment, training, intelligence or logistical support to major combatants in confronting
jihadist groups. Source on conict-related deaths: UCDP / PRIO Armed Conict Dataset: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/#d8, Pettersson, Therése and Kristine Eck
(2018) Organized violence, 1989-2017 (accessed January 10, 2019). Data on U.S.-led or supported interventions compiled from secondary sources.
The Cycle of Crisis Response: Jihadist Insurgencies
and U.S.-Supported Interventions
IRAQ
15,000
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
MALI
1,000
0
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 6
Winning the Battles, Losing the Peace: The Case of Mosul, Iraq
Nine months, one hundred thousand troops, and some of the toughest urban combat since
World War II is what it took to capture Mosul in July 2017.
a
It was the third time in the past fifteen
years that the United States and its partners had “liberated” the city, Iraq’s second largest.
The first time the United States swept into Mosul was in April 2003. However, after the United
States overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, and a Shia-dominated government took power in
Baghdad, the predominantly Sunni Arab city resisted. In 2004, insurgents in Mosul declared
their allegiance to al-Qaeda and began attacking U.S. forces.
In 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi militaries launched another oensive into Mosul, this time against
these al-Qaeda linked groups. This “surge” of two thousand U.S. troops and twenty thousand
Iraqi soldiers,
b
succeeded in temporarily bringing calm.
c
But the U.S. military departed Iraq in
2011, leaving behind largely the same conditions that had sparked the first insurgency. The
Sunni population remained disenfranchised as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia, violently
crushed peaceful protests and stopped paying the salaries of Sunni tribal militias that had
helped push back al-Qaeda.
d
When, in June 2014, eight hundred ISIS insurgents marched on Mosul, the thirty thousand
soldiers of the U.S.-trained Iraqi army turned and ran. Worse, some of the city’s inhabitants
were willing to consider that their lives might be better under the extremists than under the
Iraqi government.
e
Mosul became the political and economic center of the caliphate of the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria for nearly three years. American forces returned, for a third
time, to assist Iraqi troops in dislodging the extremists.
Already conditions are ripe for extremists to return to Mosul. One year after its liberation
from ISIS, much of the city still remained in ruins
f
and 80 percent of the youth population
was unemployed.
g
As it has been since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a Shia-dominated
government in Baghdad remains in charge of the country and is conducting a disturbing
campaign of revenge against the region’s Sunni population.
h
Bytheend of 2018, ISIS militants
in Mosul had staged a comeback, detonating a series of car bombs.
i
Notes
a
Rupert Jones, “Major General: Battle for Mosul is ‘Toughest since WWII’,” BBC News, June 26, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/
av/world-40409046/major-general-battle-for-mosul-is-toughest-since-wwii.
b
Drew Brown, “U.S. Troops Setting Down Roots in Mosul,” Stars and Stripes, February 23, 2008, https://www.stripes.com/news/
u-s-troops-setting-down-roots-in-mosul-1.75370.
c
Sam Dagher, “Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie,” New York Times, October 27, 2008, https://www.nytimes.
com/2008/10/28/world/middleeast/28mosul.html?mtrref=www.google.com.
d
Anna Louise Strachan, “Factors behind the Fall of Mosul to ISIL (Daesh) in 2014,” K4D, January 17, 2017, https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/media/59808750e5274a170700002c/K4D_HDR_Factors_behind_the_fall_of_Mosul_in_2014.pdf.
e
Martin Chulov, Fazel Hawramy, and Spencer Ackerman, “Iraq Army Capitulates to ISIS Militants in Four Cities,” Guardian, June
11, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east-states.
f
Mahmoud Al-Najjar, Gilgamech Nabell and Jacob Wirtschafter, “Smell of Death Fills Mosul Near a Year after Iraqi City Freed
from ISIS,” USAToday, May 2, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/05/02/mosul-iraq-smell-death-isis-
islamic-state/543030002/.
g
“Mosul Still a Pile of Rubble One Year On,” Norwegian Refugee Council, July 5, 2018, https://www.nrc.no/news/2018/july/mosul-
still-a-pile-of-rubble-one-year-on/.
h
Ben Taub, “Iraq’s Post-ISIS Campaign of Revenge,” New Yorker, December 24, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge.
i
Salih Elias, John Davison and Kirsten Donovan, “Car Bomb Kills Several People in Iraq’s Mosul—Medical, Security Sources,”
Reuters, November 8, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/08/reuters-america-car-bomb-kills-several-people-in-iraqs-mosul--
medical-security-sources.html.
7 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
As a result, extremist groups continue to grow in number, size, lethality, and geographic
reach. Since 9/11, the number of people killed annually in terrorist attacks has increased
fivefold.
3
ISIS, al-Qaeda, and aliated groups boast more than thirty thousand foreign
fighters from more than one hundred countries, four times the number they had in 2001
(seefigure 3, “Estimated Number of Salafi-jihadist Fighters, 1980-2018”).
4
There are more
than twice as many Salafi-jihadist groups asthere were in 2001.
5
Across the Sahel, the Horn
ofAfrica, and the Near East, they have established apresence in nineteen countries and are
actively seeking to expand.
6
A new approach is needed. The current approach is unsustainable and ineective. But
withdrawal from the fight against extremism is not an option. At a time of global political
struggle between freedom and its adversaries, the United States faces real threats, not just
of terrorism against the homeland, but from the conflict, chaos, and coercive governance that
extremists spread in fragile states.
It is to address this challenge of extremism that Congress has
charged the United States Institute of Peace and this Task
Force. Section 7080 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act
of2017 (Public Law 115-31), signed into law on May 5, 2017,
calls for a “comprehensive plan to prevent the underlying
causes of extremism in fragile states in the Sahel, Horn of
Africa and the Near East.”
The Task Force finds that the United States should turn
to a third option by seeking toact early to prevent the
dangers of extremism. A new focus on strategic prevention,
recommended by this Task Force, would shift the paradigm
from reaction to prevention, fromjust stopping terrorist
attacks to also addressing the conditions that have led to the
growth of extremism, from focusing only on immediate threats
to building long-term partnerships.
Figure 3. Estimated Number of Salafi-jihadist Fighters, 1980–2018
Source: Seth Jones et al., The Evolution of the Salafi-jihadist Threat (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2018), 9, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181221_EvolvingTerroristThreat.pdf.
Estimated Number of Jihadi-Salast Fighters, 1980–2018
Source: Seth Jones et al., The Evolution of the Sala-Jihadist Threat (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018), p. 9,
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181221_EvolvingTerroristThreat.pdf.
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
LOW ESTIMATE
HIGH ESTIMATE
A new focus on strategic
prevention, recommended by
this Task Force, would shift
the paradigm from reaction
to prevention, from just
stopping terrorist attacks to
also addressingthe conditions
that have led to the growth of
extremism, from focusing only on
immediate threats to building
long-term partnerships.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 8
The Unsustainable Costs of the Cycle of Crisis Response
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, U.S. policymakers rightfully focused on
making sure that terrorists would never again strike America. In this respect, the strategy of
dismantling terrorist networks has been eective: there has been no mass-casualty terrorist
attack against the United States since 2001. If this were still the sole metric for success, the
current approach might suce.
But extremism persists, despite U.S. oensives, because it
adapts. Since 9/11, groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS have
recognized that overseas wars of attrition are more likely
than attacks against the American homeland to precipitate
U.S. withdrawal from Muslim lands; that the existing political
order in many Muslim-majority states is already weak; and
that, therefore, inflaming already volatile societies, latching
onto existing conflicts, and instigating new ones is the best
strategy against an adversary such as the United States.
Yet, even when extremists threaten to seize territory, the U.S. response tends to be reactive,
and focused only on short-term objectives directly related to the immediate threat of violence.
Nearly all U.S. policy tools, both hard and soft, aim to dismantle terrorist networks, thwart
attacks, or stop individual radicalization. U.S. air strikes and special operations are used to
evict jihadist groups from the territory they seize; security partners in fragile states, supported
by U.S. military assistance, do much of the fighting. And even nonmilitary programs that aim to
“counter violent extremism” (CVE) focus primarily on “eorts by violent extremists to radicalize,
recruit, and mobilize followers to violence”—eorts that are typically the immediate precursor
of terrorist attacks.
7
These responses, even when successful, do little to prevent,
and at times even lay the groundwork for, further extremist
eruptions. The U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Libya,
for example, contributed to political vacuums that extremists
were able to fill. Substantial U.S. security cooperation
with regimes in Mali and Yemen may have inadvertently
contributed to systematic neglect and exclusion that
extremists exploited to gain support for their cause.
Toooften, U.S.-supplied weapons are diverted to, or U.S.-
trained fighters defect to, extremists.
With every major jihadist insurgency whose causes remain unaddressed, extremists seize
opportunities to move into neighboring countries. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which has
established an ongoing presence in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Tunisia, was born from the
bitter fruits of a civil war that began in Algeria in 1991. After a decade of intermittent insurgency
in Iraq, extremists inserted themselves into the Syrian Civil War, leading to the rise of ISIS in
both countries (see figure 4, “Spillover from Major Jihadist Insurgencies, 2000–2017”).
Even when extremists threaten to
seize territory, the U.S. response
tends to be reactive, and focused
only on short-term objectives
directly related to the immediate
threat of violence.
These responses, even
when successful, do little
to prevent, and at times
even lay the groundwork for,
furtherextremist eruptions.
9 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
The United States thus finds itself trapped in a seemingly endless cycle of crisis response.
Since 2001, the fight against terrorism is estimated to have cost the United States between
$2.8 and $5.9 trillion dollars and sixty thousand killed or injured,
8
with no end in sight.
Inthewords of former National Security Advisor and Task Force member Stephen Hadley:
“When you have a series of crises and all you end up doing is crisis management, all you’re
going toget is more crises.”
9
Figure 4. Spillover from MajorJihadist Insurgencies, 2000–2017
The above chart depicts instances where jihadists have used their presence in countries with major insurgencies to “spill
over,” establish themselves, and launch terrorist attacks in neighboring countries for a period of at least two years continuing
through the end of 2017. Countries are placed along the chart according to the year of the first terrorist attack or the start date
of the major insurgency with the exception of Algeria, whose insurgency against Islamist militant groups started in the 1990s.
Source used for establishing the start date and whether or not terrorist campaign was ongoing: Global Terrorism Database at
the website of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
(accessed January 10, 2019). Start date of major insurgencies derived from figure 2, which used the following source to chart
the course of major jihadist insurgencies: UCDP / PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/#d8, Therése
Patterson and Kristen Eck, “Organized Violence,” Journal of Peace Research 55, no.4 (2018), (accessed January 10, 2019).
Ongoing Extremist Presence in Neighboring Countries Sparked
by Spillover from Major Jihadist Insurgencies, 2000–2017
IRAQ
ALGERIA
MALI
NIGERIA
LIBYA
SOMALIA
SYRIA
BURKINA FASO
LEBANON
TURKEY
KENYA
CHAD
CAMEROON
NIGER
TUNISIA
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
SPILLOVER INTO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
MAJOR JIHADIST INSURGENCIES
The above chart depicts instances where jihadists have used their presence in countries with major insurgencies to “spill over,” establish themselves and launch
terrorist attacks in neighboring countries, for a period of at least two years continuing through the end of 2017. Countries are placed along the chart according to the
year of the rst terrorist attack or the start date of the major insurgency with the exception of Algeria, whose insurgency against Islamist militant groups started in
the 1990s. Source used for establishing the start date and whether or not terrorist campaign was ongoing: Global Terrorism Database at the website of the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (accessed January 10, 2019). Start date of major insurgencies
derived from Figure 2, which used the following source to chart the course of major jihadist insurgencies: UCDP / PRIO Armed Conict Dataset: http://uc-
dp.uu.se/downloads/#d8, Pettersson, Therése and Kristine Eck (2018) Organized violence, 1989-2017 (accessed January 10, 2019). Journal of Peace Research 55(4).
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 10
Yet, the United States can ill aord to be consumed by terrorist crises. The strategic
environment has grown more challenging and complicated in recent years. The United States
confronts, according to the 2017 National Security Strategy, “rivals [that] compete across
political, economic, and military arenas . . . to shift regional balances of power in their favor.
These are fundamentally political contests between those who favor repressive systems and
those who favor free societies.”
10
Yet, the continuous cycle of counterterrorist crisis response is
likely to impede any attempt to pivot U.S. foreign policy to address these new strategic realities.
Counterterrorism taxes the national security enterprise, consuming blood, treasure, political
will, and bureaucratic bandwidth, diminishing policymakers’ ability to focus on more important
priorities. “There is no doubt in my mind that the resource shift and focus on terrorism,”
former Acting Director of Central Intelligence Michael Morrell has warned, “were in part
responsible for our failure to more clearly foresee some key global developments such as
Russia’s renewed aggressive behavior with its neighbors.”
11
To compete eectively on the
global stage, the United States must get ahead of the extremist threat.
Beyond the Homeland: The Evolving Threat of Extremism
inFragile States
Although the current approach is costly, failure to address
the spread of extremism into fragile states would be
extremely dangerous. “Prominent terrorist organizations,
particularly ISIS and al-Qa’ida,” observes the 2018
National Strategy for Counterterrorism, “have repeatedly
demonstrated the intent and capability to attack the
homeland and United States interests and continue to plot
new attacks and inspire susceptible people to commit acts
of violence inside the United States.”
12
Such attacks, however, are not the only major extremist
threat confronting the United States. According to the U.S.
Department of Defense’s 2018 National Defense Strategy, “We
are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline
in the long-standing rules-based international order—creating
a security environment more complex and volatile than any
we have experienced in recent memory.”
13
Terrorism—like the
unprecedented rise in nonstate armed groups over the past
two decades—is a symptom of this disorder.
One of the pathologies driving this assault on the rules, institutions, and values critical to
U.S. national security is extremism, specifically militant groups professing false Sunni and
Shia Islamist teachings. They seek to displace the existing, rules-based international order
and the states within it with a transnational, absolutist and totalitarian entity ruled by a rigid,
twisted, and distorted interpretation of sharia law. The extremists’ pursuit of this goal, and
the response it provokes from governments, often generates destructive cycles of violence.
Thesuccess of extremists’ experiments in governance in parts of Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya,
Mali, Nigeria, Afghanistan, pose a grave, long-term threat to U.S. interests (see figures 5
and6, “Extremist Attacks and Extremist Governance in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa,
and the Sahel”).
Yet, the United States can ill
aord to be consumed by terrorist
crises. The strategic environment
has grown more challenging and
complicated in recent years. The
United States confronts, according
to the 2017 National Security
Strategy, “rivals [that] compete
across political, economic, and
military arenas . . . to shift regional
balances of power in their favor.
These are fundamentally political
contests between those who favor
repressive systems and those who
favor free societies.”
11 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
The most conducive environments for extremist attempts at statebuilding, and therefore for
demonstrating the validity of the extremist ideological agenda, are fragile states. According
to the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, “These groups stoke and exploit weak
governance, conflict, instability, and longstanding political and religious grievances to pursue
their goal.”
14
It is no coincidence that 99 percent of all deaths from terrorist attacks over the
Figure 5. Extremist Attacks and Extremist Governance in the Middle East,
the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel, 1996–2001
Source: Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, Beyond the Homeland: Protecting America from Extremism in Fragile
States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 2018), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Taskforce-
Extremism-Fragile-States-Interim-Report.pdf.
Extremist Attacks and Extremist Governance in the Middle
East, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel, 1996–2001
Source: Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States (2018). Beyond the Homeland: Protecting American From Extremism in
Fragile States. Interim Report of the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, p. 18. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/sites/
default/les/Taskforce-Extremism-Fragile-States-Interim-Report.pdf.
Governance
Attacks
Figure 6. Extremist Attacks and Extremist Governance in the Middle East,
the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel, 2013–18
Source: Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, Beyond the Homeland: Protecting America from Extremism in Fragile
States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 2018), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Taskforce-
Extremism-Fragile-States-Interim-Report.pdf.
Extremist Attacks and Governance in the Middle
East, Horn of Africa, and Sahel, 2013–18
Source: Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States (2018). Beyond the Homeland: Protecting American From Extremism in
Fragile States. Interim Report of the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, p. 18. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/sites/
default/les/Taskforce-Extremism-Fragile-States-Interim-Report.pdf
Governance
Attacks
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 12
past seventeen years have occurred in countries that are in conflict.
15
Nor is it surprising
that, today, 77 percent of conflicts in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel have
aviolent extremist element, compared with 22 percent in 2001.
16
These same fragile states and conflicts are also the front lines of regional and global
competitions for power, influence, and resources. Russia, China, and Iran have preyed on the
weakness of fragile states to extend their spheres of influence. Fragile states in the Horn of
Africa and the Sahel are also increasingly arenas for regional rivalries, particularly between
Iranian-backed Shia and the Middle East’s looser Sunni bloc, but also the growing intra-Sunni
contest between Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, on the one side, and Turkey and
Qatar, on the other.
These twin dynamics of the extremist political project and
authoritarian influence set upself-sustaining conflicts,
making fragile states a vital battleground in the fight
against the adversaries of freedom. The more support that
extremists garner for their critique ofthe state, the more
inclined the state is to repress them harshly, which in turn
alienates citizens, who look to radical alternatives. Societies
trapped between fragility, predation, andextremism—with
no viable alternatives for just, inclusive, and competent
governance—will remain unstable, impoverished, and
susceptible to conflict and foreign interference.
Once a country is caught in this trap, there are few good options for the United States:
stay out of the fray and appear powerless; side with the rulers and compromise America’s
democratic principles while inviting potential extremist growth; or intervene to oust the
extremists and be held responsible if stability does not quickly return. The United States has
tried all three options and found that each one can be ineective and erode its standing in
the region and the wider world.
As long as extremism persists and extremist beliefs persuade and inspire more people than
does the hope for tolerant and inclusive governance, the United States will see its ability to
shape the prospects for peace and prosperity in the twenty-first century diminished.
Changing the Paradigm: The Case for Prevention
The United States needs to adopt a dierent approach. To break out of the costly cycle of
crisis response and push back against the growing threat of extremist political orders, U.S.
policymakers need to better balance eorts to respond to terrorist threats with eorts to
prevent these threats from arising in the first place. This means proactively and preemptively
identifying countries and regions that are vulnerable to future extremist penetration in fragile
states. It requires adopting a paradigm of prevention.
This Task Force finds that prevention should be understood as a pro-active and inherently
political endeavor that requires aligning U.S. government and international eorts—
diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to support local and national
leaders in seeking to strengthen state legitimacy.
17
Societies trapped between
fragility, predation, and
extremism—with no viable
alternatives for just, inclusive,
and competent governance—will
remain unstable, impoverished,
and susceptible to conflict
andforeign interference.
13 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
A preventive strategy should be a complement to, not a replacement, for counterterrorism.
But prevention is superior to a counterterrorism-only approach. While the 2018 National
Strategy for Counterterrorism aims to eliminate threats to the United States by pursuing
terrorists to their source,
18
a complementary preventive strategy should seek to avert the
emergence of extremism. Thus, prevention could, over time, supplant counterterrorism as
theprimary policy focus in fragile states.
A preventive approach is also superior to a policy of retrenchment. Strengthening the ability
of fragile states to withstand political assaults—whether from extremists or from authoritarian
state adversaries and insurgents—builds strategic depth for the United States. Prevention
must become an integral part of a broader strategy of political competition against the
adversaries of freedom.
The goal of a preventive approach cannot and should not be to avert individual terrorist
attacks; to eradicate every extremist group in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Near
East; or to prevent all violent conflict. Nor should it necessarily be to establish Western-
style democracies across the region. Instead, in targeted countries where conditions are
conducive and engagement can happen suciently early, preventive eorts should seek
to reduce the likelihood that extremists will turn local conflicts into transnational jihads,
hold territory, or establish governance. The success of such preventive eorts should
be determined by whether national and local leaders are becoming more widely trusted
within a given community or society.
Savings from Prevention
The costs of violent conflict, military expenditure, counterterror operations, and law
enforcement are extremely high. In 2017, the global economic impact of conflict was $14 trillion,
two-thirds of which was spent on internal security, incarceration, and military operations. The
costs of violent conflict were over $800 billion, $161 billion of which was from the economic
impact of terrorism.
a
Even though the cost of fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has
declined, total counterterrorism spending by the United States amounted to $175 billion in 2017,
an elevenfold increase over 2001.
b
By contrast, activities aimed at preventing violence have been shown to save money compared
with the costs of responding to conflict.
c
The most pessimistic estimates place the cost-
eectiveness ratio of investments geared toward prevention at two dollars saved for every dollar
invested.
d
Two of the most recent estimates, conducted by the United Nations and the World
Bank (2017) and the Institute for Economics and Peace (2018), put the ratio at sixteen to one.
e
Notes
a
Conflict deaths, refugees and IDPs, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and “terrorism” are included in the costs of violent conflict;
see Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP), The Economic Value of Peace, 2018: Measuring the Global Economic Impact of
Violence and Conflict (Sydney: IEP, October 2018), 9, http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Economic-
Value-of-Peace-2018.pdf.
b
Stimson Center, Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America while Promoting Eciencies and Accountability (Washington,
DC: Stimson Center, May 2018), 5. https://www.stimson.org/content/counterterrorism-spending-protecting-america-while-
promoting-eciencies-and-accountability.
c
United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict (Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2017), 4–5, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337.
d
M. Chalmers, “Spending to Save? The Cost-Eectiveness of Conflict Prevention,” Defence and Peace Economics 18, no. 1
(2007): 2.
e
United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace, 4; IEP, Global Peace Index, 2017, (Sydney: IEP; June 2017), 4.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 14
Yet a preventive approach need not be costly or ambitious; to the contrary, in the longer
term it will result in considerable cost savings. According to a recent analysis by the World
Bank and the United Nations, every dollar invested in eorts to prevent conflict saves sixteen
dollars in spending on reconstruction, crisis management, and the military.
19
This strategy should be undertaken humbly and with
realistic expectations. There are no simple prescriptions
foraddressing the challenge of extremism. Prevention is a
step-by-step process that happens within societies, one that
plays out on a generational timeline. The United States cannot
hope to fix the underlying drivers everywhere. Nor can it hope
to solve other countries’ problems from the outside, or by
acting alone. But with a new policy paradigm—supplementing
a short-term, reactive focus on terrorism with a longer-term
commitment to preventing extremism, aligning all its policy
tools behind a shared strategy, and leveraging its unique
convening power to encourage its international partners to do
their part—the United States will be able to make a dierence.
A Dicult Road: Getting to Prevention
The need for policies that do more than react to terrorist
threats and instead address the root causes of the problem
is hardly new. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission foresaw the
possibility for extremism to spread, mutate, and reemerge.
Thus, the Commission recommended a comprehensive
strategy that would not only “attack terrorists and their
organizations” and “protect against and prepare for terrorist
attacks,” but just as critically “prevent the continued growth
of Islamist terrorism.”
20
Since then, the U.S. government and the international
community have designed and implemented policies to
prevent extremism. Progress has undoubtedly been made.
21
Yet, serious challenges persist. More often than not, the
United States and its partners lose focus on prevention;
fail to work with and through communities; fail to integrate
development, diplomacy, and defense interventions; or fail
to follow up on hard-won gains.
But with a new policy paradigm—
supplementing a short-term,
reactive focus on terrorism with
a longer-term commitment to
preventing extremism, aligning all
its policy tools behind a shared
strategy, and leveraging its unique
convening power to encourage its
international partners to do their
part—the United States will be
ableto make a dierence.
There are no simple prescriptions
for addressing the challenge
of extremism. Prevention is
a step-by-step process that
happens within societies, one
that plays out on a generational
timeline. The United States
cannot hope to fix the underlying
driverseverywhere.
15 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
This Task Force’s analysis suggests that three key hurdles have hampered previous eorts
and need to be overcome to render eective eorts to prevent the underlying conditions
of extremism in fragile states: (1) the lack of a shared understanding of the conditions of
extremism, which has inhibited the development of a cohesive policy framework to guide
the activities of agencies in fragile states; (2) in contrast to measures taken to confront
terrorists, eorts to prevent extremism have not been a consistent, sustained priority
for policymakers, and; (3) U.S. diplomatic, development, and defense tools are not well
integrated with one another, nor are they coordinated with those of international partners.
Each of these hurdles merits elaboration.
First, policymakers for the most part still lack a shared understanding of the underlying
conditions that make fragile states vulnerable to extremism and strategies for addressing
those conditions. As the independent, nonpartisan Fragility Study Group convened by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for New American Security, and the
United States Institute of Peace concluded in 2016, “across the U.S. government there is no
clear or shared view of why, how, and when to engage fragile states.”
22
This problem is only
magnified at the international level and exacerbated by politically-motivated debates about
the origins and nature of terrorism.
The Persistence of Extremism amid Failure to Consolidate
Gains:Somalia
Iraq is not the only country where extremists have regrouped in the aftermath of U.S.-led
orsupported military operations, and where the international community has failed to follow up
on hard-won gains. In Somalia, between 2009 and 2011, the al-Qaeda linked group al-Shabaab
controlled most of the country, including significant portions of the capital of Mogadishu.
Al-Shabaab gained power following Ethiopia’s 2006 military invasion—aninvasion tacitly
supported by the United States—to rid Mogadishu of the Islamic Courts Union, anIslamist
group of warlords. Following the Courts’ removal, the group’s most radical members
reconstituted to become al-Shabaab and eventually seized most of the country. They were
pushed out ofMogadishu yetagain by U.S.-backed African Union peacekeepers between
2011 and 2013.
a
Yet al-Shabaab retains control of a substantial part of Somalia and has sought
apresence or mounted major attacks in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.
b
Notes
a
“Somalia Profile–Timeline,” BBC News, January 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632; and “Al-Shabab in
Somalia,” Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, (accessed January 15, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/interactives/
global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/al-shabab-in-somalia. In fact, the roots of U.S. involvement in Somalia go back even further. The
regime of Siad Barre, a major patron of the United States during the Cold War, collapsed in 1991, leading to the collapse of the
Somali state and close to three decades of nearly continuous conflict. The Islamic Courts Union established itself in the early
2000s in the aftermath of a failed international eort to provide humanitarian aid, which included the 1993 “Black Hawk Down”
incident in which nineteen U.S. servicemembers killed and seventy-two wounded.
b
See International Crisis Group, Al-Shabaab Five Years After Westgate: Still a Menace in East Africa (Brussels: International
Crisis Group, 2018), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/265-al-shabaab-five-years-after-westgate.pdf.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 16
Yet, over the past two decades, a series of studies has contributed to a growing evidence
base on the underlying causes of extremism and violence as well as the types of approaches
needed to mitigate their recurrence in fragile states.
23
These insights are known in some
parts of the U.S. government and increasingly across the international community. Within
the U.S. government, the Stabilization Assistance Review, a new shared policy framework
to guide stabilization activities, represents a step forward; it provides a shared definition of
stabilization and describes agencies’ respective roles. The Department of State and U.S.
Agency for International Development have also launched a Strategic Prevention Project
to respond to the need for a new approach to fragile states.
24
However, their application
has been largely confined to development agencies and remains uneven, at best. But
when preventing extremism, much more needs to be done to harness lessons learned from
disparate fields and integrate them into a coherent and shared policy framework.
Second, the long-term goal of addressing the underlying
conditions that enable extremism still fails to rise to the top
of the list of U.S. and international strategic priorities. In
general, policymakers too often fail to act on early warning
analysis and to take the long-term perspective that is
needed to address root causes. Short-term imperatives
takeprecedence; donors lose focus and often fail to
provide the sustained support and assistance that partners
in fragile states need.
Prevention tends not to be a high priority in our bilateral
relationships with fragile states. Tosucceed, however,
prevention needs to be the primary modality and objective of U.S. andinternational
engagement in priority countries. A new level of political commitment will be needed
toelevate prevention as a strategic priority.
Third, despite some progress toward more coordinated approaches, security, development,
humanitarian, and diplomatic stovepipes persist within the U.S. government and among
donors. This inhibits their ability to prevent extremism through comprehensive and integrated
activities that cut across governance, peacebuilding, health, and other development sectors.
Across departments and agencies, U.S. activities in fragile states need to be better prioritized,
more closely integrated, or even discontinued to ensure
they do not work at cross-purposes. In addition, a lack of
coordination among donor governments and international
agencies leads to fragmented approaches within the same
target country and missed opportunities to pool resources
and join forces. New incentives and institutional structures
are needed to create greater cohesion and drive concerted
action across diplomatic, security, and development systems,
both internationally and within the U.S. government.
Across departments and
agencies, U.S. activities in
fragile states need to be
better prioritized, more closely
integrated, or even discontinued
to ensure they do not work
atcross-purposes.
To succeed, however, prevention
needs to be the primary modality
and objective of U.S. and
international engagement in
priority countries. A new level
of political commitment will be
needed to elevate prevention
asastrategic priority.
17 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Recommendations for a New Approach
To get ahead of the threat of extremism in fragile states, this Task Force recommends that the
United States adopt a shared framework for prevention as a key U.S. national security priority,
and launch two new initiatives to facilitate its implementation:
Recommendation 1:
Adopt a Shared Framework for Strategic Prevention
To date, the United States has lacked strategic guidance, shared across all
government agencies, for engaging preventively to address the underlying
conditions of extremism in fragile states. For prevention to become a key tenet
of U.S. foreign policy and to better align the activities of agencies working in
fragile states, the United States government must adopt a shared framework
forstrategic prevention to create a common understanding among all
agenciesof the conditions of extremism and how to mitigate themeectively.
Recommendation 2:
Establish a Strategic Prevention Initiative
Second, to operationalize this shared framework and ensure that agencies have
the resources, processes, and authorities they need, the Task Force recommends
that the U.S. government establish a Strategic Prevention Initiative that creates
and codifies the capabilities, procedures, authorities, and resources to improve
and integrate U.S. eorts to prevent extremism. The Initiative’s principal objective
should be to promote long-term coordination between agencies in fragile states.
Recommendation 3:
Launch a Partnership Development Fund
Third, the United States cannot carry the burden of addressing extremism alone.
Togalvanize international support for country-led eorts to promote prevention, the
Task Force recommends that the United States initiate diplomatic eorts to launch
a Partnership Development Fund, a new mechanism that can coordinate donor
activities and pool donor funds in support of a shared approach to prevention.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 18
III. A Shared Framework for
StrategicPrevention
Informed by a review of research, existing programs and policies, and established best
practices, this Task Force recommends that the United States adopt a new, shared
framework for strategic prevention. Informed by lessons learned about what works, the
purpose of this framework should be to create acommon, government-wide understanding
of: (1) the underlying conditions for extremism; (2) how to address those underlying
conditions; (3) criteria for where and when the United States should engage preventively;
and(4) eective approaches for engaging fragile states preventively.
The Conditions for Extremism: Political and Contextual
First, the framework for strategic prevention should reflect the emerging consensus that
the conditions that enable extremism to spread across fragile states in the Sahel, the Horn
of Africa, and the Near East are both political and context-specific in nature.
25
The local conditions that fuel extremism vary widely by place and over time. At the same
time, despite the variance across contexts, a core pattern is evident across communities
where extremism has taken hold: a community tends to become vulnerable to extremism
when the compact between society and the state has broken down. When citizens blame
thegovernment for their plight and when the bonds across diverse population groups have
frayed, violent extremist groups can gain a foothold by exploiting political and economic
grievances, advancing a radical ideology, provoking violence, establishing a presence,
andoering a viable alternative to the state.
26
Fragile states are vulnerable to extremism precisely because a defining feature of fragility is a
breakdown in the relationship between the state and society. Communities already alienated by
an oppressive, corrupt, or unresponsive government are fertile ground for extremists’ attempts
to create alternative political orders. Boko Haram, for example, played on Nigeria’s extrajudicial
killings of civilians in 2011 to fan outrage into popular support for their cause: “Nobody is
persecuting us like this government. . . nobody is persecuting our religion and our Prophet like it.
They use their soldiers, their police, their system of unbelief. . . We are being persecuted. . .”
27
Extremism
As used by this Task Force, “extremism” refers to a wide range of absolutist and totalitarian
ideologies. “Extremists” believe in and advocate for replacing existing political institutions with
a new political order governed by a doctrine that denies individual liberty and equal rights to
citizens of dierent religious, ethnic, cultural, or economic backgrounds. “Violent extremists”
espouse, encourage, and perpetrate violence as they seek to create their extremist political
order. Extremism is not unique to any one culture, religion, or geographic region.
19 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
The conditions that foster extremism in fragile states can be both internal and externally-
driven as well. Seeking influence or access to resources, global and regional powers
sometimes intentionally exploit them. At other times, external actors—including donors
themselves—unwittingly exacerbate the conditions that foster extremism. Civil wars sometimes
spill over borders, aecting neighboring countries and fueling extremism. Challenging as it
may be, a comprehensive preventive strategy must therefore assess, address, and, where
possible, mitigate the role of external actors in exacerbating these conditions (see figure 7,
“TheConditions for Extremism”).
Fragility
According to the Fragility Study Group, fragility can be defined as “the absence or breakdown
of a social contract between people and their government.” Fragile states suer from
deficits of institutional capacity and political legitimacy that increase the risk of instability and
violent conflict and sap the state of its resilience to disruptive shocks.
a
Fragility also enables
transnational crime, fuels humanitarian crises, and impedes trade and development.
Note
a
William J. Burns, Michele A. Flournoy, and Nancy E. Lindborg, “U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility”
(Washington, DC: Fragility Study Group, September 2016), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/US-Leadership-and-the-
Challenge-of-State-Fragility.pdf.
Figure 7. The Conditions for Extremism
Source: Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, Beyond the Homeland: Protecting America from Extremism in Fragile
States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 2018), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Taskforce-
Extremism-Fragile-States-Interim-Report.pdf.
The Conditions for Extremism
Source: Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States (2018). Beyond the Homeland: Protecting American From Extremism in Fragile States.
Interim Report of the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, p. 18. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/les/Taskforce-Ex-
tremism-Fragile-States-Interim-Report.pdf.
SENSE OF
INJUSTICE
EXTREMISTS
FRAGILE
REGIMES
INTERNATIONAL
ACTORS
POLITICAL
EXCLUSION
ORGANIZATIONAL
PRESENCE
IDEOLOGICAL
SUPPORT
Cast secular
governments as
illegitimate, provoke
security forces abuse.
Threaten or intimidate
nonextremist activists.
Use mosques, schools,
and media to
proselytize extremism.
Smuggle operatives
and weapons into
territory.
Govern by patronage,
corruption, neglect,
and/or repression.
Close political space,
imprison nonextremist
activists.
Fail to provide schools,
leaving space for
extremists. Weaken
traditional religious
authority.
Preside over ineective
or abusive security
forces. Tolerate
extremists.
Give unconditional
security aid and
diplomatic cover
to abusive regimes.
Prioritize security
assistance over
political concerns and
conditions.
Propagate
fundamentalist religious
ideologies. Turn a blind
eye to citizens funding
extremism.
Pour arms into
territory. Back
unreliable proxies.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 20
Addressing the Conditions for Extremism:
Country-Led andInclusive Programs
Second, the framework for strategic prevention should recognize that addressing the
political and contextual conditions for extremism will require adaptive programs that
empower leaders to strengthen state-society relations and better respond to their citizens’
needs. The success of such preventive eorts should be gauged by whether national and
local leaders are becoming more widely trusted within a given community or society.
Because the conditions that undermine the legitimacy of a state or spread mistrust in a
society are specific to individual contexts, a preventive strategy must be adapted to each
country in which it is applied, rather than oer general prescriptions for entire regions.
Rebuilding the social compact between a society and the state requires strengthening
inclusive, responsive, and accountable political and economic institutions at both the local
and the national levels
28
(see figure 8, “Building Resilience against Extremism”).
Accountability is important at the local level because, in the short term, it is the timely
demonstration of political will to listen and respond to citizens’ needs that gives societies
their best chance to withstand extremism. Over the longer term, such locally visible “quick
wins” need to translate into sustained results—unfulfilled promises could serve to exacerbate
grievances and alienation. More important, local accountability is not a viable long-term
substitute for national reforms. Local gains can quickly be undermined by a predatory central
government, whether through coopting local elites or by allowing security forces to commit
abuses (see appendix 5, “Prevention Program and Policy Priorities”).
29
Figure 8. Building Resilience against Extremism
Building Resilience Against Extremism
Inclusive governance
processes & community
consultations
Address and resolve grievances
Bolster social cohesion
Increase citizen
trust in the state
Exclusionary
governance &
injustice
undermining
resilience
21 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
The impetus to repair the frayed bonds between state and society must originate from
and be sustained by the citizens and leaders of fragile states themselves. Donors cannot
inject the political will necessary to undertake such changes. External actors satisfying local
needs while the state remains visibly unresponsive do little to alleviate, and could increase,
perceptions of injustice.
Strategic Criteria for Prevention
Third, the preventive strategy should establish and follow clear strategic criteria for
U.S. engagement in key vulnerable countries. Through even moderate investments in
prevention that are strategic and well-timed, the United States can help keep key fragile
countries on a path toward sustained stability and development.
A Tale of Two Cities: Extremism and Resilience in Tunisia
Sidi Bouzid and Metlaoui are alike in many respects. Both are similarly sized towns in Tunisia’s
interior, suer from similar social and economic problems, have a shared tribal heritage, and
are centers of political resistance and unrest.
a
Yet whereas jihadist preachers gained control
ofmost of Sidi Bouzid’s mosques and sent dozens of fighters to fight with ISIS in Syria, jihadists
failed to take over a single mosque in Metlaoui and sent only one fighter.
These dierent experiences with extremism in otherwise similar towns appear to be due to
the historic presence of labor unions in Metlaoui. These unions gave the citizens of Metlaoui
an outlet for expressing their grievances and a mechanism for taking collective action to seek
redress. As a result, resistance to the state has historically been nonviolent. In Sidi Bouzid, by
contrast, an absence of strong unions, and of any other way to express discontent, has made
grievances against the state more likely to be expressed violently, leaving the town more
susceptible to extremist ideology.
b
Unions are not the solution to extremism everywhere. But this example shows that it is the
presence of avenues for people to make their concerns known and to act to address them—
including through civic participation, informal institutions, and nonviolent action—that addresses
the political nature of local grievances and can help prevent extremism.
c
Notes
a
See Aaron Zelin, “Tunisian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria,” Policy Note 55 Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
(NewYork: 2018), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyNote55-Zelin.pdf.
b
See Michael Marcusa, “Radicalism on the Periphery: History, Collective Memory, and the Cultural Resonance of Jihadist
Ideology in Tunisia.” Comparative Politics 51, no. 2 (2019): 177—197.
c
See Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011).
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 22
Preventing extremism in fragile states is not a goal that can or should be pursued
everywhere. Whether the United States should consider a given fragile state as a candidate
for a preventive approach should be based on clear criteria, such as:
• Scope of the threat: The likelihood that extremist groups might attempt to gain support
in a country due to, for example, proximity to other extremist-occupied territory, porous
borders, ungoverned spaces, or local conflicts.
• Strategic significance: A country’s or region’s strategic significance to the United States.
• Opportunity for impact: The emergence of opportunities to aect positive change
inconditions that make the country vulnerable to extremism, including a regime’s
commitment to prevention.
• Leverage: The amount of leverage available to push for reforms.
In line with the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2017, the
United States should prioritize prevention in countries where
extremist groups show signs of making headway, where
the emergence of extremism would pose a larger strategic
threat to U.S. interests, and in which there are opportunities
to support responsible national and local leaders. Gathering
the data needed to identify priority countries based on such
criteria in a timely manner will require the United States to
deploy its intelligence community and diplomatic missions, as
well as make use of existing tools that have been developed
to identify country trends and risks, to systematically monitor
fragile states. Undertaking timely and sustained preventive
action on the basis of such early warning analysis, will require
leadership at the highest levels of the U.S. government
to ensure that agencies strike a better balance between
preventive action and crisis response.
Preventive Approaches in Fragile States: Partnerships,
Opportunities, Risks
Finally, the strategy should recognize that in those countries where the United States
choses to prioritize prevention, sustained partnerships will be needed to aect change.
More often, however, it will be necessary to seize opportunities for progress as they
present themselves while recognizing the risk that its own engagement—or that of
other international actors—might make the situation in fragile states worse (see figure 9,
“U.S.Role in Building Resilience against Extremism”).
The United States should base the decision to engage in fragile states on whether a fragile
state’s political environment is conducive to establishing the foundations for inclusive political
and economic governance. In a select few countries, the United States may find partners
at the national and local level—inside government or civil society—that are committed
to preventing extremism. In such countries, comprehensive and inclusive prevention
partnerships oer the best chance of reinforcing locally-led inclusive political processes.
As the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy notes, U.S. eorts have the most impact where
“reformers are committed to tackling their economic and political challenges” and local
actors provide input.
30
Undertaking timely and
sustainedpreventive action on
the basis of such early warning
analysis, will require leadership
at the highest levels of the U.S.
government to ensure that
agencies strike a better balance
between preventive action and
crisis response.
23 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
The compact model pioneered by the U.S. government’s Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC), which provides long-term grants to alleviate poverty in well-governed low- and
middle-income countries, oers a foundation on which to build compact-based partnerships
with countries that are vulnerable to extremism. Under a compact-based agreement with
vulnerable countries, donors and other partners should work together to identify a package
of shared goals and respective responsibilities for achieving those goals. This approach is
already gaining currency.
31
Yet, unlike the MCC, which focuses on fostering economic
growth, these partnerships should address the underlying
condition of extremism. Host governments and donors
would be required to agree on a plan for rebuilding state-
society relations. These plans would be based on genuinely
inclusive consultations and set priorities widely accepted
by all stakeholders, including civil society. Partnerships with
fragile states need to be adaptive, to account for limited
administrative capacity in partner countries, and to place
greater emphasis on learning than on rigid, externally
imposed benchmarks.
A preventive strategy should also recognize that fragile states demonstrate a broad spectrum
of governance challenges. For some, the promise of long-term partnerships with the United
States may help incentivize more responsible governance. In many places, however,
opportunities for partnership will be limited and dierent approaches will be necessary.
Figure 9. U.S. Role in Building Resilience against Extremism
U.S.’ Role in Building Resilience Against Extremism
Inclusive governance
processes & community
consultations
U.S. eorts to build
partnerships, catalyze
change, and mitigate risks
Address and resolve grievances
Bolster social cohesion
Increase citizen
trust in the state
Exclusionary
governance &
injustice
undermining
resilience
International spoilers;
extremist groups
A preventive strategy should
also recognize that fragile states
demonstrate a broad spectrum
of governance challenges. For
some, the promise of long-term
partnerships with the United
States may help incentivize more
responsible governance.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 24
Where national-level partnerships and countrywide progress are not possible, the United
States and the international community should seize opportunities wherever they can. In
some cases, this may mean seeking out and engaging leaders who show some commitment
to addressing the underlying conditions fueling extremism, wherever and whenever such
partners can be found. Engagement with provincial governments, municipalities, community
leaders, business owners, civil society, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as
women, youth, religious leaders, and others, should seek to empower such actors to build
coalitions for reform.
In other cases, opportunities for prevention and progress may arise quickly and
unexpectedly. For that reason, the United States should systematically monitor these
countries. Long before such opportunities present themselves, particularly around national
elections and peace agreements, the United States should have contingency plans in place
to swiftly pivot to building national and international coalitions to foster commitment to
strengthen resilience against extremism. Deepening our engagement with and strengthening
our understanding of local communities will allow the United States to have greater impact at
these critical moments.
Whenever the United States engages with fragile states, whether for the purpose of prevention
or to achieve other objectives, it must be aware of the political risks and trade-os involved
across all U.S. government activities. This will require applying assessments of the political
environments of fragile states to all forms of U.S. assistance, especially security cooperation.
Moreover, the risk posed by other external actors, such as those that support the spread
of extremist ideology, also should be considered and addressed. Where possible, the
United States should seek to cooperate with other outside actors, including its competitors,
toreduce fragility andextremism.
Managing the Role of Strategic Competition in the Spread
ofExtremism
Despite concerns that Chinese investments are “predatory” and pose a “significant threat
toU.S. national security interests,”
a
the United States and China have at times cooperated
toreduce the risk of conflict or the growth of extremist capabilities that would be detrimental
toboth countries’ interests. For instance, the two governments collaborated in Nigeria to
prevent nuclear material from falling into the hands of extremist groups such as Boko Haram.
b
Notes
a
John Bolton, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration’s New Africa
Strategy” (presentation at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, December 13, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/.
b
Aaron Mehta, “How the US and China Collaborated to get Nuclear Material out of Nigeria—and Away from Terrorist Groups,”
Defense News, January 14, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/01/14/how-the-us-and-china-
collaborated-to-get-nuclear-material-out-of-nigeria-and-away-from-terrorist-groups/.
25 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
IV. U.S. Strategic Prevention Initiative
Operationalizing the framework for prevention prescribed above requires a coherent U.S.
government approach and adequate capabilities, procedures, and resources. If the United
States has not itself prioritized prevention or aligned its own activities around a preventive
strategy, it will face diculty having direct impact on the ground or marshaling the support
of other donors. Political, budgetary, and bureaucratic impediments—from fractured funding
and oversight to lack of a high-level political mandate and the need to reinvigorate U.S.
diplomacy and development—impede the ability of the United States to lead these eorts.
These obstacles must be addressed.
Therefore, to ensure that the framework for strategic prevention is elevated to a national
security priority and organize U.S. government activities around it, the Task Force
recommends Congress authorize and fund, and the Executive Branch implement,
acomprehensive Strategic Prevention Initiative, which will include the following actions:
• Establishing clear roles and responsibilities for departments and agencies to promote
long-term coordination in fragile states
• Providing agencies with authorities and resources needed to carry out a preventive
strategy eectively
• Developing a plan to mitigate the political risks of providing security and foreign
assistance to fragile states
The key elements of this new Strategic Prevention Initiative should include:
• The Congress should authorize: the State Department to be the overall lead for
establishing U.S. foreign policy and advancing diplomatic and political eorts; the
U.S.Agency for International Development (USAID) to lead the implementation of
civilian assistance programs; the Treasury Department to lead U.S. contributions to
multilateral entities; and the Department of Defense to support these eorts as needed
under a new U.S. prevention strategy. Additional departments, including the Commerce
Department, the Department of Justice, and the Development Finance Corporation,
should also be assigned clear roles and responsibilities. The Strategic Prevention
Initiative should build on existing eorts to improve U.S. engagement with fragile states,
including the Stabilization Assistance Review and the Strategic Prevention Project.
• The Executive Branch should designate a new Deputy National Security Advisor for
Strategic Prevention to coordinate the policies and activities of agencies. The National
Security Council should work with the intelligence community to establish an early
warning and risk management system to identify priority prevention countries based on
clear criteria and an assessment of both risks and opportunities for engagement.
• Congress should provide new authorities for adaptive funding of prevention eorts
in fragile states in exchange for greater accountability to Congress. Congress should
authorize the creation of a new account to support sustained, multiyear investments in
prevention programs, based on an agreement between Congress and the Executive
Branch on specific countries to be prioritized. These authorities should be flexible
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 26
enough to allow adaptive implementation of programs that are responsive to evolving
conditions on the ground. The Executive Branch should closely consult with Congress
throughout the program planning, implementation, and evaluation phases concerning
challenges and results.
• Congress and the Executive Branch should empower U.S. diplomats and development
practitioners in the field to focus on longer-term prevention goals. Chiefs of mission
and USAID Mission Directors need the ability to plan, experiment with, and adapt
innovative prevention strategies to local conditions over suciently long time horizons.
Building on USAID’s strong presence on the ground, field-based sta need the flexibility
to engage widely outside of embassy compounds to reach, work with, and support the
actors that know the local contexts best. Congress and the Executive Branch should give
Foreign Service Ocers greater leeway to take risks to test promising approaches, grant
the Defense Department the authorities it needs to more eectively support U.S. civilians
in the field, and undertake acquisition reforms that will allow for more rapid and flexible
grant-making. Congress should work with the Executive Branch to support a strategy
for recruiting, training, and retaining personnel with the skills to implement prevention
strategies, including expertise in early warning and political economy analysis, provision
of technical advice to partner governments, and community-led prevention activities.
• The State Department should request, and Congress should appropriate, adequate
funding for programs and capabilities that are critical to addressing the underlying
conditions of extremism and violence in fragile states. The United States has often
under-resourced capabilities that have proven eective at reinforcing state-society
relations (see appendix 5 for illustrative programming that might be required in a
prevention country).
• Congress should require the State and Defense Departments to develop and
implement a plan to better align U.S. security cooperation with prevention priorities,
and improve security sector governance, in vulnerable countries. Building on the 2018
Quadrennial Security Sector Assistance Review’s call to better tailor security assistance
in fragile states, the plan should consider (a) providing all security sector assistance to
fragile states through five- to ten-year compacts based on a joint strategy to improve
the country’s security sector and subject to oversight from civilian authorities and civil
society; (b) restricting the types of security assistance available for fragile states with
poor security sector governance, unless exempted by senior ocials; (c) establishing
a security sector reform endowment to support partner-proposed initiatives to build
institutional capacity or undertake reforms; and (d) supporting and expanding existing
accountability eorts by appropriately funding Defense Department assessment,
monitoring, and evaluation programs (AM&E), mandating an AM&E program for State
Department–managed security assistance, designating an Assistant Secretary–level
ocial at the Defense Department to oversee the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
and designating a lead oce for coordinating all State Department–managed security
assistance. (See appendix 6, “Aligning Security Sector Cooperation with Prevention,”
formore detail.)
• Congress should consider establishing a bipartisan, bicameral prevention Working
Group composed of Members serving on relevant authorizing and appropriating
committees. Congress has a vital role to play in enabling the adaptive, multiyear, and
accountable investments that are necessary to promote prevention. The Working Group
could hold joint hearings, draft and cosponsor legislation, and meet to discuss issues
relevant to U.S. prevention programming.
27 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
V. Partnership Development Fund
The United States cannot carry the burden of preventing the underlying conditions
of extremism alone. U.S. partners and international donors are increasingly exhibiting
willingness and commitment to support stabilization in the Middle East and the Sahel.
Buttheinstitutional and financial framework that is needed to catalyze a coordinated
approach to and concerted investments in prevention is currently lacking. A new vehicle
isneeded to bring donors together around a shared approach to prevention.
Innovative new pooled funds and mechanisms designed specifically for fragile states exist,
but they focus overwhelmingly on short-term crisis response and are, for the most part, not
designed to eect enduring change. The scope of the challenge of preventing extremism in
fragile states, together with the long-term commitments and country-led solutions that are
needed to accomplish that objective, require a new international coordination and financing
mechanism to support long-term prevention partnerships in those countries. Furthermore,
with sucient buy-in from fragile states and the international community, such amechanism
could also be a powerful diplomatic vehicle to limit the ability of outside actors to undermine
prevention eorts.
To meet these needs, this Task Force recommends that Congress authorize, and the
State Department and the USAID lead, a diplomatic eort to establish the Partnership
Development Fund, an innovative international coordination and financing mechanism
to align programs and activities and raise and disburse funding to country-led, inclusive
programs that address the underlying conditions of extremism. (See appendix4, “AGlobal
Fund for Prevention,” for a more detailed proposal.) Theseeorts should build on the twenty-
plus years of U.S. experience in leading multilateral global health and other impactful
development eorts, and should leverage the unique convening power ofthe United States.
• The mandate of the Fund should be to support five- to ten-year partnerships based
on comprehensive country-led plans for strengthening relations between citizens and
the state. Unlike traditional development and stabilization programs, it would provide
resources for country-developed and -led programs and plans to prevent extremism.
Programming priorities should be based on local assessments of vulnerabilities and
could include a wide range of sectoral or multisectoral activities designed to achieve
this goal, from short-term stabilization initiatives to longer-term eorts to empower
marginalized groups such as women and youth, to inclusive dialogues, justice sector
reform, community policing, civilian security, and accountable and fair service delivery.
• The Fund should be structured as a partnership between international donors,
fragile states, aected communities in those states, civil society, nongovernmental
organizations, and the private sector. It should be supported by a small and nimble
secretariat. The Fund should also be structured to optimize the potential for public-private
partnerships that could facilitate contributions and innovations from foundations and
other private actors, including for locally led proactivedevelopment.
• The United States should contribute no more than 25 percent of the Fund’s overall
operating budget. U.S. contributions to the Fund should be contingent on contributions
from other major donors, the private sector, and fragile states themselves.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 28
• An inclusive board or steering committee should be created to oversee the Fund’s
policy and strategic decisions, including approving funding decisions. The United
States could seek to sit on the board as part of an equal number of developed
countries and fragile states, with representation from the private sector, civil society,
and nongovernmental organizations. USAID’s Associate Administrator should represent
theU.S. government on the board ofthe Fund.
• The Fund should establish realistic eligibility criteria for candidate countries that are
adapted to fragile states and based ongovernance, inclusivity, civic participation,
andtransparency metrics.
• Funding should be provided through long-term, adaptive, and compact-based
agreements comprising shared assessments, plans, and monitoring and evaluation,
all supported by a strong and country-led coordination mechanism.
• The Fund should foster a rigorous culture of design, monitoring, and evaluation
togenerate more consistent and evidence-based standards of practice that improve
the impact of programs to strengthen state-society relations and prevent extremism.
While beyond the scope of this report, there are additional steps the United States should
take as part of a comprehensive prevention strategy to strengthen the capacity of existing
international and regional organizations—including the United Nations, the World Bank,
andother key actors—to address the underlying conditions of extremism.
32
Demonstration Project
In addition to requesting this study, Congress has appropriated funds “to implement the Plan...
through a demonstration project.” It is the recommendation of this Task Force that those funds
be used to demonstrate the viability of a Partnership Development Fund by establishing
aprovisional pooled fund, to be administered by an existing multilateral institution.
The immediate availability of monies to be put into a Partnership Development Fund should
be a signal to other international donors, philanthropic leaders, and private sector innovators
of U.S. commitment to the eort and make it more likely that they will choose to participate.
In this way, the funds appropriated for this project can be used to demonstrate the viability
of an internationally coordinated prevention strategy and the Fund as the mechanism for
implementing that strategy. Furthermore, to test the eectiveness of the Fund’s approach to
prevention, this Task Force recommends that the monies it makes available to a provisional
pooled fund be used to issue grants to one to three countries for pilot projects.
However, in keeping with Congress’ directive that “such funds shall be made available to
themaximum extent practicable on a cost-matching basis from sources other than the United
States Government,” funds should be disbursed only once other international donors have
pledged contributions.
29 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
VI. Conclusion
A new, comprehensive strategy for reducing extremism in fragile states can bring coherence
to and amplify existing U.S. and international initiatives while harnessing favorable political
winds. Three dynamics point in the right direction.
First, the U.S. government has already begun to work toward more unified, interagency
approaches to this long-term fight. Second, bipartisan agreement is emerging in Congress on
the need to change how the United States engages in fragile states. Third, new opportunities
have arisen for burden sharing and international collaboration.
It is time to build on this progress and adopt a new paradigm for dealing with a threat that
has plagued the world and impeded stability and prosperity for far too long. For a preventive
strategy to succeed, it will need to outpace attempts by extremist groups to undermine
fragile states. The time to put a preventive strategy in place is now.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 30
Appendix 1
Authorizing Legislation
H.R. 244—CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2017
Public Law 115-31, May 4, 2017
DIVISION J—DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS
APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2017
FRAGILE STATES AND EXTREMISM
SEC. 7080.
(a) FUNDING.—Funds appropriated by this Act under the heading “Economic Support Fund”
that are made available for assistance for Syria, Iraq, and Somalia shall be made available
to carry out the purposes of this section, subject to prior consultation with, and the regular
notification procedures of, the Committees on Appropriations.
(b) COMPREHENSIVE PLAN.—Funds made available pursuant to subsection (a) shall be
transferred to, and merged with, funds appropriated by this Act under the heading “United
States Institute of Peace” for the purposes of developing a comprehensive plan (the Plan) to
prevent the underlying causes of extremism in fragile states in the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and
the Near East: Provided, That such funds are in addition to amounts otherwise available to
the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) under title I of this Act: Provided further, That USIP
shall consult with the Committees on Appropriations prior to developing such Plan: Provided
further, That USIP shall also consult with relevant United States Government agencies,
foreign governments, and civil society, as appropriate, in developing the Plan.
(c) DEMONSTRATION PROJECT.—Funds made available by subsection (a) shall be made
available to implement the Plan required by subsection (b) through a demonstration project,
consistent with the requirements described in section 7073(d)(2) of S. 3117 (as introduced
in the Senate on June 29, 2016): Provided, That such funds shall be made available to the
maximum extent practicable on a cost-matching basis from sources other than the United
States Government.
31 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Appendix 2
The Conditions for Extremism
(From the Interim Report of the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States,
Beyond the Homeland: Protecting America from Extremism in Fragile States)
The new strategic environment demands a new U.S. strategy to reduce the ability
ofextremism to take root and spread in fragile states. This strategy requires a common
understanding of why and how extremism emerges. Disagreements over the root causes of
extremism have bedeviled U.S. and international policy; the time has come to move past them.
The Task Force has focused on the conditions that give rise to violent extremism in fragile
states and the actors that reinforce and exploit these conditions. This focus conveys the
importance of environmental factors in addition to individual motivations, looks beyond any
single cause of extremism, and highlights the complex and dynamic interactions that make
asociety vulnerable to extremism.
The Local Conditions for Extremism
Extremism is most likely to emerge in fragile states when the following conditions prevail:
(1) citizens experience or see injustices perpetrated by the state; (2) significant segments of
society are excluded from political processes; (3) extremist ideology gains support; and (4)
extremist organizations establish a presence (see figure 10, “Conditions for Extremism”). These
conditions are shaped by the local context and thus vary significantly from one contextto another.
Sense of Injustice
In fragile states, reasons for frustration abound: poverty, unemployment, economic inequality
and exclusion, violence, and conflict can be rampant. But these conditions alone do not push
individuals to join extremist movements.
33
Instead, extremism is enabled by the belief that
Figure 10. Conditions for Extremism
Conditions for Extremism
FRAGILE REGIMES
INTERNATIONAL
ACTORS
EXTREMISTS
EXTREMISM
SENSE OF
INJUSTICE
POLITICAL
EXCLUSION
ORGANIZATIONAL
PRESENCE
IDEOLOGICAL
SUPPORT
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 32
existing indignities and suering are the direct result of poor, undemocratic, or predatory
governance. This sense of injustice aligns with a core tenet of extremist political ideology:
rejection of the state in favor of a new political order.
In Iraq, ISIS gained prominence by presenting itself as the defender of Sunnis marginalized
by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shi’a-dominated government.
34
Abusive security forces are
a major factor contributing to extremism among youth in Africa.
35
Political Exclusion
Even when trust in government is low, as it is throughout the Middle East and much of
Africa, support for extremists remains limited.
36
Extremism appeals less to citizens who can
advocate for their interests and believe their appeals might be heeded than to citizens
who believe they have no future opportunities. Where governments extend basic services
and economic opportunities (even if they are limited) to the entirety of their societies, and
where citizens are free to engage in civic and political organizations, extremists struggle to
attract followers.
37
In Tunisia’s mining basin, labor unions helped build community resilience
against extremism.
38
In Syria, ISIS struggled to penetrate regions such as Aleppo and Deraa
that have traditions of vibrant civil society and political activism.
39
When extremists provide the only viable option for change, they gain traction. Tunisian
foreign fighters were more likely to come from parts of the country where labor unions were
less embedded in the community. And Libya, a completely closed society under Muammar
el-Qaddafi’s rule, easily fell prey to violent extremism.
Ideological Support
The move to extremist violence can be facilitated, or justified, by exposure to extremist
ideology. Extremist ideology, even when peaceful, can support the same objectives as
violent extremist groups: rejection of the secular nation-state, hostility to Western values,
and strict public morality. Individuals in societies where (even nonviolent) extremism is
prevalent are more likely to favor these objectives, particularly if people have been exposed
to extremist ideology from a young age. They may also be relatively easily persuaded to
pursue these objectives violently.
Egyptian foreign fighters, for example, tend to come from religious fundamentalist families.
40
Analysts have attributed Algeria’s paroxysms of extremist violence in the 1990s to the influx,
three decades earlier, of foreign teachers, many of whom held extreme religious views.
41
Organizational Presence
The presence of an organizational infrastructure can make it easier for extremists to
recruit, inspire, and direct followers. Oftentimes, such organizational capacity comes from
outside a country’s borders. Iraqi extremists penetrated eastern Syria after the outbreak of
the civil war in 2011, laying the foundations for ISIS’s later emergence.
42
In Yemen, the arrival
ofSaudi fighters in 2009 led to the formation of AQAP.
43
In other contexts, violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in
Somalia emerge organically, in response to local conditions, but their leadership might draw
heavily on the brand, tactics, connections, or structures of a larger international organization.
44
33 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Actors Reinforcing and Exploiting the Conditions
forExtremism
These conditions that fuel extremism in fragile states are reinforced and exploited
bykeyactors: extremist groups, fragile regimes, and international actors.
Extremist Groups
Once extremists establish a presence, they reinforce
the dynamics that led to their initial emergence. Their
presence highlights the state’s inability to provide security,
their propaganda exposes citizens to extremist ideology,
and their activity provokes harsh security responses, all
of which stoke perceptions of injustice.
45
Additionally,
extremists resort to intimidation and violence to carve out
power and influence; for instance, they may target civil
society activists.
46
And once extremists have established
afoothold in one community, they can more easily spread
toneighboring communities, regions, and countries.
Fragile Regimes
Predatory regimes in fragile state put their own survival and enrichment ahead of their
people’s needs. They cling to power through a combination of patronage, repression,
andneglect.
Patronage and corruption buy o the local elites and security forces. Repression helps
keep a restive population in check temporarily, but it also fuels the sense of injustice that
extremists exploit, particularly among prison inmates.
47
Moreover, when states criminalize
dissent, their first targets are often the moderate religious voices and opposition movements
that would otherwise serve as alternatives to extremism.
Fragile regimes may choose to neglect peripheral regions
of the country, creating a void that extremism can fill. Where
states fail to provide education, religious institutions, or
a sense of shared national identity, extremists have room
to spread their ideology.
48
Where the central government
neglects security, extremists easily enter from abroad
or emerge organically from within the neglected areas.
And sometimes fragile states deliberately tolerate an
extremist presence, either to counterbalance some other
domestic or foreign threat or to attract international security
assistance.
49
Peripheral, historically marginalized regions,
such as northern Mali and Western Yemen, are particularly
vulnerable to extremists seeking exploit grievances and
broaden conflict.
Once extremists establish a
presence, they reinforce the
dynamics that led to their initial
emergence. Their presence
highlights the state’s inability
to provide security, their
propaganda exposes citizens
to extremist ideology, and their
activity provokes harsh security
responses, all of which stoke
perceptions of injustice.
Predatory regimes in fragile
state put their own survival
and enrichment ahead of
theirpeople’s needs. They
cling to power through a
combination of patronage,
repression,andneglect.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 34
International Actors
Whether intentionally or inadvertently, both great and regional powers can contribute to
thefertile environment for extremism and facilitate those that would exploit the environment.
Engaged in strategic competitions, international actors may seek to secure fragile states’
support, resources, or territory by oering them aid, investment, or weapons. Even when
done for legitimate reasons, such as defeating terrorist networks, unconditional assistance
can perpetuate if not bolster predatory regimes. Too often, international actors pursue
theirown interests with little regard for the negative impact they have on societies
vulnerable to extremism.
Regional powers can also help spread extremist ideology, either as a means of gaining
influence in the societies of fragile states or to accommodate their own internal constituencies.
Some Arab states have funded fundamentalist mosques, madrassas, textbooks, or media
that reach fragile states. Others turn a blind eye to their own citizens’ private contributions
toextremist proselytizing and, at times, even to violent extremist groups.
Occasionally, outside powers will back proxies in a
fragile state’s civil war. This intervention can exacerbate
the conflict and create space and time for extremists to
enter. It can also lead to foreign weapons making their way
into the hands of extremists. The most egregious cases
are states that, in pursuit of their political agendas, directly
arm violent extremist groups, as Iran has done across the
Middle East and into Africa.
Whether intentionally or
inadvertently, both great and
regional powers can contribute
to the fertile environment for
extremism and facilitate those that
would exploit theenvironment.
35 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Appendix 3
Principles for Preventing
ViolentExtremism
Because the drivers of violent extremism are political and context-specific, citizens and their
leaders in fragile states are best-positioned to lead eorts to address fragility as an underlying
condition. A U.S. preventive strategy should therefore focus on what the United States can
do to identify and empower these local and national actors to address the concerns of their
citizens in vulnerable communities. The preventive strategy should emphasize how to engage
fragile states over what to do in each country.
Key lessons have emerged from two decades of international experience in supporting
national and local actors in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, and elsewhere around the world.
Few of these principles are new, although their application by U.S. agencies and international
actors in fragile states remains uneven at best. The following eleven principles should be
integrated into a new U.S. policy framework to guide U.S. policy and foreign assistance
programs and to help integrate U.S. diplomacy, development, and defense eorts into more
coherent approaches at the country level in fragile states.
Intervene Early
Timely preventive engagement in fragile states, before extremist violence has spread, is more
likely to have a sustained impact and is more cost-eective than downstream counterterrorism
eorts. Once grievances have become widely entrenched, it becomes more dicult to find
common ground and build consensus for strategies to reduce the risk of violence. Timely
action requires a political commitment to prioritizing prevention. It also requires the capacity
to closely monitor the specific risks of violence, and to identify responses that are adapted to
the local context. Prevention eorts must be directly targeted to regions at highest risk,
particularly border and periphery areas where exclusion tends to be more pronounced. An
emerging international best practice for international actors and governments in fragile states
is to enhance awareness among development, security, and diplomatic communities of the
risks and impacts of violence in addition to providing early warning.
Preventing Violence in Niger
Niger’s High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, an early warning oce that reports
directly to the president, relies on a network of local and community actors who report back
to the central government when signs of heightened tension arise in a particular region
orcommunity. The oce facilitates early action through close coordination with ministries,
including security actors. Its capacity for rapid intervention has been key to preventing
violencein Niger.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 36
Support Country-Led Solutions
Because the drivers of violent extremism are context-specific, leaders in fragile states—whether
at the national or local level, inside or outside government—should take the lead on prevention
eorts. Over two decades of international engagement in fragile states demonstrates a hard-
earned lesson: externally imposed solutions and timelines do not lead to sustainable progress.
Instead, external actors are most likely to be successful when they support the eorts of national
and local leaders who are committed to prevention, and when they use their leverage to ensure
that all actors adhere to fundamental checks and balances against abuses of power, including
human rights violations and endemic corruption. Tools to facilitate international support for
country-led solutions include country-led assessments of the risks of violent extremism;
inclusively developed plans that form the basis for partnership with international actors; and
compact-based agreements between donors and fragile states on the terms of their partnership.
Promote Inclusive Political Processes and Empower
Womenand Youth
Numerous studies have shown that political exclusion can fuel grievances and spark conflict
and extremist violence. Fostering inclusive political processes and political reforms is
essential to preventing extremism. Studies have shown that women’s leadership, political
representation,
50
equal treatment, and physical security
51
are likewise crucial to making
societies more inclusive, peaceful, and resilient in the face of violent extremism. In addition,
half of the global population is under the age of twenty-four and the role of young people as
engaged citizens and peacebuilders has increasingly been recognized. According to the 2015
United Nations Security Council Resolution on Youth, Peace and Security (SCR 2250), youth
represent “a unique demographic dividend that can contribute to lasting peace and prosperity.”
The Funding Facility for Stability in Iraq
At the request of the Iraqi prime minister, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
established the Funding Facility for Stabilization in June 2015 to help prevent the resurgence
of extremist violence in cities and districts liberated from ISIS. Priorities were set by the Iraqi
authorities, which are directly responsible for stabilizing areas. As soon as a newly liberated
area is declared safe and local authorities have identified priorities, UNDP uses fast-track
procedures to bring local contractors on the ground, usually within weeks. More than 95
percent of all stabilization projects are done through the local private sector employing local
labor. The impact has been significant; half of the nearly 6 million Iraqis who were displaced
during the fighting have returned to their homes and started to rebuild their lives.
Source: United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), 259.
37 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Integrate Development, Diplomacy, and Defense within
aCoherent Approach
Preventing extremist violence is rarely the only objective of U.S. and international actors when
they engage with fragile states. But too often, security, political, and development challenges
are tackled separately instead of in relation to one another.
52
Bureaucratic impediments
provide disincentives for more eective and coordinated action; government and international
agencies are divided into silos and mandates and funding are allotted only for sector specific
activities. These disconnected approaches inhibit the ability of actors to address violent
extremism’s core drivers through comprehensive approaches that integrate activities on
projects such as service delivery, good governance, or security sector reform.
Promote an Ecient International Division of Labor
Coordination among international donors and fragile states is essential to achieving sustained
results in those countries. When the United States stands united with like-minded partners in
fragile states, we have far more eective leverage over our strategic competitors and over
domestic actors in those countries. Coordinated engagement reduces the administrative and
Interagency Coordination in Kunar Province, Afghanistan
According to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, success in reducing
the level of violence in Kunar Province can be attributed in large part to “a willingness and
commitment from [all] actors to work together in very close collaboration.” The partnership
between the military and USAID was described as “unusually close.” As a result of this
collaboration, USAID, in coordination with Afghan provincial and district governors, was able
toplan projects prior to the operation that were implemented about ten days after clearing,
with remarkable speed. USAID sta were described as “repositories of knowledge” by their
military counterparts, and that knowledge enabled the U.S. commander in this region to
conduct more eective stabilization operations.
Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience
inAfghanistan,” (May 2018), 207, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-18-48-LL.pdf.
Inclusive Programs to Combat Extremism in Morocco
In Morocco, the government has trained women as “spiritual guides” to lead prayers in
mosques. This training is designed to help combat extremist messages, while leveraging
thesacred role of women in families and communities.
Source: United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 38
coordination burden on already frail institutions. Pooling donor resources for specific fragile states
under an international financing mechanism would help build strong and visible international
coalitions for prevention; increase alignment among development actors leading prevention
programs; improve coordination among development, humanitarian, security, and diplomacy
actors; and promote comprehensive solutions at scale, rather than project-based interventions.
53
Work for Quick Wins. . . but Commit to Sustained,
RealisticTimelines
Addressing the underlying drivers of extremism is a generational task; governance and
development challenges tend to be deeply-rooted. Sustained timelines are necessary to
achieve durable results that continue beyond the span of donor attention, particularly budget
and policymaking processes. Our diplomats and aid workers need the flexibility to undertake
longer-term approaches; inconsistent resource flows can cripple eective action but are
common across donors. Instead, addressing extremism’s root causes should be viewed as
a step-by-step process that requires identifying realistic “quick wins” as well as longer-term
reforms to strengthen state-society relations. Quick wins can create confidence in fragile states’
long-term commitments, by showing citizens and donors that change is possible. Identifying
fast, achievable opportunities for progress can buy time for deep-seated changes that can take
decades to accomplish.
54
Preventing a Recurrence of Conflict in Burundi
Following the end of the Burundian Civil War in 2005, the creation of a UN Peacebuilding
Commission helped foster coordination between peacekeeping and development actors in
Burundi. The Commission helped avert a return to civil war in that country despite violence
following a contested presidential election in 2015.
Source: United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337.
Plan Colombia
Under Plan Colombia, the U.S. government oered a $10 billion aid package to Colombia that
was successfully sustained over three U.S. administrations. With this continual level of support
from the United States, Colombian president Alvaro Uribe had the resources and political
capital he needed to launch a new “democratic security” policy that sought to reassert the
state’s control over large parts of the country that were held by either right-wing paramilitary
39 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Be Flexible and Adaptive
Not only are the conditions of violent extremism in fragile states context-specific, but progress
in tackling those conditions is rarely linear. Extremist groups are increasingly adaptable.
Consequently, the United States and other international donors must prioritize and execute
programs in these countries with corresponding flexibility. The specific context of each country
must therefore drive the course of action for the United States and the international
community, who should expect the context to change over time. This does not mean that the
U.S. and the international community should abandon eorts to hold themselves accountable
or achieve durable results. It does mean, however, that rigid, predetermined, or unrealistic
outcomes—such as earmarked requirements—are unlikely to succeed. Simplified financial
management and procurement procedures are needed to improve the speed and flexibility
ofaid delivery in fragile contexts.
Adaptive Management in Tunisia
USAID’s Business Reform and Competitiveness Project in Tunisia, a three-year job creation
program, initially sought to create jobs in Tunisia by oering pre-employment training to
educated graduates who lacked common soft skills. The failure of these eorts to deliver
expected results led the team to implement a more adaptive approach by re-assessing
local needs, relying more on local actors to facilitate relationships with local enterprises,
andintegrating monitoring and evaluation teams into the program management structure.
The project re-oriented toward an approach that provided technical assistance for employers
to access existing market demand through job-fairs, pre-employment screening, and more
carefully defined hiring needs. The program generated ten thousand new jobs, 35 percent
ofwhich were filled by women.
Source: Jim Defay, “Adaptive Management in the Context of Job Creation, Tunisian Business Reform, and Competitiveness”
(case study submitted to the 2016 CLA Case Competition, Washington, DC).
forces or left-wing guerrilla groups. This eort included creating eective police forces to hold
territorial gains and providing social and economic justice to strengthen the government’s
legitimacy, particularly in parts of the country that had long been alienated from government
authority. As the Fragility Study Group concluded in its 2016 report, “through decades of
engagement, the United States created a strategic, systemic, selective, and sustained
partnership with Colombia, resulting in a much more stable and prosperous country.”
Source: Burns, Michele A. Flournoy, and Nancy E. Lindborg, “U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility”
(Washington,DC, Fragility Study Group, September 2016), 14, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/US-Leadership-and-the-
Challenge-of-State-Fragility.pdf.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 40
Incentivize Mutual Accountability in Countries
ThatAreCommitted to Prevention
Rather than impose predetermined benchmarks and conditions on fragile states from the
outside—an approach that has repeatedly failed in the past—a “mutual accountability”
framework can allow donors and partners that are committed to long-term reforms to coalesce
around a package of shared goals and respective responsibilities for achieving those goals.
Through compact-based agreements that reflect this principle of mutual accountability, donors,
recipient countries and civil society actors can hold each other accountable for delivering
targeted, agreed-on components, be it sustained funding for programs, or policy reforms. This
mutual accountability framework underpins Millennium Challenge Corporation compacts and
has informed new partnerships with fragile states like Somalia under the 2011 New Deal for
Engagement in Fragile States, a set of internationally agreed-upon best practices on how to
engage eectively in these countries. To promote prevention in fragile states, a mutual
accountability framework should span multiple years; be adaptable to changing circumstances
on the ground; promote risk tolerance; involve an inclusive set of nongovernmental actors,
including women and youth; and be premised on a preexisting political commitment to
prevention, like some of the steps taken by Indonesia to reduce the risks of conflict in that
country, as well as building sucient capacity in-country to fulfill the terms of the partnership.
Prioritize Justice and Security Sector Reform
An emerging best practice across the UN system is to prioritize security sector reforms as
a key aspect of preventive action in fragile states, integrated along with other government
planning and reforms and include improvements to accountability, procurement, and
payment.
55
Because poor security sector governance is a key source of grievance often
exploited by extremists, increasing accountability of the security sector is a crucial element of
reducing support for extremism. As in other domains, reform processes in the security sector
should be led by national actors with emphasis given to inclusive community dialogue, civilian
oversight, merit-based recruitment and processes that integrate women, youth, and minorities
into policing structures.
A National Commitment to Prevention in Indonesia
Indonesia has experienced cycles of conflict, insurgency, and terrorism over the past two
decades and it continues to struggle with internal violence. To address the long-term drivers
of violence, the government proactively set in motion processes of political and economic
decentralization that resulted in semi-autonomy for the province of Aceh, full secession for East
Timor, and that have contributed to stability and peace in the country. In parallel, Indonesia
embarked on a major security sector reform eort that established parliamentary oversight
over the security forces. This is credited with restoring a more adequate balance between
themilitary and civilian branches of government and disincentivizing the use of force.
Source: United Nations and World Bank, “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,”
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), 206, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337.
41 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Promote Transparency and Accountability
Adopting a more rigorous culture of design, monitoring, evaluation, and transparency is critical
to learning and achieving impact in fragile states. Transparency in the delivery and use of
assistance is an essential precondition for progress, especially in these countries, because
it fosters confidence between people, communities, the state and international partners.
56
Delivering visible results is an eective strategy to strengthen state-society relations in fragile
states. The United States and other donors also need a more robust learning agenda in
fragilestates. The United States should increase its capacity to capture lessons learned from
past U.S.engagements to ensure that key findings inform U.S. policy and approaches.
Do No Harm
Above all else, the United States and its allies should ensure that their actions do not
undermine the outcomes they seek to achieve. Too much support from too many donors
seeking numerous dierent objectives overwhelms the ability of partner states to set and
manage their own priorities. Lax financial oversight can incentivize corruption or fuel political
competition, leading to a heightening of tensions and violence. Working with repressive local
actors can foster grievances or fuel support for violence among marginalized members of
society. Before deciding to engage in any capacity, it is imperative to carefully assess the
political environment and consider the political risks of taking action. At times, more limited
engagement or no engagement at all may be the best option.
Supporting Security Sector Reform in Kosovo
Police reform at the community level in post-conflict Kosovo was critical to building trust
among ethnic communities and enabling eective policing across the country. Minimum
quotas for Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs were instituted, as well as a quota mandating
that 20percent of the force be made up of female ocers. By 2005 the share of women
in the police force exceeded that of most European forces. These reforms were enabled
by sustained international support in the form of both funding and technical assistance.
By2009, public opinion polls showed the police to be more trusted than any other
government institution in that country.
Source: United Nations and World Bank, “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,”
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), 209, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 42
Appendix 4
A Global Fund forPrevention
While innovative pooled funds and other international instruments to increase international
coordination on conflict management in fragile states exist, most focus overwhelmingly
on short-term crisis response, and are, for the most part, not designed to eect enduring
change in these countries. New and more nimble financing and international coordination
mechanisms—like the World Bank’s State- and Peacebuilding Fund, the UNDP’s Funding
Facility for Stabilization in Iraq, and the United Nations’ Peacebuilding Fund and Support
Oce—reflect lessons learned and principles of eective engagement in contexts of fragility,
including the need for agility and flexibility in response to needs on the ground in these
countries.
57
These tools are helping to improve the support that donors provide to countries
emerging from conflict, and are delivering results.
Yet, for the most part, these tools are not designed to support preventive eorts to tackle
the underlying, long-term conditions of violence, extremism and conflict. Recent exceptions
include the World Bank’s 2018 IDA Replenishment, which doubled the amount of financing for
fragile states from $7 billion to $14 billion over a three-year period, and the Global Community
Engagement and Resilience Fund, a small fund that provides seed grants to community-
based organizations focused on preventing extremism at the local level. These flagship
initiatives address dierent aspects of the challenge of prevention. The World Bank is filling an
important financing gap for development in fragile states, where, by definition, the institutional
and policy environment does not encourage private investment. The Global Community
Engagement and Resilience Fund was specifically designed to allow resources for countering
violent extremism programs to be pooled and quickly disbursed, but it has struggled to raise
money, particularly from the private sector, and is focused on the manifestation of extremism,
not its underlying drivers.
What is missing, still, is a mechanism to overcome the challenges of fractured and uneven
investments in prevention. A new international coordination and financing vehicle for particularly
vulnerable but not necessarily conflict-aected countries is needed to help coordinate
international support for leaders in fragile states who are committed to addressing the underlying
conditions of violence and extremism and building more resilient societies (see figure 11, “Basic
Framework for Partnership Development Fund”). The international institutional and financial
framework that is needed to catalyze such concerted investments is currently lacking.
Figure 11. Basic Framework for Partnership Development Fund
Basic Framework for Partnership Development Fund
INTERNATIONAL IN-COUNTRY
DIAGNOSIS AND
COORDINATION
MECHANISM
MARGINALIZED
COMMUNITIES
GOVERNMENT
INSTITUTIONS
DONOR
COMMUNITY
CREATES
NEW
FUND
ACCESSES
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT PANEL
REFORMS AND
PROGRAMS
43 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
A new global fund for prevention could fill key gaps in the international architecture
forviolence and conflict prevention in several ways:
• By catalyzing sustained investments in prevention programs that have a longer time
horizon than the typical short-term, one- to three-year budget cycles of most donors
• By supporting inclusive solutions led by committed national or local leaders, including
possibly by allocating grants based on compact-based agreements
• By promoting comprehensive, rather than project-based, solutions to addressing fragility
through a robust country coordination mechanism
• By incentivizing long-term, and adaptive programs in these countries
• By building strong and visible international coalitions for prevention, while increasing
alignment across the development actors that operate in specific countries, and
coordination among development, humanitarian, security and diplomacy actors
58
• By requiring a more rigorous culture of design, monitoring, and evaluation to generate
more consistent and evidence-based standards of practice that prove impact
Design and Planning Considerations
The increasing role of major international donors in fragile states, as well as the increasingly
complex global strategic environment that impacts those countries, means that coordinated
international eorts are more important than ever to eect positive change. The scope of the
challenge of preventing extremism in fragile states, together with the long-term commitments,
country-led solutions and adaptive approaches that are needed to address its root causes,
require a new international financing mechanism. This instrument should be designed to
support long-term, coordinated prevention partnerships in fragile states.
Key considerations for the design and structure of this new coordination and financing
instrument include the following:
• The mandate could be to promote international coordination and provide grants for
multi-year programs in a small number of key countries where investments in prevention
could have a catalytic eect on a region or country early on.
• The new instrument could seek to add to and help coordinate and rationalize—but not
duplicate—the separate prevention-related activities of bilateral donors, UN agencies,
and multilateral development banks in fragile states, and could supplement the existing
international security and development architecture.
• An inclusive governance structure or board comprising donors and fragile states could
oversee the fund’s policy and strategic decisions, with representation from the private
sector, civil society, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as representatives from
communities in fragile states that are particularly vulnerable to extremism, including women
and youth. This structure could include a venue for the fund’s voting members to meet with
diplomacy, humanitarian, and security actors. For example, if applicable, representatives
from defense ministries could be invited to participate in security working groups.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 44
• The establishment of a robust, inclusive and country-led coordination platform in
recipient countries could be a condition for allocating grants, and a mechanism for
aligning international assistance with country-specific prevention priorities. These
in-country platforms could include government ministries, local government leaders,
multilateral and bilateral donors, nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions,
vulnerable communities, and private sector actors.
• The coordination platforms could prioritize the analysis and dissemination of learning
about eective strategies and programs.
• Grants could also be made contingent on the development of multi-year, compact-based
agreements between the fund, other donors, governments in vulnerable countries,
and civil society organizations. Those agreements could call for shared assessments
ofneeds, analysis of international activities and gaps at the country level, shared plans
for achieving compact objectives, and monitoring and evaluation requirements.
59
• Such agreements could facilitate the mutually reinforcing, multiyear commitments to
resources, policy changes, and projects that are required to achieve prevention outcomes.
• Compact-based agreements could include commitments to other sources of
development financing, including domestic resource mobilization, debt relief,
andforeigndirect investment.
• Broad eligibility criteria could be established by founding members, based on aid
eectiveness principles.
• Groups of candidate countries could be encouraged to submit joint proposals through
the establishment of regional coordination platforms and compacts.
• The programmatic scope of the fund could be to support programs that focus
onstrengthening the compact between citizens and the state, ranging from short-term
stabilization focused on “quick wins” to programs intended to have more durable impact,
and from empowering marginalized groups such as women and youth to promoting
inclusive dialogues, justice sector reform, community policing, civilian security, and
accountable and fair service delivery. The fund could therefore have a mandate to provide
grants for prevention programs across a wide range of sectors, as well as a variety of
country and regional settings, depending on the local context and prevention priorities.
• Grant-making parameters could reflect aid eectiveness principles for fragile states,
including the need to allow for adaptive implementation and iterative monitoring and
evaluation that is responsive to conditions on the ground.
• Grants could be used to support the international coordination platform, as well
asmechanisms for scaling eective prevention programs.
• Transparency, learning, and innovation could be high priorities across these processes.
45 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Appendix 5
Prevention Program and
PolicyPriorities
Although the local conditions that fuel extremism vary widely by place and over time, a core
pattern is evident across communities where extremism has taken hold: those places tend
to become vulnerable where the compact between society and the state has broken down.
Programs across a wide variety of sectors—from justice sector reforms to job creation and
youth empowerment—that eectively empower local and national actors to strengthen state-
society relations and to become more responsive to their citizens are best suited to mitigating
the underlying conditions for extremism in fragile states.
The United States should ensure that the programs, capabilities and strategies that are
necessary to promote prevention, including in the areas listed below, are adequately funded
and consistently implemented. Although the list is by no means exhaustive, these are the
kinds of programs and policies that should be supported by the Strategic Prevention Initiative
orPartnership Development Fund.
Programmatic Priorities
Promote Inclusion. The U.S. government supports a wide range of programs to promote
inclusion in fragile states, while also contributing to relevant multilateral instruments, like
the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund.
60
These investments promote
government accountability, civil society organizations, anticorruption, access to justice,
community engagement, and civic participation. They directly strengthen local sources of
resilience—for instance by facilitating community dialogues with security forces—and build
relationships with political leaders that can open opportunities for deeper engagement
in fragile states. These programs would benefit from more consistent funding to sustain
progress with greater flexibility to better adapt to local contexts, experiment, and reorient
activities as needed.
Support Locally Led Solutions to Reinforce the Social Contract. Unlike traditional
development and stabilization programs, country-led programs that focus not only on
development needs but simultaneously on strengthening the compact between citizens and
the state, such as the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan (NSP), should be prioritized.
The key features of that program included a high level of Afghan government ownership,
as well as an in-depth community engagement process, both of which took time to achieve,
but produced the necessary level of buy-in to increase legitimacy and trust in government
across two-thirds of the country.
61
Sierra Leone’s Fambul Tok community-led reconciliation
process, which received support from USAID, also succeeded in promoting intercommunity
reconciliation, while building trust in government from the bottom up.
Empower Women. Women’s empowerment is critical to enhance community resilience against
extremist threats and to heal communities aicted by violence. States where women serve
as chief executives and are strongly represented in government are less likely to abuse their
citizens than are states run largely or exclusively by men.
62
Societies where women are treated
more equally and are more physically secure are less likely to suer from internal conflict.
63
Peace agreements are more likely to endure when women are included in the peace process.
64
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 46
The United States should promote women’s participation to help reduce extremism and build
more peaceful, inclusive societies. It should fully implement and fund the National Action
Plan on Women, Peace, and Security
65
and the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017.
66
It
should also incentivize fragile states to incorporate women’s participation in prevention-related
programs and to adopt and implement their own National Action Plans on Women, Peace, and
Security in line with UN guidance.
67
Provide Opportunities for Youth. Providing political and economic opportunities for youth
is crucial for strengthening resilience against extremism. Across the Middle East and Africa,
youth under the age of thirty make up nearly 70 percent of the population but represent
a disproportionate share of the unemployed, economically marginalized, and politically
disenfranchised.
68
Exclusion is most acute in places where extremists recruit. For example, in
Kasserine, Tunisia, where there is strong support for jihadist militancy, youth unemployment
reaches 50 percent, three times the national average.
69
Youth seek opportunities to build their future, particularly to become educated, gain
employment, advocate peacefully for change, and participate in the leadership of their
community. Programs that provide a combination of secondary education, vocational training,
opportunities for employment, civic engagement, or leadership—programs such as the
National Resources Counterinsurgency Cell in Afghanistan and the Somali Youth Learners
Initiative
70
—have shown promise in reducing support for extremism. Youth also have a strong
role to play in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. The United States should scale up
support for youth programs, particularly multidimensional programs that address the range of
factors driving youth to support and join extremist organizations in vulnerable communities.
Provide Democracy and Governance Assistance. Funding levels for democracy, human
rights, and governance programs have decreased substantially over the past two decades.
These programs have an important role to play in advancing freedom and democracy.
71
Democratic backsliding in fragile states and around the world over recent years, the
resurgence of authoritarianism, and the role that fragility can play as an underlying cause of
extremism all require that the United States redouble its investments and diplomatic eorts
topromote democratic governance.
Improve Security and Justice Sector Governance. U.S. security cooperation and assistance
should to the extent possible be reoriented to ensure it contributes to making communities
safer and security forces more responsible, to avoid exacerbating the conditions that fuel
extremism. Civilian security forces tend to increase resilience against extremism when they
establish trust with citizens and, conversely, make communities more vulnerable when they
abuse citizens, violate human rights, or exacerbate social, religious, or ethnic divisions. The
United States needs greater expertise and capacity to manage programs that reduce security
force abuse and restore trust in societies marred by abuse and conflict by fostering dialogue
between security actors and communities.
72
Respond to Extremist Ideology. Building resilience to extremism’s corrosive ideology may
be the best that the United States can do in some places. Building resilience requires moving
beyond “countering” extremist propaganda and actively working to support universal and
local values, including a strong, positive sense of local and national identity. This may include
measures designed to promote democracy and personal freedom as antidotes to the
totalitarian, repressive orders established by extremists. It also may mean providing vulnerable
communities with meaningful choices and a voice in shaping their future. The United States
supports a range of programs to counter extremist ideology, particularly to curb radicalization,
47 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
elevate Islamic voices opposed to violence, promote alternative narratives, counter extremist
propaganda and recruitment, and refute extremist ideas. These programs are managed by
USAID and the State Department, and by international platforms such as Hedayah, Etidal, and
the Sawab Center. Eorts to counter extremist ideology are insucient but still necessary to
stem the spread of extremism.
The United States also needs to stem external support for extremist ideas. U.S. pressure
on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to stop funding radical mosques, madrassas, and
media should be maintained. In addition, various types of programs may provide eective
alternatives to extremist ideology. UNESCO, for instance, has published guides for teachers
and policymakers on how to discuss extremism, identify signs of radicalization, and create
inclusive classroom environments. To take another example, America Abroad Media brings
Hollywood producers and storytellers together with visual media creators in Arab countries
toproduce compelling content that promotes tolerance and respect for diversity.
Strategies and Capabilities
Strive for Quick Wins. Where political leaders are committed to building legitimacy and
addressing the underlying drivers of extremism, the United States should support them
bypursuing “quick wins”—modest policy changes or investments that have high prospects
of success to inspire confidence in the government. In Tunisia, for example, a program to
clean up mosques across the country helped to build trust in the new secularist government
following the 2014 parliamentary election. The United States should support such programs.
Mitigate Negative Eects of Regional and Great Power Competition. As global and regional
powers expand their influence in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel, they at
times act in ways that increase state fragility and complicate and even undermine eorts
to curb extremism. The United States and its partners need to mitigate such international
spoilers—including those that support, or fail to curtail, the export of extremist ideology—by
making clear that their actions will have consequences for their relationship with the United
States. As discussed in the body of this report, the United States can, and should seek to,
limit the potential for strategic competition to ignite or fuel conflict, and should capitalize on
opportunities to work with other major powers to ensure that violent extremist groups do
not become a major territorial threat or secure weapons of mass destruction. The greatest
U.S. leverage, however, will come from oering positive alternatives to what such spoilers
can provide fragile states. A sustained commitment both to support country-led compacts
and provide investments from the U.S. private sector will make the United States a more
appealing partner than its authoritarian adversaries.
Improve Political and Conflict Analysis. The United States should improve its analysis
of local power dynamics in fragile states, particularly in subnational regions vulnerable
to extremism, and share evaluations of program results across U.S. agencies. Similar
coordination within the U.S. government would strengthen prevention-related policies
andprograms. The State Department, USAID, and the Defense Department should produce
shared diagnostics on the constraints to resilience against extremism and coordinate
the evaluations of their respective programs to identify adverse consequences from any
individual intervention on other U.S. government programs.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 48
Undertake Adaptive Programs. U.S. government-funded programs to enhance resilience
against extremism should be treated as high-risk/high-payo, and shown the same latitude
aorded to programs of the U.S. Global Development Lab and the Intelligence Advanced
Research Projects Activity. Rather than discourage experimentation, the U.S. government
should allow programs to learn from setbacks and failures, reorient accordingly, and reallocate
their budget to pursue a dierent approach.
73
Follow the example of the U.S. military, which
rigorously monitors and evaluates its operations and produces an after-action report after each
program failure. Relevant congressional sta should receive regular briefings on prevention-
related programs, particularly on the risks involved, the lessons drawn from failures, and the
use of these lessons in advancing innovation and improving program performance.
Enhance Monitoring and Evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation—related activities should
beprioritized and fully funded.
Increase U.S. Government Learning and Knowledge Management. Despite eorts by the
State Department and USAID to improve knowledge management and learning systems,
institutional knowledge concerning U.S. programs and activities in fragile states not being
systematically captured, and little is being shared across agencies or even bureaus. More
needs to be done to harness and aggregate learning across sectors, and shared knowledge
management tools should be widely adopted across agencies.
49 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Appendix 6
Aligning Security Sector Cooperation
with Prevention
The Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States consulted extensively with senior advisors,
government ocials, and outside experts on how to better align security sector cooperation
with eorts to prevent the spread of extremism. To better improve resilience to extremism
in fragile states, the United States needs to mitigate the risk that U.S. security cooperation
and assistance will provoke recruitment into extremist organizations, empower repressive
governments, fail to improve operational capabilities of fragile state partners, or prove
destabilizing. The United States also wants to be sure that the equipment it provides does not
wind up in the hands of extremists. In addition to preventing extremism, such reforms would
have the added benefits of better enabling the United States to successfully execute military
objectives by, with, and through its partners in fragile states.
This appendix expands on the recommendations in the main body of this report regarding
the Strategic Prevention Initiative, which recommends that the State Department and the
Department of Defense develop a plan to mitigate the political risks posed by security sector
cooperation and assistance and to improve U.S. capabilities to foster better security sector
governance in fragile states. The recommendation includes:
• five- to ten-year security cooperation and assistance compacts with fragile states,
modeled on the Security Governance Initiative;
• a policy of graduated security cooperation and assistance to fragile states that restricts
the type of cooperation and assistance programs available to fragile states with poor
security sector governance, subject to exemption from senior ocials;
• a security sector reform endowment to provide dedicated funding for partner states to
propose and implement institutional capacity building and security sector reform eorts
with the support of the United States; and
• an expansion of existing eorts to improve the oversight, transparency, accountability,
and performance of security sector cooperation and assistance.
Security Cooperation Compacts
To mitigate the risks that U.S. security cooperation or assistance fails to improve operational
capabilities of partners or undermines democratic institutions, the State and Defense
Departments could enter into five- to ten-year security cooperation and assistance compacts
with select fragile states. These compacts would scale up and build on lessons learned under
the Security Governance Initiative, including the practice of conducting joint diagnosis and
whole-of-government consultative processes.
74
Key elements of such compacts could include:
• bilateral U.S.-partner planning with senior-level consultations and joint diagnosis of the
strengths and challenges of the partner’s security institutions
• joint development of a bilateral security assistance and cooperation plan, including
a common strategy toimprove the governance and capacity of the partner’s
securityinstitutions
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 50
• a predictable, transparent package of assistance, over a period of at least five or
ten years, to catalyze longer-term improvements in security sector governance and
institutional professionalism and
• consultations with the national parliament and civil society groups on the compact’s
design, as well as the compact’s oversight and evaluation
Graduated Security Sector Cooperation
Activities specified in the compacts, as well as U.S. security assistance and cooperation
with fragile states writ large, should be grounded in a graduated security cooperation and
assistance policy. A policy of graduated assistance would involve pegging the types of
security sector support and programming available for fragile states to the quality of security
sector governance. Providing increasingly sophisticated and lethal capabilities and equipment
could be contingent on sustained improvements in security sector governance.
A graduated scale would allow the United States to prioritize security sector cooperation and
assistance where it is most likely to show results in increasing security, to reduce costs and limit
spending, and to reduce the risks to the United States in situations where conditions make it
more likely that its support could exacerbate the conditions of extremism and insecurity.
On the most restrictive end of the spectrum, U.S. partners would be eligible only for programs
meant to introduce basic institutional professionalism, transparency, and accountability into
the defense sector, such as International Military Education and Training. At the midway point
on the spectrum, partners could receive training on intelligence gathering and specialized
capacity building training the latter of which might involve the creation of transportation or
maintenance units or the establishment of an operational coordination center. Only strong-
performing partners on indices of security sector governance would be eligible to receive
equipment or engage in foreign internal defense and other joint operations. Eligibility criteria
would be determined on the basis of an index of publicly accessible security sector
governance indicators
75
(see figure 12, “Graduated Security Cooperation”). Senior ocials
could be granted the authority to exempt long-standing, regionally significant, or strategically
important military partners from such a requirement on national security grounds.
Figure 12. Graduated Security Cooperation
Graduated Security Assistance
VERY POOR POOR
WEAK
MID-RANGE
• Institutional
professionalization
• Defense institution
building
• Ministry of defense
advisors
• International military
education and
training
• No equipment
• Other educational,
classroom-based
training
• Human rights
training
Previous, plus:
• Military and
intelligence
capabilities advising
• Tailored capacity
building, e.g. riot
control, specialized
training,
mobility/resupply,
maritime patrol
• Nonlethal equipment
necessary to training
mission
• Internal Defense and
Development
Programs (IDAD)
Previous, plus:
• Nonlethal equipment
• Limited joint
operations, Security
Forces Assistance
(SFA)
Previous, plus:
• Lethal equipment
• Joint operations
• Foreign Internal
Defense (FID)
PARTNER’S SCORE ON
INDEX OF SECURITY
SECTOR GOVERNANCE
SECURITY SECTOR
ASSISTANCE OFFERED
* Partners spend three years at each stage before progressing to the next level. Stagnation
or backsliding on the governance index pushes partner back to previous stage.
* Partners revert to basic stage if any of the following occur: a coup, human rights abuses,
high-level corruption, U.S. weapons end up in the hands of extremists.
51 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Security Sector Reform Endowment
To better support our partners in fragile states, the United States could also establish a Security
Reform Endowment that would have a mandate to provide additional funding for partner-led-
and-managed security sector reform and institutional capacity building programs. In contrast
to current capacity building eorts that are designed, initiated, and implemented by the United
States, this Endowment would be designed specifically to support partner-solicited eorts or
initiatives to undertake security sector reforms, improve security sector governance, or build
basic, nonlethal institutional capabilities. By providing a permanent and reliable source of
funding for security sector reform and institutional professionalization, the Endowment could
strengthen eorts by local leaders in fragile states to undertake dicult reforms.
The Endowment could be housed at and managed by the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) at the Department of the Defense. Partner proposals could be evaluated
based on their promise in reducing human rights abuses, corruption, and other sources of
citizen grievance against security forces in fragile states. Revitalizing the U.S. government’s
capacity to target an important source of grievances in fragile states would help mitigate
the long-term risks of more tactical, counterterrorism-focused cooperation and assistance
with fragile states, while improving the ability of U.S. forces to operate by, with, and through
partner militaries. Congress could provide an initial appropriation and new account to fund the
Endowment. Subsequently, the Endowment could be funded through a small fee to be levied
on all security sector assistance disbursed by DSCA.
Improved Analysis, Transparency, and Oversight of Security
Cooperation and Assistance
To more accurately assess the impacts of U.S. security sector assistance and cooperation in
fragile states and to design appropriate programs, the United States could take steps to make
its current approach more evidence-based, transparent, and accountable, including:
• Increase funding for assessments, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E). The
congressionally mandated implementation of AM&E for Defense Department—managed
security cooperation activities shows early momentum but remains underfunded.
76
Congress should mandate similar AM&E for State Department–managed security
assistance. AM&E for both departments should explicitly address risks of U.S. security
assistance feeding into corruption and repressive governance.
• Create, or encourage the creation of, a new index to assess country performance on
security sector governance, using indicators derived from transparently-collected,
publicly available sources, to promote transparency across this sector, provide an
independent rating of defense institutions, facilitate assessments of institutional
challenges, and track progress and setbacks over time. This index could include
indicators such as civilian oversight, military involvement in politics, human rights abuses,
corruption, the military’s commercial holdings, ethnic imbalances in security forces, and
merit-based promotions. The index could be compiled by the U.S. government from
such sources, or, if developed privately or by multilateral institutions, used by the United
States to design, monitor, assess, and evaluate the impact of security sector cooperation
and assistance given to fragile states.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 52
• Improve partner forces’ accountability to civilian authorities by increasing the
transparency of security sector assistance to fragile states. The Defense and State
Departments could be required by Congress to compile and post on a single public
website the unclassified details of all equipment, materiel, and training provided
to foreign security forces, as well as the unclassified congressional notifications
of equipment transfers and training programs, perhaps building on the useful
ForeignAssistance.gov.
77
This new website could present an integrated database
ofsecurity assistance programs that are overseen by both the State and the Defense
Departments. In addition, Congress could close the loophole that exempts from
disclosure and evaluation requirements certain unclassified Special Operations forces
engagements that are, in essence, training and capacity building missions.
78
• Direct the Department of Defense to invest in developing a doctrine and providing
training to security cooperation ocers on how to assess and address institutional needs
of partner countries, promote professionalism in partner military forces, and improve
accountability in defense institutions.
• Create or designate a single oce in the State Department with clear responsibility
for policy planning and coordination of all security assistance managed through State
Department appropriations and authorities. This oce would have oversight of all military
and nonmilitary security sector assistance provided by the State Department, and could
coordinate with all bureaus with equities in or authorities over how security sector
assistance is spent. In addition, this oce could be empowered to lead an interagency
country-level security assistance planning process, to include diagnosis, assessment,
andpolicy development modeled on elements of the Security Governance Initiative.
79
• Strengthen oversight of Defense Department–managed security cooperation by creating
or assigning an Assistant Secretary-level position to supervise the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency and adding sta to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Security Cooperation to increase scrutiny of security cooperation programs for fragile
states and its attendant risks.
53 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Appendix 7
Consultations
The Task Force consulted with individual representatives of the following U.S. government
agencies, international and regional organizations, foreign governments, nongovernmental
organizations, academic institutions, and private sector entities:
U.S. Government Agencies
Millennium Challenge Corporation
National Security Council
Oce of Management and Budget
U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict
andHumanitarian Assistance
Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning
Bureau for Africa
Oce of Afghanistan and Pakistan Aairs
U.S. Department of Defense
Oce of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Aairs
Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Oce of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
ofDefense Security Cooperation
U.S. Department of State
Bureau of Conflict and
StabilizationOperations
Oce of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources
Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering
Violent Extremism
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
andLabor
Bureau of African Aairs
Bureau of Near Eastern Aairs
Oce of the Special Representative
forAfghanistan and Pakistan
Oce of the Special Presidential Envoy
forthe Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
Congressional Research Service
National Counterterrorism Center
Foreign Governments
Canada, Department of Global Aairs
Embassy of Burkina Faso in Washington, DC
Embassy of the Republic of Cameroon
inWashington, DC
Embassy of the Federal Democratic Republic
ofEthiopia in Washington, DC
Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
inWashington, DC
Embassy of the Republic of Mali in Washington, DC
Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco
inWashington, DC
Embassy of Norway in Washington, DC
Embassy of the Republic of Tunisia
inWashington,DC
Embassy of Qatar in Washington, DC
Federal Republic of Germany,
Federal Foreign Oce
Federal Republic of Somalia, Senate Foreign
Aairs Committee
Federal Republic of Somalia, Ministry of Foreign
Aairs and International Cooperation
Norway, Special Representative to Somalia
Republic of Haiti, Oce of the Prime Minister
Sierra Leone, Ministry of Planning
andEconomicDevelopment
Sweden, Ministry for Foreign Aairs
U.K., Department for International Development
U.K., Foreign and Commonwealth Oce
International and Regional Organizations
International Network on Conflict
andFragilitySecretariat
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding
andStatebuilding Secretariat
The g7+ Secretariat
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Oce for the Coordination
ofHumanitarian Aairs
United Nations Oce of Counter-Terrorism
World Bank Group
European External Action Service
Global Community Engagement
andResilienceFund Secretariat
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 54
Nongovernmental Organizations
Alliance for Peacebuilding
America Abroad Media
American Enterprise Institute
Aspen Ministers Forum
The Atlantic
Bipartisan Policy Center
Brookings Institution
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Center for Global Development
Center for International Development
andConflict Management
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
Coexist Foundation
Commission on State Fragility, Growth
andDevelopment
Council on Foreign Relations
East-West Center
Eurasia Group
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Foundation for Inclusion
Frontier Design
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Global Engagement Center
Hudson Institute
International Alert
Institute for Global Change
International Republican Institute
Institute for the Study of War
InterAction
International Crisis Group
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding
andStatebuilding
International Youth Foundation
Jewish Policy Center
Mercy Corps International
Middle East Institute
Muflehun
National Counterterrorism Center
National Democratic Institute
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment
Nuru International
ONE Campaign
Peace Direct
Prevention Project: Organizing Against
ViolentExtremism
Saferworld
Security Assistance Monitor
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Stimson Center
Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
Tony Blair Institute for Global Change
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Wilson Center
World Organization for Resource
Developmentand Education
World Peace Foundation
Academia
American University
Belfer Center for Science and International
Aairs, Harvard University
Columbia University
Combating Terrorism Center, West Point
ETH Zurich
Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies,
Stanford University
George Washington University
Georgetown University
Georgia Institute of Technology
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Princeton University
Private Sector
BAE Systems, Inc.
Beacon Global Strategies, LLC
Cherto Group
Citibank
Ethan Allen, Inc.
GE Power
MSNBC Cable L.L.C.
Team 3i LLC
55 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
Listening Session Titles and Participants
Listening Session 1: Curbing the Appeal
ofExtremist Ideology
Mr. Reuel Marc Gerecht, Senior Fellow,
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies
Mr. Bo Sim, Foreign Service Ocer, State
Department and Sawab Center
Dr. Barbara Walter, Professor of Political
Science, School of Global Policy and
Strategy, University of California—San Diego
Dr. David Pollock, Berstein Fellow,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ms. Katherine Zimmerman, Research Fellow,
American Enterprise Institute
Mr. Oliver Wilcox, Deputy Director, Bureau of
Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State
U.S. Intelligence Community
Listening Session 2: What Works in Preventing
Extremism in Fragile States
Dr. Lauren Van Metre, Senior Advisor,
National Democratic Institute
Dr. Stephen Watts, Senior Political Scientist
and Associate Program Director, RAND
Arroyo Center Program on Strategy,
Doctrine, and Resources
Dr. Lise Howard, Professor of Government,
Georgetown University
Dr. Renard Sexton, Post-doctoral Fellow,
Princeton University
Listening Session 3: Empowering Local Voices
and Actors to Prevent Extremism
Ms. Omezzine Khélifa, Chief Executive
Ocer, Modbiun Tunisia
Sh. Khadijah Hawajah, Chair, Plateau
StateWomen’s Peace Forum
Mr. Ahmed Albibas, Chief Executive
Ocer,Moomken
Ms. Esra El Bakoush, Project Ocer,
U.S.Institute of Peace Libya Oce
Ms. Salma Hemed, Program Ocer,
HAKIAfrica
Dr. Emad Bouzo, Syrian-American Physician,
Kingswood Research Institute
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 56
Notes
1 Neta Crawford, “United States Budgetary Costs of the Past-9/11 Wars
Through FY 2019: $5.9 Trillion Spent and Obligated,” (Brown University,
November 18, 2018), https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/
papers/2018/Crawford_Costs%20of%20War%20Estimates%20Through%20
FY2019.pdf.
2 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
theUnited States, 2004), 364.
3 “Global Terrorism Database,” National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (accessed August 20, 2018),
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/; Seth Jones, et. al., “The Evolution
of the Salafi-jihadist Threat” (Center for Strategic and International
Studies, November 2018), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/
s3fs-public/publication/Jones_EvolvingTerroristThreat_FULL_WEB.
pdf?F4jhyhPqySTHHFUHSwwfAwq8MspjnJ4q.
4 Jones et al., “Evolution of the Salafi-jihadist Threat.”
5 Ibid.
6 Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, Beyond the Homeland:
Protecting America from Extremism in Fragile States (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace, September 2018), https://www.usip.org/
sites/default/files/Taskforce-Extremism-Fragile-States-Interim-Report.pdf.
7 U.S. Department of State and United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), “Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on
Countering Violent Extremism,” May 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/1866/FINAL%20--%20State%20and%20USAID%20
Joint%20Strategy%20on%20Countering%20Violent%20Extremism%20
%28May%202016%29.pdf.
8 Around ten thousand military personnel and civilian contractors were
killed and approximately fifty thousand were wounded in the Afghanistan
and Iraq Wars. See Brian Michael Jenkins, “Fifteen Years On, Where Are
We in the ‘War on Terror’?” RAND Blog, September 7, RAND Corporation,
Santa Monica, 2016, https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/fifteen-years-on-
where-are-we-in-the-war-on-terror.html. Researchers at Brown University
estimate the total costs associated with the War on Terror, including military
operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, homeland security, and
increased spending on veterans’ care, at over $5.9 trillion. See Crawford,
“United States Budgetary Costs.” By contrast, the Stimson Center estimates
total U.S. counterterrorism spending between 2002 and 2017 to be $2.8
trillion, including overseas contingency operations, foreign assistance to
countries with significant al-Qaeda and/or ISIS presence, and homeland
security spending; see Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism
Spending, Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America While Promoting
Eciencies and Accountability (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, May
2018). https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CT_
Spending_Report_0.pdf. The main dierence between the two estimates
is that the Brown estimate accounts for estimated increases to the base
defense budget due to war, and past and future obligations for disability
and medical care for post-9/11 veterans.
9 Stephen Hadley, remarks at the Atlantic Council conference “Atlantic
Council Strategy Initiative Launch: America’s Role in the World,” at the
Atlantic Council’s website, March 13, 2015, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
news/transcripts/transcript-america-s-role-in-the-world.
10 Oce of the President of the United States, “National Security Strategy”
(December 2017), 25, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
11 Michael Morrell, The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight against
Terrorism from Al Qai’da to ISIS (New York: Twelve, 2015), 73.
12 Oce of the President of the United States, “National Strategy for
Counterterrorism of the United States of America” (October 2018), 7,
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/NSCT.pdf.
13 U.S. Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense
Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s
Competitive Edge” (Washington, DC: 2018), https://www.defense.gov/
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
14 Oce of the President of the United States, “National Strategy
forCounterterrorism of the United States of America,” 7.
15 Political terror involves extrajudicial killings, torture, and imprisonment
without trial. See Institute for Economics and Peace, “Global Terrorism Index
2017” (2017), 3, http://visionoumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-
Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf.
16 Bruce Homan, “Al-Qaeda’s Resurrection,” on the Council on Foreign
Relations’ website (March 6, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-
qaedas-resurrection.
17 This definition of prevention is informed by the Stabilization Assistance
Review (SAR), which defines the stabilization of conflict-aected areas as
“an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning U.S. Government
eorts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—toward
supporting locally legitimate authorities and systems to peaceably manage
conflict and prevent violence.” See U.S. Department of State, USAID, and
U.S. Department of Defense, “Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework
for Maximizing the Eectiveness of U.S. Government Eorts to Stabilize
Conflict-Aected Areas” (Washington, DC: 2018), 1, https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/283589.pdf.
18 Oce of the President of the United States, “National Strategy
forCounterterrorism,” 13.
19 United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches
to Preventing Violent Conflict (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), 4,
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337.
20 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, 363.
21 Over the past two decades, the United States and its international partners
have developed a deeper understanding of, and developed far more
nuanced strategies and approaches to address, fragility as an underlying
cause of violent extremism, see USAID, “USAID Fragile States Strategy”
(Washington, DC: 2005), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usaid/2005_
fragile_states_strategy.pdf; and USAID, “The Development Response to
Violent Extremism and Insurgency” (Washington, DC: 2011), https://pdf.
usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf. New policy instruments, such as the
UN Peacebuilding Support Oce and UN Oce of Counterterrorism, have
been established, and bureaucratic reforms in the U.S. government have
been adopted to enable a more eective response. See U.S. Department
of State, “Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Enduring
Leadership in a Dynamic World” (Washington, DC: 2015), https://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/267396.pdf; and U.S. Department of
State, “Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading through
Civilian Power” (Washington, DC: 2010), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/153108.pdf. And both international donors and fragile state
governments have signed onto aid eectiveness principles designed to
improve all donor engagement in situations of fragility, see International
Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “A New Deal for Engagement
in Fragile States” (2011), http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_
public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf;
and United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace.
22 William J. Burns, Michele A. Flournoy, and Nancy E. Lindborg,
U.S.Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for New American
Security, and United States Institute of Peace, 2016), https://www.usip.org/
sites/default/files/US-Leadership-and-the-Challenge-of-State-Fragility.pdf.
57 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
23 USAID, “USAID Fragile States Strategy”; “World Development Report 2011”
(Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2011), https://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf; International Dialogue for
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile
States”; United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace; Commission
on State Fragility, Growth and Development, Escaping the Fragility Trap
(International Growth Center, April 2018), https://www.theigc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Escaping-the-fragility-trap.pdf; Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “States of Fragility 2016:
Understanding Violence,” (Paris: OECD, 2016), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/
development/states-of-fragility-2016_9789264267213-en#page1; OECD,
“States of Fragility 2018,” (Paris: OECD, 2018), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/
development/states-of-fragility-2018_9789264302075-en#page1.
24 Based on lessons learned, this research project is assessing how to best
target and structure foreign assistance—alongside diplomatic and defense
engagement—to reduce conflict and instability risks in fragile states.
25 This insight is not new. For at least a decade, development agencies have
recognized the need to address the breakdown in state-society relations.
Yet, few donors do this systematically. One reason they do not is that many
perceive fragility as inherently political and therefore outside the ambit
of development action, which traditionally has focused on outcomes in
specific sectors, such as in health, agriculture or education.
26 Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, Beyond the Homeland, 19.
27 Collected by Jacob Zenn, cited in Hilary Matfess, “Boko Haram: History and
Context,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History (entry posted
online October 2017), http://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/
acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-119#ref_
acrefore-9780190277734-e-119-note-35.
28 See definitions of resilience by Bipartisan Policy Center, A Stitch in
Time: Stabilizing Fragile States (May 2011), 22, https://bipartisanpolicy.
org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/FS_Final.pdf; and by
the All-Party Parliamentary Group for the British Council, Building
Young People’s Resilience to Violent Extremism in the Middle East
and North Africa (November 2017), 36, https://appg.britishcouncil.
org/sites/default/files/3502_bc_appg_inquiry_report_06.pdf?_
ga=2.230570516.98794296.1539898662-2122977200.1539802271. See
also U.S. Department of State, “Stabilization Assistance Review.”
29 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Journey to Extremism
inAfrica (New York: UNDP, 2017), 73, http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/
content/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf.
30 Oce of the President of the United States, “National Security Strategy,” 39.
31 This mutual accountability framework has informed new partnerships with
fragile states like Somalia under the 2011 NewDeal for Engagement in
Fragile States, a set of internationally agreed -upon best practices on how
to engage eectively inthese countries.
32 Specific recommendations, consistent with this report, for how to
strengthen the international architecture for prevention can be found here:
United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace; and Burns et al., “U.S.
Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility.”
33 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 76.
34 David Ignatius, “How ISIS Spread in the Middle East,” Atlantic, October 29,
2015, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-
syria-iraq/412042/.
35 United Nations Development Programme, Journey to Extremism in
Africa (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2017),
73, http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP-
JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf.
36 Jacob Poushter, “In Nations with Significant Muslim Populations, Much
Disdain for ISIS,” Pew Research Center, November 17, 2015, http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-
populations-much-disdain-for-isis/.
37 World Bank, “Economic and Social Inclusion to Prevent Violent Extremism,”
Middle East and North Africa Economic Monitor, October 2016, http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/409591474983005625/pdf/108525-
REVISED-PUBLIC.pdf.
38 Michael Marcusa, “Radicalism on the Periphery: History, Collective Memory,
and the Cultural Resonance of Jihadist Ideology in Tunisia,” Comparative
Politics 51, no. 1 (October 2018).
39 Khaled Al Zubi, “Report From Dera’a, Cradle of the Syrian Revolution,”
Nation, September 21, 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/report-
from-deraa-cradle-of-the-syrian-revolution/. See also Rana Marcel Khalaf,
“Syria: Destruction of Civil Society Means Dictatorship, Extremism and
Displacement” (Chatham House, London, October 7, 2016), https://www.
chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/syria-destruction-civil-society-means-
dictatorship-extremism-and-further-displacement.
40 Jerome, Drevon, “Embracing Salafi Jihadism in Egypt and Mobilizing in the
Syrian Jihad,” Middle East Critique 25, no. 4 (July 2016).
41 Mohamed Benrabah, Language Conflict in Algeria: From Colonialism
to Post-independence (Bristol, England: Multilingual Matters, 2013); and
Michael Slackman, “In Algeria, a Tug of War for Young Minds,” New York
Times, June 23, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/world/
africa/23algeria.html.
42 “The Hidden Hand behind the Islamic State Militants? Saddam Hussein’s,”
Washington Post, April 4, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militants-saddam-
husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4-.
43 Caryle Murphy, “AQAP’s Growing Security Threat to Saudi Arabia,” CTC
Sentinel 3, no. 6 (June 2010), https://ctc.usma.edu/aqaps-growing-security-
threat-to-saudi-arabia/.
44 “Boko Haram,” Stanford University website, August 26, 2016,
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/
view/553?highlight=boko%2Bharam. See also Claire Felter, Jonathan Masters,
and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations
website, January 9, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab.
45 These factors hold across a variety of cases. See United Nations
Development Programme, Journey to Extremism in Africa (New York: United
Nations Development Programme, 2017), 73, http://journey-to-extremism.
undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-
english.pdf; Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member
of Ansar Al-Sharia,” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/
Details/28428/Salafism-in-Tunisia-An-Interview-with-a-Member-of-Ansar-al-
Sharia; and Maher Farrukh, “Al Qaeda’s Base in Yemen,” Critical Threats, June
20, 2017, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-qaedas-base-in-yemen.
46 On attempts by extremists to marginalize civil society in the wake of
Tunisia’s revolution, see Suzanne Daley, “Tensions on a Campus Mirror
Turbulence in a New Tunisia,” New York Times, June 11, 2012,
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/world/africa/tensions-at-manouba-
university-mirror-turbulence-in-tunisia.html.
47 “ISIS Recruitment Thrives in Brutal Prisons Run by U.S.-Backed Egypt.”
Intercept, November 24, 2015, https://theintercept.com/2015/11/24/isis-
recruitment-thrives-in-brutal-prisons-run-by-u-s-backed-egypt/.
48 Salem Solomon, “As Africa Faces More Terrorism, Experts Point to Saudi
Spread of Fundamentalist Islam,” VOA, June 20, 2017, https://www.voanews.
com/a/africa-terrorism-saudi-fundamentalist-islam/3908103.html.
49 Evan Hill and Laura Kasinof, “Playing a Double Game in the Fight
Against AQAP,” Foreign Policy, January 23, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2015/01/21/playing-a-double-game-in-the-fight-against-aqap-yemen-
saleh-al-qaeda/; and Najim Rahim and Rod Nordland, “Are ISIS Fighters
Prisoners or Honored Guests of the Afghan Government?” New York Times,
August 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/04/world/asia/islamic-
state-prisoners-afghanistan.html.
50 Nancy Lindborg, “The Essential Role of Women in Peacebuilding,”
(commentary posted on United States Institute of Peace website,
November20, 2017), https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/11/essential-
role-women-peacebuilding.
Preventing Extremism in Fragile States | 58
51 M. Caprioli, “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in
PredictingInternal Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 49 (2018):
161–178, https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/233359/original/.
52 Burns, Flournoy, and Lindborg, “U.S. Leadership and the Challenge
ofStateFragility,” 5.
53 David Gartner and Homi Kharas, “Scaling Up Impact: Vertical Funds and
Innovative Governance,” in Getting to Scale: How to Bring Development
Solutions to Millions of Poor People, ed. Laurence Chandy et al.
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 103–137.
54 Nancy Lindborg, “Fragility 2.0: Ideas to Action,” (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/fragility-2-0-
ideas-to-action/.
55 United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace, 161.
56 Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network, “Guiding Principles for
Eective U.S. Assistance” (2017). http://modernizeaid.net/wp-content/
uploads/2017/06/MFAN-goals-principles-2017.pdf.
57 The lessons learned on eective engagement in fragile states have been
captured in recent reports, including Pathways for Peace, the 2017 report
from the United Nations and the World Bank on peacebuilding and conflict
prevention; Escaping the Fragility Trap, a 2018 report by the Commission
on State Fragility, Growth and Development, led by former British prime
minister David Cameron; U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State
Fragility, the 2016 report by the Fragility Study Group; and the 2011 New
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, a policy framework developed
byself-identified fragile states and donors.
58 For a useful overview of an innovative international fund, see Gartner
andKharas, “Scaling Up Impact.”
59 Such compacts could build on the compacts established in pilot countries
under the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States framework.
60 The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund supports local,
community-level initiatives aimed at strengthening resilience against violent
extremists. See the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund,
https://www.gcerf.org/.
61 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization:
Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” (Arlington, VA: May 2018).
62 Erik Melander, “Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuses,”
Journal of Peace Research (March 2005), https://journals.sagepub.com/
doi/10.1177/0022343305050688.
63 Caprioli, “Primed for Violence”; Valerie M. Hudson, et al., “The Heart of
the Matter,” International Security 33, no. 3 (Winter 2008), https://www.
belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/IS3303_pp007-045.pdf.
64 Lindborg, “Essential Role of Women in Peacebuilding.”
65 The National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security aims to advance
women’s inclusion in peace negotiations, peacebuilding activities, and
conflict prevention and response; to protect women and girls from gender-
based violence; and to ensure safe, equitable access to relief and recovery
assistance in areas of conflict and insecurity. See USAID, National Action Plan
on Women, Peace, and Security (Washington, DC, USAID, June 2016), https://
www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/National%20Action%20
Plan%20on%20Women%2C%20Peace%2C%20and%20Security.pdf.
66 The Women, Peace, and Security Act aims to ensure that the United
States promotes the meaningful participation of women in mediation
andnegotiation processes seeking to prevent, mitigate, or resolve
violentconflict, See U.S. Congress, Senate, Women, Peace, and Security
Act of2017, S 1141, 115th Cong., became public law October 6, 2017,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1141/text.
67 As of January 2019, twenty-one of the forty five countries in the Middle East,
Horn of Africa, and Sahel have adopted a National Action Plan on Women,
Peace, and Security.
68 USAID, “ Youth in Development: Realizing the Demographic Opportunity,”
(Washington, DC: USAID, October 2012), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/1870/Youth_in_Development_Policy_0.pdf; and
USAID, “Youth Impact,” USAID website, https://www.usaid.gov/youthimpact
(accessed December 2018).
69 Alessandra Bejac, “In Tunisia’s Hotbed of Revolution People Now Struggle
to Find Work,” TRT World, July 19, 2018, https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/
in-tunisia-s-hotbed-of-revolution-people-now-struggle-to-find-work-19010.
70 “Mercy Corps: Youth Development Programs in Somalia Could
HalveSupport for Violent Groups,” Mercy Corps website, May 17, 2018,
https://www.mercycorps.org/press-room/releases/mercy-corps-youth-
development-programs-somalia-could-halve-support-violent.
71 Steven Finkel., A. Anibal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell Seligson, “The Eects of
U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003,” World Politics
59, no. 3 (2007): 404–439.
72 The United States Institute of Peace’s Justice and Security Dialogue oers
an innovative approach to developing scalable community-police dialogue
programs in fragile states.
73 Private philanthropy has begun to focus onwhat works and what does not
and to use lessons learned to design better programs. See Kelsey Piper,
“ACharity Just Admitted That Its Program Wasn’t Working: That’s a Big
Deal,” Vox, November 29, 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/11/29/18114585/
poverty-charity-randomized-controlled-trial-evidence-action.
74 U.S. Government, “Security Governance Initiative: Enhancing the
Transparent, Accountable, and Legitimate Management and Oversight of
Security Policy and Practice,” (Washington, DC, 2014), https://2009-2017.
state.gov/documents/organization/254115.pdf
75 For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is
developing an independent index of security sector governance based
onmultimodal indicators sourced from a variety of robust, existing datasets;
the World Bank is also developing indicators of security sector finance
andcorruption.
76 USAID recommends that 3–5 percent of program costs be dedicated to
M&E; in contrast, the Defense Department has so far budgeted less than
0.2 percent of its security cooperation budget for AM&E. See Thomas Ross
Jr., “Time for the Pentagon to Create a System to Better Track Its Spending,”
The Hill, March 9, 2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/377662-
time-for-the-pentagon-to-create-a-system-to-better-track-its.
77 Melissa Dalton et al., Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector
Assistance (Washington: DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, November 2018), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/180207_Dalton_OversightAccountability_Web.
pdf?9CJj6j5KVqQgWAlLSLJkOpdCga.Yz28l.
78 Section 1208 programs and Joint Combined Exchange Training events
managed by Special Operations Forces are exempt from disclosure and
evaluation requirements and thus avoid substantive oversight.
79 Since 9/11, as the allocation of funding for military assistance has shifted
dramatically from the State Department to the Defense Department
and train-and-equip programs have expanded, security assistance has
increasingly become detached from broader political assessments and
U.S. government strategies. The Defense Department is under pressure
to quickly disburse security cooperation funds, and while the State
Department and U.S. ambassadors have concurrence authority, it is
inpractice often reduced to a last-minute yes-or-no determination.
59 | Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States
2301 Constitution Avenue NW,
Washington, DC 20037
Tel: +1.202.457.1700
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