Air & Space Operations Review
Department of the Air Force
Vol. 3, No. 1 - S 2024
T B-21 T C
T A S
A S M I
O A
D A I
T O S D M
T B-21 T C
T A S
A S M I
O A
D A I
T O S D M
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Gen David W. Allvin, USAF
Chief of Space Operations, US Space Force
Gen B. Chance Saltzman, USSF
Commander, Air Education and Training Command
Lt Gen Brian S. Robinson, USAF
Commander and President, Air University
Lt Gen Andrea D. Tullos
Chief Academic Officer, Air University
Dr. Mark J. Conversino
Director, Air University Press
Dr. Paul Hoffman
Journal Team
Editor in Chief
Dr. Laura M. urston Goodroe
Advisory Editorial Board
https://www.af.mil/ https://www.spaceforce.mil/ https://www.aetc.af.mil/ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/
Mark J. Conversino, PhD
James W. Forsyth Jr., PhD
Kelly S. Grieco, PhD
John Andreas Olsen, PhD
Nicholas M. Sambaluk, PhD
Evelyn D. Watkins-Bean, PhD
John M. Curatola, PhD
Christina L.M. Goulter, PhD
Michael R. Kraig, PhD
David D. Palkki, PhD
Heather P. Venable, PhD
Wendy Whitman Cobb, PhD
Senior Editor
Dr. Lynn Chun Ink
Print Specialist
Cheryl Ferrell
Illustrator
Catherine Smith
Web Specialist
Gail White
Book Review Editor
Col Cory Hollon, USAF, PhD
Air & Space Operations Review
SPRING 2024 VOL. 3, NO. 1
3 From the Editor
AIR OPERATIONS
4 e B-21 and Tactical Creativity
Shane Praiswater
Paula G. Thornhill
19 e Airfield as a System
Mark D. Callan
35 Analytic Standards in the Context of Military Intelligence
Jack Duffield
PLANNING AND STRATEGY
50 Operational Art
A Necessary Framework for Modern Military Planning
Jonathan K. Corrado
60 Decision Advantage and Initiative
Completing Joint All-Domain Command and Control
Brian R. Price
77 e Other Side of the Deterrence Moon
Elevating “Deterrence from Space” in Strategic Competition
Timothy Georgetti
MULTIMEDIA REVIEWS
88 Masters of the Air, season 1, episodes 1 and 2
Directed by Cary Joji Fukunaga, Written by John Orloff
Reviewed by Dr. Stephen L. Renner, Colonel, USAF, Retired
90 Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 3
Directed by Cary Joji Fukunaga, written by John Orloff
Reviewed by Heather P. Venable, PhD
MULTIMEDIA REVIEWS, CONTINUED
93 Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 4
Directed by Cary Joji Fukunaga, written by John Orloff
Reviewed by Dr. John G. Terino, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired
96 Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 5
Directed by Anna Boden and Ryan Fleck, written by John Orloff
Reviewed by Dr. John G. Terino, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired
99 Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 6
Directed by Anna Boden and Ryan Fleck, written by John Orloff
Reviewed by Richard R. Muller, PhD
102 Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 7
Directed by Dee Rees, written by John Orloff
Reviewed by Richard R. Muller, PhD
105 Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 8
Directed by Dee Rees, written by John Orloff
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Ziemann, USAF
108 Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 9
Directed by Tim Van Patten, written by John Orloff
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Ziemann, USAF
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 3
FROM THE EDITOR
Dear Reader,
As conflict between Israel and Iran threatens to expand, and Russia continues its war
of attrition against Ukraine, air operations are persistently at the forefront of national
security discourse. Military planners and strategists are absorbing real- world lessons regard-
ing applications of and advances in contemporary air operations that have profound im-
plications for future battles and wars in which the United States will undoubtedly engage.
Our Spring 2024 issue of Air & Space Operations Review explores some key aspects of air
operations, planning, and strategy.
e first forum, Air Operations, opens with an analysis of the B-21 Raider. Retired
Brigadier General Paula ornhill, USAF, and Shane Praiswater argue that in the move
to pulsed operations, a rift has emerged between standoff and stand- in tactical philosophies
in the combat air forces. e Raider has the capabilities to bridge this divide and help
transcend long- standing parochial proclivities that have stalled the creative application of
airpower. In the second article in the forum, Mark Callan proposes that airfields are
centers of gravity in their own right. Accordingly, the Air Force needs to reorganize its
airfields into maneuverable rhizomatic teams, mitigating the shortfalls posed by the tra-
ditional root-tree organization of service airfields.
e forum concludes with an examination of analytic standards in military intelligence.
Jack Duffield finds that existing US and UK analytic standards’ focus on rigor, while ap-
propriate for the production of strategic intelligence, is less effective in producing timely,
relevant analysis at the tactical and operational levels of war. e US Air Force’s imple-
mentation of analytic standards provides an example of how to more effectively apply such
standards at these levels.
e second forum, Planning and Strategy, leads with a discussion about operational
art. John Corrado explores the history of operational art over the centuries and assesses
its importance in contemporary military planning and strategy, against state and nonstate
actors alike. In the second article in the forum, Brian Price defines decision advantage and
the concept of initiative against the backdrop of John Boyd’s observe, orient, decide, act
(OODA) loop, finding that decision advantage is necessary to operationalizing initiative.
In the final article of the forum and the issue, Tim Georgetti argues for the notion of
deterrence from space, reframing space capabilities—such as orbital- class rocket resupply
and space- based solar power—as both powerful deterrents and liabilities in need of defense.
As always, we welcome thoughtful, well- researched responses to our articles, with a po-
tential for publication in a future issue. ank you for your continued support of the journal.
~e Editor
4 AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW
AIR OPERATIONS
e B-21 and Tactical Creativity
Shane PraiSwater
Paula G. thornhill
Combat air forces tacticians and operational planners have yet to understand the B-21 Raider’s
potential capability. Leadership’s vision is clear, but service- level parochial interests, insular
platform cultures, and competition for resources are creating unhealthy tensions within the
combat air forces, Department of the Air Force, and across the Joint force. Such tensions could
severely hamper tactical creativity, operational planning, and strategic competition, ultimately
undermining the US Air Force’s effectiveness against a peer adversary. Amid the move toward
pulsed operations, a rift has emerged between standoff and stand- in tactical philosophies. Yet
the B-21 Raider’s family of systems at a minimum operates in both areas, likely demanding a
reconsideration of these concepts. Such a reconsideration can also help the Air Force transcend
stealth/nonstealth and fighter/bomber debates to embrace new levels of tactical creativity.
S
ecretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall III established operational imperatives for
the US Air Force in recognition that adversaries have “capabilities designed to defeat
the United States’ ability to project power.”
1
ese imperatives state that diverse
capabilities are necessary, but translating Secretary Kendall’s vision to the tactical level
may prove difficult. Amid the combat air forces’ (CAF) move toward pulsed operations, a
rift has emerged between standoff and stand- in tactical philosophies.
2
Additionally, as the
B-21 Raider’s family of systems has capabilities in both areas, the service will soon need
to reconsider these concepts.
As a unique, sixth- generation platform, the B-21 can help the Air Force transcend the
stealth- versus- nonstealth and fighter- versus- bomber debates and embrace new levels of
tactical creativity. Cultural shifts are necessary for the CAF to accept the idea of a bomber
leading—and providing persistence—during pulsed operations. e B-21 and its family
of systems would not just be a lead striker; it would be a platform enabling pulsed opera-
tions or even utilizing pulsed strike packages as dynamic employment options.
Lieutenant Colonel Shane Praiswater, USAF, PhD, is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins University Strategic Thinkers Program
and is the director of operations, 31st Test and Evaluation Squadron, B-21 Initial Cadre, at Edwards AFB, California.
Dr. Paula Thornhill, Brigadier General, USAF, Retired, is an associate professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of
Advanced International Studies and an adjunct senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. She is the author of De-
mystifying the American Military: Institutions, Evolutions, and Challenges since 1789 (Naval Institute Press, 2019).
1. Frank Kendall III, “Department of the Air Force Operational Imperatives,” infographic, US Air Force
(USAF), March 31, 2022, https://www.af.mil/.
2. “Air Force Future Operating Concept Executive Summary” (Washington, DC: USAF, March 6, 2023),
https://www.af.mil/.
Praiswater & ornhill
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 5
is article is not about one aircraft being more important than another; rather, it argues
a shift in perspective is necessary due to the cultural problems surrounding aircraft spe-
cialization, which can lead to a narrowed focus regarding other platforms. Because of the
smaller bomber community, without a cultural shift that recalibrates CAF operations in
great power competition, the service might not employ the B-21 to a level sufficient to
achieve Secretary Kendall’s vision. Even worse, absent a proper and persistent demand
signal from the CAF, the B-21, like any burgeoning acquisition program, might be vulner-
able to budget cuts and risk becoming a redux of the reduced B-2 Spirit fleet.
3
Combat air forces tacticians and operational planners tend to reduce the operational
imperatives and the concept of pulsed operations to embrace standoff tactics while largely
ignoring stand- in advantages, thus leaving holes in operational plans. e B-21 Raider
family of systems addresses these challenges by unlocking the Joint force with stand- in
capabilities and addressing current Indo- Pacific region shortfalls. rough a reconsideration
of the standoff and stand- in concepts, the CAF can move past current debates and miscon-
ceptions to materialize unprecedented levels of tactical creativity and operational planning.
e authors draw from considerable experience in the Pentagon, with Congress, and
in all levels of war. e B-21’s initial cadre have returned to the combat air forces after
staff tours that revealed the propensity for budget advocacy to split along platform lines.
While Secretary Kendall’s initiatives are encouraging, and despite the fascinating and
potentially revolutionary aspects of the B-21, CAF planners and tacticians are not prepared
to think differently, given immediate challenges and parochial attitudes. is article thus
analyzes the key issues afflicting combat air forces—most notably, the ongoing lack of
tactical creativity and an adherence to rigid operational maneuver—and offers recom-
mendations to mitigate them.
Stando versus Stand- in Debate
Secretary Kendall’s operational imperatives emphasize that resilient and redundant op-
erations are necessary to compete with peer adversaries.
4
In light of aggressive statements
from China and the enduring risk of escalation in Ukraine, the US Air Force faces a sig-
nificant challenge in preparing to fight now while simultaneously planning for future op-
erations.
5
By focusing on the most immediate threats at the expense of future considerations,
combat air forces resist tactical creativity—the ability to consider novel solutions based on
emerging capabilities potentially dissimilar to established techniques and procedures.
3. Sebastien Roblin, “e U.S. Air Force’s Biggest Mistake: Only 20 B-2 Stealth Bombers in the Force,”
National Interest, February 23, 2024, https://nationalinterest.org/.
4. Charles Pope, “Kendall Details ‘Seven Operational Imperatives’ & How ey Forge the Future Force,”
USAF, March 3, 2022, https://www.af.mil/.
5. Dave Lawler, “Xi Vows China and Taiwan Will ‘Surely Be Reunified’ in New Year’s Speech,” Axios,
January 1, 2024, https://www.axios.com/.
6 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e B-21 and Tactical Creativity
e most recent effort focused on near- term conflicts revolves around the concept of
pulsed operations. e Air Force Future Operating Concept argues winning “six critical
and concurrent fights” requires “ ‘pulsed airpower’,” or concentrating of airpower in time
and space to create windows of opportunity for the rest of the force.”
6
Pulsed operations
are a significant shift within CAF culture. Previously, establishing a relative level of endur-
ing air superiority was an assumed objective.
7
e shift is, of course, a sober reaction to
realities: US adversaries, having observed the Air Force’s dominance and ability to unlock
Joint force capabilities, have invested incredible resources into making air supremacy
impossible and even temporary air superiority as difficult as possible for the United States
and its Allies and partners near hostile territories.
8
Pulsed operations might be wise under certain constraints, but the fact remains that
embracing such a mindset de facto cedes control over a given area to the enemy for the
majority of a conflict. Pulsing is a concept driven primarily by geography, not threats.
Given more forgiving distances, the CAF might entertain more traditional methods to
continually contest airspace control: the lack of a persistence- capable platform denies
comprehensive takedowns of adversary defenses that require constant pressure to suppress.
Furthermore, an inclination to employ standoff tactics in the execution of pulsed operations
risks treating potential conflicts as anti- access/area denial (A2/AD) problems in which
more sustainable tactics are not possible.
Evidence from wargames and acquisitions suggests pulsed operations are evolving into
standoff- dependent tactics. Most recently, an unclassified wargame found standoff weap-
ons were “war- winning” weapons, although the United States won—at a great cost—only
a “Pyrrhic victory” in 2026.
9
e same wargame also found that China would continue to
evolve and target bombers employing standoff weapons, if not the weapons themselves.
10
Regarding acquisitions, weapons priorities in the president’s Fiscal Year 2024 budget,
approximately $15.1 billion worth, were all standoff munitions—Standard Missile (SM)-6,
Air Intercept Missile (AIM)-120D Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AM-
RAAM), Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff
Missile (JASSM)-ER.
11
Furthermore, to counter the decades- long effort to “install
6. Future Operating Concept.”
7. Elliot M. Bucki, “Flexible, Smart, and Lethal,” Air & Space Power Journal 30, no. 2 (Summer 2016).
8. Jeff Hagen et al., e Foundations of Operational Resilience—Assessing the Ability to Operate in an Anti- Access/
Area Denial (A2/AD) Environment: e Analytical Framework, Lexicon, and Characteristics of the Operational Resil-
ience Analysis Model (ORAM) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, July 7, 2016), https://doi.org/.
9. David Axe, “3,600 American Cruise Missiles versus the Chinese Fleet: How One U.S. Munition Could
Decide Taiwan’s Fate,” Forbes, January 9, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/; and Mark F. Cancian and Eric Hegin-
botham, “e First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan,” CSIS: Center for
Strategic & International Studies, January 9, 2023, 4, https://www.csis.org/.
10. Cancian and Heginbotham, 140.
11. Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System: US Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request
(Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller]/Chief Financial Officer, March
2023), iii, https://comptroller.defense.gov/.
Praiswater & ornhill
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 7
thickets of surface- to- air missiles” posing a “wicked problem for U.S. forces,” the Pentagon
is ramping up standoff acquisitions.
12
e change in acquisition strategies reflects threats in which the “defense is inherently
the stronger form of air warfare, and new and emerging technologies and tactics are only
strengthening the defender’s advantage.”
13
Whether or not this argument is valid, the
combination of unclassified wargames and acquisitions reflects how planners and tacticians
prioritize standoff tactics during pulsed operations. ey are not necessarily proclaiming
a standoff dependency; they are just planning based on the understanding of the threat
and weapons provided during ongoing acquisition debates.
is planning methodology creates artificial tactical limits and critical dependencies.
As Israel and Russia are learning today, standoff weapons cannot achieve full military
objectives, which then limits national leaders’ decision space and cedes the adversary
significant advantages.
14
e further back the combat air forces launch weapons, the more
complicated the kill chain required. Forces must locate, destroy, and verify targets that
might be mobile or fleetingly observable while defeating systems finely tuned toward the
destruction of standoff munitions and platforms. Correlating pulsed operations with
standoff tactics makes those tactical problems inherently more complicated by removing
pressure and playing to the adversary’s strengths; namely, that by 2030, “stronger Chinese
conventional capabilities and a survivable nuclear deterrent” complicate potential US
theories of victory.
15
Furthermore, the move toward pulsed operations might be feeding a dangerous
perspective within the CAF, where it is believed a large- scale peer conflict will likely be
short. To be clear, the “wish- casting” associated with a short war is hardly the pre-
dominant view in the Pentagon or literature, but behind the scenes, this viewpoint is
surprisingly common within the CAF. is belief contravenes most expert opinions and
belies an ignorance of the “fragmented authoritarianism” within China, which persists
under President Xi Jinping. Considering the consensus necessary within China to make
12. Christopher Woody, “e US Air Force Is Training to Take Down Chinese Warships, but China’s
Military Has Built a ‘Wicked’ Problem for It to Overcome,” Business Insider, November 13, 2023, https://
www.businessinsider.com/; and Inder Singh Bisht, “Pentagon Wants to Ramp- Up Ship- Killing Missile Pro-
curement,” Defense Post, April 7, 2023, https://www.thedefensepost.com/.
13. Maximillian Bremer and Kelly Grieco, “Assumption Testing: Airpower Is Inherently Offensive, As-
sumption #5,” Policy Paper, Stimson, January 25, 2023), https://www.stimson.org/.
14. Ron Tira, e Limitations of Standoff Firepower- Based Operations: On Standoff Warfare, Maneuver, and
Decision (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007), https://www.jstor.org/; Gregory Weaver,
“e Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Taiwan Crisis,” Atlantic Council (blog), November 22, 2023, https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/; and Alex Vershinin, “e Challenge of Dis- integrating A2/AD Zone: How
Emerging Technologies Are Shifting the Balance Back to the Defense,” Joint Force Quarterly 97 (2nd Quar-
ter, 2020), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/.
15. Jacob L. Heim, Zachary Burdette, and Nathan Beauchamp- Mustafaga, U.S. Military eories of Vic-
tory for a War with the People’s Republic of China (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, February 21, 2024),
5, https://doi.org/.
8 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e B-21 and Tactical Creativity
critical state decisions, it is highly unlikely a war would be started on such a whim that
initial failure would lower national resolve.
16
Completing long- range kill chains to meet pulsed operation objectives in a short series
of battles seems feasible, but doing so in a long, potentially escalating war will likely prove
much more difficult. If operators base their training on winning a short- term fight, pain-
ful—or even catastrophic—lessons might ensue.
Pulsed operations are a rational response to peer threats. Yet the implicit correlation of
this concept with standoff tactics in a short conflict reduces the capacity for tactical creativ-
ity and fails to meet the higher- level guidance provided by Secretary Kendall’s operational
imperatives or the tough operational problems any ensuing service leader would face. Even
worse, the defensive advantage—nothing new in modern warfare—has not made peer
adversary defenses invulnerable, but it has made, in most cases, the term standoff inac-
curate for many threats. e CAF will likely be employing weapons within threat rings,
and the weapons themselves are possible to target.
17
In other words, standoff implies a
level of safety or lower risk, combined with mission success, that is misleading. Moreover,
the logic of perpetual standoff is unsustainable; at some point, a platform or weapon must
enter a threat area.
Meanwhile, while the CAF uses the term stand- in for penetrating assets, the truth is
more nuanced. e B-21’s capabilities allow it to be much closer to targets but still outside
threat capabilities. e shorter distance makes weapons considerably more survivable and
the process of striking fleeting or mobile targets more realistic. e reduced distances
necessary for future weapons allow for acquisitional strategies favoring smaller, faster
systems with advanced seekers that provide the mass and persistence lacking with large,
exquisite—and expensive—hypersonics.
A stand- in capability, including a platform such as the B-21, could enable the long- range
kill chain standoff tactics currently favored by the CAF or act as an organic firing solu-
tion—thus not requiring offboard support—for critical threats in GPS and space- denied
environments.
18
e organic targeting aspect is important, as the combination of limited
penetrative assets and rapidly improving adversary threats is pushing the CAF into long-
range kill chain tactics that are inherently inorganic.
ese kill chains require players both in and outside of the Department of Defense to
strike highly contested targets. e Joint force has made laudable efforts to acquire the
resources necessary to implement long- range kill chain tactics. Yet an inescapable issue
remains: each link is a vulnerability, and the more links required for mission success, the
16. Andrew Mertha, “ ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0’: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy
Process,” China Quarterly 200 (December 2009), https://doi.org/.
17. Susie Blann, “Russia Fires 30 Cruise Missiles at Ukrainian Targets; Ukraine Says 29 Were Shot
Down,” AP, May 19, 2023, https://apnews.com/.
18. Eric Heginbotham et al., e U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Bal-
ance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, September 14, 2015), 241, https://www
.rand.org/.
Praiswater & ornhill
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 9
more opportunities an adversary has to disrupt or delay the targeting process.
19
e CAF
can compensate for those vulnerabilities by creating contingency solutions or lobbying for
redundancies, but the latter are not free and require acquisition resources in a contentious
spending environment.
e B-21 and its stand- in capabilities can fill operational shortfalls and address the
tenuous assumptions on which pulsed operations with standoff tactics depend. As adver-
sary systems improve, the B-21 and its family of systems can enable legacy standoff
platforms by eliminating the most critical threats to fifth- generation platforms and
weapons. Most importantly, the B-21 can help address significant hurdles facing the CAF
in theaters requiring pulsed operations. Given the standoff, fighter-centric approaches
currently preferred or required, planners must reckon with four specific challenges.
Limited Fuel
e first assumption Indo- Pacific- region plans rely on is that air and ground refueling
will be available. Given China’s A2/AD capabilities and the so- called tyranny of distance,
the idea that refueling tankers will be able to support fighters even in pulsed operations
is tenuous at best. Tankers will require levels of escort that detract from difficult targeting
operations and depend on accessible basing, not to mention willing Allies and partners
and vulnerable supply chains.
20
Vulnerable Bases
If adversaries choose to employ the full weight of their ballistic arsenal against US
regional bases, those operational headquarters are unlikely to survive. Dispersed ops are a
potential answer, but those tactics have limitations and are still vulnerable to follow- on
strikes.
21
It is telling that wargames in the last decade have focused on whether the United
States will target mainland China in a conflict over Taiwan.
22
Notwithstanding this welcome dose of political realism into planning assumptions,
a decision not to target China seems to be driven by the recognition that if China uses
its substantial missile arsenals to attack US bases in the Indo- Pacific—if not the US
mainland—the Air Force will struggle mightily to counter an invasion of Taiwan. e
combat air forces are not declining to target the Chinese mainland due to potential
19. Heather Penney, “Scale, Scope, Speed & Survivability: Winning the Kill Chain Competition,” Mitchell
Institute Policy Paper 40 (May 2023), https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/.
20. Andrew Tilghman, Guam: Defense Infrastructure and Readiness, R47643 (Washington, DC: Congres-
sional Research Service, August 3, 2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/.
21. Patrick Mills et al., Building Agile Combat Support Competencies to Enable Evolving Adaptive Basing
Concepts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April 16, 2020), https://doi.org/.
22. John Speed Meyers, Mainland Strikes and U.S. Military Strategy towards China: Historical Cases, In-
terviews, and a Scenario- Based Survey of American National Security Elites (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Cor-
poration, December 20, 2019), https://doi.org/.
10 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e B-21 and Tactical Creativity
political realities. Instead, planners hope China will reciprocate by declining to target
Guam, Japan, or other nations due to Xi’s concerns “about the PLA’s ability to fight and
win wars” and the risk of undermining Chinese Communist Party control.
23
Especially since an invasion of Taiwan will already be occurring under devastating po-
litical and economic conditions, it seems beyond fanciful to hope China will cede its great-
est advantage in what would already be a war with the highest stakes imaginable.
24
Even the
assumption that there is a meaningful distinction between the First and Second Island Chains
might be problematic: it is unlikely China would be content to eliminate only Okinawa if
the United States could continue meaningful operations from Guam.
25
Given the fallout
from an invasion of Taiwan, it is logical to assume a Chinese Communist Party leader who
orders such a drastic action would face regime- threatening implications upon failure.
26
Assuming an inherently limited conflict disfavoring the enemy—to enable a preferred
set of tactics—is dangerous. Agile combat employment might mitigate risks to short- range
aircraft, but unless such efforts are flawless, fighters—and tankers, to an extent—cannot
reach the fight or seriously affect it without convenient basing. e 2022 National Defense
Strategy explicitly states that regional base protection, specifically Guam, is a priority, but
the Air Force has largely assumed that the missile defense emphasis and expeditionary
constructs will somehow ensure base viability.
27
Unpredictable Precision Navigational Timing
Despite years of acknowledgment that GPS may not be available or effective before or
during a war, the Joint force remains critically reliant on GPS to employ weapons, especially
against standoff targets. JASSM, for example, requires GPS to reach a final point where
an infrared seeker combined with anti- GPS jamming is effective.
28
is assumption is
dangerous because US adversaries continue to invest heavily in GPS- jamming technology,
not to mention the ability to shoot down the satellites themselves.
29
23. Mark Cozad et al., Gaining Victory in Systems Warfare: China’s Perspective on the U.S.-China Military
Balance (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2023), 113, vi, https://doi.org/.
24. “Invading Taiwan Would Be a Logistical Minefield for China,” Economist, November 6, 2023, https://
www.economist.com/.
25. Derek Grossman, “America Is Betting Big on the Second Island Chain,” RAND Blog, September 8,
2020, https://www.rand.org/.
26. Andrew Mertha, “ ‘Stressing Out’: Cadre Calibration and Affective Proximity to the CCP in Reform-
era China,” China Quarterly 229 (March 2017), https://doi.org/.
27. Anthony H. Cordesman, “e New U.S. National Defense Strategy for 2022,” CSIS, October 28,
2022, https://www.csis.org/.
28. John Keller, “Lockheed Martin to Test and Integrate Extreme- Range Air- to- Ground Missile with GPS
and Infrared Guidance,” Military + Aerospace Electronics, June 5, 2023, https://www.militaryaerospace.com/.
29. Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Military Doubles Down on GPS despite Vulnerabilities,” SpaceNews, August 9,
2021, https://spacenews.com/.
Praiswater & ornhill
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 11
Contested Space Domain
e threat to GPS satellites is clearly not restricted to navigation.
30
e previously
mentioned tactical problem of targeting would be virtually impossible without the space
layer and tactics that allow for target identification and actual weapon targeting—thus the
intricacies and inherent vulnerabilities of long- range kill chains. Difficult enough as a
standoff tactic, these kill chains, without the space layer, which includes much more than
GPS, might prove impractical, at best.
31
e electromagnetic spectrum is also necessary to
complete kill chains, even with a pristine space capability.
32
e recent concern over the
possible Russian deployment of nuclear weapons in space highlights this vulnerability.
33
Given the reality of these four challenges and the nuances of standoff versus stand- in,
embracing the B-21 and discovering how to unlock its tactical creativity can unleash a
devasting physical and psychological weapon. e B-21 does not solve every tactical
problem, but it counters multiple airpower weaknesses and the investments adversaries
have made to defeat the United States.
Unique Capabilities of the B-21
e US Air Force will soon possess an unparalleled and novel asset capable of creating
effects that manipulate the enemy and shape its reactions before or during pulsed opera-
tions. Despite its appearance, the B-21 is not, as some derisively refer to it, a B-2.1. While
both platforms are highly survivable in contested environments, the B-21 earns its sixth-
generation moniker by representing an evolutionary leap in stealth technology.
34
As
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III stated, “Fifty years of advances in low- observable
technology have gone into this aircraft . . . Even the most sophisticated air- defense systems
will struggle to detect a B-21 in the sky.”
35
e CAF must wisely integrate the B-21 into
tactical and operational plans to engender the best possible combat outcomes.
30. Kevin L. Pollpeter, Michael S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham, e Creation of the PLA Strategic Sup-
port Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
November 10, 2017), 9, https://doi.org/.
31. Courtney Albon, “Space Force Seeking $1.2B for ‘Long Range Kill Chains’ Target Tracking,” De-
fense News, March 20, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/.
32. Raj Agrawal and Christopher Fernengel, “e Kill Chain in Space: Developing a Warfighting Mind-
set,” War on the Rocks, October 24, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/.
33. David Sanger and Julian Barnes, “US Fears Russia Might Put a Nuclear Weapon in Space,” New York
Times, February 17, 2024.
34. Mark Gunzinger, Understanding the B-21 Raider: America’s Deterrence Bomber (Arlington, VA:
Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, March 2023), https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/.
35. C. Todd Lopez, “World Gets First Look at B-21 Raider,” Department of Defense (DoD) News,
December 3, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/.
12 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e B-21 and Tactical Creativity
Furthermore, the B-21 is far more flexible, adaptable, and dynamic than the B-2.
36
Organic
firing capabilities allow the B-21 to operate, if necessary, without significant preplanning,
and switching targets or missions airborne is no more difficult than what the CAF became
accustomed to in decades of close air support and dynamic targeting. erefore, the B-21
can enable the long- range kill chain standoff tactics preferred by the CAF or be an organic
firing solution for critical targets in GPS- and space- denied environments.
37
e B-21’s organic capabilities will not make long- range kill chain tactics obsolete;
indeed, the bomber’s sixth- generation characteristics, combined with its unique payload,
offer the ultimate defense against adversary defensive efforts to deplete these kill chains.
A fully resourced B-21 fleet will be able to operate in areas previously considered A2/AD
protected. Stopping the Raider would significantly drain adversary resources and require
an incredible degree of focus in the chaos of battle, both factors that enable current and
future long- range kill chain efforts.
Even if an adversary did discover a way to counter the platform, the Raider’s most
important feature is its modularity. Specifically designed with the space and capability to
integrate emerging systems rapidly, the B-21 is not only a response to current adversary
decisions but also an inherent counter to future enemy plans.
38
Even among the Joint
force, the B-21’s modularity and organic firing capabilities make it the most efficient form
of adapting to a war’s unknowns and adjustments while acting as a backstop for long- range
kill chain effectiveness.
Additionally, just as the B-21 directly contradicts adversary decisions and capabilities
in the electromagnetic spectrum, this sixth- generation jet addresses the CAF’s four major
challenges mentioned in the previous section. A B-21’s inherent fuel efficiency and range
drastically reduce the fuel bill, enabling a contiguous US strike capability and lowering
the dependency on forward bases. e Raider’s nuclear- hardened nature mitigates any
loss of GPS because nuclear- hardened jets are inherently resilient against GPS jamming,
and its full suite of sensors only strengthens its redundancy.
39
Similarly, due to its dynamic
and organic firing capabilities, the B-21 is not dependent on the space layer usually
necessary to execute kill chains against fleeting targets.
40
36. Tara Copp, “Pentagon Debuts Its New Stealth Bomber, the B-21 Raider,” AP, December 3, 2022,
https://apnews.com/.
37. Cameron Hunter, “e Forgotten First Iteration of the ‘Chinese Space reat’ to US National Secu-
rity,” Space Policy 47 (February 2019), https://doi.org/.
38. Stefano D’Urso, “New Photo and Details about B-21 Raider Program and Progress Released,” Avia-
tionist, September 18, 2023, https://theaviationist.com/.
39. Inder Singh Bisht, “USAF Tests B-2 Bomber System for GPS- Denied Environments,” Defense Post,
July 13, 2022, https://www.thedefensepost.com/; and Greg Hadley, “What Happens If GPS Goes Dark? e
Pentagon Is Working on It, Space Force General Says,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, May 12, 2022, https://
www.airandspaceforces.com/.
40. Albon, “Space Force.”
Praiswater & ornhill
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 13
Stand- in with the B-21 also addresses the issues of available weapons rails and the
rising costs of hypersonics and associated upgrades.
41
e Air Force obtains the best strike
efficiencies when prioritizing mass at the lowest possible costs, but depending on fight-
ers—with their limited payloads—carrying standoff weapons results in poor costs per
effect.
42
Again, with limited B-2s and aging legacy bomber fleets undergoing difficult
upgrades, poor strike efficiencies have been prerequisite costs. Yet the B-21 can start a
commitment toward reversing the decades- long trend away from better strike efficiencies.
43
Unless the combat air forces embrace tactical creativity or at least understand the B-21’s
capabilities, however, it will be difficult to inform national leadership how the B-21 could
impact the battlefield and adversary decision- making. It is one thing to threaten the full
force of US conventional capabilities in a manner the enemy has been preparing for; it is
quite another to employ an aircraft capable of operating efficiently at the time and place
of its choosing. While hardly a silver bullet, fully realized, the B-21 could unlock Joint
capabilities and make more palatable solutions possible in a peer conflict if the CAF can
embrace tactical creativity through cultural changes.
44
Beyond the Debates: Tactical Creativity
e key to translating Secretary Kendall’s operational imperatives to the tactical
level—or, at a deeper level, increasing national- leader decision space beyond its current
tactical limits against a peer adversary—is finding a way for the combat air forces to move
beyond the stealth versus non- stealth, fighter versus bomber, and stand- in versus standoff
debates. Cultural adjustments are foundational to such an effort. For decades, the Air Force
has integrated with varying degrees of success against varying levels of opponents. Lever
-
aging the unique capabilities that fifth- and sixth- generation aircraft bring, however, will
require stand- in bombers and their family of systems to play a dynamic and leading role
to which fighter- led combat air forces are unaccustomed.
45
e current emphasis on standoff tactics undergirding pulsed operations is at least some
recognition that the Air Force has moved past the alleged successes of the first Gulf War,
in which even sympathetic accounts, such as those written by former President George
41. Mikayla Easley, “Physics and Cost Are Shaping Pentagon’s Hypersonics Paths,” DefenseScoop, April
11, 2023, https://defensescoop.com/.
42. David Deptula and Douglas A. Birkey, “Resolving America’s Defense Strategy- Resource Mismatch:
e Case for Cost- Per- Effect Analysis,” Mitchell Institute Policy Paper 23 (July 2020), https://mitchellaerospace
power.org/.
43. Mark Gunzinger, “Stand In, Standoff,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, July 1, 2020, https://www.airand
spaceforces.com/.
44. Daniel L. Haulman, “Fighter Escorts for Bombers: Defensive or Offensive Weapons,” Air Power
History 66, no. 1 (2019).
45. S. Rebecca Zimmerman et al., Movement and Maneuver: Culture and the Competition for Influence among
the U.S. Military Services (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, February 25, 2019), https://doi.org/.
14 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e B-21 and Tactical Creativity
Bush, make it clear that the United States was operating against a vastly inferior opponent.
46
Yet the transition to pulsed operations supporting standoff tactics has not—at least
yet—produced a version of the combat air forces radically dissimilar from the forces that
swamped Saddam Hussein in different decades. Furthermore, as numerous pundits and
leaders have pointed out, twenty years of close air support has not prepared the CAF for
a large- scale conflict against a peer adversary.
47
Embracing the B-21’s full capabilities would not mean rejecting pulsed operations or
standoff capabilities. Instead, combat air forces could start to engage the tactical creativity
that a persistent stand- in capability permits, whether as an enabler for pulsed operations,
a roaming threat that distracts the enemy, or—most tantalizingly—a mission- command
platform that dynamically directs pulsed operations against emerging targets. In some
respects, the F-35 Lightning II and F-15EX Eagle II communities have already started
these conversations by examining how a fourth- generation platform can complement
fifth- generation stealth.
48
is integrated vision might seem an obvious goal, but the idea of dynamic stand- in
bombers leading pulsed operations does not exist in current doctrine. is doctrinal
proclivity is not inimical. Rather, it is the natural progression of thought given the Air
Force’s evolution toward fighters in the 1970s. Today, however, the Air Force faces more
existential adversaries.
49
Parochial fights within the service are not unusual, but there is
also an ongoing debate over stealth due to the “threat” that stealth platforms present to
traditional, nonstealth platforms.
50
Unfortunately, the combat air forces are starting from a disadvantageous position regard-
ing stealth. e F-117 Nighthawk’s “retirement” in 2008 left the service with a de facto
niche capability in the B-2 due to its limited numbers, maintenance complications, and
nuclear commitments—that is, tacticians must assume that in any peer- to- peer conflict,
the B-2 might not be readily available due to nuclear alerts.
51
As a result, even with the
46. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1999).
47. omas Greenwood, Terry Heuring, and Alec Wahlman, “e ‘Next Training Revolution’: Readying
the Joint Force for Great Power Competition and Conflict,” Joint Force Quarterly 100, 1st Quarter (2021),
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/.
48. John A. Tirpak, “Joining Up on the F-15EX,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, November 1, 2020,
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/.
49. Zimmerman et al., Movement and Maneuver.
50. Mike Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals: e Problem of Air Force Leadership 1945–1982 (Maxwell
AFB, AL: Air University Press [AUP], 1998); Mike Pietrucha, “Low- Altitude Penetration and Electronic
Warfare: Stuck On Denial, Part III,” War on the Rocks, April 25, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/; Pietrucha,
“Rediscovering Low Altitude: Getting Past the Air Force’s Overcommitment to Stealth,” War on the Rocks,
April 7, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/; and Pietrucha, “e U.S. Air Force and Stealth: Stuck On Denial
Part I,” War on the Rocks, March 24, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/
51. “Special Report: Nuclear Posture Review - 2018,” DoD, accessed January 6, 2024, https://dod
.defense.gov/.
Praiswater & ornhill
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 15
introduction of fifth- generation fighters, planners and tacticians do not appreciate the
B-2’s penetration capabilities and how many targets the stealth fleet can service.
Ironically, the current B-2 community has enabled tacticians’ misperceptions regarding
advanced stealth tactics by embracing an insular culture in line with its highly classified
programs. Air Force leadership has wisely adopted a more open stance with the B-21: its
initial testing has been in broad daylight, and the B-21’s special access classifications
could—in theory—be downgraded, at least in part.
52
Unlike the B-2, this would allow
more tacticians to understand the B-21’s full capabilities and present creative options to
operational and strategic leaders.
Yet reducing classifications is no small task. e Air Force has struggled for decades
with “keeping a high fence around a small yard” to protect innovation advantages while
increasing platform crosstalk.
53
e service should consider the lessons of the F-117 and
General W. L. “Bill” Creech, whose support of the stealth aircraft was contentious. War-
fighters initially could not accept that the F-117 could act “as an enabler of the defense-
rollback strategy as well as a means to strike deep targets of high value.”
54
Above all, the Air Force as a whole must avoid categorical statements such as “stealth
is dead” or “stealth is the price of admission.”
55
e latter statement has been taken out of
context: it never meant that nonstealth platforms were unimportant. Additionally, while
former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Paul Selva acknowledged the constant
race between stealth and counterstealth, he also couched those comments with the as-
sertation that training—and by extension, packaging and planning—were what allowed
stealth to provide an “advantage over your adversary’s detection and targeting systems, not
dissimilar to quieting in submarines.”
56
While sixth- generation stealth assets can still reach stand- in ranges with reduced risk,
they are not white knights single- handedly capable of winning a war. Moreover, the stealth
of fifth- generation aircraft will struggle outside of pulsed scenarios if the CAF refuses to
embrace an integrated approach. Likewise, sixth- generation stealth is only “dead” if
unsupported B-21s are expected to behave as invisible platforms, not platforms utilizing
a family of systems and classified capabilities to achieve persistent stand- in ranges.
57
52. John A. Tirpak, “12 ings We Learned from the New B-21’s Taxi Tests and First Flight,” Air &
Space Forces Magazine, November 22, 2023, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/.
53. Laskai Lorand and Samm Sacks, “e Right Way to Protect America’s Innovation Advantage,” For-
eign Affairs, October 23, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.
54. James Slife, Creech Blue: Gen Bill Creech and the Reformation of the Tactical Air Forces (Maxwell AFB,
AL: AUP, in collaboration with College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, 2004), 59, https://
www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
55. Pietrucha, “Stuck on Denial”; and Josh Wiitala, “e Price of Admission: Understanding the Value
of Stealth,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/.
56. Adam Twardowski, “e Future of US Defense Strategy: A Conversation with General Paul J. Selva,”
Brookings, July 2, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/.
57. Joe Pappalardo, “PM Interview: Air Force Gen. Mark A. Welsh III,” Popular Mechanics, April 15,
2014, https://www.popularmechanics.com/.
16 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e B-21 and Tactical Creativity
A combat air force culture that embraces an integrated approach should recognize the
nuances of stealth, reexamine the roles of traditional bombers versus the B-21, and recap-
ture the ability to balance immediately necessary standoff tactics with an earnest desire
for tactical creativity and stand- in capabilities. Part of this cultural change must include
the Joint force, namely US Strategic Command, and the recognition that a fully capable
B-21 fleet will enable conventional escalation options so influential as to replace tactical
nuclear options.
is is not to imply nuclear certification of the platform should be delayed, although
if it were to impede conventional capabilities, slightly delaying nuclear capabilities should
be acceptable. Rather, agreements should be made now to prevent the type of Strategic
Air Command conflicts that bedeviled planners in Vietnam desperate to maximize the
B-52’s conventional effects when the bombers were committed foremost to the nuclear
Single Integrated Operational Plan.
58
Overall, parochial fights are inevitable given restricted resources and Beltway politics,
but arguably, the most significant issue facing CAF warfighters is the rifts that have seeped
down to the tactical level. ese rivalries are not a luxury the service can afford in a large-
scale conflict against a determined peer adversary. While the comparison might be hyper
-
bole, on its current path—embracing standoff/fighter- based tactics at the expense of a
platform such as the B-21—the CAF could be replicating the disastrous mistakes plagu-
ing past militaries as they chose precious cultural attitudes over necessary evolutions.
59
Conclusion and Recommendations
If the B-21 program—which is still in early testing—remains on track, the Air Force
has a game- changing asset coming sooner rather than later. To that end, there are three
general steps leadership might consider to improve its chances in a near- term conflict.
Expedite Production and Prioritize Testing
History proves accelerating a successful program is a matter of motivation, faith, and
money. e United States famously produced one B-24 per hour at Willow Run during
World War II; less effort is probably necessary to embrace a breakout mindset with the
B-21.
60
Leadership can ameliorate developmental testing—a notoriously complicated
bureaucratic maneuver in Air Force circles—by prioritizing the B-21 over legacy platforms
and the new jet trainer. If testing and funding remain on track, these efforts should yield
58. Gregory Daddis, Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2014).
59. Jonathan B. A. Bailey, “Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned: e Russo- Japanese
War, a Case Study,” in e Past As Prologue, ed. Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, 1st ed.
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 170–94, https://doi.org/.
60. Tim Trainor, “How Ford’s Willow Run Assembly Plant Helped Win World War II,” Assembly,
January 3, 2019, https://www.assemblymag.com/.
Praiswater & ornhill
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 17
operational B-21s able to employ weapons on practice ranges and potentially be conflict-
ready in three to five years, or sooner. In short, the B-21 would be impactful before 2030
and dominant no later than 2035.
Reduce Cost per Kill
Critically, the Department of Defense and Congress should continue their laudable
acquisition efforts with some relatively inexpensive modifications, but the primary focus
must be reducing the target cost per kill. Fully funding next- generation weapons for even
a fledgling B-21 force will unlock more strike efficiency than comparable platforms. And
part of this equation is the right weapons- to- platform matching. For example, taking full
advantage of the B-2 as a stopgap—perhaps by funding GBU-62 integration as soon as
possible—would offer planners an area- targeting option and stimulate tactical creativity.
61
e hypersonic attack cruise missile and other specialized efforts can remain a priority,
but not at the cost of more affordable capabilities or slowing B-21 investment. Numerous
studies have proven that a mostly standoff arsenal is unaffordable, even if the previously
mentioned limitations inherent to such a force did not exist.
62
Concerns expressed in a
RAND Corporation 2011 report that “adversaries may make calculations based on the
size of the US missile inventory”—especially given the cost increases associated with
building increasingly long- range weapons—must still be taken seriously.
63
Recalibrate the Combat Air Forces
If the combat air forces are to embrace the unique capabilities of the B-21 in the future,
they must destroy the “stealth is dead” mindset, of which the insular B-2 community is
partially responsible. Stealth and stand- in platforms are necessary to unlock strike efficiency
and affordable mass, and stealth bombers have capabilities their fighter brethren do not.
Often when planners think stealth, they typically conflate the B-2 and B-21 with more
widely understood fighter characteristics. e remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) community,
largely through the RQ-170, has proven the importance of stand- in stealth, but the fighter
community is approximately three times larger than the bomber and RPA communities
combined.
64
It is only natural that a fighter- led force coerced into standoff preferences
might struggle to embrace a new tool such as the B-21.
61. David Axe, “A Symphony of Bomb Blasts: One after Another, Four Ukrainian JDAMs Apparently
Strike Russian Positions in Bakhmut,” Forbes, April 23, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/.
62. Gunzinger, “Stand In, Standoff.”
63. omas Hamilton, “Comparing the Cost of Penetrating Bombers to Expendable Missiles over irty
Years: An Initial Look,” RAND Working Papers WR-778-AF, March 4, 2011, https://www.rand.org/.
64. Johnny Franks, “Famous Stealthy RQ-170 ‘Sentinel’ Drone Teams for Combat with B-2 & F-35,”
Warrior Maven: Center for Military Modernization, December 15, 2023, https://warriormaven.com/; and
“2021 USAF & USSF Almanac: Specialty Codes,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, June 30, 2021, https://www
.airandspaceforces.com/.
18 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e B-21 and Tactical Creativity
e Air Force must work now to enable its smart investments in fifth- and sixth-
generation stealth fully. Reducing the special accesses required—or easing the read- in
process for most tacticians—for current stealth platforms would be an excellent first step.
Additionally, directing exercises that require dynamic area targeting in heavily defended
airspace is an efficient way to breed tactical creativity and introduce the true level of mis-
sion command envisioned by Air Force leadership.
True strategic processes do not begin until combat starts, and history implies wars will
not happen where or how leaders expect.
65
e B-21, thanks to its generational leap in
stealth technology and modularity, firmly acknowledges that flexibility and adaption are
key to victory. Unfortunately, the realities of treating China and its A2/AD efforts as the
pacing threat have led the combat air forces to minimize operational challenges that will
be critical should a war ignite against any capable opponent: gas is limited, basing is as-
sailable, GPS might not be available, and the space layer is vulnerable. e B-21 offers a
chance to reconsider the relationships between stand- in and standoff and embrace a
movement toward tactical creativity. Q
65. Shane Praiswater, “Reconsidering the Relationship between War and Strategy,” RUSI Journal 168, no.
5 (July 29, 2023), https://doi.org/; and Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2013).
19 AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW
AIR OPERATIONS
e Aireld as a System
Mark D. Callan
US Air Force airfields are partners in airpower with aircraft, but they are also centers of gravity
that cannot maneuver at tempo, making them a potential weakness for adversaries to exploit. If
the Air Force is to prevail in great power competition, it needs to rethink airfield organization.
Systems thinking can help the Air Force reorganize its airfields into maneuverable rhizomatic
teams, mitigating the shortfalls of traditionally organized airfields. is study aims to help Air
Force decisionmakers guide the development of airfield systems whose potential has remained
relatively unexplored.
W
hen one is asked to visualize American airpower, airfields rarely come to
mind. Instead, one would likely conjure the image of a flight of F-100s
menacing the skies over North Vietnam, unending streams of C-54 Skytrains
breaking Stalin’s blockade of West Berlin, or perhaps B-29s lifting off from Tinian to
usher in the atomic age of history. Few would consider the outnumbered airfield defend-
ers of Tan Son Nhut airfield repelling waves of North Vietnamese sappers during the
Tet Offensive; the constant guiding hand of Tempelhof approach controllers bringing
in the endless airflow of the Berlin Airlift; or the resourceful Seabee combat engineers
on Tinian island blasting coral to build B-29-capable runways.
1
Airfields are perhaps a
less sleek and more subtle reminder of American airpower, but airfields and the service
members who defend them, operate them, and build them have always been partners
in airpower right alongside aircraft.
Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Charles Q. Brown’s Accelerate Change
or Lose action orders are now over three years old.
2
In that time, airfields played critical
roles in the Afghanistan retrograde of 2021, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022,
Major Mark Callan, USAF, is an airfield operations officer and chief of the Mobility Operations Support Management
Branch, Mobility Support Operations Division (AMC/A34), Air Mobility Command, and holds a master of arts in emergency
and disaster management from American Military University.
1. Scott Wakefield, “A Look Back at the 377th Security Police Squadron’s Defense of Tan Son Nhut,” Air
Force Global Strike Command – AFSTRAT AIR, September 22, 2022, https://www.afgsc.af.mil/; “MISSIONS:
Tinian,” 6th Bomb Group, accessed August 20, 2023, https://6thbombgroup.com/; and Stewart M. Powell, “e
Berlin Airlift,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, June 1, 1998, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/.
2. Charles Q. Brown Jr., Accelerate Change or Lose (Washington, DC: United States Air Force [USAF],
August 2020).
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 19
20 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) expansionism in the South China Sea in 2023.
3
Yet, airfields are still not organized to best maximize agile combat employment (ACE),
as they remain siloed and parochial.
e US Air Force needs to operate and maneuver airfields at tempo to execute ACE
successfully, but the service is finding that often it cannot do so fast enough to execute the
hub- and- spoke schemes of maneuver. As a result, airfields are putting ACE at risk, and
in turn, the nation’s ability to prevail in great power competition.
is article argues for a change to this status quo: airfields must be reframed, redefined,
and reorganized. First, Air Force leaders must reframe the airfield by acknowledging it is a
center of gravity (CoG)—a strategic focal point—with inherent strengths and weaknesses.
Secondly, leaders must use a system- of- systems framework to redefine airfields and shape
them into systems that mitigate the weakness inherent in CoGs. Finally, the Air Force must
reorganize airfields into smaller, rhizomatic weapon systems equipped with a pioneering,
mission- driven ethos agile enough to keep pace in great power competition.
Centers of Gravity
Many people think of the airfield as infrastructure that supports operations—a minia-
ture city bustling with the activities of combat airpower generation. Yet consider the
distant floating relative of the airfield, the aircraft carrier. Despite its benign name, the
aircraft carrier is instantly recognized around the world as a symbol of American naval
power. When aircraft carriers sail somewhere, it can be a reassuring gesture for Allies and
a not- so- subtle threat to would- be adversaries.
When the Air Force maneuvers an airfield into place, it is an equivalent gesture. Like
aircraft carriers, airfields represent a gateway through which forces many time zones away
suddenly appear in the local environment, shifting the regional balance of power with
little warning. is maneuver and concentration of forces gives air component command-
ers enormous power and makes the airfield into a natural focal point of airpower. is
concentration phenomenon makes an airfield a center of gravity.
Air forces around the world have long understood airfields as CoGs. Early airpower
theorist Italian General Giulio Douhet wrote in 1927 about both the unparalleled of-
fensive potential of aircraft as well as the relative vulnerability of aircraft when they returned
3. Clayton omas et al., U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked
Questions, R46879 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, updated September 17, 2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/; Bradley Martin, D. Sean Barnett, and Devin McCarthy, Russian Logistics
and Sustainment Failures in the Ukraine Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2023), https://doi
.org/; Liam Collins, Michael Kofman, and John Spencer, “e Battle of Hostomel Airport: A Key Moment
in Russia’s Defeat in Kyiv,” War on the Rocks, August 10, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/; and “China Ap-
pears to Be Building an Airstrip on a Disputed South China Sea Island,” AP, August 17, 2023, https://
apnews.com/.
21 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
to land at the “nest.”
4
ough the vulnerability of airfields has been implicitly understood
for decades, a deeper discussion on what explicitly makes airfields a center of gravity is
warranted, because there is little contemporary literature or Air Force doctrine that explains
why. Reframing airfields as CoGs sets the stage for redefining airfields as systems- of- systems
before reorganizing them into something more rhizomatic and pioneering.
Classical Application to Airelds
e term center of gravity translates from the German ein Zentrum der Kraft und Be-
wegung.
5
e term was borrowed from physics by Carl von Clausewitz in the early- nineteenth
century and describes a point of cohesion in an enemy where a striking blow would prove
most effective. e intent of the Newtonian metaphor was to echo the effect of a physical
blow against an object’s literal center of gravity.
6
Clausewitz’s center-of-gravity metaphor
has endured from the Napoleonic era and still finds use among military theorists and
practitioners today. It remains a central concept in Joint warfighting doctrine.
7
Using this classic notion as discussed by Clausewitz reveals four reasons why airfields
are centers of gravity: (1) airfields contain the mass of Air Force forces and act as a hub,
(2) airfields are central to the maneuver of Air Force forces and ground forces, (3) the
geographical location of airfields determines how air campaigns are waged, and (4) airfields
can exert economic and political influence during peacetime as well as wartime.
Mass. Tactically and operationally speaking, airfields contain the mass of Air Force
forces and serve as a hub of activity. Aerial ports, air traffic control towers, aircraft main-
tenance hangars, fuel farms, runways, taxiways, aprons, navigational aid facilities, and the
airfield’s airspace maintain the highest concentration of forces at the point at which aircraft
and personnel are at their most vulnerable for the longest period of time—sitting ducks,
in other words.
8
Maneuver. In terms of logistics, airfields can send and receive inter- and intra- theater
logistics airflow. e ability to maneuver forces from one part of the world to another at
the speed of airlift is what gives the US military a global versus regional influence. Joint
forceable entry operations such as airfield seizures have been used throughout the history
4. Giulio Douhet, e Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press
[AUP], 2019), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
5. Joseph L. Strange and Richard Iron, “Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant,” Joint Force
Quarterly 35 (2004).
6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989).
7. Joint Planning, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
December 1, 2020).
8. Alan J. Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, January 1, 1995), https://doi.org/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 21
22 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
of airpower.
9
Some examples include Russia’s attempted seizure of Hostomel Airport in
the opening days of its invasion of Ukraine (2022), the US seizure of Rio Hato Airfield
during its invasion of Panama (1989), and the Nazi Airborne jump operations on Maleme
airfield in Malta during World War II (1941).
10
Geography. e Air Force needs an airfield, airspace, aircraft, and many other systems
to project airpower. Airfields are the keystone support system that make airpower work.
e location of the airfield changes how airpower is employed. Airfields that are close to
the adversary pose different risks to mission and force than airfields that are distant. Each
has its own advantages and disadvantages. During World War II, Soviets favored airfields
close to the front lines of their advance because proximity gave their air forces the agility
they required to execute combined arms against the Germans.
11
During Operation Odys-
sey Dawn, however, the US Air Force used B-1Bs from Ellsworth Air Force Base, South
Dakota, to strike targets in Libya by flying sorties from the continental United States to
North Africa.
12
Influence. Airfields exert economic and political influence, and they can do so outside
of war. Unlike fighters and bombers which can only kill enemies, practice killing enemies,
or fly near adversaries to remind them that they can kill enemies, airfields controlled or
operated by the military can also be used for a range of operations that are below the
continuum of armed conflict. Examples include humanitarian assistance airlift operations
following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, which tangibly and positively affected the
state’s short- term opinion of the United States, and China’s construction of a ring of
airfields in the South China Sea to exert greater control over territorial claims.
13
Contemporary Application to Airelds
Contemporary center- of- gravity theory focuses on thinking of CoGs as systems that
can be broken down into subsystems, analyzed for weaknesses and then targeted. e Air
Force associates systems- based CoG thinking with Colonel John Warden, who applied his
five- rings targeting methodology while planning air campaigns against Iraq. After the
9. R. F. M. Williams, “e Development of Airfield Seizure Operations in the United States Army,”
Military Review, November 2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/.
10. Collins, Kofman, and Spencer, “Hostomel Airport.”
11. Martin van Creveld, Steven L. Canby, and Kenneth S. Brower, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare
(North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012).
12. Steven J. Merrill, “Ellsworth Airmen Recall Historic Mission 10 Years Later,” Ellsworth Air Force
Base, March 27, 2021, https://www.ellsworth.af.mil/.
13. Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 (Washington, DC: CJCS, June 3, 2019); Kali
Gradishar, “CRE Airmen in Pakistan Relate 2005 Earthquake to 2010 Flood Operations,” Air Mobility
Command, October 12, 2010, https://www.amc.af.mil/; and Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lessons from Department
of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia- Pacific Region (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013).
23 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
success of Operation Desert Storm, contemporary thinking about CoGs grew conceptually
from culminating battles against focal points to include systems- based warfare.
14
Another scholar highlights seven common but not universal systems around which
contemporary CoG literature tends to coalesce: fielded military, leadership, industry,
infrastructure, population, public opinion, and ideology.
15
e Air Force and Western
military thinkers understand the weaknesses of CoGs—as do potential adversaries. e
PRC has grown a systems- based framework of warfare directly in response to the West-
ern use of systems- based targeting frameworks such as Warden’s rings or other contem-
porary CoG analyses.
16
Essentially, centers of gravity like the airfield can be broken down
into subsystems, analyzed for weaknesses, targeted, and neutralized.
17
On a practical level, Air Force planners understand the threat adversaries pose. ey
know that wrestling for air superiority often requires maneuvering their aircraft and ground
forces against an adversary. Allies in World War II, notably the American Air Forces of
the South Pacific, maneuvered in conjunction with Australian ground forces from airbase
to airbase, fighting against Imperial Japanese forces setting up decisive engagements like
the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.
18
Ample Gain, a Cold War series of Allied aircraft cross-
servicing events and forerunner of agile combat employment, used the robust network of
NATO airbases to maneuver combat aircraft around what would be recognized today as
a base cluster.
19
Ample Gain worked because of robust airfield infrastructure, a large
network of NATO bases, and interoperable combat support functions.
e Air Force’s current strategy of agile combat employment, “a proactive and reactive
operational scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines to increase survivability
while generating combat power,” relies on the dispersion of airpower from a main operat-
ing base into basing clusters to complicate enemy targeting.
20
Unlike Ample Gain, ACE
maneuvers both aircraft and airfields to complicate targeting while generating opportunity.
In terms of airfields and CoGs, the Air Force uses ACE to hedge against the inher-
ent vulnerabilities of large, static airfields by relying on the speed and surprise of ma-
neuverable airfields. ACE requires both Air Force aircraft and ground forces to simultaneously
14. Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Lib-
eration Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://doi.org/.
15. Miha Šlebir, “Re- Examining the Center of Gravity: eoretical and Structural Analysis of the Con-
cept,” Revista Científica General José María Córdova 20, no. 40 (December 2022), https://doi.org/.
16. Engstrom, Systems Confrontation; John Warden, “e Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 1
(1995); Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So
at We Can All Speak the Same Language, 2nd ed. (Darby, PA: Diane Publishing, 1996); and JP 5-0.
17. Warden; and Strange.
18. omas E. Griffith Jr., MacArthur’s Airman: General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest
Pacific, 1st ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998).
19. Joint Air Power following the 2016 Warsaw Summit: Urgent Priorities (Kalkar, Germany: Joint Air
Power Competence Centre, October 27, 2017), 98, https://www.japcc.org/.
20. Agile Combat Employment, Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air
Force [DAF], August 23, 2022), 1, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 23
24 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
maneuver in response to emergent threats. Maneuver of aircraft via flush—a type of
launch- for- survival—is a skillset that aircraft had before ACE and one that aircraft still
practice. Yet, Air Force ground forces cannot keep pace because rapid reactive or proac-
tive maneuver of ground forces in response to emergent threats is still not a cultural
norm in the Air Force.
Reframing airfields as CoGs in the classical sense and in the contemporary sense provides
two key insights. First, in the classical sense, airfields have a cohesive identity as a system
that military commanders can employ to achieve effects. Second, in the contemporary sense,
airfields can be dissected into subsystems and targeted by adversaries. e Air Force under-
stands this and actively tries to mitigate this via schemes of maneuver such as ACE.
Systems- of- Systems
Contemporary Wardian CoG analysis hints at the systems- based thinking paradigm
used to define many of society’s and nature’s complex systems. e Air Force needs to
think of airfields as systems so the service can reorganize them into systems that mitigate
their historical vulnerability. e system- of- systems framework breaks down complex
systems such as airfields, allowing the Air Force to understand and reshape them.
Airfield systems possess five characteristics appropriate for the system- of- systems
designation: operational independence, managerial independence, geographic distribution,
emergent behavior, and evolutionary development.
21
Operational Independence
is characteristic is straightforward when looking at airfields. A system is made of
separate component systems that are capable of independent operation. Military airfields
are meta systems with component systems, and they themselves are component systems
in a larger system. As meta systems, they contain component systems such as radar systems,
air traffic control facilities, pavement systems, and lighting systems. Each of these provides
use independent of the others.
22
Airfields are also component systems of larger systems
like the National Airspace System (NAS), within which an airfield operates independently
of the others.
23
Managerial Independence
Component systems are acquired and integrated into a meta system to achieve a specific
purpose. At first glance, military airfields can seem like integrated monolithic entities
21. Andrew Sage and Christopher Cuppan, “On the System Engineering and Management of Systems
of Systems and Federations of Systems,” Information- Knowledge Systems Management 2 (December 1, 2001).
22. Sage and Cuppan.
23. “National Airspace System,” Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), last updated April 20, 2023,
https://www.faa.gov/.
25 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
under the control of a commander; however, airfields are managerially independent of the
systems they are administratively grouped with. An apt example comes from comparing
Chicago O’Hare International Airport to Travis Air Force Base (AFB). e more feder-
ated civil airfield of O’Hare has a diverse and loosely affiliated ecosystem of agencies that
interact for the common goal of generating economic activity.
O’Hare’s airfield, aircraft, logistics operations, housing communities, and security func-
tions are all distinct component systems required for the airport to function. As noted,
the airfield’s systems are run by a loose, federated mix of government, commercial, and
private organizations. Geographically, some of these systems are not run or located out of
Illinois, much less O’Hare itself, but they all collaborate to produce safe, efficient airflow
and economic activity that benefits the region.
24
O’Hare’s comparatively more federated organization contrasts with the 60th Air
Mobility Wing at Travis AFB. Travis is geographically concentrated and under the
management of a wing commander. e wing at Travis AFB has aircraft, an aerial port,
security forces, and basing facilities—including gyms, restaurants, and housing—all within
approximately a mile of the airfield. At first glance, the military airfield appears completely
integrated with the rest of the installation under the command of the wing commander.
Yet upon closer inspection, the airfield and its airspace are unique from the other parts
of Travis AFB. e airfield is part of the NAS, which provides regulatory oversight over
portions of airfield operations. e airfield has its own specialty fire- fighting equipment
and crews, distinct engineering regulations, and specific force protection requirements.
Although the wing commander at Travis has command of its airfield, the authorities,
resourcing, and systems used to run the airfield are not interchangeable with those used
to run the basing. us, it can be said that the airfield at Travis AFB can operate indepen-
dently of the attached base.
Geographical Distribution
e system is often geographically spread out and connected via information exchange.
Airfield operations stretch from the surface to the top of an airfield’s airspace. ey extend
from an airfield’s center point to the edges of approach airspace. Yet component systems
that support the airfield system may be located several feet underground, such as the
airfield lighting system, to several hundred miles above the airfield, such as position,
navigation, and timing satellites. Other typical examples of geographically distributed
component systems include radar towers placed on nearby hills serving airfields in their
proximity, or command- and- control centers located thousands of miles away.
24. Matt O’Shea, Ald. Matt O’Shea: O’Hare’s Facilities Are Aging. Terminal Expansion Plans Are
Crucial to Move Chicago Forward,” Chicago Tribune, January 11, 2024, https://www.chicagotribune.com;
and “Great Lakes Region," FAA (website), last updated March 11, 2024, https://www.faa.gov/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 25
26 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
Emergent Behavior
e system has capabilities that do not reside within the component systems. e career
fields and component systems of air traffic control; radar, airfield, and weather systems
maintenance (RAWS); and airfield management cannot run an airfield by themselves.
When they are combined into a flight and unified under the control of an airfield operations
officer, however, they produce the emergent property of airfield operations.
25
e Air Force
did not mastermind the creation of the airfield operations flight, but rather, air traffic
control was combined with airfield management and RAWS over a series of years to meet
the emergent demands of running an increasingly complex airfield system. Over time, the
chief air traffic control officer came to run the airfield management and RAWS sections
and slowly evolved into the airfield operations officer known today.
Understanding the airfield system and airfield operations as emergent might help explain
why the Air Force does not have a stand- alone body doctrine that describes airfield op-
erations. ere are unique behaviors and properties of airfield systems which might be
considered universal to airfield systems:
a. ey function as adaptable, evolving weapon systems that project tactical-, operational-,
and strategic- level airpower effects.
b. ey perform the function of “anchoring” military air operations to a local terminal node
that concentrates and projects forces into the air and land domains, and potentially space.
c. ey are configurable to meet mission, community, and stakeholder needs.
d. ey are portals between the land, air, and even space domains, just as the airfield’s
floating cousin, the aircraft carrier, is a portal between the maritime and air domains.
26
Airpower effects and commerce pass through the airfield and influence the ground space,
airspace, and political space around them.
e. ey contain infrastructure component systems, but they are not solely infrastructure.
Evolutionary Development
e system grows and evolves over time, never fully forming. Airfields evolve by adding
or specializing their component systems. ey change in response to their stakeholders,
25. Sage and Cuppan, “System Engineering.”
26. Sandra Erwin, “SpaceX Wins $102 Million Air Force Contract to Demonstrate Technologies for
Point-to-Point Space Transportation,” SpaceNews, January 19, 2022, https://spacenews.com; Jane Edwards,
SpaceX Awarded $102M AFRL Rocket Cargo Contract,” GOVCONWIRE, January 20, 2022, https://
www.govconwire.com; and Mike Wall, US Military’s X-37B Space Plane Lands, Ending Record-Breaking
Mystery Mission,” Space.com, November 12, 2022, https://www.space.com.
27 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
nearby communities, and both natural and humanmade threats. An example is Afghani-
stan’s Kandahar Airfield, an airfield built for piston engine aircraft in the 1960s. Kandahar
expanded and changed under Soviet use in the 1980s to accommodate higher performance
aircraft.
27
It expanded again under American use in 2001, and Kandahar continues to
change after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Understanding the airfield as a system of systems helps explain airfield system behavior.
e system- of- systems framework also delineates the basic component systems (table 1).
An understanding of these basic building- block categories enables the reorganization of
airfield systems as CoGs to overcome their inherent weaknesses.
Table 1. Typical airfield component systems
Categories of Systems Examples Narratives
operational surface systems helipad, runway, launch pad,
grass strip
operational surface that launches
and recovers air/spacecraft
air traffic control, landing
guidance, and weather sys-
tems
tactical air navigation (TACAN),
RADARs, terminal instrument
procedures/(non) precision ap-
proaches, GPS
family of systems that guides,
senses, and detects aircraft or
weather conditions in the terminal
environment; provides command
and control of aircraft
command, control,
communication systems
tactical operations center leads, manages aireld system,
conducts C4ISR, early warning,
personnel reporting
emergency service system aireld rescue and reghting,
basic medical care, crashed,
damaged, or disabled aircraft
recovery (CDDAR), explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD), rapid
aireld damage
recovery (RADR)
systems that provide emergency
response, basic medical, triage,
and recovery services necessary
to resume normal aireld opera-
tions
Two things are apparent in table 1. First, some systems on the airfield necessary to airpower
do not support airfield operations—for example, aerial port facilities. Second, some systems
and capabilities necessary to airfield operations are outside the typical airfield operations
organization—for example, civil engineering pavements and airfield lighting technicians.
28
Of note, the component systems in table 1 correspond with the role of the Senior Airfield
Authority.” Additionally, there are some civil engineering functions such as airfield rescue
fire fighting required to perform airfield operations that fall under the Senior Airfield Au-
thority's counterpart, the Base Operations Support Integrator. e current organizational
hierarchy used to run airfields is thus coordination intensive and complex.
27. Monica Whitlock, “Helmand’s Golden Age,” BBC, August 7, 2014, https://www.bbc.co.uk/; and
National Photographic Interpretation Center, Imagery Analysis Report: Disposition of Soviet Air
Forces in Afghanistan and in the USSR along the Afghanistan Border Area as of [redacted],” Z-20056/80,
IAR-0173/80, declassified report (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, August 1980), https://
www.cia.gov/.
28. Contingency Basing, JP 4-04 (Washington, DC: CJCS, January 4, 2019).
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 27
28 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
Reorganizing Airelds
e system- of- systems framework clarifies what an airfield is, what it does, and what
component systems make up the airfield. e next step is reorganizing those airfield
component system building blocks to mitigate CoG- related critical weaknesses. Military
structures are typically organized into a hierarchical structure like a chain of command.
One contemporary design scholar refers to such a structure as a root- tree form of or-
ganization.
29
Root- tree hierarchies form organizations which tend to develop into CoGs.
An alternative hierarchical form to the root- tree form is the rhizome form of organization.
A more rhizomatic form will typically “encompass ideas paradoxical to centralized hier-
archical forms, such as ‘self- organized,’ ‘decentralized,’ ‘nonlinear,’ ‘lacking order,’ and
‘irregular’ or ‘asymmetric’—terms often used in complex security challenges.”
30
Rhizom-
atic organizations are more akin to loosely organized structures that break apart, reform,
and scale as required to accomplish their goal, before breaking apart again.
31
Changing
these hierarchical forms of organization starts with understanding what each excels at.
Root- Tree Form
In the root- tree form, the “trunk” of the tree is a centralized focal point of organization
that governs the “branches” growing off the trunk.
32
US military airfield systems currently
are organized according to the root- tree system. In fact, root- tree hierarchy is the organiz-
ing principle of Air Force bureaucracy. In a typical wing, flights are nested under squadrons,
which are nested under groups, which are nested under the wing. e wing commander
is the focal point of decision and leadership. e wing commander is represented by the
trunk where the branches all grow from. Airmen executing the mission represent the end
branches farthest from the trunk. Once Airmen learn the root- tree logic of wing organi-
zation, they can walk into any squadron and understand how a squadron in a different
wing is organized in a similar way.
Air Force airfields—root- tree organizations—and the rest of the entities operating on
the airfield adhere to a standard military hierarchy that values efficiency.
33
Each function-
based organization builds its own separate and parallel hierarchy. Each “siloed” hierarchy
in these function- based organizations has independent versions of specialized workers,
supervision, command posts, and so on.
e airfields’ industrial- era Taylor- esque silos organize these systems in a root- tree
form. is works well when a typical sequence of aircraft operations occurs: an aircraft
29. Ben Zweibelson, Beyond the Pale: Designing Military Decision- Making Anew (Maxwell AFB, AL:
AUP, 2023), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
30. Zweibelson, 225.
31. Zweibelson.
32. Zweibelson.
33. Stanley McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World, 1st ed. (New
York: Portfolio, 2015); and Zweibelson.
29 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
coordinates to arrive at the airfield; the aircraft enters the airfield’s airspace, lands, and
taxis to a predetermined parking spot; the aircraft and crew are regenerated; then the
aircraft taxis, takes off, and exits airspace. is sequence is aircraft- centric—that is, processes
are organized with reference to the aircraft—and each individual step in the process is
supported by a specialized system with its own hierarchy.
is sequence of operations runs on procedural flow with respect to the aircraft and
does not emphasize communications and relationships between systems in the sequence.
e result is that each specialized system has its own way of coordinating with the aircraft.
For example, during the flight back to an airfield an aircraft might communicate with a
military- owned approach control, an air traffic control tower, supervisor of flying, a
maintenance operations center, an air terminal operations center, the airfield management
desk, and a base’s command post.
Rhizome Form
True agility will require the Air Force to change the form of its hierarchies. Root- tree
form hierarchies have their virtues and efficiencies, but the structure is not optimal for
producing small interdisciplinary teams that can effectively execute agile combat employ-
ment. e functional silos resulting from root- tree hierarchies are incentivized and orga-
nized to build connections vertically within the silo from the tactical up through the
operational and strategic levels of war.
Generating flexible teams capable of ACE in response to a dynamic threat will require
the Air Force to integrate an alternate form of organization known as the rhizome type.
e rhizome is a horizontal root system capable of producing new shoot- and- root plants
aboveground from the same root system underground, such as turmeric or ginger plants.
34
e effect is that one root system grows plant systems distributed across the ground,
creating a resilient network.
Rhizome form, compared to the Aristotelian root- tree form, represents a postmodern
means of organizational hierarchy. One analysis uses the analogy of the traditional library
network versus the hyperlinked nature of the internet to characterize the root- tree-to-
rhizome comparison.
35
In deconstructing why the Joint Special Operations Task Force
retired Army General Stanley McChrystal commanded from 2003 to 2008 initially failed
to decisively counter al- Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a violent extremist jihadist organization,
McChrystal and his coauthors point to the root- tree characteristics of the US military
versus the rhizomatic nature of the jihadist network.
36
To match the adaptability and tempo
34. Encyclopaedia Brittanica Online, s.v., “Rhizome,” last updated March 22, 2024, https://www.britan-
nica.com/.
35. Lyn Robinson and Mike Macguire, “e Rhizome and the Tree: Changing Metaphors for Informa-
tion Organisation,” Journal of Documentation 66, no. 4 (2010), https://doi.org/.
36. McChrystal et al., Team of Teams.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 29
30 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
of the inherently horizontal, rhizomatic, and dispersed al- Qaeda insurgency, McChrystal
transformed the task force command structure into a flatter, more horizontal hierarchy.
37
e vast majority of airfield systems are organized in a root- tree hierarchy and struggle
to adapt and maneuver at tempo against adversaries. Yet today there are a select few airfield
systems that can maneuver and adapt; these systems are notably rhizomatic. Contingency
response is one such organization.
Contingency response forces are what the Air Force calls an “open the base” force, al-
though this is somewhat of a misnomer.
38
ey deploy to a location and, as long as the
location has a suitable surface to land aircraft on, these forces open an airfield. Generally,
once an airbase is opened, strategic and tactical airlifters such as the C-17 and C-130 start
landing and flowing personnel and materiel through the airfield, which serves as an aerial
port of debarkation.
Of note, contingency response teams only bring enough base operations support equip-
ment to support themselves for approximately 45 to 60 days. e bed down of contingency
response personnel is completely dependent on the terrain, the enemy, and the existing
structures proximate to the airfield. Generally speaking, however, they will bed down in
the immediate vicinity of the airfield they are operating.
Contingency response forces train in garrison to ingress to a potential airfield site,
assess the airfield, and then receive fixed- wing mobility aircraft. A contingency response
squadron has a cross- section of aircraft maintenance, security forces defenders, aerial port
logistics, fuels, airfield operations, communications, civil engineering, command and
control Airmen, and other specialized Airmen who provide services such as weather
forecasting and defense against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear threats.
A typical contingency response group is made up of contingency response squadrons
and support squadrons. Groups have 36 unique Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) of
Airmen and train their Airmen to work in small, functional teams. ese teams are not
specific hierarchical silos. Rather, contingency- response teams are a cross- section of all
the hierarchies by design.
In terms of system classification, contingency response forces are a system- of- systems
made up of many diverse component systems. e main component systems used for
military airfield operations are an airfield system, a logistics system, an aircraft system, and
a force- protection system.
For example, a contingency- response team is a deployable team of Airmen that belongs
to a contingency response squadron. e team of roughly 22 to 25 Airmen is typically led
by a senior noncommissioned officer. is team can assess and open an airfield, sustain
and protect itself at that airfield, perform air traffic or landing zone operations, perform
airfield management, perform basic survey and civil engineering functions, exercise
37. Zweibelson, Beyond the Pale.
38. Air Mobility Operations, Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-36 (Washington, DC: DAF, June 28,
2019), Appendix C: Air Mobility Support and Contingency Response Elements.
31 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
command and control of an airfield, and perform continuous aerial port operations, one
aircraft at a time for 12 hours.
39
Because contingency response teams have aerial port logistics built into the structure,
they can pack up their footprint and move themselves via airlift. is ability may seem
mundane, but it is what makes these teams maneuverable. Most other squadrons in the
Air Force—and indeed, across the entire Joint force—do not have this ability because it
does not fall into their specialized siloed hierarchy. Most Air Force units do not have the
know- how and specialized aerial port personnel and materiel to move themselves, and as
a result, they cannot maneuver themselves out of harm or into an advantageous position.
Contingency response teams, like rhizomes, are dynamic. e traditional vertical root-
tree airfield hierarchies are largely dissolved and flattened. Teammates share larger amounts
of interoperability, allowing them to perform airfield, logistical, maneuver, and combat
operations while maintaining a smaller footprint. ese teams can combine with each
other, and with a few additional personnel added as a coordination overhead, they can
scale to form larger elements. For the ACE base cluster use case, the ability of contingency
response teams to move themselves via airlift is ideal. ey can be thought of as a well-
rounded system of systems that open an airfield system to execute logistics and—when it
is time to maneuver—as a logistics system that configures itself into self- loading cargo.
Figure 1 compares rhizomatic airfield systems such as contingency response teams to
their root- tree form hierarchical counterparts. While not an exhaustive list of component
systems that form these teams or air task forces, the figure illustrates the differences between
root- tree and rhizomatic system- of- system groupings. e alpha level cannot be broken
down further; the delta level represents groupings whose component systems are themselves
systems of systems. e levels of system groupings (alpha, beta, etc.) denote the level of
complexity, with alpha representing the simplest system level and delta the most complex.
40
e Air Force needs more airfields that can maneuver themselves in small rhizomatic
packages—airfield systems that look a lot like contingency response teams. ese airfields
would feature component systems from aircraft, logistics, force protection, basing, and
other airfield systems to establish a system capable of projecting airpower in the right place
and at the right time.
Such rhizomatic maneuverable airfields systems must be produced in large enough
quantities that they can form networks of homogenous contingency response teams which
can then combine or separate into diffused networks of airfields that maneuver in conjunction
with aircraft. is network would support and complement the large, static, and root-tree-
form main operating bases. e teams could move along the axis of advance, executing
the ground scheme of maneuver in an air campaign.
39. Contingency Response, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.7 (Washington, DC: Secre-
tary of the Air Force, March 3, 2022), https://static.e- publishing.af.mil/.
40. D. A. DeLaurentis, “A Taxonomy- Based Perspective for Systems of Systems Design Methods,” Pro-
ceedings of the 2005 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics 1 (2005), https://doi.org/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 31
Figure 1. Rhizomatic and root- tree system- of- systems groupings
33 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Airfield as a System
Pioneer Culture
e Air Force must invest in the culture required to operate maneuverable airfields.
is starts with creating an organization that supports a pioneering ethos, which is a
prerequisite for scaling the number of rhizomatic organizations. Such a shift to a rhizom-
atic culture calls for teams staffed with strategically aware, high- initiative noncommissioned
officers operating alongside company and field grade officers who are technically adept.
is flattened rhizomatic organization would comprise self- sufficient, mission- driven
problem solvers who get the job done creatively and effectively in a dynamically unfolding
environment. ese so-called Pioneer teams would be comfortable operating on their own
initiative in maneuvering and executing the mission.
Pioneer teams would live on the edges of the known and unknown, providing a ma-
neuverable airfield capability. Pioneer teams are not envisioned as special operational forces
(SOF). In the Air Force context, they would be the forces that bridge the gap between
SOF and the cultural mainstream of the Air Force. Pioneer team culture should be slightly
more discerning than traditional Air Force forces but more scaled and reproducible than
SOF. Individual Pioneers would value resiliency, self- sufficiency, technical acumen, and
initiative. Pioneer teams would value flat communication, aggressive problem solving, and
cross- trained skill redundancy, such that each individual team member would be a jack-
of- a- few- trades and the master of one.
Contingency response forces in Air Mobility Command, Pacific Air Forces, US Air
Forces in Europe, the Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve have already started to
foster the pioneering spirit by organizing Airmen into diverse squadrons built around the
contingency response mission, creating a contingency- response Airmen identity. e Air
Force must amplify this effect and supplant its primary AFSC identity with the contingency-
response identity. Contingency- response Airmen must become contingency- response
Airmen first and foremost via distinctive AFSCs, dress, and organizational values.
Finally, the Air Force should change the promotion system to value pioneer thinking
and values while creating viable career paths that recognize Airmen who excel in flat,
rhizomatic organizations. e traits that would help Pioneer Airmen excel in dynamic
environments are different than those of Airmen who excel in the traditional root- tree
hierarchy.
41
Contingency response Airmen would be ideal Pioneer Airmen. A Pioneer
corps would accelerate organizational learning and reinforce the ethos required to execute
rhizomatic “team- of- teams” hierarchies. Finally, it would allow the Air Force to obtain a
higher return on investment when teaching specialized perishable skills in a multicapable
Airmen setting—skills such as specialized fueling operations, landing- zone operations,
shoot- move- communicate, advanced field craft, or weighing, marking, and joint inspection.
41. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2018).
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 33
Recommendations and Conclusion
e Air Force needs to increase the number of contingency- response- team- like rhizomatic
airfield systems to complement the Air Force’s existing network of static airfields. A Pioneer
organization could focus on the organization, train, and equip mission for all contingency
response and contingency- response- like maneuverable airfield mission sets within the Air
Force. How should the Air Force tailor its systems? How does it expand the contingency-
response rhizomatic concept across the Air Force? e recommendations are threefold.
First, the Air Force needs to make the airfield a major weapon system akin to other non-
aircraft weapon systems, such as the Guardian Angel Weapon System, used for combat
search and rescue and personnel recovery. Although the airfield has long been acknowledged
informally as such within the Air Force, the service- wide designation of airfields as weapon
systems is a necessary step to accelerate their development. Such a designation is also a step
in the right direction toward running the enterprise of airfields that range from the large,
static root- tree systems to the small, rhizomatic maneuverable systems.
Secondly, similar to other Air Force nonaircraft weapon systems, contingency- response-
team- like maneuverable airfield systems should be associated with organic airlift. Organic
airlift allows maneuverable airfield systems to seize the initiative when they sense a
window of opportunity or reposition when in imminent danger. is point is only reinforced
by challenges in the Indo- Pacific where the tyranny of distance, the possibility of degraded
command and control, and the threat of near- peer aggression emphasize the need for the
ability to rapidly maneuver.
Lastly, Air Force leaders should capitalize on the effectiveness of maneuverable airfield
systems that can perform agile combat employment by integrating airfield systems into
Joint all-domain command and control. Airfields are natural platforms for command- and-
control- related functions since position, navigation, and timing and two- way communica
-
tion equipment are required for all- weather airfield operations.
Airfields work hand in hand with aircraft to project airpower. e Air Force needs
rhizomatic airfield systems similar to contingency response teams, which are powered
by a pioneer ethos to maneuver and project airpower while mitigating the critical weak-
nesses associated with them as centers of gravity. e Air Force must invest in the unique
programs, cultures, and values required to maneuver airfields to succeed in today’s great
power competition. Q
34 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 35
AIR OPERATIONS
Analytic Standards in the Context of
Military Intelligence
JaCk DuffielD
Scholarship of analytic standards generally focuses on their application in strategic intelligence
assessments. Yet analytic standards are underexplored in other environments, particularly tacti-
cal and operational military intelligence analyses. ese environments challenge many assump-
tions that generally underpin the implementation of analytic standards, including multi- analyst
quality control chains and a focus on rigor as the primary measure of quality. e US Air Force’s
implementation of analytic standards offers an illustration of how such standards can be applied
in military intelligence environments. To successfully employ analytic standards in tactical and
operational intelligence environments, emphasis must be placed on accrediting analysts themselves
as well as their output. e rigor- led model of analytic standards must also be broadened to give
greater weight to other attributes of quality intelligence analysis.
A
nalytic standards for intelligence analysis gained prominence in the revelations of
the structural intelligence failures preceding 9/11 and the flawed assessment of
the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. ese two high-
profile intelligence failures prompted much soul- searching in Western intelligence orga-
nizations.
1
A consensus emerged that a long- term decline in the quality of intelligence
analysis and assessment had occurred, which could only be reversed by implementing new
processes and principles.
2
is course of events resulted in the development of standards for intelligence analysis,
particularly in the United States and United Kingdom.
3
e Office of the Director of
National Intelligence’s (ODNI) Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, for ex-
ample, calls for intelligence products to be objective, independent of political consideration,
timely, based on all available sources of information, and in line with further specific
Flight Lieutenant Jack Duffield, an officer in the Royal Air Force and a Chief of the Air Staff ’s Fellow, holds a master of arts
in international relations from Staffordshire University, United Kingdom.
1. John A. Gentry, “Has the ODNI Improved U.S. Intelligence Analysis?,” International Journal of Intel-
ligence and CounterIntelligence 28, no. 4 (2015), https://doi.org/.
2. Alexandru Marcoci et al., “Better Together: Reliable Application of the Post-9/11 and Post- Iraq US
Intelligence Tradecraft Standards Requires Collective Analysis,” Frontiers in Psychology 9 (2018): 1, https://
doi.org/.
3. David R. Mandel, Tonya L. Hendriks, and Daniel Irwin, “Policy for Promoting Analytic Rigor in In-
telligence: Professionals’ Views and eir Psychological Correlates,” Intelligence and National Security 37, no. 2
(2022), https://doi.org/.
36 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Analytic Standards in the Context of Military Intelligence
standards including common terminology for uncertainty and confidence levels.
4
Such
standards are designed to improve the quality and effectiveness of intelligence analysis
across the US Intelligence Community (IC). Yet these standards—still in place today—
focus heavily on intelligence analysis at the strategic level. is is unsurprising, given that
they were developed in response to strategic intelligence failures; however, this focus brings
into question their relevance for intelligence analysis outside of this context.
Strategic intelligence has an intuitive meaning: it generally describes intelligence activities
that are of interest to political leaders at an international level.
5
It is in this context that the
term strategic is generally used by scholars of intelligence studies. is reflects military
terminology, where the strategic level incorporates government- wide priorities and interna-
tional concerns, and intelligence analysis influences the highest level of decision- making.
6
Military doctrine defines two other levels of activity below this—operational and
tactical—where military campaigns are organized and where individual missions are
planned and executed, respectively.
7
Military intelligence analysts are expected to work
across all three levels of activity. Yet in addition to a general lack of scholarship on military
intelligence, there is a notable academic bias in favor of the strategic level of intelligence
analysis. is makes studying analytic standards for military intelligence particularly
challenging.
8
is article aims to address this gap in the understanding of analytic standards
by exploring their application in operational- and tactical- level intelligence environments.
Because of the relative lack of scholarship on military intelligence in intelligence stud-
ies, this article takes a comprehensive approach to this exploration, deconstructing the
concept of analytic standards and exploring its core characteristics, thus determining their
applicability beyond the strategic level. ese characteristics demonstrate that the rigor- led
approach to analytic standards does not apply sufficiently to tactical and operational intel-
ligence environments, and alternative means of enforcing standards, such as those used by
the US Air Force, are necessary to overcome this limitation.
4. Analytic Standards, Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 and Technical Amendment (McClean,
VA: Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], 2015, 2022), 2–3, https://www.odni.gov/.
5. Loch K. Johnson, Handbook of Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge, 2007), 1.
6. UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), Allied Joint Doctrine, NATO Allied Joint Publication-01, F ed., v. 1
(Bristol, UK: MOD and NATO Standardization Office, 2017), 1–9, https://assets.publishing
.service.gov.uk/; and UK Defence Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, 6th ed. (Bristol, UK:
MOD, November 2022), 43, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/.
7. JDP 0-01, 43.
8. Gareth Evans, “Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure: Putting the Wheels Back on the Intelligence
Cycle,” Defence Studies 9, no. 1 (2009): 23; and John A. Gentry, “e ‘Professionalization’ of Intelligence
Analysis: A Skeptical Perspective,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 29, no. 4 (2016):
659, https://doi.org/.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 37
Rigor and Standards in Intelligence Analysis
e nature of analytic standards and the related concept of analytical rigor is still a
matter of some debate. While analytical rigor generally refers to the thoroughness of
intelligence tools and techniques employed in analysis and assessment, analytic standards
refer to the broader attributes of an intelligence product that make it effective, one of
which is rigor. Resolving the debate about the connection between the two is key to un-
derstanding how analytic standards apply beyond the strategic level. e first step in
applying analytic standards to tactical and operational military intelligence is therefore
understanding the relationship between rigor and standards in intelligence analysis.
Analytical Rigor
e general perception of analytical rigor is that it indicates reliability and thoroughness,
as opposed to demonstrating inflexibility or reflecting an analyst’s inability to change their
point of view.
9
Such rigor is a desirable outcome for intelligence, and it is therefore no
surprise that key analytic standards documents such as ODNI’s Intelligence Community
Directive 203 and the UK’s Professional Head of Intelligence Assessment’s (PHIA)
“Common Analytic Standards” consider rigor central to sound intelligence analysis.
10
Beyond this fundamental concept, however, there is some disagreement on how to further
characterize analytical rigor.
By one definition, analytical rigor is input- focused, that is, contained within the processes
by which intelligence analysis is conducted. ese processes, referred to within the United
States’ IC as analytical tradecraft, are designed to eliminate biases and assumptions and
in turn encourage quality analysis.
11
Analytical tradecraft ranges from basic processes for
interpreting intelligence collection to structured analytical techniques. ese techniques,
such as backcasting and analysis of competing hypotheses, increase rigor by breaking down
intelligence problems, highlighting both assumptions and the basis for assessments. For
some, structured analytical techniques are the bedrock of process rigor, although criticism
of this approach has persisted over the years.
12
9. Daniel J. Zelik, Emily S. Patterson, and David D. Woods, “Understanding Rigor in Information
Analysis,” in Proceedings of the Eighth International NDM [Naturalistic Decision Making] Conference, ed.
K. Mosier and U. Fischer (Pacific Grove, CA: NDM, June 2007): 1.
10. ICD 203, 2–4; and Professional Head of Intelligence Assessment (PHIA), Professional Development
Framework for All- Source Intelligence Assessment (London: Joint Intelligence Organisation, January 2019), 26,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/.
11. Gentry, “ODNI,” 641.
12. Stephen Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis: Structured Methods or Intuition?,” American Intelligence
Journal 25, no. 1 (2007): 14, https://www.jstor.org/; Robert D. Folker Jr., “Intelligence Analysis in eater
Joint Intelligence Centers: An Experiment in Applying Structured Methods,” Occasional Paper 7 (Washing-
ton, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, January 2000), 8, https://irp.fas.org/; and Welton Chang et al.,
“Restructuring Structured Analytic Techniques in Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 33, no. 3
(2018), https://doi.org/.
38 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Analytic Standards in the Context of Military Intelligence
Even outside the realm of highly structured techniques, some believe analytic standards
should be evaluated in terms of the quality of the analytical processes that contributed to
an assessment, adopting the viewpoint that procedural rigor creates good intelligence
analysis.
13
According to this approach, analytic standards are intrinsically linked to pro-
cedural rigor.
e other approach to characterizing analytical rigor is output- focused. is alternative
viewpoint considers a wider range of attributes that contribute to rigor. Rather than focus-
ing on the quality of the processes, it instead focuses on the quality of the finished intel-
ligence product. For example, one 2007 study of analytical rigor introduces the concept
of sufficient rigor, where analytic standards are evaluated in terms of sufficiency across
multiple attributes visible in an intelligence product.
14
is approach characterizes ana-
lytical rigor primarily in terms of what is delivered to customers rather than what process
is employed in analysis: this notion of sufficient product rigor ensures that intelligence
analysis is translated into useful outputs.
Both approaches—process- and product- focused—differ primarily in where they place
the emphasis when judging the quality of intelligence analysis. Some scholars argue these
approaches are not mutually exclusive and instead describe analytic standards at two
different stages of intelligence analysis. ey posit that process rigor is required for effec-
tive analytic work, while product rigor is required for quality intelligence outputs.
15
It appears that the use of the term rigor to describe the overall standard of an intelligence
product creates unnecessary confusion. Studies that aim to investigate rigor frequently in-
corporate other attributes beyond thoroughness of analytic reasoning, suggesting rigor is not
the sole measure of quality. Examples of this might include clarity of communication, audit-
ability, and effective sourcing, or the degree to which intelligence requirements are met. is
is reflected in ICD 203. In addition to defining a different relationship between standards
and rigor and alongside the characteristics of process rigor, ICD 203 also includes broader
attributes of an intelligence product—such as timeliness and use of visual information—as
analytic standards.
16
e separation between process rigor and wider analytic standards is more evident in
the PHIA analytic standards for the UK, where rigor is identified as one of the eight
components of analytic standards and is characterized by “processes, tools and techniques
appropriate to the intelligence requirement in order to be able to show logical and coherent
13. Patrick F. Walsh, “Improving Strategic Intelligence Analytical Practice through Qualitative Social
Research,” Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 5 (2017): 560, https://doi.org/.
14. Daniel J. Zelik, Emily S. Patterson, and David D. Woods, “Judging Sufficiency: How Professional
Intelligence Analysts Assess Analytic Rigor,” in Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society An-
nual Meeting 51, no. 4 (October 2007): 318; and Zelik, Patterson, and Woods, “Understanding Rigor,” 1.
15. Ashley Barnett et al., Analytic Rigour in Intelligence (Melbourne, Australia: University of Melbourne,
April 2021), 14, https://cpb- ap- se2.wpmucdn.com/.
16. ICD 203, 2–4.
Duffield
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 39
reasoning.”
17
More recent scholarship of intelligence analysis is also beginning to conform
to this viewpoint, where rigor is one part of a broader set of analytic standards.
18
ough
rigor is important to sound intelligence analysis, it is but one attribute of an effective intel-
ligence product.
e scholarly focus on analytic rigor has two causes. One is that the high- profile shocks
that kickstarted modern interest in analytic standards were both failures of analytical rigor
specifically. In the case of the National Intelligence Estimate for WMD in Iraq, poor rigor
in strategic intelligence assessment was identified as a primary issue, which paved the way
for subsequent shortfalls in independence, objectivity, and auditability.
19
e US commis-
sion report on WMDs noted an absence of common standards for analysis led to a
shortfall in rigor, and pointed out that this had been identified in various earlier reports
on the IC, but before the early 2000s, it had largely been ignored.
20
is criticism is echoed
for the UK in the Chilcot Report, which singles out a poor standard of analytical rigor as
the key contributor to intelligence failures preceding the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
21
For 9/11, poor analytical rigor again played a defining role in the Intelligence Com-
munity’s failure to predict al-Qaeda’s large- scale terrorist attack in the United States.
22
e 9/11 Commission Report stated that while techniques and processes were available for
improving analytical rigor, they had not been iterated upon or applied effectively across
the IC.
23
Because of the particular focus given to analytical rigor rather than other at-
tributes of intelligence analysis in these reports, the subsequent significant academic and
policy emphasis on it is perhaps unsurprising.
Yet this masks a second, more fundamental cause for the academic focus on analytical
rigor. Analytical rigor received such attention in the study of strategic intelligence analy-
sis because it is a priority for strategic- level intelligence itself. is characteristic emerges
from the nature of strategic intelligence, which is to tackle the largest and most complex
intelligence problems.
24
In support of strategic decision- making, such as the invasion of
another country, the thoroughness of an assessment becomes the primary focus. Further,
in order to be concise—to be consumable by senior decisionmakers—strategic intelligence
17. PHIA, Professional Development Framework, 26.
18. Barnett et al., Analytic Rigour, 21.
19. “e October 02 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),” PBS Frontline, posted June 20, 2006,
https://www.pbs.org/.
20. Laurence H. Silberman et al., e Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Report to the President of the United States (Washington, DC: Commission
on Intelligence Capabilities Regarding WMD, 2005), 389, https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/.
21. Iraq Inquiry, e Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary
Office, 2017), 114, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/.
22. Douglas Porch and James J. Wirtz, “Surprise and Intelligence Failure,” Strategic Insights 1, no. 7
(2002): 3–4, https://apps.dtic.mil/.
23. omas Kean and Lee Hamilton, e 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 346–48.
24. Walsh, “Strategic Intelligence,” 551.
40 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Analytic Standards in the Context of Military Intelligence
products must effectively distill these broad problems, requiring structured rigor. At the
most fundamental level, the focus on analytical rigor in scholarship of intelligence analy-
sis, as well as in key analytic standards documents, is caused by the primacy of rigor above
other attributes of timely, relevant, and meaningful strategic intelligence analysis.
Deconstructing analytic standards and analytical rigor has revealed several important
implications for these standards in operational and tactical military intelligence. First, it
recognizes the applicability of analytic standards for improving intelligence analysis.
Second, it separates analytical rigor—the thoroughness of intelligence tradecraft employed
in analysis and assessment—from analytic standards, or the broader attributes of an intel-
ligence product that make it effective. ird, it demonstrates that the specific character-
istics of strategic intelligence analysis mean that some analytic standards—in this case,
rigor—are of greater importance in strategic analysis.
is suggests that at the tactical and operational levels of warfare there may also be
different characteristics that lead to different priorities for analytic standards. To identify
how analytic standards apply beyond the strategic level, a greater understanding of military
intelligence analyses in these environments is required.
Tactical and Operational Intelligence Analysis
Military intelligence draws from procedural and disciplinary elements of both intel-
ligence organizations and armed services.
25
In common with civilian intelligence agencies,
military intelligence performs a range of functions which are often represented in an intel-
ligence cycle. e debate regarding the merits and utility of the intelligence cycle would
fill an entire article of its own; however, for the purpose of this article the broad categories
it defines—direction, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination—are useful in
thinking about core intelligence activities.
26
ough intelligence activities in the United
States and the United Kingdom encompass all of these stages, analytic standards chiefly
concern the analysis stage. Examining this part of military intelligence work will identify
how the assumptions of mainly strategic analytic standards may change in tactical and
operational environments.
Tactical Intelligence
At the tactical level, military intelligence analysis has several distinguishing charac-
teristics. For one, intelligence analysis teams are often much smaller than they are in
25. Jack Duffield, “Military Intelligence as a Dual Professional Identity: A Response to ‘Military–Intel-
ligence Relations: Explaining the Oxymoron,’ ” letter to the editor, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, published online January 3, 2024, 2, https://doi.org/.
26. Michael Warner, “e Past and Future of the Intelligence Cycle,” in Understanding the Intelligence
Cycle, 1st ed., ed. Mark Phythian (London: Routledge, 2013), 17–19, https://doi.org/.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 41
strategic environments.
27
is is not only an inevitable consequence of deployed opera-
tions, where the number of personnel placed in harm’s way must be as small as possible,
but it is also a fact of scale. Across multiple units, each potentially with taxing deployment
schedules and shift patterns, even a large number of analysts are quickly spread thin.
Intelligence analysts below the strategic level are also often reporting to a small customer
base, such as operational commanders and other units with overlapping areas of intel-
ligence interest.
28
In many cases, tactical intelligence analysts will be directly subordinate
to their principal customer, who strongly influences priorities for intelligence output.
Moreover, in this environment, intelligence analysis must be highly focused. Operational
relevance becomes vital, and intelligence assessments are often tailored to the unit being
supported.
29
Analysts are further required to be familiar with the capabilities they are
supporting. To triage incoming reporting and make useful assessments, intelligence analysts
must understand operating environments, friendly defensive capabilities, likely missions
and potential operating areas, as well as the assumptions underpinning risk decisions.
A final distinguishing characteristic of tactical intelligence analysis is the short time-
scales involved. A full cycle of planning and execution can occur in fewer than 24 hours,
and military capabilities are consistently held at the shortest possible readiness level,
measured in hours or even minutes.
30
Providing intelligence analysis inside these narrow
time frames is atypical for strategic intelligence analysts, who are not usually expected to
deliver finished products in response to near real- time requirements outside of crisis
scenarios.
31
Even beyond the deployed environment, large- scale deep dives into intelligence
problems are rarely the most effective use of a tactical analyst’s time. A broad understand-
ing of the strategic picture is generally sufficient to contextualize tactical intelligence work.
Operational Intelligence
For operational- level intelligence analysis, many of the same principles apply, but to a
lesser extent. is is understandable, given that the operational level of warfare is doctrin-
ally a midpoint between tactical and strategic levels of warfare. Intriguingly, a recent study
has questioned the very existence of the operational level of warfare; however, as it remains
an accepted and central component of current Western military doctrine and organizations,
the operational level of warfare certainly merits exploration in its own right.
32
27. Phillip Surrey, “Air Mobility Intelligence: Survivability in the Contested Environment,” Air and Space
Operations Review 1, no. 3 (2022): 39, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
28. Evans, “Rethinking,” 30; and MOD, Intelligence, Counter- Intelligence and Security Support to Joint
Operations, JDP 2-00 (Bristol, UK: MOD, August 2023), 172, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/.
29. Surrey, “Air Mobility Intelligence,” 44.
30. Defence Select Committee, Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence, e Defence White Paper,
Readiness Assumptions, www.parliament.uk, April 2004, https://publications.parliament.uk/.
31. Evans, “Rethinking,” 28–29.
32. Brett Friedman, On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines (Annapolis, MD: Naval In-
stitute Press, 2021).
42 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Analytic Standards in the Context of Military Intelligence
e operational intelligence environment also introduces unique further considerations
beyond those expected of the conceptual midpoint between the tactical and strategic
levels where operations traditionally are understood to occur. First, supported capabilities
are less important, as operational- level headquarters become more platform- agnostic to
command multi- asset and multidomain operations.
33
In the place of capability knowledge,
a comprehensive understanding of the area of operations and the adversaries working
within it become paramount. Tactical analysts, narrowly focused on producing intelligence
to shape execution in their specific area, are expected to collaborate with their operational-
level counterparts to resolve gaps in their wider understanding.
34
Operational- level analysts
therefore also become vital for communicating key information across intelligence chains
with absolute clarity, as well as tracking the sources of this information.
Given their role directly supporting operational commanders, intelligence teams at the
operational level often form a red cell, which challenges assumptions and bias in operational
plans and seeks to understand how adversary and other forces might think and behave
differently.
35
Operational- level intelligence analysts are frequently both a focal point and
a regional authority in military intelligence analyses, creating a bottleneck in intelligence
chains, which makes impartiality a priority. Operational- level analysts must stand apart
from the collective mindset and perspective of their unit when performing their duties, to
preserve the capability to challenge groupthink and thus insure against intelligence failure.
Accordingly, the operational intelligence environment has its own unique considerations—
belying the understanding of operations as a midpoint between strategy and tactics—which
challenge the assumptions of analytic standards applied at the strategic level.
Dierences from Strategic Intelligence
ese two subdisciplines of intelligence analysis contrast starkly with strategic analysis.
Military intelligence analysts who work at the strategic level often bring their specific
military expertise to broader strategic problems, both military strategic and grand strate-
gic in nature. e characteristics of military strategic intelligence are perhaps the least
distinctive from civilian intelligence analysis: analytical teams in both settings focus on
longer- term analyses, and the more generalized areas of concentration make deep thematic
specialization practical.
As discussed above, systematic approaches such as structured analytical techniques also
become more relevant, and less dynamic requirements mean that a greater level of process
rigor can be applied.
36
More generally, the less time- sensitive intelligence questions posed
to strategic analysts result in longer and more comprehensive products for national- level
33. JDP 0-01, 23.
34. Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF), Intelligence Analysis, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-33 (Wash-
ington, DC: Department of the Air Force, March 29, 2016), 13, https://irp.fas.org/.
35. JDP 2-00, 163.
36. Walsh, “Strategic Intelligence,” 560.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 43
decisionmakers, who typically do not demand highly specific reporting with only days or
hours of intelligence value.
Intelligence questions at the strategic level are also broader and more nebulous. Whereas
a tactical analyst often deals with a bounded problem set with a single capability in a defined
geographic area, strategic military intelligence analysts may be responsible for countries or
even whole continents. Given these broad remits, larger parts of the Intelligence Com-
munity can become more relevant; for the United States alone, the full IC is estimated to
employ more than 800,000 people.
37
Importantly, the wider range of reporting available
for strategic intelligence analysis at this level and increased use of fused intelligence prod-
ucts greatly heighten the risk of circular reporting if sourcing chains are not clear, reinforc-
ing the need for a level of rigor that is not applicable at the tactical and operational levels.
Finally, for the UK, some characteristics of tactical intelligence analysis, such as knowl-
edge of friendly capabilities, become effectively irrelevant for strategic military intelligence,
shaping operational priorities but making little impact on analytical output.
Analytic Standards
Analytic standards are applied differently in each of these environments. Far from
being environments with less rigorous analytic standards, the tactical and operational
levels instead value different attributes of intelligence analysis more strongly, as in the case
of strategic intelligence where rigor is key. As noted in a University of Melbourne study,
good analysts will generally seek to meet the highest standard feasible in their circum-
stances.
38
Nonetheless, the different levels of intelligence analyses introduce differences
in focus for analytic standards. Figure 1 represents this varied prioritization of analytic
standards at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, conveying visually the relevant
importance of each standard based on the analysis above.
37. J. Tucker Rojas, Masters of Analytical Tradecraft: Certifying the Standards and Analytic Rigor of Intelli-
gence Products, Wright Flyer Papers (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, May 2019), 2, https://media.
defense.gov/.
38. Barnett et al., Analytic Rigour, 14.
44 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Analytic Standards in the Context of Military Intelligence
Figure 1. Visual illustration of the relative importance of analytic standards in dif-
ferent military intelligence environments, based upon the PHIA analytic standards
framework
ough the figure is illustrative and does not offer a quantitative breakdown of the
relative importance of each standard, it does recognize that analytic standards in general
are of significant importance to intelligence output at every level. It also highlights that a
one- size- fits- all approach to analytic standards is insufficient for the full range of military
intelligence environments. In particular, the focus on rigor in key intelligence standards
documents largely favors the strategic intelligence environment, at the expense of applica-
bility to the tactical and operational levels. With an understanding of both analytic standards
in general and the nature of intelligence analysis in the military, it is now possible to de-
termine fully how analytic standards apply differently in the context of military intelligence.
Applying Analytic Standards Appropriately
ere are many variations in the application of analytic standards in different military
intelligence environments. For example, while thorough sourcing chains are considered
essential at the strategic level, they can be omitted at the tactical level, providing the ana-
lyst has a sound understanding of where their key information has come from.
39
Both
written sourcing chains and individual analysts’ subject matter expertise are appropriate
39. Timothy Haugh and Douglas Leonard, “Improving Outcomes: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon-
naissance Assessment,” Air & Space Power Journal 31, no. 4 (2017): 10, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 45
in the context of the activity that they support, but neither would be a good fit for the
other environment. is is only one example of how the characteristics of intelligence
analysis at different levels of war manifest in differing requirements to meet the same
analytic standard. Military intelligence outputs therefore require analytic standards tailored
to and appropriate for each military intelligence environment.
For example, the US Air Force has published supplemental analytic standards for intel-
ligence in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-133, Intelligence Analysis. is document rec-
ognizes the primacy of ICD 203 in Air Force intelligence analyses, but it tailors analytic
standards and tradecraft standards to US Air Force operations. Importantly, AFI 14-133
adjusts the IC tradecraft standards, which are referred to as Air Force intelligence analy-
sis standards. While ICD 203 refers to timeliness in a general sense of “useful analysis at
the right time,” AFI 14-133 specifies that it must be achieved with respect to mission
planning cycles, recognizing that timeliness may be constrained to just a few hours in some
environments. Similarly, while ICD 203 insists intelligence products must be “based on
all available sources,” AFI 14-133 qualifies this by noting that sources should be cited
“when feasible” and by dropping the requirement for comprehensive coverage in all cases.
40
e US Air Force analytic standards more closely resemble the UK’s analytic standards,
fused with other elements to create a practical checklist for effective analysis.
41
Amend-
ments such as these in the Air Force analytic standards take better account of how intel-
ligence is practically employed in military operations, adapting to the idiosyncrasies of
military intelligence environments.
AFI 14-133 also introduces intelligence analysis tenets—more akin to principles than
standards—that “cover the most important beliefs about [US Air Force] intelligence
analysis” and how ICD 203 should be applied in support of these beliefs.
42
Environment- specific standards for military intelligence such as those in AFI 14-133—
further subdivided into specific guidance for product types such as premission briefs, intel-
ligence scenarios, and update briefs, or presented as more general principles—offer a
valuable resource for measuring the quality of intelligence products. As one scholar argues,
analytic standards are primarily useful to “raise the floor” of acceptable intelligence output
and have less utility for judging high- quality products.
43
It is therefore acceptable for
analytic standards in military intelligence to be prescriptive, stating specifically whether
certain features such as sourcing, structured analytical techniques, and probabilistic language
are required, recommended, or suggested in each environment.
e most interesting feature of US Air Force analytic standards is the recognition of
differing modes of intelligence analysis in different situations. e Air Force identifies a
continuum of intelligence analysis. At one end, traditional “all- source analysis” prioritizes
thorough analysis of a wide range of sources, applying analytical techniques and deep
40. ICD 203, 3; and SecAF, AFI 14-133, 14.
41. SecAF, 14–17.
42. SecAF, 13.
43. Gentry, “ODNI,” 645.
46 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Analytic Standards in the Context of Military Intelligence
expertise to produce detailed and broad products.
44
At the other end is an alternative
approach referred to as “fusion analysis,” which is described as “quickly melding new in-
formation with baseline knowledge to meet specific operational needs.”
45
is concept of
fusion analysis describes tactical intelligence analysis in several key ways, such as empha-
sizing rapidity and the use of a smaller number of focused intelligence sources to answer
intelligence requirements for an operational customer. It also suggests that in these
time- sensitive situations, an analyst’s baseline knowledge is an acceptable substitute for
fully audited and referenced products.
Although UK analytic standards do not formally recognize fusion analysis, it is an
everyday reality of working in any Western intelligence organization, where phone calls
to regional analysts or teams to corroborate or request information—or even to develop
an ad hoc assessment—are commonplace. In some cases, such calls are used to focus ana-
lytical efforts or generate alternative hypotheses in support of intelligence products. In
other cases, a rapid succession of calls, emails, or chats may be the only way to deliver
effective intelligence updates in an acceptable timescale should the threat to operations
change rapidly, perhaps even during the course of a mission. Fusion analysis in intelligence
is thus a valuable doctrinal concept that demonstrates a successful application of the
principles of analytic standards in a tactical military intelligence environment.
Interestingly, AFI 14-133, as noted above, offers the construct of a continuum to rec-
ognize that analytic standards do not apply uniformly to all analyses. Yet it does not de-
lineate the difference between all- source and fusion analysis within a tactical- strategic
paradigm. Instead, AFI 14-133 acknowledges analysts will operate somewhere between
fusion analysis and all- source analysis at different times, often depending on time, the
availability of information sources, and customer requirements. In fact, the primary de-
lineation between these techniques is the extent to which the analyst may rely upon their
own current knowledge of intelligence reporting and general atmospherics in their area
of responsibility. In this way, this analytic continuum distinguishes between analysis
conducted with a high degree of preexisting subject knowledge and analysis conducted
without it, irrespective of the analytic standards applied.
One study on the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) analyst training program distin-
guishes three types of expertise in intelligence: regional expertise in a specific area, disciplin-
ary expertise in the general skills of analysis, and procedural expertise in the methods and
processes of intelligence delivery, especially review processes.
46
Using this model, regional
expertise—analogous to subject matter expertise in intelligence disciplines that are not
geographically constrained—is the type of expertise recognized by the Air Force as suitable
in some intelligence applications across all levels of operations. e analyst as a source is a
reality of intelligence analysis, particularly in intelligence environments where analytical
44. SecAF, AFI 14-133, 4.
45. SecAF, 4.
46. Stephen Marrin, “CIA’s Kent School: Improving Training for New Analysts,” International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 4 (October 2003): 613, https://doi.org/.
Duffield
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 47
power is constrained by size. Reconciling subject matter expertise with analytic standards is
the final step in understanding how such standards apply to military intelligence.
Accrediting the Analyst
e huge number of potential tactical- and operational- level operating environments
means military intelligence analysts may be thinly spread across multiple theaters and
deployments. As well as the simple matter of size, there are other factors that might
constrain the number of intelligence analysts working on a given intelligence problem.
ese factors are especially relevant beyond the strategic level, where deployments and
shifts are the norm.
In deployed operations, there is an incentive to put the minimum number of people in
harm’s way where there is a greater risk of injury or death as a result of enemy action.
Adding to this is what the UK government refers to as the “burden” of operational deploy-
ments. ese deployments disrupt the lives of service personnel and are therefore minimized
where practical.
47
When the operations tempo is high, personnel also require periods of
rest, leave, and training before returning to deployed operations—or periods of intense
operational activity at home—meaning that large proportions of personnel cannot be
deployed simultaneously without compromising the long- term ability to replace them.
ough these constraints may not apply all at once in every scenario, they must be
considered to ensure military intelligence capabilities are sufficiently agile and resilient.
ese constraints increase the importance of individual analysts with a high degree of
subject knowledge who can dramatically reduce the time required to deliver intelligence
output. In some cases, this could be a single analyst on shift in a tactical environment, with
limited communications capability and little ability to reach back to experts who can
answer ad hoc questions posed by those deployed forward.
48
e delivery of intelligence products by a small team of analysts, perhaps even a single
analyst, conflicts with the guidance of scholars of strategic intelligence analysis. Scholars
refer to the effective use of teams of analysts as “team cognition,” which improves the ability
of analysts to develop solutions to complex intelligence problems.
49
Multiple analysts can
refine hypotheses, widen the research base for a product, and propose alternative analytical
approaches and product presentations to improve the overall standard of a product.
Senior analysts in particular play a pivotal role in enforcing analytic standards. rough
quality control chains, more senior personnel review their subordinates’ work to identify
logical shortfalls or gaps in reasoning before a product is disseminated. One study observed
47. MOD and Rt Hon Philip Hammond, “Afghanistan Tour Lengths for Deployed UK Personnel,”
GOV.UK, May 14, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/.
48. Surrey, “Air Mobility Intelligence,” 39.
49. Stoney Trent, Martin Voshell, and Emily Patterson, “Team Cognition in Intelligence Analysis,” Pro-
ceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 51, no. 4 (October 2007): 308, https://
doi.org/.
48 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Analytic Standards in the Context of Military Intelligence
that a reliable standard of analytical quality control required at least three different analysts
to “rate” the quality of an intelligence product, meaning that optimized intelligence
products require at least four analysts in total to deliver.
50
For the reasons discussed above,
this is sometimes impractical in intelligence environments other than the strategic level.
In short, an alternative to multi- analyst quality control is required for tactical and opera-
tional military intelligence environments.
e concept of analytical tradecraft is defined in ICD 203 and revisited in AFI 14-133
as a core feature of intelligence analysis, emphasizing the role of the individual analyst in
implementing analytic standards.
51
As mentioned, analytical tradecraft refers to the indi-
vidual skills of an analyst—the disciplinary expertise in the general skills of analysis and
the procedural expertise in the methods and processes of intelligence delivery as defined
by the CIA training study.
52
Accreditation of these core analytical skills is an essential
component of analytic standards, although for states such as the UK, this is measured in
terms of an ability to deliver products which meet standards rather than as attributes in
their own right.
A viable approach is to accredit the analytic tradecraft of analysts themselves. is is
the approach proposed by one researcher who argues the United States needs analysts
accredited to a high standard of disciplinary and procedural intelligence expertise who
could take leading roles in improving the quality of intelligence products.
53
is approach
has echoes of the Qualified Weapons Instructor program in the UK—similar to the US
Air Force’s Weapons School program or the US Naval Aviation Warfighting Develop-
ment Center program—which emphasizes extensive training of selected personnel to
reach a high standard of individual output, and in turn accredits them to teach these
skills to others.
ese programs align with the intent of AFI 14-133 and the general direction of ICD
203, where analyst training is recognized as a means of improving the overall standard of
intelligence products. While capstone training, such as Qualified Weapons Instructor
courses, develops a small number of already capable analysts, current analytic standards
for all levels of military intelligence also apply much more broadly, serving a complemen-
tary function in enhancing the quality of all military intelligence analysts.
Furthermore, the requirement for military intelligence analysts to be prepared to work
in very small teams means that accreditation cannot be limited to products alone. Instead,
analytic standards tailored to the different military intelligence environments must be
applied to accredit the analyst and their expertise in their role. e AFI 14-133 tradecraft
standards offer an example of how this can be achieved, bridging the gap between capstone
accreditation of a small number of expert analysts and the demands of intelligence environ-
ments beyond the strategic level.
50. Marcoci et al., “Better Together,” 1.
51. ICD 203, 2–4; and SecAF, AFI 14-133, 14–17.
52. Marrin, “CIA’s Kent School,” 613.
53. Rojas, Masters, 11.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 49
Conclusions
Analytic standards are essential to high- quality military intelligence output across all
levels of war. Yet scholarship of analytic standards is currently based on the strategic intel-
ligence environment, with a high emphasis on rigor. Meanwhile, tactical intelligence
environments value other attributes of analytic standards, such as timeliness, to a far greater
extent than in strategic environments, and must apply these standards in different ways.
e operational environment, far from being a midpoint between the tactical and strate-
gic environments, has attributes all its own, prioritizing comprehensiveness and indepen-
dence over other attributes.
Military intelligence environments therefore require analytic standards to be adapted
differently, to resolve the rigor- led, strategic bias inherent to traditional analytic standards.
e US Air Force’s AFI 14-133 demonstrates how analytic standards can be applied to
separate military intelligence environments, particularly in how it shifts focus toward the
analyst and their output as emblematic of an ideal product. Recognizing the importance
of accrediting the analyst is key to implementing effective analytic standards in military
intelligence environments. Exploring how analytic standards are used in military intelligence
lays the foundation for further progress in a vital but understudied area of intelligence
scholarship. Q
50 AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW
PLANNING AND STRATEGY
Operational Art:
A Necessary Framework for Modern Military Planning
Jonathan k. CorraDo
In today’s wars and future conflicts, military leaders will face a wide variety of complex threats.
ey must be capable of addressing these threats in the context of Joint and multinational op-
erations, and they must have the vision to understand how best to apply assets in a manner that
will ultimately achieve US national policy aims. In short, leaders must employ operational art.
A key question to ask is whether the United States—now that it has shifted its focus toward
great power competition in an increasingly multipolar world—retains sufficient aptitude in
operational art. A review of the history and development of operational art, as well as an assess-
ment of its importance in a modern context, serves as a reminder of the nature and continuing
relevance of operational art in a changing world. is article focuses on deriving classic lessons
from operational art that will be relevant to American military planning vis- à- vis Russia, China,
and smaller national and nonstate enemies in a counterinsurgency context.
C
urrent theory defines operational art and planning as a process that allows for
an efficient distribution of combined forces in ways that will achieve desired
outcomes. According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Op-
erations, operational art represents “the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—
supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop
strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrat-
ing ends, ways, and means.”
1
Current interpretations of operational art additionally emphasize its role in linking
diverse units and forces together as a means of achieving key objectives through reliance
on combined force.
2
Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning states “operational art and op-
erationaldesign enable understanding, provide context for decision making, and enable
commanders and planners to identify hazards, threats, consequences, opportunities, and
risk.”
3
Although such interpretations represent established ideas and frameworks that
military decisionmakers apply within their dimensions of operational planning, they also
reflect ideas that have evolved over time.
Commander Jonathan Corrado, USNR, PhD, a qualified surface warfare officer and Seabee combat warfare officer, works as a civilian
in the nuclear industry. He is the author of Technology, Human Performance, and Nuclear Facilities (CRC Press, 2022).
1. Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], June 18, 2022), xiii.
2. Chad Buckel, “A New Look at Operational Art: How We View War Dictates How We Fight It,”Joint
Force Quarterly100 (2021).
3. Joint Planning, JP 5-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, December 1, 2020), xi.
Corrado
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 51
A historical review of the evolution of operational art offers an evaluation of the the-
ory’s origins to demonstrate how the ideas underlying operational art derive from the
foundation of modern warfare and military planning and how the concept matured and
evolved. Assessments of the theory’s impact on the US military experience show how it
has shaped America’s approach to operations at the service and Joint levels. is article
ultimately demonstrates the relevance of operational art with respect to American planning
as it relates to Russia, China, and counterinsurgency (COIN).
Operational Art and Planning: Historical Development
and Evolution
In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do,
and be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of the campaign may be
modified ad infinitum according to the circumstances, the genius of the general, the character
of the troops, and the features of the country.
Napoleon
4
e French and Prussian traditions of operational art not only inform the history, but
also current practice and definition of operational art. Napoleon Bonaparte’s restructuring
of the French army into corps—semi- independent bodies with their own infantry, cavalry,
and artillery—allowed for greater operational flexibility and is a direct antecedent to
modern combined arms and joint warfare concepts present in today’s operational art.
5
is
restructuring made the army more adaptable, able to execute complex maneuvers, and
capable of responding to dynamic battlefield situations.
e Napoleonic method, especially during his early campaigns, exemplified the syn-
chronization of efforts across the battlefield. Using a combination of speed, mass, and the
interior lines of communication, Napoleon could concentrate his forces rapidly to achieve
a decisive advantage. is notion of synchronized operations for achieving a higher op-
erational tempo remains a fundamental aspect of current operational art.
6
Although at-
tributed more to Soviet military theory, the roots of the “deep battle” concept—targeting
the entirety of the enemy’s forces rather than just the forward units—can be traced back
to the French emphasis on strategic depth during Napoleon’s time.
7
is has evolved and
is reflected in contemporary definitions of operational art, emphasizing depth and simul-
taneity of operations.
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, the chief of the German General Staff from 1857 to
1888, is often credited with developing the idea of allowing commanders significant
4. e Military Maxims of Napoleon, ed. William E. Cairnes (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 56.
5. Frederick R. Strain, “e New Joint Warfare,” Joint Forces Quarterly 2 (1993).
6. Christopher Bellamy, e Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: eory and Practice (New York: Routledge,
2015).
7. Frederick W. Kagan, “e Rise and Fall of Soviet Operational Art, 1917–1941,” in e Military History
of the Soviet Union, ed. Robin Higham and Frederick W. Kagan (New York: Springer, 2002).
52 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Operational Art
“operational freedom.”
8
is emphasized flexibility and adaptability, concepts central to
contemporary operational art. e Prussian General Staff system, which focused on me-
ticulous planning, staff wargaming, and continuous officer education, instilled a sense of
operational planning that is still recognized today.
Modern operational art reflects this in the importance placed on detailed planning and
coordination across various forces. e Prussian tradition also emphasized Auftragstaktik,
or mission- type tactics.
9
is decentralized decision- making approach, where lower- level
commanders were given a clear understanding of the commander’s intent and the freedom
to achieve that intent as they saw fit, has been integrated into modern operational art as
a means of fostering initiative and responsiveness.
10
Over time, especially during the World Wars, military thinkers and practitioners syn-
thesized elements from both the Prussian and French traditions. e World Wars saw an
unprecedented scale and complexity of military operations, necessitating an evolved un-
derstanding of operational art that drew from both traditions. Modern doctrines, par-
ticularly in the West, reflect a blend of these traditions. For instance, the US military’s
emphasis on Joint operations, combined arms warfare, decentralized execution—akin to
Auftragstaktik—and operational synchronization all bear marks of this historical legacy.
11
In essence, while operational art as a formally recognized concept might be relatively
modern, its roots in the practices of Prussian and French military traditions are evident.
e successes and failures of these historical practices have directly informed the way
operational art is understood and practiced today.
Operational Art and Planning: Connections to Technology
e evolution and maturation of operational art, rooted in the traditions of Prussia and
France but now impacting all nations, has been deeply influenced by the concurrent
evolution of technology and is a tale of adaptation and reinvention. Historically, every
significant advancement in technology has challenged existing military doctrines, forcing
strategists and tacticians to rethink how wars are fought. At times, these shifts might make
it seem as if operational art is becoming obsolete; but, in truth, it is continually evolving
to incorporate these new elements.
e French Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras saw the advent of mass conscription,
transforming armies from small professional entities to large bodies of citizen soldiers. is,
combined with advancements in artillery technology, allowed Napoleon to leverage massed
8. Richard Davis, “Helmuth von Moltke and the Prussian-German Development of a Decentralised
Style of Command: Metz and Sedan 1870,” Defence Studies 5, no. 1 (2005).
9. Eitan Shamir, “e Long and Winding Road: e US Army Managerial Approach to Command and
the Adoption of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik),” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 5 (2010).
10. Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: e Basis for Modern Military Command (New York: Pickle Part-
ners Publishing, 2015).
11. Shamir, “Winding Road.”
Corrado
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 53
firepower and maneuver in new ways, adapting the corps system effectively to the techno-
logical realities of his era. e use of visual signaling systems, such as the semaphore, played
a role in coordinating and synchronizing Napoleonic operations across vast distances.
12
After the Napoleonic era, the meticulous planning and coordination associated with
the Prussian General Staff system were heavily facilitated by the advent of the railway and
telegraph systems in the nineteenth century. ese technologies enabled rapid mobilization
and communication, allowing von Moltke to execute wide-ranging operations with greater
synchronization.
13
Operational art adapted as technological advancements in artillery,
specifically the ability to conduct indirect fire, required a more detailed level of operational
planning, coordination, and reconnaissance—all hallmarks of the Prussian tradition.
14
e stalemated battlefields of World War I were a direct result of technological advance-
ments—notably, machine guns and barbed wire—outpacing tactical and operational
thought. e challenge of overcoming static defensive lines led to further evolution in
operational art, emphasizing combined arms operations, especially the integration of in-
fantry, artillery, and the nascent air forces.
15
Operational art matured by reemphasizing
maneuver, albeit in a different context.
In World War II, the combination of motorized/mechanized units and radio com-
munications allowed for more fluid and dynamic operations. Tanks, supported by aircraft
and effectively communicated with via radio, allowed for deep penetrations into enemy
territory. Some thought traditional principles of warfare, deeply rooted in horse-and-
musket-era thinking, were now irrelevant. is confluence of technology and doctrine is
exemplified in the German concept of blitzkrieg, which bears both Prussian and French
influences—a modern manifestation of older principles such as surprise, concentration,
and maneuver.
16
Post-World War II, the advent of nuclear weapons and electronic warfare
equipment necessitated a new dimension in operational art, focusing on deterrence, rapid
response, and electronic countermeasures. is era also saw the importance of operational
security and deception reach new heights.
In the modern era, the digital revolution, cyber warfare, precision- guided munitions,
space- based assets, and drones are once again reshaping operational art.
17
e foundational
principles derived from the Prussian and French traditions—including flexibility, synchro-
nization, and combined arms operations—remain crucial. Yet they are continually adapted
12. Helena Rua, Alexandre B. Gonçalves, and Ricardo Figueiredo, “Assessment of the Lines of Torres
Vedras Defensive System with Visibility Analysis,” Journal of Archaeological Science 40, no. 4 (2013).
13. Davis, “von Moltke”; and Gunther E. Rothenberg, e Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1980).
14. William Walworth, “Can Enduring Lessons Be Drawn from Previous Eras? Discuss with Reference
to the Franco-Prussian Campaigns of 1870,” Defence Studies 3, no. 1 (2003).
15. Richard W. Harrison, e Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940 (Topeka: University Press
of Kansas, 2001).
16. James S. Corum, e Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Topeka: Uni-
versity Press of Kansas, 1992).
17. Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs 92 (2013).
54 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Operational Art
to address the challenges and opportunities presented by new technologies. In essence, as
technology evolves, so does operational art, always striving to best leverage the tools at
hand to achieve strategic objectives.
18
As the US military’s involvement in the Global War on Terror highlighted, a techno-
logically superior force can still find itself challenged by asymmetric threats and guerrilla
warfare.
19
Operational art is crucial in adapting traditional doctrines to counterinsurgency,
urban warfare, and nation- building missions.
20
While technological advancements peri-
odically challenge the relevancy of operational art, they never render it obsolete. Instead,
they drive its evolution. Operational art remains a necessary framework for understanding
and applying military force, ensuring that technology serves strategy, rather than dictating
it. e underlying principles of operational art—such as coordination, concentration, and
adaptation—are timeless, even as the tools of warfare change.
Operational Art in Past US Military Contexts
e United States, as part of the Allied forces, applied the principles of operational art
in major offensives such as Operation Overlord, the D- Day invasion. e integration of
sea, air, and land components; the synchronization of efforts; and the maneuvering of vast
armies across Europe epitomized operational art.
21
In the Pacific eater, island- hopping
campaigns demonstrated the United States’ grasp of operational depth and sequencing.
22
e US Navy and Marine Corps had to seize, hold, and use a series of islands as stepping
stones toward the Japanese mainland, each with its own set of challenges and objectives.
e initial stages of the Korean War saw a rapid North Korean advance. Yet the Inchon
Landing, masterminded by General Douglas MacArthur, showcased operational maneu-
vers, catching North Korea by surprise and reversing the course of the war.
23
Later stages,
particularly after China’s intervention, saw a shift in operational focus, with an emphasis
on holding ground and positional warfare.
A controversial chapter in US military history, the Vietnam War, posed challenges to
the application of operational art. e United States had clear tactical successes—such as
in the Ia Drang Valley—but struggled with operational and strategic alignment.
24
e
18. Shamir, “Winding Road.”
19. Zalmay Khalilzad, “Afghanistan & Iraq: Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq,” Journal of Democracy
21, no. 3 (2010).
20. Khalilzad.
21. Francis Mackay, Overture to Overlord: e Preparations of D- Day (New York: Pen and Sword, 2005).
22. John T. Hanley, “Creating the 1980s Maritime Strategy and Implications for Today,” Naval War Col-
lege Review 67, no. 2 (2014).
23. Robert D. Heinl, “From Our May 1967 Issue: e Inchon Landing: A Case Study in Amphibious
Planning,” Naval War College Review 51, no. 2 (1998).
24. Peter J. Schifferle, e Ia Drang Campaign 1965: A Successful Operational Campaign or Mere Tactical
Failure? (New York: Pickle Partners Publishing, 2015).
Corrado
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 55
enemy’s guerrilla tactics, the political constraints, and the difficulties of fighting in the
dense terrains of Vietnam often made traditional operational planning challenging.
ough not a “hot” war, the Cold War period saw the United States engage in extensive
operational planning, particularly in Europe, where the possibility of a Soviet invasion was
a constant concern. Operational art was reflected in the development of plans to rapidly
reinforce Europe, conduct deep strikes into advancing Soviet columns, and employ nuclear
weapons as deterrence and, if necessary, in warfare.
25
Next, Operation Desert Storm showcased the United States’ first application of
operational art in conflict following the Cold War. e United States executed a vast
enveloping maneuver, combining airpower, ground forces, and deception operations that
decimated the Iraqi Army in a matter of weeks.
26
In Iraq and Afghanistan, the initial
stages of both wars saw rapid US victories, but the subsequent counterinsurgency
campaigns posed challenges.
27
While the US military showed tactical proficiency, there
were criticisms regarding the alignment of operational objectives with strategic goals.
e complexities of nation- building, tribal dynamics, and the insurgent nature of the
enemy made operational art application intricate.
ere is an argument to be made that during the Global War on Terror, the US military’s
emphasis on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations led to a de-emphasis on
traditional operational art. Battles were often about hearts and minds, about building
local alliances, and about nuanced political and cultural dynamics as much as they were
about defeating enemy forces.
28
is shift in focus could have led to atrophy in large- scale,
traditional operational planning.
Arguably, operational art remains an essential tool in military planning. Yet its ap-
plication and emphasis can shift based on the nature of the conflict and the adversaries
involved. While counterinsurgency might downplay certain elements of operational art,
conventional warfare against near- peer adversaries—as seen in the increasing focus on
great power competition—brings operational art back into the spotlight. Its importance
might ebb and flow based on contemporary challenges, but it remains a crucial aspect
of military thinking.
Operational Art and Future Foes
Russia: Universal Themes and Historical Value
Operational art, as a military philosophy, has its roots in synthesizing strategic goals
with tactical actions, ensuring that each tactical engagement serves a broader strategic
25. Stephen Biddle, “Strategy in War,” PS: Political Science & Politics 40, no. 3 (2007).
26. Frank N. Schubert, e Whirlwind War: e United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995).
27. Khalilzad, “Afghanistan.”
28. Khalilzad.
56 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Operational Art
purpose. is nexus of strategy and tactics is as evident today as it has ever been, especially
in the context of Russia.
Historically, figures such as Carl von Clausewitz emphasized the importance of under-
standing warfare’s center of gravity and ensuring actions taken on the battlefield led to
decisive outcomes. As previously discussed, the Prussian and later German military systems,
for instance, placed significant emphasis on operational maneuver, epitomized by concepts
such as the Schlieffen Plan in World War I and the blitzkrieg in World War II. ese
operational plans were not just about achieving tactical victories but about using those
victories to achieve strategic outcomes: encircling enemy armies, capturing critical resources,
or rapidly advancing to force a political decision.
Russian military thought, inspired in part by its historical experiences with the likes of
Napoleon and the Eastern Front of World War II, evolved its own brand of operational
art. Concepts like the aforementioned deep battle emerged, emphasizing simultaneous
attack across the depth of the enemy’s formation, combining political, informational, and
kinetic means.
29
is heritage still influences Russian military operations today.
30
e
annexation of Crimea and Russia's war in Ukraine has showcased a blend of traditional
force, political manipulation, information warfare, and irregular militia operations—a
modern reflection of deep battle in the hybrid warfare age.
31
e vast expanse of the Russian landmass, combined with its myriad of potential front-
lines—from the Baltics to Central Asia—demands a detailed operational approach. e
concept of operational depth becomes even more crucial, given the potential for multifront
conflicts and the historical invasions Russia has faced, from Napoleon to Hitler.
Russia's actions in Crimea and Ukraine have revealed Russia’s emphasis on integrating
nonkinetic means into its operational art.
32
is includes leveraging information warfare,
cyber capabilities, and “little green men” (unmarked soldiers) to achieve objectives even
without conventional warfare. e application of operational art here involves synchroniz-
ing these unconventional assets with traditional military might.
On the defensive side, Russia’s development of anti- access/area-denial capabilities in
places like Kaliningrad or the Black Sea aims to deter or delay Western intervention,
shaping the operational space to Russia’s advantage.
33
Operational art in this context would
require NATO planners to find ways to neutralize, bypass, or even turn these capabilities
to their own advantage.
29. Ronald Ti and Christopher Kinsey, “Lessons from the Russo- Ukrainian Conflict,” Defence Studies 23,
no. 3 (2023).
30. Ben Sohl, “Discolored Revolutions: Information Warfare in Russia’s Grand Strategy,” Washington
Quarterly 45, no. 1 (2022).
31. Ti and Kinsey, “Lessons.”
32. Ti and Kinsey.
33. Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge,” in
Survival, ed. Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias (New York: Routledge, 2023).
Corrado
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 57
Operational art, in its essence, remains the mastery of synchronizing various elements
of national power and military capabilities to achieve a strategic goal. e challenges posed
by Russia, with its hybrid warfare, vast territory, and intricate defense networks, underscore
the significance of understanding and leveraging operational art. Just as the German
Wehrmacht aimed to use tactical victories for strategic success in World War II or the
Mongols utilized operational maneuver to expand their empire, modern militaries must
see beyond the immediate battlefield. To successfully counter challenges such as those
posed by Russia, military leaders must grasp not only the tools and techniques of the
modern age but also the universal lessons from history. Operational art serves as that
bridge between the lessons of the past and the challenges of the present.
China: Universal Themes and Historical Value
To understand the importance and relevance of operational art in the context of China,
one must first appreciate the historical trajectory of Chinese military thinking and its
contemporary ramifications.
China’s military history is replete with strategies and tactics that focus on the operational
level. Ancient strategies like “36 Stratagems” and the emphasis on shi—trategic advantage
or positioning—reflect a deep cultural appreciation for the nuances of operational
maneuver.
34
ese concepts are not mere relics of the past but continue to inform the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategies in the modern era.
China’s current military strategy places a significant emphasis on the maritime domain,
with the aim of breaking through the First Island Chain, a series of archipelagos that stretch
from Japan to the Philippines.
35
e operational challenges here are immense, ranging from
anti submarine warfare to anti- access/area denial strategies against potential adversaries.
Operational art in this scenario would involve coordinating naval, aerial, and missile assets
to ensure sea control and dominance. Much like Russia, China has shown a proclivity for
operations in the gray zone—actions that are aggressive but fall short of traditional warfare.
e PLA’s activities in the South China Sea, including the building of artificial islands and
militarization of disputed features, are examples of this.
36
Operational art, in this context, is
about achieving strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of open conflict.
Reflecting the modern battlefront’s digital nature, China has emphasized the integra-
tion of cyber capabilities into its military doctrine.
37
Operational art here would involve
synchronizing electronic warfare, cyberattacks, and kinetic operations to degrade enemy
capabilities and communications.
34. Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang, “Rethinking China’s Rise: Chinese Scholars Debate Strategic Over-
stretch,” International Affairs 94, no. 5 (2018).
35. Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Vision of Its Seascape,” Asian Politics & Policy 4, no. 3 (2012).
36. Tara Davenport, “Island- Building in the South China Sea: Legality and Limits,” Asian Journal of
International Law 8, no. 1 (2018).
37. Richard Alan Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: e Next reat to National Security and What
to Do about It (New York: Tantor Media, 2014).
58 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Operational Art
On land, the Belt and Road Initiative’s strategic implications require the PLA to be
capable of securing and defending vast stretches of infrastructure, potentially even in
foreign territories.
38
is again necessitates a detailed operational approach to coordinate
actions across vast geographies.
While the tools and tactics have evolved, the essence of operational art remains the
same: ensuring that individual actions serve a broader strategic purpose. China’s contem-
porary military posture, whether in the digital realm or the physical expanses of the
Indo- Pacific, requires an intricate dance of coordination, foresight, and execution—the
very hallmarks of operational art. As one analyzes China’s strategic posture, it becomes
clear that the universal principles of operational art, echoing from the annals of history,
remain critical. Just as Sun Tzu emphasized the importance of strategy, deception, and
environmental advantage, today’s military leaders must blend ancient wisdom with
modern capabilities to navigate the complex strategic landscape posed by China.
Counterinsurgencies: Universal Themes and Historical Signicance
Historically, insurgencies have been rooted in political, socioeconomic, and cultural
grievances. eir asymmetric nature means regular armies often grapple with an enemy
that does not confront them in open battles but melts into the civilian populace, making
conventional military strategies less effective. e challenges posed by insurgencies have
perennially necessitated higher- order coordination between strategy and tactics: the very
essence of operational art.
Classic works on counterinsurgency, from British officer T. E. Lawrence’s experiences
in the Arab Revolt to French officer David Galula’s doctrine derived from the Algerian
War, stress the significance of understanding the local population and winning “hearts
and minds.”
39
e success of these campaigns often pivoted on nuanced, localized opera-
tions backed by overarching strategic objectives: operational art in practice. Modern COIN
operations also emphasize protecting and winning over the civilian populace, recognizing
that insurgencies thrive amidst civilian support. Operational art in this domain would
entail coordinating military actions, civil affairs, and psychological operations to gain
popular trust and isolate insurgents.
Gathering actionable intelligence is paramount in COIN. is requires seamlessly integrat-
ing human intelligence, signals intelligence, and other intelligence assets to guide kinetic op-
erations. e synchronization of intelligence with military actions epitomizes operational art.
Striking a balance between aggressive operations against insurgents and nonkinetic operations,
like development projects and governance initiatives, is also crucial. Operational art here ensures
38. Sean Braniff, “Leveraging Regional Partners: On ‘US Grand Strategy, the Rise of China, and US
National Security Strategy for East Asia,’ ” Strategic Studies Quarterly 15, no. 4 (2021).
39. omas Edward Lawrence, e Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Graphic Arts Books, 2020); and
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: eory and Practice (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing USA,
2006).
Corrado
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 59
tactical actions, kinetic or otherwise, align with the broader strategy of stability and governance.
Understanding local customs, norms, and grievances allows forces to craft effective messaging
and strategies, undercutting insurgent narratives. Operational art in COIN involves marrying
cultural understanding with tactical actions for maximum impact.
Operational art’s universality in COIN operations is evident when one considers the delicate
balance military leaders must strike. Every action, from targeted raids to community engage-
ments, must serve the broader objective of stability, governance, and winning popular trust.
Historically, the most successful counterinsurgency campaigns, whether by Lawrence in the
deserts of Arabia or by Galula in the streets of Algiers, seamlessly blended tactical prowess
with strategic vision, showcasing the timeless and universal essence of operational art.
In the kaleidoscope of modern warfare, counterinsurgencies stand out as complex,
human- centric operations. Here more than anywhere, the enduring principles of operational
art—harmonizing strategy with tactics, ensuring every action serves a larger purpose—are
not just advantageous, but indispensable.
Conclusion
When all is said and done, it is really the commander’s coup d’oeil, his ability to see things
simply, to identify the whole business of war completely with himself, that is the essence of
good generalship.
— Carl von Clausewitz
40
Operational art can be dated back to Prussia and Napoleonic France, but the main
conclusion of this article is that the tools of operational art remain relevant to the United
States in the current and evolving threat landscape. Operational art will apply to planning
vis- à- vis Russia, China, and counterinsurgencies. e toolset of operational art is relevant
not only to third- generation warfare but also to fourth- and fifth- generation warfare.
eorists and planners must be flexible in how they import the lessons and precepts of
operational art into the current and evolving threat landscape. Q
40. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 578.
60 AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW
PLANNING AND STRATEGY
Decision Advantage and Initiative
Completing Joint All-Domain Command and Control
Brian r. PriCe
is article defines decision advantage and initiative in the context of John Boyd’s observe, orient,
decide, act (OODA) loop and his “Organic Design for Command and Control” (1987) analysis.
Boyd’s thoughts were far ahead of their day but resonate clearly in the emerging operating en-
vironment. e outcome of decision advantage is initiative. Moreover, decision advantage is not
only a condition, but also the process needed to operationalize such advantage. Because humans
remain key to effective Joint all- domain command and control, planners and strategists must be
educated regarding the doctrinal nuances of these critical concepts.
1
U
sing the Air Force’s conception of decision advantage as a foundation, this article
proposes a firmer connection between decision and execution—the “d” and “e” of
the planning, decision, and execution process. Decision advantage is rooted in
retired US Air Force Colonel John Boyd’s conception of command and control as a deci-
sion loop, and this article extends his ideas through the concept of initiative. e proposed
working definition of initiative and modification to the Air Force’s definition of decision
advantage completes the concept of Joint all- domain command and control (JADC2).
ese changes help the Joint Force create a decision- making climate that encourages the
education needed to fit situational awareness into the broader understanding and less
easily quantifiable swirl of human factors.
Introduction
Decision Advantage: e product of situational understanding, the ability to assure and exchange
information, make and communicate decisions by maintaining advantages in all domains.
Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-99, November 19, 2021
2
Dr. Brian Price is an associate professor in the Department of Warfighting at Air Command and Staff College.
1. e author wishes to thank the early readers, particularly the peer reviewers, for their valuable comments.
2. e Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All- Domain Operations, Air Force Doctrine Publication
(AFDP) 3-99/Space Force Doctrine Publication (SDP) 3-99 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Curtis LeMay Center for
Doctrine Development and Education, November 19, 2021), 4, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/.
61 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Decision Advantage and Initiative
Civilian and military leaders make timely decisions at the speed required to outpace ad-
versaries. Decision making requires a common intelligence picture and a shared under-
standing of global force posture to see operations in real time: identify opportunities to seize
the initiative, and identify trade- offs, risk, and opportunity costs. Automation, preplanned
responses, and mission command are essential to act at the required speed of relevance.
Joint Publication 3-0, June 2022
3
e Department of Defense’s embrace of Joint all- domain operations (JADO), formerly
multidomain operations, has driven a flurry of developmental and organizational activity
sparked by perceived changes in the operating environment and specific near- peer adver-
sary efforts to challenge American security leadership. Command and control is central
to all service conceptions of multidomain or all- domain operations. Given the potential
for the radical impact of emerging technologies on previous limits to the planning, deci-
sion, and execution cycles, this article—an outgrowth of Air University’s 2020 JADC2
conference—examines the concept of decision advantage through the lens of Boyd’s 1987
briefing, “Organic Design for Command and Control.”
4
While Boyd’s irascible character reduced the effectiveness of his efforts to help the
defense establishment, his late-1980s writings seem eerily prescient when considering the
intent and architecture of JADC2. A study of Boyd’s ideas can help the current generation
of planners and architects understand the possibilities better.
5
No matter the technology employed to banish the fog and friction of war, human
factors—beliefs, trust, shared vision, identity, knowledge, experience, education and train
-
ing, and others—are arguably as important to the JADC2 enterprise as are the sensor grid,
open- data standards and interchange, mesh connectivity, cloud or edge computing,
human- machine teaming, machine learning, or even artificial intelligence (AI). Russia’s
approaches to the problem suggest Russian planners understand human factors as one of
the weakest links or potentially the strongest aspect of the JADC2 enterprise.
6
is article examines a fundamental tenet that seems to underpin the Defense Depart-
ment’s JADC2 enterprise—Boyd’s observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop. is article
does not challenge the Department’s embrace of this decision- making model. Furthermore,
while it examines JADC2 doctrine and architectural designs, due to space considerations,
this article does not discuss the applicability of the development of doctrine as a practice.
3. Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, June 2022), IV-5.
4. John Boyd, “Organic Design for Command and Control,” Boyd’s Work (website), May 1987, https://
static1.squarespace.com/.
5. Brian R. Price, Eagles, Falcons & Warthogs: Gen. “Bill” Creech, Col. John Boyd and the Struggle to Remake
the Tactical Air Forces in the Wake of Vietnam (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming); and retired
General John Michael “Mike” Loh, USAF, interview conducted by the author, 2017.
6. Ofer Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and Politicization (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2018).
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Background
e concept of a revolution in military affairs is hotly contested. Still, many US military,
Ally, and partner planners recognize an ongoing revolution, noted also by Russia and China,
that harnesses emerging technologies. ese technologies include the sensor- grid, open-
architecture data framework, machine learning (“weak” AI), cloud or edge computing, and
advanced analytics. Moreover, these technologies threaten to overrun the existing planning,
decision, and execution process.
7
Joint all- domain command and control seeks to enable the
next generation of decisionmakers with a fundamental advantage, but how this technology
will shape future planning, decision, and execution cycles has not yet been precisely articulated.
e decision itself, however, does not provide advantage; rather, the action resulting
from the decision—the seizing and maintaining of the initiative—yields advantage. Initia-
tive is an underappreciated concept within the security community, and it is difficult to
assess, though it is similar to the concept of momentum in sports.
e problem of linking decision to action gives rise to a debate between military plan-
ners: is decision advantage a condition resulting partially from information advantage,
training, education, and other factors within the human domain, or does it represent the
process necessary to realize expected benefits? In fact, considering both concepts is es-
sential in formulating a comprehensive doctrinal definition of decision advantage. No
amount of situational awareness will substitute for understanding by junior or senior
leaders. Furthermore, even perfectly executed operations may fail if they operate under a
flawed strategy, arguably as was done in Afghanistan.
Foundations for Dening Decision Advantage
While senior leadership adopted the terms information advantage and decision advantage
to capture the hoped- for benefits of the JADO approach, for some years, decision advantage
stubbornly eluded a DoD definition. e concept of decision advantage was hinted at in
unclassified JADC2 and multidomain operations/JADO documents, but it was not clearly
defined, despite the fact the JADC2 enterprise’s entire purpose is “the art and science of
decision- making and the ability to translate those decisions into action, leveraging capabilities
across all domains and with mission partners to achieve an operational advantage in both
competition and conflict.”
8
Finally, in November 2021, the Air Force published its definition.
9
7. Joseph R. Biden Jr., U.S. National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, October 2022),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/; and State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China,
China’s National Defense in the New Era (Beijing: State Council Information Office, July 2019), http://www
.chinadaily.com.cn/.
8. JADC2 Cross- Functional Team, “Joint All- Domain Command and Control (JADC2) High Level
Operational Graphic (OV-1),” version 1.0, briefing slide 4, Air Combat Command Headquarters (HQ),
August 2020.
9. AFDP 3-99/SDP 3-99.
Figure 1. Modified JADC2 high- level operational graphic
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Some may conclude JADC2 is decision advantage. e above definition offers useful
connectivity across the continuum of conflict, though it does not expressly connect the
concept to JADC2’s technical architecture. is definition also appears on a key 2020 Air
Combat Command graphic summary of JADC2 (fig. 1), where the mission to “blunt the
enemy’s advance with overwhelming decision superiority” is assigned, but again without
defining what decision advantage means.
10
e JADC2 conception is an architecture for delivering superior situational awareness.
Understanding JADC2 requires at the very least deep domain, and ideally, cross- domain
knowledge, reflecting key perspectives that collide and interact to create context.
Within the US military, human- machine synergy augments the decision- making
process. Army multidomain operations doctrine notes that “man- machine interfaces,
enabled by artificial intelligence and high- speed data processing, improve human decision-
making in both speed and accuracy.”
11
e U.S. Army in Multi- Domain Operations 2028,
US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, emphasizes
attacks against the opponent’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance complex: “In
conjunction with partners and the Joint Force, Army forces counter the adversary’s recon-
naissance and conduct deception to create uncertainty within an adversary’s decision
making process.” It further notes, “Demonstrated capabilities in competition undermine
the adversary’s information warfare operations and generate complexity and uncertainty
in their decision making process.”
12
is is similar to Russia’s approach, which aims to inject ambiguity into the decision
cycle to create maneuver space. It also resembles China’s approach to decision- making, where
“systems destruction warfare” is conducted to deny key information and cause paralysis.
13
While the Army pamphlet does not define or use the term decision advantage, it does
use decisive spaces, which it defines as “locations in time and space (physical, virtual, and
cognitive) where the full optimization of the employment of cross- domain capabilities
generates a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influences the outcome of an
operation.”
14
is appears to be an adaptation of the familiar concept of decisive points,
10. Air Combat Command HQ, “JADC2 Overview” briefing, undated, slide 6.
11. e U.S. Army in Multi- Domain Operations 2028, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRA-
DOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, December 6, 2018), 20, https://adminpubs.tradoc
.army.mil/.
12. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 31.
13. David Kilcullen, e Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the Rest (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2020); Charles K. Bartles, “Recommendations for Intelligence Staffs Concerning
Russian and New Generation Warfare,” Military Intelligence, October–December 2017, 11; Fridman, Russian
“Hybrid Warfare”; and Li Yousheng, Li Yeng, and Wang Yongha, eds., Lectures on the Science of Joint Campaigns
(Beijing: Military Science Press, 2012), 74.
14. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 20.
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Decision Advantage and Initiative
and it parallels the Chinese conception of selecting key points in the opponent’s system
and designing a countersystem to oppose it.
15
TRADOC 525-3-1 also discusses predictive sustainment operations:
Precision logistics is enabled by: a sustainment enterprise resource planning deci-
sion support system (emphasis added) with predictive analysis tools and the ability
to resupply without request and/or redirect supplies based on priority; a real- time
common operating picture viewable by commanders and logisticians at echelon.
16
Such a system would be absolutely necessary to support agile combat employment or
other forms of dynamic force employment.
Finally, the Army’s integrated employment operations seek to orchestrate “information
related capabilities (IRC) in concert with other lines of operations to influence, deceive,
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of enemies and adversaries while protecting
our own” as well as to influence the enemy’s and population’s will to fight.
17
TRADOC
525-3-1 emphasizes the degradation of enemy decision- making capacity and suggests
protecting similar US capability. In the TRADOC 525-3-1 conception, the advantage is
won chiefly by attacking enemy cognition rather than building a superior process and
information environment.
Former Army Futures Command Commander General John M. Murray articulated the
clearest Army expression of decision advantage when he referenced former Army Chief of
Staff General James McConville’s use of the term decision dominance in a March 2021
interview: “is is a developing definition, but right now, [decision dominance] is the abil-
ity for a commander to sense, understand, decide, act and assess faster and more effectively
than any adversary.”
18
Murray’s conception is strikingly close to Boyd’s OODA loop.
Approaching the definition from the perspective of intelligence, another analysis observes
that available, suitably analyzed, and protected intelligence “can provide a decision advan-
tage so the decision- maker is better informed and understands more aspects of an issue
in ways that would not be possible without the intelligence” and that “this decision ad-
vantage can be especially critical when adversaries or competitors do not possess the same
insights or do not know what the opposing decision- maker does.”
19
Drawn from the Intelligence Community, this conception of decision advantage has
many strengths. In the comparison of the decisionmaker to their opponent, being “better
15. Antoine- Henri de Jomini, e Art of War, trans. W. P. Craighill and G. H. Mendell (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1862), 80; and Joint Planning, JP 5-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, December 1, 2020),
https://www.jcs.mil/.
16. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, B-1.
17. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, C-9, fn 49.
18. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army’s New Aim is ‘Decision Dominance,’ ” Breaking Defense, March 17,
2021, https://breakingdefense.com/.
19. John MacGaffin and Peter Oleson, “Decision Advantage, Decision Confidence,” Intelligencer: Journal
of US Intelligence Studies 21, no. 3 (Fall–Winter 2015), 41, https://www.afio.com/.
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informed” and “understanding more aspects of an issue” are fundamental. ese conditions
speak to the quality of information and context, leading to superior understanding.
In discussing JADC2 and the Global Information Dominance Exercise in 2021, US
Northern Command officials argued “the new artificial intelligence will instantly pull
together all sorts of data to give commanders a clear picture of the battlefield, enabling
good, fast decisions.”
20
Of this capability, these officials noted that “the key here is that
the AI system—not a slow human as in the past—will rapidly provide and constantly
upgrade best options to ensure a high probability of intercept.” A recent US Northern
Command J8 JADC2 development lead, explained,
e human now can have more time and more options to be able to make a decision.
. . . [e idea is to provide] an earlier and better understanding about what com-
petitors are doing . . . this tool allows us to be able to see: what are competitors
doing on a day- to- day basis, at their airfields, at their command and control facili-
ties, at the places that they would be operating from for their maritime operations.
21
In 2020, then Commander of US Northern Command General Terrence O’Shaughnessy
stated, “[JADC2] is going to inform our decision- makers, it’s going to help them make
decisions that, like playing chess, are thinking two or three moves downstream. It’s going to
give decision- makers, at the speed of relevance, the ability to make really complex decisions.”
22
Boyd’s OODA Loop, Organic C2, and the Concept of Initiative
A review of Boyd’s OODA loop, a key foundational concept underpinning JADC2,
reveals the aspects of the proposed notion of decision advantage not captured in existing
doctrinal and operational documents. e OODA loop decision- cycle concept lies at the
core of the JADC2 and JADO vision and architecture documents, with the assumption
that acting faster and with more complete information is necessary and inevitable, given
technological developments.
23
is assumption was challenged by Boyd.
e problems of ambiguity, initiative, and decision captured and commanded the at-
tention of Boyd in the late twentieth century. While some of Boyd’s accomplishments
may be overstated, his enduring contribution has shifted strategists, planners, and opera-
tors from mass- based to tempo- and disruption- based conceptions of war, conflict, and
20. eresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: NORTHCOM Developing, Testing AI Tools to Implement JADC2,”
Breaking Defense, March 5, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/.
21. Hitchens.
22. eresa Hitchens, “e Key to All- Domain Warfare Is ‘Predictive Analysis,’ Gen. O’Shaughnessy,”
Breaking Defense, May 5, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/.
23. Frans Osinga, “e Enemy as a Complex, Adaptive System: John Boyd and Airpower in the Post-
modern Era,” in Airpower Reborn: e Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd, ed. John Andreas Olsen
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015).
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Decision Advantage and Initiative
competition.
24
ese ideas are even more relevant in today’s hyper- paced technological
innovation environment. Boyd was early—perhaps a little too early—to the mark. Still,
his work holds considerable insight applicable to today’s environment where ambiguity is
the weapon of choice for US near- peer opponents.
e widespread acceptance of the simplified OODA loop model for decision- making
attests to the pervasive acceptance of Boyd’s compelling heuristic. In military, business,
and strategic writing, the term decision cycle is often synonymous with OODA. In figure
1, formulated by all major DoD stakeholders, the cycle is rendered as “understand, decide,
direct, employ, assess.” Within the JADC2 literature, the OODA idea serves as a core
foundation, a set of assumptions that should be carefully examined.
roughout his Air Force career, Boyd contributed significantly to fighter tactics instruc-
tion and to the realization and engineering of maneuverability in fighter design through
his energy maneuverability theory, developed with mathematician Tom Christie. Post- career,
he developed his core ideas, incorporating notions of complex, adaptive systems now reflected
in DoD doctrine. Boyd approached conflict more broadly through his manifold iterations
of the “Patterns of Conflict” briefing and a series of other less titanic but insightful, if
densely packed, works.
25
While “Patterns” has received much attention, one of his lesser- known 1987 briefings,
“Organic Design for Command and Control,” defined the OODA loop as it is commonly
used today.
26
In “Organic Design,” Boyd articulated his vision. e intent was not only to
operate faster but also to create the circumstances that would lead to confusion and pa-
ralysis for the opponent, to “operate inside the adversary’s observation- orientation- decision-
action loops to enmesh the adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion,
disorder, fear, panic chaos . . . and/or fold the adversary back inside himself so that he
cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold.”
27
e second part, “and/or fold the ad-
versary back inside of himself so that he cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold,”
is very close to the Russian concept of reflexive control and to the Chinese approach of
breaking down system links to isolate aspects of that system, such that individual parts
become less than the sum of whole.
28
Boyd went on to underscore the critical nature of social, intellectual, and cultural aspects
of command and control, concluding that the cohesion provided by “genetic heritage,
24. Price, Eagles, Falcons & Warthogs; Ian T. Brown. A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines,
and Maneuver Warfare (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2018), ch. 4; and Robert Coram’s
Boyd: e Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2004).
25. John Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict,” Boyd’s Work, December 1986, https://static1.squarespace.com/.
26. Stephen Robinson, e Blind Strategist: John Boyd and the American Way of War (Dunedin, NZ: Exisle
Publishing, 2021).
27. Boyd, “Organic Design,” slide 7.
28. Keir Giles, James Sherr, and Anthony Seaboyer, Russian Reflexive Control (Kingston, Ontario: Royal
Military College of Canada, 2017), https://www.researchgate.net/; and Timothy omas, “Russia’s Reflexive
Control eory and the Military, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17, no. 2 (August 2004), https://www
.tandfonline.com/.
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previous experiences, and unfolding circumstances” helped create a picture of the environ-
ment based on filters.
29
Filters come from the human experience—tangible and intan-
gible elements that shape observation and orientation. In turn, human factors are power-
ful contributors to winning through the decision cycle process. Boyd argued that this
process is command and control: “the process of observation- orientation- decision- action
represents what takes place during the command- and- control process—which means that
the OODA loop can be thought of as being the C&C loop.”
30
e JADC2 architecture and concepts reflect developments that seek a dramatic increase
in the operational tempo and, simultaneously, of complexity. is not only shortens the
cycle but also compresses it toward what has been called an “OODA point,” the point at
which the speed and complexity of data sources become too much for humans to handle.
31
Operators, therefore, are increasingly compelled to rely on human- machine teaming, machine
learning, and ultimately, AI. Consequently, near- peer competitors China and Russia pursue
their approaches to getting inside the US planning, decision, and execution cycle.
32
e clear compression of decision- cycle potential in near- term competition and conflict
is important, but this conception may be incomplete. Frans Osinga, a longtime student of
Boyd’s thought, carefully argued the OODA loop has often been misconstrued if aligned
purely with time.
e comprehensive overview of Boyd’s work shows that the OODA loop repre-
sents and means more than a decision process, and the model contains more ele-
ments for victory than information superiority and speed. . . . e first misconcep-
tion . . . concerns the element of speed. e rapid OODA looping idea suggests
a focus on speed of decision- making, and ‘out- looping’ the opponent by going
through consecutive OODA cycles faster.
33
Phrased this way, Osinga could be discussing JADC2’s core assumptions that the
computing/data architecture, as proposed, leaves much out—particularly the human
dimension, sometimes termed the human domain.
34
ese elements are necessary to
account for the adversary’s intentional degradation of the system, disinformation, and
ambiguity- seeking delays.
29. Boyd, “Organic Design,” slide 13.
30. Boyd, slide 26.
31. Jeffrey M. Reilly, “OODA Point: e Need for an Airman’s Approach to Operational Design,” work-
ing paper (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, November 20, 2020).
32. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, e Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and Modern-
ization of the Russian Global Forces (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2017); and
Andrew Scobell et al., China’s Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long- Term Competition (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/.
33. Frans P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: e Strategic eory of John Boyd (New York: Routledge,
2007), 235.
34. Julie Janson, “OTH Video Primer 1: e Human Domain,” Over the Horizon, February 2, 2018,
https://othjournal.com/.
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Boyd's work failed to grasp and support the potential benefit of leveraging sensor and
computer technology to dramatically improve situational awareness—as with the Air
Force’s Low- Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN), airborne
early warning and control system (AWACS) E-3 Sentry, and E-8C Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System ( Joint STARS). It seems clear his dismissal of the post-
Vietnam version of the sensor network overcorrected.
35
Few Americans in the post- Vietnam
world, or even the post-9/11 battlefields, would easily go to war without these platforms
or their forthcoming replacements, despite challenges to their survivability in a near- peer
operating environment. Nonetheless, the human factors Boyd proposed in his “alternate
vision” for “organic” command and control deserve another look, particularly in light of
Russian and Chinese efforts to aggressively inject ambiguity into the competition and
conflict environments, or to deny access to the electromagnetic spectrum, countering the
clarity sought in JADC2.
e corpus of Boyd’s work developed this theme over almost 20 years. In “Organic
Design,” he noted failures with contemporary command and control in operations, with
the evacuation of Saigon (1975) and with Desert One (1980):
e institutional response for overcoming these fiascos is more and better sensors,
more communications, more and better computers, more and better display devices,
more satellites, more and better fusion centers, etc.—all tied into one giant fully
informed, fully capable C&C system. is way of thinking emphasizes hardware
as the solution. . . .
I think there is a different way—a way that emphasizes the implicit nature of
human beings. . . .
[We] need insight and vision. . . . focus and direction. . . . adaptability. . . . [and]
security.
36
Boyd’s conception of post- Vietnam efforts to overcome fog and friction resembles
today’s sensor grid, data architecture, and emphasis on cloud/edge computing. While Boyd
clearly missed the substantial benefits provided through situational awareness when the
command- and- control system operates—as has been demonstrated with air and sensing
operations over Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere—his point about the power of
human beings, the human domain—must not be overlooked as the Defense Department
attempts to build a robust, capable, and agile JADC2 system.
Extrapolating from Carl von Clausewitz, Boyd concluded,
35. Price, Eagles, Falcons, and Warthogs.
36. Boyd, “Organic Design,” slides 3–4.
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e atmosphere of war is friction.
Friction is generated and magnified by menace, ambiguity, deception, rapidity,
uncertainty, mistrust, etc.
Friction is diminished by implicit understanding, trust, cooperation, simplicity,
focus, etc.
In this sense, variety and rapidity tend to magnify friction, while harmony and
initiative tend to diminish friction.
37
e JADO approach grasps many of these aspects, seeking to reduce fog and friction
through pervasive sensor, data resiliency, and edge computing—creating confusion by
simultaneous action in multiple domains, getting inside the opponent’s OODA loop. But
the current descriptions of JADC2 still emphasize speed and information dominance.
ey do not yet seem to embrace the service culture or human changes necessary to real-
ize the full potential of the JADC2 concept or perhaps more urgently to guard against the
opponent’s efforts to create ambiguity, confusion, disorder, isolation, and delay, if not
paralysis. e approaches taken by China and Russia noted above aim to dislodge the US
decision cycle, particularly during the critical orientation phase.
Boyd defined orientation as the crucial step within the OODA loop. He wrote that
“orientation is the schwerpunkt”—or center of gravity—and it “represents images, views,
or impressions of the world shaped by genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous expe-
riences, and unfolding circumstances.”
38
In other words, the hard- data view of the world
produced by JADO’s information advantage network will be filtered by staff and decision-
makers based on their shared and unique perspectives.
Participants’ ability to achieve unity of effort will require shared experience, culture, and
trust. In Boyd’s phrasing, “orientation is an interactive process of many- sided implicit
cross- referencing projections, empathies, correlations, and rejections that are shaped by
and shape the interplay of genetic heritage, previous experiences, and unfolding
circumstances.”
39
More provocatively, he offers a decentralized view of command and
control, favoring leadership in place of command and appreciation (monitoring) in place
of control. Boyd emphasized the power of coordinated, “harmonic” decentralization, and
stated that “appreciation and leadership offer more appropriate and richer means than
C&C for shaping and adapting to circumstances.”
40
Boyd clearly understood the purpose of driving action at and through the adversary’s
decision cycle was to create confusion, disorder, and paralysis. It is worth restating that
37. Boyd, slide 8.
38. Boyd, slides 16 and 13.
39. Boyd, slide 15.
40. Boyd, slide 32.
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the human factors, including beliefs, trust, shared vision and identity, knowledge, experi-
ence, education, and training, are as important to the JADC2 enterprise as the sensor grid,
open- data standards and interchange, mesh connectivity, cloud/edge computing, human-
machine teaming, machine learning, or even AI—if it ever fully develops. Human factors
will be the weakest links and the strongest aspects of the JADC2 enterprise.
The Concept of Initiative
Key human factors govern the concept of initiative. Initiative, or driving the action, is
foundational to competition and conflict through the OODA model. Within military
circles especially, there is sometimes a belief that taking an action—any action—is better
than ceding the initiative to the opponent.
Initiative is discussed extensively in the newest version of Joint Publication 3-0, Joint
Campaigns and Operations. In the section on Joint functions, initiative is mentioned six
times, connected expressly with command and control, the concept of mission command,
and sustainment.
41
Appendix A is associated with the principle of offensive Joint operations—
“the purpose of an offensive is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative”—but initiative
itself is not defined.
42
One concern with associating initiative with offense is that initiative can also be as-
sociated with defense and invitation: if one invites the opponent to take an action, and
they do, the opponent has the initiative even in defense. is might seem to be offense
masking as defense, but the strict usage associating initiative with offense creates a false
expectation among staff officers and commanders that offense equals initiative.
e concept of initiative as understood apart from the DoD lexicon is useful in defin-
ing what is sought through decision advantage. JP 3-0 mentions initiative nearly 40 times
and is discussed as an operational phase—“exploit the initiative to achieve operational-level
objectives.”
43
Specifically, the deployment of forces associated with seizing the initiative
may have a deterrent effect sufficient to dissuade an enemy from conducting further op-
erations, returning the [operating environment] to a more stable state.”
44
Further, initiative is closely associated with offensive in the principles of Joint operations:
“Offensive operations are how a military force seizes and holds the initiative while main-
taining freedom of action and achieving meaningful objectives.”
45
It is not the decision
itself that is important but the initiative and control the decision can afford.
A useful definition of initiative is found in the Oxford English Dictionary: “to take the
lead, make the first step, originate some action,” and “the power, right or function of ini-
tiating something, hence, to possess or have the initiative,” and “to drive or force . . . by
41. JP 3-0, III-5 (x3), III-14, III-41, III-48.
42. JP 3-0, A-1.
43. JP 3-0, VII-27.
44. JP 3-0, IV-15.
45. JP 3-0, A-1.
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some impulsive power.”
46
e concept of initiative connects decision- making with action.
e force compels the opponent to restart the OODA cycle, costing time and sowing
doubt, confusion, ambiguity, mistrust, and the other detractors from confidence, certainty,
clarity, and trust that Boyd identified. us, this article offers the following working
definition for initiative: Initiative is the impulsive power resulting from timely decision
and action, enabling freedom of maneuver while constraining an opponent’s options.
e goal of competitive or conflict- based decision- making is to drive the action, forc-
ing or inviting the opponent to respond; acting as the subject of action rather than being
the object; and by action, compelling the opponent to reobserve, reorient, redecide, and
react. Initiative is a zero- sum, binary resource; one or the other combatants may possess
it, but both cannot have it simultaneously. It is possible, however, that neither has it, and
there can be a difference in perception versus reality. One can believe they have the initia-
tive when they do not.
e initiative can be clearly felt in a game of chess, Go, or a single- combat fight. If one
feels compelled to make a given move when one would clearly prefer to make another, the
opponent holds the initiative as the driver of that action. If the situation is reversed, the
adversary loses freedom of action and is forced to react rather than acting as they would like.
is concept extrapolates to the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It is part of
the reason the study of strategy games, martial arts, or military and political history is
useful for building military domain expertise; through experience, one identifies patterns
that can distill order from chaos, building the confidence that enables decision, in turn
conveying the initiative. Any definition of decision advantage should include the intent
to capture and retain the initiative.
Decision Advantage: Condition versus Process
One argument that has plagued military planners is whether decision advantage rep-
resents a condition or a process. e condition view argues decision advantage is a state,
a blend of understanding aided by technology that enables decision. e process view
argues the condition is meaningless if not connected to a means of achieving it, the
concrete methods through which understanding will be turned into plans and action.
For some years, graduates of the Joint All- Domain Strategist (formerly Multi- Domain
Operations Strategist) program at Air Command and Staff College have learned to aug-
ment the Joint planning process through threat- informed decision- support matrices. By
anticipating the information necessary to drive a decision point at the operational or
strategic level, such matrices frame the collection of the commander’s critical information
requirements, analyze and clearly present risk, and connect the decision into an operational
or strategic design. Even using a manual process, the development and use of decision-
support matrices, while staff- intensive, enables faster and more informed decision- making
in the moment.
46. Oxford English Dictionary, compact ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1971), s.v. “initiative.”
73 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
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Figure 2. Decision support matrix for an exercise in the Air Command and Staff Col-
lege Joint All- Domain Strategist program
rough automation, under the JADC2 architecture, it should be possible to largely
automate the collection and presentation of decision- support matrices as crafted by the
staff, including changes needed to dynamically create new force and resource alignments,
enabling significantly faster decisions and operationally relevant action.
For this idea’s supporters, creating an automated system around the known decision
framework operationalizes the concept of decision advantage. In a sense, the process view
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captures the requirement for the connection of action from decision discussed above as
initiative. Decision advantage is thus the condition of holding an advantage. Yet without a
process, such advantage is meaningless as it does not translate into a seizure of the initiative.
Dening Decision Advantage
Given the nature of the OODA- loop concept emphasizing human factors, the speed
and informational advantage, and the centrality of the concept of initiative, this article
proposes a definition for decision advantage. e first part defines decision advantage itself,
while the second part sets JADC2 within the context of the OODA concept and human
factors, as noted through an adversary’s operational approaches: Decision advantage is
having access to and recognizing the right information at the right time (information
advantage), enabling timely decisions that are transformed into action, and seizing or
retaining the initiative.
e US Air Force recently released Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-99/Space Force
Doctrine Publication 3-99, Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations,
which defines decision advantage as “the product of situational understanding, the ability
to assure and exchange information, make and communicate decisions by maintaining
advantages in all domains.”
47
is definition has much to recommend it. It emphasizes
understanding over awareness. Unlike the author’s proposal, it emphasizes the centrality
of communications and connects decision- making to the need to communicate it. Yet it
also proposes the need to maintain advantages in all domains, which may prove impos-
sible in practice—though undoubtedly, this would be a welcome circumstance were it to
be somehow attained.
e Air Force definition, however, still lacks the central element that underscores the
importance of decision advantage—the conveyance of initiative. A modification of the
service definition to more firmly connect decision and initiative could read as follows: e
product of situational understanding, the ability to assure and exchange information, and
make and communicate decisions to seize or retain the advantage in key domains.
With either definition, decision advantage is supported by superior understanding,
confidence, and trust that overcomes ambiguity and creates clarity. Decision seizes and
retains the initiative concerning an adversary or competitor, forcing reobservation and re-
orientation, delaying their decision, and ultimately denying their ability to act or even retain
cohesion. Meanwhile, decision advantage seeks to maximize friendly freedom of action,
unity, and the ability to steer (the adversary) toward decisions, objectives, and end- states
favorable to the United States, expressed in some Russian literature as reflexive control.
48
Superior understanding flows from relevant knowledge, experience, appropriate intel-
lectual tools, education, and training; confidence flows from a clarity of understanding,
47. AFDP 3-99/SDP 3-99, 4.
48. Timothy L. omas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control eory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic Military
Studies 17 (2004), https://doi.org/.
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vision, purpose, authorities, and objectives—or things that are known. Trust stands against
the unknown by supporting risk through established relationships. e antithesis of deci-
sion advantage may thus be paralysis—the inability to orient, decide, and act.
David Epstein has recently and persuasively argued cross- domain and multidomain
knowledge—as in academic domains, not necessarily doctrinal warfighting domains—could
be valuable in solving wicked problems in a specialized world.
49
If Epstein is correct,
education that is broad and deep is necessary to transfer knowledge across domains and
find solutions to problems that seem intractable to specialists. Moreover, the inherent
limitations of AI known today suggest adaptability and flexibility are the keys to defeating
the relatively narrow but lightning- fast machine judgment.
50
Epstein’s argument that cross- domain knowledge is a powerful weapon when facing
debilitating ambiguity parallels the military conception of multidomain or all- domain
operations as key to achieving an advantage over the adversary. In both views, knowledge
or awareness of information from outside a single domain can yield important advantages.
e contrast between the small- unit innovation of Ukrainian forces and the centralized
plodding of Russian forces is instructive. Armed with a technological edge and fueled by
a passionate desire to defend their homes, Ukrainian civilians and military members have
innovated with technology and tactics on the fly, flummoxing their Russian opponents.
Technology such as the M142 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System, American intel-
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, the Javelin missile, and drones have enabled
Ukrainian forces to be considerably more agile and capable at long range. e technologies
alone are not flummoxing the Russian military, but perhaps the innovation pace coupled
with these technologies is.
Similarly, educational breadth may help guard against paralysis, enabling rapid synthesis
and resolution of a wicked problem on the fly. is will be necessary, given that the injection
of ambiguity and false information will most certainly adversely affect supporting machine
calculation and human judgment, leaving humans to fill the gap. Quality education, coupled
with training, will be needed to counter the difficulties of purposefully injected ambiguity
and the resulting fog and friction as subsystems are attacked and collapse.
In the quest to modernize and harness the potential of emerging technologies, the
weakest and strongest points of the JADC2 system will be the human operators and the
organizations they operate. Decisionmakers at all levels, however, still need to understand
information presented at near- machine speed—they must have situational awareness.
Perspective, bias, culture, identity, and other factors give information meaning and provide
49. David Epstein, Range: While Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World (New York: Riverhead Books,
2019).
50. Chinese State Council, “Full Translation: China’s ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Develop-
ment Plan’ [2017],” trans. Graham Webster et al., New America Foundation (website), August 1, 2017,
https://www.newamerica.org/; and Scott W. Harold, Defeat: Not Merely Compete: China’s View of Its Military
Aerospace Goals and Requirements in Relation to the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2018), 2, https://www.rand.org/.
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another set of lenses through which combat information will pass. Education is one
counter to stultifying organizational narrowness, a personal bias that may persist even
when JADC2 is realized, in whatever form it takes.
Conclusion
Joint all- domain operations seek decision advantage, leveraging all- domain information
advantage, created through the sensor grid, cloud- or edge- advanced analytics, and resil-
ient, open- data connectivity in support of mission- command- based planning, decision,
and execution cycles that must be faster, smarter, and more robust than those of the op-
ponents. Yet a key concept embedded in the JADC2 published architecture—Boyd’s
OODA loop—is frequently misunderstood to focus solely on the speed of decision. Boyd
also called out the quality of information, noting the whole point of competition in
conflict is to inject a barrage of input to disorient the opponent. Further, recent efforts to
define decision advantage miss the importance of linking action to decision—the seizing
and maintaining of initiative—which is not the same as offense.
Even if JADC2 is successful, today’s emerging opponents seek to reduce America’s
present and near future battlefield advantages through misinformation, misdirection, and
selectively attacking elements of the United States’ command- and- control systems to
create pause, indecision, degradation, and, ultimately, paralysis.
Moreover, human factors that these attacks target are the same ones that, even in a
perfect operating environment with near- perfect situational awareness, may distort un-
derstanding and lead to poor and ineffective—or even disastrous—decisions. At the same
time, humans process changing information more rapidly than machines or organizational
systems that embed centralized, machine- like qualities—as with the Russians. If thinkers
like Epstein are correct, the human elements of a JADC2 system will be the key weakness
and strength of the whole enterprise. is consideration of human breadth could comple-
ment JADC2’s machine- processed depth to reveal some of what is hidden through the
fog and friction of war. Q
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 77
PLANNING AND STRATEGY
e Other Side of the Deterrence Moon
Elevating “Deterrence from Space” in Strategic Competition
tiMothy GeorGetti
Current discussions about the intersection of deterrence and space focus exclusively on deterrence
in space. ese conversations fail, however, to consider how the United States can leverage its
space assets to deter offensive actions in nonspace domains, a concept this article calls deterrence
from space. is notion differs from deterrence in space in that it reframes space assets as both
powerful deterrents themselves and as vulnerable liabilities needing deterrence protection. Given
the rise of China’s capabilities and ambitions, the United States must not neglect the ways in
which deterrence from space can enhance integrated deterrence. Such deterrence includes ca-
pabilities such as orbital- class rocket resupply and robust space- based solar power.
M
uch has been written about how best to deter US adversaries, most importantly
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), from attacking US assets in the space
domain.
1
Yet despite the ubiquity of statements on the “critical” nature of US
military and intelligence satellites to “the modern American way of war,” or others detailing
the specifics of how satellites support the warfighter in other domains, the ways in which
space assets can directly affect military operations and American integrated deterrence writ
large are rarely addressed.
2
us, what remains noticeably absent from such discussions
as well as discussions on cross- domain deterrence—and from space deterrence literature
as a whole—are detailed accounts of what deterrent effects space assets produce themselves.
Timothy Georgetti, a research intern at US Central Command, is currently pursuing a master in security studies at the Walsh
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
1. Krista Langeland and Derek Grossman, Tailoring Deterrence for China in Space (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2021), https://www.rand.org/; Stephen J. Flanagan et al., A Framework of Deterrence in
Space Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2023), https://www.rand.org/; Steve Lambakis,
A Guide for inking about Space Deterrence and China (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2019), https://
www.nipp.org/; and Scott Pace, “A U.S. Perspective on Deterrence and Geopolitics in Space,” Space Policy 66
(November 2023), https://doi.org/.
2. Michael P. Gleason and Peter L. Hays, “Getting the Most Deterrent Value from U.S. Space Forces,” in
Space Agenda 2021: Informing the Future of Space (El Segundo, CA: Aerospace Corporation, October 2020),
55, https://csps.aerospace.org/; and Nathaniel A. Peace, “Space Denial: A Deterrence Strategy,” Joint Force
Quarterly 111, no. 4 (October 30, 2023), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/.
78 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Other Side of the Deterrence Moon
is significant gap in the literature indicates the potential of military strategists to
propagate perspectives in which space assets are viewed myopically as liabilities in need of
the protection of deterrence rather than as assets with powerful deterrent properties of their
own. In reality, space assets fall on both sides of this metaphorical deterrence moon—they
are simultaneously both vulnerable liabilities and powerful deterrents themselves.
is article examines how the United States can bolster its efforts to deter its “pacing
challenge,” the PRC, from offensive actions in nonspace domains, using American space
capabilities.
3
Borrowing from the US Space Force mission statement—which is to “secure
our Nation’s interests in, from, and to space”—this article will subsequently refer to the
act of using deterrence to protect American satellites and space assets specifically from
attacks in the space domain as deterrence in space, and the act of using American space
assets to deter offensive actions in nonspace domains as deterrence from space.
4
Given the rapid rise of PRC military capabilities and ambitions, the United States must
integrate use of a deterrence- from- space framework into its operational and strategic
mode of thinking.
5
is article focuses on two US space capabilities as examples of the
unique deterrence capabilities elucidated by a deterrence- from- space framework: orbital-
class rocket resupply and space- based solar power. e United States must continue to
invest in, develop, evaluate, and eventually deploy these technologies to maximize its
potential deterrent effect with respect to China.
Theoretical Foundations
Deterrence from space differs from deterrence in space by reframing the positionality
of space assets from vulnerable liabilities to deterrent assets. Deterrence from space is also
wider in scope and focuses on using space assets to deter aggression and attacks in all
nonspace domains, whereas deterrence in space solely focuses on deterring attacks spe-
cifically within the space domain.
6
Deterrence from space, grounded in traditional deterrence theory, prioritizes the fol-
lowing distinctions. First, it is important to distinguish between the two forms of strategic
coercion—namely, deterrence and compellence.
7
States certainly could compel from space
by continuously and actively inflicting forceful punishment on an adversary using space
3. Lloyd J. Austin III, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Depart-
ment of Defense [DoD], 2022).
4. “United States Space Force Mission,” US Space Force, accessed December 11, 2023, https://www
.spaceforce.mil/; Langeland and Grossman, Tailoring Deterrence; Pace, U.S. Perspective; and Gregory D. Miller,
“Preventing War with a Warfighting Domain: Nuclear Deterrence Lessons for Space,” Astropolitics 19, no. 1–2
(May 4, 2021), https://doi.org/.
5. Dean Cheng, Cyber Dragon: Inside China’s Information Warfare and Cyber Operations, e Changing
Face of War (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2017); and Austin, National Defense Strategy.
6. Miller, “Preventing War.”
7. Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April 19,
2019), 2, https://doi.org/.
Georgetti
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 79
assets until the adversary stops acting in a specified way. Given the sophisticated nature
of US space capabilities, compellence from space is likely already theoretically possible.
Yet due to other difficulties, such as the need for a carefully calibrated time frame and
credibility roadblocks that plague all conceptions of compellence, this article focuses only
on the concept of deterrence from space.
8
Deterrence from space is conceptually bound
to threats of force held in reserve, derived from space assets, to prevent some specified
adversarial action in any nonspace domain.
9
Acknowledging the further distinction between deterrence by denial and deterrence by
punishment from space, this article will focus on deterrence by denial from space. is can
be conceptualized as the use of space assets to deny an adversary the ability to achieve some
offensive end in a nonspace domain by imposing sufficient costs such that the offensive
action is not worth pursuing in the first place.
10
Integrated Deterrence
Deterrence from space fits perfectly within the notion of integrated deterrence outlined
in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, whereby the United States first aims to deny ad-
versaries opportunities in which the costs do not outweigh the advantages of attacking.
11
Integrated deterrence “seeks to integrate all tools of national power across domains, ge-
ography, and spectrum of conflict, while working with allies and partners.”
12
Deterrence by denial from space complements this framework by emphasizing the
deterrent effects of capabilities the United States already employs. Some of these capa-
bilities include GPS- provided position, navigation, and timing capabilities, which bolster
precision- weapons targeting; satellite- based military communications, which enhance
military responsiveness, readiness, and coordination; and space- based nuclear command
and control systems, which underpin America’s nuclear capabilities.
13
ese current space capabilities when viewed with a deterrence- from- space framework
become key contributors to the effectiveness of general US strategic efforts to deter by
denial due to the ways in which they increase the cost of offensive adversarial actions in
all domains. In addition to highlighting the deterrence- by- denial effects generated by
current US space assets, the deterrence- from- space framework elucidates deterrence- by-
denial properties of space assets, such as orbital- class rocket resupply and space- based
solar power, that otherwise would not be considered deterrents.
8. omas Schelling, Arms and Influence, Veritas Paperback ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2020), 69–78.
9. Miller, Preventing War”; and Schelling.
10. Austin, National Defense Strategy; and Lambakis, Guide.
11. Austin; and Langeland and Grossman, Tailoring Deterrence.
12. Stacie Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser, No I in Team (Washington, DC: Center for New American Se-
curity, December 14, 2022), executive summary, https://www.cnas.org/.
13. Langeland and Grossman, Tailoring Deterrence; and Lambakis, Guide.
80 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Other Side of the Deterrence Moon
Finally, it might be argued that devoting more attention to deterrence from space is not
necessary because the use of American space assets as deterrents is implied by the United
States’ reliance on cross- domain punishment threats—that “deterrence is just deterrence.”
14
Yet this is not the case. One of the pillars of effective deterrence in any domain is clear
communication.
15
Without effective communication that results in one’s adversaries under-
standing and believing one’s deterrent threats, adversaries will not be deterred.
16
Given the current literature and official government documents’ lack of discussion about
deterrence from space, the United States may not be clearly communicating its ability and
intention to use space- based capabilities as deterrents beyond their use in support of the
warfighter. Importantly, proper communication regarding this additional frame of reference
for space deterrence will increase both the likelihood that US policymakers and military
officials view space assets as having their own inherent deterrent effects and the likelihood
that the PRC understands and internalizes this deterrence potential.
17
A View from China
To evaluate the credibility of US deterrence from space vis- à- vis China, a baseline
understanding of China’s conceptions of space deterrence is necessary. It is important to
delineate the difference between Western theoretical conceptions of deterrence from the
nearest Chinese concept, 威慑 or weishe.
18
e basis of the Western concept of deterrence,
as understood by the United States, is the idea of dissuasion—that is, that threats of force
are used in order to prevent an adversary from certain action and will only be carried out
if the adversary performs this action. e Chinese concept of weishe, on the other hand,
can best be understood as strategic coercion as defined by omas Schelling. Western
strategic ideas of both dissuasion and persuasion are included in this concept; therefore,
weishe encompasses both Western ideas of deterrence and compellence.
19
Another meaningful contrast between these Western and Chinese concepts is whether
they are considered a means to larger ends or an end in and of themselves. In US military
14. Austin, National Defense Strategy; and Nicole Petrucci, “Building Space into Multi- Domain Deter-
rence Strategy,” Angle of Attack: A Journal of Airpower Strategy [blog], December 1, 2018, https://www.air
powerstrategy/.
15. Bryan Boyce, “Twenty- first Century Deterrence in the Space War- Fighting Domain: Not Your Father’s
Century, Deterrence, or Domain,” Air & Space Power Journal 33, no. 1 (2019), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
16. Boyce.
17. Austin, National Defense Strategy.
18. Dean Cheng, “Chinese Views on Deterrence,” Joint Force Quarterly 60, no. 1 (2011), https://ndupress
.ndu.edu/; Cheng, “An Overview of Chinese inking About Deterrence,” in NL ARMS Netherlands Annual
Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from eory and Practice, ed. Frans
Osinga and Tim Sweijs (Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 2020), 177–200, https://doi.org/; and James Scouras,
Edward Smyth, and omas Mahnken, Cross- Domain Deterrence in US- China Strategy: Workshop Proceedings
(Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2017), https://www.jhuapl.edu/.
19. Cheng, “Chinese Views”; Cheng, “Overview”; Scouras, Smyth, and Mahnken; and Schelling, Arms
and Influence, 4–5, 69–78.
Georgetti
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 81
strategy, preventing adversaries from acting is a goal worth pursuing for its own sake. In
PRC military strategy, however, weishe is a means of achieving other broader strategic
goals; mainly, it is a method of psychological warfare that has the power to constrain the
actions of adversaries. In other words, weishe is not to be pursued—or, more representative
of Chinese strategy, used—for its own sake, but only to force adversaries to submit to
strategic objectives.
20
ese unique characteristics of weishe directly affect how the PRC applies this concept
to space to create the concept of 空间威慑 or kongjian [space] weishe.
21
is concept
entails using “space forces and capabilities to deter or coerce an opponent, preventing the
outbreak of conflict, or limiting its extent should conflict occur.”
22
Unlike the United
States, whose concern about establishing deterrence in space stems from its own dependence
on space assets, China is concerned with operationalizing kongjian weishe, which stems
from its recognition that the United States is both dependent on and vulnerable in space.
23
us, if one had to choose, it would be most accurate to compare kongjian weishe with the
concepts of deterrence—and compellence—from space as opposed to in space. is is
because the PRC is not particularly focused on preventing adversaries from attacking its
satellites or acting in space, but rather on employing space systems, which give it the
ability to influence the perceptions, and thus behavior, of adversaries in all domains, but
particularly nonspace domains.
24
us, China’s own theory of kongjian weishe is likely evidence of the credibility of a US
deterrence- from- space posture with regard to China. Given that the PRC already values
its space assets primarily for the strategic and holistic effects they produce in all nonspace
domains and the fact deterrence from space aims to use space assets in largely the same
way, it seems highly likely the PRC will find US deterrence from space credible.
25
is is
because deterrence from space simply asks the PRC to believe its own words that kongjian
weishe “has a great deterrent effect on the enemy.”
26
Ultimately, if the PRC believes that
it can credibly achieve such a coercive effect using kongjian weishe, it is reasonable to
conclude that the PRC will similarly find its closest Western conception, deterrence from
space, to be equally credible and effective.
27
While the similarities between kongjian weishe and deterrence from space enhance the
credibility of US deterrence from space efforts vis- à- vis China, they also provide for one
area of potential escalatory misunderstanding. Given the tendency of states to project their
20. Cheng, “Chinese Views”; and “Overview.”
21. Cheng, “Overview”; and Cyber Dragon.
22. Cheng, “Overview.”
23. Cheng.
24. Cheng, “Overview”; and Cyber Dragon.
25. Cheng.
26. In eir Own Words: Science of Military Strategy 2020 (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies
Institute, January 2020), 130, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
27. eir Own Words, 130.
82 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Other Side of the Deterrence Moon
own behaviors and beliefs onto their adversaries, US deterrence from space could be
mistakenly viewed by China as a means of compellence.
28
China’s use of a singular concept
for both compellence and deterrence has the potential to blind the PRC to this nuance
in US thinking. Evidence of such misperceptions already exists. Analysis of PRC percep-
tions of US actions in space find the PRC tends to interpret US deterrent efforts in space
as being aggressive or coercive.
29
While this presents the possibility of unintended escalation due to misperception, the
advantages associated with US employment of a deterrence- from- space framework
outweigh these potential risks. Not only does deterrence from space enhance integrated
deterrence by increasing the effectiveness of deterrence by denial, but also past US actions
in space aimed at clarifying its intentions have generally been viewed as disingenuous by
China.
30
us, refraining from implementing a deterrence- from- space framework would
rob the United States of deterrence advantages without assuaging PRC misperceptions.
Deterring China from Space
To successfully determine how the United States might leverage its space assets to
deter the PRC from space, one first must understand how China calculates the cost- benefit
analysis of taking offensive actions as well as what specific interests the United States must
credibly hold under threat for China to be deterred. While an exhaustive discussion of
China’s interests is outside the scope of this paper, one PRC vital interest seems particu-
larly susceptible to US deterrence from space: military- balance/cost- benefit calculations.
China’s main interest in achieving either an equilibrium balance of power with the
United States or, from its perspective, preferably an imbalance in its favor, stems from
long- standing designs on becoming the regional hegemonic power in the Asia- Pacific
region and achieving “reunification” with Taiwan.
31
As such, the PRC is extremely concerned
with the balance of military power in the region.
32
Importantly, China seems to rely on
calculations of military balance as part of its determination for the use of force to invade
Taiwan, refraining from invading so long as it believes the likelihood of defeat is higher
than that of success.
33
us, the PRC's military-balance cost-benefit calculation is susceptible to targeting by
US deterrence from space. e United States should do so by investing in, developing, and
eventually deploying orbital- class rocket resupply and robust space- based solar power.
28. Alexis A. Blanc et al., Chinese and Russian Perceptions of and Responses to U.S. Military Activities in the
Space Domain (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, October 11, 2022), https://www.rand.org/.
29. Blanc et al.
30. Blanc et al.
31. Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Modernizing Military,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated February
5, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/; and Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris, “Broken Nest: Deterring China
from Invading Taiwan,” Parameters 51, no. 4 (November 17, 2021), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/.
32. McKinney and Harris; Maizland; and Cheng, Cyber Dragon.
33. McKinney and Harris.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 83
Orbital- Class Rocket Resupply
e United States can enhance the effectiveness of its overall deterrence posture with
regard to China by investing in and developing orbital- class rocket resupply as a deterrence-
from- space capability. Orbital- class rocket resupply capability entails the use of rocket- powered
spacecraft to rapidly transport large amounts of cargo, or possibly even people, from one
point on the globe to any other, via flights that reach just above the atmosphere of Earth
and into space—just over 100 kilometers in altitude.
34
Such flights require the use of orbital
class rockets, such as SpaceX’s Starship or other similarly sized orbital platforms.
35
While the time such capabilities will spend in the space domain is minimal, their de-
velopment is inextricably linked to the development of space domain technologies and
research and development, and therefore can only be viewed as space capabilities.
36
While
this technology is still years away from being operational, current estimates suggest such
a capability would be able to transport the equivalent cargo payload of a US Air Force
C-17 cargo plane—about 170,000 pounds—anywhere in the world in less than an hour’s
time, with even larger payloads likely possible as the technology progresses.
37
While US Transportation Command has already invested in studies and demonstration
contracts with private companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, the Department of
Defense needs to remain steadfast in its pursuit and development of these technologies.
38
e Pentagon’s efforts regarding orbital- class rocket resupply technologies have been
criticized mainly for being either too provisional or, most cogently, for being technologi-
cally too nascent to warrant investment.
39
Yet given this technology’s potential unmatched
ability to alter China’s military balance calculations in contingencies in the Asia- Pacific
region, the nascent stage of this technology offers a powerful argument for more substan-
tial investment in its development.
Currently, US deterrent threats to respond with force against either a PRC invasion of
Taiwan or its use of military force in other Asia- Pacific contingencies face an enormous
credibility problem due to the extreme logistical difficulty of supporting and deploying
34. US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) Public Affairs, “Rocket Cargo Delivery Gets
Big Boost,” press release, June 7, 2021, https://www.ustranscom.mil/; eresa Hitchens, “Starship Troop-
ers? TRANSCOM- SpaceX Accord Raises Policy Eyebrows,” Breaking Defense, October 8, 2020, https://
breakingdefense.com/; and Sandra Erwin, “SpaceX Wins $102 Million Air Force Contract to Demon-
strate Technologies for Point- to- Point Space Transportation,” SpaceNews, January 19, 2022, https://space
news.com/.
35. Von P. H. Fernandes et al., “e World in 90 Minutes or Less: Rocket Logistics and Future Military
Operations,” Campaigning: e Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College (October 13, 2022), https://jfsc.ndu.edu/.
36. Fernandes et al.
37. Hitchens, “Starship Troopers?”; and “C-17 Globemaster III,” Military.com, accessed December 12,
2023, https://www.military.com/.
38. “United States Transportation Command,” USTRANSCOM (website), accessed December 12,
2023, https://www.ustranscom.mil/; Hitchens; and Erwin, “SpaceX.”
39. Hitchens.
84 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Other Side of the Deterrence Moon
US troops so far away from the American homeland.
40
is so- called tyranny of distance
includes the vast surface area of the Pacific Ocean, which poses fuel sufficiency issues for
cargo flights, the immense lead times needed to move sufficient supplies and troops into
the Asia- Pacific theater, and the extreme scale of such efforts.
41
ese logistical nightmares
undermine even integrated deterrence’s most sincere threats to respond with force to
China’s offensive actions, based solely on the fact that US follow- through might not be
feasible within a reasonable time frame.
42
e PRC weighs this US inability for rapid
response into its calculations of the regional military balance and thus ultimately into
whether to find American deterrent threats sufficiently plausible.
43
A fully functional orbital- class rocket resupply capability would resolve these logistical
infeasibilities, affirming US deterrence concerning China’s aims regarding Taiwan. e
ability to move cargo planes’-worth of military supplies and possibly even troops from the
American homeland or other military bases around the globe to the Asia- Pacific theater
in under an hour would strengthen deterrence by denial by increasing the likelihood that
the PRC would deem offensive actions inadvisable in the first place. Moreover, this capa-
bility would also strengthen US deterrence by punishment by increasing the rapidity with
which the United States could carry out its deterrent threats if needed.
44
e capability of orbital- class rocket resupply is still likely decades away from being
mature enough to reach production or integration into US military operations.
45
e lack
of test flights, uncertainties about how cargo would need to be stored to successfully
survive flights, and concerns about the feasibility of deploying intricate and temperamen-
tal technologies such as rockets at an effective scale all pose serious challenges to the re-
alization and implementation of orbital-class rocket resupply as an effective deterrent from
space.
46
Given the ability of such a technology to solve an otherwise overwhelming deter-
rence problem for the United States, however, the Department of Defense and senior
political leaders should continue to invest in and develop orbital- class rocket resupply.
Notably, orbital- class rocket resupply demonstrates the importance of using multiple
conceptual frames when discussing the relationship between deterrence and space. Given
this capability’s lack of deterrent effect specifically within the space domain, it is not and
never would be mentioned in the context of deterrence in space. Yet with the conceptual
framework of deterrence from space, its potential deterrent effect becomes obvious. Even
if future US leaders find the use of orbital- class rocket resupply at scale to be infeasible
or cost ineffective, integrated deterrence can only be strengthened by seriously evaluating
40. McKinney and Harris, “Broken Nest”; and Maximillian K. Bremer and Kelly A. Grieco, “e Four
Tyrannies of Logistical Deterrence,” Stimson Center, November 8, 2023, https://www.stimson.org/.
41. Bremer and Grieco.
42. McKinney and Harris, “Broken Nest”; and Bremer and Grieco.
43. McKinney and Harris.
44. McKinney and Harris; and Bremer and Grieco, “Four Tyrannies.”
45. Fernandes et al., “World.”
46. Fernandes et al.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 85
this capability and all others whose deterrent effects only become apparent within a
deterrence- from- space framework.
Space- Based Solar Power
Another deterrence- from- space solution that can increase the overall effectiveness of
US integrated deterrence vis- à- vis China, is space- based solar power. Space- based solar
power is created using satellites that transform solar energy into microwaves, which are
then wirelessly beamed down to Earth to be used as power.
47
is space- based technology
can bolster US efforts to deter PRC coercive military actions short of war in the Asia-
Pacific region.
Implicit in the conception of weishe is China’s reliance on coercive military measures
short of war, sometimes referred to as irregular warfare.
48
e PRC’s use of irregular
warfare measures has recently come to the forefront of global news. For example, in 2023,
the Chinese navy blocked Philippine access to one of the island nation’s own shoals, and
it conducted exercises that same year simulating a naval blockade of Taiwan.
49
China’s
tactic of using naval blockades, designed to either cut off access/trade to a given island to
force an adversary to submit, is hard for US deterrent threats to prevent.
50
e difficulty
of deterring such tactics and other irregular warfare measures lies in the fact that threaten-
ing to respond with force is much less credible when the initial provocation does not
constitute an act of war.
51
While the PRC has not attempted to blockade US Asia- Pacific Allies and partners,
such as Japan and Taiwan, the ineffectiveness of traditional deterrent threats in preventing
this type of coercion suggests China could attempt such blockades, despite the logistical
challenges. Importantly, both Japan and Taiwan are particularly vulnerable to coercion via
blockade since each relies on imports to provide over 90 percent of their energy needs.
52
Employing an irregular warfare tactic vastly reduces the likelihood of American military
retaliation while also providing the PRC with significant leverage with which to gain
political concessions. is not only exemplifies weishe in its purest form, but also conforms
to the Chinese strategic interest of maintaining a favorable military balance.
53
47. “Space- Based Solar Power Overview,” European Space Agency, August 8, 2022, https://www.esa.int/.
48. Cheng, “Overview”; Cheng, Cyber Dragon; and Scouras, Smyth, and Mahnken, Cross- Domain Deterrence.
49. Ben Blanchard and Yimou Lee, “China Ends Taiwan Drills after Practising Blockades, Precision Strikes,”
Reuters, April 10, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/; and Karen Lema and Kay Johnson, “Explainer: Why China,
the Philippines Keep Fighting over Tiny Shoal,” Reuters, December 11, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/.
50. John J. Klein, Fight for the Final Frontier: Irregular Warfare in Space (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2023).
51. Klein.
52. “Japan: Overview,” US Energy Information Administration, July 7, 2023, https://www.eia.gov/; and
Joseph Webster, “Does Taiwan’s Massive Reliance on Energy Imports Put Its Security at Risk?,” New Atlan-
ticist (blog), Atlantic Council, July 7, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/.
53. Klein, Fight; McKinney and Harris, “Broken Nest”; and Cheng, “Overview.”
86 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
e Other Side of the Deterrence Moon
Space- based solar, however, has the potential to deprive the PRC of the coercive lever-
age of blockades by decreasing the dependence of both Taiwan and Japan on energy
imports in times of crises. While still in its infancy, space- based solar technology is much
further along in development than orbital- class rocket resupply capabilities.
54
Fortunately,
even modest projections of the potential power- generation capabilities of space- based
solar suggest single satellites would be able to provide two gigawatts of power, enough to
continuously power a city of two million people.
Even better, the energy- providing microwaves produced by solar power satellites can
be directed anywhere in range that has the requisite power- receiving antennae. is means
that whether the United States builds these satellites in collaboration with its Asia- Pacific
Allies and partners or builds them for its own in- theater use, in times of crises, the United
States could redirect power where needed.
55
In this way, space- based solar power can
bolster US integrated deterrence with regard to China by decreasing the chance that PRC
blockades would produce their desired coercive effect, thus disincentivizing their use.
While space- based solar power technology is indeed ahead of orbital- class rocket resup-
ply in its development, various technological challenges and feasibility concerns remain.
Fully functional systems will not be able to be deployed until the government or industry
develops reliable space- debris protection techniques and the government acquires a more
substantial understanding of potential environmental or health effects caused by the
wireless transmission of power.
56
Perhaps the most critical roadblock to the development
of this technology is the expected costs associated with launching the requisite satellite
systems into orbit.
57
Despite criticism of its methodology, a recent NASA report determined
the cost per kilowatt hour of electricity produced by space- based solar far exceeds that of
traditional renewable energy sources.
58
While such price disparities might make space- based solar infeasible as a renewable
energy source, the cost- benefit calculation necessarily changes when such capabilities are
viewed as a possible deterrent within a deterrence- from- space framework. With the use
of deterrence from space, the value of the potential power provided by this capability
necessarily exceeds the value of traditional and standard power generation due to its po-
tential deterrent effect against China’s coercion.
Fielding capable and robust space- based solar satellites might not be enough to deter
China from employing irregular warfare tactics, such as blockades, on its own. Yet, it most
54. Peggy Hollinger, “How to Make Space- Based Solar Power a Reality,” Financial Times, October 17,
2023, https://www.ft.com/; and Robert Lea, “Scientists Beam Solar Power to Earth from Space for 1st Time
Ever,” Space.com, June 12, 2023, https://www.space.com/.
55. Hollinger.
56. Rajini Karduri et al., “Exploring the Viability of Space- Based Solar Power,” International Journal of
Advanced Research in Innovative Discoveries in Engineering and Applications 4, no. 2 (April 27, 2019), http://
dx.doi.org/.
57. Jeff Foust, “NASA Report Offers Pessimistic Take on Space- Based Solar Power,” SpaceNews, January
19, 2024, https://spacenews.com/.
58. Foust.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 87
certainly would be an effective addition to US deterrence- by- denial efforts in the Asia-
Pacific region as it would negatively alter the PRC’s cost- benefit calculations regarding
the use of such coercive behavior. Using the framework of deterrence from space, the
United States should continue to invest in, research, and develop space- based solar power.
Conclusion
Careful review of the current literature and theoretical landscape regarding deterrence
and space reveals a dangerous US national security gap: a lack of discussion and integration
of a deterrence- from- space framework into overall US strategic and deterrence thinking.
Deterrence from space, which seeks to leverage US space capabilities to deter offensive
actions in all nonspace domains, is theoretically compatible with and complementary to
integrated deterrence. Continuing to neglect the theoretical and practical importance of
deterrence from space will only detract from the effectiveness of overall US deterrence by
leaving potential space- based deterrent capabilities unexplored and unleveraged.
Importantly, the United States must pursue deterrence from space by continuing to
invest in, develop, and deploy orbital- class rocket resupply and robust space- based solar
power. Now, more than ever, the United States must not be content with leaving one- half
of the deterrence moon in darkness. Q
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88 AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW
MULTIMEDIA REVIEWS
Masters of the Air, season 1, episodes 1 and 2.
Directed by Cary Joji Fukunaga, written by John Orloff. Aired January 26, 2024, Apple TV+.
Masters of the Air is the third World War II miniseries from Stephen Spielberg, Tom
Hanks, and Gary Goetzman, executive producers of Band of Brothers (2001) and e Pa-
cific (2010). Like the earlier series, this most recent offering is based on a compelling book
by a distinguished author, in this case Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought
the Air War against Nazi Germany by Donald L. Miller, professor emeritus at Lafayette
College and a frequent adviser to film and documentary producers.
1
Spielberg, Hanks, and Goetzman put Miller’s material into the hands of head writer
andco- producer John Orloff, best known for having written two episodes of Band of
Brothers, including “Day of Days,” which told of Easy Company’s jump into Normandy.
2
Four of the series’ nine episodes, including both under review here, were directed by Cary
Joji Fukunaga. Fukunaga is an experienced producer and director of both movies and
prestige TV, with credits such as the 2021 James Bond film No Time to Die and first sea-
son of HBO’s True Detective to his name.
3
Masters of the Air focuses on the wartime experience of the 100th Bomb Group, a four-
squadron B-17 unit based at orpe Abbotts airfield in Norfolk. e group at its arrival
in the United Kingdom comprised 37 crews of 10 Airmen—a larger pool of dramatis
personae than the single infantry company featured in Band of Brothers, but still substan-
tially more constrained in both size and scope than e Battle of Britain (1969) or Tora!
Tora! Tora! (1970), two of the best examples of an earlier generation’s World War II avia-
tion epics. Confining the story to a relatively small number of individuals is characteristic
of Spielberg’s approach to historical filmmaking, an approach exemplified in Empire of
the Sun (1987), Schindler’s List (1994), and Saving Private Ryan (1998).
e two most prominently featured Airmen are Majors Gale Cleven and John Egan, com-
manders of the 350th and 418th Bomb Squadrons. Known as “Buck” and “Bucky,” Cleven
and Egan were pre war aviation cadets who became bombardment instructor pilots before
their deployment with the 100th Bomb Group to the UK.
4
ey are well played here by Aus-
tin Butler (a 2022 Academy Award nominee for Elvis) and Callum Turner (e Boys in the
Boat, 2023), who manage to portray Cleven and Egan, respectively, as confident and compe-
tent aviators who are nonetheless shaken by the violent intensity of air warfare. “Why didn’t
you tell me?” asks Cleven after his first sortie, in which three 100th Bomb Group Flying
Fortresses were shot down, with a presumed loss of all 30 crewmen.
1. “Author & Historian Donald L. Miller,” Lafayette College, accessed January 31, 2004, https://sites
.lafayette.edu/.
2. “John Orloff,” IMDb [International Movie Database], accessed January 31, 2024, https://www
.imdb.com/.
3. “Cary Joji Fukunaga,” IMDb, accessed January 31, 2024, https://www.imdb.com/.
4. “Gale Winston Cleven,” American Air Museum in Britain, accessed January 31, 2024, https://www
.americanairmuseum.com/; and “John Clarence Egan,” American Air Museum, accessed January 31, 2024,
https://www.americanairmuseum.com/.
Multimedia Reviews
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 89
What Egan doesn’t say but Fukunaga does show is that maneuvering large formations
of heavy bombers in combat conditions can be almost unbearably chaotic. e group
struggles to rendezvous over orpe Abbots, the lead aircraft aborts for a mechanical
problem, the trailing element straggles, and a damaged Fort can’t maintain station on the
return leg. It is evident that the crews face considerable challenges in simply aviating,
navigating, and communicating, well before confronting the rigors of actual air combat.
at struggle is also convincingly presented: the flak bursts and German fighters are ob-
viously computer generated, but their size, shape, speed, and relative motion are marvel-
ously rendered. e Playtone- Amblin CGI artists appear to have modeled these scenes
on documentary footage, perhaps from the extraordinary 2018 film e Cold Blue, com-
piled from restored stock from William Wyler’s 1944 Memphis Belle.
5
e flying scenes
are so realistically and similarly composed that Masters of the Air feels at times like an
expansion of e Cold Blue universe.
at these first combat missions—the 100th Bomb Group had flown on two diver-
sions a week earlier—are depicted with a clear and unsentimental eye bodes well for the
remainder of the series. e producers have gone to some lengths for authentic detail:
Egan wears “his trademark sheepskin jacket,” the pre- mission brief matches historical
records, the crews don parachutes from rows of racks instead of more dramatic sport -
styled lockers.
6
e crew coordination is likewise realistic: engine start sequences, check-
list usage, and intercom chatter have the right vocabulary and rhythm. Orloff avoids the
temptation of inserting exposition into these snippets, choosing instead to let the camera
explain the dialogue.
Occasionally, however, he and Fukunaga allow their confidence in the audience to
waver, and they reach for the crutch of a voiceover. Two episodes in, the narration is not
yet a burden, as it is used infrequently, but it does feel abrupt and unnecessary. e bit
about the Norden bombsight in “Part Two,” for example, added little, and one can
imagine if Spielberg had been behind the camera there would have been no words at
all—just a zoomed closeup of the manufacturing label while the bombardier pinned
the bombsight into place.
ere are a few other distracting conversations, mostly in bars. e opening scene of
the first episode in which we are introduced to Cleven, Egan, and their dates is clunky.
So, too, is the bar argument between our Masters and their Royal Air Force counterparts,
who are dismissive of the US strategy of daylight precision bombing. Such a row might
well have taken place between American and British airmen, but this depiction of it and
the fight that follows are unconvincing.
ese last observations are mere quibbles. e show so far succeeds wonderfully on all
counts: it is accurate, believable, and watchable. In technical terms it is the equal, at least, of
Band of Brothers and e Pacific, and the dialogue and acting to this point far exceed the latter.
5. “e Cold Blue,” IMDb, accessed January 31, 2024, https://www.imdb.com/.
6. “John Clarence Egan.”
90 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Multimedia Reviews
If the series is able to maintain the momentum gathered in this taxi and takeoff phase, it
should have no trouble finding its strategic target.
Dr. Stephen L. Renner, Colonel, USAF, Retired
Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 3.
Directed by Cary Joji Fukunaga, written by John Orloff. Aired February 1, 2024, Apple TV+.
Having recently rewatched Twelve O’ Clock High (1949)—the stark depiction of the
immense burden of commanding in combat—I found it jarring to see the first trailer for
Masters of the Air. Whereas Twelve O’ Clock High was shot in black and white and features
more scenes in an office than in the air, Masters of the Air’s trailer is evocatively colorful
and brash. Still, both—to some extent—delve into the same territory of the interdepen-
dent struggle to balance a leader’s responsibility to the mission as well as to their crew
members. Both also focus on so- called “hard luck units.”
1
In addition to pointing out
some differences and similarities between the two shows, this review above all will help
contextualize Masters of the Air given the disappointingly limited background informa-
tion the show has provided so far.
Masters of the Air begins in May 1943, almost a year after the Eighth Air Force’s first
mission. Twelve O’ Clock High, by contrast, starts earlier in the war. Indeed, the authors of
the novel on which the movie was based had been with the Eighth Air Force since its
arrival in England in 1942. ey had thus witnessed one of the darkest periods of the
Eighth’s history in the winter and spring of 1943 as the organization began bombing
Germany. Without the long- range fighters that greatly eased the bombers’ missions in
1944, it was statistically impossible for crews to finish their tours at this point in the war.
It was also difficult for the Eighth’s leadership, with some advocates of daylight bombing
desperate enough to consider the need to perhaps switch to nighttime bombing.
2
Masters
of the Air’s second episode briefly touches on this tension between British and American
bomber crews. But the fight that breaks out between the two nations’ crews has little to do
with Airmen having imbibed their leaders’ doctrine but rather more to do with the human
costs that the American crews had to pay.
3
e key tension that has not significantly emerged yet in Masters of the Air is that be-
tween the crews and the Eighth Air Force’s highest- ranking and, arguably, its most dog-
matic leaders.
4
As one Airman wrote critically and retrospectively of the Army Air Forces’
1. See John T. Correll, “e Real Twelve O’ Clock High,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, January 1, 2011,
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/.
2. Heather Venable, “Rescuing a General: General Haywood ‘Possum’ Hansell and the Burden of Com-
mand,”Journal of Military History84, no. 2 (2020): 502–503.
3. See, for example, Richard Overy, e Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940–1945
(New York: Penguin Books, 2015), 78.
4. See Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: e Evolution of British and American Ideas
about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 6–7.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 91
mindset, “Washington was engaging in a numbers game similar to the one that was later
used in the Vietnam War” resting on “grossly exaggerated reports.”
5
is critique receives
some credence from the correspondence of Army Air Forces General Ira Eaker. Eaker
wrote in the middle of March 1943 that the Eighth Air Force had successfully completed
its “daylight high- level precision bombing experiment.” Nothing could be further from
the truth, especially without the arrival of long- range escort fighters. Instead, the fulfill-
ment of missions required what Eaker dubbed the “self- sacrifice” of bomber crews. Trag-
ically, though, the targeting of submarine pens that played such an important role in this
phase of the war—the subject of episode 2—was a waste. ey were so well- reinforced by
concrete that even a fortuitously precise hit would be unsuccessful.
6
ese human costs had taken a toll on the morale of crew members and some leaders,
including two colonels who returned to the United States from England in April 1943,
supposedly having lost their “combat spirit.” Hearing of this, Eaker insisted that each
member of the Eighth Air Force be “fully imbued with the offensive spirit” and be willing
“to pay any cost and at all odds.”
7
is was the mindset of Air Force generals leading into
episode 3. Having finally built up an air fleet, Air Force leadership would now proceed to
burn through it, determined to prove itself to the other services and its ideas to itself and
the Royal Air Force.
is notion of “maximum effort” emerges in both Twelve O’ Clock High and Masters of
the Air, as epitomized by the latter in episode 3’s raid on Schweinfurt and Regensburg. As
Colonel Neil Harding (played by James Murray) explains in this episode, a “maximum
effort” attack consisted of 12 bombers in August 1942, but now the Americans could
launch 370 bombers. Putting this number in perspective, however, shows how much ma-
turing the Eighth Air Force still had to do. e previous month, the British had launched
791 bombers during Operation Gomorrah, the infamous attack on Hamburg, Germany.
8
Episode 3 also marks a key shift in the air war’s targeting. In episode 2, the Eighth Air
Force struck joint targets. e attack on a German submarine pen in Norway supports
the Battle of the Atlantic, so critical in keeping sea lines open between the United States
and Great Britain. Schweinfurt and Regensburg, by contrast, epitomize the types of in-
dustrial bottleneck targets that pre- war air planners had envisioned at Maxwell Air Force
Base’s Air Corps Tactical School. Schweinfurt had a key ball bearings factory that plan-
ners hoped could grind fighter production to a halt. US air planners had latched onto the
5. Ralph H. Nutter, With the Possum and the Eagle: e Memoir of a Navigator’s War over Germany and
Japan (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2005), 120.
6. General Ira Eaker to Commanding General, VIII Bomber Command, March 24, 1943, Papers of Ira
C. Eaker, Box I:19, Library of Congress; and also see Barrett Tillman, “Hard Targets,” Air Force Magazine,
September 2015, 80–84; https://www.airandspaceforces.com/.
7. Major General Ira C. Eaker to Commanding General, Fighter Command, April 21, 1943, Papers of
Ira C. Eaker, Box I:19, Library of Congress.
8. John Curatola, “Operation Gomorrah: e First of the Firestorms,” National World War II Museum,
July 10, 2023, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/; and see Overy, Bombers, 167.
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idea of bottleneck targets after noting how a flood of a Pennsylvania factory had tempo-
rarily shut down aircraft production because the factory was the only one to produce an
unusual spring required in propellers.
9
To obtain as much surprise as possible and prevent the enemy to concentrate forces, plan-
ners envisioned all the bombers flying the same course for both targets, only breaking into two
groups at the last possible moment. ose bombers heading for Regensburg would, in theory,
receive the most attention by the Germans, thus facilitating the bombers headed to Schwein-
furt. Leaving Regensburg, bombers would fly south to African airfields to avoid having to face
German fighters a second time.
Equipped with B-17Fs with so- called “Tokyo tanks,” aircraft bound for Regensburg
carried an extra 1,080 gallons of fuel. But the fuel came at a cost. Because the aircraft
drew on the Tokyo tanks first, the aircraft easily caught fire if hit. By contrast, the Sch-
weinfurt bombers would have to bear the full force of German attention.
10
Some key problems resulted from the Americans seeking to have a maximum effort
without having conserved the required mass to effectively destroy a target. Lacking
sizeable- enough weapon loads or aircraft numbers to destroy the factory, they ended up
destroying what could be fixed relatively quickly.
11
Airpower zealots might proclaim that
Regensburg had been “literally wiped off the map,” and a bomber crew member in epi-
sode 3 does excitedly claim the factory to be “gone.” But hindsight would not support
such proclamations.
12
Losing as many bombers in one day as the Eighth Air Force had
in the previous six months, moreover, meant that any destruction that had occurred could
not be followed up on until October.
13
More importantly, the problem with this plan was simple: it required all the pieces to
fall in place. e literal fog of war—in this case caused by English weather—had some-
thing to say about a plan depending on precise timing, breaking up the synchronized plan
into two disparate groupings, allowing German fighters to attack both.
14
One historian has retrospectively described this plan as so complex as to be “all but
overwhelming.”
15
It is difficult to ascertain exactly what message Masters of the Air’s
screenwriters meant to convey regarding the mission’s planning. ey have Harding
proudly proclaiming the mission to be the “biggest armada in air history,” albeit incor-
rectly, as the British had flown more bombers the previous month. Harding also intones,
“e mighty Eighth has a plan” consisting of a “three- punch combo” in which “timing
9. Stephen Budiansky, Air Power: e Men, Machines, and Ideas that Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk
to Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2005).
10. Donald L. Miller, Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War against Nazi Ger-
many (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 195.
11. Miller, 200, 192.
12. Lieutenant General Harold George, qtd. in Miller, 200.
13. Miller, 201.
14. Ed Jablonski, Double Strike: e Epic Air Raids on Regensburg- Schweinfurt, August 17 (New York:
Doubleday, 1974).
15. Jablonski, 36.
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Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 4.
Directed by Cary Joji Fukunaga, written by John Orloff. Aired February 9, 2024, Apple TV+.
By this episode, it seems the catch phrase of Major Gale “Buck” Cleven (played by
Austin Butler), “Don’t count on it,” applies to almost any situation members of the 100th
find themselves in. Nothing is going to plan, the losses are adding up, and positive out-
comes are difficult to discern. Yet, there are constants that buoy all the crew involved in
proving the efficacy of daylight strategic bombardment: support from loved ones back
home, camaraderie formed from bonds strengthened in combat, and commitments to the
triumph of good over evil.
Episode 4 shifts from the difficulty of combat at 25,000 feet to the commitments and
ties that bind those determined to make a difference in the vast effort of World War II.
e determination and efforts of folks who are not on the front lines are this episode’s
subject—women, the underground resistance, support troops, and the displaced.
Although barred from combat, women played a huge role in Allied victory. Liberated
to a degree from domestic roles, they took jobs in factories to produce the instruments of
victory while men went to fight. For other women, the opportunity to travel and get
closer to the action drew them to service in organizations such as the Red Cross. Glimpses
of these Doughnut Dollies—largely nicknamed by Katherine “Tattie” Spaatz, active Red
Cross volunteer and daughter of Twelfth Air Force Commander Lieutenant General
Carl A. Spaatz—came in previous episodes.
1
Motivated by a desire to both help with the war effort and see the world, Helen (Emma
Canning) is the living embodiment of the “girl next door” back home—dispensing coffee,
doughnuts, and smiles to 100th Bomb Group members in East Anglia.
2
At a group
1. See David R. Mets, Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 170,
178–179.
2. See Kara Dixon Vuic, e Girls Next Door: Bringing the Home Front to the Front Lines (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2019), ch. 2 and 3.
will be essential.” Unless the writers expect viewers to home in on the importance of tim-
ing, we must perhaps wait to see the evolving messages as the series continues to release
new episodes.
In the meantime, it is enough to return to Twelve O’ Clock High and Masters of the Air.
e former focuses most on the burden of command and thus features far more glimpses
into the mental anguish of those responsible for serving the mission first and foremost.
By contrast, Masters of the Air focuses much more on the men who must carry out the
mission. As such, episode 3 fittingly concludes with badly- battered bombers and their
bloodied crews finding themselves with only each other as they observe the setting sun
over the Algerian desert.
Heather P. Venable, PhD
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dance, she catches the eye of replacement pilot Lieutenant Herbert Nash (Laurie David-
son). Nash seems interested in her as more than a reminder from back home, while Helen
struggles with maintaining her professional role over a more romantic one. When Nash
is later lost in combat, Helen must deal with the shock of loss that service members con-
front directly. Although Helen fills a role as a morale builder who ensures the crews see a
pretty face before they go into combat, the independence and freedom from societal
norms that come with uniformed Red Cross service offer her scant protection from the
direct pain of loss.
Following the Regensburg- Schweinfurt double raid in North Africa, bombardier
Captain James Douglass (Elliot Warren) also seeks female support while composing a
letter that conveys his nostalgia for the comforts of home and family, amid the long hours
of training and combat far from home. is segues to orpe Abbotts, where the crew of
Captain Glenn Dye (George Webster) returns from their mission. ey are the first crew
of the 100th to complete 25 missions and earn a trip home from the war. Dye’s return
temporarily elevates his English girlfriend, Lil (Nancy Farino), from a prop to a more
prominent position as she apprehensively scans the skies as well. at night, Dye and his
compatriots are feted with a celebration that serves as an introduction for a number of
replacement aircrew—led by Lieutenant Robert “Rosie” Rosenthal (Nate Mann)—who
seek acceptance from both senior leaders and experienced crews while contemplating the
event’s significance. e men account for the losses, with only 12 of the original 35 crews
that established the 100th Bomb Group in England remaining after three months of
combat. In reality, Dye’s crew was the only crew of the original 35 that completed a
25-mission tour.
3
Commander Colonel Neil “Chick” Harding (James Murray) bristles at the suggestion
from the medical staff that his unit is “flak- happy” and needs some time at a rest house
to deal with the stress of combat. Harding’s view here seems counter to the historical view
of the Eighth Air Force leadership and most aircrew. Keeping morale high and aircrew
motivated were important to the medical staff and most commanders, so leave and passes
were fairly liberal, and time in rest and recreation facilities was quite common.
Major John “Bucky” Egan (Callum Turner) takes Cleven’s advice for an extended leave
in London and is soon in a Polish restaurant/club in Hammersmith enjoying shots and
the company of Paulina (Joanna Kulig), the wife of a Polish Air Force pilot. Flying,
marital status, dancing, and sex are the topics, not atypical for American aircrew in Eng-
lish towns and cities, especially London.
4
ere is even a brief mention of the famed
Piccadilly Commandos, the army of prostitutes who plied their trade in London during
3. Harry H. Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer: e “Bloody 100th” Bomb Group of the U.S. Eighth Air Force in
Action over Europe in World War II (New York: Harper Paperbacks, 1993), 131.
4. See, for example, Juliet Gardiner, “Overpaid, Oversexed, and Over Here”: e American GI in World War
II Britain (New York: Canopy Books, 1992); Robert Morgan with Ron Powers, e Man Who Flew the
Memphis Belle: Memoir of a WWII Bomber Pilot (New York: New American Library, 2011), 138–39; and
Crosby, Wing, 305–309.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 95
the war.
5
Paulina later relates that her husband stayed to fight the invading Germans
while she evacuated and she is unsure if he is a prisoner or dead in a Silesian potato field.
Ultimately, Egan and Paulina spend the night together. As London is bombed around
them, Egan becomes mesmerized by the Luftwaffe raid and confesses that he has never
seen the “business end” of what he does. Paulina asserts that the Germans deserve what-
ever violence and destruction can be delivered to them. e next day, she declares her
heart cannot lose another pilot after Egan tries to entice her to spend the day with him.
eir story arc details how different people are affected by the chaos of war, seeking es-
cape and respite for many varied reasons.
Meanwhile, the ripples from Regensburg- Schweinfurt radiate further as Sergeant
William Quinn (Kai Alexander) opts for passage to freedom through the resistance
network. He meets up with fellow crewman Sergeant Charles Bailey (Bailey Brook)
and another Airman, Bob, in a Belgian café. Dour members of the resistance interro-
gate them, demanding verbal and written answers. e three crewmen, accompanied by
two Belgians, move out after offering responses on baseball and rousing renditions of
the Star- Spangled Banner. Quinn and Bailey are shocked when Bob is summarily exe-
cuted in front of them. Neither are swayed when the resistance guides insist he was a
German infiltrator. Although it seems most viewers also don’t understand why Bob was
singled out as a traitor, it appears that Bob dated his written responses in the European
format of day- before- month while the others must have employed the American
month- before- day standard. is scene mirrors another from Quentin Tarantino’s In-
glorious Basterds (2009) involving the exposure of an infiltrator, where an undercover
British commando orders beers with an English hand gesture that gives himself away
to the German authorities.
As the Americans continue their journey, female members of the resistance become objects
of both affection and authority, which Quinn struggles to accept. e resistance, in most Euro-
pean countries, was another avenue for women to surmount traditional gender roles, and the
series showcases this as well.
6
Back at orpe Abbotts, the bomb group is gearing up for the next big mission to Bre-
men. Cleven will lead the high squadron, but Egan will be in London on a pass. Cleven’s
plane has maintenance issues, but Sergeant Ken Lemmons (Rafferty Law), a regular in
all the episodes since the group arrived in England, comes through for him.
roughout the series, there have been the almost obligatory kudos for the mainte-
nance troops, but not to the extent of this scene. Cleven’s plane, Our Baby, has an issue
with the number two engine and will have to abort the mission if it cannot be fixed. Lem-
mons assures Cleven that he can repair the problem on the runway. Riding on the left
landing gear while the plane taxis, he completes the repair just as the B-17 lines up on the
5. See Donald L. Miller, Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War against Nazi
Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 216–20.
6. See In the Shadows of War: An American Pilot’s Odyssey through Occupied France and the Camps of Ger-
many (New York: Henry Holt, 2002).
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Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 5.
Directed by Anna Boden and Ryan Fleck, written by John Orloff. Aired February 16, 2024,
Apple TV+.
Episode 5 of Masters of the Air is the most searing installment yet. Classic movies such
as Twelve O’clock High (1949), Command Decision (1949), Memphis Belle (1990), and For-
tress (2012) have tried to convey the carnage of World War II’s Combined Bomber Of-
fensive over Europe, but none do so as effectively as this episode. is production excels
at graphically illustrating the difficulty of aerial warfare and the terrible consequences in
battles five miles in the air, on the ground below, at home station, and even back in the
United States. Perhaps introducing directors Anna Boden and Ryan Fleck, the team re-
runway for takeoff. Lemmons then rolls off the gear and under the wing and horizontal
stabilizer to a waiting jeep, yelling “you’re good to go!” to Cleven. His commitment to
accomplishing the mission shines through.
e episode ends with a focus on Lemmons and his crew as the planes return from
Bremen. e crew chief is disappointed to discover that Our Baby is not coming back,
along with eight other Flying Fortresses of the group. Lemmons kicks a toolbox out of
frustration, and the pain from both the loss and action is etched on his face. Only 16 of
24 crewmen return, with Cleven, Major Harry Crosby (Anthony Boyle), and Nash among
the missing.
e storyline shifts to Rosenthal, who has completed his first mission and heads into de-
brief. Obviously stunned by the carnage he has witnessed, he is in a state of shock. He grabs a
mission whiskey, but lets it go as he realizes that someone has to tell Helen that Nash is not
coming home. Simultaneously, other aircrew realize that Egan must be notified as well that
his best friend is also presumed dead.
Strolling down a street in London, Egan confronts the scene of a bombed- out house
and mother screaming for her dead child. Once more, he witnesses firsthand the business
end of strategic bombing, but he moves on, seeking news regarding the Bremen raid. At
the newsstand, the headline screams Bremen has been destroyed and 30 bombers did not
return. He rushes to the iconic red phone booth and calls the base. In a transparent base-
ball code, we all learn that Cleven is presumed dead. Egan steels himself and confirms he
will be back for the next mission.
is episode widens our aperture on who has a stake in the success of the Mighty Eighth
and all the lives these incredibly youthful Airmen are affecting. Simultaneously, episode 4
resets the cast of characters for dedicated viewers. e original core of the 100th is almost
completely gone, and those who remain are barely hanging on. Attrition is even hitting the
new crews so fast, we can barely remember them as well. Rosenthal appears to have a prom-
ising future. Will Egan be there to guide him to become a master of the air as well? As his
best friend would state, don’t count on it.
Dr. John G. Terino, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 97
sponsible for directing the smash Marvel Cinematic Universe action hit, Captain Marvel
(2019), is the reason the action sequences are so visceral in this episode. Although the
100th Bomb Group had been hardened in combat by October 1943, three straight days
of missions to Bremen, Marienberg, and Münster have staggered its resolve.
Previous episodes had shown the devastation of combat and losses of the series’ notable
characters, who often seemed to come straight from central casting in Hollywood. ey
were energetic young pilots with brash demeanors, cocksure attitudes, and all the visual flair
associated with the bomber boy stereotype: 50 mission crush hats, leather jackets, white
scarves, sunglasses, and rakish good looks. Major John “Bucky” Egan (Callum Turner),
Major Gale “Buck” Cleven (Austin Butler), and Lieutenant Curtis Biddick (Barry Keoghan)
were the mainstays of the 100th.
1
Colonel Neil “Chick” Harding (James Murray) was the
hard- bitten, aggressive leader we expected to lead this lot as well.
2
Now, all of them are
gone—or soon will be—and a new leader has emerged.
Lieutenant Robert “Rosie” Rosenthal (Nate Mann) arrives with a bunch of other new
faces to make up for the horrendous losses the hard- luck 100th has been dealt. His first
mission, seen in episode 4, was the raid on Bremen, where the group lost seven aircraft.
In Donald Miller’s book, after his third mission in three days, Rosenthal leaves his bomber
and asks the intelligence officer “Are they are all this tough?” before going with his men
for medical care.
3
is episode vividly illustrates why he asked the question by highlight-
ing the raid on Münster.
Egan views this mission as an opportunity to avenge Cleven’s death. Up to this point,
Egan has been the life of the party at orpe Abbotts, but the loss of his best friend has
understandably altered his mood, making him pensive and solemn. Still in the business
of dropping bombs, Egan exhibits a clear change in character as he is seen drinking and
smoking in his “office,” the flight deck of a parked B-17, before he careens away in a jeep
for briefing.
e target of the raid is the medieval walled city of Münster. Instead of a factory or
submarine pens, the Army Air Forces is going after a railroad marshalling yard in the
center of town. Mirroring decades- old debates regarding appropriate targets for strategic
bombing, the crews opine about whether they should target a site so close to houses and
churches. Uncharacteristically, Egan ends the discussion by pulling rank and formality.
Avenging Cleven is enough reason for him. As the crews head for their bombers, Egan
literally puts on a new mantle of responsibility by shedding his omnipresent fleece coat
for the standard leather jacket.
1. Donald L. Miller, Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War against Nazi Ger-
many (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 9; and Harry H. Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer: e “Bloody
100th” Bomb Group of the U.S. Eighth Air Force in Action over Europe in World War II (New York: HarperCol-
lins, 1993), 36, 39–40, 260.
2. Crosby, 142, 147–48.
3. Miller, Masters, 20.
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As we have accompanied the 100th Bomb Group in previous missions, we have seen
extraordinary heroism, stoicism, and flagging discipline in keeping formation as well. e
group has a well deserved reputation for its hard charging ways and hotshot piloting, but as
the missions move from the relative ease of French targets to the ird Reich, flying skills
do not make up for poor formation and rigid discipline.
4
In spite of that reputation, even
the best group formation of 18 unescorted Flying Fortresses is not a match for 200-plus
Luftwaffe fighters coming at them head on.
Because of damage from the previous two days’ missions and aborts, the 100th only
has 13 B-17s heading to Münster. In about seven minutes, the group basically ceases to
exist as the lead bomber with Egan at the helm is hit and other aircraft either explode
almost instantly or are last seen plummeting in pieces to German soil below.
5
e mission
was obviously nerve- wracking for the crews as there were more f- bombs dropped in this
episode than in the previous four combined.
While waiting for the escorting fighters to withdraw—in this case aided by ground fog
that kept one fighter group at base and a missed rendezvous that forced another on to
turn home early—the German fighters had extra time to attack.
6
By targeting lead crews
and going after individual groups, the Luftwaffe fighters eliminated experienced veterans,
broke up unit integrity, and picked off dispersed individual bombers one by one. Employ-
ing rockets allowed the less maneuverable twin- engine fighters to stay out of gun range
and hit bombers with devastating effect.
During this single week in October 1943, the Bloody Hundredth lost 21 planes and
over 200 men missing or killed.
7
e only regular combat crew to return was that of
Rosenthal. In the episode, his crew is shown far from home in a badly crippled ship, with
two engines on the same wing out, a huge hole in one wing, and three gunners seriously
wounded. As they lose altitude and limp home, Rosenthal maneuvers the B-17 to help
his crew shoot down pursuing enemy fighters. e crew arrives back at orpe Abbotts,
and it is a grim scene as the group maintainers and staff realize that only a single aircraft
has returned.
More so than any previous episode, the influence of chance and fate is highlighted.
Egan has bailed out and is on the run in Germany, and Captain Harry Crosby (Anthony
Boyle), promoted to group navigator, misses the mission, probably saving his life as the
man he replaced, his good friend Captain Joseph “Bubbles” Payne (Louis Greatorex), is
killed in action. In reality, Payne and his crew were lost on the March 4, 1944, mission
over Berlin months later. Nevertheless, the randomness of combat and the devastation of
loss are amply demonstrated in this episode. Even the formerly good- natured and kind -
hearted crew chief, Sergeant Ken Lemmons (Rafferty Law) grieves mightily and loses his
4. Geoffrey Perret, Winged Victory: e Army Air Forces in World War II (New York: Random House,
1993), 275.
5. Roger Freeman, e Mighty Eighth: Units, Men, and Machines (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), 77.
6. Perret, Winged Victory, 275.
7. Crosby, Wing, 147.
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Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 6.
Directed by Anna Boden and Ryan Fleck, written by John Orloff. Aired February 23, 2024,
Apple TV+.
Masters of the Air episode 6, in addition to chronicling the aftermath of the brutal
Münster mission of October 10, 1943, also unpacks a number of important topics sur-
rounding the US Army Air Forces’ bomber war against Germany. Some viewers may
have missed any reference in the series to the disastrous October 14, 1943, “Second
Schweinfurt” mission, which essentially forced a temporary halt to deep daylight raids
into German airspace. While the raid’s impact on the Eighth Air Force as a whole was
enormous, in this one case the Bloody Hundredth got off lightly: after Münster, the
100th could only muster eight planes for the Schweinfurt raid, and all returned safely
with no casualties.
1
ough the show takes some chronological liberties and makes other concessions to
good storytelling, the issues raised are fundamental to an understanding of the bomber
war. is installment features three major plot lines: Major John “Bucky” Egan’s (Cal-
lum Turner) odyssey from bail out to arrival at a prisoner of war (POW) camp; Major
Harry Crosby’s (Anthony Boyle) attendance at an Oxford symposium to address
Anglo- American relations, and the arrival of Lieutenant Robert “Rosie” Rosenthal’s
(Nate Mann) new crew at orpe Abbotts and their stay at a rest home after three har-
rowing missions.
A powerful scene depicts dozens of footlockers of missing crew members being read-
ied for shipment home, but the action soon shifts to Egan’s efforts to evade capture and
then deal with the first phases of his captivity. In reality, Egan’s capture and transit to a
POW camp were routine, but the show takes the opportunity to dramatize the range of
hazards facing downed Airmen.
Shotgun- toting German farmers first capture Egan and pass him on to the authorities.
While he and some fellow captives are being marched through the burning streets of a
1. Roger Freeman, Mighty Eighth War Diary (London: Jane’s, 1981), 126.
bearing around the English children who follow him all the time. Clearly, the losses and
changes indicate the 100th is about to chart a new course, and Rosenthal will pilot the
course Crosby charts into the future.
At this point, even the most cynical viewer has to question the efficacy of the Army
Air Forces’ bombing strategy. e horrendous losses incurred during day bombing and
the suitability of striking targets near civilian areas have already made their way into
the dialogue of the series. e devastating losses have increased dramatically as well.
Hopefully, future episodes will deliver answers to help understand why daylight bomb-
ing remained an important element of Allied victory in World War II.
Dr. John G. Terino, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired
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bombed German town, a furious mob of civilians, encouraged by a party official, overpowers
the guards and begins attacking the Terrorflieger (“terror flyers”). Most of the Airmen are
killed; Egan manages to escape from the burial wagon taking them to an unmarked grave.
Once again captured by the police, Egan finally passes to Luftwaffe control and finds himself
at the transit camp and interrogation center known as Dulag Luft.
Egan’s encounter with the lynch mob is based on a number of incidents that took place
during the war. Nazi propaganda encouraged German civilians to take the law into their
own hands. Photos of American pilots wearing leather jackets decorated with names
such as “Murder Incorporated” were circulated in order to incite violence against Allied
airmen. e Allied authorities investigated and punished a number of these crimes post-
war.
2
ough not central to the episode, there are other issues of morality touched upon.
We see dead civilians being pulled from the rubble, and an uncomprehending Egan
glimpses a train hauling cattle cars filled with human beings—by late 1943 the extermi-
nation of the Jews of Europe was accelerating.
At Dulag Luft, Egan faces a skilled interrogator seeking to extract valuable informa-
tion. US Army Air Forces personnel of the day received only minimal survival, resistance,
evasion, and escape training; most knew—as Egan did—that “name, rank, and serial
number” were the only permissible items to be divulged. Yet they were unprepared for the
sophisticated grilling in store for them at Dulag Luft.
e urbane, cultured interrogator shrewdly combines the “brother airman” card, a dis-
arming curiosity about baseball, and veiled threats of treating Egan as a spy. German inter-
rogators could draw on thick files of information about every Army Air Forces unit, culled
from press clippings, previous interrogations, and especially letters, diaries, photos, and even
theater ticket stubs brought along on missions by careless Americans. Astonished POWs,
confronted by all of this information, were easily convinced that the Germans already knew
everything. So what was the harm in filling out a few “Red Cross” forms—which their in-
terrogators claimed would serve to notify their families at home? English- speaking Germans
were sometimes placed in the cells with newcaptives, masquerading as fellow Americans.
Eventually, the 100th’s parent ird Air Division produced educational materials warning
Airmen to “Empty Your Pockets!,” “Beware of Fake Forms,” and “If You Didn’t Know Him
Before, Don’t Trust Him Now!”
3
e “spy” ploy turns out to be a bluff, and the uncoopera-
tive Egan is sent to Stalag Luft III—the future site of the famed prison break, the “Great
Escape”—where he is reunited with some friends.
e second subplot involves the series’ narrator, navigator Crosby. Still grieving and
guilt- ridden over the loss of his friend Captain Joseph “Bubbles” Payne (Louis Gre-
atorex), Crosby is selected to represent the Army Air Forces at a symposium hosted by
Balliol College, Oxford University. At the week- long event, British and American per-
2. See Kevin T. Hall, Terror Flyers: e Lynching of American Airmen in Nazi Germany (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2021).
3. ird Bombardment Division History, February 1945, US Air Force (USAF) Historical Research
Agency, 527.02 Volume II.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 101
sonnel attended lectures by distinguished dons and discussed the state of Anglo- American
relations. Despite the gauzy memories of the “friendly invasion,” the arrival of millions of
American personnel in the UK did not always proceed smoothly. Incidents of disorderly
conduct, poaching on private land, mistreatment of women, and other clashes of cultures
were worrisome to the Allied leadership.
Writer John Orloff takes a bit of dramatic license here: Payne was indeed killed in ac-
tion, but later in the war.
4
Still, this Oxford subplot, and Crosby’s growing friendship
with a British female junior officer attending the conference, largely track with the ac-
count in the real- life Crosby’s outstanding memoir A Wing and a Prayer.
In that memoir, Crosby noted that when Egan and Major Gale “Buck” Cleven were
shot down, the character of the 100th Bomb Group changed. He admits that his feelings
about the two Airmen were complicated. He considered both to be outstanding, larger -
than- life leaders, but he also saw within them an undisciplined aspect that did not always
work to the benefit of the unit.
5
e final subplot of this episode involves a new crew led by pilot Rosenthal. ree mis-
sions in three days, culminating with Münster—theirs was the only ship to return to
orpe Abbotts that awful day—earn them a spell at the “Flak House.”
6
It’s worth remembering that right about this time, General George S. Patton famously
slapped two shell- shocked infantrymen who were patients in a Sicily field hospital.
Victorian- era ideas that combat fatigue was a symptom of a character defect—pejora-
tively referred to as a “Lack of Moral Fiber”—persisted.
7
Yet the Army Air Forces was
somewhat ahead of the curve in recognizing that even the bravest individuals have a
breaking point. ough the service still dealt rather harshly with outright combat refus-
als, crews who had been through a harrowing set of missions were sent to a country house
for a short period of recuperation, supervised by a flight surgeon and furnished with ac-
cess to all sorts of genteel amenities. Later in the war “flak leave” became a normal part of
a crew’s combat tour.
8
Rosenthal’s crewmates take full advantage of the opportunity, but he himself bristles at
the inactivity. He complains to the flight surgeon that he was just getting into his battle
rhythm after three missions, and he compares himself to American jazz drummer/
bandleader Gene Krupa, forced to stop playing in the middle of a set just as he was hit-
ting his stride. e flight doc listens sympathetically, then notes that Krupa wasn’t only
playing for himself—he was setting the rhythm for the entire orchestra. is insight gives
Rosenthal pause, and he joins his crew for the rest of the brief reprieve. He is last seen
4. Harry H. Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer: e “Bloody 100th” Bomb Group of the U.S. Eighth Air Force in
Action over Europe in World War II (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 241.
5. Crosby, 320.
6. See Ian Hawkins, Münster: e Way it Was (Anaheim, CA: Robinson, 1984).
7. Mark Wells, Courage and Air Warfare: e Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second World War (London:
Frank Cass, 1995), 164–65.
8. See Wells.
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Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 7.
Directed by Dee Rees, written by John Orloff. Aired March 1, 2024, Apple TV+.
Episode 7 begins the final third of the story of the 100th Bombardment Group’s war,
picking up after a significant chronological leap, from mid- October 1943 to March 1944.
Many changes are underway both within the group and the wider war. Two narrative
threads dominate this episode: the shifts in aerial strategy and tactics that would ulti-
mately bring the Allies air mastery over Occupied Europe, and the story of Majors John
“Bucky” Egan (Callum Turner) and Gale “Buck” Cleven (Austin Butler) from behind the
barbed wire of Stalag Luft III.
Perceptions of the Allied prisoner of war (POW) experience are commonly shaped by
Hollywood portrayals, ranging from the black comedy Stalag 17 (1953) to the star- studded,
embellished classic e Great Escape (1963). is series opts for a more realistic, gritty por-
trayal. Although the Luftwaffe ran its camps broadly in line with the Geneva Convention,
there is no trace of a Hogan’s Heroes’ (1965–71) sensibility here. Malnourished prisoners
catch an unfortunate cat to augment their meager rations, and we see a POW shot and
wounded by guards for a minor infraction. e captured Airmen endure stultifying bore-
dom, punctuated only by infrequent mail calls, endless card games, and occasional bits of
war news gleaned from an illicit crystal radio set that Cleven manufactures from scrounged
components. e POWs learn of the stalemate in the Italian theater as well as major Soviet
victories on the Eastern Front—a nod to the Red Army’s contribution to victory in Europe.
Egan and Cleven naturally discuss the possibility of escape, but the prospects seem
dim. e camp, located deep inside Germany near Sagan in Silesia (now Poland), is far
from potential resistance contacts. ey are bystanders to the “Great Escape,” the March
24, 1944, mass tunnel breakout of 76 Royal Air Force prisoners. e camp’s new acting
commandant tells the senior US officers that 50 escapees were executed. He hints darkly
that control of Allied POWs might soon pass from the military to the Gestapo and asks
the lead POW to identify the Jewish officers in the camp. He replies that there are only
Americans present. Ultimately, Egan and Cleven resign themselves to sitting out the war.
back at the base, tapping out a Krupa- esque riff on the crew hatch of his B-17 before
boarding. is neat scene foreshadows Rosenthal’s rise to one of the greatest leaders to
come out of the 100th Bomb Group.
Questions of morality, inter- Allied relations, and combat stress are front and center in
this important segment of the series. e fortunes of the 100th Bomb Group—and in-
deed of the entire US Army Air Forces daylight bombing effort—bottomed out in mid-
October 1943. But changes were in the works—leadership, strategic, operational, and
tactical—that would radically transform the narrative. And it would be a transformation
and a learning curve that the 100th would do its costly part to bring about.
Richard R. Muller, PhD
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 103
In reality, despite fears of reprisals, little happened to the POWs remaining at the camp.
Appalled by the killings, the Luftwaffe staff provided materials for the construction of a me-
morial.
1
Many accounts of the Great Escape use the term “executed” to describe the fate of
the fifty, implying some sort of due process was involved; however, these men were murdered
on orders from the highest level. ough the decisionmakers in question were beyond mortal
judgment after 1945, the British painstakingly investigated and arrested the actual Gestapo
killers. Most, after a fair trial, were executed.
Back at orpe Abbotts, the 100th endures the crescendo and eventual turning point of
the daylight bomber offensive. As appropriate, most higher- level strategy debates and deci-
sions are not dramatized as little of this percolated down to the crews flying the missions.
After the crisis of autumn 1943, General Henry “Hap” Arnold, the Army Air Forces chief,
cleaned house at the Eighth Air Force, sending its commander Major General Ira Eaker to
the Mediterranean and replacing him with Major General James Doolittle, hero of the
1942 Tokyo raid. Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz took over a new headquarters, US Stra-
tegic Air Forces in Europe, with oversight of both the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, the
latter operating out of newly captured Italian bases. Arnold, in a New Year’s 1944 message
to all commands, insisted that gaining air superiority was the priority: “Destroy the Ger-
man Air Force wherever you find it—in the air, on the ground, and in the factories.”
2
A
dramatic series of February 1944 raids on German aircraft factories, dubbed “Big Week”—
not portrayed in the series—began the progressive eradication of the German fighter force.
3
e effect of these sweeping changes is slow to reach orpe Abbotts. e group was
mauled in the first major Army Air Forces attack on Berlin on March 6, 1944. e
losses—69 bombers, 15 from the 100th—were the highest of the entire war.
4
e por-
trayal of the damaged planes’ return contains some of the series’ most powerful images. A
crew hatch is flung open and dozens of empty .50-caliber brass casings spill out. A quick
shot of a shattered, bloodstained ball turret evokes Randall Jarrell’s short poem “e
Death of the Ball Turret Gunner.” Medics swarm over the shredded bombers, extricating
and treating crewmen with all manner of horrible injuries. Some years ago, I interviewed
a former Eighth Air Force medic, and he freely admitted that he still had nightmares
about things he had seen 75 years earlier.
Yet amid the carnage of “Black Monday,” and another brutal raid on the Reich capital
two days later, some rays of hope emerge. Two missing crewmen return to orpe Ab-
botts after months spent evading capture with the help of the resistance. In line with US
policy they are taken off flying status; it was too risky to permit personnel who had con-
tact with the resistance network to return to the air. Captain Robert “Rosie” Rosenthal’s
1. Paul Brickhill, e Great Escape (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), 191.
2. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, e Army Air Forces in World War II: Volume III, Europe:
Argument to V- E Day (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 8.
3. Donald Caldwell and Richard Muller, e Luftwaffe over Germany: Defense of the Reich (London:
Greenhill, 2007), 144–89.
4. Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Target Berlin: Mission 250—6 March 1944 (London: Jane’s, 1981), 142.
104 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
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(Nate Mann) crew hits the milestone of 25 missions and completes their tour, but their
celebration is tempered by the announcement that an operational tour is now 30 mis-
sions. is “moving of the goal posts” seems capricious and heartless to the crews—but
the rationale was based on a hard look at the actuarial tables. Experienced crews were a
valuable commodity; with the Eighth Air Force expanding dramatically as 1944 began,
Doolittle realized that he needed to hang onto his seasoned veterans. And, though it was
hard to discern, Airmen’s chances of survival were improving as spring 1944 wore on.
e episode also depicts the arrival of the North American P-51 Mustang escort fighter,
which combined superior performance and long range. With drop tanks they could ac-
company the bombers to Berlin and back. Acting Group Commander Lieutenant Colonel
John Bennett (Corin Silva) tells Rosenthal that, from here on in, the bombers will essen-
tially function as “bait” to bring the German fighters into the sky so the escorts can destroy
them. And indeed, the Luftwaffe day fighter force lost its entire frontline strength—and
irreplaceable pilots—during spring 1944.
In the series, the arrival of the game- changing Mustangs is almost a deus ex machina.
e reality is more complex—and more interesting. Masters of the Air focuses on the
bomber experience, but it is worth emphasizing that VIII Fighter Command went
through its own painful learning curve. Debates about close escort versus fighter sweeps,
development of “relay” procedures to ensure coverage of bomber formations for as long as
possible, and technical innovations such as auxiliary fuel tanks, were ongoing.
5
e Mus-
tang itself was a fortuitous combination of an American airframe and a British Merlin
engine. e command even published a 1940s version of a “wiki” that made the rounds:
Skywash—a collection of combat report extracts with commentary and “lessons learned”
from combat leaders.
6
ough the episode implies that an early 1944 order from Doolittle caused the switch
in focus from protecting bombers to destroying enemy fighters, the command had for
months been moving toward such an air superiority strategy. A November 1943 general
order stressed, “We have two scores we are aiming at; first the number of bombers we
bring back safely, and second the number of German fighters we destroy.”
7
Much of the
heavy lifting of the early 1944 air superiority battles was borne by the P-47 underbolt
fighters, although the incomparable Mustang garners most of the good press.
e episode concludes with Rosenthal telling soon- to- be Group Commander Bennett
that he is volunteering for a second tour. Rosenthal would ultimately command two of
the 100th Bomb Group squadrons and stand in the front rank of the combat leaders who
turned things around for the group. As group navigator Harry Crosby sums up in his
5. VIII Fighter Command, “Tactics and Techniques of Long Range Fighter Escort in VIII Fighter Com-
mand,” July 25, 1944, US Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) 524.522.
6. VIII Fighter Command, Skywash, no. 1, May 1943, AFHRA 524.549A.
7. VIII Fighter Command, Skywash, no. 5, November 1943, AFHRA 524.549A.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 105
memoir: “Bucky Egan and Buck Cleven gave the 100th its personality. Bob Rosenthal
helped us want to win the war . . . [everybody] wanted to be like Rosie.”
8
Richard R. Muller, PhD
8. Harry H. Crosby, A Wing and a Prayer: e “Bloody 100th” Bomb Group of the U.S. Eighth Air Force in
Action over Europe in World War II (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 320.
Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 8.
Directed by Dee Rees, written by John Orloff. Aired March 8, 2024, Apple TV+.
Instead of bomber crew members from the 100th Bomb Group within the Eighth Air
Force, in episode 8 we are introduced to fighter pilots from the Tuskegee Airmen of the
99th Fighter Squadron in the Fifteenth Air Force of the Mediterranean eater of Opera-
tions. While one might question the initial incongruency of a completely different organi-
zation in a different theater of the war, screenwriter John Orloff has held true to the com-
pelling story of the camaraderie so prevalent in warfare by weaving in the Tuskegee Airmen’s
story into the overarching narrative of the 100th. While other movies such as HBO’s
Tuskegee Airmen (1995) and George Lucas’ Red Tails (2012) focus on the Tuskegee Airmen
as a collective, episode 8 offers insight into actual individuals.
e opening scene shows a flight of P-40L Warhawks on a true dusk bombing mis-
sion on June 1, 1944, to strike an ammunition dump in Italy.
1
e narration references
the original World War I- era nomenclature of pursuit squadrons, which changed to
fighter squadrons in 1942.
2
Notably, all four P-40s are sporting the distinctive shark
mouth nose art made famous by China’s Flying Tigers. While the Tuskegee Airmen
were not known to paint the grins on their P-40s, the scene shows just how synonymous
they had become with the P-40. e scene introduces the Tuskegee Airmen and subtly
shows that at that point in the war, they were relegated mostly to a ground attack role
flying obsolete aircraft.
We next see Major Harry Crosby (Anthony Boyle) in the frenzied preparation for D -Day.
D- Day often evokes images of paratroopers jumping out of C-47s in the middle of the
night or men storming the beaches from Higgins Boats, but rarely does it call to mind
the contributions of airpower in the invasion. In addition to the targeting of railroads,
bridges, and other lines of communication in the lead- up to D- Day, the previous episode
showed the focus on the destruction of the Luftwaffe to ensure air superiority for the
invasion. As Crosby references, instead of a single mission per day for the 100th, the inva-
sion required multiple sorties per day. With the proximity of the Normandy region to the
1. 99th Fighter Squadron Sortie Reports, June 1943–May 1945, 2 of 4, 156, https://blackfreedom.proquest
.com/.
2. Daniel L. Haulman, historian, e- mail to the author, March 13, 2024.
106 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
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bomber bases in East Anglia, bombers were able to conduct quick- turn missions to strike,
return, re- arm, refuel, and go back out. Not only did this maintain pressure on the Ger-
man army in preventing its ability to counter the invasion, but it also provided a visual
umbrella of non- stop American and Allied aircraft over the landing force, proving the
Allies’ attainment of air supremacy. As the supreme commander of Allied forces, General
Dwight D. Eisenhower, stated in late June while surveying the Normandy beachhead, “If
I didn’t have air supremacy, I wouldn’t be here.”
3
Crosby demonstrates the oft- overlooked fact that each of those missions had to be
planned down to the minute detail—not only to secure headings, distances, and altitudes,
but also to ensure deconfliction in time and space for the myriad of other aircraft flying
in support of the invasion. e burden falls on Crosby as group navigator to plan all of
the missions. With no time to rest, he stays awake for nearly three days of non- stop
preparation until passing out from sheer exhaustion.
Episode 8 also continues to tease out the story of Sandra Westgate (Bel Powley)—the
real- life Landra Wingate. Crosby could never confirm Wingate’s actual role, but he long
suspected she was an operative of the Special Operations Executive—the UK’s counter-
part to the American Office of Strategic Services, the modern CIA’s precursor. Although
Westgate’s brief appearances do little to advance the overall narrative, they do expose how
women served in the highly dangerous role of covert intelligence collection in Nazi -
occupied territories during the war.
In the subsequent mission brief for D- Day we see two leadership transitions. e overt
transition is in the change of command from Lieutenant Colonel John Bennett’s (Corin
Silva) temporary leadership of the 100th, to the permanent command of the beloved
Colonel Tom Jeffrey (Christopher Lakewood)—known to 100th veterans as “Colonel
Jeff ”—who served as their longest- tenured commander.
4
Major Robert “Rosie” Rosenthal’s
(Nate Mann) also transitions from an advice- seeking neophyte pilot in episode 4, to the
veteran leader and squadron commander doling out advice in episode 8, after volunteering
for a second tour. Such was often the case in combat, with lieutenants rapidly rising to field-
grade ranks and command positions, often due to the combat attrition of leaders.
Although we don’t see any actual bombing on the D- Day missions, Rosenthal does
mention the pace and scale of operations, flying multiple sorties on D- Day, and the near -
mythical sight of the thousands of ships and boats in the invasion fleet, which many aviators
described as a near- religious event. e fact that Crosby slept through all of it is also true to
the fact that sometimes we miss the big show—either by being out of the theater of conflict,
off the flying schedule, or simply asleep.
Back in Foggia, Italy, the 99th is united under the 332d Fighter Group and the legendary
leadership of Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. (Jerry Mackinnon). e bar scene subtly ac-
3. Silvano Wueschner, “Key to Success: Allied Airpower at Normandy,” Maxwell AFB (website), May 29,
2019, https://www.maxwell.af.mil/.
4. “Col omas S. Jeffrey, Jr.,” 100th Bomb Group Foundation, accessed March 13, 2024, https://100thbg
.com/.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 107
knowledges the debunking of the myth that the Tuskegee Airmen never lost a bomber to
enemy fighters under their escort.
5
e Airmen’s combat record is one of distinction and
honor that doesn’t need any embellishment, yet one that had to actively counter a false nar-
rative that grew in relatively modern years.
e following mission accurately depicts a strike on August 12, 1944, by the 332d
against radar sites at Toulon in preparation for Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion
of southern France, just a few days later. Now flying P-51s, the 332d is able to conduct
long- range attacks and escort bombers into Germany. Although shown flying P-51Ds
with high velocity aircraft rockets (HVARs), the 332d was in actuality flying P-51B/Cs
with no rockets on that mission, notable because the B/C- models had only four .50-cal-
iber guns compared to the D- model’s six, reducing available firepower by a third.
6
With-
out high- explosive armament like HVARs or bombs, targeting radar installations with
just four machine guns was a highly inefficient task. e scene does, however, highlight
the challenges of maximum range operations necessitating external fuel tanks along with
the performance impact due to the drag of the external tanks and having to occasionally
use aircraft movement to shake loose a “hung” tank.
In the process, Lieutenants Richard Macon (Josiah Cross), Robert Daniels (Ncuti
Gatwa), and Alexander Jefferson (Brandon Cook) are shot down, with Macon sustaining
a broken shoulder and neck. As in previous episodes, the German interrogators at Stalag
Luft use the more relaxed, friendly interrogation method they favored over the harsh
torture experienced by Airmen in other theaters from the Japanese. In his memoir, Red
Tail Captured, Red Tail Free, Jefferson recalls not only his interrogator’s love of jazz and
Lucky Strike cigarettes, but also his own shock at the amount of information his captors
had in his dossier, to include the maintenance inspection report completed on his very
aircraft just the day prior to his fateful mission.
7
e interrogation also reveals the common sentiment of the Tuskegee Airmen—who
fought for a country that treated them as second- class citizens— that America, though
not perfect, was worth fighting for. ese Airmen were in fact fighting two wars: the war
against Nazi tyranny and the war against segregation and racism at home. Many African-
American veterans from World War II went on to be civil rights advocates and leaders,
inspired by their combat service to fight at home for a better America.
Despite segregation at home and a segregated military, Black Airmen were forced into
integration in the shared experience as prisoners of war (POW). White and Black Air-
men relied on each other to survive. As the episode reveals, when Macon, Daniels, and
Jefferson were shot down, many POWs had already been in prison for up to a year or
5. Daniel L. Haulman, Tuskegee Airmen Myths and Realities (Maxwell AFB, AL: US Air Force Historical
Research Agency, 2014), 7.
6. 99th Fighter Squadron Sortie Reports, June 1943–May 1945, 3 of 4, 110, https://blackfreedom.pro
quest.com/.
7. Alexander Jefferson, Red Tail Captured, Red Tail Free (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005),
55–60.
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more and had no idea about the Tuskegee Airmen. Seeing the men at the POW camp
was a surprise for most.
Only 12 Tuskegee Airmen were held in Stalag Luft III, but when a downed bomber
pilot later shows up and excitedly claims that “if the Red Tails had been escorting us we
wouldn’t have gotten shot down,” declaring “how many times the Red Tails saved [them],”
word about their reputation in combat quickly spreads through the camp.
8
In his memoir,
Jefferson notes with irony that a white prisoner from the South—Major Gale “Buck”
Cleven (Austin Butler) in the movie, but a different prisoner in reality—chose him to
bunk in his room because he knew Jefferson wasn’t a spy. Jefferson says he likely would
have “caught hell” from a white Southerner back home. But in the POW camp, ironically,
he was trusted because he was Black.
9
Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Ziemann, USAF
8. Jefferson, 76.
9. Jefferson, 65.
Masters of the Air, season 1, episode 9.
Directed by Tim Van Patten, written by John Orloff. Aired March 15, 2024, Apple TV+.
Episode 9 brings the war in Europe—and thus the story arcs—to an end. It begins
with Major Robert “Rosie” Rosenthal (Nate Mann) leading the 100th Bomb Group and
the entire 3rd Air Division on a strike against Berlin on February 3, 1945, complete with
P-51 escorts.
1
is scene does well to show the scale of air operations by that point in the
war with the “thousand plane raids.” e February 3rd mission included over two thou-
sand aircraft—1,437 heavy bombers and 948 fighters—to strike right at the heart of the
ird Reich.
2
As Navigator Major Harry Crosby (Anthony Boyle) narrates, the men of
the Army Air Forces have gained air superiority and are truly “masters of the air.”
Yet air superiority does not mean impunity, as Rosenthal’s crew is shot down. Mann
does a terrific job showing not only Rosenthal’s command of his crew and his aircraft on
the bomb run, but also the difficulty in getting out of an aircraft that is spinning out of
control. Many crew members were unable to bail out of bombers due to being pinned
against the aircraft by centrifugal force, spinning to their deaths. Upon landing, Rosen-
thal breaks the same arm that he broke in his first crash—a forced landing in France—
and convinces advancing Russian soldiers that he’s an American. As the book on which
the series is based reveals—in a moment where reality seems even more bizarre than
1. Donald L. Miller, Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War against Nazi Ger-
many (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2024), 423.
2. Robert Dorr, “e Bombing of Berlin by Doolittle’s Eighth Air Force,” WWII Quarterly 5, no. 3 (2014),
https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/.
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AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 109
Hollywood—Rosenthal was actually greeted with a bear hug from the Russian soldier
who only moments prior pointed a rifle at him.
3
During Rosenthal’s time with his Russian hosts he visits what historians believe to have
been the Zabikowo camp near Poznan, Poland, where prisoners—mostly Jews—were hung,
shot, and burned. While some rumblings of “death camps” were shared among Allied per-
sonnel, it wasn’t until the discovery of the multitude of concentration camps that the true
horror and scale of the wholesale industrial extermination of Jews and other persecuted
groups became known to the world.
4
Episode 9 also exposes the audience to the brutality of the “Blizzard March,” when
prisoner of war (POW) camps were hastily evacuated in late January 1945 as the Allies
closed in on the Reich and the POWs were moved deeper into the German heartland,
potentially to be used as hostages. Utter chaos ensues as 10,000 POWs from Stalag Luft
III prepare for a trip of unknown duration and destination in blizzard conditions with
just 30 minutes’ notice. Within that half hour, some POWs chose to consume as much
food as possible, paying dearly for it later as their shrunken stomachs forced them to
vomit. Others made hasty decisions as to what they could carry on makeshift sleds.
5
e line of prisoners from Stalag Luft III extended 30 miles and spanned days and
nights of marching. POWs were packed into cattle cars with human and animal feces
on the floor, with many suffering from dysentery and hypothermia. ere were a few
fatalities from an air attack by an unwitting P-47.
6
Shared misery led to shared human-
ity, accurately depicted as one POW is shown helping a German guard who struggles
to keep up on the march.
e Muskau brickworks factory provides a brief respite for warmth before the march
continues on to Nuremburg’s Stalag XIIIB and eventually to the overcrowded Stalag
VIIA in Moosburg, where POWs joined with thousands of other Allied prisoners from
across the British empire, ballooning to a total camp population of over 100,000. In real-
ity, for nearly three months, even the Red Cross didn’t know where the prisoners were.
7
Of note, while Lieutenant Colonel Albert Patton “Bub” Clark (Sam Hazeldine) is shown
as the senior American officer from Stalag III, in actuality it was Colonel Darr Alkire—
the original stateside commander of the 100th, ironically—who served in this role. Alkire
later took command of a B-24 group.
8
Although little backstory is given, we meet George Neithammer (Josh Dylan), a col-
lege friend of Major Gale “Buck” Cleven (Austin Butler) from Wyoming. Neither knew
that the other had joined the Air Corps until they saw each other as POWs and later
3. Miller, Masters of the Air, 424.
4. “Zabikowo Camp,” Holocaust Historical Society, February 5, 2022, https://www.holocausthistorical
society.org.uk/.
5. Miller, Masters of the Air, 492–505.
6. Miller.
7. Miller.
8. Miller.
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made their escape together. While Major John “Bucky” Egan (Callum Turner) is shown
fighting with a guard while Cleven and two others escape, the true story is an even more
compelling example of duty. When Cleven told Egan about his plans to escape, Egan
told him that as Alkire’s provost to maintain order among the POWs, he was duty bound
to stay with the prisoners, sacrificing his chance for freedom for the greater good.
9
Fortunately for viewers, the episode depicts the liberation of Stalag VIIA by General
George S. Patton’s ird Army. With a little dramatic license, red- tail P-51s are shown
visible from the camp, strafing the nearby Moosburg train station. Skirmishes between
German guard towers and American forces preceded the camp’s liberation. Seeing the
American flag raised over the town of Moosburg, Egan remarks on the tears and salutes
across camp before he eventually replaces the Nazi flag over the camp as well.
A different form of airpower is shown with the Operation Chowhound/Manna air-
drops of food to the people of the Netherlands. True to screen, bombers and crews ac-
customed to dropping tons of death and destruction took joy in bringing life and suste-
nance instead, witnessing the demonstration of genuine gratitude from the Dutch, who
spelled out “MANY THANKS, YANKS” in a tulip field.
10
Such missions were widely
popular among the Airmen, who leapt at the chance to do something positive after en-
during the horrors of war. One history records the reaction of one such crew member:
Children ran out of school waving excitedly. One old man stopped at a crossroads
and shook his umbrella. e roads were crowded with hundreds of people waving.
Nobody spoke in the aircraft. My vision was a little misty. Perhaps it was the rain
on the Perspex.
11
e episode also captures perhaps one of the more enduring legacies of the Eighth Air
Force: the profound bond between American Airmen and their English hosts—often
referred to as the “Friendly Invasion.” Children like Sammy Hurry (Alfie Tempest) did
in fact spend most of their free time on base with the ground crews, and townspeople
came out in their Sunday best to see the crews fly off one last time for home.
12
e strong
connection between the Airmen and the countryfolk is evident in the local museums
established and maintained after the war to honor those who served. e historical ac-
curacy of the Masters of the Air set was largely due to the photos and memories pre-
served by the local Brits who maintain the museum at orpe Abbotts, the actual home
of the 100th.
e episode also shows the emotional toll the war had on the Airmen. In contemplat-
ing the end of the war, Crosby and Rosenthal try to reconcile what they, as individuals,
did in war. While just war theory and the law of armed conflict clearly state that the use
9. Kirk Saduski, historian, interview by author, March 8, 2024.
10. Miller, Masters of the Air, 490.
11. Edward Jablonski, Air War, Volume IV (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1979), 122.
12. Chuck Dunning, “Keepers of the Castles of Little America,” British Heritage Travel, September 23,
1997, https://britishheritage.com/.
Multimedia Reviews
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW 111
of force in World War II was justified, many still wrestled with its moral and ethical chal-
lenges. Rosenthal himself, whom many believed volunteered for a second tour because he
was Jewish or had family members imprisoned in Germany, notes, “I didn’t do it because
I was a Jew, I did it because I was human, and I can’t stand bullies.”
13
e episode’s coda shares what happened to a number of the main characters after the
war, demonstrating the diversity of experiences in post- war life common to World War
II veterans. Some stayed in the service, others became lawyers or teachers, or obtained
advanced degrees—in other words, they moved on with life. Many did not talk about
their service—especially to their families—for years, if ever.
14
Masters of the Air succeeds in showing ordinary people doing extraordinary things dur-
ing the horror of warfare. No other screen portrayal to date has succeeded in showing the
full scale of mass daylight bombing raids. For general viewers, the series highlights the
courage and sacrifices of the Airmen of the Eighth Air Force and those in the English
countryside who kept them flying. It also reveals the brutality of warfare in the subfreez-
ing cold blue. For today’s Airmen, Masters of the Air shows our origin story—the doctrine
and strategy developed here at Maxwell Field in the 1930s and the culture of Air Corps
Airmen that lives on today.
Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Ziemann, USAF
13. Donald Miller, interview by author, February 16, 2024.
14. Saduski.
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