5.8 In order to legislate in this way, there would need be a statutory definition of seriousness in this
context. To implement on the basis of seriousness of offences requires a clear objective basis for
the selection of offences. There are a number of options:
(a) Defining seriousness on the basis of the ACPO/OCJR Warrant Priority Matrix, which is used
subsequently by the police to prioritise the warrant. This is an operational tool agreed by CJS
partners, with no legal status, and it would be problematic to replicate it in statute. In addition, it
does not provide the robust objective basis which would be required. This option is unlikely to
have a significant impact, in that only 1,500 backed for bail warrants per year are currently
categorised as A or B.
(b) Defining seriousness in terms of ‘indictable only’ offences. This would ensure the focus was on the
top end of the range of serious offences but would not catch some that can be tried either way,
such as certain drugs or sexual offences. As with the first option, the impact is likely to be limited, as
it is arguable that these defendants would already attract no-bail warrants if they failed to appear.
(c) Defining seriousness in terms of the maximum sentence which the substantive offence attracts
(over ‘x’ years). This would ensure more offences were covered than under option (b) but would
mean that some offences would be captured even when, on the facts, they were not particularly
serious. The impact of such a provision would depend on the threshold that was set: the lower
the threshold, the greater the impact but the greater the chances of disproportionate outcomes.
(d) Specifying the relevant substantive offences on the face of legislation, as in the schedule of Qualifying
Offences for Retrial of Serious Offences in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (see annex B). This would
help avoid some of the disadvantages of the other options, but would not remove all risk of
anomalies. Careful consideration would have to be given as to which offences should be included.
5.9 There is little evidence on which to base a robust impact assessment of these various options.
Significant further work would be required to gather this evidence, including data captures from
warrant management systems and considerable trawling, cleansing, organising and analysis of
information. This will be undertaken as part of the good practice project, with a view to
informing future consideration of legislative options.
(iii)
Restrict the Court’
s power to issue backed for bail warrants when the
defendant is deemed ‘serious’ (although the substantive offence may be
minor)
5.10 Another option is to restrict the use of backed for bail warrants by reference to the defendant,
rather than to the substantive offence.
5.11 Where a warrant is categorised as A or B but the substantive offence is not deemed serious, it is
almost invariably because of the previous offending nature of the defendant, for example, they
have been identified by the agencies as a Prolific and Priority Offender (PPO). However, PPOs are
not defined in statute, and indeed, the definition varies across the country according to local
priorities and problems. Moreover, at present the Court will generally not be made aware of an
individual’s offender status as it could be prejudicial.
5.12 Furthermore, it is arguable that a backed for bail warrant is a proportionate response to a minor
offence, irrespective of the defendant’s previous offending behaviour. In short, the defendant is
being bailed in relation to the current offence, not previous offences.
5.13 For these reasons, this is not considered to be a viable option.
Rebalancing the Criminal Justice System in favour of the law-abiding majority: Consultation 13