Chapter Two
10
According to Leahey (1992, p. 17),
For scientific research to be progressive, the scientific community in a
particular research area must agree on certain basic issues. Its members
must agree on the goals of their science, on the basic characteristics of
the real world relevant to their subject, and on permissible research
methods and mathematical techniques.
This notion of progressive scientific research is especially problematic
within transpersonal psychology where transpersonal authors “frequently
portray science as inadequate for and irrelevant to addressing transpersonal
concerns” (Friedman, 2005, p. 3). In addition, debate continues regarding
“permissible research methods”. For example, while some prominent
transpersonal researchers (e.g., Friedman & MacDonald, 2002) advocate
quantitative approaches, we note that the anthology, Transpersonal research
methods for the social sciences (Braud & Anderson, 1998) outlines five
transpersonal research methods (i.e., integral inquiry, intuitive inquiry,
organic research, transpersonal-phenomenological inquiry, inquiry informed
by exceptional human experiences), none of which utilize statistical tests.
Thus, broadly speaking, this particular sub-discipline of psychology
demonstrates a predilection for formulating sets of logically related
hypotheses (i.e., theories) coupled with a disinclination to engage in
hypothesis testing; a curious state of affairs, indeed. This predilection has
numerous negative outcomes including: (1) The glacial accumulation of
empirical knowledge, which hampers the development of an evidence base
concerning, for example, the efficacy of transpersonal psychotherapy (e.g.,
holotropic breathwork); (2) A dearth of studies that provide quantitative
phenomenological maps of ostensibly transpersonal states of conscious
awareness (e.g., kevala nirvikalpa samadhi) and therefore a failure to
respond adequately to Tart’s (1972) decades-old call for the establishment
of SSSs; and (3) A lack of validation of quantitative instruments designed
to measure transpersonal constructs.
Psychology’s sister discipline, anthropology, has an opposite problem.
Because, with the exception of so-called holocultural studies of transpersonal
experiences (e.g., Bourguignon & Evascu, 1977), anthropological research
is naturalistic, it rarely has a way of determining a universe for which
parametric statistics would be valid. Hence, anthropology has had no such
methodological quandary, for ethnographic fieldwork is normally
qualitative and grounded upon what is call participant observation: that is,
learning about life in other cultures by participating in the host’s everyday
life and seeing what happens. As is often the case when doing fieldwork
among non-Western peoples, anthropologists have come across practices