M
-PESA, Kenya’s mobile phone-based money
transfer service, exploded onto the scene in
2007. In just three years, it has attracted over 9.5
million customers, in a country with only 8.4 million
bank accounts. Every month, more than US$320
million flows through M-PESA in person-to-person
transfers, and the numbers keep rising. By nearly all
accounts, M-PESA has been an admirable success
and has expanded access to basic financial services
to millions of underserved Kenyans.
1
M-PESA has
captured the world’s attention not only because
of its success, but also because it is offered by an
unlikely financial services provider—Safaricom,
Kenya’s largest mobile network operator.
The success of Kenya’s M-PESA has raised the
question of how most effectively to regulate
nonbanks (See Box 1)—most notably mobile network
operators (MNOs)—who contract directly with
customers to issue electronic value against receipt
of equal funds (“e-money”).
2
MNOs like Safaricom are well-placed to reach
customers with affordable financial services due to
their existing customer base, marketing capabilities,
physical distribution infrastructure, and experience
with high-volume, low-value transactions (e.g., the sale
of airtime) (Ivatury and Mas 2008). Yet, despite these
advantages, regulators are often reluctant to permit
MNOs to directly contract with customers for the
provision of financial services. Taking money from the
public, even for purposes of effecting payment rather
than for saving, is uncomfortably close to accepting
public deposits—an activity almost always reserved
for prudentially regulated financial institutions, such
as commercial banks. Funds kept with such banks
3
are protected by strict prudential requirements (and
related supervision) to ensure systemic stability and
deposit security, and these same requirements would
typically apply to electronic value issued by banks in
exchange for deposited funds.
4
Nonbanks are rarely subject to the kind of prudential
regulation that apply to banks, so when nonbanks
issue e-money, regulators are understandably
concerned about ensuring adequate protection for
customer funds.
In recent years, however, policy makers around the
world have noticed how nonbank e-money issuers
could significantly promote financial services among
low-income populations. Perhaps as a result, a
number of policy makers around the world have
issued regulations expressly permitting nonbanks to
contract directly with customers for the issuance of
e-money.
5
From Afghanistan to the Philippines, West
Nonbank E-Money Issuers:
Regulatory Approaches to
Protecting Customer Funds
1 According to Vodafone, a parent company of Safaricom, at least 50% of current M-PESA users are unbanked.
2 In this Focus Note, “e-money” refers to electronically recorded value issued against the receipt of equivalent value. The electronic value, once
issued, may be redeemed for cash, transferred between customers, or used by a customer to make payments to merchants, utility companies,
and other parties. E-money may be issued by banks or nonbanks, but the term is used herein to refer to electronic value issued by nonbanks.
3 The term “bank” as used in this Focus Note refers to any supervised and prudentially regulated financial services institution that is commonly,
but not always, a bank.
4 E-money issued by regulated financial institutions is not always subject to the same prudential protections (such as deposit insurance)
afforded deposits.
5 A number of other countries, such as Kenya and Cambodia, have not issued e-money regulations but have nevertheless permitted such
nonbank models on an ad hoc basis through “no objection” letters, conditional approvals, or other means.
No. 63
July 2010
Michael Tarazi
and Paul Breloff
FOCUS NOTE
2
Africa to the European Union, jurisdictions around
the world have adopted regulation that enables a
leading role for nonbanks—while mitigating the risks
presented by the involvement of a service provider
that is not subject to full prudential regulation.
This Focus Note reviews global regulatory
approaches to protecting customer funds in
the context of nonbank e-money issuers. Most
every regulatory approach includes provisions
for “fund safeguarding”—the requirement that
nonbanks maintain unencumbered liquid assets
equal to the amount of issued electronic value—
and other measures to ensure availability of funds
when redeemed by customers against electronic
value. Some regulatory approaches also include
“fund isolation”—the requirement that the funds
underlying issued e-money be insulated from
institutional risks of claims by issuer creditors, such
as claims made in the case of issuer bankruptcy.
6
6 This Focus Note focuses on those regulatory measures that are intended primarily to protect customer funds in schemes involving nonbank
issuers. However, other regulations not discussed here may be intended at least partly to protect customer funds. For example, minimum
initial capital requirements found in some regulations may screen out unfit service providers or ensure an adequate financial cushion in event
of trouble, mitigating the risk of provider failure or bankruptcy. Similarly, regulation in Afghanistan requires service providers to post bond
as a condition of launching, in part to cover potential customer claims. Finally, some regulators require service providers to offer e-money
services as a sole business line or from a separate legal entity to facilitate regulator supervision and to insulate the e-money business from
institutional risks posed by other activities.
Box 1. Bank-based versus nonbank-based
The term “nonbank” refers to a nonprudentially regulated institution. (See Christen, Lyman, and Rosenberg 2003.)
While the distinction is often made between bank-based and nonbank-based models of branchless banking, the reality
is less binary: both banks and nonbanks typically play roles in any branchless banking scheme. In a bank-based model,
customers have a direct contractual relationship with a licensed financial institution (even though a customer may
deal exclusively with nonbank agents who conduct transactions on the bank’s behalf). In a nonbank-based model, the
customer does not have a direct contractual relationship with a licensed bank, and instead exchanges cash for electronic
value recorded in a virtual account on the server of a nonbank, such as an MNO or an issuer of stored-value cards. (See
Lyman, Pickens, and Porteous 2008.) While this distinction is still useful in delineating two different legal models, it
should be clarified that even in bank-based models, there is still typically an active role for nonbanks—and vice versa.
The graphic below gives a sense of the range of ways banks may be involved in branchless banking schemes.
Nonbank-Based ModelBank-Based Model
Bank(s) offer
individual accounts
that can be used
through bank-
managed branchless
channels
CAIXA
(Brazil)
XacBank (Mongolia)
Bank(s) offer
individual accounts
accessed through
nonbank-managed
agent networks and/or
technological
platforms
EKO (for SBI in India)
SMART (for 21 banks
in the Philippines)
Bank issues electronic
value which is
purchased from bank
and redistributed by
nonbank directly to
customers.
Orange Money (Cote
D’Ivoire, Senegal and
Mali)
Nonbank issues
electronic value and
holds matching-
value assets in
pooled account in
regulated bank.
Safaricom (M-Pesa
in Kenya)
Globe (GCASH in
the Philippines)
Bank Involvement in Branchless Banking Models
3
Fund Safeguarding
Fund safeguarding measures are aimed at ensuring
that funds are available to meet customer demand
for the “cashing out” of electronic value.
Liquidity
In countries that have permitted nonbank issuance
of e-money, regulators have typically addressed
fund safeguarding concerns by requiring that
such issuers maintain liquid assets equivalent to
the total value of the customer funds collected
(i.e., the total value of electronic value issued and
outstanding, also known as the “e-float”).
7
Liquid
assets are most often required to be maintained
as accounts with a prudentially regulated bank
but sometimes they may be maintained as other
“safe assets,” such as government securities,
although such securities may not always be as
liquid as bank accounts.
8
Liquidity requirements
exist in Indonesia, Afghanistan, the Philippines,
Cambodia, Malaysia, India (in connection with
prepaid payment instruments), and others. (See
Table 1.) In Kenya, where applicable regulation is
currently being drafted, Safaricom maintains fund
liquidity by placing collected cash in prudentially
regulated banks pursuant to a prior agreement with
the Central Bank of Kenya (CGAP 2010).
Restrictions on Use
Liquidity requirements are sometimes reinforced
by restrictions on the use of customer funds by the
nonbank issuer—for example, by prohibiting issuers
from using the funds to finance operating expenses.
In Malaysia, for example, issuers are expressly
prohibited from using such funds for any purpose
other than “cashing out” against electronic value or
executing funds transfers to third parties pursuant
to customer request. Other limitations on the use of
customer funds are more indirect. The Philippines
expressly prohibits nonbank issuers from engaging in
the extension of credit, effectively ensuring customer
funds are not endangered through intermediation by
an entity that is not fully prudentially regulated.
Diversification of E-Float Fund Holdings
Funds held in prudentially regulated banks are
not risk-free, as has been painfully proven by the
recent financial crisis. When banks fail, they cannot
always pay their depositors, often leaving small-
value depositors to pursue recovery through
deposit insurance schemes. In countries with weak
banking sectors there is an even greater risk of bank
failure coupled with the possibility that no deposit
insurance exists. However, even where deposit
insurance exists, the value of pooled accounts held
7 Note that this is a more stringent requirement than imposed on deposit-taking financial institutions, which are typically subject to reserve
requirements mandating only some small portion of overall deposits to be kept in liquid form (typically cash) to satisfy potential depositor
claims. This difference in treatment reflects a fundamental difference among banks, nonbank service providers, and their respective business
models. A bank’s business is predicated on the ability to intermediate capital, i.e., take money from those who have it and provide it (in loans
or other products) to those who need it. Nonbanks, on the other hand, are expressly prevented from intermediating deposits and thus must
make money in other ways, such as transaction charges, lowered airtime distribution costs, and reduced customer churn.
8 In West African countries under the jurisdiction of the Banque Centrale des Etats de L’Afrique d’Ouest (BCEAO), regulation also permits
funds to be invested in securities issued by registered companies. (See Table 1)
4
Table 1: Nonbank E-Money Issuers: Global Approaches to Protecting Customer Funds*
Fund Safeguarding Restrictions on Fund Use Isolation Measures Other Risk Mitigants
Afghanistan
(Amendment to the Money
Service Providers Regulation to
Extend Regulatory Oversight
to E-Money Institutions, 25
November 2009)
At all times, an e-money issuer must
maintain liquid assets to at least
100% of e-float. (Section 2.5.5.1)
Liquid assets consist of the sum of
AFN-denominated banknotes and
coins, held in a trust account at a
banking organization (full-fledged
bank licensed or permitted by Da
Afghanistan Bank. (Section 2.5.5.1)
Liquid assets must be held in trust
account at a banking organization
(full-fledged bank licensed or
permitted by Da Afghanistan
Bank). (Section 2.5.5.1)
If total electronic value liabilities
are greater than AFN 250 million,
no more than 25% of liquid assets
can be held at a single banking
organization. (Section 2.5.5.2)
If total electronic value liabilities
are less than AFN 250 million,
the e-money issuer is expected
to observe prudent diversification
of its liquid assets across financial
institutions. (Section 2.5.5.3)
BCEAO
(Instruction No. 01/2006/SP (31
July 2006) Relative a l’Emission
de Monnaie Electronique et
aux Etablissements de Monnai
Electronique)
E-money issuers shall maintain
investments of an amount at least
equal to their financial liabilities
related to debt representing the
e-money issued and only in assets
listed below:
a) Cash deposits in a bank
b) Bonds issued by the central
government or its entities or by
the central bank
c) Securities (i) other than those
referred to in point b above
and (ii) issued by companies
licensed by the Regional
Council of Public Saving and
Capital Markets, other than
companies that have qualifying
equity in the e-money issuer
concerned or which must be
included in the consolidated
accounts of those enterprises.
(Article 18.1)
Commercial activities of e-money
issuers are limited to the provision
of services related to the issuance,
the provision or management of
e-money, and the storage of data
on electronic devices on behalf of
other corporations. (Article 9)
Indonesia
(Bank Indonesia Regulation
Concerning Electronic Money, No.
11/12/PBI/2009, 13 April 2009)
(Circular Letter Concerning
E-Money, No. 11/11/DASP, 13
April 2009)
In the case the issuer is an
institution other than a bank,
managed float funds must be
placed with a commercial bank
in the form of a deposit account
consisting of savings account,
current account, and/or time
deposit account.
Issuer can use float funds
only in the interest of liability
fulfillment for e-money holders.
Float funds may not be used for
financing activities beyond the
liabilities toward the respective
holders such as financing issuer
operations. (Circular Letter,
Section VII.H.3)
License required only if float
totals or is expected to total 1
billion IDR (approx. US$110,000).
(Circular Letter, Section VII. B.1.a)
5
Table 1: Nonbank E-Money Issuers: Global Approaches to Protecting Customer Funds*
Fund Safeguarding Restrictions on Fund Use Isolation Measures Other Risk Mitigants
Afghanistan
(Amendment to the Money
Service Providers Regulation to
Extend Regulatory Oversight
to E-Money Institutions, 25
November 2009)
At all times, an e-money issuer must
maintain liquid assets to at least
100% of e-float. (Section 2.5.5.1)
Liquid assets consist of the sum of
AFN-denominated banknotes and
coins, held in a trust account at a
banking organization (full-fledged
bank licensed or permitted by Da
Afghanistan Bank. (Section 2.5.5.1)
Liquid assets must be held in trust
account at a banking organization
(full-fledged bank licensed or
permitted by Da Afghanistan
Bank). (Section 2.5.5.1)
If total electronic value liabilities
are greater than AFN 250 million,
no more than 25% of liquid assets
can be held at a single banking
organization. (Section 2.5.5.2)
If total electronic value liabilities
are less than AFN 250 million,
the e-money issuer is expected
to observe prudent diversification
of its liquid assets across financial
institutions. (Section 2.5.5.3)
BCEAO
(Instruction No. 01/2006/SP (31
July 2006) Relative a l’Emission
de Monnaie Electronique et
aux Etablissements de Monnai
Electronique)
E-money issuers shall maintain
investments of an amount at least
equal to their financial liabilities
related to debt representing the
e-money issued and only in assets
listed below:
a) Cash deposits in a bank
b) Bonds issued by the central
government or its entities or by
the central bank
c) Securities (i) other than those
referred to in point b above
and (ii) issued by companies
licensed by the Regional
Council of Public Saving and
Capital Markets, other than
companies that have qualifying
equity in the e-money issuer
concerned or which must be
included in the consolidated
accounts of those enterprises.
(Article 18.1)
Commercial activities of e-money
issuers are limited to the provision
of services related to the issuance,
the provision or management of
e-money, and the storage of data
on electronic devices on behalf of
other corporations. (Article 9)
Indonesia
(Bank Indonesia Regulation
Concerning Electronic Money, No.
11/12/PBI/2009, 13 April 2009)
(Circular Letter Concerning
E-Money, No. 11/11/DASP, 13
April 2009)
In the case the issuer is an
institution other than a bank,
managed float funds must be
placed with a commercial bank
in the form of a deposit account
consisting of savings account,
current account, and/or time
deposit account.
Issuer can use float funds
only in the interest of liability
fulfillment for e-money holders.
Float funds may not be used for
financing activities beyond the
liabilities toward the respective
holders such as financing issuer
operations. (Circular Letter,
Section VII.H.3)
License required only if float
totals or is expected to total 1
billion IDR (approx. US$110,000).
(Circular Letter, Section VII. B.1.a)
“Float funds placed at a
commercial bank… must total
100% of the funds derived from
sales proceeds of electronic money
that represent the Issuer’s liability
towards e-money holders…”
(Circular Letter, Sections VII. H.1
&2)
Malaysia
(Guideline on Electronic Money
BNM/RH/GL -16-3, July 2008)
To avoid commingling of funds, the funds collected from users should be deposited and managed separately
from the issuer’s working capital funds. (Article 10.1)
Large E-money Issuer (MYR 1 million or more for six consecutive months)
An issuer of a large e-money scheme should deposit the funds collected in exchange of the e-money issued
in a trust account with a licensed institution. Such funds can be used only to refund to uses and effect
payment to merchants. (Article 10.2(b))
Funds may be invested only in high-quality liquid ringgit assets that are limited to deposits made with
licensed institutions, debt securities issued or guaranteed by the Federal Government and Bank Negara
Malaysia, Cagamas debt securities, and other instruments as may be specified by Bank Negara Malaysia.
(Article 10.2 (c))
Small E-money Issuer
An issuer of a small e-money scheme shall place funds collected in exchange for the e-money issued in a
deposit account with a licensed institution, separated from its other accounts, and should be managed by the
issuer in a matter akin to a trust account arrangement. The funds deposited can be used only to refund users
and effect payment to merchants, and the funds shall not be invested in any form of assets other than as
bank deposits. (Article 10.3)
Issuers of large e-money schemes
who are unable to restrict their
activities to e-money business
only shall deposit and maintain an
additional 2% of their outstanding
e-money liabilities in the trust
account at all times. (Article
10.2(f))
An issuer of e-money shall not use
the money collected to extend
loans to any other persons.
(Article 13.1(ii))
Philippines
(Circular 649, 9 March 2009)
The e-money issuer should have
sufficient liquid assets equal to the
amount of outstanding e-money
issued. The liquid assets should
remain unencumbered and may
take any of the following forms:
1. Bank deposits separately
maintained for liquidity
purposes
2. Government securities set aside
for the purpose
3. Such other liquid assets as the
BSP may allow. (Section 5.D)
E-money issuers shall engage
only in the business of e-money
and other activities related or
incidental to the business of
e-money such as money transfer/
remittances. An existing entity
engaged in activities not related
to the business of e-money but
wishing to act as an e-money
issuer must do so through a
separate entity duly incorporated
exclusively for such purpose.
(Section 5.B)
Nonbank e-money issuers shall
not engage in the extension of
credit. (Section 5.C)
*Information in this table is based in part on unofficial English translations of relevant regulation. It is not intended as legal guidance or opinion, and reference should always be made to
the original text.
by nonbank e-money issuers is typically much larger
than deposit insurance coverage limits, leaving the
issuer and customers more exposed in the case of
bank failure. Afghan regulators sought to minimize
the risk of bank failure by requiring that when any
e-money issuer’s e-float exceeds a specified amount,
no more than 25 percent of the cash funds backing
such float may be held in a single financial institution.
No regulations outside of Afghanistan expressly
require such diversification as protection against
bank failure, though the trustee of the M-PESA trust
account in Kenya independently chose to minimize
risk by dividing the cash backing M-PESA’s e-float
among more than one bank.
Fund Isolation
Liquidity requirements, coupled with other
restrictions on use, may prove to be effective
mechanisms for fund safeguarding.
9
However, funds
may still be at risk if the customer’s ownership of the
funds is unclear.
While funds can be safeguarded in accounts of
prudentially regulated institutions, such funds are
often pooled and held in the name of the issuer—
not in the name of the customers. Therefore, the
nonbank issuer is often the legal owner of the
accounts, thereby making the underlying funds
vulnerable to claims by the issuer’s creditors if the
issuer goes bankrupt or if accounts have been used
as collateral to secure specific debts of the issuer.
In Kenya, M-PESA customers are isolated from
creditor claims and other ownership threats by
the use of a trust account that is administered by
a third-party trustee and held for the benefit of
M-PESA customers. However, other jurisdictions,
particularly those jurisdictions where trust accounts
do not exist, do not provide the same protections.
Indonesia, for example, mandates certain fund
safeguarding measures but the bank accounts
holding the funds are in the name of the nonbank
issuer. This is also the case in practice in Cambodia,
although Cambodian regulators are reportedly
considering regulation to replicate the protections
afforded by the trust account structure in Kenya.
Malaysia requires that customer funds be deposited
and managed separately from the issuer’s working
capital funds but while such separate management
facilitates supervision of an issuer’s compliance with
fund safeguarding requirements, it (like in Indonesia
and Cambodia) does not isolate customer funds
from claims by the issuer’s creditors.
Even when nonbank issuers successfully isolate
customer funds, mechanisms are needed whereby
customers can retrieve funds in the event of issuer
failure or other event requiring mass conversion of
electronic value into cash.
Emerging Issues
E-money models are still in their infancy. As these
models gain traction and expand, other regulatory
6
9 Another safeguarding measure is insurance. The European Union (EU), for example, permits safeguarding of funds through insurance.
EU Directive 2007/64/EC permits nonbank e-money issuers in lieu of liquidity provisions, to insure or comparably guarantee the funds
backing e-float in an amount payable in the event that the nonbank issuer is unable to meet its financial obligations. EU Directive 2007/64/
EC, Article 9.1(c) incorporated by reference from Article 7.1 of EU Directive 2009/110/EC (2009). Insuring deposits is not a safeguarding
measure adopted so far in developing countries.
7
challenges will arise, including (i ) whether to treat
e-money as savings products (rather than as simply
funds transfer) and (ii ) how to level the playing field
among different kinds of entities offering similar
services.
E-Money Platforms as Savings Products
E-money and other branchless banking services in
developing economies have demonstrated their
potential to bring millions of unbanked customers
into the financial system. At present, the use of
e-money is mostly limited to making payments. The
hope is that e-money’s reach will eventually include
other financial services, chiefly savings, which may be
of even more benefit to customers. Consequently,
regulators may soon confront questions about
whether e-money accounts should enjoy the same
benefits and protections as bank accounts. These
include the following questions:
• Should e-money issuers be permitted to pay
interest on e-money accounts? Most regulatory
authorities consider the payment of interest
a feature of a bank deposit and consequently
ban interest payments on e-money in an effort
to clearly delineate between banking activity
and payment services. However, this distinction
between payments and banking activity is of
questionable legal merit. Because deposit taking
is often an activity reserved for prudentially
regulated and licensed banks, regulators and
nonbank e-money issuers have embraced the
argument that nonbank e-money issuance is
simply a payment mechanism and not a bank
deposit. However, collecting repayable funds
from the general public is arguably a “deposit”
regardless of whether it is collected by a bank
or payment services provider (Tarazi 2009). As
e-money is increasingly used as a savings vehicle,
and as there is evidence that customers desire to
earn interest,
10
regulators may be forced to re-
evaluate perceived risks and reconsider permitting
nonbank e-money issuers to pay interest
11
earned
on pooled accounts.
12
• Shouldthefundsbackingthee-floatbecovered
bydepositinsuranceschemes? In most developing
country frameworks, e-money is not considered
a deposit and, thus, is not covered by deposit
insurance.
This is the case, for example, in Filipino
and Afghan regulation. However, as discussed,
to the extent underlying customer funds are
kept in bank accounts, such funds are exposed
to the risk of bank failure. Even in circumstances
where deposit insurance exists, the value of
pooled accounts is often much higher than the
applicable deposit insurance coverage limits. As
10 The additional service most desired by M-PESA users (38%) is “earning interest” (Pulver 2009).
11 Some regulators have argued that it is important that any payment of interest be simply a “pass through” from the bank where pooled
accounts are held to the end user. Such regulators fear that permitting an e-money issuer to pay interest or interest equivalent on its own
could encourage e-money issuers to make unsound investments with its working capital (or pooled customer funds if such pooled funds
are not adequately isolated) in order to pay out competitive rates of interest. However it is unclear why paying interest would encourage
unsound investment any more than any other cost of the issuer. And provided the funds backing the e-money float are adequately
safeguarded and isolated, the risk to end users is arguably minimal.
12 As interest accrued on the trust account established for M-PESA customers, Safaricom negotiated with Kenyan regulators to be able to
use the interest for charitable purposes. Kenyan authorities did not allow the interest to be passed through to the customers whose funds
actually earned the interest for fear that the payment of interest would make M-PESA a banking service rather than a payments service,
requiring Safaricom to obtain a bank license and be subject to full prudential regulation.
8
electronic value offerings grow in volume and
popularity, and as evidence mounts that e-money
schemes are increasingly being used as savings
vehicles,
13
regulators may want to consider
extending deposit insurance protection at the
level of individual customer e-money balances
or alternatively raise the ceiling for pooled
accounts.
14
Many developed countries already
provide such deposit protection. The United
States, for example, expressly characterizes the
funds underlying stored-value cards as “deposits”
covered by deposit insurance as long as such
funds are placed in an insured institution (FDIC
2008).
Level Playing Field
As new business models emerge and nonbank actors
enter the financial services market, regulators are
challenged to create a regulatory scheme that, to the
extent possible, levels the playing field for service
providers regardless of legal form. For example,
Kenya’s banking agent law holds banks legally liable
for their agents, but nonbank e-money issuers like
Safaricom are not similarly liable. The discrepancy
arguably disadvantages banks though some argue
that the higher level of bank liability is justified since
bank agents can engage in a fuller array of financial
services, whereas M-PESA is considered simply a
funds transfer/payments mechanism.
Countries such as the Philippines, Nigeria, and
Afghanistan attempt to create level playing fields
by regulating e-money as a service, pursuant to
a single regulation and under a single regulator
(as opposed to regulating the different service
providers based on legal form). Nevertheless, these
countries do include separate provisions in relevant
e-money regulation aimed at addressing the risks
presented (such as fund safeguarding) by nonbank
participation in the e-money sector.
15
Conclusion
The arrival of mobile telephony and innovative
technology is forcing regulators to re-evaluate their
rules for financial service provision. Nonbanks like
MNOs may be well-placed to dramatically expand
the reach and range of financial services for the poor
and unbanked. The challenge is to craft policies
and regulations that mitigate the risks to customer
funds without stifling the dynamism, creativity, and
potential of these new actors.
Forward-thinking regulators in several countries
have crafted innovative approaches to meet this
challenge. Policies related to fund safeguarding
and isolation allow regulators to meet their goals of
customer protection and financial inclusion.
Enabling the entry and leadership of nonbanks
need not be a threat to the central role of banks in
13 In the Philippines, an estimated 10% of unbanked users save an average of US$31 (one-quarter of their family savings) in the form of
e-money (Pickens 2009). In addition, nearly a third of banked customers in Kibera, Kenya, keep a balance in their M-PESA account, and a
fifth of the unbanked interviewees in Kibera use M-PESA as a substitute for informal methods of savings, especially keeping money at home.
See Morawczynski and Pickens (2009).
14 On the other hand, deposit insurance is usually funded by premiums paid by participating financial institutions, which typically pass these
costs along to their customers. Thus, inclusion of e-money issuers in a deposit insurance system may make their services slightly more
expensive.
15 Creating a level playing field is often complicated by regulatory overlap and the risk of coordination failure between relevant authorities or
even between different departments of the same government institution. For example, the banking supervision department of a central bank
may prohibit banks from engaging in an activity that is permitted to MNOs by the payments department of the same central bank.
emerging market financial systems. Indeed, we are
already witnessing how nonbank-based models like
M-PESA may actually liberate financial institutions
to innovate over the “rails” laid down by MNO
pioneers—a recent partnership between Safaricom
and Kenya-based Equity Bank launched M-KESHO,
a product using M-PESA’s platform and agent
network to provide an expanded set of banking
services—interest-bearing accounts, loans, and even
insurance. Such partnerships may very well mark
the next phase of branchless banking, cementing
the role of nonbanks in the delivery of a full array of
financial services to those currently underserved by
traditional banking models.
9
10
References
CGAP. 2010. “Research Note on Regulating
Branchless Banking in Kenya, 2010 Update.” http://
www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.42400/Updated_
Notes_On_Regulating_Branchless_Banking_Kenya.
pdf
Christen, Robert, Timothy Lyman, and Richard
Rosenberg. 2003. GuidingPrinciplesonRegulation
and Supervision of Microfinance. Consensus
Guidelines. Washington, D.C.: CGAP.
FDIC Financial Institutions Letters. 2008. “Insurability
of Funds Underlying Stored Value Cards and Other
Nontraditional Access Mechanisms, New General
Counsel’s Opinion no. 8.” Washington, D.C.: FDIC,
13 November.
Ivatury, Gautam, and Ignacio Mas. 2008. “The Early
Experience with Branchless Banking.” Focus Note
46. Washington D.C.: CGAP
Lyman, Timothy, Mark Pickens, and David Porteous.
2008. “Regulating Transformational Branchless
Banking.” Focus Note 43. Washington, D.C.: CGAP,
January.
Morawczynski, Olga, and Mark Pickens. 2009.
“Poor People Using Mobile Financial Services:
Observations on Customer Usage and Impact from
M-PESA.” Brief. Washington, D.C.: CGAP, August.
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.41163/BR_
Mobile_Money_Philippines.pdf
Pickens, Mark. 2009. “Window on the Unbanked:
Mobile Money in the Philippines.” Brief. Washington,
D.C.: CGAP, December 2009. http://www.cgap.
org/gm/document-1.9.41163/BR_Mobile_Money_
Philippines.pdf.
Pulver, Caroline. 2009. “The Importance and Impact
of M-Pesa: Preliminary Evidence from a Household
Survey.” Kenya: FSD Kenya, June.
Tarazi, Michael. “E-Money Accounts Should Pay
Interest, So Why Don’t They?” Blog post. http://
technology.cgap.org/2009/03/17/e-money-
accounts-should-pay-interest-so-why-dont-they/
The authors of this Focus Note are Michael Tarazi and Paul Breloff of CGAP. The Technology Program at CGAP works to expand financial
services for the poor using mobile phones and other technologies and is co-funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, CGAP, and the
U.K. Department for International Development (DFID).
The suggested citation for this Focus Note is as follows:
Tarazi, Michael, and Paul Breloff. 2010. “Nonbank E-Money Issuers: Regulatory Approaches to Protecting Customer Funds.” Focus Note 63.
Washington, D.C.: CGAP, July.
No. 63
July 2010
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