In Dispute 30:2 Contract Formation

CHAPTER 30

CONTRACTS

Introductory Note

A. CONTRACT FORMATION

30:1 Contract Formation ― In Dispute

30:2 Contract Formation ― Need Not Be in Writing

30:3 Contract Formation ― Offer

30:4 Contract Formation ― Revocation of Offer

30:5 Contract Formation ― Counteroffer

30:6 Contract Formation ― Acceptance

30:7 Contract Formation ― Consideration

30:8 Contract Formation ― Modification

30:9 Contract Formation ― Third-Party Beneficiary

B. CONTRACT PERFORMANCE

30:10 Contract Performance — Breach of Contract — Elements of Liability

30:11 Contract Performance — Breach of Contract Defined

30:12 Contract Performance — Substantial Performance

30:13 Contract Performance — Anticipatory Breach

30:14 Contract Performance — Time of Performance

30:15 Contract Performance — Conditions Precedent

30:16 Contract Performance — Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing — Non-Insurance

Contract

30:17 Contract Performance — Assignment

C. DEFENSES

Introductory Note

30:18 Defense — Fraud in the Inducement

30:19 Defense — Undue Influence

30:20 Defense — Duress

30:21 Defense — Minority

30:22 Defense — Mental Incapacity

30:23 Defense — Impossibility of Performance

30:24 Defense — Inducing a Breach by Words or Conduct

30:25 Defense — Waiver

30:26 Defense — Statute of Limitations

30:27 Defense — Cancellation by Agreement

30:28 Defense — Accord and Satisfaction (Later Contract)

30:29 Defense — Novation

D. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

Introductory Note

30:30 Contract Interpretation — Disputed Term

30:31 Contract Interpretation — Parties’ Intent

30:32 Contract Interpretation — Contract as a Whole

30:33 Contract Interpretation — Ordinary Meaning

30:34 Contract Interpretation — Use of Technical Words in a Contract

30:35 Contract Interpretation — Construction Against Drafter

30:36 Contract Interpretation — Specific and General Clauses

E. DAMAGES

Introductory Note

30:37 Damages — Introduction

30:38 Damages — General

30:39 Damages — Special

30:40 Damages — Liquidated

30:41 Damages — Nominal

30:42 Damages — Purchaser’s for Breach of Land Purchase Contract

30:43 Damages — Seller’s for Breach of Land Purchase Contract

30:44 Damages — Employer’s for Employee’s Breach of Personal Service Contract

30:45 Damages — Builder’s for Breach of Construction Contract by Owner Prior to

Completion

30:46 Damages — Builder’s for Substantial Though Not Complete Performance of

Construction Contract

30:47 Definition — Contract Price Agreed Upon

30:48 Damages — Builder’s for Owner’s Partial Breach — Failure to Make Installment

Payment

30:49 Damages — Owner’s for Breach of Construction Contract by Builder

30:50 Damages — Owner’s for Delay in Completion of Construction Contract

30:51 Damages — Broker’s for Breach of Real Estate Commission Contract

30:52 Damages — Owner’s for Wrongful Deprivation of Use of a Chattel

30:53 Damages — Owner’s for Breach of a Covenant Against Encumbrances

F. PARTICULAR CONTRACTS

30:54 Claim — Building Contractor’s Breach of Implied Warranty — Elements of Liability

30:55 Definition — Building Contractor’s Implied Warranties

30:56 Claim — Real Estate Commission — Elements of Liability

Introductory Note

1. The instructions in this chapter have been drafted for use in contract cases generally.

They have not been drafted to incorporate provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, C.R.S.,

title 4, such as cases in which the plaintiff is seeking contract-like damages (as opposed to tort-

like damages) for injuries or damage to persons or property allegedly caused by a breach of

warranty.

2. In cases involving contracts for the sale of goods, however, several instructions in this

chapter may be applicable, subject to their being appropriately modified to conform with the

U.C.C. See § 4-1-103, C.R.S. See also instructions in Part B of Chapter 14 which may be adapted

for use in cases involving claims for contract damages (as opposed to tort damages) for breach of

warranty of a contract for sale of goods.

A. CONTRACT FORMATION

30:1 CONTRACT FORMATION ― IN DISPUTE

A contract is an agreement between two or more persons or entities. A contract

consists of an offer and an acceptance of that offer, and must be supported by

consideration. If any one of these three elements is missing, there is no contract.

Notes on Use

1. See Notes on Use to Instruction 30:10.

2. The question of whether or not an alleged contract is sufficiently definite in its terms to

be judicially enforceable is normally a question to be determined by the court. See Stice v.

Peterson, 144 Colo. 219, 355 P.2d 948 (1960). For the test to be applied in cases involving

contracts for the sale of goods, see section 4-2-204(3), C.R.S.

3. For the requisite manifestation of assent in contracts for the sale of goods, see section

4-1-201(3), C.R.S.

4. For the requirement of consideration, see Source and Authority to Instruction 30:7.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Denver Truck Exchange v. Perryman, 134 Colo.

586, 307 P.2d 805 (1957) (For an enforceable contract to exist there must be mutual assent to an

exchange between competent parties, legal consideration, and sufficient certainty with respect to

the subject matter and essential terms of the agreement.). See also Indus. Prods. Int’l, Inc. v.

Emo Trans, Inc., 962 P.2d 983 (Colo. App. 1997).

2. “The general rule is that when parties to a contract ascribe different meanings to a

material term of a contract, the parties have not manifested mutual assent, no meeting of the

minds has occurred, and there is no valid contract. However, an exception to the general rule is

observed when the meaning that either party gives to the document’s language was the only

reasonable meaning under the circumstances. In such cases, both parties are bound to the

reasonable meaning of the contract’s terms.” Sunshine v. M. R. Mansfield Realty, Inc., 195

Colo. 95, 98, 575 P.2d 847, 849 (1978) (citation omitted). Moreover, when the parties to a

bargain, sufficiently defined to be a contract, have not agreed to an essential term, the court may

supply a term that is reasonable under the circumstances. Costello v. Cook, 852 P.2d 1330

(Colo. App. 1993). Also, a contract will not fail for indefiniteness if missing terms can be

supplied by law, presumption, or custom. Winston Fin. Group, Inc. v. Fults Mgmt. Inc., 872

P.2d 1356 (Colo. App. 1994). And, a contract is not fatally vague or indefinite simply because

the parties disagree as to its meaning. Hauser v. Rose Health Care Sys., 857 P.2d 524 (Colo.

App. 1993); see In re May, 756 P.2d 362, 369 (Colo. 1988) (“The fact that the parties have

different opinions about the interpretation of the contract does not of itself create an

ambiguity.”). However, where a mistake is made by one party on the basic nature of a material

contract provision, a resulting unconscionable contract may be avoided. Sumerel v. Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Co., 232 P.3d 128 (Colo. App. 2009) (where one party knew arithmetical

calculation of damages was erroneous, risk of mistake did not rest with other party, and the

agreement made based on that calculation was unconscionable, agreement was unenforceable

(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153-54 (1981)).

3. Generally, there can be no binding contract if further negotiations are required to come

to an agreement as to important and essential terms of the contract. Sumerel, 232 P.3d at 136-37

(discussion to resolve dispute did not include offer sufficiently definite to be capable of

acceptance); DiFrancesco v. Particle Interconnect Corp., 39 P.3d 1243, 1248 (Colo. App.

2001) (“Agreements to agree in the future are generally unenforceable because the court cannot

force parties to come to an agreement.”).

4. Where extrinsic evidence shows that parties did not intend the contract to be a binding

agreement, and where they have previously agreed that their written promises would not bind

them, such contract is a mere sham and lacks any legal effect. Landmark Towers Ass’n, Inc. v.

UMB Bank, N.A, 2016 COA 61, ¶ 63 (organizers options to purchase property to make them

eligible voters were void and unenforceable sham agreements).

30:2 CONTRACT FORMATION ― NEED NOT BE IN WRITING

A contract does not have to be in writing. If written, it does not have to be signed by

either party or dated. A contract may be partly oral and partly in writing.

Notes on Use

1. This instruction may be used where the agreement does not fall within special rules

requiring a written contract, including the statute of frauds.

2. If the contract requires signatures or dating, this Instruction should not be given or

should be appropriately modified.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by E-21 Engineering v. Steve Stock & Associates, Inc.,

252 P.3d 36 (Colo. App. 2010) (contracts may be formed without signatures of the parties bound

by them). See also Lee v. Great Empire Broad., Inc., 794 P.2d 1032 (Colo. App. 1989)

(employment agreement); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) (“A promise may

be stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct.”).

30:3 CONTRACT FORMATION ― OFFER

An offer is a proposal to enter into a contract on the terms stated in the offer.

Notes on Use

1. When given, this instruction must be given in conjunction with Instruction 30:6

(acceptance).

2. For possible modifications required in cases involving the sale of goods, see sections

4-2-204 to 2-206, C.R.S. See, e.g., Scoular Co. v. Denney, 151 P.3d 615 (Colo. App. 2006)

(interpreting section 4-2-205, C.R.S.).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Nash v. School Board No. 3, 49 Colo. 555, 113 P.

1003 (1911) (by implication); and Robert E. Lee Silver Mining Co. v. Omaha & Grant

Smelting & Refining Co., 16 Colo. 118, 26 P. 326 (1891) (same). See also Industrial Prods.

Int’l, Inc. v. Emo Trans, Inc., 962 P.2d 983 (Colo. App. 1997) (offer is manifestation by one

party of willingness to enter into bargain).

2. In the absence of an express or implied limitation, an offer must be accepted within a

reasonable time, and a reasonable time “is that which is reasonable to the offeror rather than to

the offeree.” Central Inv. Corp. v. Container Advert. Co., 28 Colo. App. 184, 187, 471 P.2d

647, 648 (1970).

3. To be effective an offer must be communicated. Kuta v. Joint Dist. No. 50(J), 799

P.2d 379 (Colo. 1990).

4. Generally, the delivery of an insurance application by an insurer to a prospective

customer does not constitute an offer of insurance; instead it is an invitation for an offer of

insurance. Griffin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 104 P.3d 283 (Colo. App. 2004).

5. There is no offer capable of acceptance where the circumstances show the parties

intended to negotiate further on some provisions. Sumerel v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

232 P.3d 128 (Colo. App. 2009).

30:4 CONTRACT FORMATION ― REVOCATION OF OFFER

(Plaintiff) (Defendant) claims the offer was revoked before it was accepted.

To revoke an offer is to withdraw it. Unless otherwise specified by the terms of the

offer, an offer may be revoked before it is accepted. To be effective, a revocation must be

communicated before the offer is accepted.

Notes on Use

None.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Stortroen v. Beneficial Finance Co., 736 P.2d 391

(Colo. 1987); Carlsen v. Hay, 69 Colo. 485, 195 P. 103 (1921); East-Larimer County Water

District v. Centric Corp., 693 P.2d 1019 (Colo. App. 1984); Sigrist v. Century 21 Corp., 519

P.2d 362 (Colo. App. 1973) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)); Smith v. Russell, 20 Colo.

App. 554, 80 P. 474 (1905); and 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 5:9 (4th ed.

1999).

2. Unless otherwise specified by its terms, an offer may be accepted within a reasonable

time unless the offer has been revoked by the offeror or rejected by the offeree. Minneapolis &

St. Louis Ry. v. Columbus Rolling-Mill Co., 119 U.S. 149 (1886); see also Townsend v.

Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 196 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Once the offer

was rejected, it must be renewed again in its entirety before it can be accepted.”); Scoular Co. v.

Denney, 151 P.3d 615 (Colo. App. 2006); Sigrist, 519 P.2d at 363 (“Offers to enter into either

bilateral or unilateral contracts may not be revoked after acceptance.”); Central Inv. Corp. v.

Container Adver. Co., 28 Colo. App. 184, 187, 471 P.2d 647, 648 (1970) (“The test for an

offer’s duration in the absence of an express or implied limitation is a ‘reasonable time.’”).

30:5 CONTRACT FORMATION ― COUNTEROFFER

If the person to whom an offer is made changes the offer in any way, that is a

counteroffer. Unless that counteroffer is accepted, no contract is made.

Notes on Use

1. Changes or additions to an offer may be a counteroffer that may be accepted to form a

contract. This instruction may be appropriately modified for cases involving issues of acceptance

of counteroffers.

2. Cases involving offers and counteroffers in real estate transactions and with real estate

agents may require more detailed factual findings and this instruction may need to be

appropriately modified. See Stortroen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 736 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1987).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Baldwin v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, 141 Colo.

529, 349 P.2d 146 (1960); Van Hall v. Gehrke, 117 Colo. 223, 185 P.2d 1016 (1947); and

Yorty v. Mortgage Finance, Inc., 29 Colo. App. 398, 485 P.2d 915 (1971).

2. Contract principles of offer, acceptance, and counteroffer do not control offers of

settlement and counteroffers under section 13-17-202, C.R.S. Centric-Jones Co. v. Hufnagel,

848 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1993).

30:6 CONTRACT FORMATION ― ACCEPTANCE

A contract is formed when the offer is accepted without (changes) (additions). An

acceptance is an expression, by words or conduct, by the person to whom the offer was

made, of agreement to the same terms stated in the offer.

Notes on Use

1. Omit any parenthesized clause that is not applicable to the evidence in the case.

2. When Instruction 30:3 (offer) is given, this instruction must also be given.

3. For modifications required in cases involving the sale of goods, see sections 4-2-206

and 4-2-207, C.R.S. See, e.g., Scoular Co. v. Denney, 151 P.3d 615 (Colo. App. 2006)

(interpreting statute).

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Nucla Sanitation District v. Rippy, 140 Colo. 444, 449,

344 P.2d 976, 979 (1959) (“the acceptance must be in the identical terms of the offer, without

any modification whatever”). See also Baldwin v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, 141 Colo.

529, 349 P.2d 146 (1960); Superior Distrib. Corp. v. Points, 141 Colo. 113, 347 P.2d 140

(1959); Van Hall v. Gehrke, 117 Colo. 223, 185 P.2d 1016 (1947); Salomon v. Webster, 4

Colo. 353 (1878); Yorty v. Mortgage Fin., Inc., 29 Colo. App. 398, 485 P.2d 915 (1971).

30:7 CONTRACT FORMATION ― CONSIDERATION

“Consideration” is a benefit received or something given up as agreed upon between

the parties. (If you find [insert the claimed consideration], then you must find that there was

consideration.)

Notes on Use

This instruction should be used when Instruction 30:1 (in dispute) is given.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Troutman v. Webster, 82 Colo. 93, 96, 257 P. 262,

263-64 (1927) (“[I]t is a consideration if the promisee, in return for a promise, does anything

legal which he is not bound to do, or refrains from doing anything which he has a right to do,

even though there is no actual loss or detriment to him or actual benefit to the promisor.”). The

court also quoted 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 102a (1924), to the effect that “[d]etriment . . .

means legal detriment as distinguished from detriment in fact.” Troutman, 82 Colo. at 96, 257

P. at 264; see also Ireland v. Jacobs, 114 Colo. 168, 163 P.2d 203 (1945) (An agreement not

supported by consideration is invalid and void.); Cooper v. Cooper, 112 Colo. 140, 146 P.2d

986 (1944) (recognizing the legal detriment rule).

2. This instruction was cited with approval in Compass Bank v. Kone, 134 P.3d 500

(Colo. App. 2006).

3. While the Colorado courts’ definition of consideration has varied somewhat, in the

majority of cases the “benefit-detriment” test has been used to determine if consideration existed.

See, e.g., Gertner v. Limon Nat’l Bank, 82 Colo. 13, 257 P. 247 (1927); Luby v. Jefferson

County Bank, 28 Colo. App. 441, 476 P.2d 292 (1970); Fearnley v. De Mainville, 5 Colo.

App. 441, 39 P. 73 (1895).

4. Another general definition of consideration appears in Grimes v. Barndollar, 58 Colo.

421, 148 P. 256 (1914), in which the court stated that any damage, suspension of a right, or

possibility of loss to the one to whom the promise is made is a sufficient consideration to support

the promise.

5. Generally, a court will not look at the adequacy of the consideration, Meyer v. Nelson,

69 Colo. 56, 168 P. 1175 (1917), and, as a general rule, a statement of consideration is

conclusive proof of that fact unless evidence to the contrary is introduced. Burch v. Burch, 145

Colo. 125, 358 P.2d 1011 (1960).

6. In several cases, courts have identified specific facts that may constitute sufficient

consideration. For example, a seal in itself no longer imparts a valuable consideration. Winter v.

Goebner, 2 Colo. App. 259, 30 P. 51 (1892), aff’d, 21 Colo. 279, 40 P. 570 (1895). Surrender of

payment of a doubtful or a disputed claim is good consideration. Harvey v. Denver & Rio

Grande R.R., 44 Colo. 258, 99 P. 31 (1908); Russell v. Daniels, 5 Colo. App. 224, 37 P. 726

(1894). A promise for a promise is valid consideration, Denver Indus. Corp. v. Kesselring, 90

Colo. 295, 8 P.2d 767 (1932), as is the forbearance of a right, Leonard v. Hallett, 57 Colo. 274,

141 P. 481 (1914). A preexisting liability is good consideration for a new promise, as is a benefit

to a third party. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Dickneite, 99 Colo. 276, 61 P.2d 1028 (1936). Where an

employment contract is terminable at the will of the employee, the employer’s promise to pay

additional compensation is supported by consideration. Olsen v. Bondurant & Co., 759 P.2d

861 (Colo. App. 1988) (promise to another promisee, supported by consideration, to pay

employees additional compensation as third-party beneficiaries, also provides consideration for

that promise). Continued employment, without more, is not consideration for a later noncompete

agreement. The continuation of an at-will employment arrangement by the employer is sufficient

consideration for a noncompetition agreement presented to the employee after his or her initial

hire. Lucht’s Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, 255 P.3d 1058 (Colo. 2011). And

consideration is not insufficient merely because it comes from a third party. Int’l Paper Co. v.

Cohen, 126 P.3d 222 (Colo. App. 2005).

7. At least one case has held that natural affection being the reason to agree to pay a

loved one is sufficient consideration. Dawley v. Dawley’s Estate, 60 Colo. 73, 152 P. 1171

(1915). But see Rasmussen v. State Nat’l Bank, 11 Colo. 301, 18 P. 28 (1888) (moral

obligation alone is not sufficient consideration).

8. In general, past consideration is not always sufficient. Compare Plains Iron Works

Co. v. Haggott, 68 Colo. 121, 188 P. 735 (1920) (agreement was nudum pactum because the

consideration was past), with Sargent v. Crandall, 143 Colo. 199, 352 P.2d 676 (1960) (past

consideration may be sufficient consideration if the prior conduct that constitutes the past

consideration was rendered at the promisor’s request).

9. If one party to an executory contract has no legally enforceable obligations or an

unlimited right to determine the nature and extent of those obligations, the contract lacks

mutuality of consideration and may, therefore, be unenforceable. See Hauser v. Rose Health

Care Sys., 857 P.2d 524 (Colo. App. 1993) (recognizing the rule, but concluding that where

contract had been performed by one party and the claim was for compensation due for

performance, lack of mutuality was immaterial). However, every contractual obligation need not

be mutual as long as each party to the contract has provided consideration. Rains v. Found.

Health Sys. Life & Health, 23 P.3d 1249 (Colo. App. 2001) (arbitration provision not

unenforceable simply because it did not require both parties to contract to arbitrate).

10. For certain offers, involving the sale of goods, that may be irrevocable though not

supported by consideration, see section 4-2-205, C.R.S.

11. When the basis for claiming the enforceability of a promise is the doctrine of

promissory estoppel, see Cherokee Metropolitan District v. Simpson, 148 P.3d 142 (Colo.

2006); Nelson v. Elway, 908 P.2d 102 (Colo. 1995); Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764 (Colo.

1983) (enforceability under the doctrine of a promise not made in compliance with the statute of

frauds); Vigoda v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 646 P.2d 900 (Colo. 1982); G & A

Land, LLC v. City of Brighton, 233 P.3d 701 (Colo. App. 2010) (city’s actions related to

possible future condemnation of landowner’s property did not constitute a promise for purposes

of promissory estoppel); Marquardt v. Perry, 200 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2008) (defense

verdict on contract claim does not preclude judgment for liability on related promissory estoppel

claim); Lutfi v. Brighton Community Hospital Ass’n, 40 P.3d 51 (Colo. App. 2001); Floyd v.

Coors Brewing Co., 952 P.2d 797 (Colo. App. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 978 P.2d 663

(Colo. 1999); Zick v. Krob, 872 P.2d 1290 (Colo. App. 1993); Chidester v. Eastern Gas &

Fuel Associates, 859 P.2d 222 (Colo. App. 1992), ; Mead Associates, Inc. v. Scottsbluff Sash

& Door Co., 856 P.2d 40 (Colo. App. 1993); L & M Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Golden, 852

P.2d 1337 (Colo. App. 1993); Frontier Exploration, Inc. v. American National Fire

Insurance Co., 849 P.2d 887 (Colo. App. 1992), Nicol v. Nelson, 776 P.2d 1144 (Colo. App.

1989) (claim based on promissory estoppel need only be proved by a preponderance of the

evidence, in accord with section 13-25-127(1), C.R.S., not by clear and convincing evidence);

and State Department of Highways v. Woolley, 696 P.2d 828 (Colo. App. 1984) (applying the

doctrine to estop landowner from revoking a right of entry). See also Univex Int’l, Inc. v. Orix

Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1996) (section 38-10-124(3), C.R.S., precludes assertion

of promissory estoppel claim to enforce unsigned credit agreement); Vu, Inc. v. Pacific Ocean

Marketplace, Inc., 36 P.3d 165 (Colo. App. 2001) (promissory estoppel claim failed where

contract was clear, unambiguous and enforceable as written); Pickell v. Arizona Components

Co., 902 P.2d 392 (Colo. App. 1994) (promissory estoppel is not available if there is an

enforceable contract between the parties), rev’d on other grounds, 931 P.2d 1184 (Colo. 1997);

Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1988); Galie v. RAM

Assocs. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 757 P.2d 176 (Colo. App. 1988); Mead Assocs., Inc. v. Antonsen,

677 P.2d 434 (Colo. App. 1984); Haselden-Langley Constructors, Inc. v. D.E. Farr &

Assocs., Inc., 676 P.2d 709 (Colo. App. 1983).

12. Promissory estoppel may be asserted against a public entity. Dep’t of Transp. v.

First Place, LLC, 148 P.3d 261 (Colo. App. 2006). A claim based on promissory estoppel lies in

contract rather than tort and, therefore, is not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. Bd. of

Cty. Comm’rs v. DeLozier, 917 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1996). However, the doctrine of estoppel is not

applied as freely against a municipal corporation as it is against an individual. Cherry Creek

Aviation, Inc. v. City of Steamboat Springs, 958 P.2d 515 (Colo. App. 1998).

30:8 CONTRACT FORMATION ― MODIFICATION

After parties enter into a contract, they may agree (orally) (or) (in writing) to

change it. There must be an offer to change the contract, acceptance of that offer, and

consideration for the change.

Notes on Use

1. Use whichever parenthesized words are appropriate to the evidence in the case.

2. Other instructions closely related to the subject matter of this instruction that may also

be applicable or be more appropriate in certain cases are Instructions 30:25 (waiver), 30:27

(rescission or cancellation by agreement), and 30:28 (accord and satisfaction).

3. This instruction should be modified when appropriate to the evidence in the case to

instruct that a written contract may be modified by later oral agreement even if the contract

expressly provides that all modifications must be in writing.

4. For cases involving the sale of goods, see section 4-2-209, C.R.S.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Dawe v. Hoskins, 77 Colo. 501, 238 P. 50 (1925)

(necessity of all parties to assent); and Arkansas Valley Bank v. Esser, 75 Colo. 110, 224 P.

227 (1924) (parties to a written contract may orally alter it at will). See also H. & W. Paving

Co. v. Asphalt Paving Co., 147 Colo. 506, 364 P.2d 185 (1961) (amendment must be supported

by mutual consideration); W. Air Lines v. Hollenbeck, 124 Colo. 130, 235 P.2d 792 (1951)

(mutual assent required for an effective amendment or abrogation of an existing contract); 2

JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 7.14 (rev. ed. 1995).

2. “Despite a provision requiring that all modifications of a written contract . . . be in

writing, [a] contract may be modified by oral agreement between the parties.” Colorado Inv.

Servs., Inc. v. Hager, 685 P.2d 1371, 1376-77 (Colo. App. 1984); see Agritrack, Inc. v.

DeJohn Housemoving, Inc., 25 P.3d 1187 (Colo. 2001) (written contract may be modified by

later oral agreement even if contract specifically provides that all modifications of contract must

be in writing); James H. Moore & Assocs. Realty, Inc. v. Arrowhead at Vail, 892 P.2d 367

(Colo. App. 1994) (same). Further, a written contract may be modified by a later oral agreement

even if the contract is subject to the statute of frauds, as long as the oral modification does not

relate to a material condition of the contract. Burnford v. Blanning, 189 Colo. 292, 540 P.2d

337 (1975); James H. Moore, 892 P.2d at 372.

30:9 CONTRACT FORMATION ― THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY

(Plaintiff) (Defendant) may enforce a contract if (he) (she) (it) is a beneficiary of the

contract between (name) and (name), even if (plaintiff) (defendant) was not named in the

contract. (Plaintiff) (Defendant) is a beneficiary of the contract when the parties to the

contract intend that the (plaintiff) (defendant) directly benefit from the contract.

Notes on Use

None.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Jefferson County School Dist. No. R-1 v. Shorey,

826 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1992); Chandler-McPhail v. Duffey, 194 P.3d 434 (Colo. App. 2008);

Everett v. Dickinson & Co., 929 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1996).

2. A person not a party to an express contract may bring an action on the contract if the

parties to the agreement intended to benefit the nonparty, provided that the benefit claimed is a

direct and not merely an incidental benefit of the contract. While the intent to benefit the

nonparty need not be expressly recited in the contract, the intent must be apparent from the terms

of the agreement, the surrounding circumstances, or both. Parrish Chiropractic Ctrs., P.C. v.

Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1994) (holding that clinic was incidental, not

third party, beneficiary of the contract). It is not necessary that the third party be specifically

referred to in the agreement. It is sufficient if the claimant is a member of the limited class that

was intended to benefit from the contract. Smith v. TCI Commc’ns, Inc., 981 P.2d 690 (Colo.

App. 1999).

3. The party who actually performed the subcontract was a third-party beneficiary of the

contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor and was entitled to bring an action

for damages for lost profits sustained as a result of contractor’s breach of such contract. E.B.

Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete Contractors, Inc., 704 P.2d 859 (Colo. 1985).

4. As to when a third-party beneficiary may be entitled to recover for breach of contract,

see Cody Park Property Owners’ Ass’n v. Harder, 251 P.3d 1 (Colo. App. 2009) (subdivision

homeowners association was not third-party beneficiary of agreement for easement); Chandler-

McPhail v. Duffey, 194 P.3d 434 (Colo. App. 2008) (defendant doctor was a third-party

beneficiary of contracts between health care plan insurer, patient’s employer, and physician

group, and was bound by contract provision barring recovery of costs in litigation); East

Meadows Co. v. Greeley Irrigation Co., 66 P.3d 214 (Colo. App. 2003); Harwig v. Downey,

56 P.3d 1220 (Colo. App. 2002) (tenants not third-party beneficiaries of contract for sale of real

property); Smith, 981 P.2d at 693-94 (provider of cable television channel was not third-party

beneficiary of franchise agreement between city and cable television operator); Frisone v.

Deane Automotive Center., Inc., 942 P.2d 1215 (Colo. App. 1996) (buyer of used car was not

third-party beneficiary of repair contract between previous owner of car and automotive service

center); Everett, 929 P.2d at 12 (introducing broker was not third-party beneficiary of clearing

broker agreements); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nikitow, 924 P.2d 1084 (Colo. App.

1995); Bain v. Pioneer Plaza Shopping Center. Ltd. Liability Co., 894 P.2d 47 (Colo. App.

1995); Villa Sierra Condominium Ass’n v. Field Corp., 878 P.2d 161 (Colo. App. 1994); and

Quigley v. Jobe, 851 P.2d 236 (Colo. App. 1992) (plaintiff only an incidental beneficiary). If a

contract is annulled, rescinded, or canceled by the parties to the contract before it is accepted by

a third-party beneficiary, the contract may not be enforced by the third-party beneficiary. Jardel

Enters., Inc. v. Triconsultants, Inc., 770 P.2d 1301 (Colo. App. 1988); Galie v. RAM Assocs.

Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 757 P.2d 176 (Colo. App. 1988) (third-party beneficiary need not be in

privity).

B. CONTRACT PERFORMANCE

30:10 CONTRACT PERFORMANCE — BREACH OF CONTRACT — ELEMENTS OF

LIABILITY

For the plaintiff, (name), to recover from the defendant, (name), on (his) (her) (its)

claim of breach of contract, you must find (all) (both) of the following have been proved by

a preponderance of the evidence:

1. The defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff to (insert the alleged

promise on which plaintiff is suing); and

2. The defendant failed to (insert the alleged promise on which the plaintiff is suing;

(and)

(3. The plaintiff [“substantially performed”] [“substantially complied with”] [his]

[her] [its] part of the contract) (or) (Plaintiff is excused from performance. Plaintiff is

excused from performance of [his] [her] [its] part of the contract if you find that [insert

facts that, if proven, would as a matter of law justify nonperformance]).

If you find that (either) (any one or more) of these (number) statements has not been

proved, then your verdict must be for the defendant.

On the other hand, if you find that all of these (number) statements have been

proved, (then your verdict must be for the plaintiff) (then you must consider the

defendant’s affirmative defense(s) of [insert any affirmative defense that would be a complete

defense to plaintiff’s claim]).

If you find that (this affirmative defense has) (any one or more of these affirmative

defenses have) been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be

for the defendant.

However, if you find that (this affirmative defense has not) (none of these

affirmative defenses have) been proved, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff.

Notes on Use

1. When the existence of the contract is in issue, Instruction 30:1 and contract formation

Instructions 30:2–30:9 should be considered. If the existence of the contract is not disputed, the

jury may be advised that the parties do not dispute that a contract was formed, but dispute that

there was a breach or the amount of damages caused by any breach, or both. See Chapter 2

(statement of the case to be determined).

2. This instruction should be modified as appropriate to reflect the positions of plaintiff,

counter-plaintiff, defendant and counter-defendant in the case.

3. Paragraph 3 of this instruction should be used only if the plaintiff’s performance or

substantial performance of the contract is a condition precedent to plaintiff’s right to recover

under the contract.

4. This instruction may be appropriately modified in cases involving particular kinds of

contracts, e.g., a suit on a promissory note, to set forth in terms more relevant to the case the

facts that are in dispute and that the plaintiff must prove in order to recover. For cases involving

performance of construction contracts, see Instruction 30:49 and the Notes on Use and Source

and Authority to that Instruction. See Part F of this chapter for other contracts. For instructions

dealing with breach of employment contract claims, see Chapter 31.

5. Depending on the facts in dispute, e.g., third party beneficiary, other paragraphs should

be included which will properly present the factual issues in dispute to the jury.

6. If the defendant has put no affirmative defense in issue or there is insufficient evidence

to support a defense, the last two paragraphs should be omitted.

7. Although mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense (see Instruction 5:2), only

rarely, if ever, will it be a complete defense. For this reason, mitigation should not be identified

as an affirmative defense in the concluding paragraphs of this instruction. Instead, if supported

by sufficient evidence, Instruction 5:2 should be given along with the damages instruction

appropriate to the claim and the evidence in the case.

8. For other affirmative defenses, see Instructions in Part C of this chapter.

9. In cases involving issues of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every

contract, see Instruction 30:16 (non-insurance contract) and Chapter 25, Bad Faith Breach of

Insurance Contract.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Hunt v. Cates, 61 Colo. 365, 157 P. 1162 (1916);

McDonald v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, N.A., 2015 COA 29, ¶ 48, 348 P.3d 957; and Long v.

Cordain, 2014 COA 177, ¶ 19, 343 P.3d 1061 (stating elements needed to prove a contract

claim). See also Coors v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 91 P.3d 393 (Colo. App. 2003) (to

prevail on claim for breach of contract, party must show existence of contract and failure to

perform some term of contract by other party), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 112

P.3d 59 (Colo. 2005); cf. Smith v. Mills, 123 Colo. 11, 225 P.2d 483 (1950) (a complaint is

sufficient if it alleges the existence of a contract and the nonperformance of the promise made).

2. Principles of conditions precedent are set forth in 8 CATHERINE A. MCCAULIFF,

CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 30.7 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1999), considering the occurrence

or nonoccurrence of any condition precedent (under certain circumstances). Conditions

precedent must be specifically pleaded. C.R.C.P. 9(c). For authority considering conditions

precedent, see Western Distributing Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1992) (defendant

had received substantially all the benefit expected from the contract and therefore plaintiffs had

substantially performed their obligations and could assert breach of contract claim against

defendant, even though not every obligation was performed); and D.R. Horton, Inc.-Denver v.

Bischof & Coffman Construction, LLC, 217 P.3d 1262 (Colo. App. 2009) (trial court erred in

instructing jury that general contractor could not recover damages for breach of contract from

subcontractors if they found subcontractors had substantially performed). See also Daybreak

Constr. Specialties, Inc. v. Saghatoleslami, 712 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Colo. App. 1985) (“When

the obligations of a contract for sale and purchase of land are mutual and concurrent [i.e., the

performance of each is a condition precedent to the obligation to perform the other], so long as

one party makes no tender of deed and the other no offer of payment, neither is in default.”).

Whether a breach of contract is material and therefore excuses the other party from performance

is generally a question of fact. Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301 (Colo. App. 2009)

(whether third-party plaintiff had materially breached or not substantially performed its contract

with third-party defendant a question for jury), aff’d on other grounds, 252 P.3d 1071 (2011);

Morris v. Belfor USA Group, Inc., 201 P.3d 1253 (Colo. App. 2008); Kaiser v. Market

Square Discount Liquors, Inc., 992 P.2d 636 (Colo. App. 1999) (material breach by a party

deprives that party of the right to demand performance by the other party).

3. “[W]hen the existence of a contract is in issue, and the evidence is conflicting or

admits of more than one inference, it is for the jury to decide whether a contract in fact exists.”

I.M.A., Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 713 P.2d 882, 887 (Colo. 1986); see also

Broomfield Senior Living Owner LLC v. R.G. Brinkman Co., 2017 COA 31, ¶ 35 (whether

builder was given reasonable opportunity to correct defects, and whether defects were patent or

latent were disputed issues of fact for the jury); Command Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fritz Cos., 36

P.3d 182 (Colo. App. 2001) (existence of contract a question of fact for jury to determine); Fair

v. Red Lion Inn, 920 P.2d 820 (Colo. App. 1995), aff’d on other grounds, 943 P.2d 431 (Colo.

1997); Tuttle v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 797 P.2d 825 (Colo. App. 1990); Stroh v. Am.

Recreation & Mobile Home Corp. of Colo., 35 Colo. App. 196, 201, 530 P.2d 989, 993 (1975)

(“the question of the existence of a warranty and whether that warranty was breached is

ordinarily one for the trier of fact”).

4. Because, in a contract action, the plaintiff is entitled to recover at least nominal

damages if the plaintiff proves the existence of a contract and its breach and there is no defense,

proof of general damages has not been included as one of the elements of the plaintiff’s proof of

liability. Interbank Invs., LLC v. Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist., 77 P.3d 814, 818

(Colo. App. 2003) (“Proof of actual damages is not an essential element of a breach of contract

claim.”); see Instruction 30:38 (General Damages – Measure). But see Diodosio, 841 P.2d at

1058; City of Westminster v. Centric-Jones Constructors, 100 P.3d 472 (Colo. App. 2003)

(damages is element of breach of contract claim); Montemayor v. Jacor Commc’ns, Inc., 64

P.3d 916 (Colo. App. 2002) (damages an element of plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract).

5. Claims for breach of contract may be made against state and municipal governmental

entities. The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) applies to tort action but does not

apply to contract actions. § 24-10-106(1), C.R.S. (“A public entity shall be immune from liability

in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the

type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant . . . .”); CAMAS Colorado, Inc. v.

Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 36 P.3d 135 (Colo. App. 2001) (public entities are not immune under

CGIA for damages arising in contract). The issue under the CGIA is not whether a contract claim

was properly pleaded but, instead, whether the claim could have been brought as a tort. Foster v.

Bd. of Governors, 2014 COA 18, ¶ 15, 342 P.3d 497 (it is only when a claim cannot lie in tort

that there is no immunity); Casey v. Colo. Higher Ed. Ins. Benefits All. Trust, 2012 COA 134,

¶ 30, 310 P.3d 196 (same).

30:11 CONTRACT PERFORMANCE — BREACH OF CONTRACT DEFINED

A breach of contract is the failure to perform a contractual promise when

performance is due.

(A material breach occurs when a party fails to (substantially perform) (or)

(substantially comply with) the essential terms of a contract.)

(A breach is not material if the other party received substantially what (he) (she) (it)

contracted for. In determining whether a breach is material, you may consider the nature

of the promised performance, the purpose of the contract, and whether any defects in

performance have defeated the purpose of the contract.)

(A material breach by one party excuses performance by the other party to the

contract.)

Notes on Use

1. This instruction, which defines the phrase “breach of contract,” should be given

whenever Instruction 30:10 is given. Use the parenthetical paragraphs when issues of material

breach are present in the case.

2. Other instructions may be needed to further refine the “breach of contract” term, and

should be given as needed according to the facts of the case, e.g., Instruction 30:12 (substantial

performance), Instruction 30:13 (anticipatory breach), Instruction 30:15 (conditions precedent).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Hunt v. Cates, 61 Colo. 365, 157 P. 1162 (1916); and

Western Distributing Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1992). Cf. Smith v. Mills, 123

Colo. 11, 225 P.2d 483 (1950) (a complaint is sufficient if it alleges the existence of a contract

and the nonperformance of the promise made).

2. For discussion of material breach, see Stan Clauson Associates Inc. v. Coleman

Brothers Construction, LLC, 2013 COA 7, ¶ 9, 297 P.3d 1042 (“A party has substantially

performed when the other party has substantially received the expected benefit from the

contract” and “[d]eviation from contract duties in trifling particulars . . . does not constitute a

material breach”); and Coors v. Security Life of Denver Ins. Co., 91 P.3d 393 (Colo. App.

2003) (to prevail on claim for breach of contract, party must show existence of contract and

failure to perform some term of contract by other party), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other

grounds, 112 P.3d 59 (Colo. 2005).

30:12 CONTRACT PERFORMANCE — SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE

A party (substantially performs) (or) (substantially complies with) the terms of a

contract when the party performs the essential obligations under the contract, and the

other party receives substantially what (he) (she) (it) contracted for.

To determine whether the party has (substantially performed) (or) (substantially

complied with) the essential obligations under the contract, you may consider the nature of

the promised performance, the purpose of the contract, and whether any defects in

performance have defeated the purpose of the contract.

Notes on Use

If the defendant, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 9(c), has pleaded the lack of complete performance

as the nonperformance of a condition precedent, then the plaintiff must prove either complete or

substantial performance. See Note 2 of the Notes on Use to Instruction 30:10. See also Note 2 of

the Notes on Use to Instruction 30:46 (substantial performance by builder).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Reynolds v. Armstead, 166 Colo. 372, 443 P.2d 990

(1968); and Newcomb v. Schaeffler, 131 Colo. 56, 279 P.2d 409 (1955). See also W. Distrib.

Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1992); Rohauer v. Little, 736 P.2d 403 (Colo. 1987);

I.M.A., Inc. v. Rocky Mtn. Airways, Inc., 713 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1986); McDonald v. Zions

First Nat’l Bank, N.A., 2015 COA 29, ¶ 50, 348 P.3d 957 (“A party has substantially performed

when the other party has substantially received the expected benefit of the contract.” (quoting

Stan Clauson Assocs. Inc. v. Coleman Bros. Constr., LLC, 2013 COA 7, ¶ 9, 297 P.3d

1042)); R.F. Carle Co. v. Biological Sciences Curriculum Study Co., 616 P.2d 989 (Colo.

App. 1980). Where there has been a “material” breach of contract, substantial performance has

not been rendered. Interbank Invs. LLC v. Vail Valley Consol. Water Dist., 12 P.3d 1224

(Colo. App. 2000) (breach that is material goes to essence of contract and renders substantial

performance of contract impossible). To determine whether a breach is material, “the trier of fact

should consider: (1) the extent to which an injured party, absent the breach, would obtain a

substantial benefit from the contract, and (2) the adequacy of compensation in damages.” Nat’l

Propane Corp. v. Miller, 18 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000); accord Coors v. Sec. Life of Denver

Ins. Co., 91 P.3d 393 (Colo. App. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 112 P.3d

59 (Colo. 2005).

2. Generally, performance or substantial performance by the plaintiff is a condition

precedent to the right to recover on the contract. See, e.g., Diodosio, 841 P.2d at 1058;

Newcomb, 131 Colo. at 62-63, 270 P.2d at 412 (builder’s failure to substantially perform

excused owners’ obligation to pay remaining balance on the contract); D.R. Horton, Inc.-

Denver v. Bischof & Coffman Constr., LLC, 217 P.3d 1262 (Colo. App. 2009) (substantial

performance was not a bar to recovery of contract damages); see also Blood v. Qwest Servs.

Corp., 224 P.3d 301 (Colo. App. 2009) (whether third-party plaintiff had materially breached or

not substantially performed its contract with third-party defendant a question for jury), aff’d on

other grounds, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011).

3. Whether a breach of contract is material and therefore excuses the other party from

performance is generally a question of fact. Morris v. Belfor USA Group, Inc., 201 P.3d 1253

(Colo. App. 2008); Kaiser v. Market Square Disc. Liquors, Inc., 992 P.2d 636 (Colo. App.

1999) (material breach by a party deprives that party of the right to demand performance by the

other party). On the other hand, the fact that one may have rendered substantial performance

does not mean that that party has not breached the contract and is not, therefore, liable for any

damages. See Zambakian v. Leson, 77 Colo. 183, 234 P. 1065 (1925); 8 CATHERINE A.

MCCAULIFF, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 36.3 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1999). Rather, it

means that the other party is not entitled to regard the breach as giving him or her a right to

repudiate the contract and refuse to perform his or her own return promise. See generally

Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1981); Little Thompson Water Ass’n v. Strawn, 171

Colo. 295, 466 P.2d 915 (1970); CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra, at §§ 36.1-36.11.

4. Even if a party has failed to render substantial performance and breached a contract,

the party may nonetheless be entitled to recover in quantum meruit for the value of the benefits

conferred to the extent those benefits exceed the loss caused by the party’s breach. Denver

Ventures, Inc. v. Arlington Lane Corp., 754 P.2d 785 (Colo. App. 1988).

5. The principle and rules set out in this instruction are not limited to construction

contracts. See R.F. Carle Co., 616 P.2d at 991-92.

30:13 CONTRACT PERFORMANCE — ANTICIPATORY BREACH

A party to a contract who shows a clear and definite intention not to perform the

contract before the time when (his) (her) (its) own performance (is due) (is to be completed)

commits a breach of contract. The intention not to perform may be shown by words or

conduct or both.

Notes on Use

1. Use whichever parenthesized words are most appropriate.

2. For possible modifications required in cases involving the sale of goods, see sections

4-2-610 and 4-2-611, C.R.S.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Lake Durango Water Co. v. Public Utilities

Commission, 67 P.3d 12 (Colo. 2003); Brown v. Jefferson County School District No. R-1,

2012 COA 98, ¶ 55, 297 P.3d 976; and Highlands Ranch University Park, LLC v. Uno of

Highlands Ranch, Inc., 129 P.3d 1020 (Colo. App. 2005). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

CONTRACTS § 250 (1981) (cited in Brown, ¶ 55, 297 P.3d at 987). Among the cases that have

recognized the doctrine of anticipatory breach, expressly or by implication, are Dreier v.

Sherwood, 77 Colo. 539, 238 P. 38 (1925) (unequivocal words of repudiation); Long v. Wright,

70 Colo. 173, 197 P. 1016 (1921) (doctrine expressly recognized); Mulford v. Torrey

Exploration Co., 45 Colo. 81, 100 P. 596 (1909) (doctrine recognized where defendant

voluntarily rendered himself incapable of performing prior to the time when his performance was

due); Saxonia Mining & Reduction Co. v. Cook, 7 Colo. 569, 4 P. 1111 (1884) (repudiation by

unequivocal words); Durango Transportation, Inc. v. City of Durango, 786 P.2d 428 (Colo.

App. 1989) (manifestation of intent not to perform must be definite and unequivocal), rev’d on

other grounds, 807 P.2d 1152 (Colo. 1991); and Johnson v. Benson, 725 P.2d 21 (Colo. App.

1986) (repudiation by unequivocal language).

2. The following do not alone constitute a repudiation: a negative attitude; doubtful or

indefinite statements that a party may or may not perform; statements that, under certain

circumstances that do not yet exist, the party will not perform; or statements showing a desire to

cancel or change the terms of a contract. 10 JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §

54.16 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2014).

3. Repudiation of a contract does not excuse the repudiating party from performing its

part of the contract, but does allow the nonrepudiating party to terminate the contract. Interbank

Invs. LLC v. Vail Valley Consol. Water Dist., 12 P.3d 1224 (Colo. App. 2000).

30:14 CONTRACT PERFORMANCE — TIME OF PERFORMANCE

If a contract does not state a specific time when the parties are to perform their

obligations under the contract, then the parties are to perform within a reasonable time. In

deciding whether a contractual obligation has been performed within a reasonable time,

you may consider all the circumstances, including the nature of the contract, the parties’

diligence, and any reason why the obligation was not performed at an earlier time.

Notes on Use

This instruction may be used whenever a written contract is silent about the date or time

of performance or where the evidence indicates that the parties to an oral contract did not have

specific intentions about a date for performance.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Boggs v. McMickle, 120 Colo. 53, 206 P.2d 824

(1949). See also Geiger v. Kiser, 47 Colo. 297, 107 P. 267 (1910); Ranta Const., Inc. v.

Anderson, 190 P.3d 835 (Colo. App. 2008).

2. If a contract does not contain an express term setting the time for performance, then the

time for performance is a reasonable time after entry into the contract. Twin Lakes Reservoir &

Canal Co. v. Bond, 156 Colo. 433, 399 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1965).

3. What is a reasonable time for performance of a contract depends upon the particular

facts and circumstances of each case and rests largely in the discretion of the finder of fact.

Larimer v. Salida Granite Corp., 112 Colo. 598, 153 P.2d 998 (1944).

30:15 CONTRACT PERFORMANCE — CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

A contract may include one or more conditions precedent. A condition precedent is

an event that must occur before performance under a contract becomes due.

Notes on Use

See the Notes on Use to Instructions 30:10 and 30:12.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by the Restatement: “A condition is an event, not certain

to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a

contract becomes due.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1981). See also

Daybreak Constr. Specialties, Inc. v. Saghatoleslami, 712 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Colo. App. 1985)

(“When the obligations of a contract for sale and purchase of land are mutual and concurrent

[i.e., the performance of each is a condition precedent to the obligation to perform the other], so

long as one party makes no tender of deed and the other no offer of payment, neither is in

default.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 (1981).

2. Principles of conditions precedent are set forth in 8 CATHERINE A. MCCAULIFF,

CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 30.7 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1999) (considering the occurrence

or nonoccurrence of any condition precedent under certain circumstances). Conditions precedent

must be specifically pleaded. C.R.C.P. 9(c). For authority considering conditions precedent, see

Western Distributing Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1992) (defendant had received

substantially all the benefit expected from the contract and therefore plaintiffs had substantially

performed their obligations and could assert breach of contract claim against defendant, even

though not every obligation was performed); and D.R. Horton, Inc.-Denver v. Bischof &

Coffman Construction, LLC, 217 P.3d 1262 (Colo. App. 2009) (trial court erred in instructing

jury that general contractor could not recover damages for breach of contract from

subcontractors if they found subcontractors had substantially performed). Whether a breach of

contract is material and therefore excuses the other party from performance is generally a

question of fact. Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301 (Colo. App. 2009), aff’d on other

grounds, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011) (whether third-party plaintiff had materially breached or

not substantially performed its contract with third-party defendant a question for jury); Morris v.

Belfor USA Group, Inc., 201 P.3d 1253 (Colo. App. 2008); Kaiser v. Market Square Disc.

Liquors, Inc., 992 P.2d 636 (Colo. App. 1999) (material breach by a party deprives that party of

the right to demand performance by the other party).

3. Generally, unless unequivocal language mandates otherwise, a contractual clause will

be interpreted as a promise rather than as a condition precedent. Main Elec., Ltd. v. Printz

Servs. Corp., 980 P.2d 522 (Colo. 1999).

30:16 CONTRACT PERFORMANCE — IMPLIED DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND

FAIR DEALING — NON-INSURANCE CONTRACT

Every contract requires the parties to act in good faith and to deal fairly with each

other in performing or enforcing the express terms of the contract.

A party performs a contract in good faith when (his) (her) (its) actions are consistent

with the agreed common purpose and with the reasonable expectations of the parties. The

duty of good faith and fair dealing is breached when a party acts contrary to that agreed

common purpose and the parties’ reasonable expectations.

Notes on Use

None.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1995).

2. Every contract in Colorado includes an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

McDonald v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, N.A., 2015 COA 29, ¶ 66, 348 P.3d 957; Platt v.

Aspenwood Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 214 P.3d 1060 (Colo. App. 2009). For a discussion as to the

existence and scope of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract, see

Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc. v. Uioli, Inc., 872 P.2d 1359 (Colo. App. 1994)

(when one party uses discretion conferred by contract to act dishonestly or to act outside of

accepted commercial practices to deprive the other party of the benefit of the contract, the

contract is breached). See also Sinclair Transp. Co. v. Sandberg, 2014 COA 76M, ¶ 52, 350

P.3d 924 (where a contract is silent, a court may imply a reasonable term to give effect to the

expectation of the parties when they entered the agreement); Newflower Mkt., Inc. v. Cook,

229 P.3d 1058 (Colo. App. 2010) (no breach of implied covenant of good faith for refusing to

negotiate or consent to deposit money into specific account when contract did not contemplate

either action); New Design Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hamon Contractors, Inc., 215 P.3d 1172

(Colo. App. 2008) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be relied upon where

one party has discretion with respect to performance of specific terms of the contract); accord

Lutfi v. Brighton Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n, 40 P.3d 51 (Colo. App. 2001); O’Reilly v. Physicians

Mut. Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 644 (Colo. App. 1999); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Haag Ltd. P’ship, 929

P.2d 42 (Colo. App. 1996).

3. The existence of a contract is a necessary predicate to a claim for breach of the implied

duty of good faith and fair dealing. Beal Corp. Liquidating Trust v. Valleylab, Inc., 927 F.

Supp. 1350 (D. Colo. 1996). A party, therefore, cannot rely on the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing as a basis for claiming that another party has wrongfully failed or refused to

enter into a contract.

4. The good faith performance doctrine serves to effectuate the intentions of the parties or

to honor their reasonable expectations. Bayou Land Co. v. Talley, 924 P.2d 136 (Colo. 1996);

Amoco Oil Co., 908 P.2d at 498; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nissen, 851 P.2d 165

(Colo. 1993); Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986); ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v.

Premier Home Prot., Inc., 181 P.3d 288 (Colo. App. 2007) (no breach of duty of good faith and

fair dealing where other party’s conduct was not contrary to claimant’s justified expectations).

5. The reasonable expectations doctrine applies to all contracts, including those free from

ambiguity, in order to effectuate the parties’ intentions. See Amoco Oil Co., 908 P.2d at 498;

Nissen, 851 P.2d 166-67; Simon v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 842 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1992); Davis,

712 P.2d at 988-90; cf. Dupre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 1024 (Colo. App. 2002); Spaur v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 942 P.2d 1261 (Colo. App. 1996); Shean v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 934 P.2d

835 (Colo. App. 1996) (doctrine of reasonable expectations applies only if the contract is

ambiguous).

6. Public policy considerations favor the honoring of the reasonable expectations of the

parties to a contract. Honoring those expectations is consistent with numerous other interpretive

rules pertaining to contracts, including: words are given effect according to their ordinary or

popular meaning; the scope of the agreement is not determined in a vacuum, but instead with

reference to extrinsic circumstances; the interpretation which makes a contract fair and

reasonable is selected over that which yields a harsh or unreasonable result; and contracts are to

be construed so as to effectuate the parties’ intentions. Davis, 712 P.2d 990-91.

7. Application of the reasonable expectation doctrine often fails to give effect to some

hornbook rules governing the construction of contracts, including the tenets that a party is

presumed to know the content of a contract signed by him, that contracts free from ambiguity are

to be enforced as written, and that specific clauses control the effect of general clauses. See

Amoco Oil Co., 908 P.2d at 498; Davis, 712 P.2d at 990; cf. Spaur, 942 P.2d 1265; Shelter

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Breit, 908 P.2d 1149 (Colo. App. 1995) (doctrine of reasonable expectations

supplements, but does not substitute for, the rule that insurance policies are to be construed

according to well-settled principles of contract construction).

8. The test of the meaning of a word or phrase under the reasonable expectations doctrine

is what an ordinary lay person would have understood it to mean. Breit, 908 P.2d at 1152.

9. The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not inject new substantive terms

or conditions into a contract. City of Boulder v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 996 P.2d 198 (Colo.

App. 1999); Soderlun v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 944 P.2d 616 (Colo. App. 1997); see also

Amoco Oil Co., 908 P.2d at 498 (“[The covenant] will not contradict terms or conditions for

which a party has bargained.”); Miller v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2016 COA 95, ¶ 46 (implied

duty of good faith and fair dealing could not be used to require bank to negotiate changes to loan

agreement.).

10. In contrast to a claim for bad faith breach of insurance contract addressed in Chapter

25, which gives rise to liability in tort and a broader range of damages, breach of the implied

duty of good faith and fair dealing in a non-insurance context is a contract claim subject to the

traditional limitations on contract remedies. These include the rule that punitive damages are not

recoverable for breach of an ordinary contract. Mortg. Fin., Inc. v. Podleski, 742 P.2d 900

(Colo. 1987). See, generally, the instructions on damages set forth in Part E of this chapter.

11. In deciding whether a party violated the obligation to act in good faith, the court must

determine whether the underlying contract provision allows for the exercise of discretion in its

performance. The concept of discretion in performance refers to one party’s power after contract

formation to set or control the terms of performance. Amoco Oil Co., 908 P.2d at 498;

Newflower Mkt., Inc., 229 P.3d at 1064 (refusing to consent to deposit money into specific

account or negotiate for same when contract did not contemplate either action not breach of good

faith duty); New Design Constr. Co., Inc., 215 P.3d at 1182 (contractor given discretion in

contract to schedule work of subcontractor). Discretion occurs when the parties, at formation,

defer a decision regarding performance terms of the contract. Amoco Oil Co., 908 P.2d at 499;

accord City of Golden v. Parker, 138 P.3d 285 (Colo. 2006); Lutfi, 40 P.3d at 59; O’Reilly,

992 P.2d at 646.

12. While the good faith performance doctrine may be used to protect a “weaker” party

from a “stronger” party, in this context weakness and strength do not refer to the relative

bargaining power of the parties. Rather, even in arms-length transactions between sophisticated

parties, there may be an agreement to confer control of performance of a contract term on one of

the parties. See, e.g., City of Golden, 138 P.3d 292-93; Mahan v. Capitol Hill Internal Med.,

P.C., 151 P.3d 685 (Colo. App. 2006). The dependent party must then rely on the party in

control to exercise good faith in the exercise of its discretion. Amoco Oil Co., 908 P.2d at 498-

99.

13. The duty of good faith and fair dealing may apply to the enforcement of a contract as

well as its performance. When applied in the enforcement context, it bars dishonest conduct such

as raising an imaginary dispute, asserting an interpretation contrary to one’s own understanding,

or falsification of facts. Bayou Land Co., 924 P.2d at 155 n.28 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. e (1981)); see also Ranta Constr., Inc. v. Anderson, 190 P.3d 835

(Colo. App. 2008) (in case decided under UCC’s good faith and fair dealing provision, buyer had

no claim for breach of warranty when seller of product has right to cure defects and buyer

interferes with that right by foreclosing it prematurely).

14. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be invoked to bar a party

from bringing a claim based on a disagreement regarding contract terms. Bayou Land Co., 924

P.2d at 154.

15. The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not apply to the termination of

an at-will employment contract. Soderlun, 944 P.2d at 623.

16. While an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in every contract, the

parties to a contract may also include an express covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a

contract term. Decker v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Colo., Inc., 931 P.2d 436 (Colo. 1997).

However, absent an agreement by the parties, no industry-specific standard will be implied into a

contract. BSLNI, Inc. v. Russ T. Diamonds, Inc., 2012 COA 214, ¶ 22, 293 P.3d 598.

30:17 CONTRACT PERFORMANCE — ASSIGNMENT

(Plaintiff) (Defendant), who was not a party to the original contract, may bring a

claim for breach of contract if rights under the contract were (intended to be) transferred

to (him) (her) (it) by (insert name of authorized assignor). This transfer is referred to as an

assignment.

(You may consider the entire transaction and the conduct of the parties to the

assignment in determining the intent to transfer contract rights.)

(A transfer of contract rights does not have to be written. A transfer of contract

rights may be oral or may be implied by the conduct of the parties to the assignment.)

Notes on Use

1. This instruction should be used only if the agreement does not specifically prohibit

assignment of rights.

2. The second and third sentences should be used only if the validity of the assignment is

contested.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Parrish Chiropractic Centers, P.C. v. Progressive

Casualty Insurance Co., 874 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Colo. 1994) (“Contract rights generally are

assignable, except where assignment is prohibited by contract or by operation of law or where

the contract involves a matter of personal trust or confidence.”); Matson v. White, 122 Colo. 79,

84, 220 P.2d 864, 867 (1950) (“consent of the other contracting party is not essential to the

validity of an assignment”); and Temple Hoyne Buell Foundation v. Holland & Hart, 851

P.2d 192, 197 (Colo. App. 1992) (a party may assign his obligations “only if such assignment

would not impair plaintiffs’ rights” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2)

(1981))).

2. An attempt to assign rights in a future contract, however, is not enforceable against the

obligor. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Med. Lien Mgmt., Inc., 2015 CO 32, ¶ 13, 348 P.3d 943 (“a

purported assignment of a right expected to arise under a contract not yet in existence operates

only as a promise to assign the right when it arises and as a power to enforce it . . . [and] does not

constitute an assignment of future or after-acquired rights so as to be effective against the

promisor’s obligor”).

3. “An assignment of a right is a manifestation of the assignor’s intention to transfer it by

virtue of which the assignor’s right to performance by the obligor is extinguished in whole or in

part and the assignee acquires a right to such performance.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

CONTRACTS § 317(1) (1981).

C. DEFENSES

Introductory Note

1. Mutual mistake may be grounds for rescission of a contract. Rescission is an equitable

claim that generally is not presented for a jury determination. See England v. Amerigas

Propane, 2017 CO 55, ¶¶ 19-22, 395 P.3d 766 (court concluded that parties were mutually

mistaken about existence of scapular fracture at the time they settled the case); Carpenter v.

Hill, 131 Colo. 553, 283 P.2d 963 (1955); Ramstetter v. Hostetler, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 46

(affirming trial court’s judgment rescinding contract where the parties mistakenly believed that

joint tenancy could be severed only by mutual agreement). The Committee therefore determined

an instruction on mutual mistake is not necessary. See generally Casey v. Colo. Higher Educ.

Ins. Benefits All. Trust, 2012 COA 134, ¶ 68, 310 P.3d 196; Snow Basin, Ltd. v. Boettcher &

Co., 805 P.2d 1151 (Colo. App. 1990).

2. A unilateral mistake of fact or law is generally not a defense to a breach of contract

claim. See Kuper v. Scroggins, 127 Colo. 416, 257 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1953). But see In re

Marriage of Manzo, 659 P.2d 669 (Colo. 1983) (in dicta, supreme court suggests a unilateral

mistake may justify rescission where one party knows of the mistake and takes advantage of it);

Sumerel v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 232 P.3d 128 (Colo. App. 2009) (where one party

knew arithmetical calculation of damages was erroneous, risk of mistake did not rest with other

party, and the agreement made based on that calculation was unconscionable, agreement was

unenforceable (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153-54 (1981)).

3. While equity recognizes an estoppel to claim damages, see Mabray v. Williams, 132

Colo. 523, 291 P.2d 677 (1955), the Committee determined that an instruction is not necessary.

See Sanger v. Larson Constr. Co., 126 Colo. 479, 251 P.2d 930 (1952) (plaintiff estopped to

claim trespass by defendant); Richmond v. Grabowski, 781 P.2d 192, 195 (Colo. App. 1989)

(“the party to be estopped [must know] the facts”); Barker v. Jeremiasen, 676 P.2d 1259 (Colo.

App. 1984) (citing elements of estoppel). If there is a dispute as to whether the plaintiff had

sufficient knowledge of the defendant’s breach, this instruction must be appropriately modified.

See Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Jim’s Hardwood Floor Co., 12 P.3d 824 (Colo. App. 2000) (party to

be estopped must know facts and party asserting estoppel must be ignorant of facts).

4. For a discussion of the elements necessary to establish the equitable defense of

estoppel by reason of delay or laches, see Manor Vail Condominium Ass’n v. Town of Vail,

199 Colo. 62, 604 P.2d 1168 (1980); Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n

v. Viewpoint Associates, 867 P.2d 70 (Colo. App. 1993); and Extreme Construction Co. v.

RCG Glenwood, LLC, 2012 COA 220, ¶ 29, 310 P.3d 246.

5. The defense of unconscionability is an equitable defense to be decided by the Court.

Therefore, the Committee determined that an instruction was not necessary. For a discussion as

to whether an agreement constitutes an adhesion contract, see Ad Two, Inc. v. City & County

of Denver, 983 P.2d 128 (Colo. App. 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 9 P.3d 373 (Colo. 2000).

6. Generally, contracts in contravention of public policy are void and unenforceable. See

Pierce v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J, 981 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1999); see also Bailey v.

Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 255 P.3d 1039 (Colo. 2011) (insurance provision of automobile rental

agreement excluding coverage for intentional criminal acts was not void as against public

policy); Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Auth. v. Cornerstone Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d

737 (Colo. 2007) (contract for renewal authority to acquire certain property by eminent domain

condemnation if necessary not void); Grippin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2016 COA

127, ¶ 26 (insurance provision limiting coverage to relatives who reside “primarily” with the

named insured was void as an improper limitation on statutorily mandated coverage); Rocky

Mountain Nat. Gas, LLC v. Colo. Mountain Junior Coll. Dist., 2014 COA 118, ¶ 20, 385

P.3d 848 (lease, which contained term that exceeded defendant’s statutory authority, was void);

Weize Co. v. Colo. Reg’l Constr., Inc., 251 P.3d 489 (Colo. App. 2010) (affirmative defense of

illegality of contract with unlicensed plumber); Amedeus Corp. v. McAllister, 232 P.3d 107

(Colo. App. 2009) (agreement to pay fees for real estate work to unlicensed party illegal and

unenforceable); Platt v. Aspenwood Condo. Ass’n, 214 P.3d 1060 (Colo. App. 2009) (where a

statute expressly forbids sale of unit without vote of other owners and imposes a penalty for

entering into a forbidden contract, the contract is void ab initio); Dinosaur Park Invs. L.L.C. v.

Tello, 192 P.3d 513 (Colo. App. 2008) (contract for installment sale was illegal for failure to

name public trustee, and issue properly raised as affirmative defense); Shotkoski v. Denver Inv.

Grp., Inc., 134 P.3d 513 (Colo. App. 2006) (agreement to compensate unlicensed real estate

broker is illegal and unenforceable); Harding v. Heritage Health Prods. Co., 98 P.3d 945

(Colo. App. 2004) (equitable doctrines may not be used to enforce illegal or void agreement);

Equitex, Inc. v. Ungar, 60 P.3d 746 (Colo. App. 2002) (neither party to a contract may waive

objections based on public policy or illegality and courts will not enforce contracts that violate

public policy even if failure to do so is unfair). However, a party to an illegal contract cannot rely

on the illegality of a contract to defeat a claim by a nonparty to the contract. Bebo Constr. Co. v.

Mattox & O’Brien, P.C., 998 P.2d 475 (Colo. App. 2000) (party who entered into illegal joint

venture agreement with law firm could not rely on illegality of joint venture to defeat claim by

third-party). Similarly, a nonparty to a contract cannot raise the defense of illegality when sued

by a party to an illegal contract. Oppenheimer Indus., Inc. v. Firestone, 39 Colo. App. 448,

569 P.2d 334 (1977) (suit for real estate commission).

7. Whether exculpatory clauses are sufficient and valid is a question of law for the court.

Four factors are considered by courts when evaluating the enforceability of exculpatory clauses:

(1) the existence of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service performed; (3) whether the

contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties was expressed in

clear and unambiguous language. McShane v. Stirling Ranch Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 2017

CO 38, ¶ 13, 393 P.3d 978; see also Stone v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 2016 COA 189M, ¶ 35

(release language in membership agreement was ambiguous and accordingly did not bar claim

for injury sustained while washing hands in restroom).

8. A contract may be unenforceable in some circumstances when it is so unfair as to be

unconscionable. Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986) (rental insurance agreement

excluding coverage when car used in the commission of a crime unconscionable, based on

parties’ expectations and overreaching by rental agency); Planned Pethood Plus, Inc. v.

KeyCorp, Inc., 228 P.3d 262 (Colo. App. 2010) (prepayment penalty clause in promissory note

not unconscionable where amount of penalty was modest and language in note was prominent);

cf. Bailey, 255 P.3d at 1057 (provision in widely used standard rental agreement avoiding

coverage when car used in commission of a crime not unconscionable and did not violate the

reasonable expectations of the insured).

9. A limitation of liability term in a contract is not enforceable where a party has

committed a willful and wanton breach of contract. Core-Mark Midcontinent, Inc. v. Sonitrol

Corp., 2012 COA 120, ¶ 16, 300 P.3d 963 (whether a breach is willful and wanton presents a

question of fact for the jury); Taylor Morrison of Colo. Inc., v. Terracon Consultants, Inc.,

2017 COA 64, ¶ 10 (jury concluded that defendant’s conduct was not “willful and wanton” and

court enforced clause limiting defendant’s liability for breach).

10. The defense of noncooperation in an insurance context must be pleaded as either an

affirmative defense or a failure of condition precedent. Soicher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 2015 COA 46, ¶ 2, 351 P.3d 559 (holding that failure to cooperate may not be raised for

first time in a proposed verdict form).

30:18 DEFENSE — FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT

The defendant, (name), is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, (name), on the

plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract if the affirmative defense of fraud is proved. This

defense is proved if you find all of the following:

1. The plaintiff (concealed a past or present fact) (failed to disclose a past or present

fact that the plaintiff had a duty to disclose) (made a false representation of a past or

present fact);

2. The fact was material;

3. The defendant entered into the (claimed) contract relying on the assumption that

the ([concealed] [undisclosed] fact did not exist or was different from what it actually was)

(falsely stated fact was true);

4. The defendant’s reliance was justified;

5. The defendant’s reliance caused (him) (her) (damages) (losses); and

6. The defendant has returned or offered to return to plaintiff (describe what, if

anything, the defendant would be legally obligated to return to the plaintiff in order to prevent

the defendant from being unjustly enriched).

Notes on Use

1. For cases involving contracts for the sale of goods, see section 4-2-721, C.R.S.

2. Use whichever parenthesized portions are appropriate in light of the evidence in the

case.

3. Omit any numbered paragraphs, the facts of which are not in dispute.

4. If the contract is wholly executory, paragraph 6 of this instruction should be omitted.

Also, in certain cases, the defendant may not be under a duty to return what he or she has

received from the plaintiff or its value. In those cases, paragraph 6 should be omitted or modified

appropriately, depending on the evidence in the case.

5. When this instruction is given, those instructions in Chapter 19 as would be

appropriate in the light of the evidence in the case should also be given, including Instruction

19:3 (defining false representation).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Trimble v. City & County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716

(Colo. 1985); Sears v. Hicklin, 13 Colo. 143, 21 P. 1022 (1889); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS §§ 159-173 (1981). See also Ice v. Benedict Nuclear Pharm., Inc., 797 P.2d

757 (Colo. App. 1990) (unless damages resulted from alleged misrepresentation, plaintiff’s fraud

is not a defense to a breach of contract claim).

2. For a discussion of rescission of insurance contract by reason of fraud in an insurance

application, see Silver v. Colorado Casualty Insurance Co., 219 P.3d 324 (Colo. App. 2009).

3. When one has been induced to enter into a contract because of a material

misrepresentation on the part of the other party, that person may have several courses of action

open to him or her, depending on the particular facts. See generally W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL.,

PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (5th ed. 1984). Among other courses of action

where both sides have fully performed the contract, the one defrauded may:

a. As a plaintiff, affirm the contract, and sue at law for damages in a tort action for deceit,

see, e.g., Club Matrix, LLC v. Nassi, 284 P.3d 93 (Colo. App. 2011), or

b. As a plaintiff, disaffirm the contract, tender back what the plaintiff has received, and

sue to recover what he or she gave as performance (rescission and restitution), or

c. As a defendant in a breach of contract action, he or she may take course a or b above as

a counterclaim. If the defendant chooses to rescind and seek restitution as a counterclaim,

the defendant may also use the fraud as a defense to the plaintiff’s claim for breach of

contract. If the defendant chooses to counterclaim for deceit, the fraud may not be used as

a defense to the damage claim (except as a counterclaim), since by suing for deceit the

defendant affirms the contract and is liable to render to the plaintiff what is due under the

contract.

4. Where the one defrauded has not fully performed, he or she may:

a. As a plaintiff, disaffirm any obligation to perform the contract further, but affirm the

contract to the extent he or she has performed it and sue for damages (if any) in a

common law action for deceit, see, e.g., Ackmann v. Merchants Mortg. & Trust

Corp., 659 P.2d 697 (Colo. App. 1982), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Kopeikin v.

Merchants Mortg. & Trust Corp., 679 P.2d 599 (Colo. 1984), or

b. As a plaintiff, disaffirm the contract, tender back what he or she has received, and sue

for rescission and restitution as above, or

c. As a defendant in a breach of contract action, counterclaim for a or b above, or, if the

contract is totally executory, simply use the fraud as a defense to any damages for breach.

5. Many cases have recognized the defrauded person’s basic alternative remedies of

rescission and restitution. See W. Cities Broad., Inc. v. Schueller, 849 P.2d 44 (Colo. 1993);

Martinez v. Affordable Housing Network, Inc., 109 P.3d 983 (Colo. App. 2004), rev’d on

other grounds, 123 P.3d 1201 (Colo. 2005); Sims v. Sperry, 835 P.2d 565 (Colo. App. 1992);

Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Chemco, Inc., 833 P.2d 786 (Colo. App. 1991), aff’d on other

grounds, 854 P.2d 1232 (Colo. 1993); see also Trimble, 697 P.2d at 723; Neiheisel v. Malone,

150 Colo. 586, 375 P.2d 197 (1962); Aaberg v. H.A. Harman Co., 144 Colo. 579, 358 P.2d 601

(1960). On many occasions, the courts have also stated the rule that the defrauded person, having

learned of the fraud, must, if that person elects to rescind, give notice promptly of his or her

intention to do so. See, e.g., Gerbaz v. Hulsey, 132 Colo. 359, 288 P.2d 357 (1955); Tisdel v.

Central Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 90 Colo. 114, 6 P.2d 912 (1931); Elk River Assocs. v.

Huskin, 691 P.2d 1148 (Colo. App. 1984).

6. While a party electing to rescind a contract is required to give prompt notice of his or

her election, a party who has been induced fraudulently to enter into two related contracts as part

of the same general transaction need not elect the same remedy for both contracts. That party

may elect to affirm one and sue for damages in deceit, and rescind the other and seek restitution

for any consideration paid or rendered. A party should not be required to elect the same remedy

for both contracts unless necessary to prevent double recovery or because the assertion of

different remedies would be so inconsistent that the assertion of one would necessarily be a

repudiation of the other. Stewart v. Blanning, 677 P.2d 1382 (Colo. App. 1984).

7. One who has been induced to enter into a contract with a third person because of the

fraud of another may affirm the contract and sue the other for damages in deceit and may also

sue the third person for damages for any breach of the contract by the third person. Because these

remedies are not inconsistent in that they would not necessarily result in double recovery, the

defrauded person need not make an election between the two. Trimble, 697 P.2d at 723-24.

8. Numbered paragraph 6 of this instruction states the rule of Gerbaz, 132 Colo. at 363,

288 P.2d at 359. When one uses fraud in the inducement as a defense to a breach of contract

action that person is in effect claiming a right to “rescind” the contract and consider himself or

herself discharged. The elements of proof of this defense are, therefore, the same as an action for

rescission and restitution. The only difference is that if the defendant has not in any way

rendered performance under the contract, he or she will not generally seek or be entitled to any

restitution. But see Murray v. Montgomery Ward Life Ins. Co., 196 Colo. 225, 584 P.2d 78

(1978) (applying these rules and the elements of this instruction to a life insurance contract, but

requiring that the misrepresentation or concealment be made “knowingly”).

9. Even though the defendant may have received some performance from the plaintiff,

the defendant is not always under a duty to return what, or the value of what, he or she received.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 384 (1981). While it “is the general rule that a

party seeking to rescind a contract must return the opposite party to the position in which he was

prior to entering into the contract . . . [that rule] is not a technical rule, but rather . . . is [an]

equitable [one], and requires practicality in readjusting the rights of the parties. . . . The standard

[to be] used is ‘substantial restoration of the status quo.’. . . How [that] is to be accomplished, or

indeed whether it can, is a matter . . . within the discretion of the trial court, under the facts as

[they may be] found to exist by the trier of [facts].” Smith v. Huber, 666 P.2d 1122, 1124-25

(Colo. App. 1983).

10. Comparing the tort remedy of deceit and the remedy of rescission, whether used as a

basis for a restitution action or a defense to a breach of contract action (this instruction), the basic

difference in terms of what must be proved appears to be that, in a deceit action, the plaintiff

must prove the defendant made the statement without an honest belief in the truth and with the

intent that the plaintiff rely on the statement, whereas, in a rescission action, an innocent

misrepresentation is sufficient. See Bassford v. Cook, 152 Colo. 136, 380 P.2d 907 (1963)

(dictum, following what now appears to be the majority rule). But see Murray, 196 Colo. at 227-

28, 584 P.2d at 80; Coon v. Dist. Court, 161 Colo. 211, 420 P.2d 827 (1966).

30:19 DEFENSE — UNDUE INFLUENCE

The defendant, (name), is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, (name), on the

plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract if the affirmative defense of undue influence is

proved. This defense is proved if you find both of the following:

1. At the time the defendant entered into the (claimed) contract, the defendant was

not acting of (his) (her) own free will; and

2. The plaintiff caused the defendant’s lack of free will by dominating the defendant

through the use of words, conduct, or both.

The mere use of persuasion or argument to cause another to enter into a contract is

not undue influence.

Notes on Use

1. This instruction should not be used in a case involving a confidential or fiduciary

relationship. See Instructions 26:2, 26:3, and 34:16.

2. Use whichever parenthesized words are appropriate to the evidence in the case.

3. This instruction must be appropriately modified if the claimed undue influence was

that of a third person. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(3) (1981).

4. The burdens of pleading and proving undue influence in an arm’s length transaction

are on the party asserting it. C.R.C.P. 8(c).

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Lighthall v. Moore, 2 Colo. App. 554, 31 P. 511 (1892);

and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(1) cmt. b (1981). See also cases cited in

Source and Authority to Instruction 34:14.

30:20 DEFENSE — DURESS

The defendant, (name), is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, (name), on the

plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract if the affirmative defense of duress is proved. This

defense is proved if you find both of the following:

1. At the time the defendant entered into the (claimed) contract, the defendant was

not acting of (his) (her) own free will; and

2. The plaintiff caused the defendant’s lack of free will by (insert the wrongful act or

threat that the court has determined to be legally sufficient to constitute duress).

Notes on Use

1. This instruction should not be used in a case involving a confidential or fiduciary

relationship. See Instructions 26:2, 26:3 and 34:16.

2. Appropriate instructions defining other terms used in this instruction must also be

given, e.g., an instruction or instructions relating to causation. See Instructions 9:18–9:20.

3. This instruction must be appropriately modified if the claimed duress was that of a

third person. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) (1981).

4. The burdens of pleading and proving duress in an arm’s length transaction are on the

party asserting it. C.R.C.P. 8(c). For this reason, the appropriate sections of Instruction 3:1

should be given reflecting the evidence in the case.

5. In cases involving the sale of goods, see section 4-2-302, C.R.S., which provides that

the determination of unconscionability at the time the contract was made is a matter of law for

the court. The parties may present evidence as to the commercial setting, purpose, and effect of

the contract to aid the court in making its determination.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Barrows v. McMurtry Manufacturing Co., 54 Colo.

432, 131 P. 430 (1913) (no evidence that threats did in fact overcome defendant’s free choice).

See also DeJean v. United Airlines, Inc., 839 P.2d 1153 (Colo. 1992) (if airline had legal right

to terminate employment of trainee pilots, threat to do so did not constitute duress); Heald v.

Crump, 73 Colo. 251, 215 P. 140 (1923) (a threat to do what one may lawfully do does not

constitute duress); Miller v. Davis’ Estate, 52 Colo. 485, 122 P. 793 (1912) (defense of duress is

lost if one accepts the benefits of the contract or remains silent for a considerable length of time

after that person has had an opportunity to avoid or rescind the contract); McClair v. Wilson, 18

Colo. 82, 31 P. 502 (1892); Adams v. Schiffer, 11 Colo. 15, 17 P. 21 (1888) (duress exists

where one person having control or possession of another’s property refuses to surrender it to the

owner except upon compliance with a demand that is unlawful); Pittman v. Larson Distrib.

Co., 724 P.2d 1379, 1384 (Colo. App. 1986) (“The threat of blacklisting an employee in an

industry is a form of coercion that constitutes duress as a matter of law[.]”); Wiesen v. Short, 43

Colo. App. 374, 604 P.2d 1191 (1979) (insufficient evidence that any force or threats had

actually subjugated the mind and will of the person against whom they were directed);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-76 (1981).

2. As to what constitutes an improper threat, see Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. v. District

Court, 954 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1998) (economic threats may give rise to duress so as to render

contract voidable). See also Premier Farm Credit, PCA v. W-Cattle, LLC, 155 P.3d 504

(Colo. App. 2006) (threat by lender to call loan due if not renewed by borrower not cognizable as

duress as a matter of law because lender had legal right to call loan due).

30:21 DEFENSE ― MINORITY

The defendant, (name), is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, (name), on the

plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract if the affirmative defense of minority is proved. This

defense is proved if you find both of the following:

1. The defendant was under the age of 18 at the time the (claimed) contract was

entered into; and

2. The defendant disaffirmed or rejected the [claimed] contract before becoming 18

or within a reasonable time after becoming 18.

Notes on Use

1. For “any legal contractual obligation,” the age of competence is 18. § 13-22-101(1)(a),

C.R.S.

2. The second numbered paragraph should be omitted if there is no dispute that the

defendant is not yet 18 or if the only dispute is whether the defendant was 18 at the time the

alleged contract was entered into.

3. If the contract is wholly executory, the second paragraph may not be applicable. See

Sipes v. Sipes, 87 Colo. 301, 287 P. 284 (1930).

4. This instruction should be modified in cases relating to insurance, see § 10-4-104,

C.R.S., or in cases involving contracts for the acquisition of necessities of life, see Perkins v.

Westcoat, 3 Colo. App. 338, 33 P. 139 (1893).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Keser v. Chagnon, 159 Colo. 209, 410 P.2d 637

(1966); and Doenges-Long Motors, Inc. v. Gillen, 138 Colo. 31, 328 P.2d 1077 (1958). See

also Fellows v. Cantrell, 143 Colo. 126, 352 P.2d 289 (1960) (where the plaintiff was seeking to

recover on a loan he had made to the defendant, the court held that the defendant’s attempted

disaffirmance at the age of 26 was not within a reasonable time after she reached majority).

2. Although the plaintiff may not be able to recover damages for breach of contract

because of the defense of minority, the plaintiff may nonetheless be able to recover some

damages on the theory of deceit, see Chapter 19, or on the theory of rescission and restitution.

Doenges-Long Motors, Inc., 138 Colo. at 38-39, 328 P.2d at 1081.

30:22 DEFENSE ― MENTAL INCAPACITY

The defendant, (name), is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, (name), on the

plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract if the affirmative defense of lack of mental capacity is

proved. This defense is proved if you find at the time the defendant entered into the

(claimed) contract, (he) (she) was suffering from an insane delusion that made (him) (her)

unable to understand the terms or effect of the contract or to act rationally in the

transaction.

Notes on Use

1. The appropriate sections of Instruction 3:1 should be given reflecting the evidence in

the case.

2. This instruction should be used in conjunction with Instruction 34:12, which defines

the term “insane delusion.”

3. This instruction may be given in conjunction with Instruction 3:5 regarding

presumptions. There is always, in civil as well as criminal actions, a presumption of sanity.

Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256 (1946).

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Hanks, 114 Colo. at 588-89, 168 P.2d at 261-62. Accord

Forman v. Brown, 944 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1997).

30:23 DEFENSE — IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE

The defendant, (name), is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, (name), on the

plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract if the affirmative defense of impossibility of

performance is proved. This defense is proved if you find all of the following:

1. An event, (insert an appropriate description of the event, i.e., the Act of God, change

of law, death of essential party, etc., on which the defendant relies), occurred that could not

reasonably be anticipated by the plaintiff and the defendant when they entered into the

contract; and

2. The defendant did not cause the event; and

3. The event (made the defendant’s performance of the contract physically

impossible) (or) (made the defendant’s performance impracticable because of [a change in

law] or an extreme and unreasonable [difficulty,] [expense,] [risk of personal injury,] [or]

[loss]).

Notes on Use

1. Omit any numbered paragraphs, the facts of which are not in dispute.

2. This instruction should not be given if the parties in their contract have impliedly or

expressly dealt with the contingency giving rise to the claim of impossibility and have allocated

the risk of the contingency taking place in a manner that would be inconsistent with paragraph 1

of this instruction. Neither should it be given unless the event that is claimed to have rendered

the defendant’s performance impossible would be sufficient for the defense as a matter of law.

3. An instruction or instructions related to causation may be used. See Instructions 9:18–

9:20.

4. The appropriate sections of Instruction 3:1 should be given reflecting the evidence in

the case.

5. For cases involving the sale of goods, see sections 4-2-613 to 4-2-616, C.R.S., which

deal, inter alia, with goods that suffer casualty without fault of either party before the risk of loss

passes to the buyer; with substitute performance; and with a delay in delivery or nondelivery if

performance as agreed upon has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency,

the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, or by

compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or

order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261-66

(1981); City of Littleton v. Employers Fire Insurance Co., 169 Colo. 104, 453 P.2d 810

(1969); and Ruff v. Yuma County Transportation Co., 690 P.2d 1296 (Colo. App. 1984)

(impossibility of performance is determined by whether “an unanticipated circumstance has

made performance of the promise vitally different from what should reasonably have been within

the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.”). See also Town of

Fraser v. Davis, 644 P.2d 100 (Colo. App. 1982) (quoting and adopting RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266(2) (1981)); Breeden v. Dailey, 40 Colo. App. 70, 574 P.2d 508

(1977) (death of party); see generally, 14 JAMES P. NEHF, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 74.1 (Joseph

M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2001).

2. Impossibility does not mean literal or strict impossibility but includes as well

“impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss

involved.” City of Littleton v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 169 Colo. 104, 108, 453 P.2d 810, 812

(1969), specifically adopting the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 454 (1932), definition of

impossibility.

3. A change in economic conditions, reducing the value of a contract to a party, is not

sufficient to constitute the defense of impossibility, particularly when the changed circumstances

are not so unforeseeable as to be outside the scope of the risks assumed by the party when

entering into the contract. Magnetic Copy Servs., Inc. v. Seismic Specialists, Inc., 805 P.2d

1161 (Colo. App. 1990); Ruff, 690 P.2d at 1298. Intervening governmental regulatory action that

does not prohibit performance or require the issuance of a permit that is unobtainable, but rather

is one that only renders performance more costly, does not constitute impossibility. Seago v.

Fellet, 676 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Colo. App. 1983) (“[I]ncreased costs are not grounds for rescission

of a contract.”); see Colo. Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Assocs., 754 P.2d 401 (Colo. App.

1987) (same). However, governmental action that makes the performance of a contract illegal

constitutes impossibility of performance. Barrack v. City of Lafayette, 829 P.2d 424 (Colo.

App. 1991) (city was discharged from whatever contractual obligations it might have had to

deliver untreated water when untreated water could no longer be legally supplied because of

public health regulations), rev’d on other grounds, 847 P.2d 136 (Colo. 1993).

4. Concerning the destruction of the subject matter of the contract or a thing upon which

the performance of a party depends, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS sections 262

through 263 (1981); and CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra, at sections 75.4-75.7.

5. The defense of impossibility of performance may be waived by the conduct of the

parties. Cornerstone Grp. XXII, L.L.C. v. Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Auth., 151 P.3d 601

(Colo. App. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007).

30:24 DEFENSE — INDUCING A BREACH BY WORDS OR CONDUCT

The defendant, (name), is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, (name), on the

plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract if the affirmative defense of inducing a breach of

contract is proved. This affirmative defense is proved if you find both of the following:

1. By words or conduct, or both, the plaintiff caused the defendant not to perform

(his) (her) (its) obligation as required by the (claimed) contract; and

2. The plaintiff actually knew, or knew there was a substantial likelihood, (his) (her)

words or conduct, or both, would have that result.

Notes on Use

1. The appropriate sections of Instruction 3:1 should be given reflecting the evidence in

the case.

2. For cases involving the sale of goods, see section 4-2-209, C.R.S., which provides that

a party that has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the contract may retract the

waiver upon reasonable notification that strict performance will be required, unless the retraction

would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Dreier v. Sherwood, 77 Colo. 539, 238 P. 38 (1925).

See also Jones v. Adkins, 34 Colo. App. 196, 526 P.2d 153 (1974); 13 SARAH HOWARD

JENKINS, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 68.7 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003).

30:25 DEFENSE — WAIVER

The defendant, (name), is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, (name), on the

plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract if the affirmative defense of waiver is proved. This

defense is proved if you find all of the following:

1. The plaintiff knew that the defendant (was required to perform) (had not

performed) (his) (her) (its) contractual promise to (insert appropriate description, e.g.,

“repair the car within 15 days”);

2. The plaintiff knew that failure of the defendant to perform this contractual

promise gave (him) (her) the right to (insert appropriate description, e.g., “sue the defendant

for damages”);

3. The plaintiff intended to give up this right; and

4. The plaintiff voluntarily gave up this right.

Notes on Use

1. The appropriate sections of Instruction 3:1 should be given reflecting the evidence in

the case.

2. Whenever this instruction is given, Instruction 30:31 (parties’ intent), appropriately

modified, should also be given.

3. For cases involving the sale of goods, see sections 4-2-209, 4-2-605 to 4-2-608, and 4-

2-720, C.R.S., which deal, inter alia, with modification, rescission, waiver, the acceptance of

goods, and the revocation of acceptance.

4. An effective waiver may be made by an authorized agent. Stewart v. Breckenridge,

69 Colo. 108, 169 P. 543 (1917). In such circumstances, this instruction must be modified

appropriately. See Chapter 7 instructions as appropriate.

Source and Authority

1. The basic requirements of a waiver as set out in this instruction are supported by

Associates of San Lazaro v. San Lazaro Park Properties, 864 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1993); Ewing

v. Colorado Farm Mutual Casualty Co., 133 Colo. 447, 296 P.2d 1040 (1956); General

Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Mitchell, 128 Colo. 11, 259 P.2d 862 (1953);

Melssen v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 2012 COA 102, ¶ 39, 285 P.3d 328; People ex rel.

Metzger v. Watrous, 121 Colo. 282, 215 P.2d 344 (1950); Glover v. Innis, 252 P.3d 1204

(Colo. App. 2011); Universal Resources Corp. v. Ledford, 961 P.2d 593 (Colo. App. 1998);

Tarco, Inc. v. Conifer Metropolitan District, 2013 COA 60, ¶ 36, 316 P.3d 82 (bond

requirement could not be waived by special district); James H. Moore & Associates Realty,

Inc. v. Arrowhead at Vail, 892 P.2d 367 (Colo. App. 1994); Lookout Mountain Paradise

Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Associates, 867 P.2d 70 (Colo. App. 1993); Tripp v.

Parga, 847 P.2d 165 (Colo. App. 1992) (waiver may be implied from conduct of party); Grimm

Construction Co. v. Denver Board of Water Commissioners, 835 P.2d 599 (Colo. App.

1992); Western Cities Broadcasting, Inc. v. Schueller, 830 P.2d 1074 (Colo. App. 1991) (no

waiver of breach of lease provision), aff’d on other grounds, 849 P.2d 44 (Colo. 1993);

Ebrahimi v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 794 P.2d 1015 (Colo. App. 1989) (waiver of interest on

promissory note); Richmond v. Grabowski, 781 P.2d 192 (Colo. App. 1989) (conduct not

sufficiently free from ambiguity nor a clear enough manifestation of an intent to waive a benefit

for there to have been a waiver as a matter of law); Magliocco v. Olson, 762 P.2d 681 (Colo.

App. 1987) (waiver by tenant of right to receive certain notice under lease; intent to waive may

be shown by conduct); Vogel v. Carolina International, Inc., 711 P.2d 708 (Colo. App. 1985)

(waiver of right to repossess collateral), Barker v. Jeremiasen, 676 P.2d 1259 (Colo. App.

1984); and World of Sleep, Inc. v. Seidenfeld, 674 P.2d 1005 (Colo. App. 1983).

2. Other cases recognizing the defense of waiver to an action for breach of contract are

Seale v. Bates, 145 Colo. 430, 359 P.2d 356 (1961); Gillett v. Young, 45 Colo. 562, 101 P. 766

(1909); McIntire v. Barnes, 4 Colo. 285 (1878); and Widner v. Walsh, 3 Colo. 548 (1877). See

also Sung v. McCullough, 651 P.2d 447 (Colo. App. 1982) (dealing with waiver of right to

terminate a lease upon happening of certain condition).

3. If the plaintiff’s claim is for a liquidated sum of money and the alleged waiver goes to

the obligation to pay the debt, then, unless the act of waiver also constituted an estoppel by

inducing reasonable detrimental reliance on the defendant’s part, it appears necessary for an

effective waiver that the plaintiff must also have been relieved of some obligations that he or she

still owed under the contract. See 13 SARAH HOWARD JENKINS, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 67.10

(Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003).

4. Parties may agree to waive statutory rights or benefits, in the absence of statutory

prohibitions or countervailing public policy. Armed Forces Bank, N.A. v. Hicks, 2014 COA

74, ¶ 28, 365 P.3d 378.

30:26 DEFENSE — STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The defendant, (name), is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, (name), on the

plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract if the affirmative defense of the expiration of the

statute of limitations is proved. This defense is proved if you find both of the following:

1. (Describe the events that constituted the claimed breach) occurred before (insert the

appropriate date); and

2. Plaintiff knew, or should have known, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, of

the existence of the (claimed) breach before (insert the appropriate date).

Notes on Use

1. This instruction should only be given if there is a disputed question of fact that would

be proper to submit to the jury, e.g., when the alleged breach occurred. However, when the

material facts are undisputed and reasonable persons could not disagree about their import, the

questions of when a claim accrues and, consequently, whether a claim is barred by the statute of

limitations may be decided by the court as a matter of law. Jackson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.

Co., 258 P.3d 328 (Colo. App. 2011).

2. If an event is claimed to have occurred that would toll the applicable statute and the

facts are disputed, this instruction should be appropriately modified. See, e.g., First Interstate

Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Berenbaum, 872 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1993) (burden on plaintiff to

show that statute had been tolled).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by section 13-80-108, C.R.S.; Stice v. Peterson, 144

Colo. 219, 355 P.2d 948 (1960); and Koon v. Barmettler, 134 Colo. 221, 301 P.2d 713 (1956).

2. Generally, in breach of contract actions, the statute of limitations is three years. § 13-

80-101(1)(a), C.R.S.; see Hersh Cos. Inc. v. Highline Village Assocs., 30 P.3d 221 (Colo.

2001) (breach of express warranty governed by three year statute for contracts);

Neuromonitoring Assocs. v. Centura Health Corp., 2012 COA 136, ¶ 20, 351 P.3d 486 (claim

for amounts not liquidated or determinable within the meaning of § 13-80-103.5(1)(a) governed

by the three year statute); CAMAS Colo., Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 36 P.3d 135 (Colo.

App. 2001) (contractor’s claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, rescission and restitution

for mistake were all governed by three year statute of limitations for contracts). But see

Portercare Adventist Health Sys. v. Lego, 2012 CO 58, ¶ 19, 286 P.3d 525 (six year statute

regarding liquidated debt applied to action for unpaid balance for medical services); BP Am.

Prod. Co. v. Patterson, 185 P.3d 811 (Colo. 2008) (six year limit applies to royalty obligations

due under contract, and claim accrues on date the debt is due, not the date breach is discovered);

Jackson, 258 P.3d at 331 (equitable action for reformation of a contract governed by the three

year statute). The statute of limitations for contracts involving the sale of goods is the same. See

§ 4-2-725(1), C.R.S. (incorporating the period of limitation set out in section 13-80-101(1)(a),

C.R.S.).

3. The defense of statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and the party asserting it

has the burdens of pleading and proof. C.R.C.P. 8(c). But see Berenbaum, 872 P.2d at 1300-01

(when complaint shows on its face that a claim for fraud was brought more than three years after

the alleged fraud and defendant has affirmatively pled the statute of limitations, the burden is on

the plaintiff to show the statute has been tolled).

4. A new promise to pay may remove a defense based on the statute of limitations.

“Since early common law, it has been universally accepted that a new promise to pay effectively

removes the bar of any applicable statute of limitations by creating a new debt, with a new due

date, and that a partial payment constitutes an implicit promise to pay.” Hutchins v. La Plata

Mountain Res., Inc. 2016 CO 45, ¶ 10, 373 P.3d 582, 585; see also Van Diest v. Towle, 116

Colo. 204, 179 P.2d 984 (1947).

5. In some instances, a demand or notice may be a condition precedent to creating a cause

of action for breach of contract. See, e.g., Stice, 144 Colo. at 226-27, 355 P.2d at 953.

30:27 DEFENSE — CANCELLATION BY AGREEMENT

The defendant, (name), is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, (name), on the

plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract if the affirmative defense of cancellation by

agreement is proved. This defense is proved if you find both of the following:

1. The plaintiff and the defendant had entered into a contract; and

2. Before any party to the contract fully performed all (his) (her) (its) obligations

under the contract, (the plaintiff and the defendant) (all the parties to the contract) agreed

to cancel the contract.

An agreement to cancel a contract may be oral or in writing, or it may be implied

from conduct of the parties.

Notes on Use

1. This instruction should not be used when one party has fully performed or the contract

is unilateral (promise for an act), rather than bilateral (mutual promises).

2. Use whichever parenthesized words are appropriate.

3. This instruction must be appropriately modified if either the plaintiff or the defendant

was not an original party to the contract. Also, appropriate modifications must be made if the

contract involved third-party beneficiaries. See 13 SARAH HOWARD JENKINS, CORBIN ON

CONTRACTS § 67.8 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003).

4. A rescission by mutual consent may be established by showing that the parties, by their

conduct, impliedly agreed to abandon their contract. When there is sufficient evidence of such an

implied agreement, this instruction should be appropriately modified. For abandonment, the acts

and conduct of the parties must be positive, unequivocal, and inconsistent with any intent to

continue to be bound by the contract, for example, by one party’s regularly acquiescing in acts of

the other party that are inconsistent with the continued existence of the contract. In re Marriage

of Young, 682 P.2d 1233 (Colo. App. 1984) (discussing earlier cases and holding that the rules

of abandonment are as applicable to antenuptial agreements as they are to other contracts); see

also Harrison v. Albright, 40 Colo. App. 227, 577 P.2d 302 (1977) (evidence of abandonment

insufficient; parties’ conduct consistent with the continued existence of their contract).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Western Air Lines v. Hollenbeck, 124 Colo. 130,

235 P.2d 792 (1951) (citing earlier cases); and Wallick v. Eaton, 110 Colo. 358, 134 P.2d 727

(1943) (the discharge by one party of the other’s obligation under a contract is sufficient

consideration for the other’s promise to discharge him). See also Esecson v. Bushnell, 663 P.2d

258, 261 (Colo. App. 1983) (“Mutual rescission requires assent . . . by both parties. . . . One

party to an executory contract, in the absence of fraud or a special reason, cannot rescind. . . .

[A]n agreement to rescind . . . requires a ‘meeting of the minds’ with ‘the clear knowledge and

understanding of the parties’. . . . Where mutual rescission is founded on the acts and conduct of

the parties, . . . such acts must be ‘inconsistent with the existence of the contract.’” (quoting

Western Air Lines, 124 Colo. at 137-38, 235 P.2d at 796, and Cruse v. Clawson, 352 P.2d 989,

994 (Mont. 1960))).

2. In determining whether there is an agreement to rescind a contract, a meeting of the

minds to rescind is evidenced by the objective acts, conduct and words of the parties and the

subjective intent of the parties is immaterial. Avemco Ins. Co. v. N. Colo. Air Charter, Inc., 38

P.3d 555 (Colo. 2002) (where insured voluntarily cashed premium check with knowledge that

purpose of check was to effectuate a rescission of insurance policy, the subjective intent of

insured not to rescind policy was immaterial and a rescission of the policy occurred); see also

Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Verploeg, 123 Colo. 246, 227 P.2d 333 (1951).

3. For cases involving the sale of goods, see sections 4-2-209 (rescission, modification,

and waiver) and 4-2-720, C.R.S. (effect of “cancellation” or “rescission” on claims for

antecedent breach).

4. An agreement of rescission is an affirmative defense for which the party asserting it

has the burdens of pleading and proof. C.R.C.P. 8(c).

5. For special requirements for a claim of renunciation of negotiable instruments, see

Glover v. Innis, 252 P.3d 1204 (Colo. App. 2011) (defense of renunciation of a negotiable

instrument under section 4-3-604, C.R.S., includes elements similar to but not the same as those

of the affirmative defense of waiver).

30:28 DEFENSE — ACCORD AND SATISFACTION (LATER CONTRACT)

The defendant, (name), is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, (name), on the

plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract if the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction

(“later contract”) is proved. This defense is proved if you find all of the following:

1. After the defendant and the plaintiff had entered into the (claimed) contract in

this case, they entered into a later contract;

2. The plaintiff and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the

later contract cancelled or changed their remaining rights and duties under the (claimed)

earlier contract(s); and

3. The defendant has fully performed the (duty) (duties) (he) (she) (it) agreed to

perform under the later contract.

Notes on Use

1. Use whichever parenthesized words are appropriate to the evidence in the case.

2. Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense for which the party asserting it has

the burdens of pleading and proof. C.R.C.P. 8(c). For ease of jury understanding of the

affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, the term “later contract” is suggested by the

Committee.

3. Other instructions closely related to the subject matter of this instruction that may also

be applicable or be more appropriate in certain cases are Instructions 30:8 (modification); 30:24

(inducing breach); 30:25 (waiver); and 30:27 (cancellation by agreement).

4. An executory accord, that is, a situation where the satisfaction promised under the new

contract has not been rendered, does not bar recovery on the original obligation unless there is

specific wording to that effect in the new contract. Hinkle v. Basic Chem. Corp., 163 Colo.

408, 431 P.2d 14 (1967); Bakehouse & Assocs., Inc. v. Wilkins, 689 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Colo.

App. 1984) (“An agreement to modify an existing agreement, i.e., an executory accord, does not

extinguish the original obligation, but suspends performance of that obligation until the accord is

breached or satisfied.”). Consequently, in those cases, this instruction should not be given unless

the instruction is appropriately modified, and, as modified, there is sufficient supporting

evidence. But see Caldwell v. Armstrong, 642 P.2d 47 (Colo. App. 1981) (because accord and

satisfaction substantially performed, plaintiff only entitled to damages for remaining part of

performance due under the accord). “The general rule is that the underlying duty or debt is not

discharged until there is satisfaction on the accord. That is, the accord is executory.” Id. at 49.

5. This instruction has been drafted to cover the defense of accord and satisfaction

generally. In many cases, however (see, e.g., cases cited below in Source and Authority), the

situation will be one where it is claimed that the defendant made a payment to the plaintiff with

the parties’ understanding that it was to be in full satisfaction of the contractual claim the

plaintiff was asserting against the defendant. In those cases the more specific instruction,

appropriately modified if necessary, approved by the court in Gardner v. Mid-Continent Coal

& Coke Co., 149 Colo. 122, 368 P.2d 204 (1962), should be used rather than this instruction.

6. This instruction is not applicable where the claim allegedly satisfied was for a

liquidated debt and the only thing given in accord was a lesser sum of money. See 13 SARAH

HOWARD JENKINS, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 69.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Hudson v. American Founders Life Insurance Co.,

151 Colo. 54, 377 P.2d 391 (1962) (citing earlier cases); and Pospicil v. Hammers, 148 Colo.

207, 365 P.2d 228 (1961). In these cases, the court reaffirmed its definition of accord and

satisfaction set out in Pitts v. National Independent Fisheries Co., 71 Colo. 316, 318, 206 P.

571, 571 (1922): “In order to constitute an accord and satisfaction, it is necessary that the money

should be offered in full satisfaction of the demand, and be accompanied by such acts and

declarations as amount to a condition that the money, if accepted, is accepted in satisfaction; and

it must be such that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand therefrom that, if he

takes it, he takes it subject to such conditions.” See also Anderson v. Rosebrook, 737 P.2d 417

(Colo. 1987) (holding that section 4-1-207, C.R.S., of the Uniform Commercial Code, dealing

with reservation of rights, does not alter the common-law rule of accord and satisfaction quoted

above); R.A. Reither Constr., Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Elec. Ass’n, 680 P.2d 1342 (Colo.

App. 1984) (same).

2. This instruction is also supported by CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra, at § 69; and

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1981).

3. An accord and satisfaction based on a mistaken belief as to a material fact is not

effective. Metro. State Bank v. Cox, 134 Colo. 260, 302 P.2d 188 (1956).

4. For cases involving the sale of goods, see sections 4-2-209 (modification, rescission,

and waiver) and 4-2-720, C.R.S. (effect of “cancellation” or “rescission” on claims for

antecedent breach).

30:29 DEFENSE — NOVATION

A novation is a new (valid) contract that replaces (a previous valid contract) (an

existing obligation with a new obligation) (an original party with a new party). For there to

be a novation, the original (obligation) (party) must be completely replaced.

Notes on Use

1. Use whichever parenthesized words are appropriate to the evidence in the case.

2. Other instructions closely related to the subject matter of this instruction that may also

be applicable or be more appropriate in certain cases are Instructions 30:8 (modification), 30:24

(inducing breach), 30:25 (waiver), and 30:27 (cancellation by agreement).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Phoenix Power Partners, L.P. v. Colorado Public

Utilities Commission, 952 P.2d 359 (Colo. 1998); Moffat County State Bank v. Told, 800

P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1990); Haan v. Traylor, 79 P.3d 114 (Colo. App. 2003); and In re Buwana,

338 B.R. 441 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2004).

2. Modification of a contract without the intent to replace the previous contract or

obligation is not enough for novation. Told, 800 P.2d at 1323.

3. The parties need not expressly manifest their intent to accomplish novation, but

novation may be inferred from facts and circumstances surrounding transaction. “It is not

necessary that all these elements be established in writing or evidenced by express words but

they may be proved as inferences from the acts and conduct of the parties and from other acts

and circumstances.” Cardwell Inv. Co. v. United Supply & Mfg. Co., 268 F.2d 857, 859 (10th

Cir. 1959).

D. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

Introductory Note

1. Generally, the interpretation of a written contract is a question of law for the court. Ad

Two, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 9 P.3d 373 (Colo. 2000); Radiology Prof’l Corp. v.

Trinidad Area Health Ass’n., 195 Colo. 253, 577 P.2d 748 (1978). The primary goal of

interpreting a contract is to determine and give effect to the intent of the parties. USI Props.

East, Inc. v. Simpson, 938 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1997). Where possible, the intent of the parties is to

be determined from the language of the written contract itself. Id. Written contracts that are

complete and unambiguous will be interpreted and enforced according to the plain and generally

accepted meaning of the words employed. Id. However, extrinsic evidence may be conditionally

admitted to determine whether a contract is ambiguous. Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch

Corp., 965 P.2d 1229 (Colo. 1998) (rejecting rigid application of “four corners” rule); accord

East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 109 P.3d 969 (Colo.

2005); Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002) (fact that extrinsic evidence may reveal

ambiguities in contract is especially true when interpreting ancient document). Moreover, a

contract must be interpreted in light of the context and circumstances of the transaction. First

Christian Assembly of God v. City & County of Denver, 122 P.3d 1089 (Colo. App. 2005).

An insurance policy is a contract, and courts must enforce the plain language of a policy if it is

unambiguous. Craft v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 2015 CO 11, ¶ 34, 343 P.3d 951.

2. The determination of whether an ambiguity exists in a written contract is also a

question of law for the court. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 741 (Colo.

1992). The provisions of a contract are ambiguous when they are susceptible to more than one

reasonable interpretation. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 2016 CO 46, ¶ 23, 375 P.3d

115 (listing of names of insureds on declarations page was unambiguous); Union Ins. Co. v.

Houtz, 883 P.2d 1057 (Colo. 1994); Ballow v. PHICO Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 1354 (Colo. 1993).

The fact that the parties may have different opinions regarding the interpretation of a contract

does not itself mean that the contract is ambiguous, see Mashburn v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 67

(Colo. App. 1984), but the court may conclude that a contract is ambiguous even if the parties

did not so argue. Gagne v. Gagne, 2014 COA 127, ¶¶ 50, 60, 338 P.3d 1152 (holding that terms

in a disputed contract were subject to “a myriad of reasonable interpretations”). The court

“should not allow a hyper-technical reading of the language in a contract to defeat the intention

of the parties.” Ad Two, Inc., 9 P.3d at 377.

3. Consequently, the instructions in this Part D apply only in cases involving written

contracts that are ambiguous, where reasonable persons might reasonably differ as to how the

ambiguity should be resolved, or where the provisions of an oral contract are in dispute. Once a

contract term is found to be ambiguous, its meaning is a question of fact to be determined in the

same manner as other questions of fact. Dorman v. Petrol Aspen, Inc., 914 P.2d 909 (Colo.

1996); Preserve at the Fort, Ltd. v. Prudential Huntoon Paige Assocs., 129 P.3d 1015 (Colo.

App. 2004); D.C. Concrete Mgmt., Inc. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 39 P.3d 1205 (Colo. App.

2001). In those cases, it is the court’s function to determine what legal significance should be

given to the various possible reasonable meanings from which the jury might determine the

correct one, and the court should inform the jury in other instructions what they are to do if they

find that the parties meant one interpretation as opposed to another.

4. The primary aim in contract interpretation is to determine what the parties intended,

and every word in an instrument is to be given meaning if at all possible. Fed. Deposit Ins.

Corp. v. Fisher, 2013 CO 5, ¶ 11, 292 P.3d 934.

5. For a discussion as to whether an objective or subjective standard should be applied to

a contract that is to be completed to the satisfaction of one of the parties, see Crum v. April

Corp., 62 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2002).

6. For a discussion of contractual conditions implied in fact or by law, see Lane v.

Urgitis, 145 P.3d 672 (Colo. 2006).

30:30 CONTRACT INTERPRETATION — DISPUTED TERM

(Plaintiff) (Defendant) disputes the meaning of the following term contained in the

contract:

(insert text of the term)

(Plaintiff) (Defendant) claims that the term means (insert proposed interpretation of

the term). On the other hand, (plaintiff) (defendant) claims that the term means (insert

proposed interpretation of the term).

Notes on Use

1. When the court has determined the contract term is ambiguous or there is an oral

contract where the terms are disputed, this instruction should be used. See Introductory Note to

Part D of this Chapter; see also C.R.C.P. 38(a) (“all issues of fact shall be tried by a jury”).

2. This instruction supplements Instruction 2:1 in that it provides an introduction to the

specific issues of the disputed terms of the contract and introduces the instructions to the jury for

deciding those issues.

3. Instruction 30:31 (parties’ intent), must be given with this Instruction. Other

instructions contained in Part D of this Chapter should be considered and used as necessary to

instruct on the interpretation of the contract.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Dorman v. Petrol Aspen, Inc., 914 P.2d 909 (Colo.

1996) (the meaning of ambiguous contractual terms is generally an issue of fact); Denver

Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2017 COA 2, ¶ 17 (“We conclude that the

[collective bargaining agreements] are ambiguous and the trial court properly let the

interpretation go to the jury as a question of fact.”) (cert. granted Oct. 2, 2017).

30:31 CONTRACT INTERPRETATION — PARTIES’ INTENT

The statements or conduct of the parties before any dispute arose between them is

an indication of what the parties intended at the time the contract was formed.

To determine what the parties intended the terms of the contract to mean, you may

also consider the language of the written agreement, the parties’ negotiations of the

contract, any earlier dealings between the parties, any reasonable expectations the parties

may have had because of the promises or conduct of the other party, and any other facts or

circumstances that existed at the time that the contract was formed.

Notes on Use

1. When the court has determined that a contract term is ambiguous or there is an oral

contract where the terms are in dispute, contract interpretation is a jury issue and this instruction

should be used. See Introductory Note to Part D of this Chapter.

2. If there is evidence in the case on other issues that would be improper for the jury to

consider on the issue of interpretation, this instruction must be appropriately modified.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Condo v. Conners, 266 P.3d 1110 (Colo. 2011) (in

interpreting a contract the court’s primary goal is to determine and effectuate the reasonable

expectations of the parties); and Draper v. DeFrenchi-Gordineer, 282 P.3d 489 (Colo. App.

2011) (the primary goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the parties,

which is to be determined primarily from the language of the agreement). See also Nahring v.

City & County of Denver, 174 Colo. 548, 484 P.2d 1235 (1971); Thompson v. McCormick,

149 Colo. 465, 370 P.2d 442 (1962); Hammond v. Caton, 121 Colo. 7, 212 P.2d 845 (1949)

(any evidence showing the parties’ intent is important in interpreting their contract); Cohen v.

Clayton Coal Co., 86 Colo. 270, 281 P. 111 (1929); Erdenberger, Inc. v. Partek N. Am., Inc.,

865 P.2d 850 (Colo. App. 1993); Colo. Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc., 833 P.2d 786

(Colo. App. 1991), aff’d on other grounds, 854 P.2d 1232 (Colo. 1993); Smith v. Long, 40

Colo. App. 531, 578 P.2d 232 (1978); Palipchak v. Kent Constr. Co., 38 Colo. App. 146, 554

P.2d 718 (1976); 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.16 (Joseph M. Perillo

ed., rev. ed. 1998).

2. Where the face of the contract shows a change, such as strike-outs, the terms may be

proven by evidence outside the contract. Hildebrand v. New Vista Homes II, LLC, 252 P.3d

1159 (Colo. App. 2010). In cases involving an ambiguity in a written contract, the jury’s

function is to determine the intention of the parties as a question of fact. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Rael,

895 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1995). Determining the parties’ intent from the circumstances

surrounding the execution of a contract is the primary method for determining the meaning of an

ambiguous term.

3. The conduct of the parties may not be used to contradict the contract’s plain,

unambiguous meaning. Great W. Sugar Co. v. White, 47 Colo. 547, 108 P. 156 (1910).

4. Insurance policies are contracts, the unambiguous terms of which must be enforced as

written, unless doing so would violate public policy. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v.

Stresscon Corp., 2016 CO 22M, ¶ 12, 370 P.3d 140; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Huizar, 52 P.3d 816

(Colo. 2002) (insurance contracts must be construed according to well-settled principles of

contract interpretation); Novell v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 15 P.3d 775 (Colo. App. 1999);

Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Casson Duncan Constr. Inc., 2016 COA 164, ¶ 15 (policy provision

requiring insurer to pay “all costs” when defending a suit against its insured under reservation of

rights was not ambiguous; insurer was required to pay taxable costs regardless of duty to

indemnify). However, if an insurance contract is ambiguous, it must be construed against the

insurer. Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 108 P.3d 288 (Colo. 2005); Cruz v. Farmers

Ins. Exch., 12 P.3d 307 (Colo. App. 2000); Bengtson v. USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins., 3 P.3d 1233

(Colo. App. 2000); Novell, 15 P.3d at 778. See Instruction 30:35 (construction against drafter).

5. Generally, unless unequivocal language mandates otherwise, a contractual clause will

be interpreted as a promise rather than as a condition precedent. Main Elec., Ltd. v. Printz

Servs. Corp., 980 P.2d 522 (Colo. 1999).

6. A fundamental rule of contract interpretation is that the latest iteration of contractual

terms controls. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fisher, 2013 CO 5, ¶ 11, 292 P.3d 934.

30:32 CONTRACT INTERPRETATION — CONTRACT AS A WHOLE

The entire agreement (with any attachments) is to be considered in determining the

existence or nature of the contractual duties. You should consider the agreement as a whole

and not view clauses or phrases in isolation.

Notes on Use

1. When the court has determined the contract term is ambiguous or there is an oral

contract where the terms are in dispute, contract interpretation is a jury issue and this instruction

should be used. See Introductory Note to Part D of this Chapter.

2. Instruction 30:30 (disputed term) and Instruction 30:31 (parties’ intent) should be

given with this instruction, along with any other instructions in this chapter that are appropriate

for the case.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Fisher, 2013

COA 5, ¶ 11, 292 P.3d 934; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Huizar, 52 P.3d 816, 819 (Colo. 2002)

(“[T]he meaning of a contract must be determined by examination of the entire instrument, and

not by viewing clauses or phrases in isolation.”); and Randall & Blake, Inc. v. Metro

Wastewater Reclamation District, 77 P.3d 804, 806 (Colo. App. 2003) (“[D]ocuments

executed together as part of a single transaction should be considered together in ascertaining the

intent of the parties.”).

2. Covenants and other recorded instruments, like contracts, should be construed as a

whole “seeking to harmonize and give effect to all provisions so that none will be rendered

meaningless.” Pulte Home Corp., v. Countryside Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 2016 CO 64, ¶ 23, 382

P.3d 821, 826.

30:33 CONTRACT INTERPRETATION — ORDINARY MEANING

Words or phrases not defined in a contract should be given their plain, ordinary,

and generally accepted meaning.

Notes on Use

1. When the court has determined the contract term is ambiguous or there is an oral

contract where the terms are in dispute, contract interpretation is a jury issue and this instruction

should be used. See Introductory Note to Part D of this Chapter.

2. Instruction 30:30 (disputed term) and Instruction 30:31 (parties’ intent) should be

given with this instruction, along with any other instructions in this Chapter that are appropriate

for the case.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Columbus Investments v. Lewis, 48 P.3d 1222 (Colo.

2002); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Huizar, 52 P.3d 816 (Colo. 2002) (interpretation of insurance

contracts); Copper Mountain, Inc. v. Industrial Systems, Inc., 208 P.3d 692 (Colo. 2009); and

Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2017 COA 6, ¶ 21, 399 P.3d 771,

776 (“The plain meaning therefore does not support limiting the policy definition to vehicles

‘primarily’ designed for driving on streets or highways.”).

30:34 CONTRACT INTERPRETATION — USE OF TECHNICAL WORDS IN A

CONTRACT

When a contract uses words or phrases from a trade or technical field, those words

or phrases should be given their usual meaning in that trade or technical field.

Notes on Use

1. When the court has determined the contract term is ambiguous or used in a special or

technical sense, contract interpretation is a jury issue and this instruction should be used. See

Introductory Note to Part D of this Chapter.

2. Instruction 30:30 (disputed term) and Instruction 30:31 (parties’ intent) should be

given with this instruction, along with any other instructions in this Chapter that are appropriate

for the case.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Washington County Board of Equalization v.

Petron Development Co., 109 P.3d 146 (Colo. 2005); KN Energy, Inc. v. Great Western

Sugar Co., 698 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1985) (a trial court may not look beyond the plain words of a

contract to interpret the parties’ underlying intent unless the contract terms are ambiguous or

used in a special or technical sense not defined by in the contract); Town of Silverton v.

Phoenix Heat Source System, Inc., 948 P.2d 9 (Colo. App. 1997); and RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981).

2. When parties are engaged in a trade or technical field, “[u]nless a different intention is

manifested . . . technical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning when used in a

transaction within their technical field.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(b)

(1981); see Bledsoe Land Co. LLLP v. Forest Oil Corp., 277 P.3d 838 (Colo. App. 2011);

David E. Pierce, Defining the Role of Industry Custom and Usage in Oil & Gas Litigation, 57

SMU L. REV. 387, 402 (2004).

3. Technical meanings refer to terms with a unique definition within a specific industry,

or to legal terms of art. See, e.g., Petron Dev. Co., 109 P.3d at 153 (“wellhead” has technical

meaning in oil and gas industry); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1992)

(“defective” has technical meaning in product liability cases); People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d

234 (Colo. 1992) (“attorney of record” is a legal term of art), overruled on other grounds by

People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 2, 320 P.3d 1194; DISH Network Corp. v. Altomari, 224

P.3d 362 (Colo. App. 2009) (nothing in the record or the statute suggests that “management

personnel” has a technical meaning as a word of art in its field that may conflict with its common

usage).

30:35 CONTRACT INTERPRETATION — CONSTRUCTION AGAINST DRAFTER

Any dispute over the meaning of any unclear terms must be decided against the

party who prepared the contract if the other party had no opportunity to select the words

written in the contract.

Notes on Use

1. When the court has determined the contract term is ambiguous or there is an oral

contract where the terms are in dispute, contract interpretation is a jury issue and this instruction

should be used. See Introductory Note to Part D of this Chapter.

2. Instruction 30:30 (disputed term) and Instruction 30:31 (parties’ intent) should be

given with this instruction, along with any other instructions in this Chapter that are appropriate

for the case.

3. This instruction should not be given unless it appears other rules of interpretation about

which the jury is instructed are likely to be unavailing. Patterson v. Gage, 11 Colo. 50, 16 P.

560 (1888).

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Christmas v. Cooley, 158 Colo. 297, 406 P.2d 333

(1965). See also Compass Ins. Co. v. City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606 (Colo. 1999); Elliott v.

Joyce, 889 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1994); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 842

P.2d 208 (Colo. 1992); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 816 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1991);

Kuta v. Joint Dist. No. 50(J), 799 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1990); Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882

(Colo. 1981); Grossman v. Sherman, 198 Colo. 359, 599 P.2d 909 (1979); Sherman Agency v.

Carey, 195 Colo. 277, 577 P.2d 759 (1978); Sunshine v. M.R. Mansfield Realty, Inc., 195

Colo. 95, 575 P.2d 847 (1978); Perl-Mack Enters. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 194 Colo.

4, 568 P.2d 468 (1977); Gardner v. City of Englewood, 131 Colo. 210, 282 P.2d 1084 (1955);

D.C. Concrete Mgmt., Inc. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 39 P.3d 1205 (Colo. App. 2001); Valdez

v. Cantor, 994 P.2d 483 (Colo. App. 1999); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bencomo, 873

P.2d 47 (Colo. App. 1994); Bassett v. Eagle Telecomms., Inc., 708 P.2d 812 (Colo. App. 1985)

(this instruction correctly states the law; proper to give the instruction when necessary to resolve

a fact question and it is supported by sufficient evidence); 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON

CONTRACTS § 24.27 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998).

30:36 CONTRACT INTERPRETATION — SPECIFIC AND GENERAL CLAUSES

Where there is an inconsistency between general and specific provisions in a

contract, the specific provisions express more exactly what the parties intended.

Notes on Use

1. When the court has determined the contract term is ambiguous or there is an oral

contract where the terms are in dispute, contract interpretation is a jury issue and this instruction

should be used. See Introductory Note to Part D of this Chapter.

2. Instruction 30:30 (disputed term) and Instruction 30:31 (parties’ intent) should be

given with this instruction, along with any other instructions in this Chapter that are appropriate

for the case.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Markham, 106

Colo. 509, 107 P.2d 313 (1940); and Holland v. Board of County Commissioners, 883 P.2d

500 (Colo. App. 1994).

E. DAMAGES

Introductory Note

1. Generally the measure of damages is a question of fact for the jury, and once the fact

of damages has been proved, uncertainty as to amount will not bar recovery if there is a

reasonable basis for computation. Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940 (Colo. 1985) (once

the fact of damage has been proved, uncertainty as to the amount will not bar recovery, and the

burden of proof of the fact of damage is by a preponderance of the evidence); Colo. Nat’l Bank

v. Ashcraft, 83 Colo. 136, 263 P. 23 (1927); Westesen v. Olathe State Bank, 75 Colo. 340, 225

P. 837 (1924); Richner v. Plateau Live Stock Co., 44 Colo. 302, 98 P. 178 (1908); City of

Westminster v. Centric-Jones Constructors, 100 P.3d 472 (Colo. App. 2003); Roberts v.

Adams, 47 P.3d 690 (Colo. App. 2001) (for damages to be recoverable, the evidence must

provide a reasonable basis for their computation); Wilson & Co. v. Walsenburg Sand &

Gravel Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 1386 (Colo. App. 1989); Overland Dev. Co. v. Marston Slopes

Dev. Co., 773 P.2d 1112 (Colo. App. 1989) (to be recoverable, losses must have been caused by

the breach); Bennett v. Price, 692 P.2d 1138 (Colo. App. 1984) (prices at which similar

residential property is listed on the market is insufficient evidence to establish market value);

Tighe v. Kenyon, 681 P.2d 547 (Colo. App. 1984).

2. Future damages may be awarded if there exists sufficient evidence to provide a

reasonable basis for computation. Pomeranz v. McDonald’s Corp., 843 P.2d 1378 (Colo. 1993)

(in breach of contract action involving future damages, rule of certainty requires that plaintiff

prove that damages will in fact accrue in the future and provide sufficient admissible evidence to

enable trier of fact to compute a fair approximation of loss); Interbank Invs. L.L.C. v. Vail

Valley Consol. Water Dist., 12 P.3d 1224 (Colo. App. 2000); see also Riggs v. McMurtry, 157

Colo. 33, 400 P.2d 916 (1965) (evidence must provide reasonable basis for computation of

damages); McDonald’s Corp. v. Brentwood Ctr., Ltd., 942 P.2d 1308 (Colo. App. 1997) (lost

profits may not be awarded if they are speculative, remote, imaginary, or impossible to

ascertain).

3. If future damages cannot be proven with a reasonable certainty, the jury may award a

measure of damages that would place the injured party in the same position had the contract

never been made, limited by the contract price. HMO Sys., Inc. v. Choicecare Health Servs.,

Inc., 665 P.2d 635 (Colo. App. 1983). A jury may not award both types of damages if the result

would be to put the injured person in a better position than the injured person would have been in

had the contract been performed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (1981) (“As an

alternative to the measure of damages stated in section 347, the injured party has the right to

damages based on his reliance interest, including expenditures made in preparation for

performance or in performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable

certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.”).

4. Where the jury awards damages for a breach, any set-offs for amounts received from

other parties should first be deducted before any adjustments are made to enforce contractual

limitations on liability. Taylor Morrison of Colo., Inc. v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., 2017

COA 64, ¶¶ 31-35.

5. As to when a plaintiff may be entitled to recover interest on damages for breach of

contract, and at what rate, see generally sections 5-12-102 and 5-12-103, C.R.S. To be entitled to

interest, the damages on which interest may be calculated need not necessarily be liquidated. See

§ 5-12-102(1)(a), (3); Jasken v. Sheehy Constr. Co., 642 P.2d 58 (Colo. App. 1982) (construing

and applying section 5-12-102(1)(a)); see also Ferrellgas, Inc. v. Yeiser, 247 P.3d 1022 (Colo.

2011) (analyzing setoff and interest calculation under section 5-12-102); Ballow v. PHICO Ins.

Co., 878 P.2d 672, 684 (Colo. 1994) (“Section 5-12-102(1)(b) is to be liberally construed to

permit recovery of prejudgment interest on money or property wrongfully withheld.”); Safeco

Ins. Co. v. Westport Ins. Corp., 214 P.3d 1078 (Colo. App. 2009) (section 5-12-102(1) applies

to equitable claim for contribution by insurer against other carriers that had wrongfully withheld

their fair share of total due to insured); Kennedy v. Gillam Dev. Corp., 80 P.3d 927 (Colo. App.

2003) (buyers who succeeded on claim to rescind contract to purchase home were entitled to

recover prejudgment interest and sellers were entitled to offset value of buyers’ use of property);

Logixx Automation, Inc. v. Lawrence Michels Family Trust, 56 P.3d 1224 (Colo. App. 2002)

(interest calculation begins at time breach of contract occurs rather than at time damages accrue).

6. Under section 5-12-102(1)(a) and (b), unless there is an agreement as to the rate of

interest, the statutory rate of interest applies to prejudgment interest on damages recovered for

money or property wrongfully withheld, in the absence of proof under section 5-12-102(1)(a)

that a greater gain or benefit was realized by the person withholding the money or property. See

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Holmes, 193 P.3d 821 (Colo. 2008) (in strict liability case,

interest due from time homeowner replaced defective heating system); Mesa Sand & Gravel

Co. v. Landfill, Inc., 776 P.2d 362 (Colo. 1989) (also interpreting statutory phrase “wrongfully

withheld”); Harris Grp., Inc. v. Robinson, 209 P.3d 1188 (Colo. App. 2009) (amount of

prejudgment interest on lost profits through the verdict date must be ascertained with reasonable

certainty, though difficult where verdict form does not separate past and future losses); Butler v.

Lembeck, 182 P.3d 1185 (Colo. App. 2007) (analyzing interest on damages awarded tenant in

dispute with landlord); Alfred Brown Co. v. Johnson-Gibbons & Reed W. Paving-Kemper,

695 P.2d 746 (Colo. App. 1984); Prospero Assocs. v. Redactron Corp., 682 P.2d 1193 (Colo.

App. 1983). “Conventional interest as a matter of contract and statutory prejudgment interest on

particular kinds of damage awards are to be distinguished from moratory interest. Moratory

interest is an element of damage in itself which is allowed as compensation for the detention and

use of money . . . [and its allowance] is a matter committed to the sound discretion of [the] court

in consideration of the equities of [the] case.” E.B. Jones Constr. Co. v. City & County of

Denver, 717 P.2d 1009, 1014-15 (Colo. App. 1986). But see § 5-12-102(1)(a)–(b) (appearing to

authorize moratory interest, so defined, as statutory interest); Farmers Reservoir & Irr. Co. v.

City of Golden, 113 P.3d 119 (Colo. 2005) (whether attorney fees are classified as “costs” or

“damages” for purpose of awarding moratory interest depends on context of case and rests within

discretion of trial court); Great W. Sugar Co. v. KN Energy, Inc., 778 P.2d 272 (Colo. App.

1989) (discussing legislative purpose in enacting section 5-12-102(1)(a)).

7. To constitute a “wrongful withholding” of money or property under section 5-12-102,

the withholding need not be tortious or in bad faith but rather a failure to pay or deliver property

when there is a legal obligation to do so. Mesa Sand & Gravel Co., 776 P.2d at 364 (citing

Cooper v. Peoples Bank & Trust, 725 P.2d 78 (Colo. App. 1986)); see also § 24-91-103,

C.R.S. (Colorado’s prompt payment statute, mandating penalty interest rate when a general

contractor fails to timely pay a subcontractor); New Design Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hamon

Contractors, Inc., 215 P.3d 1172 (Colo. App. 2008).

8. For a comprehensive discussion of the rules relating to the recovery of interest in

contract cases, see J. Kent Miller, Recovery of Interest: Part II – Other than Personal Injury, 18

COLO. LAW. 1307 (1989).

9. The economic loss rule provides a defense to tort claims that are based on duties

bargained for and existing in a contract. Cases applying the economic loss rule to particular

situations are collected in the Introductory Note to Chapter 9.

10. Colorado follows the “American Rule” with respect to the award of attorney fees in

actions for breach of contract; that is, “[i]n the absence of a statute, court rule, or private contract

to the contrary, attorney fees are not recoverable by a prevailing party. . . .” Adams v. Farmers

Ins. Grp., 983 P.2d 797, 801 (Colo. 1999); accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. Huizar, 52 P.3d 816

(Colo. 2002); Agritrack, Inc. v. DeJohn Housemoving, Inc., 25 P.3d 1187 (Colo. 2001).

11. A claim brought upon a contract provision for equitable adjustment seeks an equitable

remedy. Parker Excavating, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 2012 COA 180, ¶ 18, 303 P.3d

1222.

30:37 DAMAGES ― INTRODUCTION

If you find in favor of the plaintiff, (name), on (his) (her) (its) claim of breach of

contract, then you must award (him) (her) (it) (general) (special) (liquidated) (nominal)

damages.

To award (general) (special) (liquidated) damages, you must find by a

preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff had damages as a result of the breach, and

you must determine the amount of those damages.

If you find in favor of the plaintiff, but do not find any (general) (special)

(liquidated) damages, you shall award plaintiff nominal damages.

Notes on Use

1. Except when the amount of damages is not in dispute, e.g., liquidated damages (see

Instruction 30:40), the amount due on a promissory note, etc., the instruction should not state the

amount of damages sought. See Rodrigue v. Hausman, 33 Colo. App. 305, 519 P.2d 1216

(1974).

2. Instructions for the particular damages involved in the case should be used with this

instruction: Instruction 30:38 (general), Instruction 30:39 (special), Instruction 30:40

(liquidated), or Instruction 30:41 (nominal).

3. When supported by sufficient evidence and applicable to the damages being claimed

by the plaintiff, Instruction 5:2, dealing with mitigation of damages, should be given with this

instruction.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Giampapa v. American Family Mutual Insurance

Co., 64 P.3d 230, 237 n.3 (Colo. 2003) (“‘General damages’ are those that flow naturally from

the breach of contract, whereas ‘special’ or ‘consequential damages’ are other foreseeable

damages within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made.”).

30:38 DAMAGES — GENERAL

“General damages” means the amount required to compensate the plaintiff for

losses that are the natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s breach of the

contract.

Losses that are a “natural” result of a breach are those losses that an ordinary

person of common experience would expect to follow from a breach.

Losses are “probable” if the losses were reasonably foreseeable when the contract

was made and would likely occur if the contract were breached.

If general damages have been proved, you shall award:

(Insert the types of general damages that have been proved depending on the kind of

contract involved.)

Notes on Use

1. See Notes on Use and Source and Authority to Instruction 30:37 (introduction).

2. Instruction 30:37 (introduction) should be used with this instruction, along with

instructions for any other particular damages involved in the case: Instruction 30:39 (special),

Instruction 30:40 (liquidated), or Instruction 30:41 (nominal).

3. The court has a duty to instruct the jury on the proper measure of damages for the kind

of contract at issue. The measures of damages appropriate for several particular kinds of contract

breaches are contained in Instructions 30:42 to 30:53.

4. This instruction should be modified where the defendant has counterclaimed and

alleged that the plaintiff breached contract promises.

5. If special damages are also alleged and proven the jury also may receive instruction

30:39, so long as awarding both categories of damages does not result in any double recovery.

See General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Hogan & Hartson, LLP, 230 P.3d 1275 (Colo.

App. 2010).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Pomeranz v. McDonald’s Corp, 843 P.2d 1378

(Colo. 1993) (The general measure of damages for breach of contract cases is that sum that

places the non-defaulting party in the position the party would have enjoyed had the breach not

occurred.). See also Smith v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 9 P.3d 335 (Colo. 2000); Colo. Nat’l Bank v.

Friedman, 846 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1993); Core-Mark Midcontinent Inc., v. Sonitrol Corp., 2016

COA 22, ¶ 35, 370 P.3d 353 (discussing foreseeability and types of losses that naturally and

probably flow from a breach); Morris v. Belfor USA Group, Inc., 201 P.3d 1253 (Colo. App.

2008); Clough v. Williams Prod. RMT Co., 179 P.3d 32 (Colo. App. 2007); Kaiser v. Market

Square Disc. Liquors, Inc., 992 P.2d 636 (Colo. App. 1999); Husband v. Colo. Mtn. Cellars,

Inc., 867 P.2d 57 (Colo. App. 1993); Colo. Interstate Gas Co., Inc. v. Chemco, Inc., 833 P.2d

786 (Colo. App. 1991), aff’d on other grounds, 854 P.2d 1232 (Colo. 1993); Mesa Sand &

Gravel Co. v. Landfill, Inc., 759 P.2d 757 (Colo. App. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 776 P.2d

362 (Colo. 1989); Total Condo. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lester J. Lambert & Co., 716 P.2d 146 (Colo.

App. 1985); Smith v. Hoyer, 697 P.2d 761, 765 (Colo. App. 1984).

2. Recovery of damages is limited by the requirement of probability — the loss must

have been a foreseeable consequence of the breach at the time the contract was made. Core-

Mark Midcontinent, 2016 COA 22, ¶ 52 (a plaintiff must prove that that the loss was a

probable — more likely than not — result of the breach).

30:39 DAMAGES — SPECIAL

“Special damages” means damages, other than general damages, that the defendant

knew or should have known when the contract was made probably would be incurred by

the plaintiff if the defendant breached the contract.

If special damages have been proved, you shall award:

(Insert the types of special damages that have been proved depending on the kind of

contract involved.)

Notes on Use

1. See the Notes on Use to Instruction 30:37 (introduction).

2. Instruction 30:37 (introduction) should be used with this instruction, along with

instructions for any other particular damages involved in the case: Instruction 30:38 (general),

Instruction 30:40 (liquidated), or Instruction 30:41 (nominal).

3. Special damages must be pled with particularity. C.R.C.P. 9(g).

4. This instruction should be modified where the defendant has counterclaimed and

alleged that plaintiff breached contract promises.

5. If general damages are claimed the jury also may receive Instruction 30:38, so long as

awarding both categories of damages does not result in any double recovery. See General Steel

Domestic Sales, LLC v. Hogan & Hartson, LLP, 230 P.3d. 1275 (Colo. App. 2010).

6. If lost profits are claimed, the jury should be instructed that they may be awarded only

if: they are established with reasonable certainty; the term “net profits” is defined; and a list of

the factors the jury should consider in determining any loss of “net profits” is provided. See Lee

v. Durango Music, 144 Colo. 270, 355 P.2d 1083 (1960) (gross profits alone are not sufficient

evidence and proof of business loss must also include expenses); Carder, Inc. v. Cash, 97 P.3d

174 (Colo. App. 2003) (to establish net profits, expenses of business must be shown).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Denny Construction, Inc. v. City & County of

Denver, 199 P.3d 742, 751 (Colo. 2009) (The foreseeability “requirement is objective, focusing

on whether at the time the parties entered into the contract the defendant knew or should have

known that these lost profit damages would probably be incurred by the plaintiff if the defendant

breached the contract.”); and Giampapa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230, 237 n.3

(Colo. 2003) (“‘General damages’ are those that flow naturally from the breach of contract,

whereas ‘special’ or ‘consequential damages’ are other foreseeable damages within the

reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made.”); Core-Mark

Midcontinent Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 2016 COA 22, ¶ 32, 370 P.3d 353 (“the nonbreaching

party may also recover damages for loss that was ‘such as may reasonably be supposed to have

been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable

result of the breach of it’” (quoting Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151)).

2. For special damages to be recoverable, they must have been within the reasonable

contemplation of the parties. Uinta Oil Ref. Co. v. Ledford, 125 Colo. 429, 244 P.2d 881

(1952); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Trinidad Bean & Elevator Co., 84 Colo. 93, 267 P. 1068 (1928)

(citing earlier cases); see also Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, 230 P.3d at 1285 (contract

damages are limited to those arising from risks considered and bargained for by parties);

Fountain v. Mojo, 687 P.2d 496 (Colo. App. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

351 (1981).

3. Loss of future profits (as distinct from profits already lost) may be recovered in a

breach of contract action where they are established with reasonable certainty. Denny Constr.,

199 P.3d at 751 (“lost profits due to impaired bonding capacity, like all claims for lost profits,

must be established with reasonable certainty”); Acoustic Mktg. Research, Inc. v. Technics,

LLC 198 P.3d 96, 97 (Colo. 2008) (“future damages, including lost future royalties, may be

awarded in a breach of contract action if they are demonstrated with reasonable certainty”);

Belfor USA Grp., Inc. v. Rocky Mtn. Caulking & Waterproofing, LLC, 159 P.3d 672 (Colo.

App. 2006); see also Colo. Nat’l Bank of Denver v. Friedman, 846 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1993);

Lee, 144 Colo. at 278, 355 P.2d at 1087; Nevin v. Bates, 141 Colo. 255, 347 P.2d 776 (1959)

(lost profits claimed for breach of a lease denied as being too speculative); Uinta Oil Ref. Co.,

125 Colo. at 434, 244 P.2d at 884-85 (where existence of loss is established, plaintiff can recover

loss of net profits even though the exact amount may be difficult to ascertain); Carlson v. Bain,

116 Colo. 526, 182 P.2d 909 (1947) (lost profits allowed when rancher did not get possession of

ranch property and was unable to raise crops and livestock on the property); Colo. Nat’l Bank v.

Ashcraft, 83 Colo. 136, 263 P. 23 (1927) (the court did not err in giving an instruction that

allowed jury to consider lost profits in assessing damages, and the fact that the amount could not

be determined with exact certainty was not a valid basis for denial); Boyle v. Bay, 81 Colo. 125,

254 P. 156 (1927) (loss of net profits recoverable if, because of circumstances at time contract

entered into, the loss is reasonably within the contemplation of the parties); Corcoran v.

Sanner, 854 P.2d 1376 (Colo. App. 1993); Denver Publ’g Co. v. Kirk, 729 P.2d 1004 (Colo.

App. 1986) (where contract terminable at will upon notice being given within certain time, lost

profits are recoverable upon termination, but only for the period of time for which notice should

have been given but was not); L.U. Cattle Co. v. Wilson, 714 P.2d 1344, 1348 (Colo. App.

1986) (lost profits recoverable “if they are reasonably ascertainable based on past experience and

not too speculative, remote, or contingent”); Fagerberg v. Webb, 678 P.2d 544, 548 (Colo. App.

1983) (“Once the fact of damage has been proven, uncertainty as to amount will not prevent

recovery.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Webb v. Dessert Seed Co., Inc., 718 P.2d 1057

(Colo. 1986); Stone v. Caroselli, 653 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 1982) (lost profits sufficiently

foreseeable to be recovered by manufacturer where distributors breached contract to promote the

product and expand the market and difficulty in ascertaining exact amount of those damages

does not preclude their recovery).

4. Whether lost profits were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made is

measured by an objective standard. Denny Constr., 199 P.3d at 743 (“the question is . . .

whether [the defendant] knew or should have known that such loss would probably occur”);

H.M.O. Sys., Inc. v. Choicecare Health Servs., Inc., 665 P.2d 635 (Colo. App. 1983); see also

Lawry v. Palm, 192 P.3d 550 (Colo. App. 2008). If the fact of future losses is a certainty, the

amount of the damages may be a reasonable approximation. Denny Constr.,, 199 P.3d at 746

(lost profit damages attributable to impaired bonding capacity for construction company not

speculative as a matter of law); Acoustic Mktg. Research, Inc., 198 P.3d at 99 (loss of future

royalties proved with reasonable certainty); Logixx Automation, Inc. v. Lawrence Michels

Family Trust, 56 P.3d 1224 (Colo. App. 2002) (evidence supported jury’s determination of

damages for lost profits); Rocky Mtn. Rhino Lining, Inc. v. Rhino Linings USA, Inc., 37 P.3d

458 (Colo. App. 2001) (trial court’s calculation of damages for lost profits was reasonable and

supported by evidence), rev’d on other grounds, 62 P.3d 142 (Colo. 2003); Wojtowicz v.

Greeley Anesthesia Servs., P.C., 961 P.2d 520 (Colo. App. 1997) (damages for lost profits are

measured by loss of net profits). However, “[t]he absence of prior profits in a newly established

business does not create a ‘per se’ exclusion of loss of profit as an item of damage if sufficient

competent evidence is proffered.” Int’l Tech. Instruments, Inc. v. Eng’g Measurements Co.,

678 P.2d 558, 563 (Colo. App. 1983); see also Terrones v. Tapia, 967 P.2d 216 (Colo. App.

1998) (summary judgment precluding plaintiff from recovering damages for lost profits proper

where evidence offered by plaintiff to establish these damages was speculative); Wilson & Co.

v. Walsenburg Sand & Gravel Co., 779 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Colo. App. 1989) (where the

evidence of lost profits was insufficient, any such damages would therefore be “speculative and,

thus, unrecoverable”).

5. In computing damages for lost profits, the factfinder should consider both discount and

inflation rates if competent evidence of these rates is presented. McDonald’s Corp. v.

Brentwood Ctr., Ltd., 942 P.2d 1308 (Colo. App. 1997).

6. For cases involving the sale of goods, see sections 4-2-715 and 4-2-719, C.R.S. See

also Int’l Tech. Instruments, Inc., 678 P.2d at 563.

30:40 DAMAGES — LIQUIDATED

If you find in favor of the plaintiff, (name), and if you also find the parties agreed on

an amount to be paid to the plaintiff in the event of a breach by the defendant, (name), then

you shall award the agreed amount as the plaintiff’s damages.

Notes on Use

1. See Notes on Use to Instruction 30:37 (introduction).

2. Instruction 30:37 (introduction) should be used with this instruction.

3. This instruction should not be given if the court has determined that the contractual

provision is an improper penalty rather than a provision for liquidated damages.

4. If, in addition to the kind of breach for which the defendant has agreed to pay

liquidated damages, the defendant has committed another breach not covered by a liquidated

damages clause, the plaintiff may also be entitled to recover general damages sustained as a

result of such breach. See Instruction 30:37.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Perino v. Jarvis, 135 Colo. 393, 312 P.2d 108 (1957);

and Bilz v. Powell, 50 Colo. 482, 117 P. 344 (1911). See also Powder Horn Constructors, Inc.

v. City of Florence, 754 P.2d 356 (Colo. 1988) (lack of mutual intent to liquidate damages);

Rohauer v. Little, 736 P.2d 403 (Colo. 1987); O’Hara Grp. Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Housing

Sys., Inc., 197 Colo. 530, 595 P.2d 679 (1979); Grooms v. Rice, 163 Colo. 234, 429 P.2d 298

(1967); Yerton v. Bowden, 762 P.2d 786 (Colo. App. 1988); Mgmt. Recruiters of Boulder,

Inc. v. Miller, 762 P.2d 763 (Colo. App. 1988); Emrich v. Joyce’s Submarine Sandwiches,

Inc., 751 P.2d 651 (Colo. App. 1987); Kirkland v. Allen, 678 P.2d 568 (Colo. App. 1984)

(liquidated damages clause held to be an unenforceable penalty); H.M.O. Sys., Inc. v.

Choicecare Health Servs., Inc., 665 P.2d 635 (Colo. App. 1983) (same); P & M Vending Co.

v. Half Shell of Boston, Inc., 41 Colo. App. 78, 579 P.2d 93 (1978); Oldis v. N.W. Grosse-

Rhode, 35 Colo. App. 46, 528 P.2d 944 (1974).

2. Liquidated damages provisions must be a reasonable estimate of presumed actual

damages. Klinger v. Adams Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1034 (Colo. 2006) (a

liquidated damages provision is valid and enforceable if three elements are met: (1) “the parties

intended to liquidate damages”; (2) “the amount of liquidated damages, when viewed as of the

time the contract is made, was a reasonable estimate of the presumed actual damages that the

breach would cause”; and (3) “when viewed again as of the date of the contract, it was difficult

to ascertain the amount of actual damages that would result from a breach”).

3. The party contending that a damages clause is an improper penalty carries the burden

of proving that contention. Jobe v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 240, 242, 526 P.2d 151, 152

(1974) (“[u]nless it patently appears from the contract itself that the liquidated damages agreed

upon are out of proportion to any possible loss . . . the party asserting that the damages clause

constitutes a penalty has the burden of proving that contention”); see also Rohauer, 736 P.2d at

410; Yerton, 762 P.2d at 788 (if a single amount is stipulated for several possible breaches, the

provision is invalid as a penalty if it is unreasonably disproportionate to the expected loss of the

specific breach being sued for); Wojtowicz v. Greeley Anesthesia Servs., P.C., 961 P.2d 520

(Colo. App. 1997) (liquidated damages provision so disproportionate to actual damages as to

constitute an unenforceable penalty as a matter of law). In some cases, there may be an issue of

law as to whether a contract provision is a liquidated damages provision subject to the rule that

such provisions must be reasonable. See Planned Pethood Plus, Inc. v. KeyCorp, Inc., 228

P.3d 262 (Colo. App. 2010) (prepayment penalty in promissory note is not liquidated damages

clause).

4. The mere presence of an option to seek either liquidated damages or actual damages

does not render the liquidated damages clause invalid as a matter of law. Ravenstar LLC v. One

Ski Hill Place LLC, 2017 CO 83, ¶ 15, 401 P.3d 552. But the option must be exclusive. If a

non-breaching party elects to pursue liquidated damages as allowed by the contract, the non-

breaching party may not also seek actual damages. “Otherwise, an election to pursue liquidated

damages would function as an invalid penalty.” Id. at ¶ 16.

5. The party attempting to avoid a liquidated damage provision of a contract has the

burden of proving that the provision is an unenforceable penalty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. City

& County of Denver, 40 P.3d 25 (Colo. App. 2001). A liquidated damage provision is valid and

enforceable if (1) at the time the contract was entered into, anticipated damages in case of a

breach were difficult to ascertain, (2) the parties mutually agreed to liquidate damages in

advance, and (3) the amount of the liquidated damages, when viewed at the time the contract was

made, was a reasonable estimate of the potential general damages that a breach would cause. Id.;

see also Klinger, 130 P.3d at 1034 (listing factors used to determine whether a liquidated

damages provision constitutes a penalty).

6. For sales contracts governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, the determination of

whether a provision is a penalty or a valid liquidated damages clause should be made on the

basis of the criteria set out in section 4-2-718, C.R.S. For other contracts, in determining whether

a liquidated damages clause is valid, the court should consider whether a) the amount stipulated

was at the time a reasonable estimate of any damages which might result from a breach; b) the

anticipated damages in the event of a breach would have been uncertain or difficult to prove; and

c) the parties intended to liquidate damages in advance. Butler v. Lembeck, 182 P.3d 1185

(Colo. App. 2007).

7. “[A] liquidated damages clause addressing delay in a performance contract will not be

enforced where such delay is due in whole or in part to the fault of the party claiming the

clause’s benefit.” Medema Homes, Inc. v. Lynn, 647 P.2d 664, 667 (Colo. 1982); accord City

of Westminster v. Centric-Jones Constructors, 100 P.3d 472 (Colo. App. 2003).

8. A non-competition provision in an employment contract with a physician that provides

for liquidated damages in the event of a breach is governed by section 8-2-113(3), C.R.S. See,

e.g., Wojtowicz, 961 P.2d 521-22.

9. As to a plaintiff’s right to recover interest on liquidated damages for breach of

contract, see the introductory note to this Chapter and Board of County Commissioners, 40

P.3d at 35.

30:41 DAMAGES ― NOMINAL

If you find in favor of the plaintiff, but do not award any general, special, or

liquidated damages, you shall award the plaintiff nominal damages in the sum of one

dollar.

Notes on Use

1. See the Notes on Use to Instruction 30:37 (introduction).

2. Instruction 30:37 (introduction) should be used with this instruction, along with

instructions for any other particular damages involved in the case: Instruction 30:38 (general),

Instruction 30:39 (special), or Instruction 30:40 (liquidated).

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Hoehne Ditch Co. v. John Flood Ditch Co., 76 Colo.

500, 233 P. 167 (1925); Patrick v. Colorado Smelting Co., 20 Colo. 268, 38 P. 236 (1894);

City of Westminster v. Centric-Jones Constructors, 100 P.3d 472 (Colo. App. 2003); and

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346(2) (1981). As a matter of law, nominal damages

are one dollar. City of Westminster, 100 P.3d at 481; Overland Dev. Co. v. Marston Slopes

Dev. Co., 773 P.2d 1112 (Colo. App. 1989); Colo. Inv. Servs., Inc. v. Hager, 685 P.2d 1371

(Colo. App. 1984) (quoting the language of a former version of this instruction with approval).

2. In the absence of sufficient proof of general damages, the plaintiff is nonetheless

entitled to nominal damages. See Pomeranz v. McDonald’s Corp., 843 P.2d 1378 (Colo. 1993)

(in breach of contract action involving future damages, rule of certainty requires that plaintiff

prove that damages will in fact accrue in the future and provide sufficient admissible evidence to

enable trier of fact to compute a fair approximation of loss); Interbank Invs. L.L.C. v. Vail

Valley Consol. Water Dist., 12 P.3d 1224 (Colo. App. 2000); see also Riggs v. McMurtry, 157

Colo. 33, 400 P.2d 916 (1965) (evidence must provide reasonable basis for computation of

damages); McDonald’s Corp. v. Brentwood Ctr., Ltd., 942 P.2d 1308 (Colo. App. 1997) (lost

profits may not be awarded if they are speculative, remote, imaginary, or impossible to

ascertain).

30:42 DAMAGES — PURCHASER’S FOR BREACH OF LAND PURCHASE

CONTRACT

(The amount of damages, if any, is the market value of the property at the time of

the breach minus the contract price, plus all payments made by the plaintiff on the

contract.)

Notes on Use

1. When applicable, this instruction should be used as the insertion in Instruction 30:38.

2. If the plaintiff has not claimed to have made any payments on the contract, the last

clause relating to such payments should be omitted.

3. When necessary, the definition of market value set out in the second paragraph of

Instruction 36:3 may be given with this instruction.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Medema Homes, Inc. v. Lynn, 647 P.2d 664 (Colo.

1982) (citing a former version of this instruction); Minshall v. Case, 148 Colo. 12, 364 P.2d 868

(1961); and Bennett v. Price, 692 P.2d 1138 (Colo. App. 1984) (also adopts as the definition of

market value the definition set out in the second paragraph of Instruction 36:3).

30:43 DAMAGES ― SELLER’S FOR BREACH OF LAND PURCHASE CONTRACT

(The amount of damages, if any, is the contract price minus the market value of the

property at the time of the breach, minus any payments made by the defendant on the

contract.)

Notes on Use

1. When applicable, this instruction should be used as the insertion in Instruction 30:38.

2. If there is no dispute that the defendant in fact made no payments on the contract, the

clause relating to such payments should be omitted.

3. When necessary, the definition of market value set out in the second paragraph of

Instruction 36:3 may be given with this instruction.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Watrous v. Hilliard, 38 Colo. 255, 88 P. 185 (1906).

See also Higbie v. Johnson, 626 P.2d 1147 (Colo. App. 1980); Sorenson v. Connelly, 36 Colo.

App. 168, 536 P.2d 328 (1975); F. Poss Farms, Inc. v. Miller, 35 Colo. App. 152, 529 P.2d

1343 (1974).

30:44 DAMAGES ― EMPLOYER’S FOR EMPLOYEE’S BREACH OF PERSONAL

SERVICE CONTRACT

(The amount of damages, if any, is the reasonable cost of comparable services minus

the amount the plaintiff originally agreed to pay the defendant.)

Notes on Use

When applicable, this instruction should be used as the insertion in Instruction 30:38.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Cannon Coal Co. v. Taggart, 1 Colo. App. 60, 27 P.

238 (1891).

30:45 DAMAGES ― BUILDER’S FOR BREACH OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

BY OWNER PRIOR TO COMPLETION

(The contract price agreed upon by the parties:

(a) minus any payments made by the defendant on the contract; and

(b) minus what it would have cost the plaintiff if [he] [she] had completed the

[describe the subject matter of the contract] according to the contract.)

Notes on Use

1. When applicable, this instruction should be used as the insertion in Instruction 30:38.

2. If there is no dispute that the defendant has made no payments on the contract, clause

(a) should be omitted.

3. If necessary, Instruction 30:47 defining “agreed-upon contract price” should be given

with this instruction.

4. Also, if necessary, another instruction stating what factors should be considered in

determining the builder’s cost of completion should be given.

5. In a few cases, the builder’s damages may be the amount of the builder’s reasonable

expenditures incurred prior to the time of the breach by the owner. In those cases, the instruction

should be modified accordingly. Two such situations are when (a) the owner has repudiated the

contract or the owner’s breach was such as to amount to a repudiation, thereby giving the builder

the alternative restitutional remedy of quantum meruit, or (b) the plaintiff is unable to prove the

cost of completing the contract. See 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 60.6 (rev.

ed. 2005); MCCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 164-166 (1935).

6. When the builder has fully performed the contract, the builder’s measure of damages is

the agreed-upon contract price. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra, at § 60.6. The measure of

damages when the builder has substantially performed is set out in Instruction 30:46.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Gundersons, Inc. v. Tull, 678 P.2d 1061 (Colo. App.

1983) (in proving lost profits in the form of the out-of-bargain measure of contract damages,

once the fact of damage has been proved, uncertainty as to amount of damages will not bar

recovery), rev’d on other grounds, 709 P.2d 940 (Colo. 1985); Bruce Hughes, Inc. v. Ingels &

Associates, Inc., 653 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1982) (citing and approving the giving of this

instruction); Jasken v. Sheehy Construction Co., 642 P.2d 58 (Colo. App. 1982) (subcontractor

entitled to same measure of damages for wrongful termination by contractor of construction

subcontract); and Comfort Homes, Inc. v. Peterson, 37 Colo. App. 516, 549 P.2d 1087 (1976)

(citing former version of this instruction and applying the rule stated).

30:46 DAMAGES ― BUILDER’S FOR SUBSTANTIAL THOUGH NOT COMPLETE

PERFORMANCE OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

(The contract price agreed to by the parties:

(a) minus any payments made by the defendant, and

(b) minus the reasonable cost to the defendant of putting the [describe the subject

matter of the contract] in the condition it would have been in had the contract been

performed according to its terms.)

Notes on Use

1. When applicable, this instruction is to be used as the insertion in Instruction 30:38.

2. Normally, in a construction contract, the full or at least substantial performance by the

builder is a condition precedent to the builder’s right to recover against the owner on the

contract. If the owner, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 9(c), has pleaded the lack of complete performance

as the nonperformance of such a condition precedent, then the builder must prove either

complete or substantial performance. See Note 1 of the Notes on Use to Instruction 30:10 and

Instruction 30:11 (defining “substantial performance”). This instruction is applicable to these

cases and may be given as worded if there is no dispute as to the fact that the plaintiff, at most,

rendered only substantial performance. However, if the plaintiff claims full performance and

there is supporting evidence for the plaintiff’s claim, then this instruction should be appropriately

modified so that it is clear to the jury that clause (b) applies only if they find the plaintiff

rendered substantial performance as opposed to complete or full performance. Also, where

clause (b) is applicable, while the burden of proving at least substantial performance is on the

plaintiff, the burden of proving the cost of completing performance may in certain circumstances

be on the defendant. In these circumstances, an additional instruction on this point should be

given to the jury. See Zambakian v. Leson, 79 Colo. 350, 246 P. 268 (1926); Morris v.

Hokosona, 26 Colo. App. 251, 143 P. 826 (1914).

3. Even though the builder may not have rendered substantial performance and, therefore,

cannot recover on the express contract, the builder may nonetheless be entitled to recover for the

reasonable value of his or her services on the theory of quantum meruit, less any damages

resulting to the other party because of the builder’s breach. See Reynolds v. Armstead, 166

Colo. 372, 443 P.2d 990 (1968); Denver Ventures, Inc. v. Arlington Lane Corp., 754 P.2d 785

(Colo. App. 1988).

4. If there is no dispute that the defendant has made no payments on the contract, clause

(a) should be omitted.

5. If the application of clause (b) by the jury would result in unreasonable economic

waste, for example, the cost of substituting the specified brand of water pipe for that which the

plaintiff did install, that was virtually identical, this instruction must be appropriately modified.

See Campbell v. Koin, 154 Colo. 425, 391 P.2d 365 (1964).

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Campbell, 154 Colo. at 429-30, 391 P.2d at 367 (citing

several earlier cases). See also Houy v. Davis Oil Co., 175 Colo. 180, 486 P.2d 18 (1971); Little

Thompson Water Ass’n v. Strawn, 171 Colo. 295, 466 P.2d 915 (1970) (involving a service

contract rather than a construction contract).

30:47 DEFINITION ― CONTRACT PRICE AGREED UPON

The contract price agreed upon by the parties means the price originally agreed to

in the contract, plus or minus adjustments for any later changes agreed to by the parties.

Notes on Use

When necessary, this instruction is to be used with such Instructions as 30:48and 30:49.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Granberry v. Perlmutter, 147 Colo. 474, 364 P.2d 211

(1961) (by implication); Hottel v. Poudre Valley Reservoir Co., 41 Colo. 370, 92 P. 918

(1907); and Sisters of Charity v. Burke, 22 Colo. App. 230, 124 P. 472 (1912).

30:48 DAMAGES ― BUILDER’S FOR OWNER’S PARTIAL BREACH — FAILURE

TO MAKE INSTALLMENT PAYMENT

(The amount of any installment payment[s] due the plaintiff under the contract.)

Notes on Use

When applicable, this instruction should be used as the insertion in Instruction 30:38.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 60.4

(rev. ed. 2005).

30:49 DAMAGES ― OWNER’S FOR BREACH OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT BY

BUILDER

(The reasonable cost to the plaintiff of completing the [describe the subject matter of

the contract] according to the contract, minus any unpaid balance of the contract price.)

Notes on Use

1. When applicable, this instruction should be used as the insertion in Instruction 30:38.

2. Generally, the measure of damages for breach of a construction contract by the

contractor is an amount that would put the owner “in the same position he would have been had

the breach not occurred.” Pomeranz v. McDonald’s Corp., 843 P.2d 1378, 1381 (Colo. 1993);

see City of Westminster v. Centric-Jones Constructors, 100 P.3d 472 (Colo. App. 2003)

(applying benefit-of-bargain rule).

3. In addition to the damages covered by this instruction, the plaintiff may also be entitled

to recover damages for delay. See Instruction 30:50.

4. In cases in which unreasonable economic waste would result if this instruction were

given, the following should be substituted: “The market value of the (describe the subject matter

of the contract) had the contract been fully performed less the market value of the (describe the

subject matter of the contract) as it now exists.” See Gold Rush Invs., Inc. v. G.E. Johnson

Constr. Co., 807 P.2d 1169 (Colo. App. 1990); see also Campbell v. Koin, 154 Colo. 425, 391

P.2d 365 (1964); Sanford v. Kobey Bros. Constr. Corp., 689 P.2d 724 (Colo. App. 1984);

Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Silvercool Serv. Co., 687 P.2d 464 (Colo. App. 1984). The

phrase “as it now exists” may not always be appropriate, and should be modified if necessary,

e.g., if the building had been damaged after the plaintiff took control of it from the defendant, or

the plaintiff, after taking control, made improvements, thereby increasing its value.

5. “If the defect is remedial, recovery will be based on the [reasonable] cost to repair the

defect,” even though that cost may significantly exceed the original contract price. Olson

Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Douglas Jardine, Inc., 626 P.2d 750, 752 (Colo. App. 1981).

“Where . . . part of the deficiencies can be repaired [or completed] at reasonable cost and part

cannot, the cost of repair [or completion] can be assessed as the measure of damages [as] to the

former and the difference in market value can be used as to the latter.” Summit Constr. Co. v.

Yeager Garden Acres, Inc., 28 Colo. App. 110, 121, 470 P.2d 870, 875 (1970); see Sanford,

689 P.2d at 726. In those cases an appropriate instruction combining the principal instruction and

the alternate instruction should be given.

6. Where a builder-developer breaches a “promise to construct general amenities located

on property not owned by the promisee, commonly referred to as ‘off-site’ facilities[,]” the

proper measure of damages is “the diminution in value of the property purchased” by the

promisee, rather than the cost of completing such off-site work. Kniffin v. Colo. W. Dev. Co.,

622 P.2d 586, 591 (Colo. App. 1980); accord Seago v. Fellet, 676 P.2d 1224 (Colo. App. 1983).

In those circumstances, an instruction setting forth this “difference in market value” measure of

damages should be given, rather than this instruction. See, e.g., Instruction 6:11, appropriately

modified.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Fleming v. Scott, 141 Colo. 449, 348 P.2d 701

(1960); Newcomb v. Schaeffler, 131 Colo. 56, 279 P.2d 409 (1955); and McKinley v. Willow

Construction Co., Inc., 693 P.2d 1023 (Colo. App. 1984).

2. Under section 5-12-102(1)(a) and (3), C.R.S., prejudgment interest may be awarded on

damages for breach of a construction contract, as money wrongfully withheld, even though the

amount of such damages was unliquidated at the time of the breach. Hott v. Tillotson-Lewis

Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 1220 (Colo. App. 1983). Under section 5-12-102(1)(b), where damages

for costs to replace a defective heating system are appropriate, interest accrues from the time of

the replacement. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Holmes, 193 P.3d 821 (Colo. 2008) (strict

liability case).

30:50 DAMAGES ― OWNER’S FOR DELAY IN COMPLETION OF

CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

(The reasonable net rental value, that is, the gross rental value of the [describe the

subject matter of the contract] minus all reasonable expenses that normally would be

incurred in connection with the occupancy of the [describe the subject matter of the contract]

during the period for which the completion was delayed.)

Notes on Use

1. When applicable, this instruction should be used as the insertion in Instruction 30:38.

A delay may result in certain special damages that may also be recoverable. See, e.g., CHARLES

T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 170 (1935); see also Tricon Kent Co. v. Lafarge N. Am.,

Inc., 186 P.3d 155 (Colo. App. 2008) (In a suit by a subcontractor against a general contractor,

the “no damages for delay” clause was valid and enforceable, but construed against the general

contractor and invalidated on the basis of the general contractor’s affirmative and willful

interference with the subcontractor’s performance. In dicta, the court stated that the general rule

also applies to contracts with owners.).

2. This instruction is applicable whether or not the owner intended to rent the building

upon completion. 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 60.4 (rev. ed. 2005).

3. If the damages for delay have been covered by a liquidated damages provision,

Instruction 30:40 will normally be the appropriate instruction rather than this instruction.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by McIntire v. Barnes, 4 Colo. 285 (1878).

30:51 DAMAGES ― BROKER’S FOR BREACH OF REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

CONTRACT

(That percentage of the sales price the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff as [his]

[her] commission.)

Notes on Use

1. When applicable, see Instruction 30:56 (listing elements of liability for a real estate

commission claim), this instruction should be used as the insertion in Instruction 30:38.

2. This instruction has been drafted for what is believed to be the typical situation,

namely, that the defendant did consummate the sale to the purchaser. When that is not the case,

this instruction should be appropriately modified. For example, in a case where the plaintiff

found a buyer to purchase on the defendant’s original terms and then the defendant refused to

sell, the following would generally be more appropriate: “that percentage of the selling price the

defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff as [his] [her] commission if the property were sold at that or

a better price.”

3. If the parties agreed to a different measure for the commission, this instruction should

be modified accordingly.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Watson v. United Farm Agency, Inc., 165 Colo. 439,

439 P.2d 738 (1968) (broker’s commission is dependent upon terms of the listing agreement).

See also Notes on Use and Source and Authority to Instruction 30:56.

30:52 DAMAGES — OWNER’S FOR WRONGFUL DEPRIVATION OF USE OF A

CHATTEL

(Loss of use may be measured by either lost profits or reasonable rental value.)

Notes on Use

When applicable, this instruction should be used as the insertion in Instruction 30:38.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Koenig v. PurCo Fleet Services, Inc., 2012 CO 56, ¶

16, 285 P.3d 979 (the loss of use damages can be measured by either lost profits or reasonable

rental value without proof of probable rental income).

30:53 DAMAGES — OWNER’S FOR BREACH OF A COVENANT AGAINST

ENCUMBRANCES

(The difference between the fair market value of the property with and without the

encumbrance.)

Notes on Use

When applicable, this instruction should be used as the insertion in Instruction 30:38.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by Loveland Essential Group, LLC v. Grommon Farms,

Inc., 251 P.3d 1109 (Colo. App. 2010) (where the encumbrance at issue is a lease, and the lease

is not the highest and best use of the property, the measure of damages is the difference between

the fair market value of the property with the lease and the fair market value without the lease).

F. PARTICULAR CONTRACTS

30:54 CLAIM ― BUILDING CONTRACTOR’S BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY

― ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY

For the plaintiff, (name), to recover from the defendant, (name), on (his) (her) claim

of breach of implied warranty, you must find both of the following have been proved by a

preponderance of the evidence:

1. (As a business venture, the) (The) defendant (entered into a contract with the

plaintiff to build [insert an appropriate description, e.g., “a house for the plaintiff”]) ([built]

[or] [had built] [insert an appropriate description, e.g., “a house”] which [he] [she] [sold to

the plaintiff]); and

2. When the defendant (gave possession of) (sold) the (insert appropriate description,

e.g., “house”) to the plaintiff, the (insert appropriate description, e.g., “house”) did not

comply with one or more of the warranties the law implies as part of such a (construction

contract) (contract of sale).

If you find that either one or both of these statements has not been proved, then

your verdict must be for the defendant.

On the other hand, if you find that both of these statements have been proved, (then

your verdict must be for the plaintiff) (then you must consider the defendant’s affirmative

defense(s) of [insert any affirmative defense that would be a complete defense to plaintiff’s

claim]).

If you find that (this affirmative defense has) (any one or more of these affirmative

defenses have) been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be

for the defendant.

However, if you find that (this affirmative defense has not) (none of these

affirmative defenses have) been proved, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff.

Notes on Use

1. Whenever this instruction is given, Instruction 30:55 (building contractor’s implied

warranties) must also be given or, in lieu of giving that instruction, this instruction may be

appropriately modified to describe specifically the implied warranty or warranties the plaintiff

claims (and has presented sufficient evidence of) the defendant failed to comply with, e.g., a

building set-back requirement set out in the local zoning ordinance.

2. Omit either numbered paragraph, the facts of which are not in dispute, and revise the

other portions of the instruction as necessary.

3. Use whichever parenthesized or bracketed words and phrases are most appropriate, and

omit the last two paragraphs if the defendant has put no affirmative defense in issue or there is

insufficient evidence to support any defense.

4. Though mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense, see Instruction 5:2, only

rarely, if ever, will it be a complete defense. For this reason, mitigation should not be identified

as an affirmative defense in the concluding paragraphs of this instruction. Instead, if supported

by sufficient evidence, Instruction 5:2 should be given along with the actual damages instruction

appropriate to the claim and the evidence in the case.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399

(1964), in which the court also held that the warranties applied whether the house was sold while

under construction or after it had been completed. See also Mulhern v. Hederich, 163 Colo.

275, 430 P.2d 469 (1967); Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Wall v.

Foster Petroleum Corp., 791 P.2d 1148 (Colo. App. 1989) (allowing rescission and restitution

as an alternative remedy for breach of warranty damages).

2. The failure to correct defects caused by hazards of soil, weather, labor, and other like

conditions that are the responsibility of the builder is a failure to construct the building in a

workmanlike manner. Newcomb v. Schaeffler, 131 Colo. 56, 279 P.2d 409 (1955).

3. Privity is an essential element of claims for breach of implied warranties arising from

transactions involving real property. Forest City Stapleton Inc. v. Rogers, 2017 CO 23, ¶ 7,

393 P.3d 487, 489 (“We hold that, because breach of the implied warranty of suitability is a

contract claim, privity of contract is required to prevail on such a claim.”). The implied warranty

of fitness for habitation does not extend to a purchaser against a seller of a house which had

previously been occupied. See H.B. Bolas Enters., Inc. v. Zarlengo, 156 Colo. 530, 400 P.2d

447 (1965); see also Gallegos v. Graff, 32 Colo. App. 213, 215, 508 P.2d 798, 799 (1973)

(“implied warranty . . . is available to the buyer of a newly constructed house against the builder-

vendor . . . [but] this . . . warranty . . . does not extend to purchasers of a used home from [the

original purchasers and occupiers] who were not the builders”); Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475,

478, 503 P.2d 365, 367 (1972) (where “construction company knows, or should know, that the

intended purchaser and first occupant will not be the realty company [having the house built], but

rather the initial home owner, the implied warranty . . . extends to that first purchaser”). But see

Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978) (implied

warranty does run to second buyer where builder repurchased from first buyer, refurbished the

home, and resold it as a new home to second buyer).

4. The implied warranty of suitability arises when a commercial developer improves and

sells land for the express purpose of residential construction. Rusch v. Lincoln-Devore Testing

Lab., Inc., 698 P.2d 832 (Colo. App. 1984). The warranty of suitability has three elements: (1)

land is improved and sold for a particular purpose; (2) a vendor has reason to know that the

purchaser is relying upon the skill or expertise of the vendor in improving the parcel for that

particular purpose; and (3) the purchaser does in fact rely.

5. In actions or proceedings filed on or after April 25, 2003, asserting a “claim,

counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim for damages or loss to, or the loss of use of, real

or personal property or personal injury caused by a defect in the design or construction of an

improvement to real property,” see the Construction Defect Action Reform Act, §§ 13-20-801 to

-808, C.R.S. § 13-20-802.5(1). In particular, with respect to claims based on breach of warranty,

especially those based on express warranty, see section 13-20-807.

6. As an alternative remedy to a contract action for breach of implied warranties under

this instruction, a subsequent purchaser may sue on the theory of negligence to recover property

damage to the structure caused by the negligence of the home builder. Further, because

“Colorado has recognized recovery of damages for negligence without the parties being in

privity of contract,” a remote subsequent purchaser, not in privity of contract with the home

builder, may maintain such a negligence action. Weller v. Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc., 44 Colo.

App. 470, 471, 622 P.2d 577, 578 (1980), aff’d, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983) (limiting the rule of

the case “to latent defects which the purchaser was unable to discover prior to purchase”); see

also Johnson v. Graham, 679 P.2d 1090 (Colo. App. 1983) (undiscovered failure to install

drain or properly compact soil could be considered latent defects), rev’d in part on other grounds

sub nom. Tri-Aspen Constr. Co. v. Johnson, 714 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1986).

7. To be liable as a builder under this instruction the defendant must have been a person

regularly engaged in the “business of building” so that the sale is commercial in nature, rather

than casual or personal. Mazurek v. Nielsen, 42 Colo. App. 386, 599 P.2d 269; accord

Erickson v. Oberlohr, 749 P.2d 996 (Colo. App. 1987). Even though a builder-vendor may

have begun construction of a house as a personal residence, if, before completion, he or she puts

the house on the market in the capacity of a builder-vendor, a subsequent sale is a “commercial”

one to which the implied warranties set out in this instruction attach. Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d

1031 (Colo. 1981); see also Davies v. Bradley, 676 P.2d 1242 (Colo. App. 1983) (fact that

purchasers were unaware the seller was also the builder does not preclude purchaser’s claim for

breach of warranty).

8. To recover on the theory of breach of the implied warranty of habitability, a purchaser

need not first have made an inspection of the property. Moreover, the willful concealment of

defects obviates any requirement of inspection, even for obvious defects, because in a case of

concealment the purchaser need only have been ignorant of the facts concealed. Id.

9. An implied warranty comparable to the warranties covered by this instruction may

arise from the sale of land by a commercial developer who improves land and sells it for an

express purpose. See, e.g., Rusch, 698 P.2d at 835 (recognizing an implied warranty of fitness

for a particular purpose).

10. A builder or developer of residential construction must “provide the purchaser with a

copy of a summary report of the analysis and the site recommendations” concerning soils and

land hazards. § 6-6.5-101(1), C.R.S. In addition to “any other liability or penalty,” the failure to

provide such a report renders the developer or builder liable to the purchaser for a $500.00 civil

penalty. § 6-6.5-101(2).

30:55 DEFINITION ― BUILDING CONTRACTOR’S IMPLIED WARRANTIES

A person who enters into a contract to build a building or structure for another or

who, as a business venture, builds or has built a structure or building and sells that

structure or building to another impliedly warrants, that is, impliedly promises, that:

1. All relevant provisions of the (describe any relevant codes) applicable to the

construction of the structure or building have been complied with;

2. All work on the structure or the building has been done in a workmanlike

manner; and

3. The building or structure is suitable for the ordinary purposes for which it might

reasonably be used.

Notes on Use

1. Note 1 of the Notes on Use to Instruction 30:54 (listing elements of liability for

building contractor’s breach of implied warranty claim) is also applicable to this instruction.

2. Omit any numbered subparagraph or other portions of this instruction that are not

appropriate to the evidence in the case.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399

(1964).

2. A builder of a new house impliedly warrants the house has been built in a workmanlike

manner and that it is fit for habitation. This implied warranty includes a garage “built and sold as

an integral part of the purchase of the house.” Roper v. Spring Lake Dev. Co., 789 P.2d 483,

486 (Colo. App. 1990) (foul odor in attached garage rendered townhouse unfit for its intended

use). The implied warranty that the structure was built in a workmanlike manner includes the

workmanlike grading of the surrounding premises when the construction of the structure cannot

be divorced from that work and the responsibility for doing that work has been undertaken by the

contractor. Shiffers v. Cunningham Shepherd Builders Co., 28 Colo. App. 29, 470 P.2d 593

(1970). The implied warranty of habitability of a house (i.e., “suitable for its intended use”) also

includes a water supply sufficient in quantity and quality for its useful occupancy. Mazurek v.

Nielsen, 42 Colo. App. 386, 599 P.2d 269 (1979). It does not include, “[h]owever, a claim based

solely on the lack of a certificate of occupancy . . . [because the] warranty protects against

construction defects, not procedural defects.” Dann v. Perrotti & Hauptman Dev. Co., 670

P.2d 448, 451 (Colo. App. 1983). In cases involving these and similar situations, this instruction

should be modified according to the particular facts.

3. “These warranties may be limited by an express provision in the contract between the

parties. However, such limitation must be accomplished by clear and unambiguous language.”

Belt v. Spencer, 41 Colo. App. 227, 230, 585 P.2d 922, 925 (1978); accord Sloat v. Matheny,

625 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981) (ambiguous language held insufficient to constitute disclaimer);

Davies v. Bradley, 676 P.2d 1242 (Colo. App. 1983) (“as is” language may not be sufficient to

disclaim an implied warranty).

4. In Town of Alma v. AZCO Construction, Inc., 985 P.2d 56 (Colo. App. 1999), aff’d

on other grounds, 10 P.3d 1256 (Colo. 2000), the court declined to recognize a claim for breach

of implied warranty of sound workmanship on a public works contract.

30:56 CLAIM ― REAL ESTATE COMMISSION ― ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY

For the plaintiff, (name), to recover from the defendant, (name), on (his) (her) claim

to recover a real estate commission, you must find all of the following have been proved by

a preponderance of the evidence:

1. The plaintiff held a valid license as a real estate broker under the laws of

Colorado;

2. The plaintiff, acting as a real estate broker, entered into a listing agreement with

the defendant to sell the defendant’s property;

3. [insert the performance or occurrence of any conditions precedent the defendant has

denied under C.R.C.P. 9(c)];

4. The plaintiff produced a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to complete

the purchase of the property according to the terms of the listing agreement; and

5. The sale of the property was (completed between the defendant and the

purchaser) (prevented by the defendant’s refusal or neglect to complete the sale).

If you find that any one or more of these (number) statements has not been proved,

then your verdict must be for the defendant.

On the other hand, if you find that all of these (number) statements have been

proved, (then your verdict must be for the plaintiff) (then you must consider the

defendant’s affirmative defense(s) of [insert any affirmative defense that would be a complete

defense to plaintiff’s claim]).

If you find that (this affirmative defense has) (any one or more of these affirmative

defenses have not) been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must

be for the defendant.

However, if you find that (this affirmative defense has not) (none of these

affirmative defenses have) been proved, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff.

Notes on Use

1. Use whichever parenthesized phrase in numbered paragraph 5 of the instruction is

more appropriate.

2. Omit any numbered paragraphs, the facts of which are not in dispute, and omit the last

two paragraphs if the defendant has put no affirmative defense in issue or there is insufficient

evidence to support any defense.

3. Though mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense, see Instruction 5:2, only

rarely, if ever, will it be a complete defense. For this reason, mitigation should not be identified

as an affirmative defense in the concluding paragraphs of this instruction. Instead, if supported

by sufficient evidence, Instruction 5:2 should be given along with the actual damages instruction

appropriate to the claim and the evidence in the case.

4. When necessary, other appropriate instructions defining such terms as “real estate

broker” must also be given with this instruction.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by Fletcher v. Garrett, 167 Colo. 60, 445 P.2d 401

(1968) (supports numbered paragraph 4 of the instruction and also holds contract required in

numbered paragraph 2 may be implied from the circumstances); Osborn v. Razatos Realty Co.,

158 Colo. 446, 407 P.2d 342 (1965) (oral contract of employment as an agent sufficient);

Stavely v. Johnson, 157 Colo. 56, 400 P.2d 922 (1965) (contract between plaintiff and

defendant essential); Circle T Corp. v. Crocker, 155 Colo. 263, 393 P.2d 744 (1964) (actual

consummation of the sale not a condition to broker’s right to commission); Garrett v.

Richardson, 149 Colo. 449, 369 P.2d 566 (1962) (“exclusive” listing becomes irrevocable for

the period of time agreed upon where broker expends money or renders services in reliance);

Hayutin v. De Andrea, 139 Colo. 40, 337 P.2d 383 (1959) (not necessary that broker be the sole

cause of the sale, but he must be a predominating effective cause and not merely indirect,

incidental, or contributing cause); Carpenter v. Francis, 136 Colo. 494, 319 P.2d 497 (1957)

(states rules of numbered paragraphs 2 and 4); McCullough v. Thompson, 133 Colo. 352, 295

P.2d 221 (1956) (consummation of the sale not a condition to broker’s right to recover); Benham

v. Heyde, 122 Colo. 233, 221 P.2d 1078 (1950) (supports the requirement set out in numbered

paragraph 1); Dunton v. Stemme, 117 Colo. 327, 187 P.2d 593 (1947) (proof of one of the

statutory conditions set out in numbered paragraph 5 essential to broker’s right to recover

commission); Mapes v. City of Walsenburg,, 151 P.3d 574 (Colo. App. 2006) (broker entitled

to commission once qualified buyer produced even though seller refuses to consummate

transaction); and Denver 1500, Inc. v. Wall, 43 Colo. App. 282, 602 P.2d 903 (1979) (under

paragraph 5, a broker who thwarts the closing of a sale is not entitled to a commission on the

basis of the claim that the seller refused or neglected to make the sale).

2. “It has long been the law in Colorado that a broker who breaches his fiduciary duty

forfeits his right to a commission.” T-A-L-L, Inc. v. Moore & Co., 765 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Colo.

App. 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 792 P.2d 794 (Colo. 1990); accord

Mabry v. Tom Sanger & Co., 33 P.3d 1206 (Colo. App. 2001).

3. The requirement in paragraph 1 of the instruction that the plaintiff be a licensed broker

is based on sections 12-61-102, 12-61-117, and 12-61-119, C.R.S. See Kerr v. Australia Pac.

Res., Ltd., 841 P.2d 401 (Colo. App. 1992); see also Barton v. Sittner, 723 P.2d 153 (Colo.

App. 1986); Brakhage v. Georgetown Assocs., Inc., 33 Colo. App. 385, 523 P.2d 145 (1974).

This requirement applies in an action for a commission for the sale of a business if the sale

includes a transfer of any interest in real estate, even though the latter is not a dominant feature

of the whole transaction. See Broughall v. Black Forest Dev. Co., 196 Colo. 503, 593 P.2d 314

(1978) (overruling Cary v. Borden Co., 153 Colo. 344, 386 P.2d 585 (1963), in effect, because

of an intervening change in the statutory definition of real estate broker); see also Lieff v.

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Medco Prof’l Servs. Corp., 973 P.2d 1276 (Colo. App. 1998) (licensure requirements of statute

apply where entire stock of corporation which holds leasehold interest in property is sold).

4. While a broker licensed in another state may receive a share of a commission on a

cooperative transaction with a broker licensed in Colorado, see § 12-61-101(2)(b)(XIV), C.R.S.,

such a broker may not, because of the provisions of section 12-61-102, recover the commission

(or a share of the commission) directly in his or her own right in an action against the seller.

Notwithstanding this restriction, such a broker may, however, sue the seller directly as an

assignee of the rights of the broker licensed in Colorado or on the basis of his or her own right to

recover on the theory of unjust enrichment. Backus v. Apishapa Land & Cattle Co., 44 Colo.

App. 59, 615 P.2d 42 (1980). The fact that a broker, otherwise properly licensed, is operating out

of a branch office for which a duplicate license has not been obtained does not render

commission contracts entered into through such office void. Holter v. Moore & Co., 681 P.2d

962 (Colo. App. 1983) (analyzing a former version of section 12-61-103(2), C.R.S., that required

a separate license for each branch office). A corporation acting on its own behalf through its

agent to acquire an interest in real property for itself and another as partners is not required to be

licensed as a real estate broker. Am. W. Motel Brokers, Inc. v. Wu, 697 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1985)

(citing and applying former section 12-61-101(4)(d), C.R.S.).

5. For the definition of a real estate broker, see section 12-61-101(2)(a). When the

contract of employment was allegedly entered into by an authorized agent of the broker,

numbered paragraph 2 of the instruction should be appropriately modified.

6. “Oral listing contracts for the sale of real estate are valid, and may be implied from

surrounding circumstances.” Hayes v. N. Table Mtn. Corp., 43 Colo. App. 467, 469, 608 P.2d

830, 831 (1979).

7. Numbered paragraph 4 of the instruction sets out the first basic condition required by

section 12-61-201, C.R.S.

8. If more than one broker was employed to find a buyer, the plaintiff must establish that

he or she was the first to find a buyer who was ready, willing, and able to make the purchase, and

numbered paragraph 4 in such circumstances should be appropriately modified. See City of

Pueblo v. Leach Realty Co., 149 Colo. 92, 368 P.2d 195 (1962). This rule does not apply,

however, if the parties in their contract have provided otherwise, as, e.g., with an “exclusive”

listing contract. See, e.g., Cooley Inv. Co. v. Jones, 780 P.2d 29, 31 (Colo. App. 1989)

(“Generally, under an exclusive right to sell contract, if the property is sold within the time

prescribed, the broker is entitled to a commission, irrespective of how the sale came about.”).

9. The plaintiff has proved that he or she “produced” a purchaser when the plaintiff has

established that he or she or his or her employee or agent was the efficient agent or procuring

cause of the sale, see Dickey v. Waggoner, 108 Colo. 197, 114 P.2d 1097 (1941), or that the

plaintiff had found a purchaser who was willing to purchase on the terms and conditions

originally prescribed by the defendant or on terms the defendant subsequently agreed were

acceptable. See City of Pueblo v. Leach Realty Co., 149 Colo. 92, 368 P.2d 195 (1962);

Bradley Realty Inv. Co. v. Shwartz, 145 Colo. 65, 357 P.2d 638 (1960); see also Sherman

Agency v. Carey, 195 Colo. 277, 577 P.2d 759 (1978); Circle T Corp. v. Deerfield, 166 Colo.

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238, 444 P.2d 404 (1968); Shands v. Wm R. Winton, Ltd., 91 P.3d 416 (Colo. App. 2003)

(broker entitled to commission even though property sold to entity that seller did not know had

been formed by parties with whom broker had been negotiating); Real Equity Diversification,

Inc. v. Coville, 744 P.2d 756 (Colo. App. 1987).

10. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove the defendant actually entered into a

contract of sale with the purchaser. Leach Realty Co., 149 Colo. at 94, 368 P.2d at 196; Brewer

v. Williams, 147 Colo. 146, 362 P.2d 1033 (1961) (by implication); Mapes, 151 P.3d at 578

(broker entitled to commission once qualified buyer produced even though seller refuses to

consummate transaction); Mack v. McKanna, 687 P.2d 1326 (Colo. App. 1984). “To be

considered an ‘able’ purchaser, one . . . need not have cash in hand equivalent to the entire

purchase price at the time the offer is made. . . . Rather the offeror must be shown to have had

the financial ability to complete the purchase within the time permitted by the offer.” McGill

Corp. v. Werner, 631 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Daybreak Constr.

Specialties, Inc. v. Saghatoleslami, 712 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Colo. App. 1985) (same definition of

“able”). Depending on the circumstances of the particular case, another instruction defining

“produced” in numbered paragraph 4 may be necessary or the paragraph should be modified to

state the requirement in terms more relevant to the particular facts in dispute between the parties.

See Winston Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Fults Mgmt., Inc., 872 P.2d 1356 (Colo. App. 1994) (where

broker sets in motion a chain of events that, without break in continuity, results in lease of

commercial property, broker is the procuring cause of lease and is entitled to a commission). But

see § 12-61-201 (broker is not entitled to commission until the sale is consummated or defeated

by the refusal or neglect of the owner to consummate the sale); § 12-61-202, C.R.S. (broker is

not entitled to commission when a proposed purchaser fails to complete the purchase because of

title defects).

11. Numbered paragraph 5 sets out the second basic condition required by section 12-61-

201. See also Colo. Inv. Servs., Inc. v. Hager, 685 P.2d 1371 (Colo. App. 1984).

12. Where the defendant’s neglect is the failure to bring legal proceedings to correct title

defects to which the purchaser objects, section 12-61-202 and section 12-61-203, C.R.S., are

applicable. In such circumstances, numbered paragraph 4 and, if necessary, paragraph 5 must be

appropriately modified.

13. “[A] seller may not defeat a broker’s right to a commission by rejecting an offer

solicited by his broker, without explanation, when the variations between [the terms and

conditions of] the listing and the offer are of a minor nature . . . . [T]he broker should be given

the opportunity to rectify minor variations . . . . However, where . . . the variation between the

offer and the listing is substantial, a seller [may] reject the offer without explanation, and the

broker may not use the failure to state specific objections as grounds for claiming a

commission.” Horton-Cavey Realty Co. v. Reese, 34 Colo. App. 323, 328, 527 P.2d 914, 917

(1974); see McGill Corp. v. Werner, 631 P.2d 1178 (Colo. App. 1981) (minor and immaterial

variations). Also, the “broker is charged with knowledge that the substantial variation exists

when he submits the offer.” Colo. City Dev. Co. v. Jones-Healy Realty, Inc., 195 Colo. 114,

116-17, 576 P.2d 160, 162 (1978); see Brady v. Hoeppner, 38 Colo. App. 495, 558 P.2d 1009

(1977) (broker not entitled to commission when sale fails because of a defect of title or a

contingency of which the broker was aware when he was employed); see also Re/Max

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Suburban, Inc. v. Widener, 633 P.2d 530 (Colo. App. 1981) (broker not entitled to commission

when sale failed to close due to fault of broker).