ICE Guidance Needs
Improvement to Deter
Illegal Employment
January 15, 2021
OIG-21-15
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov
January 15, 2021
MEMORANDUM FOR: Tae D. Johnson
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Digitally signed by JOSEPH
JOSEPH V
V CUFFARI
Inspector General
Date: 2021.01.13 13:10:10
CUFFARI
-05'00'
SUBJECT: ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to
Deter Illegal Employment
Attached for your information is our final report, ICE Guidance Needs
Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment. The report identifies actions the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) can take to enhance its Worksite
Enforcement program’s overall effectiveness. We incorporated the formal
comments provided by your office.
The report contains four recommendations aimed at improving the program’s
overall effectiveness. Your office concurred with all four recommendations.
Based on the information provided in your response to the draft report, we
consider the four recommendations resolved and open. Once your office has
fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter
to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. The
memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of the
corrective actions. Please send your response or closure request to
Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will
provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and
appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We
will post the report on our website for public dissemination.
Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Thomas Kait,
Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000.
Attachment
cc: Derek N. Benner, Executive Associate Director, Homeland Security
Investigations
DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
ICE Guidance Needs Improvement
to Deter Illegal Employment
January 15, 2021
Why We Did
This Audit
The Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986
prohibits employers from
hiring individuals
unauthorized to work in
the United States. We
conducted this audit to
determine the extent to
which U.S. Immigration
and Customs
Enforcement’s (ICE)
Worksite Enforcement
(WSE) program supports
ICE’s strategic goal of
protecting the borders
through efficient
immigration enforcement.
What We
Recommend
We made four
recommendations that,
when implemented, should
improve the effectiveness of
ICE’s Worksite
Enforcement Program.
For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at
(202)981-6000, or email us at
DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov
What We Found
The WSE program’s compliance, civil enforcement,
and outreach activities are not as effective as they
could be in supporting ICE’s immigration
enforcement strategy. ICE officials did not
consistently enforce the ICE 2008 Guide to
Administrative Form I-9 Inspections and Civil
Monetary Penalties (I-9 Guide) against employers.
This occurred because the guide does not provide
detailed instructions on justifying civil fine
reductions, issuing compliance letters, or performing
follow-up inspections on warning notices. As a
result, the WSE program does not effectively deter
employers from violating employment immigration
laws and hiring unauthorized alien workers (UAW).
ICE also did not take timely and affirmative steps to
hold UAWs accountable for obtaining unlawful
employment because the I-9 Guide has not been
updated to address risks and challenges associated
with UAWs’ use of fraudulent documentation. As a
result, ICE officials cannot ensure that these
unapprehended individuals do not have criminal
records and the UAWs are free to seek employment
elsewhere.
Lastly, ICE did not ensure the outreach program
achieved measurable progress and was cost effective
because ICE officials have not conducted a
comprehensive assessment of the program.
Consequently, ICE risks overlooking other ways to
conduct effective outreach with employers to effect
positive change.
ICE Response
ICE concurred with all four recommendations.
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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Table of Contents
Background .................................................................................................... 2
Results of Audit .............................................................................................. 4
ICE Did Not Consistently Enforce I-9 Guide Policies Against Employers..5
ICE’s I-9 Guide Does Not Provide Clear Guidance to Hold UAWs
Accountable........................................................................................... 9
ICE’s Outreach Program Did Not Achieve Measurable Progress ............ 11
Recommendations......................................................................................... 12
Appendixes
Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology .................................. 15
Appendix B: ICE’s Comments to the Draft Report ................................ 17
Appendix C: I-9 Cases Reviewed .......................................................... 22
Appendix D: Details of I-9 Cases with Fines ......................................... 27
Appendix E: Sample Warning Notice .................................................... 28
Appendix F: Report Distribution .......................................................... 30
Abbreviations
CAT Compliance Automation Tool
ECIC Employer Compliance Inspection Center
ERO Enforcement and Removal Operations
HSI Homeland Security Investigations
I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IMAGE ICE’s Mutual Agreement between Government
and Employers
IRCA Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
NIF Notice of Intent to Fine
NOI Notice of Inspection
OPLA Office of Principal Legal Advisor
SAC Special Agent in Charge
UAW Unauthorized Alien Worker
WSE Worksite Enforcement
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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Background
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 prohibits employers
from hiring individuals unauthorized to work in the United States. IRCA
requires employers to obtain from each potential employee a completed U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Form I-9 Employment Eligibility
Verification (I-9) and verify employment documents. According to IRCA, it is
illegal for employers to “knowingly hire” and “continue to employ” unauthorized
workers. The Act established criminal and civil sanctions and fines against
employers who do not comply with the law.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) carries out Federal laws
governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration to promote
homeland security and public safety. ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) directorate uses a three-pronged approach in its Worksite Enforcement
(WSE) Program — enforcement, compliance, and outreach.
1) Enforcement includes bringing criminal and civil actions against
employers and employees who knowingly violate the law.
2) Compliance involves conducting I-9 inspections of employers to verify
potential employees’ eligibility to work in the United States.
3) Outreach uses the “ICE Mutual Agreement between Government and
Employers” (IMAGE) program to promote and encourage voluntary
compliance by employers. See Figure 1.
Figure 1. Three-Pronged Approach to Worksite Enforcement
Source: ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)
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Enforcement through Criminal and Civil Actions
enforcement of Federal laws
governing border control,
customs, trade, and
immigration. ICE’s goals
include the protection of our
borders through efficient
immigration enforcement and
creation of a culture of
employer compliance based on
worksite investigations. See
Figure 2. For fiscal years
2016 through 2018, ICE
reported 148 employer
convictions arising from
worksite criminal investigations.
1
Employer Compliance through I-9 Inspections
ICE special agents and forensic auditors follow the ICE 2008 Guide to
Administrative Form I-9 Inspections and Civil Monetary Penalties (I-9 Guide)
when conducting I-9 inspections to verify employers’ compliance with IRCA
requirements. An I-9 case represents an inspection of an individual
employer. The inspection process begins with a Notice of Inspection (NOI) to
inform the employer that WSE will audit hiring records to determine
compliance with IRCA. Hiring records consist of the I-9 and supporting
documentation that the employer and employees complete. The employer
must verify employment eligibility using the employees’ identity documents.
ICE officials then inspect the I-9s to identify substantive or technical
violations, after which they may issue a Notice of Inspection Results
(compliance letter), a Warning Notice, or a Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF).
Substantive violations can result from an employer failing to prepare an I-9
form or review and verify employee identity documents. Technical violations
are minor issues identified during an I-9 inspection that employers are
allowed to correct within a 10-day period. Uncorrected technical violations
or significant errors or omissions identified in I-9 inspections can result in
substantive violations that may lead to civil fines or warning notices issued
1
ICE provided arrest data on October 10, 2019, which we included in the Background section
for context. We did not test the reliability of this data and did not use this data to support our
findings.
ICE promotes homeland security and public safety through criminal and civil
Figure 2. ICE field officials at a worksite
Source: ICE HSI
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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against employers. In FYs 2016 to 2018, ICE initiated approximately 8,620
inspections.
Outreach Activities through the IMAGE Program
The IMAGE program serves as the outreach initiative of the WSE program to
educate employers about compliance with Federal regulations. According to
ICE, businesses in the United States are vulnerable to unauthorized workers
attempting to obtain employment using fraudulent documents. ICE
established the voluntary IMAGE program in July 2006 to provide education
and training to enhance employers’ awareness of fraudulent documents. ICE
uses approximately 26 special agents to serve as IMAGE coordinators
nationwide. These agents research potential companies to assess suitability for
IMAGE and conduct training and presentations to educate employers about the
program.
Related Office of Inspector General Reports
In 2014, we evaluated the WSE program’s compliance with its policies and
procedures and issued the report, Worksite Enforcement and Administrative
Inspection Process (OIG-14-33). The report noted inconsistencies in how field
offices issued warning notices and reduced fine amounts. Additionally, we
identified inadequate documentation in the case files. We made three
recommendations to improve oversight of the inspection process nationwide,
evaluate the effectiveness of the process, and report and reconcile information
on the WSE inspections. The three recommendations were implemented and
closed.
We conducted this audit to determine the extent to which the WSE program
supports ICE’s strategic goal of protecting the borders through efficient
immigration enforcement. Specifically, we reviewed compliance, civil
enforcement, and outreach activities of the WSE program. We did not review
criminal investigations conducted by the program.
Results of Audit
The WSE program’s compliance, civil enforcement, and outreach activities are
not as effective as they could be in supporting ICE’s immigration enforcement
strategy.
ICE officials did not consistently enforce the I-9 Guide against employers,
because the guide does not provide detailed instructions about justifying civil
fine reductions, issuing compliance letters, or performing follow-up inspections
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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on warning notices. As a result, the WSE program does not effectively deter
employers from violating employment immigration laws and hiring
unauthorized alien workers (UAW).
ICE also did not take timely and affirmative steps to hold UAWs accountable
for obtaining unlawful employment because the I-9 Guide has not been
updated to address risks and challenges associated with UAWs’ use of
fraudulent documentation. As a result, ICE officials cannot ensure that these
unapprehended individuals do not have criminal records and the UAWs are
free to seek employment elsewhere.
Lastly, ICE did not ensure the outreach program achieved measurable progress
and was cost effective because ICE officials have not conducted a
comprehensive assessment of the program. Consequently, ICE risks
overlooking other ways to conduct effective outreach with employers to effect
positive change.
ICE Did Not Consistently Enforce I-9 Guide Policies against
Employers
We found examples of three I-9 inspections policies that ICE did not
consistently enforce. Specifically, ICE did not always fulfill requirements to
justify civil fine reductions, issue compliance letters to employers, or follow up
on warning notices issued to employers.
ICE Officials Reduced Employers’ Fines without Justification
According to ICE’s Guide to Administrative Form I-9 Inspections and Civil
Monetary Penalties issued in 2008 (I-9 Guide), fines may be imposed against
employers for violations of IRCA. In certain circumstances, fines may be
reduced, but the reductions are to be justified and documented in the case
files. Specifically, the guidance requires ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal
Advisor (OPLA)
2
representatives in the field to document the rationale for any
reduction or negotiated settlement. Field OPLA officials are also responsible for
reviewing each notice of intent to fine, determining whether the evidence
presented is legally sufficient, and providing written justification to the Special
Agent in Charge (SAC) for inclusion in the corresponding case file.
Although I-9 inspections revealed significant violations, field OPLA officials did
not always provide proper justification for fine reductions. We reviewed 161
2
OPLA provides a full range of legal services to ICE programs and offices, including litigating
all removal cases. OPLA offers legal advice and counsel to ICE personnel on their customs,
criminal, and immigration law enforcement authorities.
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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judgmentally selected I-9 case files completed October 2015 through June
2018 and determined that WSE assessed employer fines in only 23 cases (14
percent). ICE and field OPLA officials reduced the fines by more than $230,000
for 15 of the 23 cases (65 percent), without a justification noted in the case file.
For example, ICE WSE assessed and subsequently reduced fines against the
following employers without written justification:
x Employer 21
3
was assessed a fine of about $66,000 because I-9 records
were not prepared or completed properly. ICE also identified eight UAWs
during the inspection. Subsequently, WSE reduced the employer’s fine
to about $33,000 (50 percent), but did not include a justification in the
case file.
x Employer 100 was assessed a fine of about $22,000, which was reduced
to about $11,000 (50 percent) under a settlement agreement that also
required the employer to enroll in E-Verify for 6 years.
4
The fine was
assessed because I-9 documents were not prepared or completed
properly. The file did not contain a justification for the reduction as
required by ICE guidance.
x Employer 133 was assessed a fine of about $120,000 for failure to prepare
I-9s and properly complete the documents. The inspection also identified
19 UAWs. Subsequently, WSE reduced the fine by approximately $42,000
to about $78,000, but did not include a justification in the case file.
Overall, fine reductions we examined ranged from 8 to 58 percent. Appendix D
provides a breakdown of the fines for the cases we reviewed.
ICE officials reduced fines to employers without documenting a justification
because, although ICE guidance indicates that justifications for fine reductions
are to be documented, the I-9 Guide does not provide the basic elements ICE
officials must include in case files. Regional SACs were responsible for
reviewing and approving civil fine reductions but did not ensure proper
documentation was included in the case files. Furthermore, ICE management
did not have a quality assurance process to help determine, on a consistent
and periodic basis, whether field offices were complying with the I-9 Guide
regarding substantiating fine reductions. As a result, undocumented civil fine
3
For confidentiality, we refer to employers by the unique number we assigned to each employer
case file we reviewed. See Appendix C for a complete list of I-9 cases reviewed.
4
E-Verify is a web-based system that allows enrolled employers to confirm the eligibility of
their employees to work in the United States. E-Verify employers confirm the identity and
employment eligibility of newly hired employees by electronically matching information
provided by employees on the Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, with records
available to the Social Security Administration and DHS.
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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reductions may not deter employers from violating employment immigration
laws and hiring unauthorized workers.
ICE Did Not Consistently Issue Compliance Letters to Employers as Required
The I-9 Guide directs ICE officials to issue a Notice of Inspection Results, also
known as a compliance letter, to an employer only if the inspection did not
identify technical violations, substantive violations or any UAWs within the
employer’s workforce. Procedurally, compliance letters are the result of
satisfactory I-9 inspections. Officials are required to issue fines or warning
notices for substantive violations to noncompliant employers. ICE issued
compliance letters in 63 of the 161 cases (39 percent) we reviewed.
Although ICE officials appropriately issued compliance letters for 49 of the 63
cases (78 percent), the I-9 inspections detected UAWs and substantive
violations in the remaining 14 cases (22 percent). Specifically, ICE officials
identified 101 UAWs and 93 substantive violations among the 14 cases, but did
not issue employers fines or warning notices as required. Contrary to I-9
guidance, in these 14 cases ICE officials allowed employers to correct
substantive I-9 violations or terminate UAWs, and subsequently issued each
employer a compliance letter. See Figure 3.
Figure 3. Worksite Enforcement (WSE) Compliance Letters
Source: Office of Inspector General (OIG) analysis of WSE case files
Following are several examples of the inappropriately issued compliance letters:
ICE found that the I-9 paperwork for Employer 130 had 63 substantive
violations. To correct 46 of these violations, ICE officials accepted forms
the employer had backdated to match the employees’ hire dates. ICE
then issued Employer 130 a compliance letter.
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x
x
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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ICE officials determined that 43 of 131 employees (33 percent) working
for Employer 70 were unauthorized to work in the United States. In
accordance with ICE procedures, ICE officials issued Employer 70 a
Notice of Suspect Document,
5
advising the employer that ICE had
determined 43 of its employees were unauthorized to work in the United
States. Upon receipt of the notice, Employer 70 terminated its 43
unauthorized employees. ICE officials then issued Employer 70 a letter
stating the employer was in adjusted compliance,
6
although the I-9
Guide does not allow for adjusted compliance if UAWs are present.
ICE officials issued compliance letters to employers who did not qualify to
receive them because ICE’s I-9 Guide, which has not been updated since 2008,
did not address circumstances encountered during I-9 inspections. For
instance, ICE guidance does not provide information about how ICE officials
should report inspection outcomes when ICE officials identify UAWs, but the
employers claim they are unaware that the UAWs they hired are using
fraudulent documentation. Furthermore, ICE management did not have a
mechanism to verify whether field offices were issuing compliance letters in
accordance with the I-9 Guide. As a result, ICE officials are not holding
employers accountable for noncompliance with immigration law, and the
practice of issuing compliance letters for unsatisfactory inspection results may
not deter employers from hiring unauthorized workers.
ICE Did Not Follow up on Warning Notices Issued to Employers
When ICE officials identify unresolved technical or substantive violations, the I-
9 Guide permits them to issue a warning notice to an employer, instead of a
fine, if there is an expectation of future compliance by the employer. However,
ICE guidance requires officials to include a follow-up date on the warning
notice and conduct a re-inspection of the employer within 6 months of the
original warning notice date. Appendix E includes an example of a warning
notice form issued to employers.
Of the 161 cases we reviewed, ICE officials did not follow up on 72 of 74 (97
percent) warning notices. Of the two follow-up inspections conducted, one took
5
A Notice of Suspect Document advises the employer that, based on a review of the Form I-9
and documentation submitted by the employee, ICE has determined an employee is
unauthorized to work. The document advises the employer of possible criminal and civil
penalties for continuing to employ the individual. ICE provides the employer and employee an
opportunity to present additional documentation to demonstrate work authorization if they
believe there to be an error.
6
Per I-9 Guidance, the auditor will serve the employer a Notice of Inspection Results when
technical violations have been corrected and the employer has been brought into adjusted
compliance.
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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place within 6 months and the other was done more than 2 years after
issuance of the warning notice. See Figure 4.
Figure 4. WSE Warning Notices and Follow-up I-9 Inspections
Source: OIG analysis of WSE case files
According to ICE officials, they did not follow up on warning notices because
they did not have sufficient resources, follow-up inspections were not an ICE
priority, and there was an expectation of future employer compliance, albeit
unverified. Although limited resources and competing priorities may present
real challenges, ICE management has not updated the I-9 Guide to reflect these
challenges. Instead, decisions to perform follow-up inspection were deferred by
ICE management to regional ICE officials without corresponding mechanisms
for ICE management to verify whether the follow-up inspections were
performed in accordance with the I-9 Guide. As a result, ICE officials have no
assurance that employers ultimately addressed prior violations.
ICE’s I-9 Guide Does Not Provide Clear Guidance to Hold UAWs
Accountable
The I-9 Guide instructs ICE officials to take timely and affirmative steps to
administratively arrest
7
suspected UAWs identified during I-9 inspections and
seek to bring criminal charges against the UAWs as appropriate. The guide
also permits ICE officials to exercise discretion between administrative arrest
and displacement of UAWs from the workplace.
We found that ICE officials generally did not make arrests unless the UAW also
had a criminal record or an existing Enforcement and Removal Operations
(ERO) warrant. In 48 of 161 cases (30 percent) we reviewed, ICE officials
7
An administrative arrest is the arrest of an alien for a charge to be adjudicated before an
administrative judge, such as an immigration judge, or in other administrative processes
separate from the criminal justice system.
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identified 1,129 UAWs. Of the 1,129 UAWs, ICE officials arrested only 5
individuals because of outstanding criminal warrants, such as unlawful
reentry or active ERO warrants. However, ICE officials did not administratively
arrest any of the remaining 1,124 UAWs and allowed them to stay in the
United States (as shown in Table 1) even though ICE officials determined that
some of these UAWs may have used fraudulent immigration documents, alien
numbers, or social security numbers to obtain employment, which may be
considered a criminal offense.
We also identified 2 of the 48 (4 percent) inspections where ICE officials allowed
employers to continue employing a total of 23 identified UAWs. However,
according to the I-9 Guide and Federal law, ICE officials do not have the
authority to allow employers to continue to employ UAWs.
8
Additionally, an
OPLA official, citing the federal statute, stated ICE officials should have
required the employers to “cease and desist” from the violations or initiated
criminal investigations of the employers. The remaining 1,101 UAWs identified
in our review, although not arrested, were either terminated by employers or
left their places of work on their own.
Table 1. Disposition of Unauthorized Alien Workers (UAWs) Identified from
Our Review of 48 WSE I-9 Inspections
Unauthorized Alien
Worker Disposition
Unauthorized
Alien Workers
Not Arrested
By
ICE
Unauthorized
Alien Workers
Arrested
By
ICE
Total
UAWs Arrested
5
5
UAWs Not Arrested and
Unlawfully Allowed to
Remain Employed
23 23
UAWs Not Arrested
1,101
1,101
Total UAWs Identified
1,124
5
1,129
Source: OIG analysis of WSE case files
The I-9 Guide permits ICE officials to exercise discretion when making
administrative arrests.
9
However, the fact that ICE officials arrested 5
individuals with prior criminal records and did not consider arresting the
remaining 1,124 suspected UAWs –– even when the officials found evidence of
8
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement Guide to Administrative
Form I-9 Inspections and Civil Monetary Penalties, pp. 10, 36 (Nov. 25, 2008); 8 U.S.C. §
1324a(e)(4)(A).
9
In addition, we acknowledge ICE may have in place different enforcement priorities at any
particular time, as established in the form of executive orders and policy memos implementing
such executive orders.
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fraudulent documents –– does not comply with the overall intent of the
requirement in the I-9 Guide to take timely and affirmative enforcement action.
The I-9 Guide, in these circumstances, includes steps ICE officials follow to
notify employers of suspected unauthorized workers, but the I-9 Guide does
not include guidance on how or under what circumstances ICE officials should
administratively arrest suspected UAWs. ICE’s I-9 inspection guidance has not
been updated in the past 12 years. Without additional guidance regarding the
protocols and processes to perform administrative arrests of UAWs identified
during I-9 inspections and verify the identity of individuals using fraudulent
documentation, ICE officials cannot ensure that these individuals do not have
criminal records. Additionally, ICE officials cannot ensure UAWs will not
remain free to seek employment elsewhere.
ICE’s Outreach Program Did Not Achieve Measurable Progress
ICE created the IMAGE program to reduce vulnerabilities related to
employment of illegal aliens by offering employers education and training to
improve their awareness of and compliance with Federal laws.
10
Employers
who participate in the IMAGE program must undergo I-9 inspection and agree
to specific hiring practices and terms to receive IMAGE program certification
and benefits, such as potential fine mitigation; a 2-year I-9 inspection reprieve;
and WSE information and training before, during, and after I-9 inspections.
The goal of IMAGE is to reduce illegal employment, eliminate unfair labor
advantages, and ultimately create a culture of compliance.
However, the IMAGE program is not impactful or cost effective. Since 2006,
ICE officials have reported conducting more than 20,000 IMAGE presentations
to more than 131,000 employers, by participating at trade shows, conferences,
and industry events, as well as conducting numerous live and virtual trainings.
We estimated that ICE has spent an average of $1.8 million per year during
FYs 2016 through 2018 to administer the IMAGE program. However, only 433
employers out of approximately 30 million businesses
11
in the United States
have joined the IMAGE program to date.
According to ICE officials, low participation in the IMAGE program is because
employers do not recognize the benefits of joining IMAGE. Such benefits
include reductions of fines assessed as a result of inspections or deferral of
subsequent I-9 inspections for 2 years. ICE officials said employers are
skeptical about voluntarily opening their books for I-9 inspection if the
potential to be fined remains. In January 2019, ICE officials issued a
10
The program is briefly mentioned in the FYs 2016-2020 ICE Strategic Plan, the FYs 2016-
2020 HSI Strategy, the FY 2018 WSE Strategy, and the Guide to WSE Investigations.
11
U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, 2018 Small Business Profiles.
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memorandum identifying IMAGE program challenges and recognizing that new
incentives were needed to increase the impact and cost-effectiveness of the
IMAGE program. However, ICE officials have not conducted a comprehensive
assessment of the program. As a result, ICE risks overlooking other ways to
conduct effective outreach and missing opportunities to use Federal funds
more effectively in other areas of WSE to effect positive change.
Recommendations
We recommend the ICE Homeland Security Investigations Worksite
Enforcement Unit Chief:
Recommendation 1: Update the I-9 Guide to include minimum elements ICE
officials must document in case files to justify fine reductions.
Recommendation 2: Assess I-9 processes and update the I-9 Guide to ensure
it addresses risks and challenges, including:
a. when employers make corrections to address substantive
violations and when employers claim they were unaware that they
employed Unauthorized Alien Workers;
b. ICE’s ability to conduct follow-up inspections with limited
resources; and
c. when I-9 inspections identify individuals using fraudulent
documents to obtain unlawful employment.
Recommendation 3: Develop and implement a quality assurance process that
allows ICE headquarters to sample cases on an objective, periodic basis, to
determine whether field offices reduce fines, issue compliance letters, and
conduct follow-up inspections of employers in accordance with ICE policies and
procedures.
Recommendation 4: Conduct an assessment of the IMAGE program to
determine whether implementation of other approaches would aid in achieving
its outreach goal and be cost effective, or if funds should be put to better use.
Management Comments and OIG Analysis
The Chief Financial Officer and Senior Component Accountable Official
provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are included in
Appendix B. ICE concurred with all four recommendations and is
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taking actions to address them. We also received technical comments on the
draft report and revised the report as appropriate. We consider all
recommendations resolved and open. A summary of ICE’s responses and our
analysis follows.
ICE’s Response to Recommendation 1: ICE officials concurred with
recommendation 1 and are drafting a WSE Handbook to establish revised
policies and procedures for WSE criminal investigations, administrative
inspections (Form I-9 audits), and the outreach (IMAGE) program. The draft
WSE Handbook will also provide the minimum elements that ICE officials must
document in case files to justify fine reductions. ICE’s estimated completion
date is May 31, 2021.
OIG Analysis: ICE actions are responsive to this recommendation. We
consider this recommendation resolved, but it will remain open until ICE
provides documentation showing that all planned corrective actions are
completed.
ICE’s Response to Recommendation 2: ICE officials concurred with
recommendation 2 and are addressing this recommendation through the
revision of the WSE Handbook, communication to field personnel, and
expansion of ICE’s Employer Compliance Inspection Center (ECIC). The
expanded ECIC will provide field offices with inspections of Employment
Eligibility Verification Forms, and will allow for the consolidation of WSE audits
at one centralized location. The estimated completion date is November 30,
2023.
OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and open. ICE’s planned
corrective actions meet the intent of the recommendation. We will close the
recommendation when ICE provides documentation showing the WSE
handbook revision is complete, field personnel have been informed and the
ECIC is expanded.
ICE’s Response to Recommendation 3: ICE officials concurred with
recommendation 3 and stated that expansion of the ECIC and implementation
of a Compliance Automation Tool (CAT) will address the need for a quality
assurance process. The CAT will provide for the centralized processing and
storage of I-9 inspections and facilitate quality reviews. ICE’s estimated
completion date is November 30, 2023.
OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and open. The proposed
corrective actions meet the intent of the recommendation. We will close this
recommendation when ICE provides documentation showing expansion of the
ECIC and other improvements in automation.
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ICE’s Response to Recommendation 4: ICE officials concurred with
recommendation 4. ICE will assess the IMAGE program, starting with an
analysis of the impact of its new guidance and changes to the program in
recent years. Additionally, ICE will conduct a qualitative analysis and review of
the overall efficacy of the program. ICE’s estimated completion date is
November 30, 2022.
OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and open. The proposed
corrective actions meet the intent of the recommendation, but it will remain
open until ICE provides documentation showing that all planned corrective
actions and assessments are completed.
www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-21-15
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Appendix A
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was
established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No.107−296) by
amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978.
The objective of this audit was to determine the extent to which the WSE
program supports ICE’s strategic goal of protecting the borders through
efficient immigration enforcement. The scope of this audit covers the ICE WSE
program during FYs 2016 through June 2018.
We conducted interviews with ICE officials assigned to work on worksite
enforcement cases from headquarters and SACs in seven field offices, including
El Paso, Texas; St. Paul, Minnesota; Denver, Colorado; Washington, D.C.;
Chicago, Illinois; Miami, Florida and Dallas, Texas. We analyzed legislation
and departmental regulations, policies, procedures, and guidance on
immigration enforcement and HSI WSE responsibilities. We also reviewed prior
U.S. General Accountability Office and OIG reports regarding ICE’s roles and
responsibilities in implementing the WSE program.
We evaluated a judgmental sample of 161 closed WSE I-9 case files. We tested
internal controls of WSE’s encounters with, and administrative arrests of
UAWs, and the sufficiency of documentation to support the assessment,
reduction, and collection of civil fines. Further, we reviewed the
appropriateness of compliance letters and warning notices to determine
whether they were issued according to departmental guidance, and the
effectiveness of the IMAGE program. We reviewed the I-9 inspection data ICE
provided and compared it to WSE’s reporting system and external ICE reports
and briefings to assess data reliability. We reviewed the case data and
confirmed with headquarters' Cognos Analytics reports to assess reliability. We
determined that the I-9 inspection data was reasonably complete and accurate
based on our limited testing with minimal discrepancies. Thus, we consider
the data sufficiently reliable for our findings and recommendations. WSE
criminal investigation data was not tested for data reliability or accuracy as we
did not review criminal investigations conducted by the program.
We conducted this performance audit between April 2018 and February 2020
pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require
that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our
www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-21-15
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Appendix D
Details of I-9 Cases with Fines
Employer
Application of
Intent to Fine
Amount
Fine
Reduced
Final Order
Amount
Fine
Reduction
Percentage
Reduction
Justification in
Case File
20
21
22
29
30
54
55
63
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
100
131
132
133
135
136
137
150
$ 9,869
65,914
505,442
57,892
17,685
11,406
11,802
5,694
18,513
40,564
47,801
9,152
6,703
8,315
11,856
21,785
208,552
70,831
120,192
162,553
37,755
13,182
133,096
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
$ 7,541
33,094
465,035
46,314
16,000
6,000
5,000
5,694
10,729
29,097
47,801
3,945
4,776
8,315
9,922
10,893
185,000
60,000
78,125
130,018
37,755
8,750
62,555
24 %
50 %
8 %
20 %
10 %
47 %
58 %
-
42 %
28 %
-
57 %
29 %
-
16 %
50 %
11 %
15 %
35 %
20 %
-
34 %
53 %
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
N/A
No
No
N/A
No
No
N/A
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
N/A
No
Yes
Total $1,596,554
Yes - 19
No - 4
$1,272,359 -
Yes - 4
No - 15
Source: OIG analysis of case files provided by HSI. Employer numbers in the table in this
appendix are referenced from Appendix C, I-9 Case Files Reviewed.
Results may vary due to rounding.
www.oig.dhs.gov 27 OIG-21-15
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Appendix F
Report Distribution
Department of Homeland Security
Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Acting Director
Worksite Enforcement, Unit Chief
Audit Liaison, ICE (Job Code G-18-077-AUD-ICE)
Office of Management and Budget
Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner
Congress
Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees
www.oig.dhs.gov 30 OIG-21-15
Additional Information and Copies
To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at:
www.oig.dhs.gov.
For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General
Public Affairs at: [email protected].
Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig.
OIG Hotline
To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click
on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at
(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at:
Department of Homeland Security
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Attention: Hotline
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Washington, DC 20528-0305
