2
DISCLAIMER AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The opinions expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily reect the views of the International Organization
for Migration (IOM). The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply expression
of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or
concerning its frontiers or boundaries.
IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benets migrants and society. As an intergovernmental
organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to assist in the meeting of operational challenges of migration;
advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human
dignity and well-being of migrants.
AUTHOR: Regional Data Hub
PUBLISHERS: International Organization for Migration (IOM) Regional Oce for Central America, North
America and the Caribbean
Sabana Business Centre, Boulevard Ernesto Rohrmoser
San José Costa Rica
Telephone: +(506) 2212-5300
Website: www.rosanjose.iom.int
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Regional Coordination Oce for the Caribbean - Barbados
c/o UN House Marine Gardens Hastings
Christ Church Barbados
Website: www.rosanjose.iom.int
MAPS: Sofía Arce, Data and Reporting Specialist
LAYOUT AND DESIGN: Pamela Marín
COVER PHOTO: "Leaving the camp to evacuation shelter"
© 2023 International Organization for Migration.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form
or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of
the publisher.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..............................................................................................................................................
2
KEY BACKGROUND DATA – ALL CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES .......................
5
1. OVERVIEW .....................................................................................................................................................................
6
1.1 MIGRATION TRENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN ................................................................................................
6
1.2 Scope and objectives of the report ......................................................................................................................
7
1.3 Geographic coverage ...................................................................................................................................................
8
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS .......................................................................................................
9
2.1 Regional emigrant stocks ...........................................................................................................................................
9
2.2 Breakdown of emigrants .........................................................................................................................................
10
2.3 Migrant Flows ..............................................................................................................................................................
10
3. PROFILE OF CARIBBEAN EMIGRANTS ..................................................................................................
20
3.1. OECD ............................................................................................................................................................................
20
3.2. United States ..............................................................................................................................................................
25
4. CUBAN AND HAITIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES .................................................................
25
4.1 Data on migrants and migration from Haiti and Cuba .............................................................................
25
5. REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ELSEHWERE IN THE CARIBBEAN ........
29
6. INTRAREGIONAL MOBILITY AND MIGRATION............................................................................
30
7. RETURN MIGRATION ........................................................................................................................................
32
7.1 Exploring trends in return migration through desination-side-data sources ...................................
32
8. IMMIGRATION TO CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES ..................................................................................
34
9. VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ......................................................................................
35
10. IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON MOBILITY AND TOURISM ..........................................................
36
10.1. Data and trends on arrivals in the region ....................................................................................................
36
11. REMITTANCES.......................................................................................................................................................
38
11.1 Remittances as a percentage of GDP ............................................................................................................
38
11.2 Absolute volume of remittances ......................................................................................................................
39
11.3 Remittances compared with other forms of capital ows. ..................................................................
40
11.4 Remittance transaction costs.............................................................................................................................
42
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT .................................................................................
47
12.1 Key data on natural hazards and displacement in the Caribbean ......................................................
47
12.2 Risk models for natural hazards, disasters, and displacement .............................................................
48
13. SLOW-ONSET ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES RELATED TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, MOBILITY AND MIGRATION ....................................................................................................
62
13.1 The nexus between climate change, mobility, and migration in the Caribbean ..........................
62
13.2 Exploring sea-level rise and human mobility scenarios in the Caribbean .......................................
62
13.3 The impacts of other slow-onset processes on migration and human mobility – lessons
from sixth IPCC Assessment Report .......................................................................................................................
64
14. MISSING MIGRANTS .........................................................................................................................................
65
15. CONCLUSSIONS ..................................................................................................................................................
67
16. REFERENCES ...........................................................................................................................................................
68
4
Map 1.1: Countries and territories which make up the Caribbean region in this report. ......................................8
Figure 1: Stock of Caribbean nationals living abroad, and percentage
(%) change between reference years, 1990 – 2020 (millions)...............................................................................................9
Figure 2: Percentage (%) of nationals living abroad, by region
(overall) and by individual Caribbean UN Member Countries, 2020 ............................................................................. 15
Figure 3: Top destination regions of Caribbean migrants, 2020 ...................................................................................... 16
Figure 4: Sex composition of Caribbean nationals residing abroad, 2020 .................................................................. 17
Figure 5: Inows of Caribbean nationals (by selected nationalities) into OECD Member
Countries, 2010 – 2019 ...................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Figure 6: Highly educated population emigration rates of the highly educated population to
the OECD area, by country of birth, selected Caribbean countries of origin, as of 2015/16 ............................ 20
Figure 7: Key demographic and socioeconomic characteristics –
Caribbean migrants in OECD countries, as of 2015/16 ....................................................................................................... 22
Figure 8: Nonimmigrant and immigrant visas issued to Caribbean nationals in the United
States, 2018 – May 2023 .................................................................................................................................................................... 23
Figure 9: Nonimmigrant visas issued to Caribbean nationals in the United States, by top ve
Caribbean nationalities, 2018 – May 2023 ................................................................................................................................ 24
Figure 10: Immigrant visas issued to Caribbean nationals in the United States, by top seven
Caribbean nationalities, FY 2014 – 2019 .................................................................................................................................... 24
Figure 11: Cuban and Haitian migrants identied in irregular transit in the southern zone of
Panama (Darien Province), 2016 – 2023 (Jan – May). ........................................................................................................... 26
Figure 12: Cuban and Haitian migrants apprehended by Mexican immigration authorities,
2016 – 2023 (January – May) ......................................................................................................................................................... 27
Figure 13: Visitor cards for humanitarian reasons (TVRH) issued to Cuban and Haitian
migrants in Mexico, 2016-2023 (January -April)...................................................................................................................... 27
Figure 14: Cumulative global stock of refugees and asylum seekers originating from Haiti and Cuba under
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC) mandate as of the end of 2022 .......................... 28
Figure 15: Skills Certicates issued to CARICOM nationals from 2013-2017, by category............................... 31
Figure 16: Venezuelan migrants and refugees in the Caribbean countries as of May 2023 ................................36
Figure 17: Quarterly entries of foreigners and/or nationals in Caribbean countries, 2019 –
2023 (rst quarter). .............................................................................................................................................................................. 36
Figure 11.1: Migrant remittances received as a proportion (%) of total GDP, selected Caribbean
countries / territories, 2017-2022 .................................................................................................................................................. 39
Figure 11.2: Migrant remittances received, absolute value in current U.S. Dollar (USD)
thousands of millions, Caribbean countries / territories for which data were available,
2017-2022. ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 41
Figure 11.3: Migrant remittances received, vs. total net Ocial Development Assistance
(ODA) disbursements, vs. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) net inows (Balance of Payments,
BoP), current USD millions, selected Caribbean countries, 2017-2021. ...................................................................... 43
Figure 11.4: Average transaction cost (as % of transfer) of sending remittances to selected
countries in the Caribbean, Quarter 4 2019 – Quarter 3 2020 ...................................................................................... 46
Figure 12.1: Map of new internal displacements caused by natural hazards in the Caribbean
in 2021 by country / territory .......................................................................................................................................................... 47
Figure 12.2: Characteristics of new internal displacements caused by natural hazards in the Caribbean,
2012-2022 ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 48
Figure 12.3: Map of INFORM Index for Risk Management in UN Member Countries in the
Caribbean, mid-2022 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 57
Figure 13.1: Map of one-meter sea level rise projections in the Caribbean .............................................................. 62
Figure 14.1: Migrant deaths and disappearances identied in the Caribbean region, 2016 – June 2023 ......65
INDEX OF FIGURES
5
Table 1: Top 10 origin countries / territories of Caribbean nationals residing abroad in absolute terms,
and percentage (%) increase between 1990 and 2020 ......................................................................................................... 10
Table 2: Top 10 destination countries, territories or areas of Caribbean migrants, total and by gender,
2020 ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 18
Table 3: Acquisition of nationality in OECD countries, by country of former nationality, selected
Caribbean nationalities, cumulative totals, 2010 – 2020 ...................................................................................................... 21
Table 4: Cuban and Haitian emigrants, total and by top 5 countries / territories of destination, 2020,
Haitians-Cubans ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
Table 5: Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian migrants in the United States as of May 2023 ...... 29
Table 6: Cumulative global stock of refugees and asylum seekers originating from selected other
Caribbean origin countries reported by UNHCR as of end of 2020 .............................................................................29
Table 7: Flows of CARICOM nationals under the “Facilitation of Travel” framework, principal origin and
destination countries, based on cumulative totals of annual free movement data, 2013 - 2017 ....................... 31
Table 8: Returns of persons from the U.S. by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), by country
of citizenship, scal years (FY) 2014 – FY 2019, selected Caribbean nationalities ................................................... 32
Table 9: Caribbean nationals returned by Mexican authorities, by country of citizenship, 2015 - 2020 .......32
Table 10: Caribbean nationals returned from the European Union (E.U.) and the United Kingdom
(U.K.) after being issued an order to leave, by country of citizenship, 2014-2019 ................................................... 33
Table 11: Top 10 destination countries / territories of immigrants in the Caribbean region, 2020 ................34
Table 12: Monthly international tourist arrivals in 2020, Caribbean, % change over 2019 ................................. 36
Table 12.1: Largest percentage (%) of the entire population displaced due to natural hazards in any
given year between 2012-2022, selected Caribbean countries and territories. ........................................................ 53
Table 12.2: Stock of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to natural hazards estimated in the
Caribbean as of the end of 2022. ................................................................................................................................................... 54
Table 12.3: Average expected number of new displacements per year due to sudden-onset hazards,
selected Caribbean countries/territories. .................................................................................................................................... 55
Table 12.4: Climate Risk Index score and global ranking (out of 180) for selected Caribbean countries
and territories for the period 2000-2019 ...................................................................................................................................56
Table 12.5: INFORM Index for Risk Management in UN Member Countries in the Caribbean by
country, mid 2023. ................................................................................................................................................................................ 58
Table 13.1: Predicted impacts of a one-meter sea-level-rise in CARICOM Member States, by site /
category and percentage (%) at-risk* ........................................................................................................................................... 63
INDEX OF TABLES
1
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
(ACS) American Community Survey
CMC Caribbean Migration Consultations
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CBP United States Customs and
Border Protection
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019
CReSIS Center for Remote Sensing
of Ice Sheets
CSME Caribbean Single Market and Economy
CTO Caribbean Tourism Organization
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIOC Database on Immigrants in
OECD Countries
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean
ECUE Eastern Caribbean Economic Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FY Fiscal year
GCM Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and
Regular Migration
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GMDAC Global Migration Data Analysis Centre
GNI Gross National Income
HDI Human Development Index
IDMC Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre
IDP Internally Displaced Person
ILO International Labour Organization
ISCO International Standard Classication
of Occupations
IMF International Monetary Fund
INFORM Index For Risk Management
IOM International Organization for Migration
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IRCC Immigration, Refugees and
Citizenship Canada
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change
LAC Latin America and Caribbean
LDC Least Developed Country
LPR Lawful permanent residence
MMP Missing Migrants Project
MPI The Migration Policy Institute
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NTMI Northern Triangle Migration
Information Management Initiative
ODA Ocial Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development
OECS Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States
R4V Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for
Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela
RMDU Regional Migration Data Unit, IOM
SDG Sustainable Development Goals
SIDS Small Island Development States
SLR Sea-level rise
TPS Temporary Protected Status
UASC Unaccompanied and separated children
UPMRIP Unidad de Política Migratoria,
Registro e Identidad de Personas,
Secretaría de Gobernación, México
UN United Nations
UNDESA United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Aairs
UNDP
United Nations
Development Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees
UNSD United Nations Statistics Division
US United States
USCB United States Census Bureau
USCBP United States Customs and
Border Protection
USCIS United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services
USCRS United States Congressional
Research Service
USDHS United States Department of
Homeland Security
USDOS United States Department of State
USD United States dollar
WTTC World Travel and tourism Council
2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Comprised of a total of 29 countries and territories,
3
the Caribbean is an immensely diverse region of States
with populations ranging from just tens of thousands of people to those with more than 10 million. Between these countries
and territories are a range of income levels, development outcomes, language proles, ethnic groups, economic
structures and political systems. Despite this diversity, the region is interconnected through common historical ties,
while also sharing a number of shared challenges and opportunities. Twenty-ve (25) of the 29 countries and territories
in the Caribbean are designated as Small Island Developing States (SIDS) – a distinct group of United Nations and Non-
United Nations Members/Associate Members that face “unique social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities”
(United Nations, n.d.a). These vulnerabilities include, amongst others, small sizes, remoteness, climate change impacts,
biodiversity loss, dependence on external markets, high costs and narrow resource bases which together can hinder
broader socioeconomic development (ibid.).
Existing research shows that the above realities, as well as colonial ties and other historic and present push- and pull-
factors, have had a signicant impact on shaping migration trajectories in the Caribbean (ILO, 2014; Williams et al.,
2013; Cassin et al., 2022; IOM, 2020a; IOM, 2017a). Migration often serves as an important adaptation strategy for
millions of people in the region while also carrying an immense potential for regional development. Migration in the
Caribbean can also bring challenges, both due to the loss of specialized human capital (often known as “brain drain”),
and to the obstacles that arise in assisting and ensuring access to temporary and durable solutions for diverse ows of
vulnerable migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other populations moving into, within and out
of the region.
In the area of migration, three key United Nations Programs of Action — the Barbados Programme of Action (1994)
(United Nations, n.d.a.), the Mauritius Strategy (2005) (United Nations, n.d.b.) and the SIDS Accelerated Modalities
of Action Pathway (also known as SAMOA Pathway, 2014) (United Nations, 2019) — highlight the vulnerability of
SIDS to external shocks and recognize the role of migration and migrants in the development of their communities through
nancial remittances, as well as the transfer of skills and knowledge. Recently, a number of Caribbean countries, alongside
other countries in the Americas, signed the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, reiterating the
will to “strengthen national, regional and hemispheric eorts to create conditions for safe, orderly, humane and regular
migration and to strengthen frameworks for international protection and cooperation” (The White House, 2022).
Many Caribbean countries also made pledges related to advancing the implementation of the Global Compact on
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) during the International Migration Review Forum in 2022. While there
is political will to address the myriad challenges that migration poses in the region and to maximize the benets that
migration and migrants can bring to origin, transit and destination societies, there is a persistent lack of information
and data on migration trends or comprehensive reports that can be used to inform evidence-based policymaking
and programming.
Within this context, and in line with the GCM (particularly its objectives 1, 3 and 17 on data and information), and the
2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (particularly Objective 10.7 on orderly, safe, regular and responsible
migration and mobility of people, and Target 17.18 on disaggregation of data by characteristics including migration
status), the International Organization for Migration (IOM)’s Regional Oce for Central America, North America
and the Caribbean in San José, Costa Rica, presents this data report in order to highlight several key historical
and recent developments and trends in mobility and migration in the Caribbean region. The report focuses on ocial
statistics published by international agencies as well as records published and maintained by governments. While the
depth of migration dynamics across the entire region is far too complex to understand in a single report, this p
ublication
serves as an important starting point for technocrats, policymakers, researchers, practitioners and other actors across
governments, United Nations agencies, civil society, and academia to better understand complex phenomena of
migration and mobility in the Caribbean region, in combination with other national and regional resources.
3 For the purposes of this report, the Caribbean refers to all countries/territories under the UN Statistics Division (UNSD) regional grouping as well as Belize,
Guyana and Suriname. See Map A for further information.
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Caribbean is a region of emigration. Nearly one-fth of the region’s nationals lived outside of their countries / territories
of origin as of 2020, among them a signicant number of women (UNDESA, 2020, 2021a). In proportional terms,
10 of the top 20 countries of emigration in the world in 2019 (in countries where the combined population
of residents and emigrants residing abroad exceeded 100,000) were located in the Caribbean (IOM, 2019b). Cuban
and Haitian nationals constituted most of all refugees and asylum seekers originating from the Caribbean by the end
of 2022. These two nationalities have also been the most frequently detected among Caribbean migrants travelling
irregularly through key transit points in the Americas in recent years, underpinning the precarious and vulnerable
journeys that Cuban and Haitian migrants often embark on to seek better lives abroad.
Return migration is a prominent trend in the Caribbean, including of individuals who were removed involuntarily
by authorities in key destination and transit countries; young, economically active migrants returning
voluntarily to the region to work; older retirees returning voluntarily who had originally left the Caribbean mainly
in the 1950s and 60s; and family units, often returning to the region in order to aord private education and other
benets for their children (IOM, 2017a; Fraser and Uche, 2010; Reynolds, 2008). Administrative data available from
key countries of destination would indicate that tens of thousands of Caribbean migrants are removed or involuntary/
voluntarily returned by the United States, Mexico, European Union, and United Kingdom each year, with returns/
removals continuing in notable quantities during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.
While the Caribbean region is mainly characterized by emigration, there is also a sizable population of immigrants
in the region – reaching 1.63 million as of 2020 (UNDESA, 2021a). The region’s immigrant population was relatively evenly-
distributed between immigrants originating from within and outside of the Caribbean. The top three destination countries/
territories in 2020 were the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Guadeloupe while the top three origin countries were
Haiti, the United States and the Dominican Republic (ibid.). Migrants from the United States included retirees as well as
second-generation children born of Caribbean parents in the United States who subsequently returned to the region.
In recent years, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have been facing one of the largest exoduses
of refugees and migrants in the history of the region. Through May 2023 more than 7.3 million refugees and
migrants from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela resided outside of their home country, an estimated 6.1 million
of whom were residing in other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNHCR and IOM, 2022b). While
only a small proportion of these have arrived in the Caribbean, Venezuelan refugees and migrants constitute a
measurable proportion of the total population in some Caribbean small island States, representing a challenge to reception
and integration capacities.
According to the World Travel and Tourism Council, the Caribbean region is the most reliant in the world on travel
and tourism (in terms of proportion of GDP) (WTTC, 2022). The sector’s contribution to GDP reached 14 per cent
for the region and constituted 15 per cent of all jobs in 2019 (ibid.). However, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic
led to signicant reductions in travel and mobility in the Caribbean and contributed to a nine per
cent decrease in
GDP in 2020 compared with 2019, as well as the loss of millions of jobs (ibid.). Changes in mobility from March 2020
onward are evident in the decreases in arrivals registered at ocial points of entry in selected countries and territories
of the region until 2021.
Aside from the fall-out generated on travel and tourism sectors, the pandemic also had a strong impact on
migrants themselves, as many became stranded and were unable to return home or reach their nal intended
destination (IOM, 2020c; Reuters, 2021). In light of mobility restrictions, those migrants who did choose to move were
often forced to embark on more dangerous or circuitous routes with added COVID-19 health risks (Collins, 2021;
IOM, 2021c). Migrants living in the region faced interruptions to education, job losses, lack of access to health care and
other services and rising incidents of racism and xenophobia, amongst other challenges (USAID and UNICEF, 2020;
IOM, 2020d; Bolivar Duerto, 2021; UNHCR and IOM, 2021).
4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Remittances are by far the most important source of external nancing for the Caribbean, far outnumbering
foreign direct investment (FDI) and ocial development assistance (ODA). The region has seen an increase in
absolute remittance inows year over year since 2013 (CEMLA, 2021). Remittances represent a considerable proportion
of GDP in several countries and territories and often form a fundamental support and insurance mechanism for
families and communities back home. While the COVID-19 pandemic generated concerns, both regionally and
globally, regarding the capacities of migrants to send remittances home, remittances to the Caribbean increased
18.2 per cent in 2020 compared with levels seen in 2019, a constant trend until 2021, in 2022 the economic recovery
has caused remittances to slightly lower their participation in comparison with the other income of the GDP in the
Caribbean countries or territories (ibid.).
Each year, in addition to signicant eects on economies, livelihoods, habitats, food security systems, key infrastructure
and other fundamental sectors, thousands of people are displaced due to the impact of rapid-onset natural hazards
in the Caribbean. In per capita terms, many Caribbean SIDS are amongst the most vulnerable countries/territories
in the world to disaster-related displacement in the context of rapid-onset natural hazards (Lemay, 2016.). There is
also broad consensus that extreme weather events such as tropical storms, oods, droughts and other phenomena
which occur in the region will likely increase in frequency and intensity in the coming decades (ibid.).
While data on sudden-onset disasters (notably, hurricanes) and their impact on human mobility in the Caribbean are
more widely available, displacement and migration related to other slow-onset processes which aect the region –
including sea-level rise (SLR), coastal erosion, droughts, rainfall variability, environmental degradation and more – are
more dicult to capture. However, slow onset environmental drivers are expected to play an increasingly prominent role
in generating migration in the region, particularly internally within countries and particularly from rural areas to cities.
Each year, hundreds of deaths and disappearances are registered by IOM’s Missing Migrants Project (MMP) in the
Caribbean, with countless more unregistered. Since the beginning of 2016 and through June 2023, a total of 1,298 migrant
deaths and disappearances were recorded by IOM MMP in the Caribbean region (IOM, n.d.a.). In the Caribbean region,
some of the main routes where migrant deaths and disappearances are known to occur are along maritime routes
between Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico (sometimes referred to as the “Mona passage”), Caribbean countries
and territories to the United States, and from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to dierent locations within the region.
These routes are considered particularly risky not only due to weather and environmental conditions on the high seas
but also because many movements take place in non-seaworthy vessels (ibid.). It is suspected that many deaths and
disappearances taking place in the Caribbean go unregistered, as many shipwrecks are never identied (a phenomenon
often termed “Yola shipwrecks”).
5
KEY BACKGROUND DATA – ALL CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES
3
Sources: a World Bank, “GDP (current US$)”, n.d. [04 Jan. 2022], *when 2022 is not available, most recent data is used (2020 or 2021); b World Bank, “GDP per capita (current US$)”,
n.d. [04 Jan 2022] *when 2022 is not available, most recent data is used (2020 or 2021); c United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2020, 2020; d
World Bank, “Country and Lending Groups”, n.d. [04 Jan. 2022]; e United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aairs (UNDESA), World Population Prospects Revision 2019 –
Total Population – Both Sexes, 2019; f UNDESA, “International Migrant Stock 2020: Destination and origin: Table 1”, 2021; g World Bank, “Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)”,
n.d. [04 Jan 2022]. Note: The spaces with a dash (“-“) indicate that no data were available.
Country
GDP, total, 2022,
billions (current
USD)
a
GDP per capita,
2022, thousands
(current USD)
b
Human
Development
Index (2021)
c
Income Status
2021-2022
d
Total population
(2020 projections)
e
Stock of
emigrants
(2020)
f
Stock of
immigrants
(2020)
g
Remittances
(% GDP, 2022)
h
Anguilla
- - - - 15,002 2,505 5,715 -
Antigua and
Barbuda
1.8 18,745 0.79 High 97,928 66,561 29,386 2.0
Aruba
3.1* 29,342* - - 106,766 21,456 53,593 -
Bahamas
12.9 31,458 0.81 High 393,248 53,793 63,583 -
Barbados
5.6 20,019 0.79 High 287,371 99,611 34,869 -
Belize
2.8 6,968 0.68 Lower middle 397,621 52,756 62,043 5.0
Bonaire, Sint
Eustatius and
Saba
- - - - 26,221 8,148 26,221 -
British Virgin
Islands
- - - - 30,237 5,355 22,164 -
Cayman
Islands
6.0* 88,475* - - 65,720 1,908 29,242 -
Cuba
107.4* 9,478* 0.76 Upper Middle 11,326,616 1,757,300 3,024 -
Curaçao
2.7* 17,717* - - 164,100 7,611 57,210 -
Dominica
0.6 8,415 0.72 Upper Middle 71,991 78,191 8,284 8.5
Dominican
Republic
113.6 10,121 0.77 Upper Middle 10,847,904 1,608,567 603,794 9.0
Grenada
1.3 10,016 0.80 Upper Middle 112 519 62,204 7,213 5.5
Guadeloupe
- - - - 400,127 12,542 90,206 -
Guyana
15.4 18,990 0.71 Upper Middle 786,559 438,413 31,169 2.6
Haití
20.3 1,748 0.54 Lower Middle 11,402,533 1,769,671 18,884 22.4
Jamaica
17.1 6,047 0.71 Upper Middle 2,961,161 1,118,931 23,629 21.6
Martinique
- - - - 375,265 12,963 68,624 -
Montserrat
- - - - 4,999 24,582 1,379 -
Puerto Rico
113.4 35,209 - - 2,860,840 1,850,529 247,132 -
Saint
Barthélemy
- - - - 9,885 - - -
Saint Kitts
and Nevis
1.0 20,177 0.78 High 53,192 50,285 7,725 3.4
Saint Lucia
2.1 11,481 0.72 Upper Middle 183,629 71,227 8,338 2.7
Saint Martin
(French part)
- - - - 38,659 - - -
Saint Vincent
and the
Grenadines
0.9 9,125 0.738* Upper Middle 110,947 55,525 4,738 7.3
Sint Maarten
(Dutch part)
1.6 36,220 - - 42,882 2,191 - -
Suriname
3.6 5,858 0.73 Upper Middle 586,634 273,209 47,801 4.1
Trinidad and
Tobago
27.9 18,222 0.81 High 1,399,491 330,519 78,849 0.6
Turks and
Caicos
Islands
1.1 24,918 - - 38,718 2,689 - -
United
States Virgin
Islands
4.2* 39,552* - - 104,423 3,908 - -
TOTAL STOCK OF EMIGRANTS FROM THE REGION 9,843,150
TOTAL STOCK OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE REGION 1,634,815
6
1. OVERVIEW
1.1 MIGRATION TRENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN
Comprised of a total of 29 countries and territories
2
, the Caribbean is an immensely diverse region comprised
of states with populations ranging from just tens of thousands of people to those with more than 10 million.
Between these countries and territories are a range of income levels, development outcomes, language proles
4
, ethnic
groups, economic structures and political systems. Despite this diversity, the region is interconnected through common
historical ties, while also sharing several shared challenges and opportunities.
Twenty-ve (25) of the 29 countries and territories in the Caribbean are designated as Small Island Developing States
(SIDS) – a distinct group of United Nations (UN) and Non-UN Members/Associate Members that face “unique social,
economic and environmental vulnerabilities” (UN, n.d.a). These vulnerabilities include, amongst others, small sizes,
remoteness, climate change impacts, biodiversity loss, dependence on external markets, high costs and narrow resource
bases which together can hinder broader socioeconomic development (Ibid).
Existing research shows that the above realities, as well as colonial ties and other historic and present push- and pull-
factors have had a signicant impact in shaping migration trajectories into, within and out of the region (ILO, 2014;
Williams, 2013; Cassin et al., 2022; IOM, 2020; IOM, 2017). Migration poses as an important adaptation strategy to
deal with the above-mentioned challenges for millions of people in the region while also serving as a potential tool
for development, both by way of migrant remittances sent to families and communities back home, and by way of
social remittances and the transfer of new knowledge, technology and skills. Migration in the Caribbean can also
bring challenges, both due to the loss of specialized human capital (often known as “brain drain”) as many Caribbean
workers seek better opportunities abroad, but also in the assistance and integration of diverse ows of vulnerable
migrants migrating both within the region and from countries outside of the region.
The Caribbean is a region of emigrants. Many countries in the region – including Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic
and Jamaica – had more than 1.1 million and even up to 1.7 million nationals living abroad as 2020 (UNDESA, 2021).
With an estimated 9.84 million Caribbean migrants living abroad in 2020, the majority of which (8.94 million)
resided outside of the region
5
, migration connects Caribbean countries, communities as well as migrants and their
families through strong and lasting transnational ties.
Recently, migration has risen on the agenda of many countries confronting disaster and displacement caused
by recurring and perhaps intensifying natural hazards, particularly hurricanes. In addition to sudden-onset disasters,
many Caribbean countries are increasingly susceptible to slow onset climate and environmental change, which
is expected to play an increasingly prominent role as a driver of migration in the region, particularly internally
within countries from rural areas to cities, but also across international borders
6
.
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to generate a tremendous impact on mobility in Caribbean countries as of
2022, reducing regional cross-border movement and international tourist arrivals and jeopardizing tourist revenues
and economic livelihoods.
7
As one of the regions of origin most dependent on remittances, the pandemic’s impacts
have also generated concerns over Caribbean migrants’ capacities to send money to families in countries of origin
8
.
However, data through the end of 2020 show that remittances to the region have remained relatively resilient.
9
Mainly, Spanish, French, English, Dutch, Haitian Creole and Papiament (a Spanish and Portuguese-based creole language spoken in the Dutch Caribbean, mainly
Aruba, Bonaire and Curacao).
Data derived from UNDESA, International migrant stock 2019, and refer to all migrants originating from Caribbean countries and overseas territories as classified
by UNDESA (including Puerto Rico), as well as Guyana and Suriname (classified as South America) and Belize (classified as Central America).
Caribbean Migration Consultations, Migration Governance: An Adaptation Strategy for Environmental Change, n.d. (IOM, San José) [3 Feb. 2021].
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The impact of the COVID- pandemic on the tourism sector in Latin America and the
Caribbean, and options for a sustainable and resilient recover, 2020.
World Bank, COVID-19 crisis through a migration lens, 2020.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Stand by me: COVID-19 and the resilience of remittances ows to LAC”, 2 December 2020 [3 Feb. 2021].
OVERVIE W
7
Intraregional migration in the Caribbean, a foundational provision for broader regional integration across both
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
10
and Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
11
Member States, is also
a notable trend and is playing an increasing role in the region’s economic and social development
12
.
Data also show that Cuban and Haitian migrants continue to leave their countries of origin, whether for family reunication,
in search of work, in need of international protection or for other reasons. The arrival of Venezuelan refugees
and migrants to the region in recent years has also added to complex migration dynamics and has had a strong
impact particularly (although not exclusively) on many small islands, states and territories
13
. Many of these vulnerable
migrants embark on dangerous and potentially life-threatening journeys in order to reach countries of destination, and
many have lost their lives while in transit through maritime and land routes
14
.
Finally, although data are limited, return migration – both voluntary and forced – of Caribbean migrants is
a prominent trend, bringing with them a wide variety of resources, skills, experiences and knowledge with the potential to
benet local economic development, while highlighting the importance of developing innovative policy responses
in countries and territories of origin in order to maximize return and reintegration and foster entrepreneurship and
innovation amongst returnee populations.
1.2 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT
The importance of having accessible, disaggregated, reliable, timely, public, free and high-quality data is well recognized
and highlighted in various international frameworks.
• Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Target 17.18 “… increase signicantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated
by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status…”
• Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)
Objective 1 Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies.
Objective 3 Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration.
Objective 17 Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to
shape perceptions of migration.
As coordinator and secretariat of the United Nations Network on Migration, IOM is in a unique position to contribute to the
achievement of regional objectives with regard to improving the collection, management and dissemination of migration
data. For this reason, IOM has also established its own institutional migration data strategy. This report responds
in particular to the Objective 1 of this strategy.
• IOM Migration Data Strategy
Objective 1 Strengthen the global evidence base on migration;
Objective 2 Develop capacity of States and other relevant partners to enhance the national, regional
and global migration evidence base;
Objective 3 Ensure more evidence-based IOM- and United Nations system-wide programming,
operations, policy advice and communications.
CARICOM is made up of 15 Member States and ve Associate Members and was founded in 1973. More information available here.
OECD is made up of seven Protocol Member States and four Associate Members and was founded in 1981. More information available here.
IOM, Free movement in the Caribbean: Economic and security dimensions, 2019.
Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan – January – December 2021, 2020.
IOM, Missing Migrants Project – Americas, n.d. [3 Feb. 2021].
1. OVERVIEW
OVERVIE W
8
1. OVERVIEW
• Regional Strategy for Central America, North America and the Caribbean – The information available in the Report
also responds to the IOM Vision established for the region for the period of 2020-2024:
Pillar C
Governance – “Serving as a trusted and eective leader and partner in relevant bilateral,
regional and global initiatives and processes”
iv “Enhance the capacity of governments to collect, analyse and use migration and internal displacement
data for evidence-based policymaking.”
Despite the importance of migration in the Caribbean region, there exist very few resources which highlight
migration trends in the region, and even fewer that are focused on data. Data are a critical element of evidence-
based policy making.
Within this context, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Regional Oce for Central America, North
America and the Caribbean in San José, Costa Rica, presents this brief in order to highlight several key historical and recent
developments and trends in mobility and migration in the Caribbean region, focusing on ocial statistics published by
international agencies as well as records published and maintained by governments.
1.3 GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE
Map 1.1: Countries and territories which make up the Caribbean region in this report.
Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown, and designations used on this map do not imply ocial endorsement or
acceptance by IOM.
Belize
Cuba
Jamaica
The Bahamas
Haiti
Dominican
Republic
Trinidad and
Tobago
Barbados
Guyana
Suriname
Aruba
Curaçao
Bonaire
Puerto Rico
Grenada
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and
The Grenadines
Antigua and Barbuda
Martinique
Guadaloupe
Dominica
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Montserrat
Turks and
Caicos Islands
British Virgin Islands
United States
Virgin Islands
Anguilla
Sint Maarten
Saint Martin
Saint
Barthelemy
Saba
Sint Eustatius
Country
Territory
Cayman Islands
CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
9
This section provides key data on emigration from the region, mainly sourced from estimates of the number (or
“stock”) of international migrants generated by UNDESA, with information disaggregated by sex and country of
origin/destination when possible. This section also highlights key changes in Caribbean emigration over time. For
additional information on how UNDESA generates its estimates on the international migrant stock, see the 2020
Methodological Note (UNDESA, 2021b).
2.1 REGIONAL EMIGRANT STOCKS
Figure 1: Stock of Caribbean nationals living abroad, and percentage (%) change between reference years, 1990 –
2020 (millions)
15
Source: Own calculations; based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aairs (UNDESA), Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by
sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990-2020, 2021 [05 May 2022].
• The stock of Caribbean emigrants more than doubled in three decades between 1990 and 2020, by
approximately 5.17 million. The size of the emigrant population grew on average by 13 per cent every ve
years in this 30-year period.
•
While it appears that net emigration rates have decreased in recent years, the Caribbean nevertheless remains
an area of signicant net emigration. The lion’s share of Caribbean emigration is extrarregional. While the
absolute number of intraregional migrants continues to grow, intraregional migrants as a proportion of all
Caribbean emigrants have remained relatively constant during the past three decades, hovering between 8.8
and 10.5 per cent. Of the stock of 900,462 intraregional Caribbean emigrants as of 2020, 63 per cent (567,956)
were Haitians.
Totals include migrants originating from all countries and territories signaled in section 1.3 / map 1.1.
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
91% of Caribbean migrants resided
outside of the region in 2020
9% of Caribbean
migrants resided in another country /
territory within the region in 2020
CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
10
2.2 BREAKDOWN OF EMIGRANTS
Table 1: Top 10 origin countries / territories of Caribbean nationals residing abroad in absolute terms, and percentage
(%) increase between 1990 and 2020
Source: Own calculations; based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aairs (UNDESA), Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year
by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin,
1990-2020, 2021 [05 May 2022].
Note: migrants originating from Puerto Rico are United States citizens and thus may not be considered immigrants by certain entities in the United States
and elsewhere. However, for statistical purposes, Puerto Ricans born in Puerto Rico who move to the 50 states of the United States are considered migrants by
UNDESA. The * symbol indicates a dependent area or overseas territory.
• Migrants from the top ve origin countries / territories in the region - Puerto Rico, Haiti, Cuba,
the Dominican Republic and Jamaica - represented 82 per cent (8,104,9998) of the total stock
of emigrants from the region in 2020. The top 10 countries above amounted to 94 per cent (9,284,927)
of the regions’ total number of emigrants in 2020.
While the size of the emigrant population grew signicantly across all of the above countries and territories in the
specied 30-year period, these outows tended to occur at dierent times, and are linked to dierent trends occurring
both during this timeframe and prior to 1990:
Puerto Rico: The rate of emigration from Puerto Rico showed a decline through the 1990s and early
2000s before registering a marked increase beginning in 2010 onward (UNDESA, 2021).
Top 3 destinations and percentage (%) of total emigrant stock as of 2020:
• United States (mainland)
16
: 1,829,251 (98.9%)
• Dominican Republic: 4,780 (<1%)
• Guam:
17
4,176 (<1%)
Although emigration from Puerto Rico to the continental United States took place long before World War II, the largest
waves occurred after the war ended from 1945 onward (Lehman College, n.d.). Immigration to the mainland United
States was at its peak in the 1950s (in a period often termed “the Great Migration”) both due to the precarious economic
situation on the island as well as active recruitment of workers from Puerto Rico (Library of Congress, n.d.).
A change of usual residence to reside in one of the 50 states of the United States would be considered internal migration.
A change of usual residence to reside in Guam would be considered internal migration, given that Guam is also an overseas dependent territory of the United States.
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
Emigrant stock
Country / Territory 1990 2020 % Increase
1
Puerto Rico* 1,200,245 1,850,529 54%
2
Haiti 524,711 1,769,671 237%
3
Cuba 835,175 1,757,300 110%
4
Dominican Republic 458,021 1,608,567 251%
5
Jamaica 588,450 1,118,931 90%
6
Guyana 233,318 438,413 88%
7
Suriname 177,857 330,519 86%
8
Barbados 84,766 273,209 222%
9
Dominica 40,563 99,611 146%
10
Saint Lucia 21,999 78,191 255%
CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
11
Migration to the continental United States decreased slightly after the 1950s but remained steady through the next
few decades as the Puerto Rican economy obtained relative stability. However, particularly from 2006 onward,
renewed economic woes led to large outuxes at levels not seen since the 1950s (Cohn et al., 2014). The population
of the island peaked in 2004 and has declined since, mainly due to emigration as well as low birthrates (Ibid). The
socioeconomic impacts of Hurricane Maria, a category 4 storm which struck the island in September 2017, added to the
diculties stemming from the territory’s decade-long nancial crisis and has since generated further migrant outows
(United States Census Bureau, 2019).
Haiti: Rates of Haitian emigration remained sustained during the entire 30-year period, reaching their
highest levels after 2010. On average, the emigrant population from Haiti increased by 22 per cent every
ve years between 1990 and 2020, peaking at an increase of 31 per cent between 2010 and 2015
(UNDESA, 2021).
Top 3 destinations and percentage (%) of total emigrant stock as of 2020:
• United States: 705,361 (39.9%)
• Dominican Republic: 496,112 (28.0%)
• Chile: 236,912 (13.4%)
The main drivers of Haitian emigration have included the collapse of a three-decade long dictatorship in 1986 (which
led to a political and economic crisis) as well as sustained endemic poverty and political instability through the
1990s and early 2000s (Olsen-Medina and Batalova, 2020). The large exodus of Haitian migrants witnessed after
2010 is mainly attributed to displacement and the socioeconomic fall-out resulting from the country’s devastating
2010 earthquake (Ibid). Continued insecurity and economic and political turmoil, as well as Hurricane Matthew in
2016, have also served as further drivers (Ya tes, 2021).
Cuba: The rate of emigration from Cuba remained virtually constant during the three decades spanning
1990-2020. On average, the size of the emigrant population increased by 13 per cent every ve years. The
highest growth rates in this period were seen between 2015 and 2020, when the emigrant population
increased by 17 per cent (UNDESA, 2021).
Top 3 destinations and percentage (%) of total emigrant stock as of 2020:
• United States: 1,376,211 (78.3%)
• Spain: 162,368 (9.2%)
• Italy: 38,532 (2.2%)
Large-scale emigration from Cuba in modern times was spurred by the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and the resulting political
and economic challenges in the country (Duany, 2017). On the destination side, policy mechanisms in the United
States facilitated entry of Cuban refugees and migrants, particularly from 1966 onward with the signing of the
Cuban Adjustment Act, which allowed Cuban citizens living in the United States for at least one year to apply to
be lawful permanent residents (Nodarse Venancio and Oliver, 2022). From the mid-1990s the “wet-food, dry-foot”
policy in the United States (under which Cubans arriving to United States land border points without a visa would be
admitted to the country) continued to serve as a pull factor (Blizzard and Batalova, 2020). Despite the end of “wet-food,
dry-foot” in 2017, Cuban emigration has continued in recent years in the midst of deteriorating standards of living and
social unrest, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic (Nodarse Venancio and Oliver, 2022; Sherwood and Acosta,
2022). Emigration to Spain has long been a common trend amongst Cuban migrants in light of common colonial,
historic and linguistic ties – many Cuban migrants in Spain can claim Spanish ancestry (Sosa and Perez-Diaz, 2018).
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
12
Dominican Republic: Emigration from the Dominican Republic has slowed in recent decades but
still remains high. The largest outows from the Dominican Republic in the aforementioned 30-year period
occurred between 1990 and 2000, when the emigrant population grew by 94 per cent. After 2000
and through 2020, the size of the Dominican emigrant population grew at an average of 16 per cent every
ve years. The period spanning 2015-2020 saw the slowest rate of growth within the three-decade period,
at 11 per cent (UNDESA, 2021).
Top 3 destinations and % of total emigrant stock as of 2020:
• United States: 1,376,211 (85.6%)
• Spain: 162,368 (10.1%)
• Italy: 38,532 (2.4%)
The large emigration rates from the Dominican Republic in the nineties came on the tail-end of three decades of
signicant outows (mainly toward the United States) of Dominicans eeing violence and political crises since the 1960s
as well as the eects of the Latin American economic and debt crisis of the 1980s (Babich and Batalova, 2021b). Many
Dominican nationals now emigrate through family reunication ties, particularly to the United States and Spain (Ibid).
Jamaica: The stock of Jamaican nationals living abroad increased by 46 per cent between 1990 and
2000. The rate of emigration decreased markedly after 2000, on average by seven per cent every ve
years through 2020 (UNDESA, 2021).
Top 3 destinations and % of total emigrant stock as of 2020:
• United States: 792,370 (70.8%)
• Canada: 148,982 (13.3%)
• United Kingdom: 128,772 (11.5%)
Emigration from Jamaica occurred with increasing momentum by the mid-twentieth century as the United States and the
United Kingdom recruited large numbers of Jamaican workers during and after World War II (IOM, 2018; Zong and
Batalova, 2019). In the 1960s, various policy changes led to a shift in the direction of ows away from Western Europe
and mainly toward the United States and in smaller part to Canada (IOM, 2018). High levels of emigration of Jamaicans to
Northern America, including of highly skilled workers, continued into the 1970s. While persistent economic woes tied
in particular to declines in the agricultural sector (among other factors) would lead to sustained emigration in the
1980s and 90s, rates of emigration began to decline during this period and continued to do so into the 2000s (Ibid).
Guyana: In the period spanning 1990 – 2020, the largest rates of emigration from Guyana took place
between 1990 and 2000, when the size of the emigrant population increased by 55 per cent. However,
the growth rate of the emigrant population decreased signicantly between 2000 and 2015, and between
2015 and 2020 the size of the emigrant population actually shrunk by nine per cent, from 481,000 in
2015 to 438,000 in 2020, in light of return migration.
To p three destinations and percentage (%) of total emigrant stock as of 2020:
• United States: 241,573 (55%)
• Canada: 94,421 (22%)
• United Kingdom: 28,074 (6%)
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
13
Sustained outows of Guyanese migrants have occurred since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1966,
particularly in the 1970s (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020). Many of those migrating in the decades
after independence possessed tertiary-level education or had at least completed secondary education, leaving the country
in the backdrop of a persistent lack of economic opportunities as well as ethnic and political tensions, and facilitated
by favorable immigration laws particularly for skilled workers in key destination countries, like the United Kingdom,
Canada and the United States (ibid.). As the size of the Guyanese diaspora grew signicantly in recent decades,
family reunication has also become an important channel of emigration (ibid.).
• Trinidad and Tobago: Between 1990-2020, the largest growth in the emigrant population occurred
in the 1990s at an average of 25 per cent every ve years. However, from 2000 onward the growth
in the emigrant population slowed signicantly, and, between 2015 and 2020, the overall emigrant population
decreased by approximately 38,000 from 369,000 to 331,000.
To p three destinations and percentage (%) of total emigrant stock as of 2020
• United States: 208,075 (63%)
• Canada: 70,035 (21%)
• United Kingdom: 29,508 (9%)
Recent emigration from Trinidad and Tobago has mainly been of highly-skilled workers, including nurses and
other professionals migrating to the United States and Canada (IOM, n.d.). Otherwise, Trinidad and Tobago is one
of the most prosperous islands in the Caribbean and has signicant natural gas resources, an expanding tourist
industry, foreign direct investment and agriculture, serving as a key destination of Caribbean migrants in recent years
(Ibid.). This prosperity in part has led to a decrease in emigration from the island.
• Suriname: Between 1990-2020, the largest growth in the emigrant population occurred between
2005 and 2010 (increasing by 18%). However, from 2010 onwards the growth in the emigrant population
slowed, with the total stock increasing by a more modest six per cent between 2010 and 2020.
To p three destinations and percentage (%) of total emigrant stock as of 2020:
• Netherlands: 182,922 (67%)
• France: 27,892 (10%)
• French Guiana: 26,064 (10%)
From 1945 through the 1960s emigration from Suriname was dominated by high- and middle-income students
going to the Netherlands to study and settle to work (IOM, 2015). In the 1950s, Dutch industrial and shipping rms as
well as hospitals and care institutions began recruiting Surinamese workers (both male and female) to ll critical labour
market gaps in the Netherlands (ibid.). Migration from the mid-1960s onward shifted to include a far higher number of
women (whereas prior outows were predominated by adult males) as more nurses were recruited from the country
and as family reunication became a growing trend (ibid.). The highest rates of emigration from the county began in the
1970s onward, mainly due to weak economic prospects in Suriname and ethnic and political strife. Outows peaked
in 1975, mainly toward the Netherlands, in the same year that the country gained independence (ibid.). Favorable
visa policies in the Netherlands in the immediate years following and political turmoil in the wake of independence
would driver further sustained outows through the 1990s (ibid.). Throughout this period, certain ethnic groups
in Suriname – in particular Surinamese Maroons – have migrated to French Guiana and continue to do so to this
day (ibid.).
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
14
• Barbados: The emigrant population from Barbados grew modestly on average by six per cent every
ve years between 1990 and 2000. However, since 2000 the size of the emigrant population has remained
static growing on an average of just one per cent every ve years through 2020. Between 2015 and
2020 the size of the emigrant population decreased by approximately 2,300, from 101,900 to 99,600.
To p three destinations and percentage (%) of total emigrant stock as of 2020
• United States: 51,738 (52%)
• United Kingdom: 26,622 (27%)
• Canada: 15,177 (19%)
The bulk of emigration from Barbados occurred earlier in the 20th century. In the early 1900s many Barbadian
workers went to work on the Panama Canal (Barrow, 2010). Later, many Barbadians migrated in search of better
labour opportunities in the United Kingdom from the 1940s through the 1960s. However, upon the introduction
of more restrictive immigration policies in the 1960s in the United Kingdom, combined with the liberalization of
immigration policies in the United States / growing economic opportunities in both the United States and Canada, outows
shifted largely toward Northern America (ibid.). After independence in 1966, the country’s economy transformed from
being primarily agrarian to a more diverse service-based economy with strong earnings from tourism, manufacturing
and the nancial sector (Callaghan, 2018). With the exception of a strong recession in the early 1990s, the
improved economic performance and living conditions in the country have reduced pressures to emigrate, particularly
after the 1990s.
• Dominica: Between 1990 and 2000 the emigrant stock from Dominica increased by 19 per cent.
The highest rates of growth in the emigrant population took place between 2000 and 2005 (+33%) and
2005 and 2010 (+15%). However, since then the rate of growth has slowed signicantly, with the size
of the emigrant population increasing by six per cent between 2010 and 2020.
To p three destinations and percentage (%) of total emigrant stock as of 2020
• United States: 32,379 (41%)
• United Kingdom: 8,625 (11%)
• France: 7,368 (9%)
Emigration from Dominica has been primarily economic in nature, to surrounding Caribbean islands, the United States
and Europe. The country is highly volcanic and has very few beaches, meaning that tourism to the island developed
slower than other Caribbean islands (US Department of State, 2018a). Dominica has experienced challenges diversifying
its economy and still relies heavily on agriculture, which can be vulnerable to external global commodity price shocks
(in the case of bananas, for example), as well as weather (ibid.). The island has struggled to recover from numerous
devastating Hurricanes (for example Hurricane Dean in 2007 and Hurricane Maria in 2017) which have spurred
further economic diculties, displacement and international migration.
While Figure 1 and Table 1 have highlighted trends in Caribbean emigration in absolute terms, calculating emigration
from the region in proportional terms (that is, the percentage of each country / territory’s nationals living abroad)
portrays a more nuanced reality of emigration in the region. In fact, based on 2019 gures, IOM estimated that:
• In proportional terms, ten of the top 20 countries of emigration in the world in 2019 (In countries
where the combined population of residents and emigrants residing abroad exceeded 100,000) were
located in the Caribbean, including Saint Kitts and Nevis, Dominica and Suriname (which lled the top three
spots, respectively), Grenada (5th), Guyana (6th), Antigua and Barbuda (8th), Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines (9th), Barbados (13th), Jamaica (14th) and Saint Lucia (16th) (). IOM, 2020.
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
15
Figure 2: Percentage (%) of nationals living abroad, by region (overall) and by individual Caribbean UN Member
Countries, 2020.
Source: Own calculations, based on data from: UNDESA, World Population Prospects 2019: 1-1 Total population (both sexes combined) by region, subregion
and country, annually for 1950-2100 (thousands), n.d. [01 May. 2022]; Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aairs (UNDESA), Table 1:
International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin, 1990-2020, 2021 [05 May 2022].
A review of Figure 2 above reveals that various countries that did not appear among the top 10 origin countries
of migrants in the Caribbean in absolute terms featured prominently in the list of top 10 origin countries
in proportional terms, mainly: Saint Kitts and Nevis (ranked 2
nd
amongst UN Member Countries in the region),
Antigua and Barbuda (third), Grenada (fth) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (sixth):
• Nearly one-fth of the region’s nationals were estimated to be living outside of their countries /
territories of origin as of 2020, reecting immense degrees of emigration in proportional terms.
• 7 of the 16 UN Member Countries in the Caribbean had one-third or higher of their population residing
abroad as of 2020, and the proportion of nationals living abroad did not fall below one-tenth in any
UN Member Country.
• Most emigrants from Saint Kitts and Nevis migrate to the United States – the destination of 27,765,
or 55.2 per cent of the total 50,285 emigrants from the country living abroad as of 2020. The United
Kingdom is the second-most destination of migrants from Saint Kitts and Nevis (7,998, or 16%)
followed by the United States Virgin Islands (7,103, or 14%).
• Emigration trends from Antigua and Barbuda are like Saint Kitts and Nevis, with the United States
serving as the main country of destination (46,037, or 69% of the total 66,561)
Below are some observations for specic countries included in Figure 2 above that did not appear in the top
10 countries of origin (in absolute terms) featured in Table 2:
• For each country in Figure 2 that did not fall within the top 10 countries of origin in absolute terms
(Table 2 – specically, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Bahamas and Belize – the top three countries of destination were the United States and
its territories, the United Kingdom and Canada.
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
18%
of all Caribbean nationals (from all countries and territories) were estimated to live
abroad as of 2020
Dominica
52%
Barbados
26%
Guyana
36%
Grenade
36%
Dominican Republic
13%
Saint Lucia
28%
Jamaica
27%
Antigua and Barbuda
40%
Haiti
13%
Cuba
13%
Suriname
32%
Belize
12%
Saint Kitts and Nevis
49%
Trinidad and Tobago
19%
Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines
33%
Bahamas
12%
CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
16
• Fifty-ve per cent (55%) of the 27,765 migrants from Saint Kitts and Nevis in 2020 lived in the United
States, followed by 29 per cent in the United States Virgin Islands.
• Nearly 70 per cent of the total 46,037 migrants from Antigua and Barbuda were residing in the United
States as of 2020.
• Of the 62,204 total migrants from Grenada around the world in 2020, 41 per cent were living in the
United States, 20 per cent in the United Kingdom and 18 per cent in Canada.
• Over 27 per cent of the 55,525 migrants from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as of 2020 were living
in the United States, followed by Canada (25%) and the United Kingdom (17%).
• Nearly nine in ten (87%) of the 53,793 migrants from the Bahamas in 2020 were living in the
United States.
• For Belize, 81 per cent or the total 52,756 migrants globally were estimated to be living in the United
States as of 2020.
Similar trends of signicant proportions of all nationals can be seen amongst Caribbean overseas dependent territories.
Aside from Puerto Rico (previously discussed) this include Montserrat, Bonaire, Aruba, the British Virgin Islands
and Anguilla:
Figure 3: Top destination regions of Caribbean migrants, 2020
18
Source: Own calculations; based on UNDESA, Table 1: International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by region, country or area of destination and origin,
1990-2020, 2020 [21 Jul. 2023].
Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown, and designations used on this map do not imply ocial endorsement or
acceptance by IOM.
Analysis includes nationals originating from all sovereign countries, overseas territories and dependent areas included under UNDESA classications for the
Caribbean, as well as Belize, Guyana and Suriname. This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown, and designations used on this
map do not imply ocial endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Regions are based on UNDESA classications with the exception of Guyana, Suriname and Belize,
which have been included under the Caribbean for the purposes of the present analysis.
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
Destination region
Caribbean
Central America
Northern America
Northern Europe
South America
Southern Europe
Western Europe
73.2%
7.20 million
9.1%
900,462
4.9%
483,243
0.6%
56,078
4.5%
443,848
4.3%
421,762
3.1%
302,763
CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
17
The vast majority of Caribbean emigrants are concentrated in just seven global regions. As of 2019, 99.3 per cent of
Caribbean emigrants were residing in Northern America, elsewhere in the Caribbean, Western Europe, Southern
Europe, Northern Europe, South America and Central America
19
, corridors which, aside from intraregional
migration, largely reect post-colonial ties as well as the geographic proximity and growing popularity of the
United States and Canada as principal destinations within the last 40 – 50 years.
Figure 4: Sex composition of Caribbean nationals residing abroad, 2020
20
Source: Own calculations; based on UNDESA, Table 1: Total migrant stock at mid-year by origin and major area, region or country of destination, 1990-2019,
2019 [01 Dec. 2020].
Global data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aairs (UNDESA) indicate that
48 per cent of migrants globally are women. This proportion is higher for the Caribbean region, where
53.2 per cent of all nationals living abroad were women as of 2020. This proportion has grown slightly over time,
given that in 1990 women migrants constituted 52 per cent of all Caribbean nationals living abroad. Data above
indicate that there is measurable variation between countries. However, amongst sovereign Caribbean countries,
only Haiti possesses an emigrant population that is majority male. The feminization of Caribbean emigration
in recent decades has been driven by large demand for highly-skilled female health and education workers in
key destination countries, gendered labour market segmentation and wage gaps in origin countries, increased
female labour force participation and changes in social norms regarding women’s work outside of the home and
women’s mobility, amongst other factors.
21
UNDESA regions are grouped based on seven Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) regions and 22 geographic subregions as dened by the United Nations
Statistics Division and used for the Sustainable Development Goals Report and do not imply ocial endorsement or acceptance by IOM. For more information
consult UNDESA’s International Migrant Stock : Documentation.
Overall proportions by gender for the region include migrants originating from Guyana, Suriname and Belize, as well as all Caribbean areas, territories and
countries included under UNDESA classifications: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bonaire, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba,
Curaçao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten (Dutch), Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands.
IOM, "Empowering Caribbean women through migration", On the Move, n.d. [20 Jan. 2020]; ECLAC, Women's empowerment and migration in the Caribbean, 2017.
ECLAC (Port of Spain); IOM, Migration in the Caribbean: Current trends, opportunities and challenges, 2017 (San Jose).
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
PROFILE OF CARIBB EAN EMIGRANTS
18
Table 2: Top 10 destination countries, territories or areas of Caribbean migrants, total and by gender, 2020
22
23
Source: Own calculations; based on UNDESA, Table 1: Total migrant stock at mid-year by origin and major area, region or country of destination, 1990-2019,
2019 [01 Dec. 2020].
The U.S. stands out as the principal destination country of Caribbean emigrants. Overall, 67 per cent (two-thirds)
of all Caribbean nationals residing outside of their country / territory / area of origin were located in the U.S in
2020. The number of Caribbean migrants residing in the United States is over 13 times greater than the number
of Caribbean migrants residing in Canada (the second-most principal destination country). Between 1990 and
2020, the number of Caribbean migrants residing in the U.S. increased by 110 per cent, from 3.24 million to 6.81
million. The top ve countries / territories of origin of Caribbean migrants in the U.S. in 2020 were: Puerto Rico
(1.83 million); Cuba (1.34 million); the Dominican Republic (1.17 million); Jamaica (759,172); and Haiti (737,058).
The Dominican Republic stands out as the only Caribbean country within the top 10 destination countries.
MIGRANT FLOWS
• While there are no comprehensive and / or reliable data on outows of migrants from Caribbean origin countries
/ territories / states, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) maintains annual
data on inows of foreign population by nationality to its Member countries as part of its International Migration
Database, thus allowing some ability for ow trends analysis over time. Data are based on proxies generated
from administrative records including population registers and residence permit data, as well as population
survey data in some countries.
• By ltering UNDESA data by OECD Member Countries, it is determined that 8,686,450, or 88 per cent of all
9,843,150 Caribbean emigrants abroad in 2020 were residing in an OECD Member Country , meaning that nearly
97 per cent of extraregional Caribbean emigrants in 2020 were residing in an OECD Member country
(own calculations, based on UNDESA, 2021). As such, an analysis of OECD inows data by nationality
may provide robust insight into trends in all migration movements, at least through regular channels,
of extraregional Caribbean migrants in recent years.
Analysis includes nationals originating from all sovereign countries, overseas territories and dependent areas included under UNDESA classications for the
Caribbean, as well as Belize, Guyana and Suriname
Note: migrants originating from Puerto Rico are U.S. passport holders and thus in some instances may not be considered immigrants in the United States. For
statistical purposes Puerto Ricans who move to the U.S. are considered migrants in UNDESA databases.
Country / Territory Total Stock Male Female Dominant origin
countries/territories
United States of America 6,687,356 3,078,411
(46%)
3,608,945
(54%)
Puerto Rico, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Jamaica, Haiti
Canada 512,936 225,611
(44%)
287,325
(56%)
Jamaica, Haiti, Guyana,
Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican Republic 505,372 329,095
(65%)
176,277
(35%)
Haiti
Spain 351,647 147,818
(42%)
203,829
(58%)
Dominican Republic, Cuba
Chile 297,326 177,691
(60%)
119,635
(40%)
Haiti, Dominican Republic
United Kingdom 291,264 117,576
(40%)
173,688
(60%)
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago,
Guyana, Barbados
Netherlands 207,302 91,221
(44%)
116,081
(56%)
Suriname
France 142,082 55,077
(39%)
87,005
(61%)
Haiti, Suriname
Italy 88,618 25,234
(28%)
63,384
(72%)
Dominican Republic, Cuba
Puerto Rico 60,554 28,132
(46%)
32,422
(54%)
Dominican Republic, Cuba
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
PROFILE OF CARIBB EAN EMIGRANTS
19
Figure 5: Inows of Caribbean nationals (by selected nationalities) into OECD Member Countries, 2010 – 2019
24
*Others - Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname
Source: OECD, “Inflows of foreign population by nationality”, International Migration Database, OECD.Stat, n.d. (OECD, Paris) [15 Jul. 2022] (OECD, n.d.a).
The Dominican Republic stands out as the principal country of origin amongst registered inows of Caribbean
foreign nationals to OECD countries between 2010 and 2019, with overall inows totaling just over 648,341
during this 10-year period. Cuba follows closely behind, with a total of nearly 635,974, although annual inows of
Cuban nationals have outnumbered those of nationals of the Dominican Republic since 2014 but decreased in 2019.
These two countries were followed by: Haiti (344,336 from 2010-2019); Jamaica (242,891); Guyana (66,771); Trinidad
and Tobago (48,593); Suriname (19,543); Saint Lucia (13,342); Belize (10,301); and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
(9,377), to round out the top 10. The U.S. stood out as the principal destination country of registered inows by
far for nearly every country of origin during the dened period, except for Suriname (principal destination countries
Netherlands and France) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (inows registered in Canada were slightly
higher than the U.S.).
• The approximate total (proxy) inows of nationals from the above 16 Caribbean countries to the
OECD area in the period spanning 2010-2019 was 2,076,791, including 231,426 in 2019 alone (data
for COVID-19 periods and onward were not yet available at the time of writing). The number
of registered inows per year in this period ranged anywhere from 193,439 in 2011 to as high as
255,711 in 2016.
Data are not standardized.
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
PROFILE OF CARIBB EAN EMIGRANTS
20
• Individuals from the Dominican Republic were the principal nationality registered among inows of
Caribbean nationals to OECD countries between 2010-2019, with totals reaching 648,341. However,
inows of Cuban nationals were close behind, reaching 635,974, and were higher than those registered
of nationals of the Dominican Republic between 2014 and 2018. Haitian nationals were in the third
spot, with a total of 344,336 inows registered in the OECD in the same 10-year period. While inows
of Haitian migrants to the United States during this period sustained high levels, the signicant bump
seen in 2016 is attributed to an inux of Haitians entering Chile (over 23,000) (described further in
Section 5). A total of 242,891 inows of Jamaican nationals to the OECD area were registered between
2010-2019, following by 66,771 registered inows of Guyanese migrants, to round out the top ve.
• The United States stood out as the principal destination country of registered inows by far
for nearly every Caribbean country of origin listed above in this period except for Suriname
(where the principal destination countries were the Netherlands and France) and Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines (with inows in Canada reaching slightly higher levels than in the United States).
3.1. OECD
Figure 6: Highly educated population emigration rates of the highly educated population to the OECD area,
by country of birth, selected Caribbean countries of origin, as of 2015/16
25
Sources: OECD, A Global Prole of Emigrants to OECD Countries: Younger and More Skilled Migrants from More Diverse Countries, 2020 (OECD, Paris); OECD,
Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries: DIOC, reference years 2015/16, 2016 (OECD, Paris) [07 Jan 2021].
Data on emigration of highly educated individuals is important in analyzing the impacts of potential economic and
social eects of loss of human capital, sometimes known as “brain drain”, in countries of origin. In 2015/16, the overall
global emigration rate of highly educated individuals (that is, individuals with tertiary education) towards OECD countries
was 16 per cent. However, an analysis of emigration rates of the highly educated amongst selected Caribbean countries
of origin shows that emigration of highly educated individuals toward OECD countries is far above the overall global
average in many places throughout the region, reaching nearly three-fourths of the highly educated population
in countries like Haiti and Guyana.
The emigration rate is calculated as the ratio between the number of emigrants living in OECD countries and the total sum of the resident population and emigrants living
in OECD countries. Note that only OECD destinations appear in this analysis, thus potentially underestimating the size of the phenomenon in countries of origin where
signicant numbers of emigrants are moving to non-OECD destination countries. “Highly Educated” corresponds to individuals possessing any level of tertiary education
corresponding to
International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED) levels 5-8.
3. PROFILE OF CARIBBEAN EMIGRANTS
2. CARIBBEAN EMIGRATION - STOCKS
PROFILE OF CARIBB EAN EMIGRANTS
21
Table 3: Acquisition of nationality in OECD countries, by country of former nationality, selected
Caribbean nationalities, cumulative totals, 2010 – 2020
26
Source: OECD, “Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality”, International Migration Database, OECD.Stat, n.d. (OECD, Paris) [06 Jan 2021].
Data on acquisition of nationality by foreign nationals are an important indicator of migrant integration and migration
outcomes. For immigrants who wish to settle in destination countries, becoming citizens can ensure greater social
and economic integration, including full access to employment and civic rights. Of the 16 Caribbean nationalities included
above a total of 1.42 million individuals (about the population of Caribbean) acquired citizenship on OECD countries
in the 11- year period between 2010 and 2020. Of these 1.42 million, 77 per cent occurred in the U.S. Amongst
OECD countries and in general, the U.S. was the main country of acquisitions, of nationality for all Carribbean
foreing nationals originating from the above 16 countries.
Resource constraints in processing applications may result in as backlog of unprocessed applications which are not reected in the gures. The statistics generally cover
all means of acquiring the nationality of a country.
3. PROFILE OF CARIBBEAN EMIGRANTS
Top 3 destination countries nationality
Caribbean country of
former nationality
To t a l
Acquisitions
(OECD Overall)
1 2 3
Dominican Republic 399,138 United States
299,393
Spain
76,191
Italy
11,450
Cuba 376,846 United States
302,529
Spain
42,251
Italy
8,559
Haiti 218,069 United States
163,878
France
26,353
Canada
26,477
Jamaica 216,225 United States
166,975
United
Kingdom
27,372
Canada
20,846
Guyana 65,840 United States
53,298
Canada
9,028
United Kingdom
2,315
Trinidad and Tobago 62,417 United States
51,011
Canada
6,989
United Kingdom
3,679
Suriname 15,625 Netherlands
7,864
Canada
174
United States
1,560
Saint Lucia 11,407 United States
7,693
Canada
1,828
United Kingdom
1,429
Belize 9,997 United States
9,342
Canada
363
United Kingdom
175
Barbados 9,997 United States
6,715
Canada
973
United Kingdom
1,029
Grenada 8,970 United States
6,399
Canada
1,639
United Kingdom
874
Dominica 8,924 United States
6,327
France
746
United Kingdom
524
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
8,849 United States
4,922
Canada
2,629
United Kingdom
1,244
Bahamas 6,232 United States
5,686
Canada
337
United Kingdom
122
Antigua and Barbuda 4,644 United States
4,267
Canada
202
United Kingdom
151
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3,620 United States
3,308
Canada
102
United Kingdom
163
PROFILE OF CARIBB EAN EMIGRANTS
22
Figure 7: Key demographic and socioeconomic characteristics – Caribbean migrants
27
in OECD countries, as of
2015/16
28 29
30
31
32
33
34
35
Source: Own Calculations, based on: OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries, reference years 2015/16, n.d. [28 Jan. 2021].
• The majority (two-thirds) of Caribbean migrants in OECD countries as of 2015/16 were between the ages of 25-
64. Of the approximately 7.85 million Caribbean migrants of working age (15 - 64) residing in OECD countries
as of 2015/16, approximately three-fourths resided in their respective destination countries for more than 10
years. In 2015/16, of working-age Caribbean migrants in the OECD, there was an overall unemployment rate
of six per cent. Unemployment rates of Caribbean migrants in this period appear to be roughly on par with the
overall OECD unemployment rate during this time period, which hovered between 6-7 per cent in 2015 and
2016.
36
A notably high proportion of Caribbean migrants in OECD countries in 2015/16 were highly educated
(possessing some level of tertiary education), reaching 28 per cent of Caribbean migrants aged 15 and over.
Figures contain aggregate data for the following Caribbean countries / territories or origin: Anguilla, Aruba, Netherlands Antilles (including Bonaire, Curacao, Sint Maarten
(Dutch)), Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Barbados, Cuba, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.
Lucia, Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands.
Other Caribbean countries / territories included in UNDESA classications – the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint Martin (French) are not
available as they are included under gures for France.
The indicators presented are derived from OECD’s Database on Immigrants in OECD countries (DIOC), Revision 2015/16, which contains information for all OECD
countries (destinations) and more than 200 countries of origin. The database is primarily sourced from census data. For countries not taking periodic censuses but keeping
population registers, data have been extracted from these registers. For some countries, not all themes covered in the database are present in the national census or
register. Labour force surveys have been used to ll gaps where possible.
Shows gender distribution out of all Caribbean migrants residing in OECD countries in 2015/16 (n = 8,247,918).
Out of all Caribbean migrants residing in OECD countries in 2015/16 (n = 8,247,918). Includes <0.0001% “Unknown”.
Out of all Caribbean migrants over aged 15 and over residing in OECD countries (n = 7,850,299). Includes 0.2% classied as “more than 5 years”.
Out of all Caribbean migrants aged 15 and over residing in OECD countries (n = 7,850,299).
n = 7,850,299. “Low” = ISCED levels 0 (‘less than primary’) through 2 (lower secondary education); “Medium” = ISCED levels 3 (Upper secondary education) and 4 (Post-
secondary non-tertiary education); “High” – ISCED levels 5-8 (all levels of tertiary education).
Out of all Caribbean migrants aged 15 and over in OECD countries who reported being employed (n = 4,437,560). Includes 0.2% “Unknown”.
n = 4,437,560. Skill levels based on International Standard Classication of Occupations Revision 2008 (ISCO-08). Skill Level 1 “typically involves the performance of
simple and routine physical or manual tasks”. Skill Level 2 “typically involves the performance of tasks such as operating machinery and electronic equipment; driving vehicles;
maintenance and repair of electrical and mechanical equipment” and more, with occupations at this skill level typically requiring “relatively advanced literacy and numeracy
skills and good interpersonal communication skills”. Skill Level 3 “involves the performance of complex technical and practical tasks”. Skill Level 4 “involves the performance
of tasks that require complex problem-solving, decision-making and creativity based on an extensive body of theoretical and factual knowledge in a specialized eld” (ILO,
ISCO-08, 2012).
OECD, “Unemployment rate (total, % of labour force, Jan 2005 – Dec 2020), - OECD Total”, n.d. [2 Feb. 2021].
3. PROFILE OF CARIBBEAN EMIGRANTS
PROFILE OF CARIBB EAN EMIGRANTS
23
• Similar to the overall sex distribution, females constitute the majority of working-age Caribbean migrants in
OECD countries, at 54 per cent compared to 46 per cent males. However, despite constituting a larger proportion
of working-age adults, there was a 50-50 distribution between males and females amongst employed Caribbean
migrants (aged 15 and over).
• The vast majority (7 in 10) of Caribbean migrants in OECD countries were employed in occupations at skill level
2 (ISCO-08) in 2015/16, which includes clerical support workers, services and sales workers, skilled agricultural,
forestry and shery workers, craft and related trade workers, plant and machine operators, and assemblers,
and certain occupations in the armed forces. Only 3 per cent were employed at Skill Level 1 (elementary
occupations). Just over one-fourth of employed Caribbean migrants in OECD countries were employed at skill
levels 3 and 4, which includes technicians and associate professionals, professionals, managers and certain armed
forces occupations.
• The vast majority (7 in 10) of Caribbean migrants in OECD countries were employed in occupations at skill level
2 (ISCO-08) in 2015/16, which includes clerical support workers, services and sales workers, skilled agricultural,
forestry and shery workers, craft and related trade workers, plant and machine operators, and assemblers,
and certain occupations in the armed forces. Only 3 per cent were employed at Skill Level 1 (elementary
occupations). Just over one-fourth of employed Caribbean migrants in OECD countries were employed at skill
levels 3 and 4, which includes technicians and associate professionals, professionals, managers and certain armed
forces occupations.
UNITED STATES
Figure 8: Nonimmigrant and immigrant visas issued to Caribbean nationals in the United States, 2018 – May 2023
3. PROFILE OF CARIBBEAN EMIGRANTS
PROFILE OF CARIBB EAN EMIGRANTS
24
Figure 9: Nonimmigrant visas issued to Caribbean nationals in the United States, by top ve Caribbean nationalities,
2018 – May 2023
37
Figure 10: Immigrant visas issued to Caribbean nationals in the United States, by top seven Caribbean nationalities,
FY 2014 – 2019
38
Sources: Own Calculations, based on: U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Consular Aairs, Report of the Visa Oce 2014; Report of the Visa Oce 2015;
Report of the Visa Oce 2016; Report of the Visa Oce 2017; Report of the Visa Oce 2018; Report of the Visa Oce 2019; Report of the Visa Oce 2020; Monthly
Immigrant Visa Issuance Statistics, n.d.; Monthly Nonimmigrant Visa Issuance Statistics, n.d. [4 Feb. 2021].
Fiscal year = 1 October – 31 September. Data for 2020 are provisional and are subject to change. Click here for a directory of non-immigrant visa categories. Numbers
include border crossing cards.
H-1B visas are for persons in specialty occupations, H-2A visas are for temporary agricultural workers, H-2B visas are for temporary non-agricultural workers, and H-3
visas are for trainees or special education visitors. L visas correspond to intracompany transferees of individuals already working for their employer abroad to be transferred
to the U.S. For additional information on P, O and Q visa categories and temporary worker visas in the U.S. in general, click here.
3. PROFILE OF CARIBBEAN EMIGRANTS
0
10.000
20.000
30.000
40.000
50.000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Dominican Republic 37.09 9 4 5.06 5 5 3.339 48.25 4 4 9.94 2 3 8.186
Haiti
10.77 4 1 3.25 1 18.81 0 16.69 4 1 5.158 6.199
Jamaica 10.343 11.00 1 1 5.45 8 13.69 5 1 2.747 10.49 7
Cu ba
6.098 6.298 9.131 9.453 6.503 7.748
Guyana 4.644 4.693 4.869 4.127 4.228 3.701
Trinidad and Tobago 1.118 1.318 1.356 1.247 1.401 1.240
Saint Lucia
302 347 317 392 371 289
Dominican Republic Haiti Ja maic a Cuba Guyana Trinidad and Tobago Saint Lucia
CUBAN AND HAITIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
25
4. CUBAN AND HAITIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
3. PROFILE OF CARIBBEAN EMIGRANTS
• The number of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas issued to Caribbean nationals in the United
States decreased progressively after peaking in 2016. In 2019 the total numbers of visas issued
in either category represented a 10.5 per cent decrease over 2018, a 30.4 per cent decrease over 2017
and a 33.5 per cent decrease over 2016 (complete data for 2020 were not yet available at the time of
writing). The majority of visas issued to Caribbean nationals in the United States are for temporary visits,
business, work and study purposes, with nonimmigrant visas accounting for 81.5 per cent of all visas issued to
Caribbean nationals in 2019.
• B1 and B2 visas – travel on temporary business or for tourism purposes – constituted the majority
of non-immigrant visas issued to Caribbean nationals between FY 2014 and FY 2020. Further analysis
indicates that temporary work visas represented a relatively small proportion of nonimmigrant visas issued to
Caribbean nationals. In 2019, temporary work visas in categories39 H (including H-1B, H-2A, H-2B and H-3),
L (intracompany transferee), O (Individual with extraordinary ability or achievement), P (athletes, artists
or entertainers, categories P-1, P-2 and P-3) and Q (participants in international cultural exchange programs)
totaled 19,810, or 6.5 per cent of non-immigrant visas issued that year. Amongst temporary work permits,
the majority (15,304, or 77% of temporary work visas issued to Caribbean nationals) were issued in the
form of H-2A visas (temporary agricultural workers) to Jamaican nationals. Similar trends could be noted
for previous years.
• Jamaican nationals have consistently been one of the principal recipients of H-2A and H-2B (non-
agricultural temporary workers) visas in the United States. In FY 2019 and FY 2020, Jamaica was the
second-most recipient of H-2B visas after Mexico and third-most recipient of H-2A visas after Mexico and
South Africa.
4.1 DATA ON MIGRANTS AND MIGRATION FROM HAITI AND CUBA
Table 4: Cuban and Haitian emigrants, total and by top 5 countries / territories of destination, 2020
Source: Own calculations; based on UNDESA, Table 1: Total migrant stock by origin and major area, region or country of destination, 1990-2020, [14 Jun. 2023].
• According to UNDESA, over ninety-ve per cent (91.76%) of Haitian emigrants resided in the ve countries
included in Table 4 above in 2020, including nearly 40 per cent in the U.S. alone. An overwhelming majority
of Cuban emigrants resided in the U.S. in 2020, constituting the country of destination of over 78 per cent
of Cuban nationals residing abroad in that year. However, a comparison of data from the U.S. Census Bureau
American Community Surveys (ACS) between 2010 and 2018 show that the rate of Cuban immigration to the
United States has slowed in recent years. While not yet fully reected in UNDESA (2020) gures, data from
Mexico’s 2020 Population and Housing Census show that the number of Cubans residing in Mexico increased
from 12,108 in 2010 to 25,976 in 2020
.
Haitians
To t a l 1,769,947
United States of America 705,361
Dominican Republic 496,112
Chile 236,912
Canada 100,672
France 85,042
Others 145,848
Cubans
To t a l 1,757,434
United States of America 1,376,211
Spain 162,368
Italy 38,532
Chile 23,929
Canada 19,221
Others 137,173
CUBAN AND HAITIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
26
• Meanwhile, while the United States continues to serve as a principal destination country of Haitian migrants,
Haitian migration to other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has demonstrated a notable spike
in recent years. For example, the estimated) number of Haitian migrants living in Chile increased by 595 per cent
between 2015 and 2020, from just under 40,000 to nearly 237,000 (per UNDESA). UNDESA estimates also
show that the number of Haitians in the Dominican Republic was estimated to increase by more than 21,000
from 475,084 to 496,116 between 2015 and 2020, from 27,591 to 29,629 in the Bahamas, and from just over
19,000 to just over 22,000 in French Guiana in the same time period.
• While accurate estimates on the number of Haitians in Brazil are not available through UNDESA, it
is also known that the number of Haitians migrating to Brazil increased substantially in the aftermath
of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The Observatory of International Migration (Observatório das migrações
internacionais, OBMigra) in Brazil estimated that 128,968 Haitians migrated to Brazil between 2010 and
2018, while 32,495 left during the same period.
39
Between 2000 and 2018, Brazil issued a total of 90,607
work permits to Haitians. Data from Mexico’s 2020 Population and Housing Census estimated nearly 6,000
Haitians living in the country in that year, although administrative data on humanitarian visas issued in Mexico
(see Figure 13) may indicate that this number uctuates, has changed recently and / or that there may be a
signicantly larger number of Haitian migrants currently in Mexico who under their respective visa categories
are considered visitors rather than residents.
Figure 11: Cuban and Haitian migrants identied in irregular transit in the southern zone of Panama (Darien
Province), 2016 – 2023 (Jan – May).
Source: National Migration Service of Panama (Servicio Nacional de Migración), “MIGRACIÓN – Irregulares en tránsito por Darién mayo 2023”, [14 Jun. 2023].
INEGI, Censo de Población y Vivienda 2020, Migración internacional, “Población total nacida en otro país residente en México por entidad federativa según sexo
y países seleccionados”, n.d. [4 Feb. 2020].
4. CUBAN AND HAITIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
CUBAN AND HAITIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
27
Figure 12: Cuban and Haitian migrants apprehended by Mexican immigration authorities, 2016 – 2023
(January – May)
40
Source: Migration Policy Unit, Mexican Secretariat for Home Aairs, “Cuadro 3.1.1 – Eventos de extranjeros presentados ante la autoridad migratoria,
según continente y país de nacionalidad” – 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023. [14 Jun. 2023]
Figure 13: Visitor cards for humanitarian reasons (TVRH) issued to Cuban and Haitian migrants in Mexico, 2016-
2023 (January -April)
41
Source: Migration Policy Unit, Mexican Secretariat for Home Aairs, “Cuadro 3.1.1 – Eventos de extranjeros presentados ante la autoridad migratoria,
según continente y país de nacionalidad” – 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023. [14 Jun. 2023].
Apprehensions data are based on information recorded in migrant centers, central and local oces of the National Institute of Migration, and correspond to events rather
than individuals (i.e. the same individual could have been apprehended more than once) (data for 2020 are provisional and are subject to change).
The TVRH in Mexico is a visa available to certain categories of foreign nationals in Mexico, including unaccompanied migrant children or adolescents, applicants of political
asylum or refugee status, or a foreigner who does not fall into one of these outlines cases but for whom a humanitarian cause or public interest does exist which makes his/
her admission into the country or regularizing their migratory status in the country necessary. The TVRH allows the holder to remain in Mexico while their case is being
assessed, giving them the right to enter and exit national territory as often as desired and awarding permission to work in exchange for remuneration. Upon expiration
of the TVRH, the holder may request the status of Permanent Resident (Global Forum on Migration & Development, “Humanitarian visitors cards, Mexico”, n.d. [09 Feb.
2021].
4. CUBAN AND HAITIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
CUBAN AND HAITIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
28
• An analysis of administrative data maintained by key transit countries demonstrates that Haitian and Cuban
migrants continue to embark on circuitous migration routes through Central America and northward through
Mexico with aims of reaching the United States. After relatively few apprehensions recorded by authorities
in the Darian zone of Panama (near the border with Colombia) and in Mexico in 2017 and 2018, the number
of apprehensions recorded in both locations increased substantially in 2019. While the same trend looked to
be continuing in the rst two months of 2020, the number of recorded apprehensions dropped o rapidly
beginning in March 2020. Overall, the number of apprehensions registered in Panama in 2020 represented a
65 per cent decrease over of 2019, while apprehensions registered in Mexico in 2020 represented a 76 per cent
decrease over the previous year. In 2021 the data exceeded what was previously recorded in both Panama
and Mexico, apprehensions grew by 2,123% and 1,014%, respectively, compared to 2020. Compared to
2021 in Mexico, apprehensions continued to grow 175% in 2022, while in Panama, apprehensions have
decreased during 2022 (39%) and 2023 (up to May there is a 49% decrease compared to the previous year),
in this country they remain above the ow registered prior to the COVID-19 pandemic period.
• Data would suggest that Haitian and Cuban migrants journeying northward through Central America
are increasingly arriving to Mexico as a country of destination rather than simply as a transit point. This
is evidenced not only by the registered increase in Haitian and Cuban residents in Mexico in the 2020 census
mentioned previously but could also be highlighted in the rapid increase in temporary visitor cards issued
by the Mexican government to Cuban and Haitian migrants for humanitarian reasons (TVRH) (see Figure
13) beginning in 2019. The number of TVRH visas issued to Cubans and Haitians in Mexico increased by
2,671% in 2019 compared to 2018, and continued to grow 327% in 2020, 429% in 2021 and 128% in 2022,
compared to the previous year.
Figure 14: Cumulative global stock of refugees and asylum seekers originating from Haiti and Cuba under United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC) mandate as of the end of 2022.
42
43
44
Source: HRC, “Population gures: End of year stock population totals”, UNHRC Refugee Statistics, n.d. [21 Jun. 2023].
The TVRH in Mexico is a visa available to certain categories of foreign nationals in Mexico, including unaccompanied migrant children or adolescents, applicants of political
asylum or refugee status, or a foreigner who does not fall into one of these outlines cases but for whom a humanitarian cause or public interest does exist which makes his/her
admission into the country or regularizing their migratory status in the country necessary. The TVRH allows the holder to remain in Mexico while their case is being assessed,
giving them the right to enter and exit national territory as often as desired and awarding permission to work in exchange for remuneration. Upon expiration of the TVRH, the
holder may request the status of Permanent Resident (Global Forum on Migration & Development, “Humanitarian visitors cards, Mexico”, n.d. [09 Feb. 2021].
U.S. Department of State, “Table 14: Refugee arrivals by region and country of nationality: Fiscal years 2010 to 2019”, n.d. [09 Feb. 2021].
U.S. Department of State, “Table 19: Individuals granted asylum defensively by region and country of nationality: Fiscal years 2010 to 2019”, n.d. [01 Feb. 2021];
“Table 17: Individuals granted asylum armatively by region and country of nationality: Fiscal years 2010 to 2019”, n.d. [01 Feb. 2021].
of nationality: Fiscal years 2010 to 2019”, n.d. [01 Feb. 2021].
4. CUBAN AND HAITIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
CUBAN AND HAITIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
29
Cuba and Haiti are by far the principal origin countries of refugees and asylum seekers originating
from the Caribbean countries, reaching a combined total of nearly 175,000 around the world by the end of 2020. The
largest numbers of both Haitian and Cuban refugees were located in the U.S. In the ten years spanning 2010 – 2019,
a total of 20,011 Cuban refugees and 22 Haitian refugees were resettled to the United States.49 Additionally, between
2010 – 2019, 1,055 Cubans and 4,467 Haitians were granted asylum in the U.S. after applying once already present on
U.S. territory or whilst seeking admission at a porty of entry (known as ‘asylees’).50 Brazil was the principal country
of destination for both Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers. UNHCR data showed a total stock of 15,432 Cuban asylum
seekers and 38,864 Haitian asylum seekers in Brazil as of the end of 2020.
Table 5: Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian migrants in the United States as of May 2023
Source: Adapted from U.S. Congressional Research Service, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues, May 2023 (US CRS, Washington DC).
Since the earthquake in Haiti of 12 January 2010, Haitian migrants have qualied for Temporary Protected
Status (TPS) in the U.S., “a blanket form of humanitarian relief” and a “statutory embodiment of safe haven
for foreign nationals within the United States who may not qualify for asylum but are nonetheless eeing –
or reluctant to return to – potentially dangerous situations” (US FAS, 2020). As of May 2023 there were over
107,000 Haitian migrants in the U.S. with TPS, constituting 11.9 per cent of the 900,000 individuals were TPS
holders or were eligible for TPS protections at the end of 2022.
4. CUBAN AND HAITIAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
Most recent
decision of TPS
designation
Required arrival
date in the U.S.
Expiration date 3 August 2024 % of total migrants
in the U.S. with
TPS
Termination 12 January 2011 3 August 2024 107,000 11.9 %
Table 6: Cumulative global stock of refugees and asylum seekers originating from selected other Caribbean
origin countries reported by UNHCR as of the end of 2022
Source: UNHRC, “Population gures: End of year stock population totals”, UNHRC Refugee Statistics, n.d. [13 Jan. 2021].
5. REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ELSEWERE IN THE CARIBBEAN
Country of origin
Refugees
Asylum seekers To t a l
Dominican Republic 724 6,996 7,720
Jamaica 1,868 3,345 5,213
Bahamas 781 1,210 1,991
Guyana 248 929 1,177
Trinidad and Tobago 289 627 916
Belize 65 481 546
Barbados 231 226 457
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
136 120 256
Dominica 57 162 219
Suriname 26 147 173
Grenada 51 116 167
Saint Kitts and Nevis 22 32 54
Curacao 35 5 40
Turks and Caicos Islands 19 11 30
Cayman Islands 5 0 5
REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ELSEHWERE IN THE CARIBBEAN
30
5. REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ELSEWERE IN THE CARIBBEAN
Aside from Cuban and Haitian nationals, the total number of refugees and asylum seekers originating from
other Caribbean countries is minimal and did not exceed more than 5,000 from any one country at the end
of 2020 (see Table 6 above). Aside from Cuban and Haitian nationals, the U.S. did not resettle any other
Caribbean refugees in the period of 2010 – 2019. Other nationalities of note who received asylee status in the
United States in the same period, whether armatively or defensively, included asylees from the Dominican
Republic (totaling 117 in 2010 – 2019), Jamaica (totaling 576 in the same ten-year period) and Guyana (totaling
65 from 2010 – 2019).
45
•
Free movement of persons in Caribbean countries has become a critical component of regional integration
in recent decades and has been enshrined in both the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) (created in
2001 and operationalized in 2006) and OECS’s Eastern Caribbean Economic Union (ECUE), established in 2010.
46
c.
47
• In the CSME, all CARICOM nationals are entitled to free movement and are allowed a six-month stay upon
arrival to any other Member States, under the framework known as “Facilitation of Travel”. While this permission
does not include the right to work, the CSME also includes the provision of Skills Certicates, which enable
indenite stays for selected skilled nationals who may then access the labour market in any Member State
with the same rights as the national labour force. There is a total of 12 categories of Skills Certicates, ranging
from musicians to teachers.
50
The CSME also facilitates movement of persons who are service providers or who
are establishing businesses.
• In the ECUE (OECS), full free movement is granted to all OECS nationals with entry granted using a valid photo
ID. OECS nationals are entitled to an indenite period of stay, with work privileges, in any Member State
within the bloc. However, there are no data available on the number of OECS nationals who have availed
of this scheme.
U.S. Department of State, “Table 19: Individuals granted asylum defensively by region and country of nationality: Fiscal years 2010 to 2019”, n.d. [01 Feb. 2021]; “Table
17: Individuals granted asylum armatively by region and country of nationality: Fiscal years 2010 to 2019”, n.d. [01 Feb. 2021].
U.S. Department of State, “Table 19: Individuals granted asylum defensively by region and country of nationality: Fiscal years 2010 to 2019”, n.d. [01 Feb. 2021]; “Table
17: Individuals granted asylum armatively by region and country of nationality: Fiscal years 2010 to 2019”, n.d. [01 Feb. 2021].
OECS, “Member States”, n.d. [5 Feb. 2020].
6. INTRAREGIONAL MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
INTRAREGIONAL MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
31
6. INTRAREGIONAL MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
Destination country
Total (2013-2017)
Barbados 147,072
Trinidad and Tobago 124,314
Guyana 51,829
Antigua and Barbuda 48,203
Jamaica 44,532
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
23,122
Belize 256
To t a l
439,328
*Note – No statistics available for
Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia and Suriname
Origin country or territory
To t a l
(2013-2017)
Trinidad and Tobago 90,975
Guyana 72,913
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
63,430
Jamaica 40,632
Barbados 36,577
Saint Lucia 29,270
Grenada 25,935
Dominica 25,272
Antigua and Barbuda 18,886
Suriname 17,464
Saint Kitts and Nevis 10,429
The Bahamas 9,341
Haiti 5,936
Belize 3,013
Montserrat 2,476
To t a l
453,370
Table 7: Flows of CARICOM nationals under the “Facilitation of Travel” framework, principal origin and
destination countries, based on cumulative totals of annual free movement data, 2013 - 2017
48
Figure 15: Skills Certicates issued to CARICOM nationals from 2013-2017, by category
49
Source: Adapted of data rst presented in IOM’s 2017 report, Free Movement of Persons in the Caribbean: Economic and Security Dimensions, based on
data provided by CARICOM’s Single Market and Economy (CSME) Unit (Georgetown, Guyana) in June 2019. The CSME Unit gave express consent for use
of these data in the present report in January 2021.
IOM, Free Movement of Persons in the Caribbean: Economic and Security Dimensions, 2019.
Out of the total number of Skills Certicates issued to CARICOM nationals in 2017 (n = 7,382). Data are a combination of statistics from the CSME Unit as well as data
provided by statistical units of certain CARICOM Member States. Data are incomplete and should only be used to derive general trends.
INTRAREGIONAL MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
32
6. INTRAREGIONAL MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
Of CARICOM countries reporting data, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago by
far constituted the principal recipient countries of CARICOM nationals entering under the “Facilitation of
Travel” mobility scheme between 2013-2017, while Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines stood out above other CARICOM Member States as principal countries of origin. The majority of
CARICOM nationals being awarded Skills Certicates from 2013-2017 (the most recent year for which data were
available) were University Graduates, followed by Associate Degree holders, Artisans, Nurses and Sportspersons,
to round out the top ve (the top ve categories constituted 92 per cent of all Skills Certicates issued to
CARICOM nationals in the ve-year period). However, IOM has previously noted that the overall quantity of
Skills Certicates issued each year is minimal – in 2017, the total reached just 1,165. Sixty per cent (60%) of Skills
Certicates issued in 2017 were issued in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. CARICOM data suggest that
work permits continue to be utilized more frequently by CARICOM nationals than Skills Certicates in order to
migrate intrarregionally for work
7.1. EXPLORING TRENDS IN RETURN MIGRATION THROUGH DESTINATION-SIDE DATA SOURCES"
Table 8: Returns of persons from the U.S. by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), by country of citizenship,
scal years (FY) 2016 – FY 2022, selected Caribbean nationalities
50
Source: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Fiscal Year Enforcement and Removal Operations, FY 2020, FY 2019, FY 2018, FY 2017, FY 2016, FY
2015, FY 2014.
Table 9: Caribbean nationals returned by Mexican authorities, by country of citizenship, 2015 - 2022
51
Source: Migration Policy Unit, Mexican Secretariat for Home Aairs, “Cuadro 3.2.1 – Eventos de extranjeros devueltos por la autoridad migratoria mexicana,
según continente y país de nacionalidad”, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020.
ICE Removals include removals and returns initiated by ICE and those initiated by other agencies in which “aliens were turned over to ERO for repatriation eorts”. Returns
include voluntary returns, voluntary departures, and Withdrawals Under Docket Control”. Any voluntary return recorded on or after June 1, 2013 without an ICE intake case
is not recorded as an ICE removal. Individuals removed from the U.S. may be returned to a third country and not to the original country of citizenship. Fiscal years are from 1
October – 31 September.
Excludes one individual returned to Trinidad and Tobago in 2015. Data include removals as well as assisted returns and minors of assisted returns. Data for 2020 are provisional
and are subject to change.
Country of citizenship
2016
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 To t a l
Dominican Republic 1,981 1,986 1,769 2,186 1,835 1,289 1,497 4,621
Haiti 310 5,578 934 690 895 353 1,532 2,780
Jamaica 787 782 792 751 523 406 342 1,271
Cuba 64 160 463 1,179 1,583 95 48 1,726
Trinidad and Tobago 128 128 104 106 73 48 38 159
Guyana 93 137 142 125 84 79 62 225
Belize 120 82 91 90 78 42 65 185
Bahamas 99 95 101 109 76 94 55 225
Country of citizenship
2015
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 To t a l
Cuba 466 3,617 608 179 1,808 67 899 5,003 5,902
Haiti 30 21 27 13 263 329 1,340 31 1,371
Dominican Republic 117 72 42 39 27 7 66 178 244
Belize 53 32 24 52 68 1,179 101 35 136
Jamaica 6 8 3 1 1 106 4 27 31
7. RETURN MIGRATION
RETURN MIGRATION
33
Table 10: Caribbean nationals returned from the European Union (E.U.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.) after being
issued an order to leave, by country of citizenship, 2014-2019
52
Source: Eurostat, “Third country nationals returned following an order to leave – annual data (rounded)”, updated as of 23 November 2020, n.d. [08 Feb. 2021].
• Return migration is an important component of overall migration dynamics in the Caribbean and has become
increasingly prominent in recent years. IOM previously identied four key categories of return migrants to
Caribbean countries of origin, including: (1) individuals who were removed by authorities in destination countries;
voluntary returns – both of (2) economically active young persons, as well as (3) older retirees who
had emigrated from the Caribbean in the 1960s, and (4) migrants – particularly family units – who return to the
Caribbean to raise their families, often in order to aord private education for their children.
• Very few Caribbean origin countries publish up-to-date data on return migration. Data on returns from countries
of destination are thus used (see Tables 8-10). While data recorded in the U.S., Mexico and the E.U / U.K. include
both enforced returns and voluntary returns, gures are likely an underestimate as they would not capture returns
occurring without state involvement. Notably, for the U.S., Mexico and the E.U, return data do not necessarily
imply that all persons were returned to their country of nationality, as a certain proportion of returns could
have been to third countries.
• An analysis of Tables 8-10 shows that, since 2014/2015, returns of Dominican and Cuban nationals
featured rather prominently in all three areas of destination. Returns of Haitian nationals featured prominently
in both the U.S. and Mexico but less so in the E.U. / U.K. Numerous returns were recorded of nationals of
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica from both the E.U. / U.K. and the U.S. but not from Mexico.
• Returns of Cuban nationals from the U.S. registered their highest numbers in 2019, increasing by 155 per cent
over 2018. Returns of Dominican nationals from the U.S. also reached their highest peak in six years in 2019.
Returns of Cuban nationals from Mexico dropped o signicantly in 2020 – by 99 per cent compared to 2019.
Includes third-country nationals who have in fact left the territory of an EU Member State, following an administrative or judicial decision or act stating their stay is unlawful
and imposing an obligation to leave the territory. Figures include enforced and voluntary returns. Voluntary returns refer to the situation in which the third-country national
complies voluntarily with the obligation to return (i.e. no enforcement procedure had to be launched).
7. RETURN MIGRATION
Country of citizenship
2014
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 To t a l
Jamaica 515 585 530 385 230 165 2,410
Suriname 370 330 280 235 255 265 1,735
Dominican Republic 330 310 340 205 200 205 1,590
Trinidad and Tobago 120 115 120 120 115 120 710
Cuba 95 100 110 100 160 105 670
Saint Lucia 80 90 75 60 90 65 460
Grenada 50 55 70 50 70 55 350
Barbados 55 55 40 45 50 35 280
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
55 45 45 35 50 55 260
Dominica 35 25 20 25 25 35 160
Guyana 40 40 50 40 25 25 215
Haiti 30 25 20 25 25 35 160
Antigua and Barbuda 20 30 30 25 30 20 155
Saint Kitts and Nevis 15 25 20 25 20 25 130
Belize 5 10 20 15 15 10 75
Bahamas 10 10 15 10 10 5 60
RETURN MIGRATION
34
• In the European Union / U.K., nearly all of the nationals from Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and
Tobago returned from 2014 and 2019 were returned from the U.K. Returns of Cuban nationals took place
from a number of EU destination countries, including Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden
and the United Kingdom, amongst others. Returns of nationals of Dominica occurred mainly from the U.K. but
also in smaller part from France. Returns from the Dominican Republic were spread out between Greece, Spain,
France, the Netherlands and the U.K. Returns of Haitians occurred mainly from France and the U.K. Returns
of nationals of Guyana took place mainly from the U.K but also the Netherlands, while nationals from Suriname
were mainly returned from the Netherlands and in smaller part from the U.K.
IOM’s Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) program
IOM has implemented assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programmes since 1979. IOM’s
AVRR support to migrants comprises a range of activities, and typically includes: the provision of pre-
departure counselling, the purchase of ight tickets, administrative and travel assistance, and where possible,
the provision of reintegration assistance. In the ten-year period between 1 January 2010 and 31 December
2019, IOM assisted 2,619 beneciaries with assisted voluntary return to Caribbean countries of origin. The
largest number of beneciaries in this period were from Haiti (constituting 47 per cent of all beneciaries),
followed by the Dominican Republic (18 per cent), Suriname (14 per cent), Cuba (9 per cent) and Jamaica
(5 per cent), to round out the top ve.
Source: IOM Migrant Protection and Assistance (MPA) Division.
Table 11: Top 10 destination countries / territories of immigrants in the Caribbean region, 2020
1.63 million International migrants residing in Caribbean countries (including intraregional and extraregional
migrants) as of 2020
* Note: b both the United States Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico are overseas territories of the U.S. Nationals born in mainland
U.S. and living in these territories may not be considered as international migrants under certain U.S. denitions. However,
these individuals are considered international migrants for statistical purposes in UNDESA databases. Venezeula (Bolivarian
Republic of ), hereafter Venezuela.
Source: UNDESA, Table 1: Total migrant stock at mid-year by origin and major area, region or country of destination, 1990-2020, 2020 [21 Jul. 2023].
7. RETURN MIGRATION
8. IMMIGRATION TO CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
Principal countries / Territories of origin
Destination country
/ Territory
To t a l
Immigrants
1 2 3
Dominican Republic
603,794
Haiti
496,112
Venezuela*
34,063
U.S.
14,626
Puerto Rico
247,132
U.S. nationals*
159,515
Dominican Republic
46,905
Cuba
12,637
Guadeloupe
90,206
France
50,960
Haiti
13,973
Martinique
8,635
Trinidad and Tobago
78,849
Venezuela
24,001
Guyana
10,923
Grenada
8,913
Martinique
68,624
France
52,350
Guadeloupe
6,070
Saint Lucia
2,256
Bahamas
63,583
Haiti
29,629
U.S.
10,359
Jamaica
8,042
Belize
62,043
Guatemala
26,767
El Salvador
10,016
Honduras
9,784
Curaçao
57,210
Venezuela
16,500
Netherlands
10,562
Dominican
Republic
6,665
Aruba
53,593
Venezuela
17,000
Colombia
10,926
Netherlands
5,128
Suriname
47,801
Guyana
13,557
Brazil
5,566
China
5,446
RETURN MIGRATION
35
Despite primarily being a region of emigration, Caribbean countries and territories also serve as
destination countries of both intraregional and extraregional migrants. As of 2020, there were 1.64 million
international migrants residing in Caribbean countries. Just over one-third of these migrants were in the
Dominican Republic. Given that UNDESA gures are based primarily on population censuses, more recent
migration movements within the region (for example, of Venezuelan migrants and refugees) may not be
fully reected in the dataset as of 2020.
Figure 16: Venezuelan migrants and refugees in the Caribbean countries as of May 2023
195,979 Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the Caribbean countries as of May 2023
Source: IOM and UNHCR, R4V, Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, R4V Latin America and the Caribbean, Venezuelan Refugees
and Migrants in the Region - May 2023. [21 July. 2023]
Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown, and designations used on this map do not imply ocial endorsement or
acceptance by IOM
• In recent years, countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have been facing one of the largest
outow movements of refugees and migrants in the history of the region. As of May 2023, more than
7.3 million refugees and migrants from Venezuela resided outside of their home country, an estimated
6.1 million of which were residing in other countries in LAC. The Caribbean sub-region of Aruba,
Curacao, the Dominican Republic, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago have also experienced the arrival of
approximately 201,240 Venezuelan refugees and migrants. Although the ve aforementioned countries host
just three per cent (3.3%) of the total stock of Venezuelan migrants and refugees in the LAC region as of
May 2023, Venezuelans constitute a measurable proportion of the total population in a number of small
island states in the region.
8. IMMIGRATION TO CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
9. VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
!
!
!
!
!
Dominican
Republic
Aruba
Curaçao
Trinidad and Tobago
Guyana
115,283
17,000
14,000
35,314
19,643
Venezuelan refugees and migrants
IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON MOBILITY AND TOURISM
36
10. IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON MOBILITY AND TOURISM
10.1. DATA AND TRENDS ON ARRIVALS IN THE REGION
Table 12: Monthly international tourist arrivals in 2020, Caribbean, % change over 2019
53
Figure 17: Quarterly entries of foreigners and/or nationals in Caribbean countries, 2019 – 2023 (rst quarter).
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (FOREIGNERS AND NATIONALS), 2019 - 2023 (rst quarter)
Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, “Sector turismo – total (residencia y aeropuertos) – 2019-2023”, n.d. [15 Jun. 2023].
JAMAICA (FOREIGNERS AND NATIONALS), 2019 and 2023 (rst quarter)
Source: Jamaica Tourist Board, Monthly Statistical Report 2019-2023, May 2023 [15 Jun. 2023].
53
Caribbean country classications based on the IMF (see Statistical Annex of IMF World Economic Outlook).
Jan
Feb Mar Abr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
-2.2% +0.3% -57.2% -97.6% -99.3% -98.8% -94.7% -78.8% -76.4%
IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON MOBILITY AND TOURISM
37
10. IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON MOBILITY AND TOURISM
BAHAMAS (FOREIGNERS), 2019 and 2023 (rst quarter)
Source: Bahamas Ministry of Tourism, “Foreign Arrivals (Air & Sea Landed & Cruise) – 2019-2023”, n.d. [15 June. 2021].
In 2020, there was a signicant decrease in human mobility throughout the region, beginning in March.
This decline in mobility coincided with the introduction of travel restrictions imposed by various countries
in the region to contain the outbreak of COVID-19. Overall, tourist arrivals to the Caribbean region declined
by 69 per cent in 2020 compared with 2019. The decline in the tourism industry raised numerous concerns
given the economic reliance on the sector for many of the smaller island nations.
The economic recovery of the tourism sector began in 2021 and continued to grow in 2022 for the Dominican
Republic, Jamaica, and the Bahamas. The Dominican Republic has managed to recover its visitation above
(11%) the period prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bahamas is very close to this situation for 2022
(-3%) and manages to have a better rst quarter in 2023 (23%) compared to the same period in 2019, just
like the Dominican Republic (11%). Jamaica continues below the data (-21%) for entries indicated before the
measures taken by the pandemic. The speed of recovery determines important conditions in the countries, such
as recovering jobs and income associated with tourism, to improve their economy in general.
REMITTANCES
38
11.1 OVERVIEW OF MIGRANT REMITTANCES IN THE CARIBBEAN
In the context of international migration, remittances are usually understood as money or goods / in-kind transfers
sent by international migrants back to families, friends and communities in countries of origin (IOM, n.d.).
Migrant remittances can be sent through both formal channels (such as via bank wire transfers) as well as informal channels
(for example, money being physically carried back home), and may be sent by migrants residing permanently
in their respective countries of destination or by short-term migrant workers employed temporarily in a
foreign country where they are not a usual resident.
Remittances are by far the most important source of external nancing for the Caribbean, far outnumbering
foreign direct investment (FDI) and ocial development assistance (ODA) (IMF, 2017). The Caribbean is primarily
a net recipient of remittances, and the region has seen an increase in absolute inows year over year since 2013
(Center for Latin American Monetary Studies, CEMLA, 2021). In many countries in the region, migrant remittances
amount to 10 per cent of GDP or more (World Bank, n.d.x.), and often form a fundamental support and insurance
mechanism for many families and communities back home.
The COVID-19 pandemic generated concerns both regionally and globally regarding the capacities of migrants to
send remittances home, given the strong socioeconomic impacts of the crisis in migrant destination countries. However,
• Despite initial projections of a decline, remittances to the Caribbean actually increased by 18.2 per cent in
2020 compared with levels seen in 2019 (CEMLA, 2021). This would mean that the region in general fared
better than the rest of the world that year, which overall saw a decline of 1.6 per cent compared with 2019
(World Bank, 2021).
This signicant increase is attributable to numerous factors, including remitters sending larger sums of money home to
support families aected by the COVID-19 crisis and various disasters in the region (for example, Hurricanes Eta
and Iota), economic stimulus in the United States and other destination countries as well as more remitters sending
money through formal instead of informal channels (World Bank, 2021).
This section presents key data and trends on remittances in the Caribbean, sourced in large part form World Bank
Migration and Remittances data, based on annual estimates of national balance of payment statistics produced by central
banks and compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (IOM, 2021). It is important to note that estimates
in this section do not include informal transfers.
54
54
For additional information on methodologies and limitations, see Plaza and Ratha, 2017.
11. REMITTANCES
REMITTANCES
39
11.2 REMITTANCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
This section highlights the contributions of remittances to the GDP of selected countries and territories in the
Caribbean, as well as recent changes in 2020 and 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Figure 11.1: Migrant remittances received as a proportion (%) of total GDP, selected Caribbean countries /
territories, 2017-2022
Sources: KNOMAD World Bank, Personal remittances, received (% of GDP), n.d. [16 Jun. 2023]; KNOMAD World Bank, Migrant and Remittances Data, “Annual
Remittances Data (updated as of June 2023)”, 2023
55
(World Bank, Washington DC) [19 Jul. 2023].
55
For the Bahamas, Cuba, Saint Martin (French part), Puerto Rico, British Virgin Islands and United States Virgin Islands were not reported for any of the reference years in Figure
11.1. Estimates for Curaçao, Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands were not available for 2021, while data for Sint Maarten (Dutch part) were only available through
2018.
11. REMITTANCES
REMITTANCES
40
World Bank data on remittances as a proportion of GDP reect that:
• As of 2022, for the 20 countries/territories in the Caribbean for which data were available, remittances constituted
more than 15 per cent of GDP in a total of 3 countries/territories (Bermuda, Haiti, and Jamaica) and more than
ve per cent of GDP in 5 countries/territories (Guyana, Curacao, St. Vincent and the Grenadine, Dominica,
and Dominican Republic).
• Since 2019, the share of GDP derived from remittances has shown an upward trend mainly in Jamaica
(increasing by 5.4 percentage points between 2019 and 2022), Haiti (+1.9 percentage points, 2022 vs. 2019),
Suriname (+1.7 percentage points, 2022 vs. 2019), Belize (+1 percentage points, 2022 vs. 2019), Dominica
(0.7 percentage points 2019 and 2022), and Dominican Republic (increasing by 0.7 percentage points between
2019 and 2022).
• Remittances as a proportion of GDP increased between 2019 and 2020 for Guyana, Belize, Aruba, and Saint
Lucia but then retracted slightly back to 2019 levels (or higher) in 2022. Remittances as a proportion of
GDP remained relatively constant for Saint Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda and Trinidad and Tobago
between 2019 and 2022.
• Countries and territories in the region where a downward trend can be seen in the share of GDP derived
from remittances between 2019 and 2022 include Curacao (decreasing by 5.9 percentage points between
2019 and 2022), Bermuda (decreasing by 4.9 percentage points between 2019 and 2022), Guyana (decreasing
by 4.7 percentage points between 2019 and 2022) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (decreasing by
1.4 percentage points between 2019 and 2022, albeit noting that levels seen in the latter country between
2019-2022 remain higher than those recorded in 2017 and 2018).
• While estimates at a regional level are not available, the World Bank does produce estimates on remittances as
a proportion of GDP for the subregion of Caribbean Small States (CSS) – encompassing Antigua and Barbuda,
the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. In 2022 (the most recent year for which
an estimate for the CSS is available, remittances were estimated to constitute 6.5 per cent of the combined
GDP for these 13 countries (World Bank, n.d.x). This is compared with 5.6 per cent recorded in 2019,
5.4 per cent in 2018 and 5.6 per cent in 2017 (Ibid), showing the importance of remittances at a sub-regional
level in the rst year of the COVID-19 pandemic.
11.3 ABSOLUTE VOLUME OF REMITTANCES
To complement the data shown in Figure 11.1 above, Figures 11.2 and 11.3 below shows the breakdown of remittances
inows to countries in the region in absolute terms, highlighting that while remittances may not constitute as
high of a proportion of GDP in some countries/territories, they are still signicant on a nominal basis. To more
accurately represent the magnitude of remittance ows to the top three recipient countries in the region – Haiti,
Dominican Republic and Jamaica – these countries graphed separately from the rest of the countries and territories (all
of which received less than USD 400 million in remittances in 2022) (the scales between Figures 11.2 and 11.3 dier).
The Caribbean countries and territories below altogether received a total of USD 21.88 billion
in remittances as of 2022.
11. REMITTANCES
REMITTANCES
41
Figure 11.2: Migrant remittances received, absolute value in current U.S. Dollar (USD) thousands of millions,
Caribbean countries / territories for which data were available, 2017-2022.
Source: KNOMAD World Bank, Migrant and Remittances Data, “Annual Remittances Data (updated as of May 2023)”, 2023 (World Bank, Washington DC)
[16 Jun. 2023].
11. REMITTANCES
REMITTANCES
42
Data on absolute remittance ows to countries and territories in the Caribbean in the most recent ve-year period
available indicate that:
• The total of nearly USD 20 billion in remittances received in the 20 countries and territories for which
data were available represents an increase of 22.6 per cent compared with the USD 16.53 billion received
in 2020 and an increase of 38 per cent compared with the USD 14.30 billion received in 2019.
• Of the USD 20 billion received in the above countries and territories in 2022, nearly half (47%)
was received in the Dominican Republic alone, while just over one-fth (20.7%) was received in Haiti
and 16.8 per cent in Jamaica.
• Between 2020 and 2022, absolute remittance ows increased in the following countries and territories:
Haiti (+31%), Sint Maarten (Dutch part) (27%), Guyana (26%), Dominican Republic (+23%), Jamaica
(+20%), Suriname (+19%), Belize (+18%), Aruba (9%), Trinidad and Tobago (4%) and Saint Kitts and
Nevis (4%).
• There was very little change in the volume of remittances received in the following countries
and territories between 2020 and 2022: Barbados and Cayman Islands.
• The following countries saw a decrease in the volume of remittances received in 2022 compared with
2020: Dominica (-11%), Curaçao (-6%), Antigua and Barbuda (-5%), St. Lucia (-2%) and Grenada (-1%).
11.4 REMITTANCES COMPARED WITH OTHER FORMS OF CAPITAL FLOWS
The continued importance of migrant remittances in the Caribbean as a valuable source of foreign exchange is reected
in the fact that they very often outpace foreign direct investment (FDI) and ocial development assistance (ODA)
received in key origin countries. Remittances ows tend to be more evenly distributed across developing countries,
and have also proven to be more stable than other capital ows, particularly in times of nancial volatility when foreign
direct investment might be less reliable (such as during the COVID-19 pandemic) (Ratha and IMF, n.d.; European
Parliament, 2014). This is evidenced in Figure 11.4 below, where FDI is shown to exceed inows of remittances
in certain years across selected countries but also shows signicantly higher inter-year variation when compared to the
former, particularly in 2020 in the rst year of the pandemic.
ODA is dened by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as nancial aid “provided by ocial agencies,
including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies” that is “administered with the promotion
of the economic development and welfare of developing countries” (OECD, n.d.x.). Global ODA from ocial
donors reached an all-time high of USD 178.9 billion in 2021 globally as the world continued to grapple with the eects
of the COVID-19 crisis (Ibid). Not all countries are eligible to receive ODA – for an updated list of ODA recipients
as of 2021, see here.
FDI is dened by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as “an investment involving a long-
term relationship and reecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity in one economy… in an enterprise resident
in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor” (UNCTAD, 2018).
The below gure 11.3 shows the breakdown of ODA and FDI inows versus remittances in some of the main remittance-
receiving countries in the Caribbean (note that not all gures are shown on the same scale).
11. REMITTANCES
REMITTANCES
43
Figure 11.3: Migrant remittances received, vs. total net Ocial Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements,
vs. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) net inows (Balance of Payments, BoP), current USD millions, selected
Caribbean countries, 2017-2021.
11. REMITTANCES
REMITTANCES
44
Sources: OECD, Aid (ODA) disbursement to countries and regions [DAC2a], n.d. [19 Jun. 2023]; World Bank, Foreign direct investment, net inows (BoP, current US$),
n.d. [19 Jun 2023]; KNOMAD World Bank, Migrant and Remittances Data, “Annual Remittances Data (updated as of May 2023)”, 2023
60
(World Bank, Washington
DC) [19 Jun. 2023].
11. REMITTANCES
REMITTANCES
45
When comparing data on remittances with ocial net ODA and FDI inows, the following trends may be observed:
• For the 11 countries above, the main source of external capital in 2020 and 2021 was remittances
for six countries: Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, Dominica, Belize, and Suriname. For Jamaica,
Dominican Republic, and Haiti this is a trend since 2017 at least.
• On a cumulative basis, the total quantity of remittances received between 2017 and 2021
outnumbered the total combined quantity of net ODA and FDI received in the same period in the
following countries: Jamaica (cumulative remittances received in this period were 4.3 times greater than
ODA and FDI inows combined), Haiti (3.2 times greater), Dominican Republic (2.5 times greater),
and Suriname (1.3 times greater).
• A steep decrease in FDI inows between 2019 and 2020 can be observed across all countries included
in Figure 11.4, due to the economic fallout and uncertainty generated by the COVID-19 pandemic
(UNCTAD, 2021). This is in line with the rest of the world, which witnessed a 42 per cent overall
decline in FDI in 2020 compared to 2019 (Ibid). In 2021 all the countries increased their FDI inow
but two (Suriname and Grenada).
• On the other hand, remittances showed signicantly more resilience, for the period 2019-2021 with
decreases witnessed in only two of the 11 countries shown above (Antigua and Barbuda and Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines in 2020).
• Levels of net ODA received in the above 11 countries were dwarfed by both FDI and remittances in
virtually all countries except for Haiti, where ODA outpaced FDI in this period. The same situation
occurs in Dominica, St. Lucia, and Suriname for 2020-2021.
The demonstrated importance of remittances as a vital form of external capital for many countries in the region
also underscores the need to reduce as much as possible the barriers that migrants face in sending money home
as well as the obstacles that communities of origin face in receiving money. One of the most prominent barriers
is the cost associated with sending and receiving transfers. SDG Goal 10 Reduce inequality within and among countries,
target 10.c commits to, “by 2030, reduce to less than three per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances
and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than ve per cent.” This means that it should be possible
for remitters to send money to the beneciary for an average cost of ve per cent or less of the amount sent in any
specic corridor. Remittance costs can range from the fee charged by the sending agent typically paid by the sender,
as well as a fee to convert currencies.
The following Figure 11.4 shows the average price of sending remittances to selected countries in the region for which
data were available.
11. REMITTANCES
REMITTANCES
46
Figure 11.4: Average transaction cost (as % of transfer) of sending remittances to selected countries in the Caribbean,
Quarter 4 2019 – Quarter 3 2020
Source: World Bank, Remittance Prices Worldwide (Receiving Countries), n.d. [20 Jun. 2023].
Based on the most recent data available (up through 2020), the following observations can be made:
• In none of the above cases or quarters did average prices to send remittances (as a percentage
of the transfer) fall below the maximum threshold established in in target SDG 10.c.
• The countries that have been closest to the goal SDG 10.c. are Suriname for 2017 and the Dominican
Republic in 2019, however, like the rest of the countries, there have been variations that move them
away from the objective.
• Cuba and the Dominican Republic registered a downward trend in the percentage cost
of remittances to these countries between 2017 and 2019, however, both register an increase in
2020 (0.9 and 0.1, respectively, percentage points more than in 2019).
• Between 2019 and 2020, there has been a percentage decrease in the cost of remittances
for three countries: Jamaica (-1.2%), Guyana (-0.9%), and Haiti (-0.3%).
11. REMITTANCES
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
47
12.1 KEY DATA ON NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN
Each year, in addition to signicant eects on economies, livelihoods, habitats, food security systems, key infrastructure
and other fundamental sectors, thousands of people are displaced due to the impact of rapid-onset natural hazards
in the Caribbean. In per capita terms, many Caribbean SIDS are amongst the most vulnerable countries/territories
in the world to disaster-related displacement in the context of rapid-onset natural hazards (IADB, n.d.x.). There is also
broad consensus that extreme weather events such as tropical storms, oods, droughts and other phenomena which
occur in the region will likely increase in frequency and intensity in the coming decades (ibid.).
Given the broadscale impacts on human mobility and displacement in the Caribbean, this section presents key data and
analysis on trends and models of internal displacement due to disasters in the context of rapid-onset natural hazards
(the section does not cover conict-related internal displacement). The information is derived from data collected
and maintained by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), which monitors displacement across the
world caused by conicts and disasters. Estimates are sourced from government agencies, UN organizations, IOM
DTM, humanitarian clusters, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and local
authorities whenever possible. When these priority sources cannot be accessed, secondary and tertiary sources are
used (IDMC, n.d.x).
56
Figure 12.1: Map of new internal displacements caused by natural hazards in the Caribbean in 2022
by country / territory
Source: Own elaboration, based on data from Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), “Disaster events 2008-2021 (new displacement) per hazard type”,
n.d. [23 May 2022].
Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown, and designations used on this map do not imply ocial endorsement or
acceptance by IOM.
56
For additional information on IDMC methodologies, see here. Examples of secondary sources include international and local NGOs, civil society and human rights
organizations and academia, while tertiary sources include media and aected populations.
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
Internal displacement due to disasters
0
1 - 40
41 - 120
121 - 1,500
1,501 - 14,867
14,868 - 89,900
Belize
Cuba
Haiti
Dominican
Republic
Trinidad and Tobago
Guyana
Suriname
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and
The Grenadines
89,900
54,240
14,867
40
1,500
3
560
5,140
120
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
48
Figure 12.2: Characteristics of new internal displacements caused by natural hazards in the Caribbean, 2012-2022
5.3 million new internal displacements caused by natural hazards were registered in the Caribbean in the 11-
year period between 2012 and 2022
Source: IDMC, “Disaster events 2008-2022 (new displacement) per hazard type”, n.d. [22 June 2023].
By country / territory and year
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
By proportion of new displacements caused by each hazard type, by year
Ye a r
To t a l
Storm Flood Earthquake Volcanic
Eruption
Wildre Dry mass
movement
Wet mass
movement
2012 483,013 93% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2013 19,282 94% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2014 17,941 62% 38% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2015 35,051 31% 69% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2016 1,322,876 99% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2017 1,984,324 98% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2018 90,474 72% 18% 10% <1% <1% <1% 0%
2019 26,473 99% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2020 701,384 98% <1% 2% 0% 0% 0% <1%
2021 455,097 45% 2% 48% 5% 0% 0% 0%
2022 166,370 78% 16% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Overall 5,302,285 84% 11% 5% <1% <1% <1% <1%
By number of hazard events (left) and proportion of new
displacements (%) caused by hazard category (right)
Ye a r Weather-related Geophysical
2012 13 100% 0 0%
2013 10 100% 0 0%
2014 4 100% 0 0%
2015 8 100% 0 0%
2016 18 100% 0 0%
2017 38 100% 0 0%
2018 23 91% 3 9%
2019 16 100% 0 0%
2020 23 98% 2 2%
2021 13 47% 2 53%
2022 17 94% 1 6%
Overall 183 96% 8 4%
By year and quantity of countries/territories aected, 2012-2021
Ye a r No. of countries /
territories aected
Total no. of new
displacements
2012 4 483,013
2013 8 19,282
2014 2 17,941
2015 6 35,051
2016 10 1,322,876
2017 19 1,984,324
2018 10 90,474
2019 11 26,473
2020 8 701,384
2021 9 455,097
2022 9 166,370
Overall 5,302,285
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
49
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
50
The information presented in the above gures for displacements by country/territory is intended to accurately
visualize new disaster-related displacements in areas most aected in the region, by showing data on the same scale.
For this reason, the gure for Cuba is signicantly larger than for the other top ve countries/territories in the region
(Haiti, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and Dominica).
Others
Source: IDMC, “Disaster events 2008-2021 (new displacement) per hazard type”, n.d. [22 June 2023].
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
Others
Country
2012
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
2022
TOTAL
(2012-2022)
Saint Vincent
and the
Grenadines
0 2,325 0 0 338 20 0 232 0 23,032 3 25,950
Bahamas 0 0 0 2,842 3,500 1,565 230 9,480 0 0 0 17,977
Suriname 0 300 0 0 0 6,000 0 0 0 6,500 1,500 14,300
Sint Maarten
(Dutch part)
0 0 0 0 0 12,706 0 0 0 0
0
12,706
Saint Martin
(French part)
0 0 0 0 0 10,582 0 0 0 0 0 10,582
Belize 0 126 0 252 3,500 0 0 0 6,273 0 0 10,151
British Virgin
Islands
0 0 0 0 0 6,000 0 0 0 0 0 6,000
Jamaica 2,000 0 0 0 3,524 29 7 0 2 16 0 5,578
United States
Virgin Islands
0 0
0
0 0 2,311 0 0 0 0 0 2,311
Saint Lucia 0 1,200 0 0 130 0 0 25 0 0 560 1,915
Guyana 0 0 0 0 0 195 1,168 0 0 220 120 1,703
Antigua and
Barbuda
0 0 0 0 0 1,423 0 0 0 0 0 1,423
Trinidad and
Tobago
0 29 0 0 0 200 860 48 33 0 40 1,210
Barbados 0 0 0 0 90 0 0 102 0 380 0 572
Anguilla 0 0 0 0 0 500 0 0 0 0 0 500
Grenada 0 0 0 0 0 146 27 26 0 0 0 199
Turks and
Caicos
Islands
0 0 0 0 50 60 0 0 0 0 0 110
Saint Kitts
and Nevis
0 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 33
Martinique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
51
By principal hazards causing new internal displacement events each year
Ye a r Principal hazards and countries / territories impacted (in no particular order)
2012
Hurricane Sandy (Jamaica, Cuba Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Cuba).
2013
Tropical Storm Chantal and Tropical Depression Gabrielle (Dominican Republic); Tropical Storm Barry (Belize); oods in
Haiti; storms in Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; oods in Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
2014
Tropical Storm Crystobal, other storms and oods in the Dominican Republic; oods in Haiti.
2015
Tropical Storm / Hurricane Erika (Dominica, Dominican Republic); Hurricane Joaquin (Dominican Republic); oods in Belize,
Cuba, Dominican Republic and Haiti.
2016
Hurricane Matthew (Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Turks and Caicos Islands,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) and Hurricane Earl (Belize); oods in Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines; tornado in Haiti.
2017
Hurricane Irma (Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Martin (French part), Puerto Rico, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), Turks and Caicos Islands, British Virgin Islands, United
States Virgin Islands); Hurricane Maria (Dominica, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, United States Virgin Islands); oods
in Dominican Republic; Tropical Storm Isaac and oods in Dominica; subtropical storm Alberto in Cuba; wildres in the
Bahamas.
2018
Hurricane Michael (Cuba); landslides, earthquake, and oods in Haiti; volcanic eruption, landslides and oods in Trinidad and
Tobago, Tropical Storm Beryl (Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico); heavy rains in Jamaica, oods in Guyana.
2019
Tropical Storm / Hurricane Dorian (Barbados, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Bahamas); tornado in
Cuba; storms in Dominican Republic; storms and oods in Haiti; Tropical storm Karen in Trinidad and Tobago and Puerto
Rico, oods in Trinidad and Tobago and Martinique.
2020
Hurricane Eta (Belize, Cuba, Dominican Republic); Hurricane Iota (Belize); Tropical Storm Nana (Belize); Hurricane Isaias
(Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico); Hurricane Delta (Cuba); tornado and oods in Cuba; Hurricane
Laura (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico); Hurricane Zeta (Jamaica); Tropical Storm Gonzalo, tornados and
landslides in Trinidad and Tobago; earthquakes in Puerto Rico; oods in the Dominican Republic.
2021
Hurricane Elsa (Barbados, Dominican Republic, Cuba); Hurricane Ida (Cuba); Tropical Storm Fred (Dominican Republic);
Hurricane Grace (Jamaica, Cayman Islands, Dominican Republic, Haiti); Floods in Guyana, Suriname, and Haiti; Volcanic
eruption in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Earthquake in Haiti.
2022
Hurricane Ian, oods and wildre in Cuba; Hurricane Fiona and oods in Dominican Republic; Hurricane Lisa (Belize);
Floods in Suriname; Earthquake and oods in Haiti
Source: IDMC, “Disaster events 2008-2021 (new displacement) per hazard type”, n.d. [22 June 2023].
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
52
IDMC data presented in Figure 12.2 reveal a wealth of information about dynamics of displacement due to natural
hazards in the Caribbean over the 11-year period spanning 2012-2022:
• A total of 5,302,285 new internal displacements due to natural hazards were recorded in the
Caribbean region between 2012 and 2022. There was an average of 482,026 new internal displacements
due to natural hazards recorded in the region each year for the same period.
• The number of new internal displacements recorded in Cuba alone in this eleven-year period was
almost four times greater than the total number of new internal displacements recorded in all other
Caribbean countries and territories combined in the same period. Many of the displacements in
Cuba are understood to be due to coordinated mass evacuations conducted by the government to
mitigate the impacts of natural hazards (Aguirre, 2005).
• Overall, 78 per cent of all new internal displacements registered in the Caribbean between 2012 and
2022 occurred in Cuba, 10 per cent in Haiti, seven per cent in the Dominican Republic, two per cent
in Puerto Rico, less than one per cent in Dominica and two per cent (112,862) in other countries
and territories.
• On average, nine countries and territories in the region were aected by internal displacements
due to natural hazards each year between 2012 and 2022.
• Displacement gures vary signicantly by year, depending on the nature, severity, and location of natural
hazards– for example, under 18,000 new internal displacements due to disasters were registered in
2014, compared with nearly two million in 2017.
• The year 2017 demonstrated the sheer depth of displacement risk in the Caribbean, with three major
hurricanes – Harvey, Irma and Maria – leading to the internal displacement of millions of people in
a single month (Platform on Disaster Displacement, n.d.). In fact, Hurricane Irma was the largest
disaster in the entire world in 2017 (UNICEF, 2019).
• Most internal displacements due to natural hazards in the Caribbean are weather-related – causing
95 per cent of all new disaster-related displacements recorded between 2012-2022. Just ve per cent
of new disaster-related displacements in this period were caused by geophysical natural hazards.
• Most disaster-related displacements in the eleven-year period under analysis were caused by storms
(84%), oods (11%), earthquakes (5%), and a small proportion were caused by other types of
hazards (<1%).
• Most new internal displacements were recorded between June and November, coinciding with the
Caribbean tropical cyclone (hurricane) season.
To shed more light on the potential impact of natural hazards on internal displacement in the region, the
below exploratory analysis presents the largest number of individuals displaced in a given year between 2012 and 2022
in selected Caribbean countries and territories in comparison to their total estimated population in the same year (per
UNDESA). These gures should be interpreted as rough estimates, considering that the same individual could have
been displaced multiple times in the same year.
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
53
Table 12.1: Largest percentage (%) of the entire population displaced due to natural hazards in any given year
between 2012-2022, selected Caribbean countries and territories
Sources: UNDESA, World Population Prospects Revision 2019 – Total Population – Both Sexes, 2019; IDMC, “Disaster events 2008-2022 (new displacement)
per hazard type”, n.d. [22 June 2023].
When analyzing internal displacements due to natural hazards in proportional terms to total country/territory population
during the ten-year period between 2012 and 2021, the analysis reveals that:
• A signicant proportion of the entire population of certain Caribbean countries and territories were
internally displaced at some point between 2012-2021 – reaching as high as approximately 48 per cent
in Dominica in 2017, 30 per cent in Sint Maarten (Dutch part) in 2017, 27 per cent in Saint Martin
(French part) in 2017 and 21 per cent in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in 2021.
• Many countries and territories that did not rank among the highest in new internal displacements
due to natural hazards in absolute terms (see Figure 22.2) featured at the top of the list when taken
in proportional terms alongside population size, for example – Saint Martin (French part), Sint Maarten
(Dutch part) and British Virgin Islands.
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
Country
Highest recorded number of new
internal displacements due to
natural hazards recorded in any
given year between 2012-2021, by
country/territory and year
Total population (in
same year as year with
highest no. of new
internal displacements)
Estimated proportion (%) of the
population internally displaced by
natural hazards in each country/
territory’s most prominent year
of new displacements between
2012-2022
Dominica 34,798 (2017) 71,991 48%
Sint Maarten (Dutch part) 12,706 (2017) 42,882 30%
Saint Martin (French part) 10,582 (2017) 38,659 27%
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 23,032 (2021) 110,947 21%
British Virgin Islands 6,000 (2017) 30,237 20%
Cuba 1,738,000 (2017) 11,326,616 15%
Puerto Rico 86,406 (2017) 1,850,529 5%
Anguilla 500 (2017) 15,002 3%
Haiti 220,304 (2021) 11,402,533 2%
Bahamas 9,480 (2019) 393,248 2%
Belize 6,273 (2020) 397,621 2%
United States Virgin Islands 2,311 (2017) 104,423 2%
Antigua and Barbuda 1,423 (2018) 97,928 2%
Suriname 6,500 (2021) 586,634 1%
Dominican Republic 68,789 (2017) 10,847,904 <1%
Jamaica 3,524 (2016) 2,961,161 <1%
Saint Lucia 1,200 (2013) 183,629 <1%
Trinidad and Tobago 860 (2018) 1,399,491 <1%
Guyana 1,168 (2018) 438,413 <1%
Grenada 146 (2017) 112,519 <1%
Barbados 376 (2021) 287,371 <1%
Turks and Caicos Islands 60 (2017) 38,718 <1%
Saint Kitts and Nevis 33 (2017) 53,192 <1%
Martinique 2 (2019) 375,265 <1%
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
54
Table 12.2: Stock of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to natural hazards estimated in the Caribbean as of the
end of 2022.
• Over 166,000 individuals were estimated to be living in internal displacement due to natural hazards
across three Caribbean countries as of the end of 2022.
• Given the scale of new internal displacements that occur each year, it can be deduced that most
displacements due to rapid-onset natural hazards in the Caribbean do not lead to situations
of protracted displacement (IDPs). One exception is in Haiti, where 99 per cent of the entire stock
of IDPs due to natural hazards in the Caribbean were living as of the end of 2022. Most IDPs
due to natural hazards in Haiti as of the end of 2022 were displaced by the country’s 2021 earthquake
(magnitude 7.2 which struck 14 August 2021, aecting 500,000 people primarily in the southwest)
(Haiti Shelter Cluster, 2021) and the 2010 earthquake, which destroyed 105,000 homes and
damaged more than 208,000, aecting three million people and displacing 1.5 million, per IOM gures
(Benet, 2020). Additionally, the number of disaster related IDPs in Haiti is likely an undercount,
given that IOM estimates (as agreed with the Government of Haiti) do not include informal camps
and settlements that developed in and around the country’s cities during the emergency response
and after the crisis (Ibid).
12.2 RISK MODELS FOR NATURAL HAZARDS, DISASTERS AND DISPLACEMENT
Given the signicant human, nancial, environmental and infrastructural impacts that sudden-onset natural hazards
have on the Caribbean and around the world, various actors have developed risk models to try to forecast dierent
dimensions of risk associated with these types of hazards and their impact on economies, on humanitarian crises and
on human displacement.
The following section highlights three key risk models which shed light on natural hazards, disasters and displacement
in the Caribbean. An analysis of the information derived from these three models might help in determining
which countries and territories in the region are most at risk, the scale of risk at the national and regional level, the types
of natural hazards that pose the greatest amount of risk, and whether or not risk appears to be increasing, decreasing
or remaining the same. This information can in turn help to inform prevention, preparedness and response to disasters
in the future.
i. Global Displacement Risk Model
The Global Displacement Risk Model created by IDMC presents data on displacement risk associated with sudden-
onset disasters, assisting stakeholders in understanding the likelihood of such population movements taking place in the
future (IDMC, n.d.x.). The model estimates the average expected number of displacements per year for sudden-onset
hazards, measured by the hazard (phenomenon that may cause displacement) combined with exposure (people and
buildings in hazard-prone areas) and vulnerability (how buildings react to dierent hazard intensities) (IDMC, n.d.x.)
57
57
For more information on methodologies and limitations, visit the related IDMC webpage here.
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
Country
Stock no. of individuals living in displacement due
to natural hazards
Cuba 89,900
Dominican Republic 54,240
Haiti 14,867
Suriname 1,500
Saint Lucia 560
Others 163
Overall
166,370
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
55
The below table 12.2 shows estimated risk of future displacement for selected countries and territories in the Caribbean.
Table 12.3: Average expected number of new displacements per year due to sudden-onset hazards, selected
Caribbean countries/territories.
Source: IDMC, Global Displacement Risk Model, n.d. [accessed 22 June 2023].
Note: Data for Barbados, Grenada and Saint Kitts and Nevis were not available. The * symbol indicates an overseas territory.
Models for future displacement due to sudden-onset hazards in the Caribbean would suggest that:
• The Caribbean region will likely see hundreds of thousands of new displacements each year
due to natural hazards, with upwards of 236,000 estimated to occur per year, on average, in the
14 countries and territories included in Table 12.1.
• Cyclonic winds (caused by storms) are expected to be the main absolute drivers of new internal
displacements across the Caribbean countries/territories included above, followed by storm surge
and earthquakes.
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
By proportion of new displacements caused by each hazard type, by year
Country
Total expected no. of
displacements per year
Earthquake Storm surge Tsunami Cyclonic wind Flood
Antigua and Barbuda 3,366 268 983 1 2,114 -
Cuba 23,306 - 17,674 - 5,532 724
Dominica 2,393 285 1,376 - 732 -
Dominican Republic 41,777 11,609 3,489 23 18,863 7,793
Guyana 3,015 - - - - 3,015
Haiti 50,469 26,167 4,562 61 7,718 11,961
Jamaica 14,903 1,136 4,787 4 8,431 545
Puerto Rico* 53,405 2,633 6,370
80
44,171 151
Saint Lucia 2,395 151 1,492 - 752 -
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
1,086 58 879 - 149 -
Suriname 2,916 - - - - 2,916
Trinidad and Tobago 7,147 6,876 230 - 30 11
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
56
ii. Global Climate Risk Index
The Global Climate Risk Index (CRI), released annually by Germanwatch, is a rank of countries and territories most
impacted by extreme weather events. The CRI scores are derived from the MunichRe NatCatSERVICE data set
on the impacts of extreme weather events and associated socio-economic data. The score is a composite indicator
based on average fatalities overall, average fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants, average losses in millions of USD (at
PPP) and average losses per unit of GDP in per cent (%). The CRI is designed to indicate a level of exposure and
vulnerability to extreme events, which countries may understand as “warnings in order to be prepared for more
frequent and/or more severe events in the future” (Germanwatch, 2021, p.4). Data were analyzed for a total of
180 countries in 2021. Notably, the index is not a comprehensive climate vulnerability scoring, and by focusing
on extreme weather events (such as storms, oods, etc.) it does not consider slow-onset processes (such as ocean
warming or sea-level rise) (ibid.).
58
Below is the list of Caribbean countries and territories for which a CRI score was
available in 2021, along with their respective global rank in terms of risk. Notably, data on Cuba were not available
amongst the scored countries and territories.
Table 12.4: Climate Risk Index score and global ranking (out of 180) for selected Caribbean countries and territories
for the period 2000-2019
Source: Germanwatch (Eckstein et al.), Brieng paper: Global Climate Risk Index, 2021: Who suers most from extreme weather events? Weather-related
loss events in 2019 and 2000-2019, 2021.
Note: The * symbol indicates a dependent area or overseas territory.
58 For additional information on methodologies and limitations, see the 2021 report here.
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
Country/territory
Global ranking CRI Score
Puerto Rico* 1 7.17
Haiti 3 13.67
Bahamas 6 27.67
Dominica 11 33.00
Grenada 24 39.67
Belize 33 48.67
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 48 59.17
Dominican Republic 50 59.50
Saint Lucia 51 60.33
Jamaica 54 63.83
Antigua and Barbuda 56 64.50
Guyana 119 108.17
Saint Kitts and Nevis 130 116.00
Barbados 148 135.33
Trinidad and Tobago 159 148.00
Suriname 171 164.00
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
57
The 2021 global CRI results indicate that:
• Four Caribbean countries and territories were among the top 15 most impacted by extreme
weather events around the world between 2000 and 2019.
• Eight Caribbean countries and territories were among the top 50 most impacted by extreme
weather events around the world between 2000 and 2019.
ii. INFORM Risk Index
The INFORM Risk Index, a multi-stakeholder forum led by the Joint Research Center of the European Commission,
is a global tool to understand the humanitarian crises and disasters based on 80 dierent indicators which measure
hazards and people’s exposure to them (Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the European Commission, 2021).
The components of risk are divided into three dimensions: (1) hazards and exposure – including natural
59
and
human
60
; (2) vulnerability – including socioeconomic
61
and vulnerable groups
62
; and (3) lack of coping capacity – both
institutional
63
and infrastructural
64
(Ibid). Based on this composite index, a risk prole is created for each country,
with a rating between zero and 10.
65
In addition to the annual report (see the most recent report for 2021), the EU
operates an online map tool which allows users to visualize the overall INFORM risk index as well as the indices for the
above three categories, separately.
Below is a mapping of the INFORM Risk Index results as of mid-2022 for UN Member Countries in the Caribbean,
shown on a scale of ve categories between very low (0-2), low (2.1-3.5), medium (3.6-5.0), high (5.1-6.5)
and very high risk (6.6-10).
Figure 12.3: Map of INFORM Index for Risk Management in UN Member Countries in the Caribbean, mid-(2022)
Source: Own elaboration, based on: Inter-Agency Standing Committee and European Commission, INFORM Risk model map tool, n.d. [accessed 15 May 2022].
59
Including earthquakes, tsunamis, droughts, oods, tropical cyclones and epidemics.
60
Current conict intensity and project conict risk
61
Development and deprivation (50%), inequality (25%) and aid dependency (25%).
62
Uprooted people and other vulnerable groups.
63
Disaster Risk Reduction and Governance capacities.
64
Communication, physical infrastructure and access to health system.
65
The INFORM Risk Index, being a composite index, is a simplied a view of reality and should be interpreted alongside other sources. Detailed information
on the limitations of the tool and methodologies is available on the website here
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
Index for Risk Management
Very low Low
Medium
High
Vey high
Belize
Cuba
Jamaica
The Bahamas
Haiti
Dominican
Republic
Guyana
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Barbados
Antigua and Barbuda
Dominica
Saint Lucia
Saint Kitts
and Nevis
Saint Vincent and
The Grenadines
Grenada
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
58
Furthermore, below is the breakdown of the overall INFORM Risk and indices on hazards and exposure, vulnerability
and coping capacities for each country. This helps to distinguish the impact of natural hazards from other components that
drive risk. For reference, as of mid-2022 the country with the highest risk rating around the world was Somalia (8.8)
while the lowest was Singapore (0.6) (Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the European Commission, 2021).
Table 12.5: INFORM Index for Risk Management in UN Member Countries in the Caribbean by country, mid-2022
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
Haiti World Ranking Position: 21
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
High (6.4)
6.4 5.7 7.2
Natural hazard
7.7 Very High
Socio-economic
vulnerability
6.6
Infrastructure
6.6
Human hazard
5.8
Vulnerable groups
4.6
Institutional
7.8
Belize World Ranking Position: 71
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Medium (4.1)
3.2 4.2 5
Natural hazard
5.5 High
Socio-economic
vulnerability
3.9
Infrastructure
3.9
Human hazard
0.0
Vulnerable groups
4.4
Institutional
6
Guyana World Ranking Position: 89
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Medium (4.1)
2.2 4.1 5
Natural hazard
3.9 Medium
Socio-economic
vulnerability
3.9
Infrastructure
5.8
Human hazard
0.1
Vulnerable groups
4.2
Institutional
4.1
Suriname World Ranking Position: 103
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Low (3.3)
2.3 3.0 5
Natural hazard
4 Medium
Socio-economic
vulnerability
3.5
Infrastructure
3.6
Human hazard
0.1
Vulnerable groups
2.4
Institutional
6.2
Dominican Republic World Ranking Position: 61
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Medium (4.6)
4.1 4.8 4.2
Natural hazard
6.7 Very High
Socio-economic
vulnerability
3.4
Infrastructure
3.0
Human hazard
0.1
Vulnerable groups
6.0
Institutional
5.3
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
59
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
Jamaica World Ranking Position: 109
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Low (3.1)
3.3 2.5 3.5
Natural hazard
5.5 High
Socio-economic
vulnerability
4.1
Infrastructure
2.9
Human hazard
0.1
Vulnerable groups
0.6
Institutional
4.1
Dominica World Ranking Position: 113
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Low (3)
2.8 2.5 4
Natural hazard
4.9 High
Socio-economic
vulnerability
4.2
Infrastructure
3.0
Human hazard
0.1
Vulnerable groups
0.5
Institutional
4.9
Cuba World Ranking Position: 121
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Low (2.9)
3.3 2.5 2.9
Natural hazard
5.5 High
Socio-economic
vulnerability
2
Infrastructure
1.6
Human hazard
0.1
Vulnerable groups
3
Institutional
4
Trinidad and Tobago World Ranking Position: 128
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Low (2.7)
1.8 3.4 3.3
Natural hazard
3.3 Low
Socio-economic
vulnerability
2
Infrastructure
1.4
Human hazard
0
Vulnerable groups
4.6
Institutional
4.8
Saint Lucia World Ranking Position: 127
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Low (2.5)
1.4 2.7 4
Natural hazard
2.6 Low
Socio-economic
vulnerability
3.8
Infrastructure
2.7
Human hazard
0
Vulnerable groups
1.4
Institutional
5.1
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
60
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines World Ranking Position: 142
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Low (2.4)
1.4 3 3.3
Natural hazard
2.6 Low
Socio-economic
vulnerability
4.2
Infrastructure
2.3
Human hazard
0
Vulnerable groups
1.7
Institutional
4.2
Antigua and Barbuda World Ranking Position: 153
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Low (2.1)
2 1.3 3.7
Natural hazard
3.7 Medium
Socio-economic
vulnerability
1.7
Infrastructure
1.5
Human hazard
0
Vulnerable groups
0.9
Institutional
5.4
Bahamas World Ranking Position: 155
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Very Low (2)
1.8 1.5 3.1
Natural hazard
3.3 Low
Socio-economic
vulnerability
2.1
Infrastructure
2.2
Human hazard
0
Vulnerable groups
0.9
Institutional
3.9
Barbados World Ranking Position: 155
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Very Low (2)
2.1 1.5 2.5
Natural hazard
3.8 Medium
Socio-economic
vulnerability
2.4
Infrastructure
1.7
Human hazard
0
Vulnerable groups
0.5
Institutional
3.2
Grenade World Ranking Position: 165
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Very Low (1.8)
0.9 1.6 3.8
Natural hazard
1.7 Very Low
Socio-economic
vulnerability
2.2
Infrastructure
2.6
Human hazard
0
Vulnerable groups
1
Institutional
4.8
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
Source: Inter-Agency Standing Committee and European Commission, INFORM Risk model map tool, n.d. [accessed 15 May 2022].
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
61
An analysis of indices for the 15 Caribbean countries covered in INFORM’s database reveals that:
• While many countries and territories fall within the low or very low-risk category overall,
isolating each country/territory’s score for natural hazards shows that a signicant proportion rank
very high, high or medium in this category (nine out of 16, or 56%).
• On the other hand, ratings for human hazards (conict intensity and conict risk) were very low
for most of the region, indicating that natural hazards were the main components driving risk to
humanitarian crises and disasters in the Caribbean.
• Despite high risk for natural hazards, overall risk to humanitarian crises and disasters in the region
is relatively low given lower-risk vulnerability proles and sucient levels of coping capacity.
• One exception is Haiti, where very high risk to natural hazards is also compounded by moderate risk
of human hazards, high socio-economic vulnerability, moderate presence of vulnerable groups and
very high lack of infrastructural and institutional coping capacities.
12. NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISPLACEMENT
Saint Kitts and Nevis World Ranking Position: 165
Inform Risk Index
Hazards &
exposure index
Vulnerability index
Lack of coping capacity index
Very Low (1.8)
1.5 1.4 2.9
Natural hazard
2.8 Very Low
Socio-economic
vulnerability
1.9
Infrastructure
2.5
Human hazard
0
Vulnerable groups
0.9
Institutional
4.1
SLOW-ONSET ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE, MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
62
13.1 THE NEXUS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE, MOBILITY AND MIGRATION IN THE CARIBBEAN
While data on sudden-onset disasters (notably, hurricanes) and their impact on human mobility in the Caribbean are
more widely available, displacement and migration related to other, slow-onset processes which aect the region –
including sea-level rise, coastal erosion, droughts, rainfall variability, environmental degradation and more – are more
dicult to capture. However, slow onset environmental drivers are expected to play an increasingly prominent role
in generating migration in the region, particularly internally within countries and particularly from rural areas to cities.
While not a comprehensive review, this section summarizes data and statistics on selected slow-onset processes that
are expected currently and, in the future, to impact human mobility in the region.
13.2 EXPLORING SEA-LEVEL RISE AND HUMAN MOBILITY SCENARIOS IN THE CARIBBEAN
In 2019, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicted that sea-level rise (SLR) could be
up to 1.10 meters above levels from the 1950s if global warming exceeds four degrees Celsius by 2100 (IPCC, 2019).
However, a number of academic studies in response have asserted that these gures are likely conservative, and that
actual SLR may be much higher.
66
High SLR scenarios by 2100 put SLR at two meters or higher (UN Environmental
Programme, 2010).
• The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2010) estimated that a one-meter SLR
would displace an estimated 110,000 people in CARICOM nations, with the Bahamas being the most
aected, followed by Saint Kitts and Nevis and Antigua and Barbuda (ibid.).
• Bellard et al. (2013) estimated that even with one-meter SLR, 8.7 per cent of the Caribbean’s islands
would be completely submerged, increasing to 49.2 per cent at six meters. This carries important
implications given that an estimated 22 million people in the Caribbean live between six meters elevation
(Cashman and Nagdee, 2017) while 50 per cent live within 1.5 kilometers of the shore (IADB, 2016).
The map shown in Figure 13.1 shows the visual impacts of the more conservative one-meter SLR projection in the region.
Figure 13.1: Map of one-meter sea level rise projections in the Caribbean
Source: Own elaboration, based on ArcGIS layers and data available from Esri, HERE Technologies, Garmin, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
States (FAO), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), United States Geological Survey (USGS) – Centers for the Remote Sensing of Ice
Sheets (CReSIS), University of Kansas, with research supported by the National Science foundation under grant numbers 0424589, 0122520 and 0407827. GIS
layers and les available here.
66
See for example, Siegert, M. et al., 2020, “Twenty-rst century sea-level rise could exceed IPCC projections for strong-warming futures”, One Earth 3, pp.
691-703; or Hofer, S. et al., 2020, “Greater Greenland Ice Sheet contribution to global sea level rise in CMIP6”, Nature, 11:6289.
13. SLOW-ONSET ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES RELATED TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
Esri, Garmin, GEBCO, NOAA NGDC, and
Belize
Cuba
Jamaica
Haiti
Dominican
Republic
Caribbean Sea
Atlantic Ocean
Pacific Ocean
Puerto
Rico
Trinidad and Tobago
Suriname
Guyana
The Bahamas
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Colombia
Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela
Esri, Garmin, GEBCO,
NOAA NGDC, and
Dominica
Antigua and
Barbuda
Saint Kitts
Grenada
Saint Vincent and
The Grenadines
Saint Lucia
Barbados
Martinique
Guadaloupe
Montserrat
Saint Barthelemy
Anguilla
Saint
Martin
and Nevis
SLOW-ONSET ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE, MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
63
• Even with a one-meter SLR, 74 per cent of resort properties in Belize, 64 per cent in Saint Kitts
and Nevis, 46 per cent in Haiti, 36 per cent in the Bahamas and 33 per cent in Trinidad and Tobago
are estimated to be at risk, jeopardizing the tourism industry in many Caribbean countries (UNEP, 2010).
• A one-meter SLR is also expected to have signicant impacts on transport and energy infrastructures and
would lead to agricultural loss of six per cent in the Bahamas, ve per cent in Dominica and three per cent
in Haiti, for example (Ibid). A one-meter SLR is also predicted to have signicant eects on natural
areas and biodiversity, including wetlands (ibid.).
For a comprehensive breakdown of these one-meter SLR scenarios, see Table 13.1 below.
Table 13.1: Predicted impacts of a one-meter sea-level-rise in CARICOM Member States, by site / category
and percentage (%) at-risk*
* Unable to calculate
Source: Table adapted from UNEP, Modelling the Transformational Impacts and Costs of Sea Level Rise in the Caribbean, 2010.
Note: Projections were made as of 2010 and may have changed.
13. SLOW-ONSET ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES RELATED TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
Country
Land Area
Population
Urban Area
Wetland Area
Agricultural Land
Crop Plantation
Major Tourism
Resorts
Airpots
Road Network
Protected Areas
Power Plants
Ports
Antigua and Barbuda 2% 3% 2% * 2% 1% 10% 0% 2% 5% 0% 100%
Barbados 1% 1% <1% * <1% <1% 8% 0% 0% * 0% 100%
Belize 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 73% 50% 4% 0% 33% 40%
Dominica <1% 1% <1% * 5% <1% 0% 0% 14% 0% 0% 67%
Grenada 1% 1% <1% * 3% 1% 11% 100% 1% * 100% 100%
Guyana <1% 1% <1% 1% <1% * 0% 0% 12% * 0% 0%
Haiti <1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 1% 46% 50% 1% * 0% 100%
Jamaica <1% 0% <1% <1% 1% <1% 8% 20% 2% 1% 0% 100%
Montserrat 1% 1% * * 2% 1% 0% 0% 4% * 0% 100%
St. Kitts & Nevis 1% 2% 1% * 5% 1% 64% 50% 0% * 0% 50%
St. Lucia 1% 1% <1% * 1% 1% 7% 50% 0% 0% 0% 100%
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 1% 1% 1% * 2% 1% 10% 50% 1% * 0% 67%
Suriname <1% 1% 1% <1% <1% <1% 5% 0% 7% 0% 0% 100%
The Bahamas 5% 5% 3% 5% 6% 3% 36% 38% 14% 1% 38% 90%
Trinidad and Tobago 1% 1% 1% <1% 3% * 33% 50% 1% 0% 0% 100%
SLOW-ONSET ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE, MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
64
The above information presented in Figure 13.1 and Table 13.1 reect the most conservative scenario for SLR. Under
a two-meter SLR scenario:
• The number of people displaced in CARICOM nations is expected to more than double compared
with the one-meter SLR scenario, while the quantity of wetland area lost would also double,
numerous airports would be partially inundated, hundreds of kilometers of roads would be impacted,
power plants would be impacted and more (UNEP, 2010).
• Under both the one-meter and two-meter SLR scenarios, potential ooding from storm surges will
increase, thus having an impact not only on long-term processes but also on the severity of natural
hazards and thus disaster-related displacement (ibid.).
• SLR is expected to generate further wave-driven ooding in the region (IPCC, 2021). Every centimeter
increase in SLR is expected to cause a doubling of the probability of ooding (IPCC, 2021; citing
Taherkhani et al., 2020).
13.3 THE IMPACTS OF OTHER SLOW-ONSET PROCESSES ON MIGRATION AND HUMAN MOBILITY –
LESSONS FROM SIXTH IPCC ASSESSMENT REPORT
While constituting one of the most visual and frequently discussed slow-onset environmental phenomenon
in the Caribbean, SLR is not the only slow-onset process that aects the region. The Caribbean currently faces and
will continue to face the impacts of other slow-onset processes, including coastal erosion, droughts and environmental
degradation.
The most recent Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC released in 2022 observed that the declining trend in rainfall
in the months of June, July and August in the Caribbean region is expected to continue in the coming decades, while
a warming climate in the region and globally is expected to contribute to higher evapotranspiration and consequently,
higher aridity and more severe agricultural and ecological doubts in the region (estimated with medium condence at
global warming levels of 2°C and above) (IPCC, 2022).
Below is a summary of key points related slow-onset processes and human mobility in the Caribbean highlighted in
Chapter 15 on Small Islands:
• Additional warming in the Caribbean will likely lead to a drier region, more frequent droughts and
signicant impacts on agricultural yield and production, including limiting the range of crops that can
be grown in certain countries (p.5, p. 27).
• More frequent droughts in the Caribbean are also expected to have an impact on freshwater systems
(with reductions expected in the volume of fresh groundwater). In a scenario of 1°C increase
in temperatures this could increase the number of individuals facing severe water resources stress
in the region by 60 per cent in the period spanning 2043-2071 (p.3, p.4).
• Despite continued gaps in knowledge, there is evidence of increasing retreat of shorelines and beach
loss (with high condence) in the Caribbean region over past decades (p.15).
• Food security in the region is also threatened by invasive species and crop pests/diseases inuenced
by climate change (p. 17, p. 22, p. 23).
• The degradation of land and marine ecosystems and decrease in potable water in the Caribbean region
is projected to have a signicant impact across sectors – health systems, economies, food security,
infrastructures, etc. – and there is condence this will lead to further migration (p.5). It is important to
signal that climate-related migration will be highly context specic and will occur under a variety of
modalities, including forced displacement, voluntary decisions to move as a strategy to reduce risks,
as well as planned resettlement (p. 29).
13. SLOW-ONSET ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES RELATED TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
MISSING MIGRANTS
65
The above challenges are compounded by issues in urban planning and population growth. Many Caribbean small
islands are struggling from urban sprawl and the increase in informal settlements, often in high-risk areas (p.45).
The information presented in this section highlight the need for development of comprehensive sub-national, national,
regional and global climate change adaptation strategies, the mainstreaming of climate adaptation strategies into
development strategies and the close linkage of climate adaptation strategies with disaster response mechanisms.
Likewise, human mobility and migration should be mainstreamed into any climate and disaster related policies and
frameworks, and vice versa.
Notably, low data quality has been cited on numerous occasions (Smith and Rhiney, 2016; Robinson, 2018; Mycoo,
2020) as a barrier to creating eective strategies (IPCC, 2022). The data and evidence currently available are still not
sucient to understand the full range of how climate drivers are inuencing or will inuence migration patterns,
nor to estimate the scale (ibid.). IOM highlighted similar dynamics in its regional report for the six member countries
of the OECS published in 2021, Migration, Environment, Disaster and Climate Change Data in the Eastern Caribbean.
IOM’s Missing Migrants Project (MMP) collects data from various sources (including coast guards and medical examiners,
media reports, NGOs and surveys and interviews with migrants, amongst others) to track migrants who have died or
gone missing during their migration journeys to a dierent country.
In the Caribbean region, some of the main routes where migrant deaths and disappearances are known to occur are
along maritime routes between Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico (sometimes referred to as the “Mona passage”),
Caribbean countries and territories to the United States, and from Venezuela to dierent locations within the region
(IOM, forthcoming). These routes are considered particularly risky not only due to weather and environmental conditions
on the high seas but also because many movements take place in non-seaworthy vessels (Ibid). It is suspected that
many deaths and disappearances taking place in the Caribbean go unregistered, as many shipwrecks are never identied
(a phenomenon often termed “Yola shipwrecks”) (Ibid).
The below Figure 14.1 shows key disaggregated data on deaths and disappearances of migrants identied in the region
in recent years.
Figure 14.1 Migrant deaths and disappearances identied in the Caribbean region, 2018 – June 2023
Source: IOM, Missing Migrants Project – Americas, n.d. [13 May. 2022].
13. SLOW-ONSET ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES RELATED TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, MOBILITY AND MIGRATION
14. MISSING MIGRANTS
MISSING MIGRANTS
66
• Since the beginning of 2016 and through June 2023, a total of 1.298 migrant deaths and disappearances
were recorded by IOM’s MMP in the Caribbean region.
• Of the total number of deaths and disappearances recorded in this period this corresponds to, 206
females(15.8%), 281 males (21.6%), 41 minors (3.1%) and 770 undetermined (59.5%).
• As can be seen from the Missing Migrants Project data for the Caribbean, the largest demographic
group for which we have data is the one that represents migrants who could not be determined in
more detail, which implies a challenge in itself for data collection in this region.
It is important to note that the year 2022 represented a tragic record of lives lost in the Caribbean, which is undoubtedly
a call to States and other stakeholders to remember the commitments made in Goal 8 of the Global Compact for
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration to save lives and establish coordinated international eorts for migrants in transit.
The Caribbean islands receive many migrants and refugees who use dangerous maritime and land routes. This
migratory dynamic increases the vulnerability of migrants to exploitation, human tracking and other human rights
violations and makes them prone to loss of life during migratory transit (IOM,2021)
Unfortunately, in the Caribbean during the year 2023 the Missing Migrants Project has continued to investigate,
analyze, monitor and make data collection of deaths and disappearances in the Caribbean which continue to occur
systematically from January 1 to June 30 the Missing Migrants Project recorded 118 lives lost which corresponds to 22
women, 47 men, 3 minors and 46 unidentied.
The identication of hundreds of cases of this tragic phenomenon in the Caribbean highlights the need to
design new policy interventions, invest signicant resources and fortify international cooperation between governments,
UN agencies, civil society and other key stakeholders to ensure that migration through the Caribbean takes place
in a safe, orderly, regular and humane manner. Aside from the tragic loss of life that occurs on migration routes,
migrant deaths and disappearances also generate a signicant impact on families and friends back home, who, aside
14. MISSING MIGRANTS
from the economic impacts, must cope with the emotional and psychological toll of losing a loved one (IOM, 2021x).
CONCLUSION
67
15. CONCLUSION
This report is one of very few products that exists that comprehensively analyzes data and information throughout the
Caribbean to generate a panorama of migration and mobility into, within and out of the entire region. While only
a starting point, the report has shed light on immense dynamics of emigration which shows no signs of abating
soon. The report has also provided information on the signicant outows of migrants from Caribbean countries
and territories to Northern America and Europe in the past ve-to-ten years which, albeit slowing during the
COVID-19 pandemic, remained high since 2021. In addition to summarizing key points related to the sociodemographic
and labour prole of Caribbean migrants in key destination locations (among other key points, highlighting signicant
degrees of out-migration of highly-educated individuals from the region), the data have also revealed a myriad
of complexities in recent movements of (often) highly vulnerable migrants and refugees from Cuba and Haiti, who have
been frequently identied moving in large numbers through precarious and circuitous routes in the Americas in 2022
and 2023. While presenting useful information on returns and removals oriented in administrative data maintained
and published by key destination countries and regions, this publication has also revealed signicant gaps in the evidence
base on return migration in the Caribbean, pointing to the need for additional research and information collection.
An analysis of data on immigration has revealed that, while the Caribbean is mainly a region of net emigration,
there are large populations of both intraregional immigrants (underpinning the importance of free movement and
mobility in CARICOM and OECS member countries) and extraregional immigrants residing in the region. Inows of
Venezuelan refugees and migrants have had a strong impact on many small island Sates in the region particularly from
2017 onward. As a region highly dependent on travel and tourism, the signicant drop in tourist arrivals registered
in countries and territories throughout the region from 2020 to 2021 has generated signicant negative externalities
on economies, since 2022, the economies have recovered, there are still countries or territories that do not reach the
levels of well-being prior to the pandemic.
Concerningly, sudden-onset and slow-onset environmental hazards and processes show the potential to generate
immense levels of internal and international displacement and migration within the region in the coming decades,
underscoring the need for comprehensive interagency and multi-sectoral disaster risk reduction and response
mechanisms and climate change adaptation strategies at the national, subregional and regional levels in the Caribbean
in order to maximize the benets of migration as an adaptation strategy and minimize any possible negative impacts to
migrants, host communities and Caribbean societies. Finally, as hundreds of cases of deaths and disappearances of migrants
in the Caribbean continue to be identied each year, this tragic phenomenon highlights the need to design new policy
interventions, invest signicant resources and fortify international cooperation between governments, United Nations
agencies, civil society and other key stakeholders to ensure that migration through the Caribbean takes place in a safe,
orderly, regular and humane manner.
68
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Disclaimer PUB: This publication was issued without approval by IOM Publications Unit
Required citation: International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2023. Data report: Trends and characteristics of Caribbean
migration and mobility. San José.
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