The drug policy reform agenda in the Americas

IDPC Brieﬁng Paper

The drug policy reform agenda in the

Americas

(Version 2)

Coletta A Youngers* August 2013

Introduction

Latin America has emerged at the vanguard of

efforts to promote debate on drug policy reform.

For decades, Latin American governments

largely followed the drug control policies and

programs of Washington’s so-called war on

drugs.

Yet two parallel trends have resulted

in a dramatic change in course: the emergence

of left-wing governments that have challenged

Washington’s historic patterns of unilateralism

and interventionism and growing frustration

with the failure of the prohibitionist drug control

model put forward by the US government. In

recent years, the regional debate on drug policy

issues -- long dormant -- has surged as evident

in media coverage, renewed interest on the

part of academia, the emergence of grassroots

initiatives such as the cannabis reform

movement, and perhaps most importantly, calls

for reconsideration of prevailing drug policies

by a range of local and national officials. For

the first time, sitting presidents are questioning

the underlining premises of the international

drug control paradigm and calling for debate

on alternative approaches. Their actions have

had repercussions internationally, as those

presidents have successfully pushed for debate

within the Organization of American States

(OAS) and the United Nations (UN).

At the national level, numerous countries have

implemented or are debating drug policy

reforms. Most significantly, two countries have

boldly challenged the 1961 Single Convention

on Narcotic Drugs. Bolivia is the first country

to denounce and return to the convention

with a reservation, in this case with regards

to coca leaf use within its own territory. And

Uruguay will likely become the first country

in the world with legal, regulated cannabis

markets. On July 31, the Mujica administration’s

proposed legislation won a narrow victory in

Uruguay’s House of Representatives and it

now heads for near-certain approval by the

country’s Senate. If the legislation is approved

as expected, Uruguay will join the U.S. states

of Washington and Colorado, which are also

putting into place regulated cannabis markets.

These developments could encourage other

reform-minded governments to explore similar

initiatives. This historic moment could be

looked back upon as a significant turning point

for cannabis reform efforts in the region and

around the world.

However, the obstacles to drug policy reform

more broadly – at the national, regional and

international levels – loom large. Efforts to

rewrite drug laws in Argentina and Ecuador, for

example, have faced inordinate delays in the

face of opposition from powerful conservative

political forces and some religious sectors.

More often than not, public opinion continues

* Coletta A. Youngers is an IDPC Associate, Senior Fellow at the Washington Ofﬁce on Latin America (WOLA) and member of the research team, Colectivo de

Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD)

to support mano dura, or hardline, approaches

as a result of popular perceptions and fears

that more flexible drug policies will lead to

increased drug use and violence. Such fears

are fanned by sensationalist or biased media

coverage, as well as very real problems of

citizen insecurity and violence in the poor

neighborhoods where illicit drug use tends to

be most prevalent. Regionally, while key Latin

American leaders have spoken out in favor of

reform, many others have remained silent or

wedded to present policy. And internationally,

a key group of countries, including the United

States and Canada, are vociferously opposed to

taking any action outside of the confines of the

existing international drug control conventions.

Yet while drug policy reforms will no doubt

advance slowly, major fissures are evident

in the international drug control architecture

so carefully crafted by the United States and

other countries. Perhaps nowhere is that

more evident than in Latin America. After

analyzing the regional debate, national level

reforms and impediments to those reforms,

this report concludes with concrete policy

recommendations that should be undertaken

to maintain the momentum and advance drug

policy debates and reforms in the region.

The regional debate

At the root of the drug policy debate in

Latin America is growing recognition that

present policies have failed to achieve the

desired objectives, the extremely high costs

of implementing those policies paid by Latin

American countries, and the need to place

higher priority on reducing unacceptably high

levels of violence. Of particular concern is the

spread of organized crime and the resulting

violence, corruption and erosion of democratic

institutions. More than forty years after the

U.S. “war on drugs” was launched, most Latin

American countries face far deeper problems

with drug trafficking. Drug dependency – and

related health and societal consequences

– continues to spread as trafficking routes

multiply, bringing more and more Latin

Americans into contact with illicit substances.

Jails are bursting at the seams with low-level

drug offenders, causing a serious humanitarian

crisis, while ineffective or lax law enforcement

and corruption ensure that few medium or large-

scale traffickers end up behind bars.

As noted,

organized crime has spread its reach across

the region, posing significant challenges to

states characterized by weak law enforcement

and judicial institutions. As succinctly stated

by Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina,

“We have seen that prohibitionism and the war

against drugs have not given the results hoped

for. Quite the opposite, the cartels have grown

in strength, the flow of arms towards Central

America from the north has grown and deaths

in our country have grown. This has forced us to

search for a more appropriate response.”

While discontent with present policy in

Latin America had been bubbling under the

surface for some time, the 2009 launch of the

Latin American Commission on Drugs and

Democracy’s report marked a turning point,

sparking widespread media coverage of the

Commission’s calls for drug policy reform. As

a result, more influential newspapers and

influential individuals came out in support of

drug policy reform. By the launch of the report

of the Global Commission on Drug Policy two

years later, drug policy was front and center on

the regional agenda. However, it is only recently

that ex-presidents have been joined by sitting

presidents, such as Colombia’s Juan Manual

Santos and Guatemalan President Otto Pérez

Molina, in calling for reconsideration of the

prevailing international drug control regime.

Another significant shift in the debate came

when a long taboo subject, legalization, was

put on the table. While President Santos was

the first of those presidents in office today

to call for consideration of drug legalization,

Guatemala’s President Pérez Molina can be

credited with inserting the legalization issue

into the drug policy reform debate – and

Uruguay’s President José Mujica took that

debate one step further with his proposal to

create regulated cannabis markets in that

country. While there has been much media

confusion over the precise meaning of terms

like decriminalization and legalization,

for the

first time the idea of legal, regulated markets

has become part of the regional drug policy

debate. As explained in more detail below, the

Uruguayan government’s proposal to create

legal, regulated markets for cannabis has shown

that viable regulation models are an option and

can be the subject of reasoned debate.

The Organization of American States

Perhaps the most significant turning point,

however, was the outcome of the April

2012 Cartagena summit, where most of the

hemispheres’ presidents gathered in a private,

closed-door meeting at which drug policy

was the only topic discussed. As a result of

that exchange, President Santos announced

that the OAS was being tasked with analyzing

the results of present policy and exploring

alternative approaches. OAS Secretary General

José Miguel Insulza, with the support of OAS

staff from the Secretariat for Multidimensional

Security and the Inter-American Drug Abuse

Control Commission (CICAD), led a two-fold

process. First, six studies were drafted with the

input of a working group composed of CICAD

and other multilateral officials, government

representatives, academics and other experts.

An analytical report, drawing from the six

studies (now annexes to the report), was then

prepared by Secretary Insulza’s office. Second,

two independent organizations, Reos Partners

and the Centro de Liderazgo y Gestión, carried

out a “scenario planning” exercise where a

multidisciplinary team of prominent individuals

constructed a set of four scenarios about

possible future outcomes resulting from the

application of different drug policies, with the

objective of framing regional discussions and

informing strategic decision making at the

national level. These documents were presented

to the presidents of Colombia and Panama

(which is hosting the next hemispheric summit)

on May 17, 2013.

The analytical report, The Drug Problem in

the Americas,

covers a wide range of issues

and viewpoints; however, numerous points

highlighted in the report are groundbreaking

for an initiative by a multilateral organization

and could significantly advance the regional

debate. The OAS report stakes out new territory

by recognizing the harm caused by drug policy

itself and that it is precisely prohibitionist

policies that create the illegal economy that

generates crime, violence and corruption. It

also recognizes that most people consume

drugs recreationally and only a very small

percentage develops a drug dependency. Of

particular significance, a chapter of the report, a

scenario and one of the annexes are dedicated

to legal and regulatory alternatives. They cover

a wide range of material, review the potential

impact of the decriminalization of personal

possession and use, legislation and regulation,

and acknowledge that there are many possible

approaches to making drugs legal.

According to the OAS, neither of the reports is

intended to provide policy recommendations;

nonetheless, the last chapter of the analytical

report, “Contributions to the Debate,” suggests

some useful policy alternatives. The report calls

for drug use to be treated from a public health

perspective, for people who use drugs not to be

criminalized and hence for the decriminalization

of drug consumption. Acknowledging that

those convicted of lesser drug offenses are

incarcerated for extremely long periods of time,

the report suggests national drug law reforms

to ensure proportionality in sentencing and

alternatives to incarceration for low-level drug

offenders. In debunking the “one-size-fits-

all” approach to drug policy, the final chapter

underscores that drug issues need to be

addressed in different ways in different countries

depending on the challenges they face. Hence,

countries should be given the flexibility to

adopt approaches tailored to individual needs.

Finally, two far-reaching policy alternatives

are included at the very end of the last chapter.

First, the report underscores the value of

assessing “existing signals and trends that lead

toward the decriminalization or legalization

of the production, sale and use of marijuana,”

noting that, “Sooner or later decisions in this

area will need to be taken.”

Second, the

report opens the door to convention reform:

“Greater flexibility could lead to the possibility

of amending domestic legislation or promoting

changes to international law.”

For the first time,

a regional multilateral organization has raised

the issue of reform of the international drug

control conventions.

The OAS scenarios report provides an even

more pioneering tool for debating policies and

informing decision-making processes. The

scenarios are stories about what is possible

– what could happen – and are not mutually

exclusive narratives, but rather are meant to be

read together. The four scenarios are entitled

Together, Pathways, Resilience and Disruption.

Of these, Pathways is the most ground-breaking.

It posits that present prohibitionist policies

cause too much harm; the alternative is to

explore and learn from regulatory frameworks,

beginning with cannabis. Both that scenario

and Resilience advocate for a harm reduction

approach. Together, the OAS analytical and

scenarios reports offer a great deal of material

for debate at the local, national, regional and

international level.

Shortly after the release of the OAS reports, the

hemisphere’s foreign ministers came together

at the annual OAS General Assembly meeting

which took place in Antigua, Guatemala from

June 4 to 6, 2013. At the suggestion of the

Guatemalan government, for the first time drug

policy was the thematic focus of a General

Assembly meeting. Drug policy has long been

a taboo topic in official Latin American circles,

given the traditional U.S. dominance in defining

drug policies in the region, so the mere fact that

it was the focus of debate was in and of itself

extremely significant. The debate that did take

place illustrated the growing recognition across

the region that present drug control policies are

not working and that some countries in particular

are paying a high social, economic and political

cost for implementing those policies, hence

the need to consider alternative approaches.

However, the Antigua meeting also showed a

lack of consensus among Latin American and

Caribbean countries on the way forward.

As was to be expected, arduous negotiations

went into the General Assembly’s final

declaration, which is always adopted by

consensus. Much of the original language

proposed by the Guatemalan government was

removed, while more “traditional” language

was added, repeating what can be found in

other OAS and UN drug policy declarations. In

short, the declaration, Toward a Comprehensive

Anti-Drug Policy in the Americas, lost much of

the reform-minded focus intended by the host

country. Nonetheless, it calls for countries to

initiate a multi-layered process of consultation

on drug policy issues in a variety of national

and regional forums, taking into account the

OAS studies just described, and concludes

by entrusting the OAS Permanent Council to

convene a Special Session of the OAS General

Assembly in 2014 to continue discussion of

drug policy issues.

The OAS reports and the

process laid out in Antigua ensure that drug

policy will remain at the top of the hemispheric

agenda for the foreseeable future.

Contrary to what many analysts anticipated,

the OAS has emerged at the forefront of

the regional drug policy debate. As more

progressive governments have taken power in

Latin America, left-wing leaders have created

new regional associations, including the Union

of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the

Community of Latin American and Caribbean

States (CELAC), potentially making the OAS

less relevant. Some expected UNASUR to

play a proactive role in developing alternative

approaches to drug policy. However, while its

South American Council on the World Drug

Problem appeared to get off to a good start,

it has largely replicated the working groups

that presently exist in CICAD, no country is

presently playing a leadership role that could

shape a more reform-oriented approach and

internal differences between countries have

to date stymied reform-oriented action.

Similarly, CELAC – which in contrast to

UNASUR has no formal infrastructure and is

led by foreign ministries – has not developed

a leadership role on the issue, though drug

policy is often included on the agenda of EU-

CELAC meetings and included in subsequent

declarations. The next hemispheric presidential

summit is scheduled to take place in Panama

in 2015; however, it remains unclear whether

or not the issue of Cuba’s participation will

be resolved such that it can move forward. In

short, the regional power dynamics between

these different bodies are still in the process of

being defined, but for the time being the OAS is

taking the lead in moving forward the regional

debate on drug policy issues.

The 2016 UN General Assembly Special

Session on Drugs

Finally, the governments of Colombia,

Guatemala and Mexico were successful in

getting the issue of drug policy reform on the

United Nations’ agenda. At the 2012 UN General

Assembly meeting, those countries issued a

formal statement underscoring the need to

“review the approach” of present drug policies

and called on the United Nations to “exercise its

leadership…and conduct a profound reflection

to analyze all available options, including

regulatory or market measures, in order to

establish a new paradigm that prevents the flow

of resources to groups involved in organized

crime. The statement concludes by asking the

UN to host “an international conference to

allow the necessary decisions to be made in

order to achieve more effective strategies and

tools with which the global community faces the

challenges of drugs and their consequences.”

These sentiments were echoed in the declaration

of the Ibero-American Summit – including all

countries of Latin America, Spain and Portugal

– which took place on November 16 and 17,

2012. Shortly thereafter, it was announced that

a special session of the UN General Assembly

(UNGASS) would be convened in early 2016 on

the “world drug problem.”

The Report of the Third Committee on

International drug control to the General

Assembly states that the UNGASS review will

include “an assessment of the achievements

and challenges in countering the world drug

problem, within the framework of the three

international drug control conventions and other

relevant United Nations instruments (emphasis

added).”

Yet meaningful drug policy reform

ultimately necessitates convention reform

and a key question remains as to whether or

not the issue of convention reform will finally

make it to the negotiating table. A step forward

in that direction was taken when in December

2012 President Santos joined President Pérez

Molina (along with numerous former presidents,

including former U.S. President Jimmy Carter)

in signing the Beckley Foundation Public Letter,

The Global War on Drugs has Failed: It is Time

for a New Approach, which states: “At the root

of current policies lies the 1961 UN Single

Convention on Narcotic Drugs. It is time to re-

examine this treaty which imposes a ‘one-size-

fits-all’ solution, in order to allow individual

countries the freedom to explore drug policies

that better suit their domestic needs.”

The

Beckley Foundation’s report, Roadmaps to

Reforming the UN Drug Conventions, spells

out how the conventions might be amended

in order to allow countries greater flexibility to

experiment with alternative policies.

Whether

or not the United Nations member states are up

to that challenge remains to be seen.

Jockeying has already begun to control the

UNGASS agenda. At this year’s Commission

on Narcotic Drugs (CND) meeting in Vienna,

Austria in March,

a resolution was presented

which would have ensured CND control

over the planning process. Reform-minded

governments were successful in garnering

support for compromise language that refers

to “its” leading role in the preparatory process,

thereby leaving the door open for more actors

to be involved. Reform advocates are proposing

that UN agencies and missions in New York

take the lead in preparing the UNGASS agenda,

with the involvement of a range of agencies in

addition to the CND, such as UNDP, UNAIDS,

WHO, the Human Rights Council and others.

Another crucial question is the role that civil

society organizations will have in the process.

Having launched the UNGASS on drugs, Latin

American leaders have the opportunity to play

a key role in defining its content and outcome.

National-level reforms

Even before drug policy alternatives became

the subject of regional debate, some drug

law reform efforts were already underway.

However, key national level reforms described

below have often floundered due to a range of

political obstacles. Draft legislation pending at

the time of this writing in Brazil, a country that

was among the first to reconsider its drug law,

threatens to set back progress in implementing

harm reduction-oriented reforms. The overall

balance of advancing drug policy reform in

the region over the last few years remains

disappointing and has led some analysts to

conclude that change will more likely come

from below, as has happened in the United

States with regards to cannabis. At the local

level, officials such as Bogota Mayor Gustavo

Petro are forging ahead with innovative harm

reduction-oriented programs designed to

provide access to health services to people who

use drugs and to reduce the violence associated

with the drug trade. An exception to this trend

may be with regards to cannabis. A regional

cannabis reform movement is slowly being

consolidated and significant moment is building

for cannabis law reform. Moreover, the balance

could tip in favor of reforms if the Uruguayan

government is ultimately successful – and all

indications are that it will be – in creating legal,

regulated cannabis markets.

Decriminalizing consumption

The decriminalization of the possession of

small amounts of drugs for personal use in

those countries where it is illegal is one of

the more widely discussed reforms.

In 2006,

Brazil passed a law that partially decriminalized

possession for personal use. Subsequently, in

2008, a Sao Paulo judge ruled that imposing

sanctions for drug possession for personal

use is unconstitutional. In August 2009,

Mexico adopted legislation decriminalizing

the possession of small quantities of drugs for

personal use and mandating the provision of

prevention and treatment programs. Though

the threshold quantities for determining

personal use are problematically low, the law at

least recognizes drug consumption as a public

health – not criminal – matter.

That same month, the Argentine Supreme

Court ruled that imposing criminal sanctions

for the possession of small amounts of drugs

for personal use is unconstitutional; at the

same time, an official commission was drafting

new drug legislation. In 2012, that and various

other legislative proposals were combined into

one law that would decriminalize possession

for personal use, reduce penalties for low-

level drug-related crimes, give judges greater

discretion in determining penalties and

potentially allow the cultivation of cannabis for

personal use. Unfortunately, though a political

consensus was forged in support of the drug

law reform, it was put on hold while a draft law

on national drug treatment policy is debated.

Yet that draft law is advancing very slowly, while

other issues continue to dominate the political

agenda. All indications are that President

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner does not want

to use her dwindling political capital on drug

policy-related issues. With congressional

elections looming in October 2013, it is likely

that any proposed drug-related legislation will

continue to languish for some time. However,

one significant advance has taken place in

Argentina. Two and a half years after its initial

approval, the regulations for implementation

of the National Law on Mental Health were

announced at the end of May 2013. They

include very good provisions on the treatment

of drug dependency from a public health and

human rights perspective.

Particularly noteworthy, upon taking office

Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa adopted

a reform discourse and the country’s new

constitution is the only one in the hemisphere

that declares drug use to be a public health issue.

Article 364 of the 2008 Constitution states:

“Addictions are a public health problem…Under

no circumstances will these be criminalized or

will their constitutional rights be violated.”

Setbacks to reform processes

President Correa also implemented a pardon

of low-level drug offenders which led to the

release of an estimated 2,300 individuals. The

pardon was intended as a temporary measure as

the countries’ drug law was reformed to ensure

proportionality in sentencing (Ecuador has one

of the harshest drug laws in the hemisphere

and it makes no distinction between levels of

involvement in the drug trade, subjecting low-

level offenders to excessively long sentences).

Significant effort went into drafting new drug

legislation as part of a broader criminal penal

code reform effort. However, the proposed

changes to the existing drug law have suffered

steady setbacks as they have gone through

various government revisions (although the

presently pending legislation would improve

proportionality in sentencing). The draft

legislation is now in the hands of the National

Assembly, where members have repeatedly

raised the issue of alleged increases in crime,

violence and drug trafficking in order to toughen

the legislation. It remains to be seen whether or

not President Correa – with elections behind

him and a newly-forged majority in the National

Assembly – will return to his initial discourse of

promoting drug law reform. Incipient indications

that Ecuador may follow in Uruguay’s footsteps

in implementing legal, regulated cannabis

markets are a promising sign.

As noted above, Brazil’s 2006 law removes

prison sentences for possessing small

amounts of drugs for personal use, though it

is still a criminal offense. But because the law

also increased the prison sentences for drug

trafficking without specifying who would qualify

as a trafficker or a drug user, one unintended

consequence of the law was a dramatic increase

in those arrested for street-level dealing. In

response, in 2012 civil society organizations

launched a sophisticated campaign in support

of full decriminalization of drug use.

April 16, 2013, seven former Ministers of

Justice sent a letter

to the head of the federal

Supreme Court requesting it to declare that the

criminalization of possession for personal use

is incompatible with the country’s constitution

(as was previously ruled at the state level). Yet

at the same time, legislation is pending in the

Brazilian Congress that could increase fines

and mandatory education programs for users,

increase mandatory penalties for small-scale

trafficking and potentially institutionalize forced

treatment. The proposed legislation was passed

by the House and is now under consideration in

the Senate.

Guatemala and Colombia initiate reform

processes

On a more positive note, two key presidents who

have been advocating for international reforms

while maintaining hardline drug policies at home

are beginning to talk of domestic-level reforms.

Despite his public support for regulated drug

markets, President Pérez Molina has increased

military involvement in counter-drug activities.

Yet he also commissioned a report from the

UK-based Beckley Foundation on options for

alternative drug policies. Their report, Paths

to Reform, was presented to President Pérez

Molina and his key advisors in January 2013.

Its recommendations include, among other

proposals, decriminalizing possession of all

drugs for personal use; examining the potential

implementation of a legal regulated cannabis

market; clarifying distinctions between

minor and major drug offences and reducing

sentences for non-violent, low-level offenders

(such as drug “mules”); and establishing a

Poppy Commission to examine conversion of

illicit poppy crops to licit cultivation for medicinal

use, ideally for domestic purposes.

With regards to the latter, President Pérez

Molina has said he will consider a proposal to

permit legal poppy cultivation for producing

pain medications, to be used domestically.

(Presently, access to such medications in

Guatemala is extremely limited.) In early

February, the Guatemalan government

announced a record elimination of poppy plants

for the first part of the year. Interestingly, it

also announced that nobody was detained

in the process. According to the Minister

of Government, Mauricio López Bonilla, as

reported by El Periódico, “The destruction,

focused on attacking the product and not

detaining people, was carried out within the

framework of the depenalization model being

promoted by President Otto Pérez.”

The

Guatemalan government is also moving forward

with plans to create a presidential commission

to evaluate current policies and propose

possible reforms, similar to that established in

Colombia (see below).

Perhaps of even greater signiﬁcance, Colombia’s

President Santos – who had previously said that

a new regional and international consensus was

needed in order for reforms to go forward – has

also moved in the direction of domestic-level

reforms. Between 1994 and 2009, possession

of small amounts of marijuana and cocaine for

personal use was not prosecuted in Colombia, due

to a Constitutional Court ruling that states that the

possession of a “minimum dose” of drugs cannot

be penalized when it occurs “in the exercise of

their personal rights…and the defendant did not

affect others.”

After repeated efforts, former

Colombian President Alvaro Uribe was ﬁnally

successful in amending the country’s constitution

in order to allow for the criminalization of the

minimum dose and illicit drug consumption. In

a subsequent citizen security law, an article

was included to eliminate the provision in

the previously existing law allowing for the

minimum dose, thereby codifying the results of

the constitutional change into law. In addition,

shortly after taking ofﬁce the Santos government

circulated a draft of a proposed National Drug Law

which, among other matters, also criminalized

possession for personal use. However, in June

2012, the Constitutional Court ruled on the article

in the citizen security law referred to above, stating

that the constitution does not allow penalizing

consumers (similar rulings on individual cases

were also handed down by the Supreme Court).

Civil society groups and legal experts also played

an important role in providing input into the draft

legislation and advocating for reforms. The draft

drug legislation went through several revisions

and in January 2013, Colombia’s Justice Minister,

Ruth Stella Correa, announced that the revised

drug law to be presented to congress will also

decriminalize possession for personal use of

small amounts of synthetic drugs, such as ecstasy

and methamphetamines, in addition to cocaine

and marijuana which is still allowed under current

law. The proposed legislation would also obligate

municipalities to provide funds for prevention and

treatment programs.

The Justice Minister also announced the

formation of a Drug Policy Commission, which

has a broad mandate to evaluate the drug policies

implemented over the last ten years and make

recommendations for future drug policy. It is to

present a final report by the end of the year. The

draft drug law described above is not expected

to move forward until the commission has made

its recommendations (and with presidential

elections looming in 2014 could very well

be put on hold until after the campaigning).

Particularly interesting is the composition of the

commission which appears intended to ensure

that alternative policies are indeed put forward.

The widely-respected webpage, La Silla Vacia,

refers to it as una commission de ruptura, or a

commission designed to make a break from

the past.

It includes former President César

Gaviria (member of the Global Commission

on Drug Policy), former police General Óscar

Naranjo (now on the drug policy event circuit

expressing some sympathy towards certain

reforms), former Constitutional Court member

Rodrigo Uprimny (a leading reform advocate)

and Universidad de los Andes economic

professor Daniel Mejía Londono (a leading

economist working on drug policy issues), who

chairs the commission. As noted by La Silla

Vacia, President Santos is finally sending a “clear

signal that he intends to align internal policy with

his international discourse.”

On May 21, 2013,

the commission released its first document,

focused on consumption, which recommends

totally decriminalizing consumption, including

for those who commit crimes while under the

influence of illicit substances, and providing

evidence-based treatment programs for people

dependent on drugs.

Drug policy is also on the agenda of the

negotiations between the Colombian

government and the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia (FARC); it is the second

to last agenda item and sub-items include

alternative/economic development, prevention

and public health, and addressing the problem

of production and trafficking. Also according

to La Silla Vacía, the last draft of the proposed

National Drug Law that it obtained in March

of this year includes numerous proposals that

coincide to a certain extent with those put

forward by the FARC. In the context of the

negotiations on rural development, the FARC

has called for economic development in coca

growing regions; an end to the criminalization

and persecution of those communities; an

immediate and definitive end to aerial spraying

and other forms of eradication; the legalization

of coca, poppy and marijuana cultivation for

therapeutic and medicinal purposes, industrial

use or cultural purposes; and the reorientation

of land use towards sustainable agricultural

production. La Silla Vacía reports that the

Colombian government’s draft drug law

also allows for some legal cultivation for licit

uses, restricts aerial spraying, and promotes

voluntary manual coca reduction. It would also

create mechanisms such that coca producers

who voluntarily participate in coca eradication

would not be held criminally liable for having

cultivated coca, which is presently illegal in

Colombia.

Agreement in the negotiations

on certain basic principles related to coca

cultivation could result in a significant turning

point in Colombian drug policy, which has long

been the US poster child for criminalization of

coca growers and forced eradication.

Finally, Bogota mayor Gustavo Petro is playing

a significant role in advancing a public health

focus in the drug policy debate in Colombia,

implementing a novel program, the Medical

Care Center for Dependent Drug Users (Centos

de Atención Médica a Drogodependientes), or

CAMAD.

Launched in September 2012, the

CAMAD is a pilot project focused primarily on

the use of bazuco, or cocaine base, in the Bronx,

an extremely poor neighborhood of Bogota

where homeless people are concentrated and

drug use, trafficking and violence proliferate.

An estimated 7,500 bazuco users – who often

panhandle or commit crimes to support their

habit - and 9,500 homeless people are in

the Bronx.

The CAMAD began as a mobile

medical care center staffed by psychiatrists,

psychologists, doctors and nurses that refers

dependent drug users to detoxification and

rehabilitation treatment. The next phase of

the project is a program to reduce bazuco

consumption by replacing it with marijuana and

possibly coca, in order to reduce the anxiety

caused both by consuming bazuco and in

trying to get off the drug. In addition to weaning

patients off drugs, the idea is to eliminate the

violence associated with bazuco consumption.

Initially, a small group of people dependent on

drugs from the Bronx who are already receiving

assistance from the CAMAD will undertake an

8-month program that also includes counseling,

job training and other services. According to

the Director of Acción Técnica Social, Julián

Andrés Quintero, ‘This project is not aimed

at getting people to quit using. This is about

reducing the risks and mitigating the damage.

We want people to quit a substance that is very,

very damaging and transition to something

less dangerous and which will allow them to

function in society.’

If successful, the presently

controversial program will be expanded.

The cannabis reform movement

The most radical reform presently under

discussion in the region has come from the

Uruguayan government, which on June 20,

2012 unveiled a proposal that, if adopted by

the country’s legislature, would create legal,

government-controlled markets for cannabis,

as part of a broader strategy to promote

a public health-oriented drug policy and

separate the marijuana market from the far

more dangerous paco market. (Though there

are a variety of theories about what paco is and

it appears that production varies depending on

where it is produced, paco is usually described

as being produced from the refuse in making

cocaine mixed with various solvents. Its use is

highly addictive and damaging.) In regulating

cannabis, the government intends to prevent

people who use cannabis from exposure to

more dangerous drugs when purchasing on the

black market and free up resources to focus on

more harmful substances. The government’s

proposal has received significant support from

a civil society platform called Responsible

Regulation, which has carried out a public

education and media campaign. In a visit to

Uruguay the week before the vote in the lower

House, OAS Secretary General José Miguel

Insulza lent his political clout to the debate,

personally endorsing the proposal.

If adopted by the Senate as expected, the

legislation approved on July 31 in the House

of Representatives will legalize and regulate

the entire cannabis production and distribution

chain. It will allow individuals to cultivate up to

six plants in their homes. It will also allow for

the creation of cannabis clubs, cooperatives

of between 15 and 45 members allowed to

collectively cultivate up to 99 plants. Finally, the

bill will allow the government to grant licenses

to private businesses to grow cannabis, which

will be purchased exclusively by the state

and sold in pharmacies. A new government

office, the Institute of Regulation and Control

of Cannabis, will be created to implement the

legislation. The highly-regulated market will

include strict age limits, electronic controls

limiting the amount purchased per month (up to

40 grams per person per month), and prohibit

public use or purchase by non-Uruguayan

citizens. All other forms of cannabis cultivation,

distribution, sale and cross-border trafficking

will remain illegal.

The legislation faced its biggest hurdle in the

lower House, where it squeaked by with 50

votes out of the 96 lawmakers present. It is

expected to face less opposition in the Senate,

where it will come up for a vote in the coming

months. It is possible that the Senate will make

changes that will need to be re-approved by

the House, but local analysts predict it will be

signed into law by President José Mujica, who

has championed the legislation, by October

2013. At that point, Uruguay will become the

only country in the world where cannabis can be

cultivated, sold and consumed legally (even in

Holland production remains illegal, though the

purchase and consumption of small amounts of

cannabis in coffee shops is tolerated).

Prior to the government’s announcement

of its intention to legally regulate cannabis,

legislation was already pending in Uruguay that

would allow for auto-cultivo, the cultivation of

cannabis for personal use – and it appeared

to have a very good chances of congressional

approval. As noted, Argentina is contemplating

similar action and there is also a movement in

Brazil to allow for the cultivation of marijuana

for personal use. In countries where full-scale

regulated markets are not politically viable,

auto-cultivo may be a reasonable alternative.

Congressional initiatives to legally regulate the

cannabis market have also been introduced

in Chile and Mexico and as noted, the Correa

government in Ecuador has also indicated that

it might consider a similar reform. While in

Mexico the proposal has little, if any, chance

of being approved at the national level, it

has gained momentum in Mexico City. The

legislative assembly of the Federal District of

Mexico, where the nation’s capital is located,

is seriously considering one such proposal. In

August 2013, the local legislature will carry out

a series of forums for legislators and officials

on the topic, in coordination with CUPIHD and

UNODC. The Federal District faces a similar

situation as that of the U.S. states that have

approved legal, regulated cannabis markets:

federal laws prohibiting drugs use, production

and sale remain firmly entrenched while

local governments begin to experiment with

alternative approaches. Local analysts believe

that the cannabis regulation initiative has a

good chance of moving forward in Mexico City.

Proponents of creating legal, regulated

cannabis markets point out that it poses

comparatively smaller risks than many other

substances (including legal drugs) and yet the

prohibitionist approach causes enormous harm

to those caught up in the criminal justice system.

More tolerant attitudes towards cannabis use in

many countries – including the United States

– suggest that sooner or later, more and more

countries will begin the shift toward legal,

regulated markets.

Nowhere is this trend clearer than in the

United States, and Uruguay and other Latin

American countries are closely watching

Colorado and Washington. In the November

2012 U.S. elections, in the state of Washington

55.4 percent voted to “legalize the production,

distribution and possession of marijuana, and

establish regulations.” A similar initiative

passed in Colorado with 54.8 percent of the

vote. In both cases, possession for personal

use is now legal and ultimately cannabis will

be sold at state-licensed stores. The Colorado

initiative also allows individuals to cultivate up

to six plants. Washington’s 66-page regulatory

proposal was carefully written to stand up to

federal pressure.

The Obama administration faces a political

conundrum as it defines its response to the

cannabis legalization initiatives approved in

Washington and Colorado, which pit state law

against federal law. (The federal Controlled

Substances Act prohibits the production,

sale and possession of marijuana.) A range

of policy tools are at its disposal, including

stepping up Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA) enforcement activities, taking action in

the courts, or threatening to seize marijuana

tax revenues. An April 2012 report by the

Brookings Institution and the Washington

Office on Latin America argues that a more

appropriate response would be for the U.S.

Justice Department to “use its considerable

leverage to ensure that state regulators protect

the federal government’s interests in minimizing

exports across state lines, sales outside the

state-regulated system, sales of unduly large

quantities, sales of adulterated products, sales

to minors, organized crime involvement, and

other abuses.”

Upon taking office, President Obama initially

promised to respect state laws on medical

marijuana. However, the DEA publicly expressed

opposition to that position and over time has

significantly increased its raids of medical

marijuana facilities. The DEA is part of the

Department of Justice and hence should follow

White House directives; however, in this case it

appears that there was no attempt on the part of

the White House to object or attempt to reign in

the DEA. Two years ago when California voted

on Proposition 19, which would have legally

regulated marijuana, Attorney General Eric

Holder spoke out forcefully against it. This year,

however, the Justice Department remained

silent prior to the voting in Washington and

Colorado. (Some speculate that was because

Colorado was a battle-ground state and Obama

needed the youth vote.) Since the elections,

officials have made only broad statements

that they are reviewing the situation and that

drug enforcement policy has not changed. In

December when asked about recreational

marijuana users in the states where it has

been legalized, President Obama responded,

“We’ve got bigger fish to fry.”

U.S. Attorney

General Eric Holder has only said that he has

had “good conversations” with elected leaders

in Washington and Colorado; at the time of

this writing he has yet to provide any more

details on the administration’s response. Some

analysts think that Justice Department officials

are waiting for more details on the proposed

regulatory frameworks before reacting.

Such prudence is warranted given the broad

popular support received in each state – and

given the clear trend in the United States

towards relaxing marijuana laws. Polls now

show that more than half of all Americans

support some form of legalization. Sixteen

U.S. states have decriminalized marijuana use,

20 states and the District of Colombia have

legalized marijuana for medical use, and two

states are in the process of implementing legal,

regulated markets. Six states have marijuana

legalization bills pending and three more are

likely to join them soon. At least two more

states, including California, are likely to have

referendums to legalize marijuana in the next

presidential elections in 2016.

And legislation

has been introduced in the U.S. Congress to

legalize cannabis at the federal level, though it

has little chance of passing anytime soon.

The inconsistency in the United States’ situation

– with the federal government advocating for

strict prohibition while more and more states

move in the direction of relaxing cannabis

laws – has not been lost on Latin America. In

public comments immediately following the

U.S. elections, Luis Videgaray, who at the time

was leading Mexican President Enrique Peña

Nieto’s transition team, called the vote a game-

changer, stating that “Obviously we can’t handle

a product that is illegal in Mexico, trying to stop

its transfer to the United States, when in…at

least part of the United States it has a different

status.”

At the Davos meeting in January

2013, the governments of Costa Rica, Mexico

and Colombia announced that they were

initiating talks with U.S. officials to prepare

for the legalization of marijuana in Colorado

and Washington. These developments further

erode U.S. credibility in the regional drug

policy debate, providing more political space

for those countries like Uruguay, Guatemala

and Colombia that are advocating for national,

regional and international drug policy reform.

Coca and the conventions

The fact that the United States, one of the

primary architects of the international drug

control conventions, is now in violation of those

conventions has also not been lost on the

Bolivian government. The 1961 Convention

mistakenly classifies the coca leaf – which has

been consumed in its natural state for centuries

by indigenous peoples in the Andean region of

South America – as a dangerous narcotic, along

with cocaine. Yet Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution

(Article 384) states: “The State shall protect

native and ancestral coca as cultural patrimony,

a renewable natural resource of Bolivia’s

biodiversity, and as a factor of social cohesion;

in its natural state it is not a narcotic. Its

revaluing, production, commercialization, and

industrialization shall be regulated by law.” The

Constitution allowed for a period of four years

for the government to “denounce and, in that

case, renegotiate the international treaties

that may be contrary to the constitution.” In

other words, Bolivia had to reconcile its new

constitution with its international obligations.

As a first, more modest effort, the government of

Bolivia sought to amend the Single Convention

by deleting its provision requiring that “coca

leaf chewing must be abolished” within 25

years (Article 49), a period that ended in 1989.

Without any objections, Bolivia’s request would

have been approved automatically. But the

U.S. government organized a “friends of the

convention” group that led to 18 countries

objecting to Bolivia’s request. In response, the

Bolivian government took more drastic action.

In June 2011, the Plurinational State of Bolivia

withdrew from the 1961 Convention on Narcotic

Drugs as amended by the 1972 Protocol with the

intention to re-adhere with a new reservation

allowing for the traditional uses of the coca leaf

in its territory. In order to block Bolivia’s return

to the Single Convention, one-third or more of

the 184 UN treaty members would have had

to formally object by January 10, 2013. Bolivia

launched a diplomatic campaign to secure

support and gained an important victory at

the November 2012 Ibero-American Summit

held in Cádiz, Spain. At that summit, a special

communiqué was adopted on the traditional

use of coca chewing in which the presidents

unanimously stated:

Conscious of the importance of

conserving the ancestral and cultural

practices of indigenous peoples, in

the framework of respect for human

rights and the fundamental rights of

indigenous peoples, in accordance

with international instrument … We

recognize that the traditional use of

coca chewing (akulliku) of the coca leaf

is a cultural and ancestral manifestation

of the people of Bolivia and Peru and

should be respected by the international

community.

In other words, Bolivia gained at least tacit

support from all Latin American countries, as

well as Spain and Portugal, for eliminating

the international stigma presently—and

erroneously—associated with the coca leaf.

By the January 10 deadline, only 15 countries

had formally objected.

Bolivia is now again

a party to the Single Convention, having won

a significant victory in its efforts to right the

historic wrong in the classification of the coca

leaf as a dangerous narcotic. Bolivia is the first

country to ever denounce the 1961 Convention

and then re-accede with a reservation (though

other countries included reservations with their

original adoption of the convention) However,

the right to traditional uses of the coca leaf only

pertains to Bolivia; the exportation and use of

coca leaf internationally remains prohibited.

Impediments to reform

Despite these promising signs, the response

by other Latin American governments to the

Bolivian and Uruguayan initiatives illustrate

the myriad of political and other obstacles to

drug policy reform in the region – and beyond.

Although Bolivia secured recognition of the

licit uses of the coca leaf at the Ibero-American

summit in Cádiz in November 2012, Mexico

broke ranks and was the only Latin American

country to oppose Bolivia’s re-entry to the

1961 Convention. Countries around the region

initially criticized Uruguay’s actions. Perhaps the

toughest condemnation came from Colombia’s

President Santos, who – at the time the proposal

was announced – reiterated his assertion that

national reforms should only be implemented

after a new international consensus is reached.

At the November 2012 bi-annual meeting of

the OAS’s CICAD, following a presentation on

the Uruguayan government’s cannabis initiative

only one country offered concrete support,

Guatemala. However, the reference to regulated

markets for cannabis in the OAS report, as well

as the Pathways scenario, and OAS Secretary

General’s personal endorsement of the

Uruguayan plan for regulated cannabis markets

may blunt any such criticism in the future.

Efforts by Guatemalan President Otto Pérez

Molina to create a united front among Central

American countries in favor of drug policy reform

have failed to bear fruit. Prior to the Cartagena

summit, Guatemalan President Pérez Molina

invited Central American presidents to attend a

regional summit to shape a joint position on drug

policy alternatives. In response, U.S. officials

went on a ‘charm offensive’ in Central America

sending more U.S. officials to the region in a

one month period than at any time in recent

history, including Vice President Joe Biden,

Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano,

then-Under Secretary of State Maria Otero and

the State Department’s top drug official, William

Brownfield. The effort paid off: Though all of

the Central American presidents had initially

accepted the invitation, the presidents of El

Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua dropped out

at the last minute – no doubt due at least in part

to U.S. pressure. Costa Rican president Laura

Chinchilla did attend the summit and initially

adopted a more reform-oriented discourse,

at least for an international audience. But as

her popularity has plummeted and popular

concerns about crime and drug trafficking have

grown, she too has adopted a hardline approach,

proposing “looser wiretapping laws, easier

confiscation of suspect assets and quicker

approval of U.S. warships docking in Costa

Rican ports. President Laura Chinchilla also

wants to drop a longstanding ban on extraditing

Costa Ricans for prosecution.”

As noted above and as evident in Costa Rica,

governments often face pressure from media

and some political sectors to maintain “tough”

drug policies. Both foment popular perceptions

and fears that more flexible drug laws will lead

to increased drug use and violence. As has long

been the case in the United States, politicians

often fear that they have a lot to lose and little

to gain in promoting alternative drug policies. In

contrast to shifting public opinion in the United

States on cannabis legalization, public opinion

in Latin America by and large remains in favor

of prohibitionist and mano dura approaches.

Improved and more informed media coverage

and public education is needed to promote an

evidence-based debate on drug policy and drug

policy alternatives in the region.

In short, while key Latin American countries have

spoken out in favor of reform, many others have

remained silent or remain closely allied with the

United States and Canada, strong defenders of

the prevailing drug control paradigm. Countries

with leftwing governments that have played a

leading role in creating Latin American policies

and positions independent from Washington –

such as Brazil and Venezuela – have failed to

advocate for regional or international drug policy

reforms and often resist efforts to promote

more debate. (Indeed, the strongest advocates

of reform, Presidents Santos and Pérez Molina,

come from conservative political backgrounds

and Pérez Molina, a retired general, faces

troubling allegations of responsibility for human

rights violations.) Since taking office in late 2012,

Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has

not yet shown an inclination to join Presidents

Santos and Pérez Molina in advocating for an

international debate on drug policy alternatives,

as his predecessor, Felipe Calderón, ultimately

did. In Latin America, the scale remains tipped

towards those governments supporting the

status quo.

Continued Militarization

For its part, Washington largely continues on

auto-pilot when it comes to the implementation

of drug control programs in Latin America.

response to the growing drug policy debate in

Latin America, US officials have made clear their

willingness to discuss any policies – as long

as they fall within the confines of the existing

conventions. This approach has continued into

President Obama’s second mandate. To their

credit, since taking office President Obama and

the Director of National Drug Control Policy, Gil

Kerlikowske, have refrained from using “drug

war” rhetoric and have focused much more on

the issue of U.S. demand for illicit drugs, publicly

recognizing the U.S. role in stimulating illicit

drug trafficking. The change in tone was evident

in President Obama’s recent visit to Mexico and

Costa Rica where, following Mexican President

Peña Nieto’s lead, he focused on economic

development and trade issues, downplaying

security concerns.

Yet despite the Obama Administration’s change

in rhetoric, in reality the U.S. “war on drugs”

continues to be waged across the region. On

any given day, 4,000 US troops are deployed

across Latin America on counter-drug missions.

In addition, as many as four U.S. Navy ships

are on patrol, U.S. pilots are clocking tens

of thousands of hours per year flying drug-

control missions and agents from at least 10

U.S. agencies are involved in training and other

drug control activities in the region.

As Plan

Colombia and the Merida Initiative in Mexico

wind down, U.S. attention has steadily shifted

to Central America. U.S. sources report that

an estimated 80 percent of the cocaine bound

for the United States now passes through the

isthmus. U.S. drug control assistance to Central

American security forces has steadily increased

through the Central American Regional Security

Initiative (CARSI). A variety of U.S. agencies

are now on the ground in Central America;

in Guatemala, U.S. marines have trained the

feared Kaibiles special forces unit, while the

DEA’s Foreign-Deployed Advisory Support

teams (FAST) accompany Honduran forces on

anti-drug missions and in the process have been

implicated in various killings.

In 2011, the U.S.

Defense Department trained more than 300

Honduran military personnel and spent nearly

US$90 million to maintain Joint Task Force

Bravo, the 600-member U.S. unit stationed at

the Soto Cano Air Base.

Yet the dangers loom

large of further militarization in a region with a

tragic history of U.S. intervention and internal

conflict, violence and extremely weak and often

corrupt institutions.

The ruling Conservative party in Canada

has also stepped up its military assistance

for counter-drug efforts in Central America.

Since 2006, Canadian forces have joined with

other countries in an unprecedented increase

in military involvement in drug interdiction

in Latin America.

Though the Canadian

government has long participated in naval

operations in the Caribbean and has provided

radar and reconnaissance patrol aircraft to

countries in the region, the commander of

Canada’s operational forces, Lt.-Gen. Stuart

Beare, recently announced stepped-up efforts

in Central America and the Caribbean. “We’re

staying connected in the hemisphere, in

particular, in capacity-building partners in the

Caribbean Basin, sustaining a great effort with

Jamaica, reaching into Belize and Guatemala,

helping them to build their own capacity, to

manage their own security forces and security

conditions,” he told the CBC. Canada now has

a “forward-deployed operational staging center”

in Jamaica and is training its troops in jungle

warfare in Belize, as it provides military support

to that country.

Canada also participates in ongoing counter-

narcotics missions in the Caribbean Sea and

the eastern Pacific. Canadian warships and

aircraft have acted as eyes and ears for the

U.S.-led Joint Interagency Task Force – South

(JIATF-S) to prevent transport of drugs and

money by air and sea between South America,

Central America, the Caribbean islands and

North America.

Canadian military aircraft and

warships have been involved in interdiction

efforts in the Caribbean Sea including assisting

the U.S. Coastguard to board vessels and

seize illegal drugs. Canadian military aircraft

have been involved in surveillance sorties

in the region.

Canada also participates in

Operation Martillo, a multilateral counter-drug

interdiction effort in the Caribbean Basin led by

the United States, through Operation CARIBBE,

which provides Canadian ships and aircrafts to

the multilateral initiative.

These moves are

consistent with Canada’s recent objections to

Bolivia’s reservation on the coca leaf and its

return to the 1961 Convention, as well as its

opposition to the UNGASS 2016 debate on

global drug policy.

For Central American governments and peoples,

a fundamental concern is the potential for

drug trafficking and organized crime to further

exacerbate the region’s high levels of crime

and violence. Crucial to mitigating the corrosive

impact of drug trafficking and other forms of

crime are solid institutions, particularly Central

American judiciary and police forces, which

remain among the weakest in the hemisphere.

Yet institutional reform and institution-building

are medium to long-term strategies. In the

short term, viable strategies to reduce crime

and violence and needed in order to give

governments the space they need to pursue a

longer-term reform agenda. More promising

options are focused-deterrence and selective

targeting strategies, which have shown some

success in reducing violent crime in numerous

locations in the United States. According to

Vanda Felbab-Brown, these strategies “seek

to minimize the most pernicious behavior of

criminal groups, such as engaging in violence, or

to maximize certain kinds of desirable behavior

sometimes exhibited by criminals…”

In other

words, enforcement efforts are designed to

shape criminal behavior in ways that, in this case,

discourage violence. For example, police can

clearly communicate that they will target those

criminal groups that engage in the most violent

behavior and act accordingly. While the amount

of illicit drugs available will not necessarily be

impacted, homicides and other violent crimes

should decline.

Policy recommendations

Meaningful drug policy reform will no doubt be a

long and messy process, yet demands for reform

are steadily growing across the hemisphere.

Latin American leaders have played a key role

in advancing regional and international drug

control debates and some countries, such as

Bolivia and Uruguay, are moving forward with

significant reforms. Numerous efforts could

and should be undertaken to maintain the

momentum and advance drug policy debates

and reforms:

• President Obama should allow Colorado and

Washington to implement the referendums

approved by the citizens in those states and

should participate constructively in the drug

policy debate at home and abroad; in the

least, the U.S. and Canadian governments

should show greater tolerance for the drug

policy debate that has blossomed across

Latin America.

• As the drug policy debate continues,

there are a series of reforms that can be

undertaken now by countries that are in-line

with the flexibility allowed by the conventions.

Of these, perhaps the most significant are

the decriminalization of possession of small

amounts of drugs for personal consumption;

drug law reform to ensure proportionality in

sentencing and alternatives to incarceration

for those convicted of low-level, non-

violent drug offenses; and the expansion

of evidence-based treatment services for

people dependent on drugs, which remain

woefully inadequate across the region.

• In Central American and other countries

facing high levels of violence, law

enforcement agencies should consider

adopting focused-deterrence and selective

targeting strategies aimed at reducing

violence and promoting development,

rather than simply focusing on attempts to

stifle the flow of drugs to the United States

and Europe.

• Countries across the region should support

the efforts of the government of Uruguay

to create legal, regulated markets for

cannabis. Countries should be given the

flexibility to experiment with and implement

policies that are appropriate for their

national realities. In addition, much could

be learned from the Uruguayan experience

about basic questions such as how to

implement regulatory frameworks that

avoid, or limit, parallel black markets and

the impact of creating legal, regulated

markets on the consumption of cannabis,

other drugs and alcohol.

• Bolivia’s experience to gain international

acceptance for the use of the coca leaf in

its natural form points to the need for the

modernization and revision of the existing

international drug control conventions.

On the coca issue, the WHO should

undertake a review of the coca leaf and

consider the possibility to remove it from

Schedule I of the 1961 Single Convention

on Narcotic Drugs. More broadly, serious

convention reform is needed to make them

“fit for purpose” and the 2016 UNGASS on

Drugs provides an ideal forum for initiating

that process.

• Having launched the 2016 UNGASS on

drugs, Latin American leaders should take

advantage of the opportunity, through their

foreign ministries and missions in New York

and Vienna, to play a key role in defining its

content, ensuring that it maintains a reform-

oriented focus.

• Latin American governments and civil

society organizations should organize

forums for debating the OAS analytical

and scenarios reports at the local and

national level. They should ensure an active

debate on drug policy issues at regional

forums, including the Meeting of Ministers

Responsible for Public Security in the

Americas, to be held in Medellin, Colombia

in November 2013, and the next bi-annual

CICAD meeting also to be held in Colombia

in December 2013. These should lay the

groundwork for the 2014 OAS General

Assembly Special Session focusing on

drug policy, which should be structured to

ensure a serious, informed debate and to

allow the hemisphere’s foreign ministers to

come to consensus on at least initial drug

policy reforms.

Endnotes

1 For more information, see: Youngers, C. & Rosin, E. (2005

eds.), Drugs and democracy in Latin America: The impact of

U.S. policy (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.)

2 For more information, see: Metaal, P. & Youngers, A. (2011

eds.), Systems overload: Drug laws and prisons in Latin

America (Transnational Institute & Washington Ofﬁce on

Latin America), http://www.wola.org/publications/systems_

overload_drug_laws_and_prisons_in_latin_america_0

3 “Guatemala’s president (22 January 2013), ‘My country bears

the scars from the war on drugs’, The Guardian, http://www.

guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/19/otto-molina-war-drugs-

guatemala

4 Decriminalization refers to removing criminal sanctions or

penalties and most often is in reference to carrying small

amounts of drugs for personal use. Legalization usually

refers to removing criminal sanctions for consumption,

production and trafﬁcking. In a legal regulation framework,

the production, distribution and consumption of drugs are no

longer considered illicit, but are subject to a regulated system

(e.g. the regulatory system applied for tobacco, alcohol or

medicines).

5 The analytical and scenarios reports can both be found

at: http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.

asp?sCodigo=E-261/13

6 Organization of American States (2013), The Drug Problem in

the Americas, p. 104.

7 Ibid.

8 For additional analysis of the OAS reports, see: International

Drug Policy Consortium (July 2013), IDPC Advocacy Note,

Launching the Debate: The OAS Reports on Hemispheric Drug

Policy, http://idpc.net/publications/2013/07/idpc-advocacy-

note-launching-the-debate-the-oas-reports-on-hemispheric-

drug-policy

9 For more analysis on the Antigua meeting and ﬁnal declaration,

see: http://idpc.net/blog/2013/06/latin-american-leaders-

chart-course-for-drug-policy-debate

10 For more information, see: Velasco, C.A. (March 2013),

El Consejo Suramericano sobre el Problema Mundial de

las Drogas de la UNASUR, logros y desafíos 2012-2013

(International Drug Policy Consortium), http://idpc.net/

es/publications/2013/03/informe-del-idpc-el-consejo-

suramericano-sobre-el-problema-mundial-de-las-drogas-de-

la-unasur-logros-y-desaﬁos-2012-2013

11 Declaración conjunta de los Gobiernos de Colombia,

Guatemala y México (1 October 2012)

12 United Nations General Assembly (4 December 2012),

International Drug Control, Report of the Third Committee,

Sixty-seventh session, Agenda item 104, A/67/459

13 See: http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/public-letter/

14 See: Beckley Foundation (2012), Roadmaps to reforming the

UN drug conventions, http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/

Roadmaps-to-Reform.pdf

15 See: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/

session/56.html

16 A report by WOLA and the Transnational Institute ﬁnds that

a signiﬁcant number of those incarcerated for drug offenses

are consumers – even in countries where possession of drugs

for personal use is not a crime. See: Metaal, P. & Youngers,

A. (2011 eds.), Systems overload: Drug laws and prisons in

Latin America (Transnational Institute & Washington Ofﬁce on

Latin America), http://www.wola.org/publications/systems_

overload_drug_laws_and_prisons_in_latin_america_0

17 Viva Rio (12 July 2012), Viva Rio launches campaign to

change drug law in Brazil, http://vivario.org.br/en/viva-rio-

launches-campaign-to-change-drug-law-in-brazil/

18 Viva Rio (24 April 2013), Criminalizing the drug user is

unconstitutional, http://vivario.org.br/en/criminalizing-the-

drug-user-is-unconstitutional/

19 See: Fielding, A. & Giacomello, C. (2013), Paths for reform –

Proposed options for alternative drug policies in Guatemala

(The Beckley Foundation), http://www.beckleyfoundation.

org/paths-for-reform

20 Prensa Libre (27 February 2013), Otto Pérez Molina retoma

impulso a regulación de droga, http://www.prensalibre.

com/noticias/politica/Perez-retoma-impulso-regulacion-

droga_0_853114711.html

21 Boche, E. (6 February 2013), Gobierno reporta incautación

record de amapola, sin capturas, http://www.elperiodico.

com.gt/es/20130206/pais/224375/

22 Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-221/94, Despenalización

del Consumo de la Dosis Personal, Bogotá, 5 de mayo de

1994

23 El Tiempo (29 January 2013), Se podrían cargar tres

pastillas de droga sintética, http://m.eltiempo.com/justicia/

detalles-de-proyecto-para-combatir-las-drogas/12562861

24 La Silla Vacía (30 January 2013), Santos comienza a

aterrizar su discurso internacional sobre drogas, http://

www.lasillavacia.com/historia/santos-comienza-aterrizar-su-

discurso-internacional-sobre-las-drogas-41218

25 Ibid

26 La Silla Vacía (5 February 2013), Así encajaría el Estatuto de

Drogas del Gobierno con propuestas de Farc, http://www.

lasillavacia.com/historia/asi-encajaria-el-estatuto-de-drogas-

del-gobierno-con-propuestas-de-farc-41328

27 For more information, see: Quintero, J. (22 November

2012), Bogotás medical care centres for drug addicts

(CAMAD), Series on legislative reform of drug policy

No. 22 (Transnational Institute), http://idpc.net/

publications/2012/12/bogota-s-medical-care-centres-for-

drug-addicts-camad

28 Wyss, J. (7 May 2013), ‘Colombia’s capital banks on marijuana

cure for hard drug addicts’, The Miami Herald, http://www.

miamiherald.com/2013/05/07/v-fullstory/3385818/

colombias-capital-banks-on-marijuana.html

29 Quoted in Wyss, ibid

30 For additional analysis, see: Ramsey, G. (25 July 2013),

‘Uruguay is pushing to legalize marijuana’, InSight Crime,

http://www.insightcrime.org/uruguay-legalization-drugs/

uruguay-marijuana-bill-faces-political-economic-obstacles

31 Taylor, S. Jr. (April 2012), Marijuana policy and presidential

leadership: How to avoid a federal-state train wreck

(Brookings Institution & Washington Ofﬁce on Latin

America), pp. 2-3, http://www.brookings.edu/research/

papers/2013/04/11-marijuana-policy-taylor

32 Dwyer, D. (14 December 2012), ‘Marijuana not high Obama

priority’, ABC News

33 The Seattle Times (6 March 2013), ‘Holder says little about

states’ pot laws; supporters buoyed’

34 For more information, see: http://www.mpp.org/

35 Castillo, E.E. & Weissenstein, M. (12 November 2012),

‘Leaders in Latin America call for review of drug policy after 2

U.S. states vote to legalize marijuana’, The Associated Press

36 For more information see: International Drug Policy

Consortium (July 2011), IDPC advocacy note – Bolivia’s legal

reconciliation with the UN Single Convention on Narcotic

Drugs, http://idpc.net/publications/2011/07/idpc-advocacy-

note-bolivia-withdraws-from-1961-convention

37 These were: Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,

Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Russian

Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland and the United States

38 Weissentstein, M (18 February 2013), ‘Costa Rica toughens

stance in US-backed drug ﬁght’, Associated Press, http://

www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10665377

39 Youngers, C.A. (April 2011), The Obama Administration’s drug

control policy on auto-pilot (London: International Drug Policy

Consortium), http://idpc.net/publications/2011/04/obama-

administration-drug-policy-on-auto-pilot

40 Lopez, D., Burke, G., Bajak, F. & Arce, A. (3 February

2013), ‘U.S. military expands its drug war in Latin America’,

Associated Press, http://www.usatoday.com/story/

news/world/2013/02/03/us-expands-drug-war-latin-

america/1887481/

41 Bird, A. & Main, A. (August 2012), Collateral damage of a drug

war: The May 11 killings in Ahuas and the impact of the U.S.

war on drugs in Moskitia, Honduras (Center for Economic

and Policy Research & Rights Action), http://www.cepr.net/

documents/publications/honduras-2012-08.pdf

42 Lopez, D., Burke, G., Bajak, F. & Arce, A. (3 February

2013), ‘U.S. military expands its drug war in Latin America’,

Associated Press, http://www.usatoday.com/story/

news/world/2013/02/03/us-expands-drug-war-latin-

america/1887481/

43 For more information, see: Carter, C. (February 2013),

Brieﬁng note on Canada and the war on drugs in Latin

America (Canadian Drug Policy Coalition)

44 Cudmore, J. (2 February 2013), ‘War on drugs draws

Canadian military focus in Central America’, CBC News,

http://www.hufﬁngtonpost.ca/2013/02/02/war-on-drugs-

canada-military_n_2605082.html

45 Forget, P. (2011), ‘Law enforcement detachments and the

Canadian navy: A new counter-drug capability’, Canadian

Naval Review, 7(2): 6-11

46 Government of Canada (2012), National defense and the

Canadian forces: Operation Caribbe, http://www.cjoc.forces.

gc.ca/cont/caribbe/index-eng.asp

47 Government of Canada (2012), National defense and the

Canadian forces: Operation Caribbe, http://www.cjoc.forces.

gc.ca/cont/caribbe/index-eng.asp

48 Blickman, T. (2013), Objections to Bolivia’s reservation to

allow coca chewing in the UN Conventions (Transnational

Institute: Drug Law Reform in Latin America), http://

druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/4245-objections-

to-bolivias-reservation-to-allow-coca-chewing-in-the-un-

conventions; Mexican Foreign Ministry (27 November 2012),

The UN General Assembly approves resolution presented by

Mexico on international cooperation against drugs, http://

www.drugpolicy.org/resource/un-general-assembly-

approves-resolution-presented-mexico-international-

cooperation-against-

49 Felbab-Brown, V. (February 2013), Modernising Drug Law

Enforcement Report 2 – Focused deterrence, selective

targeting, drug trafﬁcking and organised crime: Concepts

and practicalities (International Drug Policy Consortium),

http://idpc.net/publications/2013/02/focused-deterrence-

selective-targeting-drug-trafﬁcking-and-organised-crime-

concepts-and-practicalities

50 For more detailed recommendations, please see: International

Drug Policy Consortium (July 2013), IDPC Advocacy Note,

Launching the Debate: The OAS Reports on Hemispheric

Drug Policy, http://idpc.net/publications/2013/07/idpc-

advocacy-note-launching-the-debate-the-oas-reports-on-

hemispheric-drug-policy

International Drug Policy Consortium

Fifth ﬂoor, 124–128 City Road, London

EC1V 2NJ, United Kingdom

telephone: +44 (0)20 7324 2975

email: [email protected]

website: www.idpc.net

The International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) is a global network of NGOs and

professional networks that promotes objective and open debate on the effectiveness,

direction and content of drug policies at national and international level, and supports

evidence-based policies that are effective in reducing drug-related harms. IDPC

members have a wide range of experience and expertise in the analysis of drug

problems and policies, and contribute to national and international policy debates.

For decades, Latin American governments largely followed the drug control policies

and programs of Washington’s so-called war on drugs. Yet, Latin America has

recently emerged at the vanguard of efforts to promote debate on drug policy reform.

After analyzing the regional debate, national level reforms and impediments to those

reforms, this report concludes with concrete policy recommendations that should be

undertaken to maintain the momentum and advance drug policy debates and reforms

in the region.

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