Briefing
November 2015
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service
Author: Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig
Members' Research Service
EN
PE 572.799
The EU's mutual assistance clause
First ever activation of Article 42(7) TEU
SUMMARY
On 17 November 2015, Article 42(7), or the mutual assistance clause of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU), was invoked for the first time, when France asked for aid and
assistance from the other European Union (EU) Member States in the aftermath of the
deadly terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015.
Included in EU primary law in 2009 by the Lisbon Treaty, under the specific provisions
on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU mutual assistance clause
(or the EU mutual defence clause as it is called by many), had never previously been
used. As there is no precedent, many questions have arisen with regard to its scope,
implementation and the role of the EU institutions, as well as to the relationship with
other provisions in EU law which refer to the expression of solidarity between EU
Member States, in particular the EU solidarity clause contained in Article 222 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).
France's decision to request assistance from the other Member States under Article
42(7) TEU, rather than following other possible approaches, has been explained in
various ways, not least through the preference of dealing bilaterally with the other EU
governments, without involving the EU institutions. All EU Member States have
unanimously promised their full aid and support for France, but the process of defining
the substance of their commitments is still ongoing.
In this briefing:
The EU’s mutual assistance clause: the
provisions of Article 42(7) TEU
Member States' bilateral commitments
The EU solidarity clause and its
relationship with CSDP and Article 42(7)
Explaining France's choice
Main references
The EU's mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU)
Members' Research Service
The EU’s mutual assistance clause: the provisions of Article 42(7) TEU
Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) – part of the Treaty's specific
provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – contains the mutual
assistance clause of the EU (also considered as the EU’s mutual defence clause).
Inspired by Article V of the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty establishing the Western
European Union (WEU),
1
the mutual assistance clause was included in the EU
framework by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Until then, no such provision had been agreed
to complement the EU's crisis management powers in the context of defence
cooperation under the CSDP.
Origins
During the debates in the Convention that led to the
drafting of the Constitutional Treaty, the question arose
whether the EU should have a mutual defence clause
similar to that of NATO and the WEU, as well as on the
future role of the WEU. In this context, proposals on the
principle of solidarity in light of new threats such as
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction were also
discussed. In this regard, a Franco-German proposal
aimed to incorporate the WEU mutual defence clause into
the EU, through the mechanism of enhanced cooperation
since an automatic defence obligation in the Treaty would
have been opposed by the neutral Member States.
2
A
subsequent Franco-German idea was to have a 'general
clause on solidarity and security, binding all member
states in the European Union, and allowing for a response
to risks of any sort that threaten the Union', therefore
combining in one clause both a mutual assistance
obligation on the model of the WEU (addressing traditional threats such as aggression
by another state) and a solidarity obligation to respond to new threats, such as terrorist
attacks. In the end, the draft Constitutional Treaty included two separate provisions.
First, a solidarity clause in event of terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters
was included, and later incorporated in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the EU (TFEU). And second, there was the mutual assistance/defence clause which
constituted the fruit of a compromise and therefore contains weaker language than the
WEU's mutual defence clause. This provision was incorporated by the Lisbon Treaty in
Article 42(7) TEU. The compromise was meant to bring closer the positions of three
groups of states: those seeking a mutual defence commitment; those aiming to protect
their traditional neutral status (such as Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden
3
) and those
wanting to ensure that the article would not undermine NATO. The introduction of the
mutual assistance clause in the TEU also allowed for the dissolution of the WEU,
officially announced in 2010.
Scope and reservations
Unlike the 'civilian' solidarity clause of Article 222 TFEU (see below), the mutual
assistance provision covered by Article 42(7) TEU clearly has defence implications
covering collective defence,
4
as suggested by the reference to Article 51 of the UN
Charter,
5
to the NATO commitments of those EU Member States which are also part of
Article 42(7) TEU
If a Member State is the victim of armed
aggression on its territory, the other
Member States shall have towards it an
obligation of aid and assistance by all
the means in their power, in accordance
with Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. This shall not prejudice the
specific character of the security and
defence policy of certain Member States.
Commitments and cooperation in this
area shall be consistent with
commitments under the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation, which, for those
States which are members of it, remains
the foundation of their collective defence
and the forum for its implementation.
The EU's mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU)
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NATO, to the clause being located within the chapter on CSDP, as well as by the origins
of the clause as outlined above.
A series of elements should therefore be underlined in this context.
Firstly, the different formulations of the mutual assistance/defence clauses contained in
the TEU, the WEU Treaty and NATO's Washington Treaty lead to the idea of differing
obligations and to the conclusion that the WEU's Article V was more exigent than Article
42(7) TEU and NATO's Article 5.
6
Article 42(7) TEU renounces the automatism implied by
the WEU clause – the Member States 'will afford the Party so attacked all the military
and other aid and assistance in their power' – and provides instead that 'Member States
shall have ... an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power'; which
is then subject to other conditions (see below) which alleviate to some extent this duty.
Moreover, Article 42(7) TEU gives leeway to the Member States to decide with what
means they fulfil the aid and assistance obligation (e.g. diplomatic, financial, military,
police cooperation, etc.), just like Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty also leaves it to
the individual member state to decide what action it deems necessary and does not
automatically assume military response by all members. In this respect, Article 42(7)
TEU does not expressly mention military means so as to accommodate those EU
members with a neutral status and Denmark which has an opt-out from the adoption
and implementation of decisions with military and defence implications. But the article
does not exclude such military assistance, which would be contrary to the meaning of
the clause.
7
On the other hand, the Article 42(7) TEU clause is said to be more extensive from a
geographical point of view than the equivalent WEU and NATO provisions: while
assistance under those is limited to 'Europe' for the WEU and 'Europe and North
America' for NATO, the TEU covers all armed aggression against a Member State 'on its
territory' – which is said also to cover those extra-European territories to which EU law
applies (e.g. France's overseas départements) but not to the Overseas Countries and
Territories listed in Annex II of the Treaties.
8
Secondly, in the context of the reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter, while the
Charter speaks of a right to self-defence in the event of an 'armed attack', the TEU uses
the term 'armed aggression'. However this distinction has been explained as a linguistic
issue.
9
More relevant in the context of response to terrorist attacks, there is a persistent
debate on whether Article 51 of the UN Charter could also be invoked in relation to
non-state armed groups. However, the predominant view is that Article 51 applies only
to armed attack/aggression committed by a state, and that it cannot be invoked in
relation to armed aggression, including terrorist attacks, perpetrated by non-state
actors. In any case, the link to Article 51 in the EU's mutual assistance provision can be
understood to mean that any military action in self-defence by EU Member States under
Article 42(7) TEU will be assessed against the legality of that action in light of Article 51.
10
Thirdly, the duty of assistance under Article 42(7) TEU is subsumed to two
considerations: the relationship with NATO and the 'specific character of the security
and defence policy of certain Member States'.
As concerns relations with NATO, the EU Treaty's mutual assistance obligation is
understood as not having precedence over the collective defence obligation contained
in NATO’s Article 5. In this respect, it is considered that the EU's mutual assistance
clause is secondary to NATO's and could not be invoked if NATO's Article 5 had already
The EU's mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU)
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been invoked. It is argued that, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, whereby 'when a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be
considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other
treaty prevail', NATO's founding act takes precedence over the application of the TEU,
as also provided for in Article 351 TFEU.
11
Moreover, other legal experts consider there
is no danger of legal inconsistencies unless the EU mutual defence clause is triggered
against a non-EU NATO member, which would be highly unlikely. The EU, in CSDP, and
NATO have been portrayed as organisations complementary to each other, and
problems could arise in the event of duplication. However with respect to the EU
conducting crisis management operations, there is in principle no such NATO
precedence. But the EU itself is constrained by primary law with regard to collective
self-defence under the CSDP: in principle, the EU cannot conduct self-defence
operations within the framework of the CSDP (only its Member States), unless the
Treaty is amended or the European Council decides unanimously on the establishment
of common defence in accordance with Article 42(2) TEU. In this sense also, NATO is the
primary organisational venue for Member States to exercise collective self-defence.
12
Furthermore, the EU's collective assistance obligation must respect the ‘specific
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States’. In conformity
with this provision and taking into account Declarations 13 and 14 annexed to the EU
Treaties, on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Treaty guarantees
Member States' specific character in this field. In particular, it gives them the possibility
that their specific principled reservations with regard to the duty of aid and assistance
pursuant to Article 42(7) TEU be taken into account. This 'specific character' can entail
for example the policy of military neutrality of the four abovementioned EU Member
States, the reservation of the German Parliament, namely giving consent to the
deployment of German armed forces, or could even be taken to encompass the nuclear
armed EU Member States (France and the UK). The provision is assessed as not
exempting absolutely these Member States from their legal obligation to provide aid
and assistance, but as allowing these states to choose means of assistance which are
not incompatible with their status or domestic law requirements.
13
Finally, Article 42(7) TEU could be also viewed in connection with Article 44 TEU (and
also Article 42(5) TEU), whereby the Council may entrust the implementation of a task,
i.e. a CSDP mission/operation, to a group of willing states or with Article 43(1) TEU,
whereby the EU's CSDP operations 'may contribute to the fight against terrorism,
including by supporting third countries in combatting terrorism in their territories'.
Implementation and role of the EU institutions
Procedure
Article 42(7) TEU does not set out any formal procedure. No Council decision or
conclusion is needed to implement Article 42(7) TEU, only the existence of the
facts/situation constituting the reason for invoking the article. If the Member State
affected makes a request for assistance, it ensues from Article 42(7) TEU there is a legal
obligation to assist incumbent on all the other Member States, through civilian or
military means. As concerns the provision of military assistance, most agree there is at
least a political obligation to assist. Subsequently, the other Member States must define
in concrete terms the scope of their support and the means they intend to put at the
requesting state's disposal.
The EU's mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU)
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On 17 November 2015, France invoked for the first time the mutual assistance clause during the
Foreign Affairs Council meeting (in the format of Defence Ministers). France requested
assistance, following the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 that left 130 dead and
hundreds injured. Unanimously, the EU Defence Ministers promised their full aid and support.
As the article had never been triggered since 2009 there is no precedent. France has already
engaged in bilateral talks with the other Member States in order to specify their aid and
assistance. The bilateral nature of the support means that it will not be a uniform contribution
from the Member States, and will reflect the individual deals agreed between Paris and its
counterparts. It also does not mean that EU Member States are obliged to provide any military
assets to the campaign against ISIL/Da'esh.
EU High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Federica Mogherini,
clarified that France's invocation of the article does not mean a CSDP mission or operation.
What is the role of the EU institutions?
The invocation by France of Article 42(7) implies an intergovernmental process,
excluding the EU institutions from decision-making and the application of measures
taken. According to the HR/VP, Article 42(7) TEU is meant to activate bilateral aid and
assistance and the EU/EEAS role will be limited to coordination or facilitation of what
France and the other Member States decide ('the European Union can facilitate this and
coordinate this, whenever and however it is useful and necessary'). Already, the CFSP
and CSDP are intergovernmental policies in nature. As such the Union's 'communautaire'
institutions – the Commission, the EP (according to Article 36 TEU) and the Court of
Justice of the EU – play a limited role. The Court for example has no jurisdiction (with
two exceptions: monitoring respect for the powers of EU institutions (Article 40 TEU)
and reviewing the legality of CFSP decisions providing for restrictive measures against
natural or legal persons (Article 275(2) TFEU)).
In the particular case of Article 42(7) TEU, the implementing obligations deriving from it
belong rather to the Member States acting collectively or within NATO. As mentioned,
the CSDP framework does not currently allow for EU self-defence operations. Also the
invocation by France of the mutual assistance clause in the formal setting of the Council
has been considered purely incidental. Nevertheless, choosing the Council as the venue
can be interpreted as having political, institutional and practical implications, in
particular expressing solidarity and readiness to provide assistance according to the EU
Treaties.
The European Parliament
The EP adopted, in November 2012, a resolution on the EU’s mutual defence and solidarity
clauses. With regard to the mutual defence clause, the EP underlined the necessity to be
prepared for situations 'involving non-NATO EU Member States or EU Member States’
territories that are outside the North Atlantic area and are therefore not covered by the
Washington Treaty, or situations where no agreement on collective action has been reached
within NATO' and expressed the view that the clause could even cover non-armed attacks, such
as cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure, 'if the Member State’s security is significantly
threatened by its consequences.' Furthermore, the EP invited the VP/HR to 'propose practical
arrangements and guidelines' and an analysis of the role of the EU institutions in the event the
mutual defence clause was invoked. Finally, the EP made a plea for using the EU's crisis
management structures in this context, in particular activating the EU Operational
Headquarters.
The EU's mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU)
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Member States' bilateral commitments
In the context of its request for assistance, France has been pointing out the need for
assistance in meeting some of its foreign military commitments, including its
participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and in EU CSDP missions and
operations. France currently contributes 939 uniformed personnel (military and police)
to UN peacekeeping missions, of which 845 are serving in UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping
mission in Lebanon. In 2014, almost 8 000 French troops were engaged in French and
multinational (EU and UN) deployments outside France's territory. According to Europe
Diplomacy and Defence, the external operations of the French army could mean costs of
€1.128 billion in 2015 (similar to 2014), of which a large part was dedicated to France's
operations in the Sahel (Barkhane), in Iraq/Syria (Chammal) and in the Central African
Republic (Sangaris). France also called on the other Member States to take part in air
strikes in Syria. It is considered that another priority will be greater sharing of
intelligence between EU Member States and the reinforcement of the EU's borders.
The bilateral consultations are ongoing, but some commitments have already been
made public. The UK has offered France the use of its Akrotiri airbase in Cyprus for
French aviation and also given additional in-flight refuelling support. The UK
government is currently preparing to ask the UK Parliament for backing for air strikes in
Syria.
Germany had apparently already mentioned the possibility of increasing its contribution
to the EU training mission (EUTM) in Mali, where it already contributes around
200 staff, while ruling out involvement in Syria. Ahead of President François Hollande's
meeting with Chancellor Angela Merkel on 25 November, Germany also announced it
will increase its contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) from
10 to 650 troops, subject to parliament's approval, so that French commitments in the
country could be reduced to some extent.
14
Belgium and the other countries active in
the Sahel were requested by France to maintain their commitments in the region –
Belgium had seemingly planned to end its military contribution of 80 troops to EUTM
Mali in January 2016. As concerns Italy, which has ruled out any military intervention in
Syria or Iraq, the possibility of increasing the country's presence in Lebanon is being
considered.
The EU solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU) and its relationship with CSDP
and Article 42(7) TEU
Many have wondered why France chose to invoke the mutual assistance clause of
Article 42(7) instead of the solidarity clause contained in Article 222 TFEU, which
specifically provides for assistance from the Union and its Member States for an EU
Member State victim of a terrorist attack, a natural or man-made disaster.
Article 222 TFEU, or the solidarity clause, provides for two levels of assistance:
by the EU jointly with its Member States to the Member State the object of a
terrorist attack or victim of a natural or man-made disaster (Article 222(1) TFEU);
by Member States, which have an obligation to assist the requesting Member
State in the abovementioned situations, in which case the Council becomes the
locus for coordination (Article 222(2)TFEU). Implementation by Member States
should be seen against the provisions of Declaration No 37 annexed to the
Treaties, whereby a Member State can choose the most appropriate means to
comply with its own solidarity obligation towards another Member State.
The EU's mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU)
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In June 2014, according to Article 222(3) TFEU, the Council adopted a Decision setting
out the modalities for implementation by the Union (but not by the Member States –
Article 222(2) TFEU) of the solidarity clause (Council Decision 2014/415/EU) on the basis
of a joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative.
The Council Decision specifically mentions that it has no defence implications, so it does
not fall within the remit of CSDP; although the means put at the disposal can be military
resources of Member States (e.g. one could envisage the European Gendarmerie Force
deployed for civilian protection). Therefore the Council Decision does not represent a
legal framework for action if military means are used for defence purposes. The
Council Decision states that it 'is without prejudice to Article 42(7) TEU' and also
provides that, 'in the event that a crisis requires CFSP or CSDP action, a decision should
be taken by the Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties.'
Although the EEAS and CSDP structures are involved under Article 222 TFEU – the Union
will mobilise all instruments at its disposal such as police and judicial cooperation, the
EU civil protection mechanism, the structures developed in the framework of the CSDP
– this role is defined by the abovementioned Council Decision and cannot be
understood as a CFSP/CSDP role. Both the primary law (Article 222(3) TEU) and the
Council Decision specifically mention that decisions with defence implications should be
taken in accordance with the specific procedures on CFSP/CSDP – unanimity under
Article 31(1) TEU and the other relevant provisions of the Treaties.
It must also be pointed out that the implementation by the Union of the solidarity
clause is restricted to the Member State's 'territory', in line with Article 222(1) TFEU, as
regards the prevention of the terrorist threat and assistance in the event of a terrorist
attack (although the notion of territory as used in the Council Decision might be better
replaced by 'jurisdiction' according to some experts.) EU operational action under CSDP
as mentioned above cannot mean self-defence action on the Union's territory. Also
Article 42(7) does not have this territorial limitation when it comes to implementation,
except with regard to the armed aggression that must have happened on the Member
State’s territory.
Another detail to underline is the Council Decision's provision on the invocation of the
solidarity clause, according to which 'in the event of a disaster or a terrorist attack, the
affected Member State may invoke the solidarity clause if, after having exploited the
possibilities offered by existing means and tools at national and Union level, it considers
that the crisis clearly overwhelms the response capabilities available to it.' This has been
considered a contradictory provision – also because the other Member States have no
means of assessing whether the affected Member State has indeed exploited all
possibilities and tools at its disposal before invoking Article 222. Also, Article 222 TFEU is
under the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice, therefore failure to assist a Member
State that has invoked the solidarity clause could be the object of judicial proceedings.
Although the added value of the solidarity clause has been called into question, as there
are already established cooperation and coordination mechanisms at EU level, experts
still consider it an important tool that must be viewed in a broader context, including
other Treaty provisions that pursue similar aims such as Article 42(7) TEU. Some
interpretations point to the existence of a certain overlap or grey areas between the
two clauses, which reaffirms the political discretion of the EU and its Member States as
to the means employed (political, military or other means) to fight old and new security
The EU's mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU)
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threats. Finally, it could also be imagined that the two provisions might apply in parallel,
and in this case the different procedures for implementation should be reconciled.
Explaining France's choice
Neither the EU mutual defence clause nor the solidarity clause had been invoked so far,
therefore France's decision is a first. When asked why France invoked Article 42(7) TEU
and not Article 222 TFEU, the French Defence Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, (as well as
Mogherini) emphasised this was mainly a 'political act' that the French hope to see
translated into 'capability collaboration for French interventions in Syria and Iraq, either
by relief to or support of France in other operations.' Both Mogherini and Le Drian
seemed to downplay the operational significance of France's request under Article 42(7)
TEU putting the emphasis on the political nature of the act. They also underlined that it
needs to be seen as separate from NATO's similar Article 5 clause.
The Council in its Conclusions of 17 November 2015 specifies that 'offers may consist of
material assistance and of support in theatres of operation where France is engaged'.
Thus, some view France's invocation of Article 42(7) being not necessarily related to the
substance of the article, but as a lever to use during the bilateral consultations in order
to get something for which France has been asking for some time now: that other
Member States make a contribution to French efforts, either in Mali or CAR or in the
Middle East. This has been a longstanding French criticism of other EU Member States
as it had the perception of being left to deal alone with the situation in various crisis
theatres. In this context, it was also assessed that, as the EU's solidarity clause is
restricted to EU territory and France was actually trying to get support outside its
territory, opting for the mutual assistance clause was logical.
Moreover, it was pointed out that France opted deliberately for 'neither NATO nor
supranational assistance'. In the case of NATO, France's choice not to invoke Article 5
may be related to France's current diplomatic efforts, aimed at Russia and Arab
countries also, to rally a grand coalition to combat ISIL/Da'esh in Iraq and Syria, which
NATO involvement might jeopardise. Also, the limited role for EU institutions could
explain the choice of Article 42(7) by France over other possibilities, thus clearly
expressing a preference for the intergovernmental/bilateral framework.
Other views insist on the political symbolism of invoking the Article 42(7) TEU clause,
seen as a necessary and bold affirmation on the part of France of the need for a
common foreign policy towards the Middle East, therefore a 'common Middle East
strategy and an integrated police and intelligence effort', something NATO cannot do.
Also the choice of the EU's mutual assistance clause could be regarded in the light of
past French efforts to enhance the EU's security and defence policy, as well as of a
'certain conception of Europe's role in global affairs'.
Main references
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) a commentary, Blanke, H-J., Mangiameli, S., Heidelberg,
Springer, 2013 , 1813 p.
The 'Solidarity Clause' of the European Union – dead letter or enabling act?, Martino, A-M,
SIAK-Journal − Zeitschri für Polizeiwissenscha und polizeiliche Praxis (2), 2015, pp 65-76.
Endnotes
1
Article V of the WEU Treaty reads: 'If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in
Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.' The
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provision is complemented by Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty which emphasises NATO's role and gives it
de facto precedence to implement collective defence in case of aggression against one of the ten WEU members:
'In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty
shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the
appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.'
2
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) a commentary, Blanke, H-J., Mangiameli, S., Heidelberg, Springer, 2013,
pp. 1201-1235.
3
Currently Malta is another EU Member State with declared neutrality status. Cyprus is a non-NATO EU member.
4
Cf. Blanke, Magiamelli, op.cit.
5
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides an exception to the prohibition of the use or the threat to use force
(Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) and allows for the right of individual or collective self-defence in the event of an
armed attack against a state Member of the United Nations.
6
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that: 'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken
as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.'
7
Cf. Blanke, Magiamelli, op.cit.
8
Ibidem.
9
While some consider this terminological distinction to imply a different threshold of gravity of the hostile act (that
is, allowing for a right to self-defence at a lower threshold than armed attack), others point simply to the different
language versions of the EU Treaties (as well as the French version of the UN Charter) and the fact that the
negotiations for the Lisbon Treaty took place in French, thus the use of the English translation of 'aggression armée'.
10
Cf. Blanke, Magiamelli, op.cit.
11
See Commentario breve ai Trattati dell'Unione europea, Pocar, F., Baruffi, M C., Adinolfi, A., Padova, CEDAM, 2014,
1844 p.
12
Cf. Blanke, Magiamelli, op.cit.
13
In 2009, following the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in the first referendum, the European Council adopted a
decision meant to give concrete guarantees to Ireland (but not only) in the field of security and defence: 'It will be
for Member States – including Ireland, acting in a spirit of solidarity and without prejudice to its traditional policy of
military neutrality – to determine the nature of aid or assistance to be provided to a Member State which is the
object of a terrorist attack or the victim of armed aggression on its territory. ... It will be a matter for Ireland or any
other Member State, to decide, in accordance with any domestic legal requirements, whether or not to participate
in any military operation.'
14
Currently France contributes 35 troops and police to MINUSMA.
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