12
This issue is more relevant for those central banks that are also banking supervisory
authority, since they are charged with a great many functions. To offer clarity in this regard,
central banks laws often set out a comprehensive list of functions in a single legislative
provision. If that is the case, such a list should ideally also include a supervisory/regulatory
function.
A good way to draft such a function is to charge the supervisory authority with
the succinct function “to regulate and supervise banks and other financial institutions.” An
alternative is to draft the regulatory and supervisory function in somewhat more detail,
possibly even in the banking law instead of in the central bank law.
Whatever approach is
taken, such a function should be clearly distinguished from the objectives of the central bank-
cum-supervisory authority, given that they play legally very different roles.
19. The legal framework should also be clear as to whether the supervisory
authority has powers to pursue the statutory objectives. Does the supervisory authority
have the legal powers to pursue the statutory objectives (e.g., powers to issue regulations, to
set prudential standards, to grant and revoke banking licenses, to take corrective action,
impose sanctions etc.), or does the power reside with another authority or agency? Ideally,
the supervisory authority should also be the licensing authority and be able to issue
regulations and take supervisory decisions autonomously. However, constitutional or
administrative law may constrain the level of involvement of autonomous (i.e., non-political)
agencies in general or individual normative decisions, and require a degree of involvement of
political bodies in the establishment and enforcement of banking and other forms of
regulation. For instance, in some countries, the supervisory authority may not have the legal
power to issue or revoke licenses
or to promulgate secondary regulation.
The question is
A good example of this can be found in the Law 1/34 of 2 December 2008 on the Statute of the Central Bank
of Burundi: Article 6 states that the central bank has a secondary objective to contribute to the stability of the
financial system, while Article 7 establishes the function of regulation and supervision of banks and other
financial institutions.
See for instance Article 4 (5), (7) and (9) of the Central Bank of Russia Act.
The Netherlands is an example of where the central bank is the prudential supervisor, but the supervisory
objective and function is established in the banking law rather than in the central bank law: see next footnote.
A good example of how this can be achieved can be found in the Netherland’s Law on Financial Supervision.
Article 1:24.1 provides that the objective of financial supervision is the solidity of financial firms and the
stability of the financial system. Article 1:24.2 charges the Dutch central bank with the function of supervision
over financial firms and their access to financial markets.
There are still countries where the supervisory authority is not the licensing authority. For instance, in
Malaysia and Kuwait, the central bank is the supervisor, but banks are licensed by the Minister of Finance. In
Italy, the Ministry of Economy and Finance decides on license revocations, upon proposal by the Bank of Italy.
In some countries (e.g. USA, Lebanon and Singapore), regulatory agencies have the legal power to
promulgate secondary regulation in their fields of competence. In other countries (e.g. the UK, Netherlands,
Belgium), constitutional principles require that secondary regulation be approved by political bodies
(Parliament, the Government, or Ministry of Finance).