112 Number 90, Spring 2024
Byrnes' policy of compromise with the Soviet Union had come under strong attack in
Washington. The Secretary of State had concluded that public diplomacy was
necessary to defend and explain his diplomacy toward the Soviet Union. He had not
ended his pursuit of a modus vivendi with the U.S.S.R., as his rejection of Kennan's
cable #511, the famous “Long Telegram” calling for containment of Soviet
expansionism, and his reopening of negotiations on loans to Russia, both indicated.
With the eruption of the Iranian issue in March 1946, Byrnes was forced to publicly
take a stance in opposition to the Soviet Union. Byrnes told Bidault that American
opinion was no longer disposed to make concessions on important questions.
Nevertheless, despite his limited flexibility, the Secretary of State continued to pursue
a diplomacy of compromise with the Soviet Union, but within considerably
circumscribed limits.
The Paris Foreign Ministers Meetings
Despite the failure of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Iran, Byrnes did not
intend to allow Iran to slow the process of peace-making. Similarly, the Secretary of
State was prepared to overlook what he later termed “Stalin's tactics in London,” when
the Soviet Union turned the United Nations into a propaganda forum and gratuitously
abused the veto power in the dispute over the Levant. There were, Byrnes believed,
“differences on which the deputies will not reach agreement.” The Secretary therefore
concluded that the “Foreign Ministers must make an effort to reconcile the differences
that exist.”
On March 5, 1946, the day before the note to the Soviet Union on Iran was dispatched,
Byrnes had proposed that the Foreign Ministers meet on April 15, 1946.
19
British
Foreign Minister Bevin opposed such a démarche “until we have had some moderately
satisfactory reply to our remonstrances regarding Persia.”
The Secretary of State, although rejecting Bevin's argument, accepted the British
Foreign Minister's position, writing: “However, if you are opposed to meeting, I shall
not communicate with the other Foreign Ministers.”
With the introduction of his resolution postponing the discussion of Iran's complaint
until May 6, Byrnes hoped to clear the air in time for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers.
By May 6, as the Secretary wrote, he hoped “there would be nothing to discuss.”
Accordingly, on April 4, with the Iranian issue apparently disposed of, Byrnes
suggested that the Foreign Ministers meet in Paris on April 25, 1946.
19
See Byrnes memo of conversation with the British Ambassador, March 6,1946, FRUS, 1946, II, p.
25; Byrnes to Dunn (Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy in London), March 5, 1946, Ibid., pp. 22-
23; Halifax (British Ambassador) to Byrnes, March 9, 1946, Ibid., pp. 27-28.; and Byrnes to Gallman
(U.S. Chargé in the United Kingdom), March 22, 1946, Ibid., p. 35.
11
Karl: From Compromise to Confrontation: The American Secretary of State
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2024