ACTEC Law Journal ACTEC Law Journal
Volume 47 Number 1 Article 3
6-1-2021
The Perpetual Business Purpose Trust: The Business Planning The Perpetual Business Purpose Trust: The Business Planning
Vehicle for the Future, Starting Now Vehicle for the Future, Starting Now
Alexander A. Bove Jr.
Melissa Langa
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Bove, Alexander A. Jr. and Langa, Melissa (2021) "The Perpetual Business Purpose Trust: The Business
Planning Vehicle for the Future, Starting Now,"
ACTEC Law Journal
: Vol. 47: No. 1, Article 3.
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The
Perpetual
Business
Purpose
Trust:
The
Business
Planning
Vehicle
for
the
Future,
Starting
Now
Alexander
A
Bove,
Jr.
and
Melissa
Langa*
Most
estate
planning
attorneys
will
agree
that
the
trust
is
the
most
flexible
and useful
document
we
have
in
designing
estate
plans
for
cli-
ents,
and
the
concept
and
use
of
trusts
continues
to
expand
and
evolve
over
the
years.
We
have
even
developed
our
own
special
acronyms
for
planning,
with
terms
such
as
GRITs,
GRATs,
QPRTs,
SLATs,
CRUTs,
and
ILITs,
each
of
which
tells
us
the
story
and
use
of
that
trust.
But
every
one
of
these
trusts
as
well
as
the
many
others
we
use
all
have
the
same
three
common
elements,
a
trustee,
a
corpus, and
one
or
more
ben-
eficiaries,
without
which
there
can
be
no
trust,
we
are
told.
And
with
a
bit
of
thought
one
might
argue
that
of
the three
elements,
the
most
im-
portant
could
be the
beneficiary,
for
without
a
beneficiary,
a
trust
could
have
no purpose,
and
without
a
purpose,
what
would
be the
point
of
having
a
trust?
But
what
if
we
took
this
one
step
further?
What
if we
design
a
trust
that
is
created
to
accomplish
a
purpose,
but
has
no
ascertainable
benefi-
ciaries?
Actually,
this
is
not
at
all
new.
We
have
been
living
and
working
with
such
trusts
for
hundreds
of
years in
the
form
of
charitable
trusts.
But
in
fact,
charitable
trusts
do
have
beneficiaries
-
the
public
-
it's
just
that
there
are no
identifiable
beneficiaries
in
the
terms
of
the
trust.
An
essential
role
of
a
beneficiary
in
the non-charitable
trust
is
to
enforce
the
trust
according
to
its
terms.
In the
case
of
the
charitable
trust,
it
is
the
jurisdiction's
attorney
general
(who
represents
the
public)
who
would
enforce
the
trust.'
So
does
this
leave
us
with
the restriction
that,
with
the
exception
of
a
charitable
trust,
we
can
only
establish
a
trust
that
has
identifiable
beneficiaries?
Until
about
a
hundred
years
ago,
that
was
the
case
(and
it
is
still
the
case
in
the
United
Kingdom).
Gradually,
set-
tlors
began
to
have
ideas
about
trusts
that
could
be
established
to
ac-
complish
a
purpose,
rather
than
to
provide
for
named
individual
beneficiaries.
One
of
the
earlier
and
most
famous
attempts
in
this
regard
was
by
the
well-known
author/playwright,
George
Bernard
Shaw.
Shaw
left
his
estate
in
trust,
directing
the
trustees
to use
the
funds
to
develop
a
*
Alexander
A.
Bove
Jr.
and
Melissa
Langa
are
the
principals
of Boston
law
firm
of
Bove
&
Langa
P.C.
1
What
Attorneys
General
Do,
NAT'L
Ass'N
Arr'Ys
GEN.,
https://www.naag.org/
attorneys-general/what-attorneys-general-do
[https://perma.cc/BFV9-82LY].
3
ACTEC
LAW
JOURNAL
new
alphabet,
emphasizing
the
use
of
phonetics,
and
once
accomplished,
to
translate
one of
his
plays,
into
the
new
alphabet.
2
The
trustees
asked
the
court
to
rule
on
whether
this
trust
could
be
carried
out,
as
Shaw's
instructions
also
called
for
determining
how
many
people
in
the world
would
be
speaking
and
writing English
at
any given
time.
3
The
court
quickly
ruled
that
the
trust
purpose
did
not
rise
to
the
level
of
a
charita-
ble
trust,
and
in
addition,
its
terms
would
be
virtually
impossible
and
also
wasteful
to
carry-out,
and,
equally
important,
there
was
no
one
to
enforce the
provisions of
the
trust.
4
There
were
a
number
of
somewhat
similar
cases
after
Shaw
-
simi-
lar,
that
is,
in
proposing
a
project
for
the
trustees
to complete
as
op-
posed
to
naming
beneficiaries
-
but
none
of
which
was
approved
by
the
court.
For
example,
in
one
case, a
trust
was
established
to
promote
the
integrity
and
independence
of
newspapers,
5
and
still
another
to
board
up
a
house
and
keep
it
closed
for
20
years.
6
In
all
of
these
cases,
the
trusts
failed
because
either
they
did
not
rise
to
the
level
of
a
charita-
ble
trust
or
they
were
wasteful
and
unattainable,
and
there
was
no
one
to
enforce
them.
In
a
few
cases,
the
ego
of the
settlors
seemed
to
get
the
better
of
them,
but not
the
better
of
the
court.
In
the
M'Caig
case,
for instance,
the
settlor
directed
his
fiduciaries
to expend
the
remainder
of
his
estate
to
erect
artistic
towers
and
statues
of
himself
and
family
members
to
spread
among
his
several
properties.
7
In
rejecting
the
bequest
as
waste-
ful,
the
court
said
that
such
monuments
would
be
"objects
of
no
utility,
private
or
public,
objects
which
benefit
nobody,
and
which
have
no
other
purpose
or
use
than
that
of
perpetuating
at
great
cost,
and
in an
absurd
manner,
the
idiosyncrasies
of
an
eccentric
testator."
8
Interestingly,
if
it
weren't
for
cases
like
Shaw
and
M'Caig,
and
of
course
the
many
others
whose
settlors
and
testators
had
purposes
in
mind
instead
of
persons
who
would
enjoy
the
benefits
of
their
estates,
it
might
well
be
that
the
purpose
trust
(for
anything
other
than
pets
and
the
upkeep
of
graves)
would
never
have
developed.
And
in
fact,
we
are
using
the
term
"developed"
somewhat
optimistically.
It
is
only
with
the
adoption
of
the
Uniform
Trust
Code
("UTC")
that
thirty-five
states
(as
2
In
re
Shaw
[1957]
1
All
ER
745
at
745
(Eng.).
3
See
id
4
See
id.
5
In
re
Astor's
Settlement
Trusts
[1952]
1
All
ER
1067
at
1067
(Eng.).
6
Brown
v.
Burdett
[1882]
47
LT
94
at
94-95
(Eng.).
7
M'Caig
v.
Univ.
of
Glasgow
(1906)
SC
231,
231
(Scot.).
8
Id.
at
242.
[Vol.
47:3
4
PERPETUAL
BUSINESS
TRUSTS
of
this writing)
9
have
formally
accepted
the
purpose
trust.
But
what
ex-
actly
is
a
purpose
trust
and
how
will
it
change
the
future
of business
succession
planning?
A
purpose
trust
is
a
trust
that
is
established
for
a
purpose,
10
as
op-
posed
to
the
typical
trust
which
is
established
to provide
for
benefi-
ciaries
-
thus,
a
purpose
trust
has
no
beneficiaries.
11
It
is
this
fact
which
distinguishes
the
purpose
trust
from
all
other
trusts
(except
for
pet
trusts
and
trusts
for
the
upkeep
of
graves).
And
it
was
this
distinction
that
prevented
purpose
trusts
from
being
recognized
in
most
jurisdictions,
because
without
a
beneficiary,
there
would
be
no
one
to
enforce
the
trust.
12
Although
the
answer
to
this
problem
seemed
too
obvious
for
discussion,
the
unique
nature
of
the
purpose
trust
and
the
somewhat
rigid
adherence
to
the
centuries-old
basic
concept
of
the trust,
amounted
to
a
mold
no
one
wished
to
break.
Nevertheless,
once
the
solution
be-
came
apparent,
the
purpose
trust
began
to take
hold,
opening
the door
for
planning
far
beyond
pets
and
graves.
The
missing
piece
to
the
puzzle,
then,
was
the
presence
of
an
enforcer
to
enforce
the
trust.
Thus,
the
enforcer,
in
effect,
took
the
place
of
a
beneficiary,
and
we
then
have
a
valid,
enforceable
trust,
provided
this
new
form
of
trust
met the
other
requirements.
Such
other
requirements
actually
apply
to
all
trusts,
but
seem
more
applicable
to
purpose
trusts,
because
at first
glance,
there
seems
to
be
no
limit
to
the purposes
a
settlor
can
dream
up
(e.g.
George
Bernard
Shaw).
So,
besides
an
enforcer,
a
purpose
trust
must
have
a
purpose
that
is
reasonably
possible
of
attainment,
not
wasteful,
and
not
against
public
policy.
13
Thus,
a
purpose
trust
to
establish
a
school
for
pickpockets
would
not
make
the
grade,
while
a
school
for
magicians
would
be
fine.
Slowly,
very
slowly,
the
purpose
trust
began
to
take
hold
across
the
world,
largely
in
the
Caribbean,
with
jurisdictions
such
as
Bermuda,
14
the
Cayman
Islands,1
5
and
the
Bahamas1
6
adopting
purpose
trust
law,
9
Trust
Code,
UNIF.
L.
COMM'N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/commun
ity-home?communitykey=193ff839-7955-4846-8f3c-ce74ac23938d&tab=groupdetails
[https://perma.cc/UR9B-T34B].
10
PAUL
BAXENDALE-WALKER,
PURPOSE
TRUSTS
11
(Butterworths
1999).
11
Alexander
A.
Bove
Jr.,
Are
We
Missing
the
Purpose
of
the
Purpose
Trust?,
TR.
&
EST.,
Oct.
2020,
at
2,
3.
12
See
id.
13
Id.
14
See
Trusts
(Special
Provisions)
Amendment
Act
1998,
§
12A
(Berm.).
15
See
Trusts
Law
(2011
Revision),
§
99
(Cayman
Is.).
16
See
Purpose
Trusts
Act,
2004
(Bah.).
Fall
2021]
5
ACTEC
LAW
JOURNAL
and
in
Europe,
with
Gibraltar
17
and
Guernsey,1
8
but not
the
United
Kingdom,
which
still
does
not
recognize
non-charitable
purpose
trusts.19
While
the
purpose
trust
legislation
and
practice
in
the
foreign
juris-
dictions
for
the
most
part
reflected
serious
efforts
to
address
the
uses
of
a
purpose
trust
and
perhaps
to
attract
business
through
their
use,
for
the
United
States,
the
purpose trust
was,
and
in
most
cases
remains,
an
af-
terthought,
an
"extra"
that
came
with
the UTC.
Section
409
of
the
UTC
is
a
brief
section
which
provides
that
a
non-charitable
trust
may
be
es-
tablished
for
a
purpose,
as
long
as
it
provides
for
an
enforcer
(while
section
408
provides
for the
pet
trusts
and
is
typically two
or
three
times
the
length
and
detail
of
the
non-charitable
purpose
trust
section.).
In
addition
to
the requirement
of an
enforcer,
purpose
trust
law
typically
provides
that trust
assets
in
excess
of
those
reasonably
needed
to
accom-
plish
the
trust
purpose
will
be
returned
to
the
settlor.
Clearly,
the
Uni-
form
Law
Commission
(who
drafted
the
UTC
for
the
states
to
use)
felt
that
the
purpose
trust
would
be
of
little
use.
Nevertheless,
a
number
of
planners,
here
and
in
other
jurisdictions,
began
to
see
unique
value
of
the
purpose
trust
in
ways
not
previously
possible.
For
example,
a
purpose
trust
could be
used
to
hold
family
va-
cation
property
in
perpetuity
allowing
for
family
use
for
generations
without
estate
taxes
and
unaffected
by
family
disputes
or
creditor
claims
(of
course,
the
trust
would
have
to
be
adequately
funded
to
carry
the
property).
Perhaps
the
most
significant
use
of
the
purpose
trust
and
one
which
is
gradually
re-writing
business
succession
planning
is
the
idea
of
holding
a
family
business
(or
control
of
the
family
business)
in
a
perpet-
ual
business
purpose
trust.
A
famous
illustration
of
this
is
the
Bosch
Corporation,
which
has
been
held
in
a
purpose
trust
for
over
60
years.
20
In
that
case,
the
business
is
owned
part
by
the
Bosch
Purpose
Trust
and
part
by
the
Bosch
Charitable
Foundation,
one
part
generating
income
for
the
Bosch
family,
the
other
for
several
charities.
2
1
One
problem
for
the
business
purpose
trust
here
in
the
United
States
is
that
most
of the
states
that
have
rubber-stamped
UTC
section
409,
providing
that
their
purpose
trust
must
have
a
very
limited
dura-
tion,
which
weighs
against
using
a
business
purpose
trust
in
the
states.
A
17
See
Purpose
Trusts
Act
2015,
Act
No.
2015-17
(Gib.).
18
See
Trusts
Law,
2007
(Guernsey).
19
Alexander
A.
Bove
Jr.
&
Melissa
Langa,
The
Purpose
of
Purpose
Trusts,
BOVE
&
LANGA
(Mass.
Laws.
Wkly.),
Mar.
1,
2004,
at
1,
3.
20
See
Robert
Bosch:
Legacy,
BoscH,
www.bosch.com/stories/robert-bosch-legacy
[https://perma.cc/9G76-RJTH].
21
See
Who
We
Are,
ROBERT
BOSCH
STIFTUNG,
www.bosch-stiftung.de/eil/who-we-
are
[https://perma.cc/8Y3K-AUQS]
(stating
that
the
foundation
"directly
serves
charita-
ble
purposes,"
while
the shareholder
also
"receives
a
proportion
of
the
distributed
divi-
dends
in
the
company.").
[Vol.
47:3
6
PERPETUAL
BUSINESS
TRUSTS
few
states,
such
as
Delaware,
New
Hampshire, South
Dakota,
and Ore-
gon,
had
the
foresight
to
allow such
trusts
to
continue
in
perpetuity.
2
2
The
use
of
a
purpose trust
in
the
business
context
can
take
a
num-
ber
of
different
forms,
depending
of
course
on
the
family
circumstances
and
objectives.
For
the
sake
of simplicity,
let's
picture
a
perpetual
pur-
pose
trust
to
which
all
of
the
controlling
interest
in
a
closely-held
family
business
is
transferred.
The
trust
would
provide
that
the
company
would
be
managed
by
carefully
chosen
individuals,
including
family
members
and
possibly
certain
long-term
employees
or outside
consultants.
The
trust
would
include
provisions
for
an advisory
committee,
which
could
also
include
family
members,
to
allow
them
to
participate
in
company
management
and
decisions.
Note that the
business
could
continue
to
be
run
by
its
existing
managers,
but
they would answer
to
the
trustees
of
the
trust
which owns
the shares,
and
the
trustees
would
answer
to
the
enforcer
(which
could
also
be
in
the
form
of
a
committee)
but
typically,
less
active
than
the
advisory
committee.
Finally,
most
business
purpose
trusts
contain
provisions
for
a
trust
protector
(or
protector
committee)
who
could
amend
the
trust,
change
the
trust
situs
or
governing
law,
or
the
rules
for removing
and
appointing members
of
the
other
commit-
tees.
Unless
otherwise
desired,
the
trust
could
prohibit
a
sale
of
the
company
or control
by
outside
investors.
Though
the above
arrangement
may
appear
to
take
away
benefits
from
the
family,
the
trust/business
structure
can be
quite
flexible.
For
example,
family
members
who
are
not
employed
by
the
company
could
hold
(individually
or
through
a
trust)
dividend-paying,
non-voting
shares
of
the
company,
generating
a
share
of
the
company
profits.
Family
mem-
bers
who
are
employed
by
the
company
can
receive
salaries and
bonuses
as
appropriate.
Once
the
decision
is
made
to
carry
on
the
business
for
the
family
(and
in
some
cases
for the
public)
in
perpetuity,
the
first
step,
of course,
is
to
transfer
the
ownership
and
control
of the
business
to
the
trust.
Un-
like
the
"normal"
trust,
unless
there
is
a
charitable
objective,
the
pur-
pose
trust
has
no
dispositive
provisions.
Replacing
the
dispositive
provision
is
the
statement
of
the
trust
purpose,
which
in
this
case
would
be the
maintenance
and
enhancement
of
the
Family Company.
In trans-
ferring
the
ownership
to
the
trust,
the
owners(s)
would
encounter
the
same
valuation
concerns
(minus
the
minority
discount)
as
with
any
other
transfer
of this
sort,
so
a
proper
valuation
is
important.
The larger
22
See
Susan
N.
Gary,
The
Oregon
Stewardship
Trust:
A
New
Type
of
Purpose
Trust
that
Enables
Steward-Ownership
of
a
Business,
88
U.
CIN.
L.
REv.
707,
720
(2020);
see
also
Howard
Zaritsky,
The
Rule
Against
Perpetuities:
A
Survey
of
State
(and
D.C.) Law,
ACTEC
ST.
SURVEY
2, 7,
8,
https://www.actec.org/assets/l/6/ZaritskyRAPSurvey.
pdf?hssc=1.
7
Fall
2021]
ACTEC
LAW
JOURNAL
practical
hurdle
typically
encountered
is
where
does
the
purchase
money
come
from?
In
at
least one
case,
the
trust
solicited
investors
to
purchase
bonds
with
an
attractive
interest
rate,
which
the
company
would
redeem
as
early
as
possible
from
its
operation
(a
"bootstrap"
sale).
23
In
cases
where
use
of
the
gift
tax
exemption
would
be
meaningful,
that
would
also
be
an
option.
Another
alternative
would
be
for the
company
to
issue
special,
callable,
non-voting
preferred
shares
with
a
high
dividend.
The
company
could
gradually
redeem
the
outstanding
preferred
shares.
Since
the
trust's
shares
are
not
owned
by
any
of
the
family
mem-
bers,
the
typical
problems
that
go
with
ownership
are
eliminated.
That
is,
family
ownership
or
control
disputes,
divorces,
early
death
or
incom-
petence,
creditor
attacks,
and
tax
issues
(discussed
below),
including
val-
uation
and
liquidity
problems,
are no longer
an
issue.
Once
the
owner(s)
has
made
a
completed
transfer,
either
by
sale
or
gift
for
valid
consideration,
barring
retention
of
excess
control,
the
value
of
the
company
should
not
be
included
in
the
transferor's
estate.
What
will
be
included,
depending
on
the
method
of
sale,
will
be
the
balance
of
any
sales
proceeds
remaining
on
death.
Efficient
tax
planning
could
re-
sult
in
saving
on
this
part
as
well.
Similarly,
since
the
other
family
mem-
bers
own
no
shares,
the
business
value
will
not
be
included
in
their
estates.
As
noted
above,
however,
the
original
owner(s)
must
be
careful
not
to
retain
control
over
the
shares
held
in
the
purpose
trust,
as
this
would
risk
estate
tax
exposure.
While
the
business
purpose
trust,
if
properly
structured,
would
seem
to
offer
near
"ideal"
tax
opportunities,
there
is
one
"catch"
to
the
tax
side of
it,
at
least
where
income
taxes
are
concerned.
Because
the
non-charitable
purpose
trust
is
so
rarely
used
in
this
country,
there
are
practically
no
rules
and
almost
no
tax
history
on
its
use.
All
that
we
have
at
this time
is
a
single
revenue
ruling
24
on
a
pet
trust
(also
a
non-charita-
ble
purpose
trust),
so
the
basic
structure
and
tax
treatment
of
this
trust
is
admittedly
the
same
as
a
business
purpose
trust.
In
that
ruling,
income
from
a
trust
was
to
be
used
for
the
maintenance
of
a
cat.
Since
Internal
Revenue
Code
("IRC")
section
661
allows
a
trustee
to
deduct
distribu-
tions
made
to
a
trust
beneficiary,
the
trustee
proposed
to
deduct
from
the
trust's
taxable
income
distributions
made
for
the
benefit
of
the
cat.
The
IRS
pointed
out
that
the
other
"side"
of
IRC
section
661
is
the
requirement
under
IRC
section
662
that
the
beneficiary
report
the
trust
distribution
as
income.
Since
the
cat
wouldn't
be
reporting
the
trust
in-
come,
the
trust
could
not
deduct
it.
Thus,
the
ruling
held
and
continues
23
See
generally
Michael
C.
Farrar,
"Bootstrap"
Sales
in the
Supreme
Court,
40
No-
TRE
DAME
L.
REv.
304
(1965)
(explaining
how
businesses
use
bootstrap
sales
to
avoid
taxes
and
how
this
practice
is
viewed
by
the
law).
24
See
Rev.
Rul.
76-486,
1976-2
C.B.
193.
[Vol.
47:3
8
PERPETUAL
BUSINESS
TRUSTS
to
stand
for
the
fact
that
unless
the
trust
distribution
will
be
reported
by
an
individual
or
non-charitable
entity
as
income,
the
trustee
will
not
be
entitled
to
a
section
661
deduction
for
the
distribution.
25
Accordingly,
even
if
the
purpose
trust
distributes
its
profits,
unless
the distribution
qualifies
as
a
charitable deduction
or
is
a
deductible
bus-
iness
or
investment
expense,
the
trust
will
be
taxed
on
its
income
at
the
higher
trust
tax
rates.
Estate
taxes
are
another
story, however.
Whereas
in
the
typical
suc-
cessful family
business
picture,
some
or
all
of
the
business value
would
be included
in
the owners' estates,
then
possibly again
in
subsequent
generations,
accompanied
of course
by
valuation
issues
and
possible
family
obstacles,
the
use
of
a
business
purpose
trust
could avoid
estate
taxes,
costs,
loss
of
value,
and
insure
longevity
of
the
business.
In
addi-
tion, it
has
been
found
that
the
purpose
trust
arrangement
results
in
greater
retention
of
employees,
as
they
don't
feel
they
are working
to
build
a
company
for
sale
to
others,
with
new
management
and
more
profit
for the
selling
shareholders.
26
More
specifically,
the
typical
objectives
of
a
purpose
trust
owner-
ship
would
reflect
the
following:
1.
Ensure
retention
and
continuation
of
the
business
indefinitely;
2.
Allow
family
members,
descendants,
and key
employees
to
manage
or
participate
in
management
of
the
business;
3.
Provide
benefits
to
family
members
in
and
out
of
the busi-
ness,
as
well
as
other
parties,
such
as
employees
and
charities;
4.
Consider
and
develop
the
favorable
impact
the
company
has
on
the
community;
5.
Protect
against
outside
disruptions
or
exposure
to
loss
of
business
ownership,
such
as
divorce,
lawsuits,
estate
dis-
putes,
and
the
like;
and
6.
Protect
against
sale
of
the
business
or
hostile
takeovers
by
outside
investors.
27
Once
the
decision
is
made
to
form
a
perpetual
business
purpose
trust,
and
the
decisions
regarding
trustees,
advisor,
enforcer,
and
protec-
tor
committees
are
thought
out,
the
next
important
issue
is
the
gov-
25
See
id.
A
"bootstrap"
sale
occurs
when
the
buyer's
payments
to
the
seller
are
made primarily
(sometimes totally)
from the
cash
produced
by
the item
purchased
by
the
buyer
(e.g.,
stock
dividends,
rent,
etc.).
See
Geoffrey
J.
Lanning,
Tax
Erosion
and
the
"Bootstrap
Sale"
of
a
Business-I,
108
U.
PA.
L. REV.
623,
623
(1960).
26
See
Alexander
A. Bove
Jr.,
The
Purpose
Trust
Has
a
New
Purpose,
PROB.
&
PROP.,
July/Aug.
2019,
at
40,
42.
27
Id.
Fall
2021]
9
ACTEC
LAW
JOURNAL
erning
law
of the
trust.
From
the
authors'
research,
the
better
states
to
consider
are,
in
this
order,
Oregon,
South
Dakota,
and
Delaware.
Ore-
gon
28
and
South
Dakota
29
are the
only
two
states
that
have
specific
pur-
pose
trusts
statutes,
and
all
three
allow
perpetual
purpose
trusts.
30
The
Oregon
statute
was
thoughtfully
and
specifically
designed
for the
estab-
lishment
of
a
business
purpose
trust,
and
in
fact,
unlike
any
other
juris-
diction,
domestic
and
international,
it
can't
be
used
for
any
non-business
type
of
purpose
trust.
31
Thus,
if
business
owners
wish
to
provide
for
con-
tinuation
and
growth
of
their
business
for
generations,
why
not
do-so
in
a
jurisdiction
with
laws
designed
for
that
very
purpose?
28
See
OR.
REV.
STAT.
§
130.193
(2019).
29
See
S.D.
CODIFIED
LAws
§
51-1-20
(2021).
30
See
OR.
REV.
STAT.
§
130.193(14);
see
also
Bove
Jr.,
supra
note
26,
at
42
(stating
that
Delaware,
New
Hampshire,
and
South
Dakota
allow
perpetual
purpose
trusts).
31
See
OR.
REV.
STAT.
§
130.193(1).
[Vol.
47:3
10
