REVISED ARIZONA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(CRIMINAL)
Fifth Edition, 2019
(Cite as RAJI (CRIMINAL) 5th)
Continuing Legal Education
Copyright © 1989, 1996, 2000, 2008, 20102019
Third Edition 2008
2010 Supplement April 2010
2011 Cumulative Supplement June 2011
2012 Cumulative Supplement June 2012
Third Edition December 2013
Fourth Edition December 2016
2017 Update March 2017
2018 Update July 2018
Fifth Edition September 2019
State Bar of Arizona
All Rights Reserved.
Library of Congress Number Applied for.
Printed in the United States of America
RAJI
(CRIMINAL) 5TH has been prepared by the Criminal Jury Instructions
Committee of the State Bar of Arizona. The State Bar Board of Governors has
approved these instructions and authorized their publication and sale.
These instructions are recommended for use in all criminal trials in Arizona courts.
But court and counsel should satisfy themselves in each casefrom original and
fully current authoritythat the instructions being given in a case are both
appropriate and correct for the case.
With regard to the use of these instructions, please refer to the Important Notice
immediately following.
PREFACE
This Fifth Edition, and prior editions, of REVISED CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (RAJI
CRIMINAL) is the product of thousands of hours of work by the State Bar of Arizona Criminal
Jury Instruction Committee. This project would not have been accomplished without the
dedicated work of the members of the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee. RAJI CRIMINAL,
5TH EDITION represents a collaborative effort by defense attorneys, prosecutors and judicial
officers.
The First Edition of RAJI
CRIMINAL was published in 1989 as RECOMMENDED ARIZONA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS. Those jury instructions were approved in advance of publication by the
Arizona Supreme Court. Subsequently, the Arizona Supreme Court stopped approving jury
instructions except in the context of appellate cases. Accordingly, the user is advised that these
instructions have not been approved by the Arizona Supreme Court.
The Second Edition of RAJI
CRIMINAL was published in 1996 under the renamed title
REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL), 2nd Edition. After publication of the 1996
RAJIs, the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee was assigned the task of revising the
instructions. A supplement was published in 2000. From 1997 to 2005, the Committee
completed the Standard Instructions, eight chapters in Title 13, Title 28 instructions and non-
capital case aggravation phase instructions. Work on the capital case instructions started in 2002
following the United State Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona. Since 2005, the
Committee completed over twenty-five chapters in Title 13 and four non-Title 13 chapters,
revamped Title 28 (predominantly DUI instructions) and drafted the capital case instructions,
amounting to over 400 individual instructions and verdict forms. A large bulk of these
instructions, including all the capital case instructions, did not even exist in the 1996 RAJI
CRIMINAL, 2nd Edition.
The Third Edition, published in 2008, represented a comprehensive revision to RAJI
CRIMINAL, 2nd Edition and its supplements. Subsequent editions include revisions based on
yearly legislative amendments to the Arizona Criminal Code.
Many of the jury instructions are accompanied by Use Notes and Comments. The Criminal
Jury Instruction Committee not only wants RAJI
CRIMINAL, 5th Edition to be a comprehensive
set of accurate jury instructions, but also a resource for the user wishing to do additional
research about issues related to criminal jury instructions.
We thank the past and present members of the Committee for their hard work in bringing
the third edition to fruition. We also thank Ilona Kukan from the State Bar staff for her
assistance and encouragement. The instructions remain a work in progress, so any suggestions
for revisions or for new instructions are always appreciated. The State Bar is committed to
keeping RAJI Criminal up-to-date with periodic supplements reflecting legislative changes and
the always evolving case law.
Hon. Sam J. Myers, Chair
June 2019
State Bar of Arizona
Criminal Jury Instructions Committee Members
1999-2019
Hon. Gary E. Donahoe, Chair (04-11)
Antonio R. Zúñiga, Chair (02-03)
Hon. James H. Keppel, Chair (98-02)
Hon. Paul J. McMurdie, Chair (11-13)
Hon. Sam J. Myers, Chair (15-19)
Lisa M. Aubuchon (00-10)
Hon. Jay R. Adleman (12-15)
Jennifer S. Bedier (05-06)
James P. Beene (03-15)
Matthew H. Binford (12-18)
Elizabeth T. Bingert (16-19
Hon. James G. Blake (96-01)
Michael V. Black (11-13)
Jocquese L. Blackwell (08-11)
Lawrence H. Blieden (08-14)
Michael A. Breeze (18-21)
Hon. Maria C. Brewer (12-19)
Brandon M. Brown (14-17)
Sean H. Bruner (98-02)
Hon. Douglas R. Camacho (15-18)
Theodore Campagnolo (99-13)
Flynn P. Carey (11-13)
C. Daniel Carrion (96-19)
Kent E. Cattani (06-12)
Bruce H. Chalk (09-19)
Joel Chorny 915-1
James P. Cleary (00-03)
Edwin M. Cook (99-01)
Sylvina D. Cotto (99-01)
William B. DeMars, Jr. (04-10)
David G. Derickson (13-14)
Hon. Gary E. Donahoe (02-08)
Hon. Sally Schneider Duncan (04-13)
David J. Euchner (10-19)
Hon. John M. Gaylord (02-03)
Stacey F. Gottlieb (97-01)
Robert K. Gundacker (11-17)
Hon. Philip Hall (99)
Paul W. Hawkins (16-19)
Hon. Ruth Hilliard (99)
Melissa Ho (07-13)
Hon. Jason R. Holmberg (18-19
Robb P. Holmes (05-19)
Jeremy D. Horn (14-17)
Hon. Jeffrey A. Hotham (98-01)
Joan N. Huls (98-01)
Patience Huntwork (99)
Hon. Brian K. Ishikawa (98-01)
Shawn A. Jensvold (10-13)
Alice M. Jones (18-19)
Monica B. Klapper (10-13)
Hon. Roger Kaufman (00)
Hon. John N. Lamb (05-17)
Todd C. Lawson (11-19)
Vikki M. Liles (13-16)
Jennifer K. Linn (16-19)
Hon. Danelle B. Liwski (18-19)
Comm. Steven P. Lynch (03-12)
Hon. Julie A. Mata (18-19)
Sarah L. Mayhew (18-19)
Joseph T. Maziarz (00-03)
Steve W. McCarthy (15-19)
Hon. Crane McClennen (98-03)
Jane E. McLaughlin (07)
Hon. Paul J. McMurdie (05-11
Hon. Colleen McNally (99-03)
Alicia M. Morrison Skupin (07-16)
Janet McNaughton (98-03)
Comm. Richard L. Nothwehr (06-12)
Ed Novak (99)
Victoria A. Otto (15-18)
Hon. Jose S. Padilla (00-16)
Hon James E. Padish (98-01)
Richard T. Platt (09-10)
Sigmund G. Popko (96-01)
Hon. Peter Reinstein (99)
Leonardo L. Ruiz (13-19)
Jon Sands (96-01)
Jeffrey Sandler (99)
Louis F. Stalzer (96-16)
Hon. Alicia M. Skupin (16-19)
Shawn L. Steinberg (18-19)
Mikel P. Steinfeld (13-19)
Patricia L. Stevens (06-11)
Joseph P. St. Louis (03-06)
Hon. Paul E. Tang (04-16)
Roberta L. Tepper (04-07)
Charles M. Thomas (04-13)
Anna M. Unterberger (99-12)
Kenneth N. Vick (13-19)
William S. Wallace (18-19)
Hon. Michael Wilkinson (99)
Hon. Gerald A. Williams (16-19)
Antonio R. Zúñiga (98-19)
IMPORTANT NOTICE
The following jury instructions have been prepared by the Criminal Jury Instruction
Committee of the State Bar of Arizona. The State Bar Board of Governors has authorized
the publication and distribution of these instructions for use where appropriate.
In the past, the Arizona Supreme Court expressed qualified approval for various jury
instructions, which were then published as RECOMMENDED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
However, before the last RAJI (Criminal) publication, the Arizona Supreme Court decided
not to issue or qualify approvals for any jury instructions. Due to the action by the Court,
members of the Board of Governors established guidelines for future RAJIs and decided
that this disclaimer should be included for all RAJIs. Accordingly, the instructions have also
been renamed R
EVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONSCRIMINAL (RAJI-CRIMINAL), 5
TH.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND APPROACH
RAJI instructions are designed to be neutral, brief, and simply worded. They should be
selected and edited to be case specific and non-RAJI instructions being added only to
the extent needed.
The Committee periodically adds new RAJI instructions. Nonetheless, certain omissions
are deliberate and are expected to be permanent. The Committee has intentionally left
out routinely requested argumentative instructions and those which explore overly
detailed rules of law.
The volume of instructions given to each jury should be held to a reasonable minimum.
Schwarzer, Communication with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REV. (1981). We
believe that juries function better when not overloaded with unfamiliar and unnecessary
information.
In most trials, the ordinary principles of law that apply to the facts provide both
necessary and sufficient bases for all jury instructions. Requested jury instructions
selectively quoting from appellate court opinions seldom are helpful, nor do they
generally reflect the kind of language best adapted to jury instructions. Such requests
often use language and concern subjects addressed to trial court judges and lawyers
rather than to jurors. Petefish v. Dawe, 137 Ariz. 570, 672 P.2d 914 (1983).
In Rosen v. Knaub, 175 Ariz. 329, 857 P.2d 381 (1993), the Arizona Supreme Court stated
that every reasonable precaution should be taken to avoid instructions which jurors
might think reflect the judge’s weighing of the evidence. Rosen also overruled the giving
of “sudden appearance” and “unusual event” instructions, giving reasons for rejecting
proposed jury instructions which fit nearly argumentative, narrow, and particularized
statements of law, whether they favor plaintiffs or defendants. RAJI instructions are
designed to follow the principles stated in Rosen.
COPYRIGHT 2019, STATE BAR OF ARIZONA i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS
1 Importance of Jury Service ...........................................................................................1
2 Duty of Jurors .................................................................................................................1
3 Evidence ..........................................................................................................................2
4 Direct and Circumstantial Evidence ............................................................................2
5 Stipulations ......................................................................................................................2
6 Evidence, Statements of Lawyers and Rulings ..........................................................3
7 Rulings of the Court ......................................................................................................3
8 Exclusion of Witnesses ..................................................................................................4
9 Bench Conferences and Recesses ................................................................................4
10 Credibility of Witnesses .................................................................................................5
11 Expert Witness................................................................................................................5
12 No Transcript Available to Jury; Taking Notes .........................................................6
13 Admonition .....................................................................................................................6
14 Media Coverage ..............................................................................................................8
15 Presence of a Deputy .....................................................................................................8
16 Questions by Jurors .......................................................................................................9
17 Alternate Jurors ...............................................................................................................9
18 Constitutional Right Not to Testify .......................................................................... 10
19 Statements of Defendant ........................................................................................... 10
20 Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof .................................................. 10
21 Jury to Be Guided by Official English Translation/Interpretation
(Short Version) ........................................................................................................... 11
21 Jury to Be Guided by Official English Translation/Interpretation
(Long Version) ............................................................................................................ 12
21.1 Interpreter for the Defendant ................................................................................... 12
21.2 Citizenship/Nationality Instruction ......................................................................... 12
22 The Charged Offense ................................................................................................. 13
23 Scheduling During Trial ............................................................................................. 13
24 Order of Trial ............................................................................................................... 13
S
TANDARD CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS
1 Duty of Jury .................................................................................................................. 15
2 Indictment/Information Is Not Evidence .............................................................. 15
3 Presumption of Innocence ........................................................................................ 15
4(a) Burden of Proof .......................................................................................................... 16
4(b) Standards for the Burden of Proof ........................................................................... 17
5 Jury Not to Consider Penalty .................................................................................... 17
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6 Defendant’s Right to Represent Himself/Herself ................................................. 18
7 Defendant Absent at Trial.......................................................................................... 18
8 Evidence to Be Considered........................................................................................ 18
9 Defendant Need Not Produce Evidence ................................................................ 19
10 Lawyers’ Comments Are Not Evidence .................................................................. 19
11 Stipulations ................................................................................................................... 19
12 Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts ....................................................................... 20
13 Redacted Exhibits ........................................................................................................ 20
14 Direct and Circumstantial Evidence ......................................................................... 20
15 Credibility [Believability] of Witnesses ..................................................................... 21
16 Testimony of Law Enforcement Officers ............................................................... 21
17 Expert Witness ............................................................................................................. 21
18(a) Defendant Need Not Testify ..................................................................................... 22
18(b) Defendant’s Testimony .............................................................................................. 22
19 Voluntariness of Defendant’s Statements) .............................................................. 22
20 Reserved ........................................................................................................................ 22
21 Defendant Witness (Prior Conviction) .................................................................... 23
22 Witness (Prior Conviction) ........................................................................................ 23
23 Evidence for Limited Purpose .................................................................................. 24
24 Other Acts .................................................................................................................... 24
25 Character Evidence in Sexual Misconduct Cases ................................................... 24
26 Character and Reputation of the Defendant ........................................................... 25
27 Facility Dog .................................................................................................................. 25
28 Absence of Other Participant .................................................................................... 26
29 Consider Evidence Separately ................................................................................... 26
30 Separate Counts ........................................................................................................... 26
31 Dismissal/Severance of Some Charges Against Defendant ................................. 27
32 Disposition of charge Against Defendant ............................................................... 27
33 Multiple Acts ................................................................................................................ 27
34 Reserved ........................................................................................................................ 28
35 Voluntary Act ............................................................................................................... 28
36 Lesser-Included Offense ............................................................................................ 28
37 Possession Defined ..................................................................................................... 29
38 Deliberate Ignorance ................................................................................................... 30
39 Involuntary Intoxication ............................................................................................. 31
40 Flight or Concealment ................................................................................................ 32
41 Threats by Defendant ................................................................................................. 32
42 Lost, Destroyed, or Unpreserved Evidence ............................................................ 33
43 Mere Presence .............................................................................................................. 33
44 Motive ........................................................................................................................... 34
45 Identification ................................................................................................................ 34
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46 Alibi or Non-Presence of the Defendant ................................................................ 35
47 Third Party Culpability ............................................................................................... 35
48 Reserved ........................................................................................................................ 36
49 Reserved ........................................................................................................................ 36
50 Reserved ........................................................................................................................ 36
51 Jury Foreperson ........................................................................................................... 36
52 Closing Instruction ...................................................................................................... 36
53 Impasse Instruction .................................................................................................... 37
54 Reconstituting the Jury ............................................................................................... 38
55 Jury Polling ................................................................................................................... 39
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 1
1.052 Act Defined .................................................................................................................. 41
1.053 Benefit Defined .......................................................................................................... 41
1.054 Calendar Year Defined ............................................................................................... 41
1.056 Conduct Defined ......................................................................................................... 41
1.057 Crime Defined ............................................................................................................. 41
1.058 Criminal Street Gang Defined ................................................................................... 41
1.059 Criminal Street Gang Member Defined ................................................................... 41
1.0510(a)(1) Intentionally or With Intent To Defined ................................................................. 42
1.0510(a)(2) Intent Inference ...................................................................................................... 42
1.0510(b) Knowingly Defined .................................................................................................... 42
1.0510(c) Recklessly (Reckless Disregard) Defined ................................................................ 43
1.0510(d) Criminal Negligence ................................................................................................... 44
1.0510.01 Included Mental State Knowingly ......................................................................... 44
1.0510.02 Included Mental State Recklessly .......................................................................... 44
1.0510.03 Included Mental State Criminal Negligence ........................................................ 44
1.0512 Dangerous Instrument Defined ................................................................................ 45
1.0513 Dangerous Offense Defined ..................................................................................... 45
1.0514 Deadly Physical Force Defined ................................................................................ 45
1.0515 Deadly Weapon Defined ........................................................................................... 45
1.0516 Economic Loss Defined ........................................................................................... 46
1.0517 Enterprise Defined ...................................................................................................... 46
1.0518 Felony Defined ............................................................................................................ 46
1.0519 Firearm Defined .......................................................................................................... 46
1.0523 Human Smuggling Organization Defined - Deleted ............................................. 46
1.0524 Intoxication Defined ................................................................................................... 46
1.0528 Omission Defined ....................................................................................................... 47
1.0529 Peace Officer Defined ................................................................................................ 47
1.0530 Person Defined ............................................................................................................ 47
REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL, 5TH
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1.0532 Physical Force Defined ............................................................................................... 47
1.0533 Physical Injury Defined .............................................................................................. 47
1.0534 Possess Defined ........................................................................................................... 47
1.0535 Possession Defined ..................................................................................................... 47
1.0537 Property Defined ......................................................................................................... 47
1.0538 Public Servant Defined .............................................................................................. 48
1.0539 Serious Physical Injury Defined ............................................................................... 48
1.0540 Unlawful Defined ........................................................................................................ 48
1.0541 Vehicle Defined ........................................................................................................... 48
1.0542 Voluntary Act Defined ............................................................................................... 49
1.0543 Voluntary Intoxication Defined ................................................................................ 49
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 2
2.024 Transferred Intent ...................................................................................................... 51
2.025 Affirmative Defense .................................................................................................... 51
2.03 Causation Instruction Intervening Event............................................................. 52
2.03.02 Causation Instruction Pre-existing Physical Condition ..................................... 53
2.03.03 Causation (Multiple Actors) ....................................................................................... 53
2.04.01(A) Causation Ignorance of Fact ...................................................................................... 53
2.04.02(B) Causation Ignorance of Law ...................................................................................... 53
2.06 Entrapment ................................................................................................................. 54
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 3
3.01 Accomplice .................................................................................................................. 55
3.05 Enterprise Liability ...................................................................................................... 55
3.06 Personal Liability for Conduct of an Enterprise..................................................... 56
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 4
4.02 Justification Defense in Execution of Public Duty ................................................ 57
4.03 Justification: Use of Physical Force .......................................................................... 58
4.04 Justification for Self-Defense..................................................................................... 59
4.04-1 Non-Justification for Threat or Use of Physical Force ......................................... 61
4.05 Justification for Self-Defense Physical Force .......................................................... 62
4.06 Justification for Defense of a Third Person ............................................................ 64
4.07 Justification in Defense of Premises ......................................................................... 66
4.08 Justification in Defense of Property ......................................................................... 67
4.09 Justification for Use of Physical Force in Law Enforcement ............................... 68
4.10(1) Justification for Threatened Deadly Physical Force in Law Enforcement ......... 68
4.10(2) Justification for Using Deadly Physical Force in Law Enforcement by a
Non-Peace Officer ...................................................................................................... 70
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4.10(3a) Justification for Using Deadly Physical Force in Law Enforcement by a
Peace Officer ................................................................................................................ 71
4.10(3b) Justification for Using Deadly Physical Force in Law Enforcement by a
Peace Officer ................................................................................................................ 72
4.10(4) Justification for Threatening Deadly Physical Force in Law
Enforcement by a Peace Officer ............................................................................... 74
4.11 Use of Force in Crime Prevention ............................................................................ 74
4.12 Duress ........................................................................................................................... 76
4.14 Justification for Correctional Officer to Use Reasonable and Necessary
Means ............................................................................................................................ 77
4.15 Justification – Domestic Violence ............................................................................ 77
4.16 Justification for Security Officer to Use Reasonable and Necessary Means ...... 78
4.16(1) Security Officer Defined ............................................................................................ 78
4.16(2) Private Contractor Defined ....................................................................................... 79
4.17 Necessity Defense ....................................................................................................... 79
4.18 Justification for Using Force in Defense of Residential Structure or
Occupied Vehicles ....................................................................................................... 80
4.19 Justification: Presumption and Exceptions ............................................................. 80
4.21 Justification: Defensive Display of a Firearm ......................................................... 81
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 5 INSTRUCTIONS
5.02 Insanity (Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity) (for offenses committed
prior to January 2, 1994) ............................................................................................. 83
5.02-1 Insanity (Guilty Except Insane) (for offenses committed on or after
January 2, 1994) ........................................................................................................... 84
5.02-2 Insanity (Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity) (for offenses committed
prior to January 2, 1994) ............................................................................................. 85
5.03-1a Effect of Non-Prescribed Alcohol or Drug Use or Abuse of Prescribed
Medication (Non-Insanity Case) ............................................................................... 86
5.03-1b Effect of Non-Prescribed Alcohol or Drug Use or Abuse of Prescribed
Medication (Insanity Case) ......................................................................................... 87
5.03-2a Effect of Non-Abusive Use of Prescribed Medication (Non-Insanity
Case) .............................................................................................................................. 87
5.03-2b Effect of Non-Abusive Use of Prescribed Medication (Insanity Case) .............. 88
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 7 INSTRUCTIONS
7.04 Dangerous Offense Defined ..................................................................................... 91
7.05 Dangerous Crime Against a Child ............................................................................ 92
7.05 Verdict Form ................................................................................................................ 93
7.08-C Release Status ............................................................................................................... 93
7.08-C Verdict Form ................................................................................................................ 96
7.08-D Release Status ............................................................................................................... 96
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7.08-D Verdict Form ................................................................................................................ 97
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 10 INSTRUCTIONS
10.01 Attempt ......................................................................................................................... 99
10.02 Solicitation .................................................................................................................. 100
10.031 Elements of Conspiracy ........................................................................................... 100
10.032 Relationship Among Multiple Co-Conspirators (Deleted) ................................. 101
10.033 Liability for a Single Conspiracy to Commit Multiple Offenses ........................ 101
10.034 Verdict Form Deleted with Explanatory Note ..................................................... 101
10.035 Liability for Other Conspirator’s Acts Deleted with Explanatory Note ........... 101
10.036 Mere Association Not Sufficient for Conspiracy ................................................. 102
10.037 Scope of Proof of Conspiracy ................................................................................. 102
10.038 Proof of Membership in Conspiracy ...................................................................... 103
10.039 Acts and Statements of Co-Conspirators .............................................................. 103
10.0310 Consideration of Evidence of Success of Conspiracy ......................................... 104
10.0312 Definition of “Overt Act” for Conspiracy ............................................................ 104
10.0313 Conspiracy Guilt of Substantive Offense ......................................................... 104
10.04 Facilitation .................................................................................................................. 105
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 11 INSTRUCTIONS
11.02 Negligent Homicide .................................................................................................. 107
11.03A1 Manslaughter .............................................................................................................. 118
11.03A2 Manslaughter by Sudden Quarrel or Heat of Passion ......................................... 109
11.03A3 Manslaughter by Aiding Suicide .............................................................................. 110
11.03A4 Manslaughter by Coercion ....................................................................................... 110
11.03A5 Manslaughter of Unborn Child ............................................................................... 110
11.04 Second-Degree Murder ............................................................................................ 112
11.04A Second-Degree Murder (Mother and Unborn child) ........................................... 113
11.05 First-Degree Premeditated Murder ......................................................................... 114
11.05A1 First-Degree Murder of an Unborn Child ............................................................. 116
11.05A3 First Degree Murder of a Law Enforcement Officer .......................................... 116
11.052 First Degree Felony Murder .................................................................................... 117
Sample Instruction with Lesser-Included Offenses Instruction and
Verdict Form .............................................................................................................. 117
Sample Instruction with Lesser Included Offenses of First-Degree
Murder and Verdict Form ........................................................................................ 118
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 12
12.01 Endangerment ............................................................................................................ 123
12.02 Threatening or Intimidating ..................................................................................... 123
12.03 Assault ......................................................................................................................... 124
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12.04 Aggravated Assault General ................................................................................ 124
12.04B Aggravated Assault – Domestic Violence ............................................................. 126
12.048 Aggravated Assault Upon Teacher or School Employee .................................... 127
12.04.09A Aggravated Assault Control of Officer’s Firearm ............................................ 127
12.04.09B Aggravated Assault Control of Officer’s Weapon Other Than a Firearm ... 128
12.04.09C Aggravated Assault Control of Officer’s Implement Other Than a
Firearm ........................................................................................................................ 128
12.04.10 Aggravated Assault Defendant in Custody ........................................................ 129
12.05 Unlawfully Administering Intoxicating Liquors or Drug .................................... 129
12.06 Dangerous or Deadly Assault by a Prisoner ......................................................... 130
12.07 Prisoners [Committing Assault with Intent to Incite to Riot/Participate
in a Riot]...................................................................................................................... 130
12.08 Assault: Vicious Animals .......................................................................................... 131
12.09 Drive-By Shooting .................................................................................................... 131
12.11 Discharging Firearm at a Structure ......................................................................... 131
12.12 Prisoner Assault with Bodily Fluids ....................................................................... 132
12.14 Unlawful Mutilation .................................................................................................. 132
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 13
13.01 Restrain Defined ........................................................................................................ 135
13.02 Custodial Interference .............................................................................................. 135
13.02 Verdict Form Custodial Interference ................................................................... 136
13.02C Defense to Custodial Interference .......................................................................... 137
13.031 Unlawful Imprisonment ........................................................................................... 138
13.032 Unlawful Imprisonment Defense ...................................................................... 138
13.04 Kidnapping ................................................................................................................. 139
13.05 Access Interference ................................................................................................... 140
13.06 Unlawfully Obtaining Labor or Services ............................................................... 140
13.07.01 Sex Trafficking ........................................................................................................... 140
13.07.02 Sex Trafficking of a Minor ....................................................................................... 142
13.07.A Sex Trafficking (Victim Eighteen Years of Age or Older) ................................. 143
13.07.B Sex Trafficking (Victim Under Eighteen Years of Age)...................................... 143
13.08 Trafficking of Persons for Forced Labor or Services .......................................... 144
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 14
14.01.01 Oral Sexual Contact Defined ................................................................................... 147
14.01.02 Position of Trust Defined ........................................................................................ 147
14.01.03 Sexual Contact Defined ............................................................................................ 147
14.01.04 Sexual Intercourse Defined...................................................................................... 147
14.01.05 Spouse Defined .......................................................................................................... 147
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14.01.06 Teacher Defined ........................................................................................................ 147
14.01.07 Without Consent Defined ........................................................................................ 148
14.02 Indecent Exposure .................................................................................................... 148
14.03 Public Sexual Indecency to a Minor ....................................................................... 149
14.04 Sexual Abuse .............................................................................................................. 149
14.05.01 Sexual Conduct with a Minor ................................................................................. 150
14.05.02 Sexual Conduct with a Minor – Special Relationship .......................................... 151
14.06.01 Sexual Assault ............................................................................................................. 152
14.06.02 Sexual Assault Aggravation Instruction if Use of Drugs Alleged .................. 153
14.06.03 Sexual Assault Aggravation Instruction for the Allegation of Serious
Physical Injury ............................................................................................................ 154
14.07.01 Defense to Sexual Abuse .......................................................................................... 154
14.07.02 Defense to Sexual Conduct with a Minor.............................................................. 155
14.07.03 Emergency Occurrence Defense to Indecent Exposure, Sexual Abuse,
Sexual Conduct with a Minor, or Sexual Assault .................................................. 155
14.07.04 Lack of Sexual Interest Defense to Sexual Abuse and Molestation of
Child ............................................................................................................................ 156
14.07.05 Defense Based on Age to Sexual Conduct with a Minor or Aggravated
Luring a Minor for Sexual Exploitation ................................................................. 156
14.09 Unlawful Sexual Conduct by Probation Department Employees ..................... 157
14.10 Molestation of a Child .............................................................................................. 158
14.11.01 Bestiality ...................................................................................................................... 158
14.11.02 Bestiality ...................................................................................................................... 159
14.17 Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child ...................................................................... 159
14.18 Sexual Misconduct by a Licensed Behavioral Health Professional .................... 160
14.19.1 Unlawful Sexual Conduct by a Correctional Employee ...................................... 161
14.23 Violent Sexual Assault .............................................................................................. 164
14.24.01 Voyeurism ................................................................................................................... 162
14.24.02 Voyeurism ................................................................................................................... 164
14.25.01 Unlawful Distribution of Recognizable Images.................................................... 165
14.28 Sexual Extortion ........................................................................................................ 166
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 15
15.01(1) Critical Public Service Facility Defined .................................................................. 167
15.01(2) Enter or Remain Defined ......................................................................................... 167
15.01(3) Entry Defined ............................................................................................................ 167
15.01(4) Fenced Commercial Yard Defined ......................................................................... 167
15.01(6) Fenced Residential Yard Defined ........................................................................... 168
15.01(7) In the Course of Committing Defined ................................................................... 168
15.01(8) Manipulation Key Defined....................................................................................... 168
15.01(9) Master Key Defined .................................................................................................. 168
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15.01(10) Nonresidential Structure Defined ........................................................................... 168
15.01(11) Residential Structure Defined .................................................................................. 168
15.01(12) Structure Defined ...................................................................................................... 168
15.01(13) Vending Machine Defined ....................................................................................... 168
15.04 Criminal Trespass in the First Degree .................................................................... 169
15.05A1 Possession of Burglary Tools .................................................................................. 169
15.05A2.1 Possession of Master Key ........................................................................................ 170
15.05A2.2 Possession of Manipulation Keys ........................................................................... 170
15.05A2.3 Possession of a Manipulation Key .......................................................................... 170
15.06 Burglary in the Third Degree ................................................................................... 171
15.07 Burglary in the Second Degree ................................................................................ 171
15.08 First Degree Burglary ................................................................................................ 172
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 16
16.006 Tampering with Utility Property Defined ............................................................. 175
16.011 Damaging or Damage Defined ............................................................................... 175
16.012 Defacing Defined ..................................................................................................... 175
16.013 Litter Defined ............................................................................................................ 175
16.014 Property of Another Defined .................................................................................. 176
16.015 Tamper Defined ....................................................................................................... 176
16.016 Utility Defined .......................................................................................................... 176
16.02 Criminal Damage ....................................................................................................... 176
16.021 Criminal Damage to a Utility ................................................................................... 177
16.022 Criminal Damage to a Utility – Verdict Form ...................................................... 177
16.023 Criminal Damage – Verdict Form .......................................................................... 178
16.04 Aggravated Criminal Damage.................................................................................. 178
16.041 Aggravated Criminal Damage Form of Verdict............................................... 179
16.05 Aggregation of Amounts for Criminal Damage ................................................... 180
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 17
17.01(1) Damage Defined........................................................................................................ 181
17.01(2) Occupied Structure Defined .................................................................................... 181
17.01(3) Property Defined ....................................................................................................... 181
17.01(4) Structure Defined ...................................................................................................... 181
17.01(5) Wildland Defined ...................................................................................................... 181
17.02 Reckless Burning ....................................................................................................... 181
17.03 Arson of a Structure or Property ............................................................................ 182
17.04 Arson of an Occupied Structure ............................................................................. 183
17.05 Arson of an Occupied Jail or Prison Facility ........................................................ 183
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STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 18
18.01(1) Check Defined ........................................................................................................... 185
18.01(2) Control or Exercise Control Defined..................................................................... 185
18.01(3) Credit Defined ........................................................................................................... 185
18.01(4) Deprive Defined ........................................................................................................ 185
18.01(5) Draw Defined ............................................................................................................ 185
18.01(6) Funds Defined ........................................................................................................... 185
18.01(7) Issue Defined ............................................................................................................. 185
18.01(8) Material Misrepresentation Defined ....................................................................... 186
18.09(9) Means of Transportation Defined .......................................................................... 186
18.01(10) Obtain Defined .......................................................................................................... 186
18.01(11) Pass Defined ............................................................................................................... 186
18.01(12) Property Defined ....................................................................................................... 186
18.01(13) Property of Another Defined .................................................................................. 186
18.01(14) Services Defined ........................................................................................................ 186
18.01(15) Value Defined ............................................................................................................ 187
18.01(15).01 Value of Ferrous or Nonferrous Metal Defined .................................................. 187
18.01(16) Drawee Defined ......................................................................................................... 187
18.01(17) Drawer Defined ......................................................................................................... 187
18.02.01 Theft ............................................................................................................................ 188
18.02.02 Theft (Vulnerable Adult) .......................................................................................... 189
18.02.02A Inference Relating to theft from Vulnerable Adult (for Offenses
Committed On or After September 30, 2009 ....................................................... 191
18.02.02B Affirmative Defense to Theft from a Vulnerable Adult (for Offenses
Committed On or After September 30, 2009 ....................................................... 192
18.02.03 Inference Relating to actions for Theft of Ferrous and Nonferrous
Metal ............................................................................................................................ 193
18.02.04 Inference Relating to Actions for Theft of Ferrous or Nonferrous
Metal ............................................................................................................................ 193
18.027 Definition of Value in Theft Cases ......................................................................... 194
18.028 Verdict Form Instruction for Chapter 18 Offenses ............................................. 195
18.03 Unlawful Use of Means of Transportation ........................................................... 195
18.04.01 Theft by Extortion .................................................................................................... 196
18.04.02 Affirmative Defense to Theft by Extortion under A.R.S. § 13-
1804(A)(5) or (7) ........................................................................................................ 197
18.05(1) Continuing Criminal Episode Defined .................................................................. 198
18.05.01 Shoplifting .................................................................................................................. 198
18.05.02A Shoplifting (With an Artifice or Prior Convictions) (For Offenses
Committed Prior to September 19, 2007) ............................................................. 200
18.05.03B Inference Relating to Shoplifting (for offenses committed on or after
September 19, 2007 ................................................................................................... 201
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18.06.B Unlawful Failure to Return Rented or Leased Property...................................... 202
18.07.01 Issuing a Bad Check .................................................................................................. 203
18.07.02 Affirmative Defense to Theft by Issuing a Bad Check ....................................... 204
18.08.01 Inferences Relating to Issuing a Bad Check .......................................................... 205
18.08.02 Inferences Relating to Theft of Property or Services by Issuing a Bad
Check ........................................................................................................................... 206
18.13 Unlawful Failure to Return a Motor Vehicle Subject to a Security Interest ..... 207
18.13.01 Affirmative Defense to Unlawful Failure to Return a Motor Vehicle
Subject to a Security Interest ................................................................................... 208
18.14 Theft of Means of Transportation .......................................................................... 209
18.15 Unlawful Use of Power of Attorney ...................................................................... 210
18.16(1) Merchant Defined ..................................................................................................... 211
18.16.01 Unlawful Manufacture or Sale of a Theft Detection Shielding Device ............ 211
18.16.02 Unlawful Possession of a Theft Detection Shielding Device ............................. 211
18.16.03 Unlawful Possession of a Theft Detection Device Remover ............................. 212
18.16.04 Unlawful Removal of a Theft Detection Shielding Device ................................ 212
18.17 Unlawful Possession, Use or Alteration of a Retail Sales Receipt or
Universal Product Code Label ................................................................................ 213
18.18 Misappropriation of Charter School Monies ........................................................ 213
18.19 Organized Retail Theft ............................................................................................. 214
18A1 Verdict Form (Theft & Unlawful Use of Power of Attorney) For All
Offenses Occurring Prior to September 21, 2006................................................ 215
18A2 Verdict Form (Theft & Unlawful Use of Power of Attorney) For All
Offenses Occurring After September 21, 2006 .................................................... 217
18B1 Verdict Form (Shoplifting) For All Offenses Occurring Prior to
September 21, 2006 ................................................................................................... 219
18B2 Verdict Form (Shoplifting) For All Offenses Occurring After
September 21, 2006 and Prior to September 19, 2007 ........................................ 220
18B3 Verdict Form (Shoplifting) For All Offenses Occurring On or After
September 19, 2007 ................................................................................................... 221
18C Verdict Form (Misappropriation of Charter School Monies) ............................ 223
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 19
19.02 Robbery ....................................................................................................................... 225
19.03 Aggravated Robbery ................................................................................................. 225
19.04 Armed Robbery ......................................................................................................... 226
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STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 20
20.02 Forgery ........................................................................................................................ 229
20.02.C Forgery in Connection With a Drop House ......................................................... 230
20.03 Criminal Possession of a Forgery Device .............................................................. 230
20.04 Criminal Simulation ................................................................................................... 230
20.06 Criminal Impersonation ........................................................................................... 231
20.08 Taking the Identity of a Person or Entity .............................................................. 231
20.08.A Taking the Identity of a Person or Entity .............................................................. 232
20.08.B Knowingly Accepting the Identity of Another Person ........................................ 233
20.09.A Aggravated Taking the Identity of a Person or Entity......................................... 233
20.09.B Knowingly Accepting the Identity of Another Person ........................................ 235
20.10 Trafficking in the Identity of Another Person or Entity ..................................... 236
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 21
21.01.01 Cancelled or Revoked Credit Card Defined .......................................................... 239
21.01.02 Cardholder Defined .................................................................................................. 239
21.01.03 Credit Card Defined .................................................................................................. 240
21.01.04 Expired Credit Card Defined .................................................................................. 240
21.01.05 Incomplete Credit Card Defined ............................................................................ 241
21.01.06 Issuer Defined ............................................................................................................ 241
21.01.07 Merchant Defined ..................................................................................................... 241
21.01.08 Participating Party Defined ...................................................................................... 242
21.01.09 Receives or Receiving Defined ................................................................................ 242
21.01.10 Reencoder Defined ................................................................................................... 243
21.01.11 Scanning Device Defined ......................................................................................... 243
21.02 Theft of a Credit Card or Obtaining a Credit Card by Fraudulent Means ....... 243
21.02-1 Affirmative Defense to Theft of a Credit Card or Obtaining a Credit
Card by Fraudulent Means ....................................................................................... 245
21.03 Receipt of Anything of Value Obtained by Fraudulent Use of a Credit
Card ............................................................................................................................. 246
21.04 Forgery of Credit Card ............................................................................................. 247
21.05 Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card ............................................................................. 248
21.06 Possession of Machinery, Plate or Other Contrivance ........................................ 249
21.07 False Statement as to Financial Condition or Identity ......................................... 250
21.08 Fraud by a Person Authorized to Provide Goods or Services ........................... 251
21.09-1 Credit Card Transaction Record Theft (Defendant-Merchant) ......................... 252
21.09-2 Credit Card Transaction Record Theft (Defendant Not a Merchant) .............. 252
21.10-1 Unlawful Use of Scanning Device or Reencoder ................................................. 253
21.10-2 Unlawful Possession of Scanning Device or Reencoder ..................................... 254
21.03A Verdict Form Receipt of Anything of Value by Fraudulent Use of a
Credit Card ................................................................................................................. 255
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21.05A Verdict Form Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card ................................................ 256
21.09A Verdict Form – Credit Card Transaction Record Theft No Scheme or
Course of Conduct Alleged ..................................................................................... 257
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 22
22.04 Defrauding Secured Creditors ................................................................................. 259
22.05 Defrauding Judgment Creditors .............................................................................. 259
22.06 Fraud in Insolvency................................................................................................... 260
22.07 Receiving Deposits in an Insolvent Financial Institution ................................... 260
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 23
23.01.A.01 Collect an Extension of Credit Defined ................................................................ 263
23.01.A.02 Creditor Defined ....................................................................................................... 263
23.01.A.03 Debtor Defined ......................................................................................................... 263
23.01.A.04 Extend Credit Defined ............................................................................................. 263
23.01.A.05 Extortionate Extension of Credit Defined ............................................................ 263
23.01.A.06 Extortionate Means Defined ................................................................................... 263
23.01.A.07 Repayment of Any Extension of Credit Defined ................................................. 264
23.01.B.01 Dealer in Property Defined ..................................................................................... 264
23.01.B.02 Stolen Property Defined ........................................................................................... 264
23.01.B.03 Traffic Defined .......................................................................................................... 264
23.01.C.01 Animal Activity Defined .......................................................................................... 264
23.01.C.02 Animal Facility Defined............................................................................................ 265
23.01.C.03 Animal or Ecological Terrorism Defined .............................................................. 265
23.01.C.04 Biological Agent Defined ......................................................................................... 265
23.01.C.05 Combination Defined ............................................................................................... 265
23.01.C.06 Communication Service Provider Defined ........................................................... 265
23.01.C.07 Criminal Syndicate Defined ..................................................................................... 266
23.01.C.08 Explosive Agent Defined ......................................................................................... 266
23.01.C.09 Material Support or Resources Defined ................................................................ 266
23.01.C.10 Public Establishment Defined ................................................................................. 266
23.01.C.11 Research Facility Defined ........................................................................................ 266
23.01.C.12 Terrorism Defined .................................................................................................... 266
23.01.C.13 Toxin Defined ............................................................................................................ 267
23.01.C.14 Vector Defined .......................................................................................................... 267
23.01.C.15 Weapon of Mass Destruction Defined .................................................................. 267
23.01.D.01 Control Defined ........................................................................................................ 268
23.01.D.02 Enterprise Defined .................................................................................................... 268
23.01.D.03 Financial Institution Defined................................................................................... 268
23.01.D.04 Racketeering Defined................................................................................................ 268
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23.01.D.05 Records Defined ........................................................................................................ 270
23.01.E.01 Access Defined .......................................................................................................... 270
23.01.E.02 Access Device Defined ............................................................................................. 270
23.01.E.03 Computer Defined .................................................................................................... 270
23.01.E.04 Computer Contaminant Defined ............................................................................ 270
23.01.E.05 Computer Program Defined .................................................................................... 271
23.01.E.06 Computer Software Defined.................................................................................... 271
23.01.E.07 Computer System Defined ....................................................................................... 271
23.01.E.08 Critical Infrastructure Resource Defined ............................................................... 271
23.01.E.09 False or Fraudulent Pretense Defined .................................................................... 271
23.01.E.10 Financial Instrument Defined ................................................................................. 271
23.01.E.11 Network Defined ....................................................................................................... 272
23.01.E.12 Property Defined ....................................................................................................... 272
23.01.E.13 Proprietary or Confidential Computer Security Information Defined ............. 272
23.01.E.14 Services Defined ........................................................................................................ 272
23.05 Permissible Inferences Relating to Theft under A.R.S. §§ 13-802(A)(5)
and 13-1814(A)(5)...................................................................................................... 272
23.06 Possession of Altered Property ............................................................................... 274
23.07.01 Trafficking in Stolen Property in the Second Degree .......................................... 274
23.07.02 Trafficking in Stolen Property in the First Degree ............................................... 275
23.08.A Participating in a Criminal Syndicate ...................................................................... 276
23.08.A.5 Involving a Minor in Participating in a Criminal Syndicate ................................ 277
23.08.C Assisting a Criminal Syndicate ................................................................................. 278
23.08.01 Terrorism .................................................................................................................... 278
23.08.01.A.4 Terrorism (Weapon of Mass Destruction) ........................................................... 281
23.08.02.A Making a Terrorist Threat ........................................................................................ 281
23.08.02.B False Reporting of Terrorism .................................................................................. 282
23.08.03 Unlawful Use of Infectious Biological Substance or Radiological Agent ......... 282
23.09 Bribery of a Sports Participant ................................................................................ 284
23.10 Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices .......................................................................... 284
23.11 Willful Concealment.................................................................................................. 285
23.12A Illegal Control of an Enterprise............................................................................... 286
23.12B Illegally Conducting an Enterprise .......................................................................... 286
23.12C(1) Illegal Control of an Enterprise Utilizing a Minor ............................................... 287
23.12C(2) Illegally Conducting an Enterprise Utilizing a Minor .......................................... 287
23.16.A.1 Computer Tampering ............................................................................................... 288
23.16.A.2 Computer Tampering ............................................................................................... 288
23.16.A.3 Computer Tampering ............................................................................................... 290
23.16.A.4 Computer Tampering ............................................................................................... 290
23.16.A.5 Computer Tampering ............................................................................................... 291
23.16.A.7 Computer Tampering ............................................................................................... 292
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23.16.A.8 Computer Tampering ............................................................................................... 293
23.16.E Critical Infrastructure Instruction ........................................................................... 293
23.16.01 Unlawful Possession of an Access Device ............................................................ 294
23.16.01(B) Permissible Inference ................................................................................................ 296
23.16.02 Unauthorized Release of Proprietary or Confidential Computer Security
Information ................................................................................................................ 296
23.16.02.D Critical Infrastructure Instruction ........................................................................... 297
23.17.A Money Laundering in the First Degree .................................................................. 298
23.17.B Money Laundering in the Second Degree ............................................................. 299
23.17.C Money Laundering in the Third Degree ................................................................ 300
23.19.01 Smuggling of Human Beings ................................................................................... 301
23.19.02 Additional Finding Regarding Human Smuggling (with Table of
Consanguinity) ........................................................................................................... 301
23.20.01 Residential Mortgage Fraud ..................................................................................... 302
23.20.02 Pattern of Residential Mortgage Fraud .................................................................. 302
23.21.A Participating in a Criminal Street Gang.................................................................. 303
23.21.B Assisting a Criminal Street Gang ............................................................................ 304
23.22 Unlawful Transaction Involving Drop Houses .................................................... 305
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 24
24.01 Dissemination of Personal Information on the World Wide Web ................... 307
24.05 Compounding ............................................................................................................ 308
24.07 Tampering with a Public Record ............................................................................ 308
24.08 Securing the Proceeds of an Offense ..................................................................... 309
24.09 Obstructing Criminal Investigations or Prosecutions ......................................... 309
24.11 Impersonating a Peace Officer ................................................................................ 309
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 25
25.01.1 Contraband Defined ................................................................................................. 311
25.01.2 Correctional Facility Defined .................................................................................. 311
25.01.3 Custody Defined ........................................................................................................ 311
25.01.4 Escape Defined .......................................................................................................... 311
25.02 Escape in the Third Degree ..................................................................................... 312
25.03 Escape in the Second Degree .................................................................................. 312
25.04 Escape in the First Degree ....................................................................................... 313
25.05 Promoting Prison Contraband ................................................................................ 313
25.07 Failure to Appear in the First Degree .................................................................... 314
25.08 Resisting Arrest .......................................................................................................... 314
25.08(A)(3) Resisting Arrest (Passive Resistance) ...................................................................... 315
25.081 Defense to Resisting Arrest .............................................................................................. 316
25.12 Hindering Prosecution in the First Degree ........................................................... 316
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25.14 Promoting Secure Care Facility Contraband ......................................................... 317
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 26
26.01(1) Employee Defined .................................................................................................... 319
26.01(2) Employer Defined ..................................................................................................... 319
26.01(3) Party Officer Defined ............................................................................................... 319
26.02 Bribery of a Public Servant or Party Officer ......................................................... 319
26.03 Trading in Public Office ........................................................................................... 320
26.05 Commercial Bribery Defined ................................................................................... 320
26.05 Commercial Bribery Form of Verdict ................................................................ 321
26.06 Offer to Exert Improper Influence on Public Officer or Employee for
Consideration ............................................................................................................. 321
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 27
27.01(1) Material Defined ........................................................................................................ 323
27.01(2) Statement Defined ..................................................................................................... 323
27.01(3) Sworn Statement Defined ........................................................................................ 323
27.02(A) Perjury ........................................................................................................................ 323
27.02(B) Perjury by Inconsistent Statements......................................................................... 324
27.03 False Swearing ............................................................................................................ 324
27.06 Limitation on Defenses ............................................................................................ 325
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 28
28.01(1) Juror Defined ............................................................................................................. 327
28.01(2) Official Proceeding Defined ................................................................................... 327
28.01(3) Physical Evidence Defined ...................................................................................... 327
28.01(4) Testimony Defined.................................................................................................... 327
28.01(5) Threat Defined ........................................................................................................... 327
28.02 Influencing a Witness ................................................................................................ 328
28.03 Receiving a Bribe by a Witness ................................................................................ 328
28.04 Tampering with a Witness ........................................................................................ 329
28.05 Influencing a Juror .................................................................................................... 329
28.06 Receiving a Bribe by a Juror .................................................................................... 330
28.07 Jury Tampering .......................................................................................................... 330
28.08 Misconduct by a Juror .............................................................................................. 330
28.09 Tampering with Physical Evidence ......................................................................... 331
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 29
29.03 Riot .............................................................................................................................. 333
29.04 Disorderly Conduct ................................................................................................... 333
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29.07 False Reporting .......................................................................................................... 334
29.10 Cruelty to Animals .................................................................................................... 335
29.10.01 Animal Fighting ......................................................................................................... 336
29.10.02 Presence at Animal Fight ......................................................................................... 337
29.10.03 Cockfighting ............................................................................................................... 337
29.10.06 Defense to Cruelty to Animals and Bird Fighting ................................................ 337
29.11 Interference with or Disruption of an Educational Institution.......................... 338
29.12 Unlawful Introduction of Disease or Parasite ...................................................... 339
29.21B Harassment of a Public Officer or Employee ...................................................... 339
29.21.01 Aggravated Harassment............................................................................................ 340
29.22A Unlawful Interference with Emergency Public Safety Land Mobile Radio
Frequency Transmissions ......................................................................................... 341
29.23 Stalking ........................................................................................................................ 342
29.25 Hoax ............................................................................................................................ 343
29.26 Abandonment or Concealment of a Dead Body .................................................. 344
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 30
30.05.A Interception of Communications; Installation of Pen Register or Trap
and Trace Device ....................................................................................................... 345
30.05.B Installation of a Pen Register or Trap and Trace Device .................................... 345
30.06 Divulging Communication Service Information .................................................. 346
30.08 Possession of Interception Device ......................................................................... 347
30.19.A. Surreptitious Recording ............................................................................................ 348
30.19.B. Disclosure of Surreptitious Recording ................................................................... 348
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 31
31.01.01 Deadly Weapon Defined .......................................................................................... 351
31.01.02 Deface Defined .......................................................................................................... 351
31.01.03 Explosive Defined ..................................................................................................... 351
31.01.04 Firearm Defined ........................................................................................................ 351
31.01.05 Improvised Explosive Device Defined .................................................................. 351
31.01.06 Occupied Structure Defined .................................................................................... 351
31.01.07 Prohibited Possessor Defined ................................................................................. 351
31.01.08 Prohibited Weapon Defined .................................................................................... 352
31.01.09 Trafficking Defined ................................................................................................... 356
31.02.01 Public Establishment Defined ................................................................................. 356
31.02.02 Public Event Defined ............................................................................................... 356
31.02.03 School Defined .......................................................................................................... 357
31.02.04 School Grounds Defined ......................................................................................... 357
31.07 Unlawful Discharge of Firearms ............................................................................. 357
31.07.01 Municipality Defined ................................................................................................ 357
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31.07.02 Properly Supervised Range Defined ....................................................................... 358
31.16.01 Body Armor Defined ................................................................................................ 358
31.17.01 Authorized Remote Stun Gun Defined ................................................................. 358
31.17.02 Remote Stun Gun Defined ...................................................................................... 359
31.023 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Prohibited Weapon) ....................................... 359
31.023-A Misconduct Involving Weapons (Prohibited Weapon) ....................................... 361
31.023-B Misconduct Involving Weapons (Prohibited Weapon Involving Dry Ice) ...... 363
31.024 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Prohibited Possessor) .................................... 364
31.025 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Selling or Transferring Deadly
Weapon to Prohibited Possessor) ........................................................................... 366
31.026 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Defacing a Deadly Weapon) ......................... 367
31.027 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Possessing a Defaced Deadly Weapon) ...... 367
31.028 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Use or Possession of Deadly Weapon
During Commission of Drug Offense) .................................................................. 368
31.029 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Discharging Firearm at Occupied
Structure) .................................................................................................................... 369
31.0212 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Possessing Deadly Weapon on School
Grounds Felony Allegation) .................................................................................... 370
31.0213 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Carrying Deadly Weapon in Nuclear or
Hydroelectric Plant) .................................................................................................. 371
31.0214 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Supplying Firearm to Another Person
Who Will Commit Felony) ....................................................................................... 371
31.0215 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Using Deadly Weapon in Terrorism
Act) .............................................................................................................................. 372
31.0216 Misconduct Involving Weapons (To Further a Criminal Street Gang) ............ 372
31.02(A)(4) Affirmative Defense to Misconduct Involving Weapons Under
A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(4) .............................................................................................. 373
31.02(A)(6) Affirmative Defense to Misconduct Involving Weapons Under
A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(b) ......................................................................................... 374
31.02(A)(7) Affirmative Defense to Misconduct Involving Weapons Under
A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(a), (b), (c) or (d) ................................................................ 374
31.04 Depositing Explosives .............................................................................................. 375
31.07 Unlawful Discharge of Firearms ............................................................................. 375
31.09 Sale or Gift of Firearm to Minor ............................................................................ 376
31.10 Misconduct Involving Simulated Explosive Devices ........................................... 377
31.10.01 Interference on Placing or Sending a Simulated Explosive Device ................... 378
31.11 Minors Prohibited from Carrying or Possessing Firearms ................................. 378
31.13.01 Possession of Firearm by Adjudicated Delinquent .............................................. 379
31.13.02 Subsequent Possession of Firearm by Adjudicated Delinquent ......................... 380
31.16 Misconduct Involving Body Armor ....................................................................... 381
31.17 Misconduct Involving Remote Stun Gun .............................................................. 381
31.22 Misconduct Involving Remote Stun Gun .............................................................. 381
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31.129 Taking Prohibited Articles into Jail or Onto Jail Grounds ................................. 382
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 32 INSTRUCTIONS
32.01 Enticing a Person for Purpose of Prostitution ..................................................... 383
32.02 Procurement by False Pretenses for Purposes of Prostitution .......................... 383
32.03 Placing a Person in Prostitution .............................................................................. 384
32.04 Receiving Earnings of Prostitute ............................................................................ 384
32.05 Causing Spouse to Become Prostitute ................................................................... 385
32.06 Taking a Child for Purpose of Prostitution ........................................................... 386
32.07 Detention of Persons in a House of Prostitution for Debt ................................ 387
32.08 Maintaining or Operating House of Prostitution ................................................. 387
32.09 Pandering .................................................................................................................... 388
32.10 Transporting Persons for Purpose of Prostitution or Other Immoral
Purpose ....................................................................................................................... 389
32.11 Definitions ................................................................................................................. 390
32.12A Child Sex Trafficking ................................................................................................ 391
32.12B Child Prostitution ...................................................................................................... 392
32.14 Prostitution ................................................................................................................. 392
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 33 INSTRUCTIONS
33.01.01 Amusement Gambling Defined .............................................................................. 395
33.01.02 Conducted as a Business Defined ........................................................................... 396
33.01.03 Crane Game Defined ................................................................................................ 396
33.01.04 Gambling or Gamble Defined ................................................................................ 396
33.01.05 Player Defined ........................................................................................................... 396
33.01.06 Regulated Gambling Defined .................................................................................. 397
33.01.07 Social Gambling Defined ......................................................................................... 397
33.021 Exclusions................................................................................................................... 398
33.021.1 Tax Exempt Exclusions ........................................................................................... 399
33.03 Promotion of Gambling ........................................................................................... 399
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 34 INSTRUCTIONS
34.021 Possession of Peyote ................................................................................................. 401
34.022 Sale or Transfer of Peyote ........................................................................................ 401
34.023 Offer to Sell or Transfer Peyote ............................................................................. 402
34.024 Defense to Peyote Offenses .................................................................................... 402
34.03(A1) Unlawful Use of Vapor-Releasing Substance ....................................................... 402
34.03(A2) Sale, Transfer, Offer to Sell or Offer to Transfer a Vapor-Releasing
Substance .................................................................................................................... 402
34.03(A3) Unauthorized Sale, Transfer, Offer to Sell or Offer to Transfer a
Vapor-Releasing Substance ...................................................................................... 403
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34.03(B) Failure to Keep Records of Vapor Releasing Glue .............................................. 404
34.03(C) Availability of Vapor-Releasing Glue Containing a Toxic Substance ............... 405
34.03(D) Sign Needed for Vapor-Releasing Substance ........................................................ 405
34.039 Defense to Vapor-Releasing Substance ................................................................. 406
34.03.01 Sale of Delivery of Nitrous Oxide to a Minor ...................................................... 406
34.04(A) Failure to Report the Sale, Transfer or Furnishing of a Precursor or
Regulated Chemical ................................................................................................... 406
34.04(C) Failure to Report the Sale, Transfer or Furnishing of a Precursor or
Regulated Chemical ................................................................................................... 409
34.04(D) Failure to Report the Receipt of a Precursor or Regulated Chemical
from Outside the State.............................................................................................. 410
34.04(F) Failure to Report the Suspicious Sale, Transfer or Furnishing of a
Precursor or Regulated Chemical ............................................................................ 410
34.04(G) Failure to Report the Theft, Disappearance or Loss of a Precursor or
Regulated Chemical ................................................................................................... 411
34.04(H) Failure to Maintain Records of a Precursor or Regulated Chemical ................. 412
34.04.01(A) Possession or Sale of Precursor Chemicals ........................................................... 412
34.04.01(B) Sale or Transfer or Furnishing of a Precursor Chemical by a Retailer .............. 414
34.04.01(C) Sale of a Precursor Chemical by a Retailer ............................................................ 414
34.04.01(D) Sale or Transfer or Furnishing of Precursor Chemicals by a Wholesaler ......... 415
34.04.01(E) Sale or Transfer or Furnishing of Precursor Chemicals by a
Manufacturer .............................................................................................................. 415
34.051 Possession or Use of Marijuana .............................................................................. 416
34.052 Possession of Marijuana for Sale ............................................................................. 417
34.053 Production of Marijuana .......................................................................................... 418
34.0541 Selling, Transporting, Importation, Transferring of Marijuana for Sale ........... 419
34.0542 Offering to Sell, Transport, Import or Transfer Marijuana for Sale ................. 419
34.061 Possession/Use of Prescription-Only Drug ......................................................... 420
34.062 Possession of Prescription-Only Drug for Sale .................................................... 421
34.063 Possession of Equipment and Chemicals to Manufacture Prescription-
Only Drug ................................................................................................................... 422
34.067(1) Sale, Transfer, or Importation of a Prescription-Only Drug .............................. 423
34.067(2) Offer to Sell, Offer to Transfer, Offer to Import a Prescription-Only
Drug ............................................................................................................................. 423
34.071 Possession of Dangerous Drug ............................................................................... 424
34.07.01 Manufacturing Methamphetamine Causing Injury to a Person under
Fifteen ......................................................................................................................... 424
34.072 Possession of Dangerous Drug for Sale ................................................................ 425
34.076 Obtaining Dangerous Drug by Fraud .................................................................... 426
34.0771 Selling, Transporting, Importing, Transferring of Dangerous Drug
For Sale ....................................................................................................................... 426
34.0772 Offering to Transport, Import, or Transfer Dangerous Drugs ......................... 427
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34.081 Possession or Use of a Narcotic Drug ................................................................... 427
34.082 Possession of Narcotic Drug for Sale .................................................................... 428
34.086 Obtaining Narcotics by Fraud ................................................................................. 428
34.0871 Transporting or Importing Narcotics for Sale; Selling, Transferring
Narcotic Drugs .......................................................................................................... 429
34.0872 Offering to Transport, Import, Sell, Transfer Narcotics .................................... 429
34.091 Involving or Using Minors in Drug Offenses ...................................................... 429
34.092 Involving or Using Minors in Drug Offenses ...................................................... 430
34.111 Sale or Transfer of Drugs in a Drug Free School Zone ...................................... 430
34.112 Possession or Use of Drugs in a Drug Free School Zone .................................. 431
34.113 Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs in a Drug Free School Zone ....................... 432
34.15 Possession of Drug Paraphernalia .......................................................................... 432
34.17 Use of Wire Communication or Electronic Communication in [Drug
Related] [Organized Crime Related] Transaction ................................................. 433
34.21.01 Using Building for Sale, Manufacture or Distribution of Dangerous or
Narcotic Drugs .......................................................................................................... 435
34.21.02 Fortification of a Building ........................................................................................ 435
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 34.1 INSTRUCTIONS
34.53 Manufacture or Distribution of Imitation Controlled Substance ...................... 437
34.54 Manufacture or Distribution of Imitation Prescription-Only Drug .................. 437
34.55 Manufacture or Distribution of Imitation Over-the-Counter Drug ................. 438
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 35 INSTRUCTIONS
35.01(1) Harmful to Minors Defined .................................................................................... 441
35.01(2) Item Defined .............................................................................................................. 441
35.01(3) Knowledge of Character Defined ........................................................................... 442
35.01(4) Nudity Defined .......................................................................................................... 442
35.01(5) Sadomasochistic Abuse Defined ............................................................................. 442
35.01(6) Sexual Activity Defined ............................................................................................ 442
35.01(7) Sexual Conduct Defined .......................................................................................... 442
35.01(8) Sexual Excitement Defined ..................................................................................... 443
35.01(9) Ultimate Sexual Acts Defined ................................................................................. 443
35.01(10) Prurient Defined ........................................................................................................ 443
35.02 Production, Publication, Sale, Possession, or Presentation of Obscene
Items ............................................................................................................................ 444
35.04 Coercing Acceptance of Obscene Articles or Publications ................................ 444
35.06 Furnishing Harmful Items to Minors ..................................................................... 445
35.061 Furnishing Harmful Items to Minors (Internet Activity) .................................... 445
35.07 Public Display of Explicit Sexual Materials ........................................................... 445
35.09 Duty to Report ........................................................................................................... 446
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35.12 Obscene or Indecent Telephone Communications to Minors for
Commercial Purposes ............................................................................................... 447
35.13 Sale or Distribution of Material Harmful to Minors through Vending
Machines ..................................................................................................................... 447
35.131 Defenses to Sale or Distribution of Material Harmful to Minors
through Vending Machines ...................................................................................... 447
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 35.1 INSTRUCTIONS
35.51(1) Communication Service Provider Defined............................................................ 449
35.51(2) Computer Defined .................................................................................................... 449
35.51(3) Computer System Defined ....................................................................................... 449
35.51(4) Exploitive Exhibition Defined ................................................................................ 449
35.51(5) Minor Defined ........................................................................................................... 449
35.51(6) Network Defined ....................................................................................................... 449
35.51(7) Producing Defined .................................................................................................... 449
35.51(8) Remote Computing Service Defined ...................................................................... 450
35.51(9) Sexual Conduct Defined ........................................................................................... 450
35.51(10) Simulated Defined ..................................................................................................... 450
35.51(11) Visual Depiction Defined ......................................................................................... 450
35.52 Commercial Sexual Exploitation of a Minor ......................................................... 450
35.53 Sexual Exploitation of a Minor ............................................................................... 452
35.54 Luring a Minor for Sexual Exploitation ................................................................. 452
35.56 Permissible Inference ................................................................................................ 453
35.58 Admitting Minors to Public Displays of Sexual Conduct ................................... 453
35.59 Defense to Sexual Exploitation of a Minor ........................................................... 454
35.60 Aggravated Luring a Minor for Sexual Exploitation ............................................ 454
35.61 Unlawful Age Misrepresentation ............................................................................. 456
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 36 INSTRUCTIONS
36.01 Domestic Violence Offense Defined ..................................................................... 459
36.01.02 Aggravated Domestic Violence ............................................................................... 459
36.01.02 Special Verdict Form Domestic Violence ......................................................... 460
36.03.01 Partial-Birth Abortion ............................................................................................... 461
36.06(A) Bigamy ......................................................................................................................... 462
36.06(B) Defenses to Bigamy .................................................................................................. 462
36.07 Marrying the Spouse of Another............................................................................. 463
36.08 Incest ........................................................................................................................... 463
36.09A Child Bigamy .............................................................................................................. 463
36.09B Defenses to Child Bigamy ........................................................................................ 464
36.20 Failure to Report ........................................................................................................ 464
36.23A Child Abuse or Vulnerable Adult Abuse ............................................................... 466
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36.23B Child Abuse or Vulnerable Adult Abuse ............................................................... 466
36.23D Emotional Abuse of a Vulnerable Adult ............................................................... 467
36.23.01 Vulnerable Adult Defined ........................................................................................ 468
36.28.11a Arizona Medical Marijuana Act – Registered Qualifying Patient ...................... 468
36.28.11b Arizona Medical Marijuana Act – Designated Caregiver .................................... 469
36.28.11c Arizona Medical Marijuana Act – Authority to Cultivate ................................... 470
36.28.11d Arizona Medical Marijuana Act – DUI Affirmative Defense ............................ 471
36.28.11e Arizona Medical Marijuana Act – Visiting Qualifying Patient ........................... 472
36.28.11f Arizona Medical Marijuana Act – Medical Use .................................................... 473
36.28.11g Arizona Medical Marijuana Act – Allowable Amount ........................................ 473
36.28.11h Arizona Medical Marijuana Act – Prohibited Locations ..................................... 474
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 37 INSTRUCTIONS
37.01(A)(1) Unlawful Use of Food Stamps ................................................................................ 475
37.01(A)(2) Unlawful Use of Counterfeit Food Stamps ........................................................... 475
37.01(A)(3) Unlawful Appropriation of Food Stamps ............................................................. 476
37.02(A)(4) Unlawful Use of Food Stamps ................................................................................ 476
37.02.01 Unlawful Excavating ................................................................................................. 477
37.04(A)(1)
& (2) Adding Poison to Food, Drink or Medicine ......................................................... 477
37.04(A)(3) Adding Harmful Substance to Food, Drink or Medicine ................................... 477
37.05(A)(1)
& 2 Unlawful Manufacturing or Distributing of Sounds or Images
from Recording Devices .......................................................................................... 478
37.05(A)(3) Unlawful Manufacturing or Distributing Transferred Sounds
& 4 or Images without Name of Manufacturer ........................................................... 479
37.05(A)(5) Unlawful Transferring a Performance ................................................................... 479
37.05(A)(6) Unlawful Distributing a Recorded Performance .................................................. 480
37.05(B) Defense to Offenses Under A.R.S. § 13-3705(A) ................................................ 481
37.05.01 Article Defined .......................................................................................................... 481
37.05.02 Distributing Defined ................................................................................................. 481
37.05.04 Manufacturing Defined ............................................................................................ 481
37.05.05 Owner Defined .......................................................................................................... 481
37.05.06 Phonorecord Defined ............................................................................................... 481
37.07(A)(1) Telecommunication Fraud ....................................................................................... 482
37.07(A)(2) Telecommunication Fraud ....................................................................................... 482
37.07(A)(3) Telecommunication Fraud ....................................................................................... 483
37.07(A)(4) Telecommunication Fraud ....................................................................................... 484
37.09 Manufacture, Sale or Distribution of Unauthorized Decoding Device ............ 485
37.09(C) Rebuttable Inference of Intent ................................................................................ 485
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37.13(A) Consideration for Medical Referral ........................................................................ 486
37.13(B) Fraudulently Obtaining Medical or Health Coverage .......................................... 487
37.13(C) Fraudulently Obtaining Medical or Health-Care Coverage by Use of
False Identification .................................................................................................... 487
37.13(D) Counterfeiting or Altering Identification for the Purposes of Fraudulently
Obtaining Medical or Health-Care Coverage ........................................................ 488
37.13(E) Furnishing Identification for the Purposes of Fraudulently Obtaining
Medical or Health Care Coverage .......................................................................... 488
37.14 Aggravated or Multiple Insurance Code Violations ............................................. 489
37.16 Failure to Give Notice of Dangerous-Crimes-Against-Children
Conviction .................................................................................................................. 489
37.19 Fraudulently Obtaining Wireless Telecommunications Services or Devices;
Manufacturing, Distributing and Selling Unauthorized Decoding Devices ..... 490
37.19(C) Rebuttable Inference Regarding A.R.S. § 13-3719 ............................................... 491
37.21(A)(1) Unlawfully Applying Tattoos, Brands, Scarifications and Piercings to
Minors ......................................................................................................................... 491
37.21(A)(2) Use of Unsterilized Needle to Tattoo or Pierce ................................................... 492
37.21(A)(3) Using an Unauthorized Location to Tattoo, Brand, Scarify, Implant,
Mutilate or Pierce ...................................................................................................... 492
37.21(A)(4) Administering Anesthesia Without a License ....................................................... 492
37.21(B) Exception .................................................................................................................... 493
37.21(C) Defense ....................................................................................................................... 493
37.21(E) Definitions .................................................................................................................. 493
37.24 Obtaining Utility Services by Fraud ........................................................................ 493
37.24(B) Rebuttable Inference ................................................................................................. 494
37.25 Interference with Monitoring Devices ................................................................... 495
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 38
38.21 Failure to Register a Sex Offender .......................................................................... 497
38.22 Failure to Notify of Change of Address or Change of Name ............................ 497
38.81 Arrest; How Made; Force and Restraint ................................................................ 498
38.87 Method of Arrest by Officer by Virtue of a Warrant .......................................... 498
38.88 Method of Arrest by Officer Without a Warrant ................................................. 499
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 43
43.4702 Conducting a Chop Shop ........................................................................................ 501
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 44
44.4802 Possession or Sale of Cloned Cellular or Wireless Telephones .......................... 503
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STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 45
45.4902 Criminal Trespass on a Commercial Nuclear Generating Facility ..................... 505
45.4903 Justification Defense Armed Nuclear Security Guard ......................................... 505
STATUTORY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS TITLE 13, CHAPTER 46
46.5002 Criminal Trespass on a Military Reservation or Facility ...................................... 509
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ON-CRIMINAL STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS, TITLE 28
28.622.1 Unlawful Flight from Pursuing Law Enforcement Vehicle .............. 511
28.661 Leaving the Scene of an Injury or Fatal Accident ............................... 511
28.6611 Knowledge of Injury ................................................................................ 512
28.6612 Leaving the Scene of an Injury or Fatal Accident Form of
Verdict ........................................................................................................ 512
28.662 Leaving the Scene of an Accident ......................................................... 513
28.663 Driver’s Duty to Give Information and Assistance ............................ 514
28.675 Causing Death by Use of Vehicle .......................................................... 514
28.676 Causing Serious Physical Injury by Use of a Vehicle .......................... 516
28.1321 Refusal to Submit to Test ....................................................................... 518
28.1381(A)(1)-APC Actual Physical Control Defined ........................................................... 518
28.1381(A)(1)-1 Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under the Influence ....... 519
28.1381(A)(2) Driving or Actual Physical Control With an Alcohol
Concentration of 0.08 or More Within Two Hours of Driving ....... 520
28.1381(A)(3) Driving or Actual Physical Control While There Is a Drug in
the Defendant’s Body .............................................................................. 521
28.1381(A)(4) Driving or Actual Physical Control of a Commercial Motor
Vehicle With an Alcohol Concentration of 0.04 or More ................. 521
28.1381(D) Affirmative Defense to Driving or Actual Physical Control While
There Is a Drug in the Defendant’s Body ............................................ 522
28.1381(G) Presumptions of Intoxication ................................................................. 523
28.1381-MJ Registered Qualifying Patient (Medical Marijuana) ............................. 524
28.1381-MS Mental State ............................................................................................... 524
28.1382(A) Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under the Extreme
Influence of Intoxicating Liquor ........................................................... 524
28.1383(A)(1)-1 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under
the Influence While [License][Privilege to Drive] Was
[Suspended][Canceled][Revoked][Refused][Restricted]...................... 525
28.1383(A)(1)-2
Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under
the Influence While [License][Privilege to Drive] Was
[Suspended][Canceled][Revoked][Refused][Restricted] With
Lesser-Included Offense of Driving or Actual Physical
Control while Under the Influence ....................................................... 527
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28.1383(A)(1)-3 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control With an
Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 While [License][Privilege to
Drive] Was [Suspended][Canceled][ Revoked][Refused]
[Restricted] ................................................................................................. 527
28.1383(A)(1)-4 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While There
Is a Drug in the Defendant’s Body While [License][Privilege
to Drive] Was [Suspended][Canceled][Revoked][Refused]
[Restricted] ................................................................................................. 529
28.1383(A)(2)-1 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under
the Influence Two Convictions Within Eighty-Four
Months) ...................................................................................................... 530
28.1383(A)(2)-2 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control With an
Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 or More Within Two Hours of
Driving Two Convictions Within Eighty-Four Months ................. 531
28.1383(A)(2)-3 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While There
Is a Drug in the Defendant’s Body Two Convictions Within
Eighty-Four Months ................................................................................ 532
28.1383(A)(3)-1 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under
the Influence While There Is a Person Under the Age of
Fifteen Years in the Vehicle .................................................................... 533
28.1383(A)(3)-2 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control With an
Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 or More Within Two Hours of
Driving While There Is a Person Under the Age of Fifteen
Years in the Vehicle ................................................................................. 534
28.1383(A)(3)-3 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While There
Is a Drug in the Defendant’s Body While There Is a Person
Under the Age of Fifteen Years in the Vehicle ................................... 534
28.1383(A)(4)-1 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Subject
to an Interlock Device and Under the Influence ................................ 535
28.1383(A)(4)-2 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Subject
to an Interlock Device and an Alcohol Concentration of 0.08
or More within Two Hours of Driving ................................................. 535
28.1383(A)(4)-3 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Subject
to an Interlock Device and There Is a Drug in the
Defendant’s Body ..................................................................................... 536
28.1383(A)(4)-4 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under
the Extreme Influence of Intoxicating Liquor While Subject
to an Interlock Device ............................................................................. 536
28.1383(A)(5)-1 Aggravated Driving or actual Physical Control While Driving
the Wrong Way on a Highway and Under the Influence ................... 536
28.1383(A)(5)-2 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Driving
the Wrong Way on a Highway and an Alcohol Concentration
of 0.08 or More Within Two Hours of Driving .................................. 537
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28.1383(A)(5)-3 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Driving
the Wrong Way on a Highway and There Is a Drug in the
Defendant’s Body ..................................................................................... 538
28.1383(A)(5)-4 Aggravated Driving or actual Physical Control while Driving
the Wrong Way on a Highway and a Commercial Motor
Vehicle with an Alcohol Concentration of 0.04 or More .................. 538
28.1383(A)(5)-5 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Driving
the Wrong Way on a Highway Under the Extreme Influence
of Intoxicating Liquor ............................................................................. 539
28.1383(B) Eighty-Four Month Provision ................................................................ 540
28.3318 Presumption of Receipt of Notice ........................................................ 540
36.2802(D) Affirmative Defense of Insufficient Concentration of
Marijuana to Cause Impairment............................................................. 541
C
RIMINAL STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS, TITLE 5
5.395(A)(1)-APC Actual Physical Control Defined .............................................................. 543
5.395(A)(1) Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized
Watercraft While Under the Influence ...................................................... 544
5.395(A)(2) Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized
Watercraft With an Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 or
More Within Two Hours of Operating .................................................... 545
5.395(A)(3) Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized
Watercraft While There Is a Drug in the Defendant’s
Body ................................................................................................................ 546
5.395(A)(4) Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Commercial
Motorized Watercraft With an Alcohol Concentration
of 0.04 or More ............................................................................................. 546
5.395(C) Affirming Defense to Operating or Actual Physical
Control While There Is a Drug in the Defendant’s Body ...................... 547
5.395(F) Presumptions of Intoxication ..................................................................... 547
5.397(A)(1) & (2) Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized
Watercraft While Under the Extreme Influence of
Intoxicating Liquor ....................................................................................... 548
5.396 (A)(1)-1 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of a
Motorized Watercraft While Under the Influence
Three or More Convictions Within Eighty-Four
Months ........................................................................................................... 548
5.396(A)(1)-2 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of
a Motorized Watercraft With an Alcohol
Concentration of 0.08 or More Within Two Hours
of Operating Three Convictions Within Eighty-
Four Months ................................................................................................. 549
5.396(A)(1)-3 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of
a Motorized Watercraft While There Is a Drug in the
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Defendant’s Body Three or More Convictions
Within Eighty-Four Months ....................................................................... 550
5.396(A)(2)(a)-1 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of
a Motorized Watercraft While Under the Influence
While There Is a Person Under the Age of Fifteen
Years Aboard the Motorized Watercraft .................................................. 551
5.396(A)(2)(a)-2 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of
a Motorized Watercraft With an Alcohol
Concentration of 0.08 or More Within Two Hours
of Operating While There Is a Person Under the Age
of Fifteen Years Aboard the Motorized Watercraft ................................ 552
5.396(A)(2)(a)-3 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of
a Motorized Watercraft Under the Influence of
Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs While There Is a
Person Under Fifteen Aboard The Motorized
Watercraft ...................................................................................................... 552
5.396(A)(2)(b)-1 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of
a Motorized Watercraft While Under the Influence
While There Is a Person Under the Age of Fifteen
Years Aboard The Motorized Watercraft With One
Prior ................................................................................................................ 553
5.396(A)(2)(b)-2 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control
a Motorized Watercraft With an Alcohol
Concentration of 0.08 or More Within Two
Hours of Operating While There Is a Person
Under the Age of Fifteen Years Aboard the
Motorized Watercraft With One Prior ...................................................... 554
5.396(A)(2)(b)-3 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control
of a Motorized Watercraft Under the Influence of
Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs While There Is a
Person Under Fifteen Aboard – With One Prior .................................... 554
5.396(A)(2)(c) Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control
of a Motorized Watercraft While Under the
Extreme Influence While There Is a Person
Under the Age of Fifteen Years in the Motorized
Watercraft ...................................................................................................... 555
36.2802(D) Affirmative Defense of Insufficient Concentration of
Marijuana to Cause Impairment ................................................................. 556
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ON-CRIMINAL STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS, TITLE 14
14.5101.01 Definition of Incapacitated Person......................................................................... 559
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NON-CRIMINAL STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS, TITLE 25
25.500(1) Support Defined ........................................................................................................ 561
25.500(2) Arrearage Defined ..................................................................................................... 561
25.511 Failure of Parent to Provide for Child ................................................................... 561
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ON-CRIMINAL STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS, TITLE 35
35.301 Misuse of Public Monies ................................................................................................... 563
N
ON-CRIMINAL STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS, TITLE 38
38.101 Definition of “Officer” or “Public Officer” ......................................................... 565
38.421 Stealing, Destroying, Altering or Secreting a Public Record .............................. 565
N
ON-CRIMINAL STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS, TITLE 39
39.161 Presentment of False Instrument for Filing .......................................................... 567
N
ON-CRIMINAL STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS, TITLE 41
41.1661 Correctional Officer Defined .................................................................................. 569
N
ON-CRIMINAL STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS, TITLE 44
44.1453.B.1 Use of Counterfeit Marks with One Prior Conviction ........................................ 571
44.1453.B.2 Use of Counterfeit Marks......................................................................................... 572
44.1453.D.1 Use of Counterfeit Marks with Two Prior Convictions ...................................... 573
44.1453.D.2 Use of Counterfeit Marks......................................................................................... 574
44.1453.C Manufacturing or Producing Items or Services with Counterfeit Marks ......... 576
44.1455 Use of Unauthorized Copy of Computer Software ............................................. 577
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ON-CRIMINAL STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS, TITLE 46
46-451.01 Abuse Defined ........................................................................................................... 579
46-451.02 De Facto Conservator Defined ............................................................................... 579
46.451.03 De Facto Guardian Defined .................................................................................... 579
46.451.04 Exploitation Defined ................................................................................................ 579
46.45.05 Informed Consent Defined ..................................................................................... 580
46.45.06 Neglect Defined ......................................................................................................... 580
46.451.09 Vulnerable Adult Defined ........................................................................................ 580
46.455 Endangerment of a Vulnerable Adult .................................................................... 581
46.456.04 Position of Trust and Confidence Defined ........................................................... 581
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ON-CAPITAL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES INSTRUCTIONS ...................................... 583
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CAPITAL CASE SENTENCING INSTRUCTIONS
Foreword to the Court; Introduction to Capital Case Sentencing Instructions
(Not to Be Read to the Jury) .......................................................................................................... 587
Capital Case 1.0 Degree of Participation Instruction (Enmund/Tison) ............................. 588
Capital Case 1.0.1 Accomplice Liability ................................................................................... 592
Eligibility Phase
Capital Case 1.1 Nature of the Hearing ................................................................................ 594
Capital Case 1.1A Nature of the Hearing – For Offenses Occurring On or After
August 2, 2012 ............................................................................................. 595
Capital Case 1.2 Duties of the Jury ........................................................................................ 596
Capital Case 1.3 Evidence ....................................................................................................... 596
Capital Case 1.4 Burden of Proof .......................................................................................... 597
Capital Case 1.5 Definition of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt ................................. 597
Capital Case 1.5.1 Order of Aggravation Phase ...................................................................... 598
Capital Case 1.6 Aggravating Circumstances ....................................................................... 598
Capital Case 1.6(a)(1) Definition of “Serious Offenses” (for offenses occurring on or
after July 17, 1993) ...................................................................................... 600
Capital Case 1.6(b) Definition of “Grave Risk of Death to Another” .......................................... 602
Capital Case 1.6(c) Definition of “Consideration for the Receipt, or in Expectation of
the Receipt, of Anything of Pecuniary Value” ................................................ 604
Capital Case 1.6(d) Definition of “Especially Cruel, Heinous or Depraved” ...................... 606
Capital Case 1.6(e) Definition of “During the Commission of the Offense” ..................... 612
Capital Case 1.6(f) Definition of “Cold, Calculated Manner Without Pretense of
Moral or Legal Justification ....................................................................... 612
Capital Case Verdict Form 1 ......................................................................................................... 614
Penalty Phase
Capital Case 2.1 Nature of Hearing and Duties of Jury ..................................................... 617
Capital Case 2.2 Evidence ....................................................................................................... 617
Capital Case 2.3 Mitigation...................................................................................................... 618
Capital Case 2.4 Duty to Consult with One Another ......................................................... 619
Capital Case 2.5 Victim Impact Information ....................................................................... 620
Capital Case 2.6 Mitigation Assessment and the Sentence Burden of Proof .................. 620
Capital Case 2.7 Order of This Phase ................................................................................... 622
Capital Case 2.8 Jury Not to Consider Financial Cost of Penalty ..................................... 623
Capital Case 2.9 State’s Evidence ........................................................................................... 623
Capital Case 2.10 Intellectual Disability .................................................................................. 623
Mitigation
Foreword to the Court Introduction to Statutory Mitigating Circumstance
Instructions (Not To Be Read To The Jury) ............................................................................................ 625
Capital Case 3.1 Mitigation Evidence .................................................................................... 626
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Capital Case 3.2 Significant Impairment ............................................................................... 626
Capital Case 3.3 Duress ........................................................................................................... 627
Capital Case 3.4 Relatively Minor Participation ................................................................... 627
Capital Case 3.5 Death Not Reasonably Foreseeable ......................................................... 628
Capital Case 3.6 Age ................................................................................................................ 628
Capital Case Verdict Form 2 .......................................................................................................... 629
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ABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................................... 631
COPYRIGHT 2019, STATE BAR OF ARIZONA
PRELIMINARY CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS
Preliminary Criminal 1 Importance of Jury Service
Jury service is an important part of our system of justice, with a long and distinguished
tradition in American law. From the beginning, American law has viewed the jury system as
an effective means of drawing on the collective wisdom, experience, and fact-finding abilities
of persons such as yourselves. While it may be an occasional inconvenience, or worse, jury
service is an important responsibility for you, one, which I am sure, you will take seriously.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Preliminary 2, RAJI (Civil) 5th.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
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SE NOTE: The trial judge may wish to consider incorporating this instruction as the first
paragraph of Preliminary Criminal 2.
Preliminary Criminal 2 Duty of Jurors
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Now that you have been sworn, I will briefly tell you something about your duties as
jurors and give you some instructions. At the end of the trial I will give you more detailed
instructions, and those instructions will control your deliberations.
It will be your duty to decide the facts. You must decide the facts only from the evidence
produced in court. You must not speculate or guess about any fact. In deciding this case, you
are not to be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public
opinion, or public feeling. Race, color, religion, national ancestry, gender or sexual
orientation should not influence you.
You will hear the evidence, decide the facts, and then apply the law I will give to you to
those facts. That is how you will reach your verdict. In doing so you must follow that law
whether you agree with it or not.
You must not take anything I may say or do during the trial as indicating any opinion
about the facts. You, and you alone, are the judges of the facts.
SOURCE: Capital Case Instruction 1.2.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
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Preliminary Criminal 3 Evidence
You will decide what the facts are from the evidence presented here in court. That
evidence will consist of testimony of witnesses, any documents and other things received
into evidence as exhibits, and any evidence stipulated to by the parties or that you are
instructed to consider.
[You may hear reference to exhibits that are not admitted and are not asked to be
admitted. These exhibits are not admitted as evidence, but the information from them that is
testified to by witnesses is evidence that you may consider.]
You will decide the credibility of the witnesses and weight to be given to any evidence
presented in the case, whether it is direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.
SOURCE: Preliminary 3, RAJI (Civil) 5th modified.
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SE NOTE: Use of bracketed paragraph two is left to the discretion of the judge.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
Preliminary Criminal 4 Direct and Circumstantial Evidence
Evidence may be direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is a physical exhibit or the
testimony of a witness who saw, heard, touched, smelled or otherwise actually perceived an
event. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a fact or facts from which the existence of
another fact may be determined. The law makes no distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence. You must determine the weight to be given to all the evidence
without regard to whether it is direct or circumstantial.
SOURCE: Preliminary 3, RAJI (Civil) 5th modified.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
Preliminary Criminal 5 Stipulations
During the trial, the lawyers are permitted to stipulate that certain evidence exits. This
means both sides agree that evidence exists and is to be considered by you during your
deliberations at the conclusion of the trial.
SOURCE: Standard 3, RAJI (Criminal), modified.
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Preliminary Criminal 6 Evidence, Statements of Lawyers and Rulings
As I mentioned earlier, it is your job to decide from the evidence what the facts are.
Here are six rules on what is and what is not evidence:
1. Evidence to be considered: You must determine the facts only from the testimony
of witnesses and from exhibits admitted in evidence. Anything you may see or hear
when the court is not in session, even if what you see or hear is done or said by one
of the parties or by one of the witnesses, is not evidence and must not be considered
by you. If you should hear or see anything pertaining to the case outside the
courtroom or if anyone should attempt to speak to you about this case outside the
courtroom, please report to me as soon as you can.
2. Lawyers’ statements: Statements or arguments made by the lawyers in the case are
not evidence. Their purpose is to help you understand the evidence and law.
3. Questions to a witness: A question is not evidence. A question can only be used to
give meaning to a witness’ answer.
4. Objections to questions: If a lawyer objects to a question and I do not allow the
witness to answer, you must not try to guess what the answer might have been. You
must also not try to guess the reason why the lawyer objected in the first place.
5. Rejected evidence: At times during the trial, evidence may be offered that I do not
admit as evidence. When evidence is not admitted, you must not consider it for any
purpose.
6. Stricken evidence: At times I may order some evidence to be stricken from the
record. Then it is no longer evidence and you must not consider it for any purpose.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Preliminary 7, RAJI (Civil) 5th modified.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
Preliminary Criminal 7 Rulings of the Court
Admission of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. I will apply those rules and
resolve any issues that arise during the trial concerning the admission of evidence.
If an objection to a question is sustained, you must disregard the question and you must
not guess what the answer to the question might have been. If an exhibit is offered into
evidence and an objection to it is sustained, you must not consider that exhibit as evidence.
If testimony is ordered stricken from the record, you must not consider that testimony for
any purpose.
Do not concern yourselves with the reasons for my rulings on the admission of
evidence. Do not regard those rulings as any indication from me of the credibility of the
witnesses or the weight you should give to any evidence that has been admitted.
SOURCE: Preliminary 4, RAJI (Civil) 5th.
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USE NOTE: The second paragraph may be deleted if used with Preliminary Criminal 6.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
Preliminary Criminal 8 Exclusion of Witnesses
The Rule of Exclusion of Witnesses is in effect and will be observed by all witnesses
until the trial is over and a result announced. This means that all witnesses will remain
outside the courtroom during the entire trial except when one is called to the witness stand.
They will wait in the areas directed by the bailiff unless other arrangements have been made
with the attorney who has called them. The rule also forbids witnesses from telling anyone
but the lawyers what they will testify about or what they have testified to. If witnesses do talk
to the lawyers about their testimony, other witnesses and jurors should avoid being present
or overhearing.
The lawyers are directed to inform all their witnesses of these rules and to remind them
of their obligations from time to time, as may be necessary. The parties and their lawyers
should keep a careful lookout to prevent any potential witness from remaining in the
courtroom if they accidentally enter.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Preliminary 12, RAJI (Civil) 5th.
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SE NOTE: Give this instruction only if the Rule of Exclusion of Witnesses has been
invoked.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
Both Rule 9.3, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 615, Arizona Rules of
Evidence, deal with exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom.
Preliminary Criminal 9 Bench Conferences and Recesses
From time to time during the trial, it may become necessary for me to talk with the
attorneys out of the hearing of the jury, either by having a conference at the bench when the
jury is present in the courtroom, or by calling a recess. Please understand that while you are
waiting, we are working. The purpose of these conferences is not to keep relevant
information from you, but to decide how certain evidence is to be treated under the rules of
evidence and to avoid confusion and error. We will, of course, do what we can to keep the
number and length of these conferences to a minimum. I may not always grant an attorney’s
request for a conference. Do not consider my granting or denying a request for a conference
as any indication of my opinion of the case or of what your verdict should be. Please do not
be concerned with what we are discussing at any bench conference we may have. Please
respect the privacy of those participating in the bench conference in order to maintain the
fairness of the trial.
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SOURCE: Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions, Instruction 2.2, modified
by addition of the last two sentences.
Preliminary Criminal 10 Credibility of Witnesses
In deciding the facts of this case, you should consider what testimony to accept, and
what to reject. You may accept everything a witness says, or part of it, or none of it.
In evaluating testimony, you should use the tests for accuracy and truthfulness that
people use in determining matters of importance in everyday life, including such factors as:
the witness’s ability to see or hear or know the things the witness testified to; the quality of
the witness’s memory; the witness’s manner while testifying; whether the witness has any
motive, bias, or prejudice; whether the witness is contradicted by anything the witness said
or wrote before trial, or by other evidence; and the reasonableness of the witness’s testimony
when considered in the light of the other evidence.
Consider all of the evidence in light of reason, common sense, and experience.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Standard 18, RAJI (Criminal) 3rd;
Preliminary 5, RAJI (Civil) 5th.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
Preliminary Criminal 11 Expert Witness
A witness qualified as an expert by education or experience may state opinions on
matters in that witness’s field of expertise, and may also state reasons for those opinions.
Expert opinion testimony should be judged just as any other testimony. You are not
bound by it. You may accept it or reject it, in whole or in part, and you should give it as
much credibility and weight as you think it deserves, considering the witness’s qualifications
and experience, the reasons given for the opinions, and all the other evidence in the case.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Standard 25, RAJI (Criminal) 3rd;
Preliminary 6, RAJI (Civil) 5th.
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SE NOTE: Give only if it is anticipated that an expert witness will testify.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
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Preliminary Criminal 12 No Transcript Available to Jury; Taking Notes
At the end of the trial you will have to make your decision based on what you recall of
the evidence. You will not be given a written transcript of any testimony; you should pay
close attention to the testimony as it is given.
You have been provided with note pads and pens. The court encourages you to take
notes during the trial if you wish to do so. Do not let note taking distract you so that you
miss hearing or seeing other testimony. You may use your notes during your deliberations at
the end of the trial. Until then, keep your notes to yourself. During recesses in the trial, you
may leave your notes on your seat. Your notes are confidential and my bailiff will guard
them. No one will be allowed to read your notes. Whether you take notes or not, you should
rely upon your own memory of what was said and not be overly influenced by the notes of
other jurors. After you have rendered your verdict, the bailiff will collect your notes and
destroy them.
Do not be influenced at all by my taking notes at times. What I write down may have
nothing to do with what you will be concerned with at this trial.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Preliminary 8, RAJI (Civil) 5th modified.
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SE NOTE: Rule 18.6(d), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires the court to
“instruct the jurors that they may take notes” during the trial.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
Preliminary Criminal 13 Admonition
I am now going to say a few words about your conduct as jurors. I am going to give you
some dos and don’ts, mostly don’ts, which I will call “The Admonition.”
Do wear your juror badge at all times in and around the courthouse so everyone will
know you are on a jury.
Each of you has gained knowledge and information from the experiences you have had
prior to this trial. Once this trial has begun you are to determine the facts of this case only
from the evidence that is presented in this courtroom. Arizona law prohibits a juror from
receiving evidence not properly admitted at trial. Therefore, do not do any research or make
any investigation about the case on your own. Do not view or visit the locations where the
events of the case took place. Do not consult any source such as a newspaper, a dictionary,
a reference manual, television, radio or the Internet for information. If you have a question
or need additional information, submit your request in writing and I will discuss it with the
attorneys.
Do not talk to anyone about the case, or about anyone who has anything to do with it,
and do not let anyone talk to you about those matters, until the trial has ended, and you have
been discharged as jurors. This prohibition about not discussing the case includes using e-
mail, Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, instant messaging, Blackberry messaging, I-Phones, I-
Touches, Google, Yahoo, or any internet search engine, or any other form of electronic
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communication for any purpose whatsoever, if it relates in any way to this case. This
includes, but is not limited to, blogging about the case or your experience as a juror on this
case, discussing the evidence, the lawyers, the parties, the court, your deliberations, your
reactions to testimony or exhibits or any aspect of the case or your courtroom experience
with anyone whatsoever, until the trial has ended, and you have been discharged as jurors.
Until then, you may tell people you are on a jury, and you may tell them the estimated
schedule for the trial, but do not tell them anything else except to say that you cannot talk
about the trial until it is over.
One reason for these prohibitions is because the trial process works by each side
knowing exactly what evidence is being considered by you and what law you are applying to
the facts you find. As I previously told you, the only evidence you are to consider in this
matter is that which is introduced in the courtroom. The law that you are to apply is the law
that I give you in the final instructions. This prohibits you from consulting any outside
source.
If you have cell phones, laptops or other communication devices, please turn them off
and do not turn them on while in the courtroom. You may use them only during breaks, so
long as you do not use them to communicate about any matter having to do with the case.
You are not permitted to take notes with laptops, Blackberries, tape recorders or any other
electronic device. You are only permitted to take notes on the notepad provided by the
court. Devices that can take pictures are prohibited and may not be used for any purpose.
It is your duty not to speak with or permit yourselves to be addressed by any person on
any subject connected with the trial. If someone should try to talk to you about the case,
stop him or her or walk away. If you should overhear others talking about the case, stop
them or walk away. If anything like this does happen, report it to me or any member of my
staff [insert phone number] as soon as you can. To avoid even the appearance of improper
conduct, do not talk to any of the parties, the lawyers, the witnesses or media representatives
about anything until the case is over, even if your conversation with them has nothing to do
with the case. For example, you might pass an attorney in the hall, and ask what good
restaurants there are downtown, and somebody from a distance may think you are talking
about the case. So, again, please avoid even the appearance of improper conduct.
The lawyers and parties have been given the same instruction about not speaking with
you jurors, so do not think they are being unfriendly to you. When you go home tonight and
family and friends ask what the case is about, remember you cannot speak with them about
the case. All you can tell them is that you are on a jury, the estimated schedule for the trial,
and that you cannot talk about the case until it is over.
In a civil case, the jurors are permitted to discuss the evidence during the trial while the
trial progresses. In a criminal case such as this, however, the jurors are not permitted to
discuss the evidence until all the evidence has been presented and the jurors have retired to
deliberate on the verdict. You may not discuss the evidence among yourselves until you
retire to deliberate on your verdict.
Therefore, during breaks and recesses whether you are
assembled in the jury room or not, you shall not discuss any aspect of the case with each other
until the case is submitted to you for your deliberations at the end of the trial. Again, if you have
a question or need additional information, submit your request in writing and I will discuss it
with the attorneys.
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During the trial, you are not to engage in any conduct that impairs or interferes with your
ability to hear and understand the court proceedings.
Do not form final opinions about any fact or about the outcome of the case until you have
heard and considered all of the evidence, the closing arguments, and the rest of the instructions I
will give you on the law. Keep an open mind during the trial. Form your final opinions only after
you have had an opportunity to discuss the case with each other in the jury room at the end of
the trial.
Please advise me in writing immediately if you believe that any juror has violated any
provision of this admonition.
Before each recess, I will not repeat the entire Admonition I have just given you. I will
probably refer to it by saying, “Please remember the Admonition,” or something like that.
However, even if I forget to make any reference to it, remember that the Admonition still applies
at all times during the trial.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Preliminary 9, RAJI (Civil) 5th, modified.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
Preliminary Criminal 14 Media Coverage
There may or may not be news media coverage of the trial. What the news media covers
is up to them. If there is media coverage, you must avoid it during the trial. If you do
encounter something about this case in the news media during the trial, end your exposure
to it immediately and report to me as soon as you can. If there are cameras in the courtroom
during the trial, do not be concerned about them. Court rules require that the proceedings be
photographed or televised in such a way that no juror can be recognized.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Preliminary 10, RAJI (Civil) 5th.
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SE NOTE: Where there is extensive media coverage about a case, the trial judge may wish
to consider asking the jurors at the start of the trial each day whether any juror has seen or
heard anything in the media about the case.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
Preliminary Criminal 15 Presence of a Deputy
Deputies are assigned to courtroom by the sheriff’s office. A deputy’s presence in this
courtroom should not be considered by you for any purpose, influence your view of the
evidence, or impact your deliberations in anyway.
USE NOTE: The court should exercise its discretion in giving this instruction.
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Preliminary Criminal 16 Questions by Jurors
If at any time during the trial you have difficulty hearing or seeing something that you
should be hearing or seeing, or if you get into personal distress for any reason, raise your
hand and let me know.
If you have any questions about parking, restaurants, or other matters relating to jury
service, feel free to ask one of the court staff. But remember that the Admonition applies to
court staff, as it does to everyone else, so do not try to discuss the case with court staff.
If you have a question about the case for a witness or for me, write it down, but do not
sign it. Hand the question to the bailiff. If your question is for a witness who is about to
leave the witness stand, please signal the bailiff or me before the witness leaves the stand.
The lawyers and I will discuss the question. The rules of evidence or other rules of law
may prevent some questions from being asked. If the rules permit the question and the
answer is available, an answer will be given at the earliest opportunity. When we do not ask a
question, it is no reflection on the person submitting it. You should attach no significance to
the failure to ask a question. I will apply the same legal standards to your questions as I do to
the questions asked by the lawyers. If a particular question is not asked, please do not guess
why or what the answer might have been.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Preliminary 11, RAJI (Civil) 5th.
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SE NOTE: Rule 18.6(e), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires the court to instruct
the jurors that “they are permitted to submit to the court written questions directed to
witnesses or to the court.” Review of the juror questions must be done out of the presence
of the jury (for example, at a bench conference) and should be done on the record.
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OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
Preliminary Criminal 17 Alternate Jurors
The law provides for a jury of _____ persons in a case such as this. We have more than
_____ jurors so that, if a juror becomes ill or has a personal emergency, the trial can
continue without that juror.
At the end of the case, alternate jurors will be determined by lot in a drawing held in
open court. Please do not be concerned with who may or may not be chosen as an alternate
at the end of the case.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Preliminary 13, RAJI (Civil), 5th.
COMMENT: ARIZ. CONST., art. 2, § 23 and A.R.S. § 21-102(A) require a 12-person jury if the
potential sentence is 30 years or more. “A defendant’s exposure to a sentence of at least
thirty years’ imprisonment establishes his or her right to a twelve-person jury,
notwithstanding the actual sentence imposed. State v. Luque, 171 Ariz. 198, 201, 829 P.2d
1244, 1247 (App.1992) (“commencement of deliberations is the crucial point” in
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determining when defendant’s right to twelve-person jury under article II, § 23 of Arizona
Constitution attaches); see also State v. Smith, 197 Ariz. 333, 4 P.3d 388 (App. 1999).” State v.
Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, 239 n. 3, 52 P.3d 804 (App. 2002); State v. Kuck, 210 Ariz. 288, 110
P.3d 1022 (App. 2005) distinguishing State v. Maldonado, 206 Ariz. 339, 342, 78 P.3d 1060,
1063 (App. 2003) (jury size is determined at the outset of the trial) and holding that the size
of the jury is determined by the maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed when
the case goes to the jury. Defense counsel’s waiver of a twelve-person jury without the
defendant’s knowing waiver is fundamental error requiring reversal and a new trial.
Maldonado, 206 Ariz. 339, 78 P.3d 1060 (App. 2003). The possible prison sentence, even if it
is a mandatory consecutive sentence, in a probation violation matter is not required to be
included in determining whether a twelve-person jury is required for defendant’s new,
untried case. State v. Nguyen, 208 Ariz. 316, 318, 93 P.3d 516, 518 (App. 2004).
Preliminary Criminal 18 Constitutional Right Not to Testify
A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to not testify at trial, and the
exercise of that right cannot be considered by the jury in determining whether a defendant is
guilty or not guilty.
SOURCE: Standard 15, RAJI (Criminal) 3rd.
Preliminary Criminal 19 Statements of Defendant
If there is testimony in this case about what a defendant said to a law enforcement
officer, you must not consider any such statements unless you determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant made the statements voluntarily.
A defendant’s statement to a law enforcement officer was not voluntary if it resulted
from the defendant’s will being overcome by a law enforcement officer’s use of any sort of
violence, coercion, or threats or by any direct or implied promise, however slight.
You must give such weight to the defendant’s statement as you feel it deserves under all
the circumstances.
SOURCE: See Standard 6, RAJI (Criminal) 3rd.
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SE NOTE: Give this instruction only if a statement of the defendant to law enforcement is
going to be introduced by the State.
Preliminary Criminal 20 Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof
The State has charged the defendant with a crime. The charge is not evidence against the
defendant. You must not think the defendant is guilty just because the defendant has been
charged with a crime. The defendant has pled “not guilty.” The defendant’s plea of “not
guilty” means that the State must prove every part of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The law does not require a defendant to prove innocence. Every defendant is presumed
by law to be innocent.
The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In
civil cases, it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not or that its truth
is highly probable. In criminal cases such as this, the State’s proof must be more powerful
than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the
defendant’s guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute
certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every doubt.
If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant
is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him/her guilty. If, on the other hand, you think
there is a real possibility that he/she is not guilty, you must give him/her the benefit of the
doubt and find him/her not guilty.
In deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, do not consider the possible
punishment.
SOURCE: See Standard 5a and 5b(1), RAJI (Criminal) 3rd; State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596,
898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995).
C
OMMENT: This instruction is to be given in every criminal case. Portillo, supra. The
instruction should be given exactly as written without any modification. State v. Sullivan, 205
Ariz. 285, 288, 69 P.3d 1006, 1009 (App. 2003).
Preliminary Criminal 21 (Short Version) Jury to Be Guided by Official English
Translation/ Interpretation
[Language to be used] may be used during this trial. The evidence you are to consider is
only that provided through the official court [interpreters] [translators]. Although some of
you may know [language to be used], it is important that all jurors consider the same evidence.
Therefore, you must consider only the English interpretation, disregarding what you heard in
[insert language]. You must disregard any different meaning. You may not comment to
fellow jurors on what you heard in [insert language]. Additionally, you may not reinterpret
for other jurors testimony that has been interpreted by the court interpreter because that
would be providing your fellow jurors with information not on the record.
SOURCE: Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions, Instruction 1.16.
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language as applicable to the case. “Interpreter” or
“interpretation” will be used for the spoken language and “translator” or “translation” will be
used for written documents.
Should there be an issue with the accuracy of the interpretation or translation, counsel
should raise the issue with the trial judge.
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Preliminary Criminal 21 (Long Version) Jury to Be Guided by Official English
Translation/ Interpretation
[Insert language] may be used during this trial. The evidence you are to consider is only that
provided through the official court interpreters. Although some of you may know [insert
language], it is important that all jurors consider the same evidence. Therefore, you must accept
the English interpretation. You must disregard any different meaning.
The court interpreter is required to remain neutral and to interpret between English and
[insert language] accurately and impartially to the best of the interpreter’s skill and judgment.
The court interpreter is trained to give as accurate a translation as possible under the
circumstances.
You must evaluate interpreted testimony as you would any other testimony. That is, you
must not give interpreted testimony any greater or lesser weight than you would if the witness
had spoken English.
It is important that each juror reach a decision based on the same set of facts. The
possibility that a word or phrase may have another meaning is not a topic for discussion unless
it is raised by counsel and resolved by the court. Therefore, you must consider only the English
interpretation, disregarding what you heard in [insert language]. You may not comment to
fellow jurors on what you heard in [insert language]. Additionally, you may not retranslate for
other jurors testimony that has been translated by the court interpreter because that would be
providing your fellow jurors with information not on the record.
USE NOTE: “Interpreter” or “interpretation” will be used for the spoken language and
“translator” or “translation” will be used for written documents.
Preliminary Criminal 21.1 Interpreter for the Defendant
Every person is entitled to a fair trial regardless of the language a person speaks and
regardless of how well a person may, or may not, use the English language. Many citizens and
noncitizens have a primary language other than English. Our Constitution protects all people
within our state regardless of their nationality or their proficiency with the English language.
Bias against or for a person who has little or no proficiency in English, or because the speaker
does not use English, is not allowed. The fact that the defendant requires an interpreter must
not influence you, in your deliberations, in any way.
Preliminary Criminal 21.2 Citizenship/Nationality Instruction
Every person is entitled to a fair trial regardless of nationality or citizenship. Our
Constitution and laws protect all people within our state regardless of their nationality or
citizenship. Bias against or for a person because of their nationality or citizenship is not allowed.
The defendant’s nationality or citizenship must not influence you in your deliberations, in any
way.
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Preliminary Criminal 22 The Charged Offense
To assist you in considering the evidence that will be presented during the trial, I will
now tell you about the crime[s] with which the defendant is charged. The defendant is
charged with [“insert name of crime[s]”], which crime[s] require[s] proof of the following:
[Set out the elements of the charged crime or crimes along with any definitions that may
prove useful to the jury during presentation of the evidence.]
The defendant has pled “not guilty” to [this charge] [these charges]. The State must
prove each element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. I will give you more
details and definitions about the alleged crime in the final jury instructions.
SOURCE: Rule 18.6(c), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.
C
OMMENT: Rule 18.6(c) provides that immediately after the jury is sworn, the court is to
instruct the jury on, “the elementary legal principles that will govern the proceeding.” It is
recommended that the jury be instructed on the elements of the charged crime and any basic
definitions so that the jury can put the evidence in context during the trial.
Preliminary Criminal 23 Scheduling During Trial
The trial is expected to last through _________. We will all do our best to move the
case along, but delays frequently occur. These won’t be anyone’s fault, so don’t hold them
against the parties. Delays usually occur because the attorneys and I often need to resolve
certain legal matters before these matters may be presented to you in court or because I am
busy with matters in other cases.
The usual hours of trial will be from ______ to ______. We will take short recesses
about every mid-morning and mid-afternoon and occasionally stretch breaks in place. We
will recess at ______ and begin again at ______. Unless a different starting time is
announced prior to recessing for the evening, you may assume a starting time of ______ for
the next day. At the beginning of the day, please assemble in the jury room for this division.
Please do not come back into the courtroom until you are called by the bailiff.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Preliminary 15, RAJI (Civil) 5th.
C
OMMENT: Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to
instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise
provided.”
Preliminary Criminal 24 Order of Trial
Criminal trials generally proceed in the following order:
First, the prosecuting attorney will make an opening statement giving a preview of the
case. The defendant’s attorney may make an opening statement outlining the defense case
immediately after the prosecutor’s statement, or it may be postponed until after the State’s
case has been presented. What is said in opening statements is not evidence. Nor is it an
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argument. The purpose of an opening statement is to help you prepare for anticipated
evidence.
Second, the State will present its evidence. After the State finishes the presentation of its
evidence, the defendant may present evidence. If the defendant does produce evidence, the
State may present additional, or rebuttal, evidence. With each witness, there is a direct
examination, a cross-examination by the opposing side, and, finally, redirect examination.
This usually ends the testimony of that witness.
Third, after all the evidence is in, I will read and give you copies of the final instructions,
the rules of law you must follow in reaching your verdict.
[Fourth, the attorneys will make closing arguments to tell you what they think the
evidence shows and how they think you should decide the case. The State has the right to
open and close the argument since the State has the burden of proof. Just as in opening
statements, what is said in closing arguments is not evidence.]
[Fourth, the attorneys will make closing arguments to tell you what they think the
evidence shows and how they think you should decide the case. The State has the right to
open the argument, but if the defendant presents an affirmative defense, the defendant may
be allowed to close the argument because the defendant has the burden of proof on the
affirmative defense. If no affirmative defense is presented, the State has the right to close the
argument. Just as in opening statements, what is said in closing arguments is not evidence.]
Fifth, you will deliberate in the jury room about the evidence and rules of law in an
effort to reach the verdict[s]. If you unanimously agree upon the verdict[s], [it] [they] will be
read in court with you and the parties present.
[Sixth, in some circumstances, it may be necessary for you to make additional findings. If
this is the case, I will give you further instructions at that time.]
Finally, you will be discharged and released from the Admonition.
The rules of law I have shared with you in the past few minutes are preliminary only. At
the end of the case I will read to you and give you a copy of the final instructions of law. In
deciding the case you must be guided by the final instructions.
SOURCE: Bench Book for Superior Court Judges; Rule 19.1(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
COMMENT: The second bracketed “fourth” paragraph is included because where the
defense has the burden of proof on an affirmative defense, the trial court has the discretion
to grant surrebuttal. See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 468-69, ¶¶ 202-04, 94 P.3d 1119 (2004);
State v. Steelman, 120 Ariz. 301, 319, 585 P.2d 1213, 1231 (1978). If the court has made the
decision to allow surrebuttal before hearing the evidence, the court may wish to use the
second bracketed “fourth” paragraph.
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STANDARD CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS
Standard Criminal 1 Duty of Jury
It is your duty as a juror to decide this case by applying these jury instructions to the
facts as you determine them. You must follow these jury instructions. They are the rules you
should use to decide this case.
It is your duty to determine what the facts are in the case by determining what actually
happened. Determine the facts only from the evidence produced in court. When I say
“evidence,” I mean the testimony of witnesses and the exhibits introduced in court. You
should not guess about any fact. You must not be influenced by sympathy or prejudice. You
must not be concerned with any opinion that you feel I have about the facts. You, as jurors,
are the sole judges of what happened.
You must consider all these instructions. Do not pick out one instruction, or part of
one, and ignore the others. As you determine the facts, however, you may find that some
instructions no longer apply. You must then consider the instructions that do apply, together
with the facts as you have determined them.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 1 (1996).
Standard Criminal 2 Indictment/Information Is Not Evidence
The State has charged the defendant with [a crime] [certain crimes]. A charge is not
evidence against the defendant. You must not think that the defendant is guilty just because
of a charge. The defendant has pled “not guilty.”
This plea of “not guilty” means that the State must prove each element of the charge[s]
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Standard Criminal 3 Presumption of Innocence
The law does not require a defendant to prove innocence. Every defendant is presumed
by law to be innocent. You must start with the presumption that the defendant is innocent.
SOURCE: The instruction is based on language from the 1989 and 1996 versions of the
Revised Arizona Jury Instructions.
U
SE NOTE: The Committee strongly recommends the court use this instruction in every
case along with the required reasonable doubt instruction.
C
OMMENT: In Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held
that, under facts of that case, the failure of the trial court to give defendant’s requested
instruction on presumption of innocence violated defendant’s due process rights to a fair
trial. In Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held
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that the failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence in and of
itself does not violate the Constitution, and noted that the error it found in Taylor was based
on the facts of that case. Accord State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31, 770 P.2d 328, 335 (1989).
Because any error in the failure to give a presumption of innocence instruction will depend
on the facts of the case, the Committee is of the opinion that the better practice is to give
this instruction in every case.
Standard Criminal 4(a) Burden of Proof
The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
This means the State must prove each element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. In
civil cases, it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not or that its truth
is highly probable. In criminal cases such as this, the State’s proof must be more powerful
than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the
defendant’s guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute
certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every doubt.
If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant
is guilty of the crime charged, you must find [him][her] guilty. If, on the other hand, you
think there is a real possibility that [he][she] is not guilty, you must give [him][her] the benefit
of the doubt and find [him][her] not guilty.
SOURCE: State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995), with the addition of
the language contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph.
C
OMMENT: This is the instruction verbatim from State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596, 898
P.2d 970, 974 (1995), with the addition of the language contained in the second sentence of
the first paragraph. In State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 418, 984 P.2d 16, 26 (1999), the
Arizona Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the “firmly convinced” language in the Portillo
instruction, and stated: “We have clearly indicated our preference for this instruction, which
is based upon the Federal Judicial Center’s proposed instruction.” 194 Ariz. 408, ¶ 30. This
instruction is included for those who are of the opinion that the Arizona Supreme Court has
mandated that the courts must now use only the exact language given in Portillo. The
Committee believes, however, that the Portillo instruction is incorrect to the extent that it
states that the preponderance of the evidence standard and the clear and convincing
evidence standard apply only in a civil case. In a criminal case, facts in general must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and certain specific facts must be proved by
either a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence. A.R.S.
§ 13-205(A) (unless otherwise provided, a defendant must prove an affirmative defense by a
preponderance of the evidence); A.R.S. § 13-206(B) (defendant must prove entrapment by
clear and convincing evidence); A.R.S. § 13-502 (defendant must prove legal insanity by clear
and convincing evidence); State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 582, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1997)
(State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed other act).
Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2) defines these other standards for the jurors.
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Standard Criminal 4(b) Standards for the Burden of Proof
There are three standards for the burden of proof:
1. Preponderance of the evidence;
2. Clear and convincing evidence;
3. Beyond a reasonable doubt.
Preponderance of the Evidence
A party having the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence must persuade you, by the evidence, that the claim or a
fact is more probably true than not true. This means the evidence that favors that party
outweighs the opposing evidence.
Clear and Convincing Evidence A party having the burden of proof by clear and
convincing evidence must persuade you, by the evidence, that the claim or a fact is highly
probable. This standard is higher than the standard for proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, but is lower than the standard for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt The State has the burden of proving the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This means the State must prove each element of each
charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof, by the
evidence that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. This standard is higher
than the standard for either proof by a preponderance of the evidence or proof by clear and
convincing evidence.
There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in
criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every doubt. If, based on your
consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged, you must find [him][her] guilty. If, on the other hand, you think there is a real
possibility that [he][she] is not guilty, you must give [him][her] the benefit of the doubt and
find [him][her] not guilty.
COMMENT: This instruction takes the instruction given in State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596,
898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995), and combines it with the definitions for preponderance of the
evidence and clear and convincing evidence from the civil RAJI. In a criminal case, facts in
general must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and certain specific facts must
be proved by either a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence.
A.R.S. § 13-205(A) unless otherwise provided, a defendant must prove an affirmative
defense by a preponderance of the evidence); A.R.S. § 13-206(B) (defendant must prove
entrapment by clear and convincing evidence); A.R.S. § 13-502 (defendant must prove legal
insanity by clear and convincing evidence); State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 582, 944 P.2d
1194, 1196 (1997) (State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant
committed other act).
Standard Criminal 5 Jury Not to Consider Penalty
You must decide whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty by determining what the
facts in the case are and applying these jury instructions.
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You must not consider the possible punishment when deciding on guilt; punishment is
left to the judge.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 7 (1996); State v. Koch, 138 Ariz. 99, 105, 673 P.2d 297, 303
(1983); State v. Van Dyke, 127 Ariz. 335, 337, 621 P.2d 22, 24 (1983).
Standard Criminal 6 Defendant’s Right to Represent Himself/Herself
Every defendant has a right to represent [himself] [herself]. [The Defendant will be
representing himself/herself with the assistance of an advisory lawyer.] The Defendant’s
decision to represent [himself] [herself] means that [he] [she] will be required to follow the
same rules and procedures as any lawyer.
You should not let the fact that the Defendant has chosen to represent [himself]
[herself] affect your deliberations in any way.
SOURCE: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).
Standard Criminal 7 Defendant Absent at Trial
You are not to consider or speculate about the defendant’s absence from the courtroom.
It is not evidence, and you must not consider it in deciding if the State has proved its case
beyond a reasonable doubt.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 33 (1996); Rule 9.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Standard Criminal 8 Evidence to Be Considered
You are to determine what the facts in the case are from the evidence produced in
court. If an objection to a question was sustained, you must disregard the question and
you must not guess what the answer to the question might have been. If an exhibit was
offered into evidence and an objection to it was sustained, you must not consider that
exhibit as evidence. If testimony was ordered stricken from the record, you must not
consider that testimony for any purpose.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 4 (2016).
C
OMMENT: When the trial court sustains a defendant’s objection to an improper comment
and admonishes the jury to disregard it, this is generally sufficient to cure the prejudicial
impact unless it is highly damaging or the instruction from the court is clearly inadequate.
State v. Clow, 130 Ariz. 125, 127, 634 P.2d 576, 578 (1981).
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Standard Criminal 9 Defendant Need Not Produce Evidence
The State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence. The
defendant is not required to produce evidence of any kind. The defendant’s decision not to
produce any evidence is not evidence of guilt.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 16 (1996); A.R.S. § 13-115 (statutory language as of October
1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: If a defendant testifies and refers to absent witnesses or defense counsel argues
about others involved or infers that the State could have called other witnesses, the State
may argue to the jury that although the State has the burden of proof, the defense has the
power of subpoena also. This comment is not a comment on defendant’s right not to testify.
See State v. Petzolt, 172 Ariz. 272, 278, 836 P.2d 982, 988 (App.1991); State v. Rutledge, 205
Ariz. 7, 14, 66 P.3d 50, 57 (2003) (stating that the comments must be taken in the context of
the facts presented and in that case, where defense raised an alibi defense, it was proper for
prosecutor to comment that the defendant’s interview with the police did not include any
alibi evidence). It is well settled law that a prosecutor may comment on defendant’s failure to
produce exculpatory evidence as long as the State does not call attention to defendant’s
failure to testify. State v. Herrera, 203 Ariz. 131, 137, 51 P.3d 353, 359 (App. 2002). However,
the State is not permitted to argue to the jury about the defense failure to produce witnesses
or evidence when there has been no evidence presented or arguments made by counsel
about absent witnesses or evidence or the failure of the State to call witnesses or present
specific evidence. See State v. Corona, 188 Ariz. 85, 89, 932 P.2d 1356, 1360 (App. 1997).
Standard Criminal 10 Lawyers’ Comments Are Not Evidence
In their opening statements and closing arguments, the lawyers have talked to you about
the law and the evidence. What the lawyers said is not evidence, but it may help you to
understand the law and the evidence.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 2 (1996).
C
OMMENT: The opening statement should not contain any facts that the parties cannot
prove at trial. State v. Bowie, 119 Ariz. 336, 339, 580 P.2d 1190, 1193 (1978). The trial court
should not restrict an opening statement containing facts that the party believes in good faith
that it can establish at trial. State v. Pedroza-Perez, 240 Ariz. 114, 377 P.3d 311 (2016).
Standard Criminal 11 Stipulations
The lawyers are permitted to stipulate that certain facts exist. This means that both sides
agree those facts do exist and are part of the evidence. You are to treat a stipulation as any
other evidence. You are free to accept it or reject it, in whole or in part, just as any other
evidence.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) Standard 3 (1996).
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USE NOTE: In State v. Allen, 223 Ariz. 125, 126, ¶10, n. 2, 220 P.3d 245, 246 (Ariz. 2009), the
Arizona Supreme Court noted that it was incorrect to instruct the jury that it “should accept
* * * as true” any fact stipulated to by the parties.
Standard Criminal 12 Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts
During the course of the trial, you were informed that the Court had taken judicial
notice that [describe adjudicative facts]. You may or may not accept this judicial notice as
conclusive.
C Rule 201(f), Arizona Rules of Evidence (effective as of January 1, 2012).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should be given to the jury during the trial after the trial court
has taken judicial notice of an adjudicative fact pursuant to Rule 201, and should be given
again in the final instructions.
C
OMMENT: The Arizona Supreme Court adopted a new Rule 201 on September 8, 2010,
that is effective on January 1, 2012, as part of R-10-0035, in which subsection (f) specifically
requires that this instruction be given in criminal cases when the trial court has taken judicial
notice of an adjudicative fact.
Standard Criminal 13 Redacted Exhibits
Some of the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence have had portions deleted
from them for legal reasons. Do not concern yourselves with the reasons why some portions
of the exhibits have been deleted. Do not speculate upon what the deleted portions might,
or might not, reveal.
SOURCE: State v. Kennedy, 122 Ariz. 22, 27, 592 P.2d 1288, 1293 (App. 1979).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should be given to the jury d t the time that the redacted
exhibit has been admitted and published to the jury, and should be given again in the final
instructions
Standard Criminal 14 Direct and Circumstantial Evidence
Evidence may be direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a witness
who saw, heard, or otherwise sensed an event. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a fact
or facts from which you may find another fact. The law makes no distinction between direct
and circumstantial evidence. It is for you to determine the importance to be given to the
evidence, regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 24 (1996); State v. Carter, 118 Ariz. 562, 564, 578 P.2d 991,
993 (1978); State v. Salinas, 106 Ariz. 526, 527, 479 P.2d 411, 412 (1971); State v. Harvill, 106
Ariz. 386, 390, 476 P.2d 841, 845 (1970).
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Standard Criminal 15 Credibility [Believability] of Witnesses
In deciding the facts of this case, you should consider what testimony to accept, and
what to reject. You may accept everything a witness says, or part of it, or none of it.
In evaluating testimony, you should use the tests for truthfulness that people use in
determining matters of importance in everyday life, including such factors as: the witness’s
ability to see or hear or know the things the witness testified to; the quality of the witness’s
memory; the witness’s manner while testifying; whether the witness had any motive, bias, or
prejudice; whether the witness was contradicted by anything the witness said or wrote before
trial, or by other evidence; and the reasonableness of the witness’s testimony when
considered in the light of the other evidence.
Consider all of the evidence in the light of reason, common sense, and experience.
SOURCE: Preliminary 4 and Standard 6, RAJI (Civil) 3d; Rule 21.1, Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to instructions to the jury in civil actions shall apply to
criminal actions, except as otherwise provided.”
U
SE NOTE: If a witness has been impeached pursuant to Rule 609 with evidence of a prior
felony, Standard Criminal 19 (witness was the defendant) or Standard 20 (third-party
witness) should also be given. If character evidence was admitted pursuant to Rule 404, the
court should consider either modifying Standard 19 or Standard 20 if given or giving a
separate instruction regarding for what purpose(s) the jury may consider the Rule 404
evidence.
Standard Criminal 16 Testimony of Law Enforcement Officers
The testimony of a law enforcement officer is not entitled to any greater or lesser
importance or believability merely because of the fact that the witness is a law enforcement
officer. You are to consider the testimony of a police officer just as you would the testimony
of any other witness.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 34 (1996); State v. Walters, 155 Ariz. 548, 552, 748 P.2d 777,
781 (1987).
Standard Criminal 17 Expert Witness
A witness qualified as an expert by education or experience may state opinions on
matters in that witness’s field of expertise, and may also state reasons for those opinions.
Expert opinion testimony should be judged just as any other testimony. You are not
bound by it. You may accept it or reject it, in whole or in part, and you should give it as
much credibility and weight as you think it deserves, considering the witness’s qualifications
and experience, the reasons given for the opinions, and all the other evidence in the case.
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SOURCE: Rule 702, Arizona Rules of Evidence; Preliminary 6, RAJI (Civil) 4th; Rule 21.1,
Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure: “The law relating to instructions to the jury in civil
actions shall apply to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided.” State v. Roberts, 139
Ariz. 117, 122-23, 677 P.2d 280, 285-86 (App. 1983).
Standard Criminal 18(a) Defendant Need Not Testify
The defendant is not required to testify. The decision on whether or not to testify is left
to the defendant acting with the advice of an attorney. You must not let this choice affect
your deliberations in any way. [You must not conclude that the defendant is likely to be
guilty because the defendant did not testify.]
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 15 (1996); A.R.S. §§ 13-115 and 13-117 (statutory language as
of October 1, 1978); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Standard Criminal 18(b) Defendant’s Testimony
You must evaluate the defendant’s testimony the same as any witness’ testimony.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 36 (1996).
Standard Criminal 19 Voluntariness of Defendant’s Statements
You must not consider any statements made by the defendant to a law enforcement
officer unless you determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made the
statements voluntarily.
A defendant’s statement was not voluntary if it resulted from the defendant’s will being
overcome by a law enforcement officer’s use of any sort of violence, coercion, or threats, or
by any direct or implied promise, however slight.
You must give such weight to the defendant’s statement as you feel it deserves under all
the circumstances.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 6 (1996); A.R.S. § 13-3988 (statutory language as of October
1, 1978); State v. Williams, 136 Ariz. 52, 56, 664 P.2d 202, 206 (1983); State v. McVay, 127
Ariz. 18, 20, 617 P.2d 1134, 1136 (1980); State v. Brooks, 127 Ariz. 130, 138, 618 P.2d 624,
632 (App. 1980).
Standard Criminal 20 Reserved
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Standard Criminal 21 Defendant Witness (Prior Conviction)
You have heard evidence that defendant has previously been convicted of a criminal
offense. You may consider that evidence only as it may affect defendant’s believability as a
witness. You must not consider a prior conviction as evidence of guilt of the crime for
which the defendant is now on trial.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 19 (1996); Rule 609, Arizona Rules of Evidence; State v. Green,
200 Ariz. 496, 499, 29 P.3d 271, 274 (2001).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction must be given if the court allows evidence of defendant’s prior
conviction. “Whenever evidence is admitted of other offenses there is an imperative duty on
the trial court to clearly instruct the jury as to the restricted and limited purpose for which
such evidence is to be considered.” State v. Canedo, 125 Ariz. 197, 200, 608 P.2d 774, 777
(1980). The court’s failure to provide this type of instruction constitutes reversible error. Id.
C
OMMENT: The above instruction is appropriate when the trial court admits the evidence of
the prior conviction only for impeachment under Ariz. R. Evid. 609. If relevant, the trial
court may also admit the evidence of the prior conviction under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b); State
v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 499, 707 P.2d 289, 297 (1985); State v. Burciaga, 146 Ariz. 333, 335,
705 P.2d 1384, 1386 (App. 1985).
If the trial court admits the evidence under both Rule 404(b) and Rule 609, the trial
court should delete the word “only” in the second sentence. Also, the trial court should
consider combining this instruction with Standard Criminal 26A or 26B, dealing with
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. The Court should also consider whether the
specific reference to the nature of the prior offense(s) should or should not be sanitized to
prevent prejudice. See State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, 318, 86 P.3d 370, 374 (2004); State v.
Montano, 204 Ariz. 413, 426, 65 P.3d 61, 74 (2003).
Standard Criminal 22 Witness (Prior Conviction)
You have heard evidence that a witness has previously been convicted of a criminal
offense. You may consider this evidence only as it may affect the witness’ believability.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 20 (1996); Rule 609, Arizona Rules of Evidence.
U
SE NOTE: The Court should consider whether the specific reference to the nature of the
prior offense(s) of a witness should be sanitized to prevent prejudice. See State v. Montano, 204
Ariz. 413, 426, 65 P.3d 61, 74 (2003) (case involving witness’ prior conviction).
S
OURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 21 (1996); State v. Nieto, 186 Ariz. 449, 457, 924 P.2d 453, 461
(1996); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 174, 800 P.2d 1260, 1282 (1990), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 929 (1991).
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Standard Criminal 23 Evidence for Limited Purpose
You [are about to hear] [have heard] evidence that [describe evidence to be received for limited
purpose]. This evidence is admitted only for the limited purpose of [describe purpose] and, therefore,
you must consider it only for that limited purpose and not for any other purpose.
SOURCE: Federal Jury Instruction 2.11; Arizona Rules of Evidence 105 (effective as of
September 1. 1977).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should be given to the jury before such evidence is admitted,
and should be given again in the final instructions.
Standard Criminal 24 Other Acts
Evidence of other acts has been presented. You may consider [this act][these acts] only if
you find that the State has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
committed [this act][these acts]. You may only consider [this act][these acts] to establish the
defendant’s [motive], [opportunity], [intent], [preparation], [plan], [knowledge], [identity],
[absence of mistake or accident]. You must not consider [this act][these acts] to determine
the defendant’s character or character trait, or to determine that the defendant acted in
conformity with the defendant’s character or character trait and therefore committed the
charged offense.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 26A (1996); Rule 404(b), Arizona Rules of Evidence
(Statutory language as of Nov. 1, 1988); State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 944, 946, P.2d 1194,
1196 (1997) (added the requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in bracketed portions as applicable to facts of case. “Clear and
convincing evidence” is defined in Standard Criminal Instruction 5(b)(2).
The bracketed list in the third sentence is not exhaustive. The trial court should include
in the instruction the specific relevant purpose or purposes for which the evidence was
admitted. For a broad listing of relevant purposes, see M.
UDALL ET AL., LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 84, at 182-89 (3d ed. 1991). If the defendant requests a limiting instruction, the trial court
MUST give a limiting instruction. State v. Ives, 187 Ariz. 102, 111, 927 P.2d 762, 771 (1996).
C
OMMENT: Based on Arizona Supreme Court cases, the Committee recommends that the
trial court conduct a Rule 403 balancing and state on the record that it has done so. See State
v. Hughes, 189 Ariz. 62, 68, 938 P.2d 457, 463 (1997); State v. Ives, 187 Ariz. 102, 111, 927 P.2d
762, 771 (1996); State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 19, 926 P.2d 468, 486 (1996); State v. Taylor, 169
Ariz. 121, 125-26, 817 P.2d 488, 492-93 (1991). But see State v. Cannon, 148 Ariz. 72, 76, 713
P.2d 273, 277 (1985) (when defendant makes Rule 404(b) objection, trial court not required
sua sponte to conduct Rule 403 balancing).
Standard Criminal 25 Character Evidence in Sexual Misconduct Cases
Evidence of other acts has been presented. [Evidence to rebut this has also been
presented.] You may consider this evidence in determining whether the defendant had a
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character trait that predisposed [him][her] to commit the [crime][crimes] charged. You may
determine that the defendant had a character trait that predisposed [him][her] to commit the
[crime][crimes] charged only if you decide that the State has proved by clear and convincing
evidence that:
1. The defendant committed these acts; and
2. These acts show the defendant’s character predisposed [him][her] to commit
abnormal or unnatural sexual acts.
You may not convict the defendant of the [crime][crimes] charged simply because you
find that [he][she] committed these acts, or that [he][she] had a character trait that
predisposed [him][her] to commit the [crime][crimes] charged.
Evidence of these acts does not lessen the State’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 26B (1996); Rule 404(c), Arizona Rules of Evidence (statutory
language as of Nov. 1, 1988); A.R.S. § 13-1420 (statutory language as of April 28, 1997); State
v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 583, 944 P.2d 1194, 1197 (1997) (added the requirement of proof
by clear and convincing evidence).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in bracketed portions as applicable to facts of case. “Clear and
convincing evidence” is defined in Standard Criminal Instruction 5(b)(2).
Under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c)(2), the trial court MUST give a limiting instruction. This
instruction replaces RAJI (Criminal) No. 14.101, Previous Sexual Acts (1989).
C
OMMENT: Under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c)(1)(A) and (B), the trial court must make preliminary
specific findings, and under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c)(1)(C), it MUST conduct a Ariz. R. Evid.
403 balancing.
The Committee preferred the language “abnormal or unnatural sexual acts” rather than
“aberrant sexual propensity” because “aberrant sexual propensity” is difficult to understand
and define.
Standard Criminal 26 Character and Reputation of the Defendant
You have heard evidence of the defendant’s character for [truthfulness,] [peacefulness,]
[honesty,] [etc.]. In deciding this case, you should consider that evidence together with, and
in the same manner as, all the other evidence in the case.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 8 (1996); State v. Childs, 113 Ariz. 318, 322, 553 P.2d 1192,
1196 (1976); State v. Vild, 155 Ariz. 374, 379-380, 746 P.2d 1304, 1309-1310 (App. 1987).
Standard Criminal 27 Facility Dog
A witness may be accompanied by a dog while testifying in court. The dog’s presence is
not and should not be a reflection on the truthfulness or credibility of any testimony that is
offered by the witness. The dog is trained to assist witnesses in court proceedings. The
presence of the dog should not influence your deliberations in any way.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-4442 (statutory language as of August 3, 2018).
Standard Criminal 28 Absence of Other Participant
The only matter for you to determine is whether the State has proved the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant’s guilt or innocence is not affected by the
fact that another person or persons might have participated or cooperated in the crime and
is not on trial now. You should not guess about the reason any other person is absent from
the courtroom.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 12 (1996); State v. Cannon, 148 Ariz. 72, 79-80, 713 P.2d 273,
280-81 (1985).
Standard Criminal 29 Consider Evidence Separately
There are ___ defendants. You must consider the evidence in the case as a whole.
However, you must consider the charge[s] against each defendant separately.
Each defendant is entitled to have the jury determine the verdict as to each of the crimes
charged based upon that defendant’s own conduct and from the evidence which applies to
that defendant, as if that defendant were being tried alone.
The defendant’s conduct may include acting as [a principal] [an accomplice] [a co-
conspirator].
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 32 (1996); Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993); State v.
Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 68, 859 P.2d 169, 178 (1993).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in bracketed portions as applicable to the facts of the case.
If applicable, the court shall instruct on accomplice liability [See Statutory Criminal
Instruction 3.01] or conspiracy [See Statutory Criminal Instruction 10.03].
Standard Criminal 30 Separate Counts
Each count charges a separate and distinct offense. You must decide each count
separately on the evidence with the law applicable to it, uninfluenced by your decision on
any other count. You may find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt, all,
some, or none of the charged offenses. Your finding for each count must be stated in a
separate verdict.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 35 (1996); State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 145, 12 P.3d 997,
1015 (2000); State v. Parra, 10 Ariz. App. 427, 431, 459 P.2d 344, 348 (1969).
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Standard Criminal 31 Dismissal/Severance of Some Charges Against Defendant
At the beginning of the trial, the charge[s] against the defendant [was][were] read to you.
[Specify count[s] or charge[s]] [is] [are] no longer before you. You should not speculate
about why the charge[s] [is] [are] no longer part of this trial.
The defendant is on trial only for the charge[s] of [remaining count[s]]. You may
consider the evidence presented only as it relates to the remaining count[s].
S
OURCE: Federal Jury Instruction 2.13.
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should be given to the jury during the trial after the dismissal or
severance of charges, and should be be given again in the final instructions.
Standard Criminal 32 Disposition of Charge Against Defendant
For reasons that do not concern you, the case against codefendant [name] is no longer
before you. Do not speculate why. This fact should not influence your verdict[s] with
reference to the remaining defendant[s], and you must base your verdict[s] solely on the
evidence against the remaining defendant[s].
SOURCE: Federal Jury Instruction 2.14.
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should be given to the jury during the trial after the dismissal of
a codefendant from the case, and should be given again in the final instructions.
It may not be appropriate to give this instruction if the defense is based on third-party
culpability of a dismissed codefendant.
Standard Criminal 33 Multiple Acts
The defendant is accused of having committed the crime of _____ [in Count _____].
The prosecution has introduced evidence for the purpose of showing that there is more than
one [act] [or] [omission] upon which a conviction [on Count ____] may be based. Defendant
may be found guilty if the proof shows beyond a reasonable doubt that [he][she] committed
any one or more of the [acts] [or] [omissions]. However, in order to return a verdict of guilty
[to Count _____], all jurors must agree that [he] [she] committed the same [act] [or]
[omission] [or] [acts] [or] [omissions]. It is not necessary that the particular [act] [or]
[omission] agreed upon be stated in your verdict.
SOURCE: CALJIC 17.01 (West 2008).
U
SE NOTES: In State v. Klokic, 219 Ariz. 241, 244, ¶14, 196 P.3d 844, 847 (App. 2008), the
court wrote:
“[I]n drafting an indictment, the State may choose to charge as one count
separate criminal acts that occurred during the course of a single criminal
undertaking even if those acts might otherwise provide a basis for charging
multiple criminal violations. In such cases, however, if the State introduces
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evidence of multiple criminal acts to prove a single charge, the trial court is
normally obliged to take one of two remedial measures to insure that the
defendant receives a unanimous jury verdict.”
One of these measures is to, “instruct the jury that they must agree unanimously on a
specific act that constitutes the crime before the defendant can be found guilty.” Id.,
(footnote and citations omitted).
Standard Criminal 34 Reserved
Standard Criminal 35 Voluntary Act
Before you may convict the defendant of the charged crime(s), you must find that the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant [committed a voluntary act]
[omitted to perform a duty imposed upon the defendant by law that the defendant was
capable of performing]. A voluntary act means a bodily movement performed consciously
and as a result of effort and determination. You must consider all the evidence in deciding
whether the defendant [committed the act voluntarily] [failed to perform the duty imposed
on the defendant].
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 17 (1996); A.R.S. §§ 13-105 (statutory language as of April 19,
1994) and 13-201 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); State v. Lara, 183 Ariz. 233,
234-35, 902 P.2d 1337, 1338-39 (1995).
U
SE NOTE: The appropriate bracketed language should be used in cases depending on
whether a defendant is accused of committing a voluntary act or failing to perform a duty
imposed by law. “Voluntary act” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
Standard Criminal 36 Lesser-Included Offense
The crime of [_________] includes the lesser offense of [___________]. You may
consider the lesser offense of [__________] if either
1. you find the defendant not guilty of [insert the greater offense]; or
2. after full and careful consideration of the facts, you cannot agree on whether to find
the defendant guilty or not guilty of [insert the greater offense].
You cannot find the defendant guilty of [insert the lesser offense] unless you find that
the State has proved each element of [insert the lesser offense] beyond a reasonable doubt.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 22; State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 439-40, 924 P.2d 441, 443-
44 (1996).
U
SE NOTE: In determining whether an instruction on a lesser-included offense is proper,
the Arizona Supreme Court has set forth a two-part test: (1) whether the offense is a lesser-
included offense of the crime charged, and (2) whether the evidence otherwise supports the
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giving of the instruction. State v. Vickers, 159 Ariz. 532, 542, 768 P.2d 1177, 1187 (1989), cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1033 (1990); State v. Celaya, 135 Ariz. 248, 251, 660 P.2d 849, 852 (1983).
To determine whether a lesser-included offense instruction is warranted, the trial court
may consider whether by its very nature the included offense is always a constituent part of
the greater offense or whether the terms of the charging document describe the lesser
offense even though the lesser offense would not always form a constituent part of the
greater offense. State v. Gooch, 139 Ariz. 365, 366, 678 P.2d 946, 947 (1984); State v. Magana,
178 Ariz. 416, 418, 874 P.2d 973, 975 (App. 1994).
As a general rule, a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction if there
is evidence from which the jury could convict on the lesser offense and find that the State
failed to prove an element of the greater offense. State v. Jansing, 186 Ariz. 63, 68, 918 P.2d
1081, 1086 (1996); State v. Ruelas, 165 Ariz. 326, 328, 798 P.2d 1335, 1337 (App. 1990); State
v. Conroy, 131 Ariz. 528, 532, 642 P.2d 873, 877 (App. 1982). The evidence supporting the
lesser-included offense may be circumstantial and it may be in dispute. State v. Cousin, 136
Ariz. 83, 87, 664 P.2d 233, 237 (App. 1983).
When the record is such that the defendant is either guilty of the crime charged or not
guilty, the trial court should refuse to give a lesser-included instruction. State v. Jackson, 186
Ariz. 20, 27, 918 P.2d 1038, 1045 (1996); State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 408, 844 P.2d 566,
575 (1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 912 (1993); State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 479, 486, 698 P.2d 724,
731 (1985); State v. Gendron, 166 Ariz. 562, 566, 804 P.2d 95, 99 (App. 1990).
C
OMMENT: Where the evidence could support a conviction for a lesser offense, however,
the trial court must not refuse to give it on the ground that the defendant pursued an “all-or-
nothing” defense before the jury. State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1 (2006).
The trial court should not refuse to give a lesser offense instruction on the ground that
the lesser offense is not entirely subsumed by the greater offense. State v. Lua, 237 Ariz. 301
(2015).
Standard Criminal 37 Possession Defined
The law recognizes different types of possession.
“Actual possession” means the defendant knowingly had direct physical control over an
object.
“Constructive possession” means the defendant, although not actually possessing an
object, knowingly exercised dominion or control over it, either acting alone or through
another person. “Dominion or control” means either actual ownership of the object or
power over it. Constructive possession may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Both actual and constructive possession may be sole or joint. “Sole possession” means
the defendant, acting alone, had actual or constructive possession of an object. “Joint
possession” means the defendant and one or more persons shared actual or constructive
possession of an object.
You may find that the element of possession, as the term is used in these instructions, is
present if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual or constructive
possession, either acting alone or with another person.
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SOURCE: RAJI (Rev. Criminal) No. 37 (1996); A.R.S. § 13-105; (statutory language as of
September 21, 2006); State v. Cox, 214 Ariz. 518, 520, 155 P.3d 357, 359 (App. 2007); State v.
Barreras, 112 Ariz. 421, 422-23, 542 P.2d 1120, 1121-22 (1975); State v. Scarborough, 110 Ariz.
1, 2, 5, 514 P.2d 997, 998, 1001 (1973); State v. Arce, 107 Ariz. 156, 163, 483 P.2d 1395, 1402
(1971).
Standard Criminal 38 Deliberate Ignorance
The State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that
[he] [she] was [transporting] [in possession of] [transferring] {insert name of illegal drug}. That
knowledge can be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence showing that the
defendant was aware of the high probability that the [package(s)] [container(s)] [vehicle]
contained {insert name of illegal drug}, and that the defendant acted with conscious purpose to
avoid learning the true contents of the [package(s)] [container(s)] [vehicle]. You may not find
such knowledge, however, if you find that the defendant actually believed that no {insert name
of illegal drug} were in the [vehicle driven by the defendant] [package(s)] [container], or if you
find that the defendant was simply careless.
SOURCE: State v. Haas, 138 Ariz. 413, 675 P.2d 673 (1983); State v. Diaz, 166 Ariz. 442, 803
P.2d 435 (App. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds, 168 Ariz. 363, 813 P.2d. 728 (1991); State
v. Fierro, 220 Ariz. 337, 206 P.3d 786 (App. 2008); United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th
Cir. 2007).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction is drafted in the context of a drug offense because the issue of
deliberate ignorance appears most often in that context. For example, in State v. Diaz, 166
Ariz. 442, 803 P.2d 435 (App. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds, 168 Ariz. 363, 813 P.2d.
728 (1991) the defendant was charged with transporting marijuana. Although the defendant
admitted being told that the truck contained “drugs,” the defendant claimed he did not know
the true contents of the truck. Addressing defendant’s claim of ignorance, the court wrote:
We agree with appellant that the instruction given was improper. First, the
court refused appellant's request that it define the term “illegal substance.”
That term could include innumerable items both within and without the list
of drug offenses. Secondly, the statute under which appellant was charged
requires the state to prove that the defendant knowingly transported or
transferred a narcotic drug. A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(7); see State v. Arce, 107 Ariz.
156, 483 P.2d 1395 (1971). The state is thus required to show that appellant
knew that what he was transporting was a narcotic drug, not an illegal
substance. That knowledge can be established either by direct or
circumstantial evidence. It can be established by showing that appellant was
aware of the high probability that the packages contained a narcotic drug
and that he acted with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the true
contents of the packages. United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 725 F.2d 471 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837, 105 S. Ct. 134, 83 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1984). Any
self-imposed ignorance cannot protect appellant from criminal
responsibility.
166 Ariz. at 445, 803 P.2d at 438.
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Deliberate ignorance can be an issue in other types of cases. E.g., see, State v. Haas, 138
Ariz. 413, 420, 675 P.2d 673, 680 (1983) (“Thus, the jury could easily have concluded that
even if defendant had no actual knowledge of the fraud, he was aware of the high probability
that the scheme was fraudulent and deliberately shut his eyes to avoid learning the truth.
Such a conclusion justifies the ultimate inference of knowing participation.”) The instruction
should be modified to reflect the nature of the case and the type of knowledge required to
be proved.
C
OMMENT: Users are referred to A.R.S. § 13-204 and Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury
Instruction 5.7. Some members of the committee felt that the “high probability” language
could be confusing to the jury in light of the Portillo instruction.
The instruction should only be given “’when the defendant claims a lack of guilty
knowledge and there are facts and evidence that support an inference of deliberate
ignorance.” United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
829, 106 S. Ct. 92, 88 L. Ed.2d 76 (1985). The reason such an instruction should not be
given in all cases is “because of the possibility that the jury will be led to employ a negligence
standard and convict a defendant on the impermissible ground that he should have known
[an illegal act] was taking place.” United States v. Beckett, 724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir.1984) (per
curiam).” United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1986).
Standard Criminal 39 Involuntary Intoxication
Unlike voluntary intoxication, intoxication resulting from the involuntary use of alcohol
or drugs may be considered in deciding whether the defendant had the mental state required
to prove an offense. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all the
elements of the offense, including the required mental state.
If you determine that the defendant became intoxicated solely as a result of drugs or
alcohol administered to [him] [her] against [his] [her] will or without [his] [her] knowledge,
you should then consider whether the involuntary intoxication prevented the defendant
from acting with a particular mental state or states required to establish the offense.
If you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the required mental state for the
offense, you must find the defendant “not guilty.”
SOURCE: State v. Edmisten, 220 Ariz. 517, 521, ¶ 9, 207 P.3d 770, 774 (App. 2009); State v.
McKeon, 201 Ariz. 571, 38 P.3d 1236 (App. 2002).
U
SE NOTE: The court should also consider giving the voluntary intoxication instruction,
Criminal Jury Instruction 1.0538.
Comment: A.R.S. § 13-503 provides that “the abuse of prescribed medications does not
constitute insanity and is not a defense for any criminal act or requisite state of mind.” This
phrase suggests that this instruction may apply if the defendant presents evidence that the
intoxication resulted from the non-abuse of prescription medication. If so, the following
“non-abuse” language may be considered for use:
If you find that the defendant became intoxicated solely as a result of the
non-abuse of prescription medication, you should then consider whether the
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degree of intoxication caused the defendant to be unable to act with the
mental state[s] required to establish the offense[s].
Standard Criminal 40 Flight or Concealment
In determining whether the State has proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, you may consider any evidence of the defendant’s running away, hiding, or
concealing evidence, together with all the other evidence in the case. [You may also consider
the defendant’s reasons for running away, hiding, or concealing evidence.] Running away,
hiding, or concealing evidence after a crime has been committed does not by itself prove
guilt.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 9 (1996).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets if supported by the facts. Case law allows the jury to
consider the defendant’s offered reasons for the alleged flight or concealment. State v. Hunter,
136 Ariz. 45, 49, 664 P.2d 195, 199 (1983). Thus, the bracketed language should be given
only upon the defendant’s request.
“Use of the flight instruction is proper where the circumstances of leaving the crime
scene reveal a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. . . . It is not necessary to show that law
enforcement officers were pursuing the defendant at the time in order to satisfy the
‘consciousness of guilt’ requirement.” Merely leaving the crime scene is not tantamount to
flight. The inquiry focuses on “whether [the defendant] voluntarily withdrew himself in
order to avoid arrest or detention.” State v. Wilson, 185 Ariz. 254, 257, 914 P.2d 1346, 1349
(App. 1995). “A two-fold test must be applied to determine whether a flight instruction
should be given. First, the evidence is viewed to ascertain whether it supports a reasonable
inference that the flight or attempted flight was open, such as the result of an immediate
pursuit. If this is not the case then the evidence must support the inference that the accused
utilized the element of concealment or attempted concealment. The absence of any evidence
supporting either of these findings would mean that the giving of an instruction on flight
would be prejudicial error.” Wilson, supra, 185 at 257, 914 at 1349. Depending on the facts,
the failure of a defendant to appear at trial may be justification for the court to give a flight
instruction. State v. Roderick, 9 Ariz. App. 19, 22-23, 448 P.2d 891, 894-95 (1968). Absence of
the defendant at the time set for trial after being released on bond, is insufficient to support
an inference of the element of concealment or attempted concealment, which is essential to
warrant the giving of a flight instruction unless the flight or attempted flight is open, as upon
immediate pursuit. State v. Camino, 118 Ariz. 89, 91, 574 P.2d 1308, 1310 (App. 1977).
Standard Criminal 41 Threats by Defendant
In determining whether the State has proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, you may consider, along with all the other evidence in the case, evidence that the
defendant sought to influence testimony by threatening a witness to the alleged offense.
Such threats do not by themselves prove guilt.
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SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 14 (1996); State v. Settle, 111 Ariz. 394, 397, 531 P.2d 151, 154
(1975); State v. Contreras, 122 Ariz. 478, 481, 595 P.2d 1023, 1026 (App. 1979).
Standard Criminal 42 Lost, Destroyed, or Unpreserved Evidence
If you find that the State has lost, destroyed, or failed to preserve evidence whose
contents or quality are important to the issues in this case, then you should weigh the
explanation, if any, given for the loss or unavailability of the evidence. If you find that any
such explanation is inadequate, then you may draw an inference unfavorable to the State,
which in itself may create a reasonable doubt as to the defendants guilt.
SOURCE: State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 187, 393 P.2d 274, 277-78 (1964); State v. Eagle, 196
Ariz. 27, 31, 992 P.2d 1122, 1126 (App. 1998) and State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 443, 759
P.2d 579, 589 (1988); State v. Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. 147, ¶¶ 7-19, 329 p.3d 1049 (2014).
U
SE NOTE: “A Willits instruction is appropriate when the State destroys or loses evidence
potentially helpful to the defendant.” State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 33, 906 P.2d 542, 566
(1995) (quoting State v. Lopez, 163 Ariz. 108, 113, 786 P.2d 959, 964 (1990)). However, the
destruction or nonretention of evidence does not automatically entitle a defendant to a
Willits instruction. Id. A Willits instruction is not given merely because a more exhaustive
investigation could have been made. To merit the instruction, a defendant must show “(1)
that the State failed to preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence having a
tendency to exonerate [the defendant], and (2) that this failure resulted in prejudice.” Murray,
id. (citing State v. Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 863 P.2d 861 (1993)).
C
OMMENT: The instruction restores the language of Willits, which stated that the jury “may
infer” that the evidence was unfavorable to the State. The 1996 Revised Instruction changed
that permissive inference to a mandatory one (jury “should assume”). In Eagle, supra, 196
Ariz. at 31, 992 P.2d at 1126, the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that the 1996 Revised
Instructions language did not follow the permissive inference language of Willits.
In Sate v. Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. 147, ¶¶ 7-19, 329 P.3d 1049 (2014), the Arizona Supreme
Court explained that the standard for giving a Willits instruction requires only that the lost
evidence would have been “potentially helpful” or “potentially useful” to the defense. The
court, at ¶¶ 17-18, specifically held that an entire line of cases from Division One of the
Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard for giving a Willits instruction.
Standard Criminal 43 Mere Presence
Guilt cannot be established by the defendant's mere presence at a crime scene, mere
association with another person at a crime scene or mere knowledge that a crime is being
committed. The fact that the defendant may have been present, or knew that a crime was
being committed, does not in and of itself make the defendant guilty of the crime charged.
One who is merely present is a passive observer who lacked criminal intent and did not
participate in the crime.
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SOURCE: State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 65, 969 P.2d 1168, 1177 (1998); State v. Noriega, 187
Ariz. 282, 286, 928 P.2d 706, 710 (App. 1996).
U
SE NOTE: In a prosecution for accomplice liability based on actual presence, the trial judge
must, if requested, give a mere presence instruction. State v. Noriega, supra, (reversible error to
refuse to give mere presence instruction in this circumstance). However, the instruction
must be supported by competent evidence. State v. Portillo, 179 Ariz. 116, 119, 876 P.2d 1151,
1154, affirmed in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 182 Ariz. 592, 898 P.2d 970 (1995); State v.
Martinez, 175 Ariz. 114, 118, 854 P.2d 147, 151 (App. 1993) (trial court properly refused to
give a mere presence instruction where the defendant’s presence at the crime scene was not
an issue and the instruction did not fit the facts).
Standard Criminal 44 Motive
The State need not prove motive, but you may consider motive or lack of motive in
reaching your verdict.
SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 38 (1996); State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 447, 759 P.2d 579,
593 (1988); State v. Hunter, 136 Ariz. 45, 50, 664 P.2d 195, 220 (1983).
C
OMMENT: The court’s failure to instruct the jury on motive did not deny defendant a fair
trial. State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 447, 759 P.2d 579, 593 (1986). The presence or absence of
motive is relevant in a murder prosecution and a proper motive instruction should be given
upon request. Id.
Motive is not an element of the crime of murder; nonetheless, in a murder prosecution,
the presence or absence of motive is relevant. State v. Hunter, 136 Ariz. 45, 50, 664 P.2d 195,
200 (1983).
Standard Criminal 45 Identification
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the in-court identification of the
defendant at this trial is reliable. In determining whether this in-court identification is reliable
you may consider such things as:
1. the witness’ opportunity to view at the time of the crime;
2. the witness’ degree of attention at the time of the crime;
3. the accuracy of any descriptions the witness made prior to the pretrial identification;
4. the witness’ level of certainty at the time of the pretrial identification;
5. the time between the crime and the pretrial identification;
6. any other factor that affects the reliability of the identification.
If you determine that the in-court identification of the defendant at this trial is not
reliable, then you must not consider that identification.
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SOURCE: RAJI (Criminal) No. 39 (1996); State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 381-85 453 P.2d
951, 952-56 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970). See also; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98
(1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction must be given, upon request, when the defendant has shown
suggestive circumstances attendant to a pretrial identification that tend to bring the reliability
of the identification testimony into question. State v. Nottingham, 231 Ariz. 21, 289 P.3d 949
(App. 2012); Perry v. New Hampshire, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
Standard Criminal 46 Alibi or Non-Presence of the Defendant
The State has the burden of proving that the defendant was present at the time and place
the alleged crime was committed. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant was
present at the time and place the alleged crime was committed, you must find the defendant
not guilty.
Standard Criminal 47 Third Party Culpability
The State has the burden of proving that the defendant is the person who committed the
alleged crime[s]. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant committed the
alleged crime[s] because the crime may have been committed by a third party, you must find
the defendant not guilty.
SOURCE: Standard Criminal 43 (Alibi or Non-Presence of the Defendant) (noting
conceptual similarity between alibi and third party culpability).
U
SE NOTE: Although instructions should be given on any theory of the case reasonably
supported by the evidence, failure to give a third party culpability instruction sua sponte does
not rise to the level of fundamental error. State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, ¶¶ 51-56, 296 P.3d
54, 67-68 (2013).
COMMENT: In State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, ¶¶ 51-56, 296 P.3d 54, 67-68 (2013), the
Arizona Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s failure sua sponte to give a proper
third party culpability instruction when trial counsel’s requested instruction violated the
constitutional prohibition against commenting on the evidence and trial counsel refused the
trial judge’s invitation to modify the requested instruction.
On the other hand, in State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 61-63 ¶¶ 16-26, 961 P.2d 1006,
1009-11 (1998), the Supreme Court found reversible error where a requested alibi instruction
was denied. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court noted that alibi is not an affirmative defense
and thus would fall under the “aegis of a general denial” of the charges, reliance on other
instructions regarding the state’s requirement to prove guilt would be “inconsistent with the
general rule entitling a party to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by the
evidence.” Id. at 63 ¶¶ 23-24, 961 P.2d at 1011. See also State v. Edmisten, 220 Ariz. 517, 524 ¶
21, 207 P.3d 770, 777 (App. 2009) (distinguishing harmless error review conducted in
Rodriguez from the fundamental error review Court of Appeals must apply when trial counsel
failed to preserve error for appeal).
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Standard Criminal 48 Reserved
Standard Criminal 49 Reserved
Standard Criminal 50 Reserved
Standard Criminal 51 Jury Foreperson
When you go to the jury room you will choose a foreperson.
The role of jury foreperson is important, but please remember that the foreperson’s
opinion about the case is not more important than that of the other jurors. The opinions of
each juror count equally.
The jury foreperson’s responsibilities include the following:
1. Make sure every member of the jury is present during all discussions and
deliberations.
2. Preside over deliberations and make sure that the deliberations are conducted
respectfully and that all issues are fully discussed. The discussions should be open and free
so that every juror may participate.
3. All jurors should be allowed to state their views about the case and what they think
the verdict should be and why.
4. All members must agree unanimously on any verdict. Therefore, the foreperson
should count the votes to ensure that every juror has voted.
5. If you reach a verdict [verdicts], fill out the verdict form[s] and then sign the form
on behalf of the jury.
6. If the jury reaches a verdict, the foreperson will inform the bailiff. When the jury
returns to the courtroom, the foreperson will bring the signed or unsigned verdict form[s] as
well as any question forms that may have been used.
7. When you return to the courtroom, the court will ask the foreperson whether the
jury has reached any verdict. The foreperson will respond “yes” or “no.” The foreperson is
not expected to read any verdict to the court; that will be done by the clerk.
COMMENT: This instruction was developed based on a 1999 publication by the American
Judicature Society entitled “Behind Closed Doors, A Resource Manual to Improve Jury
Deliberations
Standard Criminal 52 Closing Instruction
The case is now submitted to you for decision. When you go to the jury room you will
choose a Foreperson. He or she will preside over your deliberations.
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I suggest that you discuss and then set your deliberation schedule. You are in charge of
your schedule, and may set and vary it by agreement and the approval of the Court. After
you have decided on a schedule, please advise the bailiff.
You are to discuss the case and deliberate only when all jurors are together in the jury
room. You are not to discuss the case with each other or anyone else during breaks or
recesses. The admonition I have given you during the trial remains in effect when all of you
are not in the jury room deliberating.
After setting your schedule, I suggest that you next review the written jury instructions
and verdict [form] [forms]. It may be helpful for you to discuss the instructions and verdict
[form] [forms] to make sure that you understand them. Again, during your deliberations you
must follow the instructions and refer to them to answer any questions about applicable law,
procedure and definitions.
Should any of you, or the jury as a whole, have a question for me during your
deliberations or wish to communicate with me on any other matter, please utilize the jury
question form that we will provide you. Your question or message must be communicated to
me in writing and must be signed by you or the Foreperson.
I will consider your question or note and consult with counsel before answering it in
writing. I will answer it as quickly as possible.
Remember that you are not to tell anyone, including me, how you stand, numerically or
otherwise, until after you have reached a verdict or have been discharged.
All [eight] [twelve] of you must agree on [the] [each] verdict. You must be unanimous.
Once all [eight] [twelve] agree on a verdict, only the Foreperson need sign the verdict form
on the line marked “Foreperson.”
You will be given [insert number] form(s) of verdict. The verdict form(s) read as follows
and there is no significance to the order in which the options of “guilty,” “not guilty,”
[“unable to agree”] [“proven”] [“not proven”] are listed on the verdict [form] [forms]:
USE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the case.
Standard Criminal 53 Impasse Instruction
This is offered to help you, not to force you to reach a verdict.
As jurors, you have a duty to discuss the case with one another and to deliberate in an effort
to reach a just verdict. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after you
consider the evidence impartially with your fellow jurors. During your deliberations, you should
not hesitate to re-examine your own views and change your opinion if you become convinced
that it is wrong. However, you should not change your belief concerning the weight or effect of
the evidence solely because of the opinions of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of
returning a verdict.
You may wish to identify areas of agreement and disagreement and then discuss the law and
the evidence as they relate to the areas of disagreement.
If you still disagree, you may wish to tell the attorneys and me which issues, questions, law
or facts you would like us to assist you with. If you decide to follow these steps, please write
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down the issues where further assistance might help bring about a verdict and give the note to
the bailiff. The attorneys and I will then discuss your note and try to help you.
I do not wish or intend to force a verdict. We are merely trying to be responsive to your
apparent need for help. If it is possible that you could reach a verdict as a result of this
procedure, you should consider doing so.
Please take a few minutes and discuss this instruction among yourselves. Then advise me in
writing of whether we can attempt to assist you in the manner indicated above or whether you
do not believe that such assistance and additional deliberation would assist you in reaching a
verdict.
SOURCE: Comment to Rule 22.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended;
Comment to Rule 39(h), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended (Trb. 2016);
Capital Case Instruction 2.4, RAJI Criminal 4th.
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OMMENT: Before giving an impasse instruction, the trial judge must determine whether
the jury is at an impasse because “prematurely giving an impasse instruction may * * * be a
form of coercion.” State v. Fernandez, 216 Ariz. 545, 550, ¶ 13, 169 Ariz. 641, 646 (App.
2007); State v. Huerstel, 206 Ariz. 93, 99, ¶ 17, 101, ¶ 25, 75 P.3d 698, 704, 706 (2003).
Where a jury has not reached a unanimous decision and has notified the court, the trial
judge should ask the jury whether it is at an impasse and needs assistance from the court. If
the jurors indicate their decision is final, the impasse instruction is not appropriate. State v.
Kuhs, 223 Ariz. 376, 385, 224 P.3d 192, 201 (2010).
In 2016-2017, the Criminal Rules Task Force recommended to the Supreme Court that
most of the comments to the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure be deleted. The adoption
of Standard 42 provided judges and practitioners with a more readily accessible source for
the impasse instruction, thus rendering the comments to the rules duplicative and
unnecessary.
Standard Criminal 54 Reconstituting the Jury
Members of the jury, I have replaced a deliberating juror with an alternate juror. The
alternate juror will now be a deliberating juror. Please do not speculate or guess about the
reasons for this change.
You remain under the admonitions previously given to you. You are also required to
follow the final jury instructions previously provided and read to you.
You are to start your deliberations anew, starting with selection of a [Presiding Juror]
[Jury Foreperson]. Any preliminary or final decisions you may have made about [any aspect
of the case] [this phase] must be set aside and discussed anew. You shall not consider any
part of your prior deliberations and/or discussions.
[For capital case sentencing proceedings and non-capital aggravation proceedings (in
which the alternate juror has been present during the aggravation proceeding), add the
following: You shall begin anew only for the phase you are currently deliberating. You shall
not deliberate anew about a verdict(s) already reached and entered.]
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SOURCE: Rule 18.5(h) and (i), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure; State v. Martinez, 198
Ariz. 5, 7, 6 P.3d 310, 312 (App. 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the case.
Standard Criminal 55 Jury Polling
In a moment, the clerk will ask each of you the following question: “Is this [Are these]
your True Verdict[s]?” You need only answer “yes” or “no” to the question. The question is
intended to determine whether you individually agree with the verdict[s] that [has][have]
been announced here in court. If you now disagree for any reason with the verdict[s] that
[has][have] been announced here in court, now is the time to tell me by answering “no” to
the question. If you agree with the verdict[s] that [has][have] been announced, please answer
“yes” when asked.
USE NOTE: This instruction should be read before the jury is polled; the judicial officer
should decide whether to poll on each individual count.
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CHAPTER 1
STATUTORY DEFINITIONS
1.052 Definition of “Act”
“Act” means a bodily movement.
1.053 Definition of “Benefit”
“Benefit” means anything of value or an advantage, present or future.
1.054 Definition of “Calendar Year”
“Calendar Year” means three hundred sixty-five days actual time served without release,
suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon or parole, work furlough or
release from confinement on any other basis.
1.056 Definition of “Conduct”
“Conduct” means an act or omission and its accompanying culpable mental state.
1.057 Definition of “Crime”
“Crime” means a misdemeanor or a felony.
1.058 Definition of “Criminal Street Gang”
“Criminal street gang” means an ongoing formal or informal association of persons in
which members or associates individually or collectively engage in the commission,
attempted commission, facilitation or solicitation of any felony act and that has at least one
individual who is a criminal street gang member.
1.059 Definition of “Criminal Street Gang Member”
“Criminal street gang member” means an individual to whom at least two of the
following seven criteria that indicate criminal street gang membership apply:
(a) Self-proclamation.
(b) Witness testimony or official statement.
(c) Written or electronic correspondence.
(d) Paraphernalia or photographs.
(e) Tattoos.
(f) Clothing or colors.
(g) Any other indicia of street gang membership.
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1.0510(a)(1) Definition of “Intentionally” or “With Intent To”
“Intentionally” [or “with intent to”] as used in these instructions means that a
defendant’s objective is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(a).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The Committee feels that the language of the instruction is more understandable to
jurors than is the statutory language.
Use in conjunction with instructions defining the criminal statute involved.
It is error to instruct that intent may be presumed from an inherently dangerous act.
People v. Burres, 101 Cal. App. 3d 341, 161 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1980).
COMPARABLE INSTRUCTION: CALJIC 3.34 (1979 revision) describes proof of intent by
statement and circumstances.
1.0510(a)(2) Intent Inference
Intent may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. It
need not be established exclusively by direct sensory proof. The existence of intent is one of
the questions of fact for your determination.
SOURCE: State v. Quatsling, 24 Ariz. App. 105, 536 P.2d 226 (1975), with “direct sensory
proof” substituted for the language of the opinion.
1.0510(b) Definition of “Knowingly”
“Knowingly” means that a defendant acted with awareness of [or belief in] the existence
of conduct or circumstances constituting an offense. It does not mean that a defendant must
have known the conduct is forbidden by law.
[It is no defense that the defendant was not aware of [or could not believe in] the
existence of conduct or circumstances solely because of voluntary intoxication.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(b).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The Committee feels that the language of the instruction is more understandable to
jurors than is the statutory language.
Use this language where the defendant does not possess actual knowledge but has a
belief that a certain circumstance exists, e.g., believing that property is stolen when in fact it is
not, or believing that a co-conspirator is a trusted accomplice who in fact is an undercover
agent.
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Ignorance of the law is no defense. See A.R.S. § 13-204(B). This final sentence is
intended to counter the possibility that jurors may interpret the preceding sentence to
establish that defense. There may be an exception to this general rule in conspiracy cases
involving public welfare offenses. See State v. Gunnison, 127 Ariz. 110, 618 P.2d 604 (1980),
and the comments to Statutory Criminal Instruction 10.031.
1.0510(c) Definition of “Recklessly (Reckless Disregard)”
“Recklessly [reckless disregard] ________” means that a defendant is aware of and
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that conduct will result in .
The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregarding it is a gross deviation from
what a reasonable person would do in the situation.
[It is no defense that a person who created such a risk was unaware of it solely because
of voluntary intoxication.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(c).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The Committee believes that the language of the instruction is more understandable to
jurors than is the statutory language.
Insert the appropriate conduct, e.g., “causing any physical injury,” A.R.S. § 13-
1203(A)(1); or “infringing on the inhabitant’s right of privacy,” A.R.S. § 13-1504(A)(2). This
instruction is not necessary in cases of manslaughter under A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(1) and (3),
second degree murder under A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(3), endangerment under A.R.S. § 13-1201
and reckless burning under A.R.S. § 13-1702 because “recklessly” has been incorporated in
the instructions defining those crimes.
Insert the appropriate result. Generally, the same language inserted at 2, supra, will
suffice. However, if the charge is criminal damage under A.R.S. § 13-1602(A)(4), the
appropriate language would be “depriv[ing] livestock of access to the only reasonably
available water.” If the charge is trafficking in stolen property under A.R.S. § 13-2306,
“conduct will result in” should be deleted from the first sentence of the instruction and the
following language should be inserted: “[he] [she] possesses property the permanent
identifying features of which, including serial numbers and labels, have been removed or in
any fashion altered.”
Use this sentence only if there is evidence that the defendant was intoxicated.
“Recklessness” is more than merely engaging in “dangerous conduct” because of the
conscious disregard for the known danger. State v. Huffman, 137 Ariz. 300, 670 P.2d 405
(App. 1983).
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1.0510(d) Criminal Negligence
“Criminal negligence” means, with respect to a result or a circumstance described by a
statute defining an offense, that a person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
[It is no defense that the defendant is unaware of or disregards the risk solely because of
voluntary intoxication.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(d).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should be used only in those statutes whose mental state
involves the rarely-criminalized standard of negligence, e.g., A.R.S. § 13-1102, negligent
homicide.
1.0510.01 Included Mental State Knowingly
If the State is required to prove that the defendant acted “knowingly,” that requirement
is satisfied if the State proves that the defendant acted “intentionally.”
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-202(C) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978.)
U
SE NOTE: Although the source for this instruction is in Chapter 2, the instruction is
included in the Chapter 1 definitions for ease of use.
1.0510.02 Included Mental State Recklessly
If the State is required to prove that the defendant acted “recklessly,” that requirement is
satisfied if the State proves that the defendant acted “intentionally” or “knowingly.”
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-202(C) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978.)
U
SE NOTE: Although the source for this instruction is in Chapter 2, the instruction is
included in the Chapter 1 definitions for ease of use.
1.0510.03 Included Mental State Criminal Negligence
If the State is required to prove that the defendant acted “with criminal negligence,” that
requirement is satisfied if the State proves that the defendant acted “intentionally,”
“knowingly,” or “recklessly.”
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-202(C) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978.)
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USE NOTE: Although the source for these three instructions is in Chapter 2, the instructions
are included in the Chapter 1 definitions for ease of use.
1.0512 Definition of “Dangerous Instrument”
“Dangerous instrument” means anything that is readily capable of causing death or
serious physical injury under the circumstances in which it is [used] [attempted to be used] or
[threatened to be used].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-105(12).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Dangerous instrument” as defined by subsection (12) includes a fire, State v. Wilson, 135 Ariz.
395, 661 P.2d 659 (App. 1983) and an automobile when used under circumstances that are
“readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.” State v. Venegas, 137 Ariz. 171, 669
P.2d 604 (App. 1983). Whether an object is a dangerous instrument is usually a jury question.
State v. Caldera, 141 Ariz. 634, 688 P.2d 642 (1984).
1.0513 Definition of “Dangerous Offense
“Dangerous offense” means an offense that involved [the discharge, use or threatening
exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument] [the intentional or knowing
infliction of serious physical injury on another person].
USE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
1.0514 Definition of “Deadly Physical Force”
“Deadly physical force” means either:
1. force which is used with the purpose of causing death or serious physical injury, or
2. force which in the manner of its use is capable of creating a substantial risk of
causing death or serious physical injury.
1.0515 Definition of “Deadly Weapon”
“Deadly weapon” means anything designed for lethal use, including a firearm.
Use Note: An unloaded gun may qualify as a deadly weapon. A firearm is a deadly weapon
unless it is permanently inoperable. A missing pin makes it only temporarily inoperable. State
v. Spratt, 126 Ariz. 184, 613 P.2d 848 (App. 1980). Whether an object is a deadly weapon is
usually a jury question. State v. Caldera, 141 Ariz. 634, 688 P.2d 642 (1984).
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1.0516 Definition of “Economic Loss”
“Economic Loss” means any loss incurred by a person as a result of the commission of
an offense. Economic loss includes lost interest, lost earnings and other losses which would
not have been incurred but for the offense. Economic loss does not include losses incurred
by the convicted person, damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages or consequential
damages.
1.0517 Definition of “Enterprise”
“Enterprise” includes any corporation, association, labor union, or other legal entity.
COMMENT: If the alleged offense is a violation under Chapter 23, the Court should use the
definition of “Enterprise” in Criminal Instruction 23.01.D.02 instead of this instruction.
1.0518 Definition of “Felony”
“Felony” means an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in the
custody of the state department of corrections is authorized by any law of this state.
1.0519 Definition of “Firearm”
“Firearm” means any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or
other weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by
the action of expanding gases [except that it does not include a firearm in permanently
inoperable condition.]
USE NOTE: Language contained in the brackets should only be used when evidence is
presented raising a reasonable doubt as to the operability of the firearm. State v.
Rosthenhausier, 147 Ariz. 486, 493, 711 P.2d 625, 632 (App. 1985) cited with approval in State v.
Valles, 162 Ariz. 1, 7, 780 P.2d 1049, 1055 (1989).
1.0523 Definition of “Human Smuggling Organization” - deleted
Users are advised that in United States v. State of Arizona, 119 F. Supp. 3d 955 (2014), the
court held that federal law preempts Arizona law governing human smuggling.
1.0524 Definition of “Intoxication”
“Intoxication” means any mental or physical incapacity resulting from use of drugs, toxic
vapors or intoxicating liquors.
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1.0528 Definition of “Omission”
“Omission” means the failure to perform an act as to which a duty of performance is
imposed by law.
1.0529 Definition of “Peace Officer”
“Peace officer” means any person vested by law with a duty to maintain public order and
make arrests.
1.0530 Definition of “Person”
“Person” means a human being and, as the context requires, an enterprise, a public or
private corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a firm, a society, a
government, a governmental authority or an individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property.
1.0532 Definition of “Physical Force”
“Physical force” means force used upon or directed toward the body of another person and
includes confinement, but does not include deadly physical force.
1.0533 Definition of “Physical Injury”
“Physical injury” means the impairment of physical condition.
1.0534 Definition of “Possess”
“Possess” means knowingly to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise
dominion or control over property.
1.0535 Definition of “Possession”
“Possession” means a voluntary act if the defendant knowingly exercised dominion or
control over property.
1.0537 Definition of “Property”
“Property” means anything of value, tangible or intangible.
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1.0538 Definition of “Public Servant”
A “public servant” is a person who is an officer or employee of any branch of
government, whether elected, appointed, or otherwise employed. [The term includes a peace
officer and any person participating as an advisor, consultant, or otherwise in performing a
governmental function.]
[A public servant includes any person who has been elected, appointed, employed, or
designated to become a public servant as defined here, even though this person does not yet
occupy that position.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-105(38).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language only when evidence shows the public servant was
an advisor or consultant or acted in a similar capacity.
Use this version where the evidence indicates the public servant did not occupy the
office in question at the time of the crime.
C
OMMENT: By statute, A.R.S. § 13-105(38), a “public servant” does not include a “juror or
witness.” These words are not included in the instruction because of the infrequency of any
definitional problem regarding these two roles.
1.0539 Definition of “Serious Physical Injury”
“Serious physical injury” includes physical injury that creates a reasonable risk of death,
or that causes serious and permanent disfigurement, serious impairment of health or loss or
protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §13-105(39) (Statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
COMMENT: A.R.S. §13-3623(F)(5) defines serious physical injury identically, except that it
provides for “serious
or
permanent disfigurement.”
1.0540 Definition of “Unlawful”
“Unlawful” means contrary to law or, where the context so requires, not permitted by
law.
1.0541 Definition of “Vehicle”
“Vehicle” means a device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a highway, waterway or airway, excepting devices moved by
human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
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1.0542 Definition of “Voluntary Act”
“Voluntary act” means a bodily movement performed consciously and as a result of
effort and determination.
1.0543 Definition of “Voluntary Intoxication”
“Voluntary intoxication” means intoxication caused by the knowing use of drugs, toxic
vapors or intoxicating liquors by a person, the tendency of which to cause intoxication the
person knows or ought to know, unless the person introduces them pursuant to medical
advice or under such duress as would afford a defense to an offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-105 (statutory language as of August 2, 2012).
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2.024 Transferred Intent
You may find that the defendant acted “intentionally” or with “intent to” as to [name of
the alleged victim] on the charge of [name of offense and, if need for clarity, the count
number] if you find “transferred intent.” Transferred intent is established if the actual result
of the defendant’s action differs from that which the defendant intended or contemplated
only in the respect that:
1. A different person or different property is injured or affected; or
2. The injury or harm intended or contemplated would have been more serious or
extensive than that caused.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-203(B) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the definition of intent.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
The actual intended victim can be different or the intended harm may be different in
degree but not both. State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 72 P.3d 343 (App. 2003).
There must be an intent to cause a particular result as an element of an offense before
the doctrine of transferred intent applies. State v. Siner, 205 Ariz. 301, 69 P.3d 1022 (App.
2003); State v. Lopez, 234 Ariz. 465, 323 P.3d 748 (App. 2014).
2.025 Affirmative Defense
The defendant has raised the affirmative defense of [ ] with respect to the
charged offense[s] of [ ]. The burden of proving each element of the offense[s]
beyond a reasonable doubt always remains on the State. However, the burden of proving the
affirmative defense of [ ] is on the defendant. The defendant must prove the
affirmative defense of [ ] by a preponderance of the evidence. If you find that the
defendant has proven the affirmative defense of [ ] by a preponderance of the
evidence you must find the defendant not guilty of the offense[s] of [ ].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-205 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: Justification defenses under Chapter 4 of A.R.S. Title 13 are not affirmative
defenses for crimes occurring on or after April 24, 2006, pursuant to legislative enactment.
However for crimes occurring before this date, they remain affirmative defenses. In such
cases, the court shall instruct on “affirmative defense” so as to inform the jury on the burden
of proof. “Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Instruction 2.025).
An affirmative defense must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
“Preponderance of the evidence” is defined in Standard 5b(2).
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The affirmative defense at issue may apply to all charged offenses. The instruction should
specify the particular offenses to which it is applicable. Use language in the brackets as
appropriate to the facts and charges.
C
OMMENT: In the vast majority of cases proof of the affirmative defense will require the
jurors to acquit the defendant on the applicable charged offense[s]. However, in certain
instances proof of the affirmative defense may only reduce the defendant’s legal culpability.
In those instances, the final sentence of the instruction should be modified accordingly.
A.R.S. § 13-205 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” the defendant must
prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Currently, the only exception
to the preponderance of evidence standard are the affirmative defenses of entrapment and
insanity, which must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See A.R.S. §§ 13-206, -502(C).
When the affirmative defenses of entrapment or insanity are raised, this instruction should not
be given. The entrapment (2.026) and insanity (5.02) instructions should be given, which include
the clear and convincing evidence standard.
This instruction is consistent with the affirmative defense instruction (on self defense)
suggested by the court of appeals in State v. Sierra-Cervantes, 201 Ariz. 459, 37 P.3d 432 (App.
2001).
2.03 Causation Instruction Intervening Event
Conduct is the cause of a result when both of the following exist:
1. But for the conduct the result in question would not have occurred.
2. The relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal
requirements imposed by the definition of the offense.
In order to find the defendant guilty of [the crime], you must find that the [death]
[injury] was proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.
The proximate cause of a [death] [injury] is a cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, produces the [death] [injury], and without which the [death] [injury] would not
have occurred.
Proximate cause does not exist if the chain of natural effects and cause either does not
exist or is broken by a superseding intervening event that was unforeseeable by the
defendant and, with the benefit of hindsight, may be described as abnormal or extraordinary.
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a superseding intervening event
did not cause the [death] [injury].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-203(A) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); State v. Bass, 198
Ariz. 571, 12 P.3d 796 (2000); State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 279, 709 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1985);
State v. Freeland, 176 Ariz. 544, 548, 863 P.2d 263, 267 (App.1993) (holding that a victim’s
failure to wear a seat belt was not a superseding cause of injury in an aggravated assault case
arising from a DUI-related accident because “[o]ne who drinks and drives should reasonably
foresee that some among the potential victims of drunken driving will not wear seat belts
and that such victims, among others, might be seriously injured in an alcohol-induced
collision”).
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2.03.02 Causation Instruction Pre-existing Physical Condition
When a person causes injury to another, the consequences are not excused, nor is the
criminal responsibility for the resulting [death] [injury] lessened, by the pre-existing physical
condition of the person [killed] [injured].
SOURCE: State v. Decello, 111 Ariz. 46, 50-51, 523 P.2d 74, 78-79 (1974).
Use Note: This instruction should be given with general causation instruction. See Statutory
Criminal Instruction 2.03.
2.03.03 Causation (Multiple Actors)
The unlawful acts of two or more people may combine to cause the [death] [injury] of
another. If the unlawful act of the other person was the sole proximate cause of [death]
[injury], the defendant’s conduct was not a proximate cause of the [death] [injury]. If you
find that the defendant’s conduct was not a proximate cause of the [death] [injury], you must
find the defendant not guilty.
SOURCE: State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 278-79, 709 P.2d 1336, 1339-40 (1985); see also State v.
Bass, 198 Ariz. 571, 576, 12 P.3d 796, 801 (2000); State v. Sucharew, 205 Ariz. 16, 25-26, 66
P.3d 59, 68-69 (App. 2003).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction may be appropriate to give if there is a dispute regarding the
unlawful acts of two or more people where there is no accomplice liability. It should be
given along with the general causation instruction that requires the state to prove causation.
See Statutory Criminal Instruction 2.03.
2.04.01(A) Causation Ignorance of Law
Ignorance or a mistaken belief as to a matter of fact does not relieve a person of criminal
liability unless:
1. The ignorance or a mistaken belief as to a matter of fact negates the culpable mental
state required for a commission of the offense; or
2. The ignorance or a mistaken belief as to a matter of fact establishes a defense of
justification.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-204(A) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
2.04.01(B) Causation Ignorance of Fact
Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of law does not relieve a person of criminal
responsibility.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-204(B) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
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2.06 [Replaces Standard 13] Entrapment
The defendant has raised the affirmative defense of entrapment with respect to the
charged offenses[s] of [ ]. The defendant must prove the following by clear and
convincing evidence:
1. The idea of committing the offense[s] started with law enforcement officers or their
agents rather than the defendant; and
2. The law enforcement officers or their agents urged and induced the defendant to
commit the offense[s], and
3. The defendant was not predisposed to commit the type of offenses[s] charged
before the law enforcement officers or their agents urged and induced the defendant
to commit the offenses[s].
The defendant does not establish entrapment if [he] [she] was predisposed to commit
the offenses[s]. It is not entrapment for law enforcement officers or their agents to use a
ruse or to conceal their identity.
The conduct of law enforcement officers and their agents may be considered in
determining if the defendant has proven entrapment.
If you find that the defendant has proven entrapment by clear and convincing evidence
you must find the defendant not guilty of the offense[s].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-206 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as applicable to the charges.
C
OMMENT: In 1997, the legislature codified the entrapment defense in A.R.S. § 13-206. See
State v. Preston, 197 Ariz. 461, 463-64, 4 P.3d 1004, 1006-07 (App. 2000). Consistent with
prior case law, the statute requires that the defendant admit the substantial elements of the
offense[s] as a condition of raising the entrapment defense. 197 Ariz. at 464, 4 P.3d at 1007.
However, the statute now requires the defendant to prove entrapment by clear and
convincing evidence. Id. Consistent with prior case law, admission of the substantial
elements of the offense must be accomplished either by the defendant’s testimony, by a
written stipulation admitting to the elements entered into evidence, or a reliable out-of-court
admission, such as would be made in a confession to law enforcement after Miranda
warnings had been read. State v. Gray, 239 Ariz. 475, 372 P.3d 999 (2016).
Subsection D of the statute required that the trial court instruct the jurors that the
defendant had admitted the elements of the offense[s] and “that the only issue for their
consideration is whether the [defendant] has proven the affirmative defense of entrapment
by clear and convincing evidence.” A.R.S. § 13-206(D). However, in Preston, the Arizona
Court of Appeals declared subsection D of the statute unconstitutional because it effectively
denied a criminal defendant the presumption of innocence and the right to a jury
determination of guilt. 197 Ariz. at 466-68, 4 P.3d at 1009-11. The court held that subsection
D was severable from the remainder of the statute. Id. at 468, 4 P.3d at 1011. The court
upheld placing upon the defendant the burden of proving the affirmative defense of
entrapment by “clear and convincing evidence.Id. at 464-65, 4 P.3d at 1007-08.
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CHAPTER 3
3.01 Accomplice
“Accomplice” means a person, who, with the intent to promote or facilitate the
commission of the offense, does any of the following:
1. solicits or commands another person to commit the offense; or
2. aids, counsels, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid another person in planning or
committing the offense; or
3. provides means or opportunity to another person to commit the offense.
A defendant is criminally accountable for the conduct of another if the defendant is an
accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense, including any offense
that is a natural and probable or reasonably foreseeable consequence of the offense for
which the person was an accomplice.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-301 and -303(A)(3) (statutory language as of September 26, 2008).
U
SE NOTE: For offenses that occurred before September 26, 2008, the following instruction
should be used:
“Accomplice” means a person, who, with the intent to promote or facilitate the
commission of the offense, does any of the following:
1. solicits or commands another person to commit the offense; or
2. aids, counsels, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid another person in planning or
committing the offense; or
3. provides means or opportunity to another person to commit the offense.
A defendant is criminally accountable for the conduct of another if the defendant is an
accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense. This criminal liability
extends only to offenses that the defendant intended to aid, solicit, facilitate or command.
In State v. Phillips, 202 Ariz. 427, 436, 46 P.3d 1048, 1057 (2002), the court reversed a
premeditated murder conviction, affirmed a felony murder conviction and held that to be an
accomplice to premeditated murder, the defendant must intend to aid or facilitate another in
committing the murder. The 2008 legislative amendment supersedes Phillips.
3.05 Enterprise Liability
An enterprise commits an offense if:
[the conduct constituting the offense consist of a failure to discharge a specific duty
imposed by law.]
[the conduct undertaken in behalf of the enterprise and constituting the offense is
engaged in, authorized, solicited, commanded or recklessly tolerated by the directors of the
enterprise in any manner or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of
employment.]
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[the conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the enterprise while
acting within the scope of employment and in behalf of the enterprise, and the offense is a
misdemeanor or petty offense.]
[the conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the enterprise while
acting within the scope of employment and in behalf of the enterprise, and the offense is
defined by a statute which imposes criminal liability on an enterprise.]
[“Agent” means any officer, director, employee of an enterprise or any other person who
is authorized to act in behalf of the enterprise.]
[“High managerial agent” means an officer of an enterprise or any other agent in a
position of comparable authority with respect to the formulation of enterprise policy.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-306 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); State v. Far West Water
& Sewer, Inc., 224 Ariz. 173, 228 P.3d 909 (App. 2010).
3.06 Personal Liability for Conduct of an Enterprise
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which such person
performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of an enterprise to the same
extent as if such conduct were performed in such person’s own name or behalf.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-306 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction may not apply in cases where the person’s conduct was a
failure to act. See State v. Angelo, 166 Ariz. 24, 800 P.2d 11 (App. 1990).
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CHAPTER 4
Prefatory Use Note:
This user note applies to all of the justification instructions.
Justification defenses under Chapter 4 of A.R.S. Title 13 are not longer affirmative
defenses. Justification defenses contained in Chapter 4 of Title 13 do not apply to criminal
prosecutions for criminal offenses under Title 28. See State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, 188-89, 52
P.3d 218, 220-21, ¶¶8, 9 (App. 2002) (holding that Title 13 justification defenses do not
apply to Title 28 violations).
4.02 Justification Defense in Execution of Public Duty
A defendant is justified in using or threatening physical force or deadly physical force if:
1. It was required or authorized by law; or
2. A reasonable person in a similar situation would believe that it was required or
authorized [by the judgment or direction of a competent court or tribunal, even
though the court or tribunal may have lacked jurisdiction] [in the lawful execution of
legal process, even though there may have been a defect in the legal process]; or
3. A reasonable person in a similar situation would believe that it was required or
authorized to assist a peace officer in the performance of such officer’s duties, even
though the officer may have exceeded the officer’s legal authority.
A defendant may use deadly physical force in execution of public duty only to protect
against another’s use or apparent attempted or threatened use of deadly physical force.
Defense in execution of public duty justifies the use or threat of physical force or deadly
physical force only while the apparent danger continues, and it ends when the apparent
danger ends. The force used may not be greater than reasonably necessary to defend against
the apparent danger.
The use of physical force or deadly physical force is justified if a reasonable person in
the situation would have reasonably believed that immediate physical danger appeared to be
present. Actual danger is not necessary to justify the use of physical force or deadly physical
force in defense of execution of public duty.
You must measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable person in the
situation would have believed.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-402 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and 13-205 (statutory
language as of April 24, 2006); State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9 (1995).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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“Physical Force” and “Deadly Physical Force” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0528 and 1.059).
C
OMMENT: The Arizona Supreme Court has required that an instruction under A.R.S.
§§ 13-404 and -405 must include a reference to the reasonable person standard. State v.
Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995). Because A.R.S. § 13-402 requires a
reasonable person standard in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the direction given in Grannis will
likely apply in this Instruction.
4.03 Justification: Use of Physical Force
A defendant is justified in using physical force as follows:
[A parent/guardian/teacher/person entrusted with the care or supervision of a minor or
incompetent person may use reasonable and appropriate physical force upon such minor or
incompetent person when and to the extent reasonably necessary and appropriate to
maintain discipline.]
[A superintendent/entrusted official of a jail/prison/correctional institution may use
physical force for the preservation of peace, to maintain order or discipline, or to prevent the
commission of any felony or misdemeanor.]
[A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a place where others are
assembled/on a common carrier of passengers may use physical force if and to the extent
that a reasonable person in a similar situation would believe it necessary to maintain order.
Such person may use deadly physical force only if reasonably necessary to prevent death or
serious physical injury. This defense is also available to a person acting under the direction of
the responsible person. A defendant may use deadly physical force only to protect against
another’s use or apparent, attempted or threatened use of deadly physical force. You must
measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable person in the situation would have
believed.]
[A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit
suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself/herself may use physical force upon
such other person to the extent reasonably necessary to thwart the result.]
[A duly licensed physician/registered nurse/person acting under the direction of a duly
licensed physician/person acting under the direction of a registered nurse/person who
renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency occurrence may use reasonable
physical force for the purpose of administering a recognized and lawful form of treatment
that is reasonably adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient only if
the following condition exists/conditions exist:
1. The treatment is administered with the consent of the patient/if the patient is a
minor or an incompetent person, with the consent of the parent, guardian or other
person entrusted with the care and supervision of the minor or incompetent person;
or
2. The treatment is administered in an emergency when a reasonable person in a similar
situation administering such treatment believes that no one competent to consent
can be consulted and that a reasonable person in a similar situation as a patient,
wishing to safeguard his/her welfare, would consent.]
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The use or threat of [physical force] [deadly physical force] is justified only while the
apparent danger continues, and it ends when the apparent danger ends. The force used may
not be greater than reasonably necessary to defend against the apparent danger.
The use of [physical force] [deadly physical force] is justified if a reasonable person in
the situation would have reasonably believed that immediate physical danger appeared to be
present. Actual danger is not necessary to justify the use of physical force or deadly physical
force.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-403 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and 13-205 (statutory
language as of April 24, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and slashes as appropriate to the facts.
“Physical Force” and “Deadly Physical Force” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0528 and 1.059).
In regard to the bracketed portion pertaining to jail/prison officials, the following
instruction should be given if the facts are appropriate: “Actual danger is not necessary to
justify the use of [physical force for the preservation of peace, to maintain order or
discipline, or to prevent the commission of any felony or misdemeanor] [deadly physical
force to prevent death or serious physical injury]. Mere words may be sufficient to justify the
use of physical force.” See State v. Bojorquez, 138 Ariz. 495, 498-99, 675 P.2d 1314, 1317-18
(1984) (holding that these instructions could be appropriate if the facts warranted them).
4.04 Justification for Self-Defense
A defendant is justified in using or threatening physical force in self-defense if the
following two conditions existed:
1. A reasonable person in the situation would have believed that physical force was
immediately necessary to protect against another’s use or apparent attempted or
threatened use of unlawful physical force; and
2. The defendant used or threatened no more physical force than would have
appeared necessary to a reasonable person in the situation.
A defendant may use deadly physical force in self-defense only to protect against
another’s use or apparent attempted or threatened use of deadly physical force.
Self-defense justifies the use or threat of physical force or deadly physical force only
while the apparent danger continues, and it ends when the apparent danger ends. The force
used may not be greater than reasonably necessary to defend against the apparent danger.
The use of physical force is justified if a reasonable person in the situation would have
reasonably believed that immediate physical danger appeared to be present. Actual danger is
not necessary to justify the use of physical force in self-defense.
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You must decide whether a reasonable person in a similar situation would believe that:
physical force was immediately necessary to protect against another’s [use] [attempted use]
[threatened use] [apparent attempted use] [apparent threatened use] of unlawful physical
force; or
You must measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable person in the
situation would have believed.
[The threat or use of physical force is not justified:
1. In response to verbal provocation alone;
2. To resist an arrest that the defendant knew or should have known was being made
by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer’s presence and at the peace
officer’s direction, whether the arrest was lawful or unlawful, unless the physical
force used by the peace officer exceeded that allowed by law; or
3. If the defendant provoked the other’s use of unlawful physical force, unless:
a. The defendant withdrew from the encounter or clearly communicated to the
other person the defendant’s intent to withdraw, reasonably believing that
the defendant could not withdraw from the encounter; and
b. The other person nevertheless continued or attempted to use unlawful
physical force against the defendant.]
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge.
[The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-404 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and § 13-405 (statutory
language as of July 29, 2010) and § 13-205 (statutory language as of April 24, 2006); State v.
Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995); State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 404, 783
P.2d 1184, 1196 (1989); State v. Noriega, 142 Ariz. 474, 482, 690 P.2d 775, 783 (1984), overruled
on other grounds, State v. Burge, 167 Ariz. 25, 28 n.7, 804 P.2d 754, 757 n.7 (1990) (overruling
only on Noriega’s holding that a grand jury’s allegation of dangerousness in an indictment is
insufficient to invoke 13-604’s sentence enhancement allegations); State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87,
235 P.3d 240, ¶ 12 (2010) (overruling Grannis, Dumaine, and Noriega to the extent they
required that a defendant act in self defense based solely on a fear of imminent harm).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
If the charged offense involves the threat or use of deadly physical force, use Statutory
Criminal Instruction 4.05.
If the defense asserts that the arrest exceeded that allowed by law, use Statutory Criminal
Instructions 38.81, 38.87 and/or 38.88, as applicable.
If there have been past acts of domestic violence as defined in A.R.S. § 13-3601,
subsection A, against the defendant by the victim, the state of mind of a reasonable person
shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person who has been a victim of
those past acts of domestic violence. A.R.S. § 13-415.
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When defendant’s residential structure or occupied vehicle is involved, the presumption
set forth in A.R.S. § 13-419 may apply.
Physical Force and Deadly Physical Force are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0528 and 1.059).
Unlawful is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
If the defense asserts that another person committed the charged act, the defendant is
still entitled to justification instructions so long as they are supported by the slightest
evidence. State v. Carson, 243 Ariz. 463, 410 P.3d 1230 (2018).
C
OMMENT: This instruction modifies the 1989 RAJI version of Statutory Criminal
Instruction 4.04. An instruction that was almost identical to former 4.04 was held reversible
error in Grannis: A defendant may only use deadly physical force in self-defense to protect
himself from another’s use or attempted use of deadly physical force. 183 Ariz. at 61, 900
P.2d at 10. Furthermore, [u]nder A.R.S. §§ 13-404 and -405, apparent deadly force can be met
with deadly force, so long as defendants belief as to apparent deadly force is a reasonable
one. An instruction on self-defense is required when a defendant acts under a reasonable
belief; actual danger is not required. (Emphasis in the original.)
In State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 235 P.3d 240, ¶ 12 (2010), the Arizona Supreme Court
stated that “the sole question is whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s
circumstances would have believed that physical force was ‘immediately necessary to protect
himself.’” The court rejected any instruction that suggests or requires that a defendant’s fear
of imminent harm be the sole motivation for employing self defense. Id. The court
disapproved language in previous supreme court cases that required the defendant to act
solely because of a belief or fear of imminent harm, noting that such a requirement ignored
the fact that the statute has been based on an objective standard since 1977. Id. at ¶ 9
4.04-1 Non-Justification for Threat or Use of Physical Force
A defendant is not justified in using or threatening physical force against another:
[in response to verbal provocation alone.]
[to resist an arrest that the defendant knew or should have known was being made by a
peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer’s presence and at the peace officer’s
direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the
peace officer exceeds that allowed by law.]
[if the defendant provoked the other person’s use or attempted use of unlawful physical
force, unless:
1. the defendant withdrew from the encounter or clearly communicated to the
other person the intent to withdraw with the reasonable belief that the
defendant could not safely withdraw; and
2. the other person continued or attempted to use unlawful physical force
against the defendant.]
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
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defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-404(B) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
When defendant’s residential structure or occupied vehicle is involved, the presumption
set forth in A.R.S. § 13-419 may apply.
The court should instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Physical Force” and “Unlawful” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0528) and 1.0541).
In cases asserting a defense based upon excessive force by police, the court may also
choose to instruct on “arrest” and “method of arrest by officer” as defined in A.R.S. §§ 13-
3881, -3887 and -3888 (Statutory Definition Instructions 38.81, 38.87 and 38.88).
C
OMMENT: The privilege of self-defense is not available to one who is at fault in provoking
an encounter or difficulty that results in a crime. State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 104-05, 664
P.2d 646, 648-49 (1983) (stating that “an aggressor may not claim self-defense unless he
withdraws from the combat in such a manner as will indicate his intention in good faith to
refrain from further aggressive conduct.”)
The public policy prohibiting force against an unlawful arrest accomplished without
excessive force is to avoid violence against police officers by relegating the interest of the
individual to the interest of the public, and by allowing the individual to seek recourse
through civil damages in a subsequent lawsuit. See State v. Lockner, 20 Ariz. App. 367, 371,
513 P.2d 374, 379 (1973).
A suspect has no right to use physical force against the lawful use of a police dog to
apprehend the suspect. State v. Doss, 192 Ariz. 408, 412-13, 966 P.2d 1012, 1016-17 (App.
1998).
4.05 Justification for Self-Defense Physical Force
A defendant is justified in using or threatening deadly physical force in self-defense if the
following two conditions existed:
1. A reasonable person in the situation would have believed that deadly physical fo
rce
was immediately n
ecessary to protect against another’s use or apparent attempted or
threatened use of unlawful deadly physical force;
and
2. The defendan
t used or threatened no more deadly physical force than would h
ave
ap
peared necessary to a reasonable person in the situat
ion.
A defendan
t may use deadly physical force in self-defense only to protect against
another’s use or apparent attempted or threatened use of deadly physical force.
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Self-defense justifies the use or threat of deadly physical force only while the apparent
danger continues, and it ends when the apparent danger ends. The force used may not be
greater than reasonably necessary to defend against the apparent danger.
The use of deadly physical force is justified if a reasonable person in the situation would
have reasonably believed that immediate deadly physical danger appeared to be present.
Actual danger is not necessary to justify the use of deadly physical force in self-defense.
You must decide whether a reasonable person in a similar situation would believe that:
Deadly physical force was immediately necessary to protect against another’s [use]
[attempted use] [threatened use] [apparent attempted use] [apparent threatened use] of
unlawful deadly physical force.
You must measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable person in the
situation would have believed.
A defendant has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force in
self-defense if the defendant:
1. Had a legal right to be in the place where the use or threatened deadly physical force
in self-defense occurred; and
2. Was not engaged in an unlawful act at the time when the use or threatened deadly
physical force in self-defense occurred.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-404 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and § 13-405 (statutory
language as of July 29, 2010) and § 13-205 (statutory language as of April 24, 2006); State v.
Grannis,
183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995); State v. Dumaine,
162 Ariz. 392, 404,
783 P.2d 1184, 1196 (1989); State v. Noriega,
142 Ariz. 474, 482, 690 P.2d 775, 783 (1984),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Burge,
167 Ariz. 25, 28 n.7, 804 P.2d 754, 757 n.7 (1990)
(overruling only on Noriega’s
holding that a grand jury’s allegation of dangerousness in an
indictment is insufficient to invoke § 13-604’s sentence enhancement allegations); State v.
King, 225 Ariz. 87, 235 P.3d 240, ¶ 12 (2010) (overruling Grannis, Dumaine, and Noriega to the
extent they required that a defendant act in self defense based solely on a fear of imminent
harm).
Use Note: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
If there have been past acts of domestic violence as defined in A.R.S. § 13-3601,
subsection A, against the defendant by the victim, the state of mind of a reasonable person
shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person who has been a victim of
those past acts of domestic violence. A.R.S. § 13-415.
Physical Force and Deadly Physical Force are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0528 and 1.059).
Unlawful is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
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If the defense asserts that another person committed the charged act, the defendant is
still entitled to justification instructions so long as they are supported by the slightest
evidence. State v. Carson, 243 Ariz. 463, 410 P.3d 1230 (2018).
COMMENT: This instruction modifies the 1989 RAJI version of Statutory Criminal
Instruction 4.04. An instruction that was almost identical to former § 4.04 was held
reversible error in Grannis:
A defendant may only use deadly physical force in self-defense to
protect himself from another’s use or attempted use of deadly physical force. 183 Ariz. at 61,
900 P.2d at 10. Furthermore, [u]nder A.R.S. §§ 13-404 and -405, apparent
deadly force can be
met with deadly force, so long as defendants belief as to apparent deadly force is a
reasonable one. An instruction on self-defense is required when a defendant acts under a
reasonable belief; actual danger is not required. (Emphasis in the original.)
In State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 235 P.3d 240, ¶ 12 (2010), the Arizona Supreme Court
stated that “the sole question is whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s
circumstances would have believed that physical force was ‘immediately necessary to protect
himself.’” The court rejected any instruction that suggests or requires that a defendant’s fear
of imminent harm be the sole motivation for employing self defense. Id. The court
disapproved language in previous supreme court cases that required the defendant to act
solely because of a belief or fear of imminent harm, noting that such a requirement ignored
the fact that the statute has been based on an objective standard since 1977. Id. at ¶ 9.
4.06 Justification for Defense of a Third Person
A defendant is justified in using or threatening physical force in defense of a third
person if the following two conditions existed:
1. A reasonable person in the situation would have believed that physical force was
necessary to protect against another’s [use] [attempted use] [apparent attempted use]
[threatened use] of unlawful physical force against a third person; and
2. The defendant used or threatened no more physical force than would have appeared
necessary to a reasonable person in the situation.
3. A defendant may use deadly physical force in defense of a third person only to
protect against another’s [use] [attempted use] [apparent attempted use] [threatened
use] of deadly physical force.
Defense of a third person justifies the use or threat of physical force or deadly physical
force only while the danger continues, and it ends when the danger ends. The force used
may not be greater than reasonably necessary to defend against the danger.
Actual danger is not necessary to justify the use of physical force or deadly physical force
in defense of a third person.
The use of physical force or deadly physical force is justified if a reasonable person in
the situation would have reasonably believed that immediate physical danger appeared to be
present.
You must decide whether a reasonable person in a similar situation would believe that:
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1. Physical force was necessary to protect against another’s [use] [attempted use]
[apparent attempted use] [threatened use] of unlawful physical force against a third
person;
2. Deadly physical force was necessary to protect against another’s [use] [attempted
use] [apparent attempted use] [threatened use] of unlawful physical force against a
third person.
You must measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable person in the
situation would have believed.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-404 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); A.R.S. § 13-405
(statutory language as of July 29, 2010); A.R.S. § 13-406 (statutory language as of July 20,
2011) and 13-205 (statutory language as of April 24, 2006); State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-
61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995); State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 404, 783 P.2d 1184, 1196 (1989);
State v. Noriega, 142 Ariz. 474, 482, 690 P .2d 775, 783 (1984), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Burge, 167 Ariz. 25, 28 n.7, 804 P.2d 754, 757 n.7 (1990) (overruling only on Noriega’s holding
that a grand jury’s allegation of dangerousness in an indictment is insufficient to invoke § 13-
604’s sentence enhancement allegations).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
If there have been past acts of domestic violence as defined in A.R.S. § 13-3601,
subsection A, against the defendant by the victim, the state of mind of a reasonable person
shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person who has been a victim of
those past acts of domestic violence. A.R.S. § 13-415.
When defendant’s residential structure or occupied vehicle is involved, the presumption
set forth in A.R.S. § 13-419 may apply.
“Physical Force” and “Deadly Physical Force” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0528 and 1.059).
If the defense asserts that another person committed the charged act, the defendant is
still entitled to justification instructions so long as they are supported by the slightest
evidence. State v. Carson, 243 Ariz. 463, 410 P.3d 1230 (2018).
C
OMMENT: This instruction modifies the 1989 RAJI version of Statutory Criminal
Instruction 4.06 in light of modifications to Statutory Criminal Instruction 4.04. An
instruction that was almost identical to former 4.04 was held reversible error in Grannis: “A
defendant may only use deadly physical force in self-defense to protect himself from
another’s use or attempted use of deadly physical force.” 183 Ariz. at 61, 900 P.2d at 10.
Furthermore, “[u]nder A.R.S. §§ 13-404 and -405, apparent deadly force can be met with
deadly force, so long as defendant’s belief as to apparent deadly force is a reasonable one. An
instruction on self-defense is required when a defendant acts under a reasonable belief;
actual danger is not required.” (Emphasis in the original).
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4.07 Justification in Defense of Premises
A defendant in lawful possession or control of the premises is justified [in threatening to
use deadly physical force] [in using physical force] [in attempting to use physical force] [in
threatening to use physical force] in defense of premises if a reasonable person in the
situation would have believed it immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the
commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by another person in or upon
the premises. The force used may not be greater than reasonably necessary to prevent the
[attempted] criminal trespass.
An actual criminal trespass is not necessary to justify the use of physical force in defense
of premises. A defendant is justified in defending premises if the defendant reasonably
believed that a criminal trespass was being [committed] [attempted]. You must measure the
defendant’s belief against what a reasonable person in the situation would have believed.
The defense ends when the [attempted] criminal trespass ends.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-407 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and 13-205 (statutory
language as of April 24, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
A.R.S. § 13-407(A) provides that a person or the person’s agent in lawful possession or
control of the premises may be entitled to claim this defense.
When defendant’s residential structure or occupied vehicle is involved, the presumption
set forth in A.R.S. § 13-419 may apply.
“Physical Force” and “Deadly Physical Force” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0528 and 1.059).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
“Premises” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-407(C).
“Criminal Trespass” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1501 et seq.
C
OMMENT: A person may use deadly physical force in the defense of premises only if it is
used in the defense of the person or third persons as described in A.R.S. §§ 13-405 and
-406. See A.R.S. § 13-407(B).
The term “la
wful” possession or control is not defined by statute. However, it appears
from case law that it has the same meaning as “possession” as defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
See, e.g., State v. Malory, 113 Ariz. 480, 483, 557 P.2d 165, 168 (1976) (noting that lawful
possession or control is shown if the accused had the property under his control in the sense
that it was under his direction or management).
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While a person’s entry on premises may be initially lawful based on express or implied
invitation, the person in lawful possession or control always has the right to withdraw that
invitation, making such entry a trespass, at which time reasonable force may be used to eject
the trespasser. See Ramirez v. Chavez, 71 Ariz. 239, 226 P.2d 143 (1951) (bar owner had the
right to remove an unruly bar customer).
4.08 Justification in Defense of Property
A defendant is justified in using physical force against another in defense of property if a
reasonable person in the situation would believe it necessary to prevent what a reasonable
person in the situation would believe was [an attempt] [a commission] [a threat] by the other
person of [theft] [criminal damage] involving tangible movable property under the
defendant’s possession or control.
Defense of property justifies the use physical force only while the danger continues, and
it ends when the danger ends. The force used may not be greater than reasonably necessary
to defend against the danger.
Actual danger is not necessary to justify the use of physical force or deadly physical force
in defense of property.
The use of physical force is justified if a reasonable person in the situation would have
reasonably believed that immediate physical danger appeared to be present.
You must measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable person in the
situation would have believed.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-408 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and 13-205 (statutory
language as of April 24, 2006); State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Physical Force” and “Deadly Physical Force” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0528 and 1.059).
“Theft” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 et seq.
“Criminal damage” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1601 et seq.
A person may use deadly physical force in the defense of property only if it is used in the
defense of the person, third persons or for crime prevention as described in A.R.S. §§ 13-
405, -406 and -411. See A.R.S. § 13-408.
When defendant’s residential structure or occupied vehicle is involved, the presumption
set forth in A.R.S. § 13-419 may apply.
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4.09 Justification for Use of Physical Force in Law Enforcement
A defendant was justified in using or threatening physical force in law enforcement if:
1. The defendant was [making an arrest or detention] [assisting in making an arrest or
detention] [preventing the escape after arrest or detention] [assisting in preventing
the escape after arrest or detention] of another person; and
2. A reasonable person in the situation would have believed that using or threatening
physical force was immediately necessary [to effect the arrest or detention] [to
prevent the escape]; and
3. [The defendant made known to the other person the purpose of the arrest or
detention] [The defendant believed that the other person knew the purpose of the
arrest or detention] [The defendant could not have reasonably made known to the
person to be arrested or detained, the purpose of the arrest or detention]; and
4. A reasonable person would have believed that the arrest or detention was lawful.
The use of physical force in law enforcement is justified only while the danger continues,
and it ends when the danger ends. The force used may not be greater than reasonably
necessary to defend against the danger.
Actual danger is not necessary to justify the use of physical force in law enforcement.
The use of physical force is justified if a reasonable person in the situation would have
reasonably believed that there was immediate physical danger. You must measure the
defendant’s belief against what a reasonable person in the situation would have believed.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-409 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and 13-205 (statutory
language as of April 24, 2006; State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Physical Force” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0528).
4.10(1) Justification for Threatened Deadly Physical Force in Law Enforcement
A defendant was justified in threatening deadly physical force against another if:
1. The defendant was [making an arrest or detention] [assisting in making an arrest or
detention] [preventing the escape after arrest or detention] [assisting in preventing
the escape after arrest or detention] of another person; and
2. A reasonable person would have believed that threatening deadly physical force was
immediately necessary [to effect the arrest or detention] [to prevent the escape]; and
3. [The defendant made known to the other person the purpose of the arrest or
detention] [The defendant believed that the other person knew the purpose of the
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arrest or detention] [The defendant could not have reasonably made known to the
person to be arrested or detained, the purpose of the arrest or detention]; and
4. A reasonable person effecting the arrest or detention would have believed that the
arrest or detention was lawful; and
5. A reasonable person effecting the arrest or detention would have believed that the
person [being arrested] [escaping] was:
[Actually resisting the discharge of a legal duty with deadly physical force.]
[Actually resisting the discharge of a legal duty with the apparent capacity to use
deadly physical force.]
[A felon who had escaped from lawful confinement.]
[A felon who was fleeing from justice.]
[A felon who was resisting arrest with physical force.]
A person is justified in threatening deadly physical force only while the [flight] [escape]
[resisting] continues, and the justification ends when the [flight] [escape] [resisting] ends.
You must measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable person in the
situation would have believed.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-410(A) (statutory language as of 1989) and 13-205 (statutory language
as of April 24, 2006); State v. Olsen, 157 Ariz. 603, 610, 760 P.2d 603, 610 (App. 1988); State v.
Barr, 115 Ariz. 346, 349-50, 565 P.2d 526, 529-30 (App. 1977).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
If the defendant is a peace officer, Statutory Criminal Instruction 4.10(4) should be used
instead of this instruction when the peace officer threatened deadly physical force in
response to the potential use of physical or deadly physical force against the peace officer.
See A.R.S. § 13-410(D).
[“Physical Force” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0528).
“Felon” is not a defined statutory term. “Felon” for purposes of this statute should be
defined as someone who has committed a felony or is suspected of having committed a
felony. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-15(1985); Olsen, supra.
“Felony” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0516).
C
OMMENT: The underlying factual prerequisites are identical to Statutory Criminal
Instruction 4.09, because A.R.S. § 13-410 predicates the threatened use of deadly force on
the prerequisites countenanced under A.R.S. § 13-409.
The justification for threatening deadly physical force against a fleeing felon ends when
the fleeing felon has stopped fleeing. State v. Bojorquez, 138 Ariz. 495, 498, 675 P.2d 1314,
1317 (1984); State v. Gendron, 166 Ariz. 562, 566, 804 P.2d 95, 99 (App. 1990), vacated in part
on other grounds, State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 812 P.2d 626 (1991).
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4.10(2) Justification for Using Deadly Physical Force in Law Enforcement by a
Non-Peace Officer
A defendant who was not a peace officer was justified in using deadly physical force
against another if:
1. The defendant was [making an arrest or detention] [assisting in making an arrest or
detention] [preventing the escape after arrest or detention] [assisting in preventing
the escape after arrest or detention] of another person; and
2. A reasonable person would have believed that the other person was actually resisting
the discharge of a legal duty with [physical force] [the apparent capacity to use deadly
physical force]; and
3. [The defendant made known to the other person the purpose of the arrest or
detention] [The defendant believed that the other person knew the purpose of the
arrest or detention] [The defendant could not have reasonably made known to the
person to be arrested or detained, the purpose of the arrest or detention]; and
4. A reasonable person would have believed that the arrest or detention was lawful.
The use of deadly physical force is justified only while the danger continues, and the
justification ends when the danger ends. The force used may not be greater than reasonably
necessary to defend against the danger.
Actual danger is not necessary to justify the use of physical force or deadly physical force
in law enforcement. The use of deadly physical force is justified if a reasonable person in the
situation would have reasonably believed that immediate physical danger was present. You
must measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable person in the situation would
have believed.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-410(B) (statutory language as of 1989) and 13-205 (statutory language
as of April 24, 2006); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985); State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz.
52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995); State v. Olsen, 157 Ariz. 603, 610, 760 P.2d 603, 610 (App.
1988); State v. Barr, 115 Ariz. 346, 349-50, 565 P.2d 526, 529-30 (App. 1977).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction is available to defendants who raise a factual issue as to
resisting excessive police force. State v. Gendron, 166 Ariz. 562, 566, 804 P.2d 95, 99 (App.
1990), vacated in part on other grounds, State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 812 P.2d 626 (1991).
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Peace officer,” “physical force,” “serious physical injury,” and “deadly physical force”
are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0525, 1.0528, 1.0534 and
1.059).
C
OMMENT: This instruction tracks the statutory language. In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,
11-12 (1985), the Court, in a civil damage action, held that deadly physical force may not be
used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe
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that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
others. The Arizona statute arguably conflicts with Garner because in paragraph 2 above, the
statute allows use of physical force by a civilian when the danger did not involve the use of
deadly physical force. The impact of this possible conflict has not been decided in Arizona.
The underlying factual prerequisites are identical to Statutory Criminal Instruction 4.09,
except that it has been changed to comply with the deadly force language in A.R.S. § 13-
410(B), because A.R.S. § 13-410(B) predicates the use of deadly force by a non-peace officer
on the underlying factual prerequisites countenanced under A.R.S. § 13-409.
A.R.S. § 13-410(B) creates a limited right for members of the public to resist excessive
police force. State v. Bojorquez, 138 Ariz. 495, 498, 675 P.2d 1314, 1317 (1984); State v.
Gendron, 166 Ariz. 562, 566, 804 P.2d 95, 99 (App. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds, State v.
Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 812 P.2d 626 (1991).
4.10(3a) Justification for Using Deadly Physical Force in Law Enforcement by a
Peace Officer
A defendant who was a peace officer was justified in using deadly physical force against
another if:
1. The defendant was [making an arrest or detention] [assisting in making an arrest or
detention] [preventing the escape after arrest or detention] [assisting in preventing
the escape after arrest or detention] of another person; and
2. A reasonable person would have believed that using deadly physical force was
immediately necessary [to effect the arrest or detention] [to prevent the escape]; and
3. [The defendant made known to the other person the purpose of the arrest or
detention] [The defendant believed that the other person knew the purpose of the
arrest or detention] [The defendant could not have reasonably made known to the
person to be arrested or detained, the purpose of the arrest or detention]; and
4. A reasonable person would have believed that the arrest or detention was lawful; and
5. The defendant reasonably believed it necessary to defend himself/herself or a third
person from what the defendant believed to be the [use] [imminent use] of deadly
physical force.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-410(C)(1) (statutory language as of 1989) and 13-205 (statutory
language as of April 24, 2006); State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Deadly Physical Force” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.059).
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COMMENT: Unlike the language in A.R.S. §§ 13-410(A) and (B), which specifically requires a
“reasonable person” standard, or in A.R.S. § 13-410(D), which specifically requires a
“reasonable officer” standard, the language in A.R.S. § 13-410(C) is unclear as to whether the
legislature intended to require an objective or subjective standard. A plain reading of A.R.S.
§ 13-410(C) allows the use of deadly force by a peace officer based upon what the defendant
officer reasonably believes is necessary, thereby creating a subjective standard. However,
because § 13-410(C) relies upon § 13-409, which contains a reasonable person standard, it is
possible for a court to conclude that an objective standard should apply. In such case, the
court should include the following sentence in the text of the instruction: “You must
measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable [person] [peace officer] in the
situation would have believed.” See State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10
(1995). There is no statutory definition of “reasonable peace officer” in A.R.S. § 13-410, and
the Committee was unable to locate any criminal cases providing such a definition. However,
the reader is directed to the following two cases that discuss reasonable police conduct: State
v. Superior Court, 185 Ariz. 47, 912 P.2d 51 (App. 1996); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332, 553
P.2d 1206 (1976).
The underlying factual prerequisites are identical to Statutory Criminal Instruction 4.09,
because A.R.S. § 13-410(C) predicates the use of deadly physical force by a peace officer on
the situations countenanced under A.R.S. § 13-409.
Notwithstanding, a peace officer may threaten deadly physical force at any time when
reasonably necessary to protect against another’s potential use of physical force or deadly
physical force. See A.R.S. § 13-410(D).
4.10(3b) Justification for Using Deadly Physical Force in Law Enforcement by a
Peace Officer
A defendant who was a peace officer was justified in using deadly physical force against
another if:
1. The defendant was [making an arrest or detention] [assisting in making an arrest or
detention] [preventing the escape after arrest or detention] [assisting in preventing
the escape after arrest or detention] of another person; and
2. [The defendant made known to the other person the purpose of the arrest or
detention] [The defendant believed that the other person knew the purpose of the
arrest or detention] [The defendant could not have reasonably made known to the
person to be arrested or detained, the purpose of the arrest or detention]; and
3. A reasonable person would have believed that the arrest or detention was lawful; and
4. The defendant reasonably believed that the use of deadly physical force was
necessary to (effect an arrest) (prevent the escape from custody) of the (suspect)
(escapee) whom the peace officer reasonably believed:
[had (committed/attempted to commit/was committing/was attempting to
commit) a felony involving the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon.]
[was attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon.]
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[through past or present conduct of the (suspect/escapee), which conduct
was known by the defendant that the (suspect/escapee) was likely to
endanger human life or inflict serious bodily injury to another unless
apprehended immediately.]
[was necessary to lawfully suppress a riot if the (suspect/escapee) or another
person participating in the riot was armed with a deadly weapon.]
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-410(C)(2) (statutory language as of 1989 and 13-205 (statutory
language as of April 24, 2006); State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and slashes as appropriate to the facts.
“Deadly weapon,” “peace officer,” “physical force” and “deadly physical force” are
defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510, 1.0525, 1.0528 and
1.059).
C
OMMENT: Unlike the language in A.R.S. § 13-410(A) and (B), which specifically requires a
“reasonable person” standard, or in A.R.S. § 13-410(D), which specifically requires a
“reasonable officer” standard, the language in A.R.S. § 13-410(C) is unclear as to whether the
legislature intended to require an objective or subjective standard. A plain reading of A.R.S.
§ 13-410(C) allows the use of deadly force by a peace officer based upon what the defendant
officer reasonably believes is necessary, thereby creating a subjective standard. However,
because § 13-410(C) relies upon § 13-409, which contains a reasonable person standard, it is
possible for a court to conclude that an objective standard should apply. In such case, the
court should include the following sentence in the text of the instruction: “You must
measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable [person] [peace officer] in the
situation would have believed.” See State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10
(1995). There is no statutory definition of “reasonable peace officer” in A.R.S. § 13-410, and
the Committee was unable to locate any criminal cases providing such a definition. However,
the reader is directed to the following two cases that discuss reasonable police conduct: State
v. Superior Court, 185 Ariz. 47, 912 P.2d 51 (App. 1996); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332, 553
P.2d 1206 (1976).
The underlying factual prerequisites are identical to Statutory Criminal Instruction 4.09,
because A.R.S. § 13-410(C) predicates the use of deadly physical force by a peace officer in
the situations countenanced under A.R.S. § 13-409.
Notwithstanding, a peace officer may threaten deadly physical force at any time when
reasonably necessary to protect against another’s potential use of physical force or deadly
physical force. See A.R.S. § 13-410(D).
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4.10(4) Justification for Threatening Deadly Physical Force in Law Enforce-
ment by a Peace Officer
A defendant who was a peace officer was justified in threatening deadly physical force
against another if a reasonable peace officer in the situation would have believed it necessary
to protect such peace officer against another’s potential use of physical force or deadly
physical force.
You must measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable peace officer in the
situation would have believed.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-410(D) (statutory language as of 1989 and 13-205 (statutory language
as of April 24, 2006); State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Peace Officer,” “Physical Force” and “Deadly Physical Force” are defined in A.R.S.
§ 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0525, 1.0528 and 1.059).
Because A.R.S. § 13-410(D) provides that it is “notwithstanding any other provisions of
this chapter …,” it appears to override any other justification defenses.
C
OMMENT: The Arizona Supreme Court has required that an instruction under A.R.S.
§§ 13-404 and -405 must include a reference to the reasonable person standard. State v.
Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995). Because A.R.S. § 13-410 requires a
reasonable person standard, the direction given in Grannis will likely apply in those situations,
although the instruction should be modified to apply to peace officers. There is no statutory
definition of “reasonable peace officer” in A.R.S. § 13-410, and the Committee was unable
to locate any criminal cases providing such a definition. However, the reader is directed to
the following two cases that discuss reasonable police conduct: State v. Superior Court, 185
Ariz. 47, 912 P.2d 51 (App. 1996); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332, 553 P.2d 1206 (1976).
The ability to threaten deadly physical force against a fleeing felon ends when the fleeing
felon has stopped fleeing. State v. Bojorquez, 138 Ariz. 495, 498, 675 P.2d 1314, 1317 (1984);
State v. Gendron, 166 Ariz. 562, 566, 804 P.2d 95, 99 (App. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds,
State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 812 P.2d 626 (1991).
The use of deadly physical force against a fleeing felon is constitutionally unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect “poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
4.11 Use of Force in Crime Prevention
The defendant was justified in threatening or using physical force and/or deadly physical
force against another if and to the extent the person reasonably believed that physical force
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or deadly physical force was immediately necessary to prevent another from committing or
apparently committing the crime[s] of:
[List applicable enumerated crime[s] from A.R.S. § 13-411(A)].
There is no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force. There is no
requirement that any threat to the defendant’s safety exist before the defendant may use
physical force and/or deadly physical force. However, physical force and/or deadly physical
force can be used only to the extent it appears reasonable and immediately necessary to
prevent commission of the crime[s].
The defendant’s use or threatened use of physical or deadly force is not limited to a
person’s home, residence, place of business, land the person owns or leases, or conveyance
of any kind, but includes any place in this state where a person has a right to be.
The defendant is presumed to have acted reasonably if the defendant reasonably
believed [he/she] was acting to prevent the imminent or actual commission of [list applicable
enumerated crime[s] from A.R.S. § 13-411(A)].
The defendant is justified in using physical force and/or deadly physical force against
another person even if that person is not actually committing or attempting to commit the
crime[s] if the defendant reasonably believed he/she was preventing the commission of the
crime[s]. Actual danger is not necessary to justify the use of physical force or deadly physical
force in crime prevention.
If evidence was presented that raised this justification defense for [insert count number
and name of offense], then the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden,
then you must find the defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Use Note
regarding the applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-411(A)(D) (statutory language as of July 20, 2011); State v. Korzep, 165
Ariz. 490, 492-94, 799 P.2d 831, 833-35 (1990); Korzep v. Superior Court (Ellsworth), 172 Ariz.
534, 537-38, 838 P.2d 1295, 1298-99 (App. 1991); State v. Taylor, 169 Ariz. 121, 122-23, 817
P.2d 488, 489-90 (1991) (holding that the defense applied where the defendant shot and
killed the deceased, but could not tell whether the deceased had a gun); State v. Hussain, 189
Ariz. 336, 339, 942 P.2d 1168, 1171 (App. 1997) (holding that a person may use deadly
physical force under 13-411 if the person reasonably believes that it is immediately necessary
to prevent an enumerated crime it is not necessary that the other person used or attempted
to use unlawful deadly physical force); Korzep, 165 Ariz. at 492, 799 P.2d at 833 (holding that
the only limitation upon the use of deadly force under 13-411 is the reasonableness of the
response.); cf., State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60, 900 P.2d 1, 9 (1995) (self-defense) (holding
that [u]nder A.R.S. 13-404 and -405, apparent deadly force can be met with deadly force)
(emphasis in the original); State v. Almeida, 238 Ariz. 77, 356 P.3d 822 (App. 2015).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate. The court should also give
definitions of the enumerated crimes if it gives this instruction. To the lay person, some of
the legal definitions are not intuitive, especially that of kidnapping. If the crime of burglary in
the second degree is defined, the predicate felony should also be specified and defined.
A defendant is entitled to a justification instruction if it is supported by the slightest
evidence. Hussain, 189 Ariz. at 337, 942 P.2d at 1169.
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Physical force and deadly physical force are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0528 and 1.059).
Justification defenses under Chapter 4 of A.R.S. Title 13 are not affirmative defenses for
crimes occurring on or after April 24, 2006, pursuant to legislative enactment. However, for
crimes occurring before this date, they remain affirmative defenses. In such cases, the court
shall delete the last paragraph and instruct on affirmative defense so as to inform the jury on
the burden of proof. Affirmative defense is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 2.025). An affirmative defense must be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence. Preponderance of the evidence is defined in Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2).
If the defense asserts that another person committed the charged act, the defendant is
still entitled to justification instructions so long as they are supported by the slightest
evidence. State v. Carson, 243 Ariz. 463, 410 P.3d 1230 (2018).
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-411(D) provides that this section includes the use or threatened use
of physical force or deadly physical force in a person’s home, residence, place of business,
land the person owns or leases, conveyance of any kind, or any other place in this state
where a person has a right to be.
4.12 Duress
A defendant is justified in committing the conduct giving rise to the charged offense if a
reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances would have believed that he/she was
compelled to commit such conduct by the [threat] [use] of immediate physical force against
[him/her] [another person] that [resulted] [could have resulted] in serious physical injury that
a reasonable person in the situation would not have resisted.
[A defendant is not justified in committing an offense if the defendant intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly placed himself/herself in a situation in which it was probable that
the defendant would be subjected to duress.]
You must compare the defendant’s belief with what a reasonable person in the
defendant’s circumstances would have believed.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-412 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and 13-205 (statutory
language as of April 24, 2006); State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally,” “knowingly,” and “recklessly” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1), 1.0510(b) and 1.0510(c)).
“Serious physical injury,” “physical force” and “deadly physical force” are defined in
A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0534, 1.0528 and 1.059.
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The defense of duress is not available to a defendant in offenses involving homicide or
serious physical injury. See A.R.S. § 13-412(C).
COMMENT: The defense of duress cannot be used for offenses involving homicide or
serious physical injury. A.R.S. § 13-412(C). However, if death or serious physical injury is not
an element of a lesser-included offense, a duress instruction may be given only as to the
lesser-included offense.
In State v. Richter, 245 Ariz. 1 ¶¶ 22-31, 424 P.3d 402 (2018), the Arizona Supreme Court
held that the reasonable person standard applies to the duress defense, but that the jury must
view how a reasonable person, in the defendant’s circumstances, would have viewed the
situation. If the defendant raises the slightest evidence supporting a duress defense, the trial
court must instruct on that defense.
The State Bar Criminal Jury Instructions Committee substituted “the defendant’s
circumstances” for the statutory language (“situation”) based on Richter.
4.14 Justification for Correctional Officer to Use Reasonable and Necessary
Means
A defendant who was a correctional officer was justified in using all reasonable and
necessary means, including deadly force, to prevent the attempt of a prisoner sentenced to
the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections from:
[Escaping from custody or from a correctional facility.]
[Taking another person as a hostage.]
[Causing serious bodily injury to another person.
“Correctional officer” is defined as a person, other than an elected official, who is
employed by the State of Arizona or a county, city or town in Arizona and who is
responsible for the supervision, protection, care, custody or control of inmates in a state,
county or municipal correctional institution, including counselors, but excluding secretarial,
clerical and professionally trained personnel.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Use Note regarding the applicability of
this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-414 and 41-1661 (statutory language as of June 26, 1997); A.R.S. § 13-
205 (statutory language as of April 24, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
4.15 Justification Domestic Violence
If you find there have been past acts of domestic violence against the defendant by the
listed victim, the state of mind of a reasonable person for purposes of [self-defense,]
[justified use of deadly physical force,] [and/or] [defense of a third person] must be
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determined from the perspective of a reasonable person who has been a victim of those past
acts of domestic violence.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-415 (1992).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
If this instruction is given, an instruction defining “domestic violence” such as Criminal
Instruction 36.01 dealing with A.R.S. § 13-3601(A) should be given.
4.16 Justification for Security Officer to Use Reasonable and Necessary Means
A defendant who was a security officer employed by a private contractor was justified in
using all reasonable and necessary means, including deadly force, to prevent a prisoner in the
custody of the private contractor from:
[escaping from the custody of (a law enforcement officer/an authorized custodial
agent/a correctional facility).]
[taking another person as a hostage.]
[causing death or serious bodily harm to another person.]
“Security officer” is an individual employed by a private prison in Arizona who has met
or exceeded the minimal training standards established by the American Correctional
Association.
“Private contractor” is a person that contracts with any governmental entity to provide
detention or incarceration services for prisoners.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-416 (statutory language as of June 26, 1997) and 13-205 (statutory
language as of April 24, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and slashes as appropriate to the facts.
4.16(1) Definition of Security Officer”
“Security officer” is defined as an individual employed by a private prison in Arizona
who has met or exceeded the minimal training standards established by the American
Correctional Association.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-416(B) (statutory language as of June 26, 1997).
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4.16(2) Definition of “Private Contractor”
“Private contractor” is defined as a person that contracts with any governmental entity
to provide detention or incarceration services for prisoners.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-416(C) (statutory language as of June 26, 1997).
4.17 Necessity Defense
The defendant was justified in engaging in conduct that constituted the offense[s] of
[ _________ ] if:
1. A reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would be compelled to engage in
the conduct; and
2. The defendant had no reasonable alternative to avoid imminent public or private
injury greater than the injury the defendant reasonably believed might have resulted
from the conduct constituting the offense[s]; and
3. The defendant did not intentionally, knowingly or recklessly place [himself] [herself]
in a situation in which it was probable that the defendant would have to engage in
the conduct constituting the offense[s].
You must measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable person in the
situation would have believed.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-417 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997) and 13-205 (statutory
language as of April 24, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts and charges.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally,” “knowingly,” and recklessly” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1), 1.0510(b) and 1.0510(c)).
C
OMMENT: A defendant may not assert the defense of necessity for offenses involving
homicide or serious physical injury. A.R.S. § 13-417(C). For those offenses, the instruction
may not be given. However, where serious physical injury is an element of a charged offense
and the jurors are instructed on a lesser-included offense that does not include the element
of serious physical injury, a necessity instruction may be given relating to the lesser-included
offense, if supported by the evidence.
The Arizona Supreme Court has required that an instruction under A.R.S. §§ 13-404 and
-405 must include a reference to the reasonable person standard. State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz.
52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995). Because A.R.S. § 13-417 requires a reasonable person
standard, the direction given in Grannis will likely apply in those situations.
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4.18 Justification for Using Force in Defense of Residential Structure or
Occupied Vehicles
The defendant was justified in threatening to use or using physical force or deadly
physical against another person if the defendant reasonably believed the following:
1. The defendant, or another person, was in imminent peril of death or serious physical
injury; and
2. [The person against whom the physical force or deadly physical force was threatened
or used was in the process of unlawfully or forcefully entering or had unlawfully or
forcefully entered a residential structure or occupied vehicle.]
[The person against whom the physical force or deadly physical force was threatened
or used had removed or was attempting to remove [the defendant] [another person]
against the [defendant’s] [other person’s] will from a residential structure or occupied
vehicle.]
Residential structure” means any structure, movable or immovable, permanent or
temporary, that is adapted for both human residence and lodging whether occupied or not.
“Vehicle” means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, that is designed
to transport persons or property.
The defendant has no duty to retreat before threatening or using physical force or deadly
physical force.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act with such justification. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-418 and 13-205 (statutory language as of April 24, 2006) and 13-1501
(statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
When defendant’s residential structure or occupied vehicle is involved, the presumption
set forth in A.R.S. § 13-419 may apply.
4.19 Justification: Presumption and Exceptions
The defendant is presumed to reasonably believe that the threat or use of physical force
or deadly force is immediately necessary if the defendant knows or has reason to believe that
the person against whom physical force or deadly force is threatened or used is unlawfully or
forcefully entering or has unlawfully or forcefully entered and is present in the defendant’s
residential structure or occupied vehicle.
For the purposes of justification, a person who is unlawfully or forcefully entering or
who has unlawfully or forcefully entered and is present in a residential structure or occupied
vehicle is presumed to pose an imminent threat of unlawful deadly harm to any person who
is in the residential structure or occupied vehicle.
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These presumptions do not apply if:
[The person against whom physical force or deadly physical force was threatened or
used had the right to be in or was a lawful resident of the residential structure or
occupied vehicle, including an owner, lessee, invitee or titleholder, and an order of
protection or injunction against harassment had not been filed against that person.]
[The person against whom physical force or deadly physical force was threatened or
used was the parent or grandparent, or had legal custody or guardianship, of a child or
grandchild sought to be removed from the residential structure or occupied vehicle.]
[The person who threatened or used physical force or deadly physical force was engaged
in an unlawful activity or was using the residential structure or occupied vehicle to
further an unlawful activity.]
[The person against whom physical force or deadly physical force was threatened or
used was a law enforcement officer who entered or attempted to enter a residential
structure or occupied vehicle in the performance of official duties.]
[“Residential structure” means any structure, movable or immovable, permanent or
temporary, that is adapted for both human residence and lodging whether occupied or not.]
[“Vehicle” means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, that is designed
to transport persons or property.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-419 (statutory language as of July 20, 2011) and 13-1501 (statutory
language as of September 30, 2009); State v. Abdi, 226 Ariz. 361, 248 P.3d 209 (App. 2011).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
When the defendant’s residential structure or occupied vehicle is involved, the
presumption applies to the justification defenses set forth in A.R.S. §§ 13-404408, and 13-
418.
4.21 Justification: Defensive Display of a Firearm
The defendant is justified in defensively displaying a firearm if a reasonable person
would have believed that physical force was immediately necessary to protect himself/herself
against the [use] [attempted use] of unlawful [physical force] [deadly physical force].
The defendant was not justified in displaying a firearm if:
[The defendant intentionally provoked another person to [use] [attempt to
use] unlawful physical force.]
[The defendant used a firearm during the commission of a (list serious
offense from A.R.S. § 13-706) (list violent crime from A.R.S. § 13-901.03)].
“Defensive display of a firearm” includes:
1. verbally informing another person that the person possesses or has available a
firearm.
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2. exposing or displaying a firearm in a manner that a reasonable person would
understand was meant to protect the person against another’s use or attempted
use of unlawful physical force or deadly physical force.
3. placing the person’s hand on a firearm while the firearm is contained in a
pocket, purse or other means of containment or transport.
[The defendant was not required to defensively display a firearm before using physical
force or threatening physical force that was otherwise justified.]
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not defensively display a firearm. If the State fails to carry this burden, then you must find
the defendant not guilty of the charge. [The user is directed to the Prefatory Use Note regarding the
applicability of this paragraph.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-421 (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court should instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.05(9b)).
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.05(9a)).
“Physical Force” and “Deadly Physical Force” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.05(12) & (28)).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. §
13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.05(19)).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.05(30)).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
Paragraph C of the statut
e provides that the defensive display of a firearm by the
defendant is not required before the use or threat of physical force by a defendant who was
otherwise justified in the use or threatened use of physical force.
If the Court is instructing the jury on the second bracketed item of when the justification
does not apply, the Court must specify the serious crime or violent crime that the defendant
is alleged to have committed.
If the defense asserts that another person committed the charged act, the defendant is
still entitled to justification instructions so long as they are supported by the slightest
evidence. State v. Carson, 243 Ariz. 463, 410 P.3d 1230 (2018).
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5.02 Insanity (Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity) (for offenses committed prior
to January 2, 1994)
You must determine from the evidence whether the defendant was insane at the time
the crime was committed.
A defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct by reason of insanity if at the time
of such conduct the defendant was suffering from such a mental disease or defect as not to
know the nature and quality of the act, or if the defendant did know, the defendant
nonetheless did not know that the conduct was wrong.
The defendant must prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, which means it is
highly probably that the defendant was insane. This is a lesser standard of proof than
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-502 (statutory language as of September 15, 1989); State v. King, 158
Ariz. 419, 424, 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should be used for offenses committed prior to January 2,
1994. For offenses committed after that date, Statutory Criminal Instruction 5.02 must be
used. See State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 192, 717 P.2d 866, 871 (1986) (holding that the
burden of proof is substantive and a defendant is entitled to have the burden of proof
applied “as it existed at the time of his crime.”).
A.R.S. § 13-502(B) places the burden of proof on the defendant. The jury should be told
about this burden, because it is an exception to the prosecution’s general burden of proof of
all elements of the crime. State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424, 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988) (holding
that jurors should be informed that “clear and convincing evidence is evidence that makes
the existence of the issue propounded ‘highly probable.’”).
The insanity defense is limited to cognitive defects and does not include emotional
insanity, irresistible impulse or partial impairment. State v. Howland, 134 Ariz. 541, 658 P.2d
194 (App. 1982).
A special verdict on insanity is required under A.R.S. § 13-502(C).
C
OMMENT: “The State continues to have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable
doubt the elements of the crime charged, including any culpable mental state required for
commission of the crime. State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. at 192, 717 P.2d at 871, citing County Court
of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979).
Lay testimony is admissible on the issue of insanity; precluding it may result in reversible
error. Expert testimony is not required. State v. Bay, 150 Ariz. 112, 116, 722 P.2d 280, 284
(1986).
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5.02-1 Insanity (Guilty Except Insane) (for offenses committed on or after
January 2, 1994)
You must determine from the evidence whether the defendant was guilty except insane
at the time the crime was committed.
A defendant is guilty except insane if at the time of the crime the defendant was afflicted
with a mental disease or defect of such severity that the defendant did not know the criminal
act was wrong.
The defendant must prove guilty except insane by clear and convincing evidence, which
means that it is highly probable that the defendant was insane. This is a lesser standard of
proof than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
A mental disease or defect does not include disorders that result from acute voluntary
intoxication or withdrawal from alcohol or drugs, character defects, psychosexual disorders
or impulse control disorders.
Conditions that do not constitute insanity include, but are not limited to:
[momentary, temporary conditions arising from the pressure of the circumstances]
[moral decadence]
[depravity]
[passion growing out of anger, jealousy, revenge, hatred]
[passion growing out of other motives in a person who does not suffer from a
mental disease or defect or an abnormality that is manifested only by criminal
conduct]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-502 (statutory language as of 1996); State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424,
763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988) (holding that the jurors should be informed that “clear and
convincing evidence is evidence that makes the existence of the issue propounded ‘highly
probable.’”).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction must be used for offenses committed on and after January 2,
1994. For offenses committed prior to that date, Statutory Criminal Instruction 5.02-2 must
be used. See State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 192, 717 P.2d 866, 871 (1986) (holding that the
burden of proof is substantive and a defendant is entitled to have the burden of proof
applied “as it existed at the time of his crime”).
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on “affirmative defense” so as to inform the jury on the burden
of proof.
“Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Definition Instruction
2.025).
Because the burden of proof for the defendant is clear and convincing for insanity, but
only preponderance of the evidence for intoxication, the court shall use Standard Criminal
Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of proof.
“Intoxication,” and “voluntary intoxication” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0520 and 1.0538).
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If a defense of involuntary intoxication is raised, the trial court should instruct the jury
on A.R.S. § 13-503 (Statutory Criminal Instructions 5.03-1a, 5.03-1b, 5.03-2a and/or 5.03-
2b).
Because this defense requires a lesser standard of proof than the State’s burden, the trial
court should use Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2) so that the jury is apprised of the
different standards of proof.
C
OMMENT: “The State continues to have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable
doubt the elements of the crime charged, including any culpable mental state required for
commission of the crime.State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. at 192, 717 P.2d at 871, citing County
Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979).
Lay testimony is admissible on the issue of insanity; precluding it may result in reversible
error. Expert testimony is not required. State v. Bay, 150 Ariz. 112, 116, 722 P.2d 280, 284
(1986).
It is an open question whether a defendant who is found guilty of the charged offense is
entitled to a retrial on the “guilty except insane” issue if the jury was not unanimous on that
issue. See United States v. Southwell, 432 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2005). The issue may need to be
addressed in the form of verdict.
5.02-2 Insanity (Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity) (for offenses committed
prior to January 2, 1994)
You must determine from the evidence whether the defendant was insane at the time
the crime was committed.
A defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct by reason of insanity if at the time
of such conduct the defendant was suffering from such a mental disease or defect as not to
know the nature and quality of the act, or if the defendant did know, the defendant
nonetheless did not know that the conduct was wrong.
The defendant must prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, which means it is
highly probable that the defendant was insane. This is a lesser standard of proof than
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-502 (statutory language as of September 15, 1989); State v. King, 158
Ariz. 419, 424, 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988).
USE NOTE: This instruction must be used for offenses committed prior to January 2, 1994.
For offenses committed after that date, Statutory Criminal Instruction 5.02-1 must be used.
See State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 192, 717 P.2d 866, 871 (1986) (holding that the burden of
proof is substantive and a defendant is entitled to have the burden of proof applied “as it
existed at the time of his crime.”).
A.R.S. § 13-502(B) places the burden of proof on the defendant. The jury must be told
about this burden, because it is an exception to the prosecution’s general burden of proof of
all elements of the crime. State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424, 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988) (holding
that jurors should be informed that “clear and convincing evidence is evidence that makes
the existence of the issue propounded ‘highly probable.’”).
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“Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Definition Instruction
2.025).
Because the burden of proof for the defendant is clear and convincing for insanity, but
only preponderance of the evidence for intoxication, the court shall use Standard Criminal
Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of proof.
The insanity defense is limited to cognitive defects and does not include emotional
insanity, irresistible impulse or partial impairment. State v. Howland, 134 Ariz. 541, 658 P.2d
194 (App. 1982).
A special verdict on insanity is required under A.R.S. § 13-502(C).
C
OMMENT: “The State continues to have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable
doubt the elements of the crime charged, including any culpable mental state required for
commission of the crime. State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. at 192, 717 P.2d at 871, citing County
Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979).
Lay testimony is admissible on the issue of insanity; precluding it may result in reversible
error. Expert testimony is not required. State v. Bay, 150 Ariz. 112, 116, 722 P.2d 280, 284
(1986).
5.03-1a Effect of Non-Prescribed Alcohol or Drug Use or Abuse of Prescribed
Medication (Non-Insanity Case)
It is not a defense to any criminal act if the criminal act(s) [was] [were] committed due to
temporary intoxication resulting from the voluntary [ingestion] [consumption] [inhalation]
[injection] of [alcohol] [illegal substance(s)] [psychoactive substance(s)] [abuse of prescribed
medication(s)].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-503 (statutory language as of January 2, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: Use this instruction when a defense is raised as to voluntary intoxication in a
case in which insanity is not a defense. If insanity has been raised as a defense, the trial court
shall use this instruction and Statutory Criminal Instructions 5.02 and 5.03-1b.
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Intoxication,” and “voluntary intoxication” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0520 and 1.0538).
If there is any evidence to support a defense of temporary intoxication caused by the
defendant’s nonabusive use of prescribed medication or a prescribed psychoactive
substance, the court shall also instruct on Statutory Criminal Instruction 5.03-2a, along with
this Instruction.
C
OMMENT: The defense of temporary intoxication can be asserted arising from the
nonabusive use of prescription medication to negate the requisite state of mind for a
criminal act. State v. McKeon, 201 Ariz. 571, 575, 38 P.3d 1236, 1240 (App. 2002).
A psychoactive substance that was prescribed to the defendant and was used in a
nonabusive manner should be considered as nonabusive use of prescription medicine. State
v. McKeon, 201 Ariz. 571, 574-75, 38 P.3d 1236, 1239-40 (App. 2002).
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5.03-1b Effect of Non-Prescribed Alcohol or Drug Use or Abuse of Prescribed
Medication (Insanity Case)
A defendant cannot be considered guilty except insane in committing the offense(s)
charged if the offense(s) [was] [were] committed due to temporary intoxication resulting
from the voluntary [ingestion] [consumption] [inhalation] [injection] of [alcohol] [illegal
substance(s)] [psychoactive substance(s)] [abuse of prescribed medication(s)].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-503 (statutory language as of January 2, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: Use this Instruction when a defense is raised as to voluntary intoxication in a
case in which insanity is a defense. If insanity has not been raised as a defense, but voluntary
intoxication is an issue, the trial court should instead use Statutory Criminal Instruction
5.03-1a.
The court shall also instruct on guilty except insane (Statutory Criminal Instruction 5.02).
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Intoxication,” and “voluntary intoxication” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0520 and 1.0538).
If there is any evidence to support a defense of temporary intoxication caused by the
defendant’s nonabusive use of prescribed medication or a prescribed psychoactive
substance, the court shall also instruct on Statutory Criminal Instruction 5.03-2b, along with
this Instruction.
C
OMMENT: The defense of temporary intoxication can be asserted arising from the
nonabusive use of prescription medication to negate the requisite state of mind for a
criminal act. State v. McKeon, 201 Ariz. 571, 575, 38 P.3d 1236, 1240 (App. 2002).
A psychoactive substance that was prescribed to the defendant and was used in a
nonabusive manner should be considered as nonabusive use of prescription medicine. State
v. McKeon, 201 Ariz. 571, 574-75, 38 P.3d 1236, 1239-40 (App. 2002).
5.03-2a Effect of Non-Abusive Use of Prescribed Medication (Non-Insanity
Case)
A defendant may be justified in committing the offense(s) charged if the offense(s) [was]
[were] committed due to temporary intoxication resulting from the voluntary non-abusive
[ingestion] [consumption] [inhalation] [injection] of [prescribed medication(s)] [prescribed
psychoactive substance(s)].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-503 (statutory language as of January 2, 1994); State v. McKeon, 201
Ariz. 571, 38 P.3d 1236 (App. 2002).
U
SE NOTE: Use this instruction only if there is any evidence that the defense is based upon
the defendant’s non-abusive use of prescribed medication or a prescribed psychoactive
substance, and insanity has not been raised a defense. If insanity has been raised as a defense,
the trial court shall use this instruction and Statutory Criminal Instructions 5.02 and 5.03-2b.
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The court shall also instruct on Statutory Criminal Instruction 5.03-1a and/or Statutory
Criminal Instruction 5.03-1b.
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on “affirmative defense” so as to inform the jury on the burden
of proof.
“Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Definition Instruction
2.025).
Because the burden of proof for the defendant is a preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall use Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of
proof.
“Intoxication,” and “voluntary intoxication” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0520 and 1.0538).
C
OMMENT: The defense of temporary intoxication can be asserted arising from the
nonabusive use of prescription medication to negate the requisite state of mind for a
criminal act. State v. McKeon, 201 Ariz. 571, 575, 38 P.3d 1236, 1240 (App. 2002).
A psychoactive substance that was prescribed to the defendant should be considered as a
prescription medicine, even though the statute seems to differentiate them. State v. McKeon,
201 Ariz. 571, 574-75, 38 P.3d 1236, 1239-40 (App. 2002).
5.03-2b Effect of Non-Abusive Use of Prescribed Medication (Insanity Case)
A defendant may be considered guilty except insane in committing the offense(s)
charged if the offense(s) [was] [were] committed due to temporary intoxication resulting
from the voluntary non-abusive [ingestion] [consumption] [inhalation] [injection] of
[prescribed medication(s)] [prescribed psychoactive substance(s)].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-503 (statutory language as of January 2, 1994); State v. McKeon, 201
Ariz. 571, 38 P.3d 1236 (App. 2002).
U
SE NOTE: Use this instruction only if there is any evidence that the defense is based upon
the defendant’s non-abusive use of prescribed medication or a prescribed psychoactive
substance, and insanity has been raised a defense. If insanity has not been raised as a defense,
the trial court should use instead Statutory Criminal Instruction 5.03-2a.
The court shall also instruct on Statutory Criminal Instructions 5.02, 5.03-1a and 5.03-
1b.
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on “affirmative defense” so as to inform the jury on the burden
of proof.
“Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Definition Instruction
2.025).
Because the burden of proof for the defendant is a preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall use Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of
proof.
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“Intoxication,” and “voluntary intoxication” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0520 and 1.0538).
C
OMMENT: The defense of temporary intoxication can be asserted arising from the
nonabusive use of prescription medication to negate the requisite state of mind for a
criminal act. State v. McKeon, 201 Ariz. 571, 575, 38 P.3d 1236, 1240 (App. 2002).
A psychoactive substance that was prescribed to the defendant should be considered as a
prescription medicine, even though the statute seems to differentiate them. State v. McKeon,
201 Ariz. 571, 574-75, 38 P.3d 1236, 1239-40 (App. 2002).
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7.03A Not Committed on Same Occasion But Consolidated for Purposes of
Trial
The State has alleged that Counts [list the count numbers] were committed on different
occasions. In deciding whether these offenses were committed on the same occasion or on
different occasions, factors to be considered include, but are not limited to:
1. Time;
2. Place;
3. Number of victims;
4. Whether the crimes were continuous and uninterrupted; and
5. Whether the offenses were part of a single criminal episode.
This list is not meant to be all-inclusive. It is up to you to examine all the available
evidence and weigh its credibility in determining whether these offenses were committed on
the same occasion or on different occasions.
The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the offenses on different occasions.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-703(A); State v. Ortiz, 238 Ariz. 329, 343 ¶ 64, 360 P.3d 125, 139 (App.
2015); State v. Kelly, 190 Ariz. 532, 534, 950 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1997).
U
SE NOTE: The court should submit this allegation, and provide this instruction, in a
bifurcated proceeding, after the jury returns verdicts in the guilt phase of the trial. See Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 19.1(c); State v. Patterson, 230 Ariz. 270, 277 ¶¶ 29-30, 283 P.3d 1, 8 (2012).
C
OMMENT: In State v. Ortiz, 238 Ariz. 329, 343 ¶ 64, 360 P.3d 125, 139 (App. 2015), the
court held that the allegation that offenses were committed on different occasions must be
submitted to the jury under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
7.04 Definition of “Dangerous Offense”
An offense is a dangerous offense if it involved [the intentional or knowing infliction of
serious physical injury] [the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument]. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the offense was a dangerous offense. Your finding on this issue must be unanimous.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-105(13) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Dangerousness must be found by the jury except when it is an element of the
offense. This instruction should be used during the aggravation phase for any offense that is
alleged to be dangerous when the dangerous nature of the offense is not an element of the
offense. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 19.1(b); State v. Patterson, 230 Ariz. 270, 283 P.3d 1 (2012). Use
bracketed language as appropriate to the case.
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“Serious physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(34) (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0534).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(13) (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510).
“Dangerous instrument” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(11) (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0511).
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(9)(a) (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(9)(b) (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: The infliction of serious physical injury must be done intentionally or knowingly
to be a dangerous offense. Those mental states are not required for the use or threatening
exhibition of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument to be a dangerous offense. State v.
Garcia, 165 Ariz. 547, 799 P.2d 888 (App. 1990); State v. Tamplin, 146 Ariz. 377, 706 P.2d 389
(App. 1985); State v. Venegas, 137 Ariz. 171, 669 P.2d 604 (App. 1983).
7.05 Dangerous Crime Against a Child
An offense is a dangerous crime against a child if the defendant’s conduct was focused
on, directed against, aimed at, or targeted a victim under the age of fifteen.
The defendant need not have known that the victim was under the age of fifteen.
[It is not a defense to a dangerous crime against children that the minor is [a person
posing as a minor] [fictitious] if the defendant knew or had reason to know the purported
minor was under fifteen years of age.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-705 (statutory language as of August 3, 2018); State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz.
321, 78 P.3d 732 (2003).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language when appropriate.
COMMENT: If appropriate, this instruction should only be given in an aggravation
phase. Rule 19.1(b)., see State v. Patterson, 230 Ariz. 270, 283 P.3d 1 (2012)
In State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, ¶ 1, 78 P.3d 732 (2003), the court rejected an
interpretation of A.R.S. § 13-604.01 (now § 13-705) that would have required a finding that
the defendant “was ‘particularly dangerous to children’ or that he ‘pose[s] a direct and
continuing threat to the children of Arizona.’” The court held that “in order to prove that a
defendant has committed a dangerous crime against a child, the State must prove that the
defendant committed one of the statutorily enumerated crimes and that his conduct was
‘focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target[ed] a victim under the age of fifteen.’” Id. at
¶ 19; see also State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 854 P.2d 131 (1993). The defendant need not
know the victim’s age; however, the statute is not intended to apply to a defendant who
fortuitously injures a child by “unfocused conduct.” Sepahi, ¶¶ 11, 12, citing Williams. Williams
also notes that “[a]s a practical matter, the question of whether the child victim is the target
of the defendant’s conduct will rarely be an issue given the nature of the crimes listed in
13-705(P)].”
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Because A.R.S. § 13-705 subjects a defendant who has been found to have committed a
dangerous crime against a child to enhanced sentencing ranges, the Committee is of the
opinion that where the element of the charged offense does not require a finding that the
victim was a minor, a jury must make this finding to satisfy the requirements of Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
The sentence under A.R.S. § 13-705 differs depending on the age of the victim.
Therefore, the jury will still have to find the age of the child as part of its verdict. In State v.
Hollenback, 212 Ariz. 12, 126 P.3d 159 (App. 2005), the court approved the use of a jury
interrogatory as part of a verdict form asking the jury whether the State had proven the
victims were less than twelve years of age.
7.05 Verdict Form
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find that the offense was a
dangerous crime against a child.]
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled action, upon our oaths, do
find that (check only one):
[_____ the defendant was at least eighteen years of age and the victim was under twelve
years of age.]
[_____ the defendant was at least eighteen years of age and the victim was twelve years
of age or younger.]
[_____ the defendant was at least eighteen years of age and the victim was under fifteen
years of age but at least twelve years old.]
USE NOTE: This interrogatory should be presented along with the standard aggravating
factor verdict form. The sentence under A.R.S. § 13-705 differs depending on the age of the
victim. Therefore, the jury will still have to find the age of the child as part of its aggravation
verdict. In State v. Hollenback, 212 Ariz. 12, 126 P.3d 159 (App. 2005), the court approved the
use of a jury interrogatory as part of a verdict form asking the jury whether the state had
proven the victims were less than twelve years of age.
Which of the bracketed alternatives to use depends on which subsection of § 13-705 is
charged.
7.08-C Release Status
The State alleges that Defendant committed the offense of “[insert name of offense on
which jury found defendant guilty]” while [he/she] [was on probation for a conviction of a
felony offense] [was on parole, work furlough, community supervision or any other release
following a conviction of a felony offense] [escaped from confinement following a felony
conviction] in [insert case number]. The law provides that the jury must decide whether an
allegation of commission of a felony [while on probation for a conviction of a felony
offense] [while on parole, work furlough, community supervision or any other release
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following a conviction of a felony offense] [after escape from confinement following a
felony conviction] is proven or not proven.
Defendant has denied this allegation.
You must now determine whether the allegation that Defendant [was on probation for a
conviction of a felony offense] [was on parole, work furlough, community supervision or
any other release following a conviction of a felony offense] [escaped from confinement
following a felony conviction] in [insert case number] at the time [he/she] committed the
crime of “[insert name of offense on which jury found defendant guilty]” is proven or not
proven. You must consider all the instructions I have previously given to you, together with
the following instructions:
To prove the allegation that Defendant [was on probation for a conviction of a felony
offense] [was on parole, work furlough, community supervision or any other release
following a conviction of a felony offense] [escaped from confinement following a felony
conviction] at the time [he/she] committed the crime of “[insert name of offense on which
jury found defendant guilty],” the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. Defendant had been convicted of a felony offense prior to [insert date of offense on
which defendant was found guilty]; and
2. Defendant is the person who was convicted of that felony offense; and
3. Defendant [was on probation for a conviction of a felony offense] [was on parole,
work furlough, community supervision or any other release following a conviction
of a felony offense] [had escaped from confinement following a felony conviction]
prior to [insert date of offense on which defendant was found guilty]; and
4. Defendant knew that [he/she] [was on probation for a conviction of a felony
offense] [was on parole, work furlough, community supervision or any other release
following a conviction of a felony offense] [had escaped from confinement
following a felony conviction] prior to [insert date of offense on which defendant
was found guilty]; and
5. Defendant committed the offense of “[insert name of offense on which jury found
defendant guilty]” while [was on probation for a conviction of a felony offense] [was
on parole, work furlough, community supervision or any other release following a
conviction of a felony offense] [escaped from confinement following a felony
conviction].
The State has the burden of proving each of these five elements beyond a reasonable
doubt. In civil cases, it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not or
that its truth is highly probable. In criminal cases such as this, the state’s proof must be more
powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced that the
allegation is true. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute
certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every doubt.
If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the allegation
is true, you must find that the allegation has been proven. If, on the other hand, you think
there is a real possibility that the allegation is not true, you must give [him/her] the benefit of
the doubt and find that the allegation has not been proven.
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In order to reach a verdict, all of you must agree on the verdict. All of you must agree on
whether the allegation is proven or not proven. You will be given one form of verdict on
which to indicate your decision. It reads as follows and there is no significance to the order
in which the options are listed:
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-708(C) (statutory language effective January 1, 2009.)
U
SE NOTE: The following script may be used by the judge prior to giving this instruction:
Members of the jury, there is another matter that must be presented to
you for decision. The State alleges that Defendant committed the offense of
“[insert name of offense on which defendant convicted]” while he/she [was
on probation for a conviction of a felony offense] [was on parole, work
furlough, community supervision or any other release following a conviction
of a felony offense] [escaped from confinement following a felony
conviction]. The law provides that the jury must decide whether an
allegation of commission of a felony while [on probation for a conviction of
a felony offense] [on parole, work furlough, community supervision or any
other release following a conviction of a felony offense] [escaped from
confinement following a felony conviction] is proven or not proven. We
estimate that the presentation of evidence and argument on this issue will
take about ____ minutes.
I am going to read to you the allegation: [read from the State’s notice]
Defendant has denied this allegation.
After the evidence has been presented and counsel have made any
arguments, I will give to you and read the jury instruction you are to follow
in deciding this issue.
[Opening Statement, Evidence, Argument]
[Read the jury instruction and verdict form.]
If the § 13-708(C) allegation is being tried at a time other than immediately following the
trial on the main offense, other appropriate instructions should be given.
C
OMMENT: If the conviction on which the allegation made pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-708 is
made is “a serious offense as defined by A.R.S. § 13-706,” resulted in serious physical injury
or “involved the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument,” the court
must sentence the defendant to the maximum sentence allowed by law. If at least two
aggravating factors listed in A.R.S. § 13-701(D) are found, the court may increase the
sentence by up to twenty-five percent. The court shall also revoke any release status on the
prior felony and impose a consecutive sentence on the new offense unless the prior
conviction was in another state.
The determination of whether the underlying felony is a serious offense, resulted in
serious physical injury or involved the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument is probably one for the court to make as a matter of law if the determination can
be made by reference to the statutory definition of the prior offense or to findings made by
the sentencing court. See Cherry v. Araneta, 203 Ariz. 532, 57 P.3d 391 (App. 2002).
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7.08-C Verdict Form
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled action, and upon our
oaths, do find as follows on the allegation that Defendant, [insert defendant’s name],
committed the offense of “[insert name of offense on which jury found defendant guilty]”
while [he/she] [was on probation for a conviction of a felony offense] [was on parole, work
furlough, community supervision or any other release following a conviction of a felony
offense] [escaped from confinement following a felony conviction] [released on bond] in
[insert case number of “release” case] to be:
_____ Proven
_____ Not Proven
_____________________________
Presiding Juror
Printed Name __________________
Juror # ______
7.08-D Release Status
The State alleges that defendant committed the offense of “[insert name of offense on
which jury found defendant guilty]” while [he/she] [was released on bond] [was released on
his/her own recognizance] [escaped from preconviction custody] on another felony charge
in [insert case number]. The law provides that the jury must decide whether an allegation of
commission of a felony [while on release] [after escape from preconviction custody] on
another felony charge is proven or not proven.
Defendant has denied this allegation.
You must now determine whether the allegation is proven or not proven. You must
consider all the instructions I have previously given to you, together with the following
instructions:
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. This defendant had [been released on bond] [been released on his/her own
recognizance] [escaped from preconviction custody] on a separate felony offense
prior to [insert date of offense on which defendant was found guilty]; and
2. This defendant committed the offense of “[insert name of offense on which jury
found defendant guilty]” while [released on bond] [on his/her own recognizance]
[escaped from preconviction custody].
The State has the burden of proving each of these two elements beyond a reasonable
doubt. In civil cases, it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not or
that its truth is highly probable. In criminal cases such as this, the State’s proof must be
more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced that the
allegation is true. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute
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certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every doubt.
If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the allegation
is true, you must find that the allegation has been proven. If, on the other hand, you think
there is a real possibility that the allegation is not true, you must give [him/her] the benefit of
the doubt and find that the allegation has not been proven.
In order to reach a verdict, all of you must agree on the verdict. All of you must agree on
whether the allegation is proven or not proven. You will be given one form of verdict on
which to indicate your decision. It reads as follows and there is no significance to the order
in which the options are listed:
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-708(D) (statutory language effective January 1, 2009.)
U
SE NOTE: The following script may be used by the judge prior to giving this instruction:
Members of the jury, there is another matter that must be presented to
you for decision. The State alleges that Defendant committed the offense of
“[insert name of offense on which defendant convicted]” while he was
[released on bond] [released on his/her own recognizance] [had escaped
from preconviction custody] on another felony charge. The law provides
that the jury must decide whether an allegation of commission of a felony
while [on release] [on escape status] on another felony charge is proven or
not proven. We estimate that the presentation of evidence and argument on
this issue will take about ____ minutes.
I am going to read to you the allegation: [read from the State’s notice]
Defendant has denied this allegation.
After the evidence has been presented and counsel have made any
arguments, I will give to you and read the jury instruction you are to follow
in deciding this issue.
[Opening Statement, Evidence, Argument]
[Read the jury instruction and verdict form.]
If the § 13-708(D) allegation is being tried at a time other than immediately following the
trial on the main offense, other appropriate instructions must be given.
C
OMMENT: The allegation made pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-708(D) (formerly § 13-604(R)) that
the defendant committed the offense while on release status from the commission of
another felony offense must be tried to a jury. State v. Beasley, 205 Ariz. 334, 70 P.3d 463
(App. 2003). If proved, two years must be added to the defendant’s sentence. Release status
must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gross, 201 Ariz. 41, 31 P.3d
815 (App. 2001); see also State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, 52 P.3d 804 (App. 2002) (agreeing
with Gross and holding that release status adding two years to sentence as enhancement
under§ 13-604(R) [now § 13-708(D)] must be determined by a jury in light of Apprendi).
7.08-D Verdict Form
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled action, and upon our
oaths, do find as follows on the allegation that Defendant, [insert defendant’s name],
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committed the offense of “[insert name of offense on which jury found defendant guilty]”
while [released on bond] [released on his/her own recognizance] [escaped from
preconviction custody] on another felony charge in [insert case number of “release” case] to
be:
_____ Proven
_____ Not Proven
_____________________________
Presiding Juror
Printed Name __________________
Juror # ______
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CHAPTER 10
10.01 Attempt
The crime of attempted ________________ requires proof that the defendant:
1. intentionally engaged in conduct that would have been a crime if the circumstances
relating to the crime were as the defendant believed them to be; or
2. intentionally [committed][failed to commit] any act that was a step in a course of
conduct that the defendant [planned would end] [believed would end] in the
commission of a crime; or
3. engaged in conduct intended to aid another person to commit a crime, in a manner
that would make the defendant an accomplice, had the crime been committed or
attempted by the other person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1001 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); State v. Nunez, 159
Ariz. 594, 596, 769 P.2d 1040, 1042 (App. 1989); State v. Adams, 155 Ariz. 117, 119, 745 P.2d
175, 177 (App. 1987).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the Statutory Criminal Instruction 3.01 Accomplice.
Factual impossibility is not a defense to an attempted crime; “words may be acts
sufficient to sustain a conviction for an attempt when viewed in the light of the
circumstances in which they were uttered.” State v. Carlisle, 198 Ariz. 203, 207, 8 P.3d 391,
395 (App. 2000), quoting State v. Dale, 121 Ariz. 433, 435, 590 P.2d 1379, 1381 (1979).
Attempted conspiracy is not a cognizable offense. State v. Sanchez, 174 Ariz. 44, 47, 846
P.2d 857, 860 (App. 1993).
There is no cognizable offense of attempted second degree murder as to the subsection
relating to reckless conduct because reckless conduct is an unintended consequence. State v.
Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 627, 931 P.2d 1133, 1137 (App. 1996). Likewise, attempted
manslaughter is not a cognizable offense. State v. Adams, 155 Ariz. 117, 120, 745 P.2d 175,
178 (App. 1987).
Attempted second degree murder requires proof that the defendant either intended to or
knowingly attempted to cause the death of another; it is not sufficient to show that the
defendant intended to do serious bodily harm. State v. Ontiveros, 206 Ariz. 539, 541, 81 P.3d
330, 332 (App. 2003).
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10.02 Solicitation
The crime of solicitation to commit [insert name of crime] requires proof that the
defendant:
1. intended to promote or facilitate the commission of [insert name of crime]; and
2. [encouraged, commanded, requested, or solicited another person to engage in
specific conduct that would constitute [insert name of crime]]
[encouraged, commanded, requested, or solicited another person to engage in
specific conduct that would establish the other person’s complicity in the com-
mission of [insert name of crime]].
S
OURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1002 (statutory language as of April 23, 1980).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intent” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
Depending on the type of offense, the court may need to submit a special form of
verdict to determine the class of the crime solicited, e.g., a theft or criminal damage case.
C
OMMENT: Solicitation does not apply to a peace officer acting in his official capacity, in
the line of duty, and within the scope of authority, e.g., as an undercover agent. A.R.S. § 13-
1002(A).
10.031 Elements of Conspiracy
The crime of conspiracy to commit requires proof:
1. The defendant agreed with one or more persons that one of them or another person
would engage in certain conduct; and
2. The defendant intended to promote or assist in the commission of such conduct;
and
3. The intended conduct would constitute the crime charged], and the defendant knew
that such conduct was a crime[.] [; and]
4. [An overt act was committed in furtherance of such conduct.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1003 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); State v. Gunnison, 127
Ariz. 110, 114, 618 P.2d 604, 608 (1980).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Ignorance of the law is not among the elements of the mental state of “knowingly”
defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(6)(b), and hence the claim of ignorance of the law is no defense.
State v. Morse, 127 Ariz. 25, 31, 617 P.2d 1141, 1147 (1980). The State must show that the
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defendant participated in a known, criminal agreement; it does not appear necessary under
A.R.S. § 13-1003 to prove that the defendant knew the statutory provision or intended to
violate a specific law.
Paragraph 4 should be omitted where an overt act is not required. An overt act is not
required for felonies against a person, arson of an occupied structure, and burglary in the
first degree. A.R.S. § 13-1003(A).
If the defendant knows or has reason to know that the person with whom he or she
conspired has conspired with another person to commit the same offense, the defendant is
guilty of conspiring to commit the offense with the third person even if the third person’s
identity is unknown. A.R.S. § 13-1003(B).
C
OMMENT: State v. Gunnison, 127 Ariz. 110, 114, 618 P.2d 604, 608 (1980) held that the
defendant had to know that the underlying act of the conspiracy was a criminal act.
10.032 Relationship Among Multiple Co-Conspirators [Deleted]
10.033 Liability for a Single Conspiracy to Commit Multiple Offenses
A person who conspired to commit multiple offenses is guilty of a single conspiracy if
each offense that was the object of the conspiracy arose out of the same agreement or
relationship.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1003(C) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should not be given in instances where multiple conspiracies, as
distinguished from multiple objects within a single conspiracy, are charged. See Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 772 (1946); Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 553 (1947),
and their progeny. Because of the possibility of complex instructions in this area, care should
be taken to avoid this and other collateral conspiracy instructions when there is no
supporting evidence.
10.034 Verdict Form [Deleted]
Note: The committee chose to delete the recommended verdict form that required
jurors to state the specific object[s] they found to be objects of the conspiracy. The charging
document and jury instructions should make it clear to the jurors what the charge is and the
verdict would be based on those instructions. Any issues that must be determined by a jury
that require more specificity should be indicated on the verdict form in every criminal case.
10.035 Liability for Other Conspirator’s Acts [Deleted]
NOTE: The instruction in the 1989 RAJI was based on Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640 (1946), case. In State ex rel. Woods v. Cohen, 173 Ariz. 497, 844 P.2d 1147 (1992), the
Arizona Supreme Court held that Pinkerton is not the law in Arizona. In State v. Portillo, 179
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Ariz. 116, 876 P.2d 1151 (App. 1994), the court of appeals held that it was reversible error to
give the 1989 RAJI instruction.
In Arizona, for a conspirator to be guilty of a substantive crime committed by a co-
conspirator, the evidence must be sufficient to support a finding of guilt as a principal or as
an accomplice. State ex rel. Woods v. Cohen; State v. Portillo.
10.036 Mere Association Not Sufficient for Conspiracy
The fact that persons conduct themselves in a similar manner or associate with each
other or assemble together or discuss common aims does not alone prove a conspiracy.
SOURCE: State v. Sullivan, 68 Ariz. 81, 200 P.2d 346 (1948); State v. Green, 117 Ariz. 92, 570
P.2d 1265 (App. 1977); D
EVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS, 3D ED., § 27.04.
U
SE NOTE: This instruction is consistent with State v. Salazar, 27 Ariz. App. 620, 625, 557
P.2d 552, 557 (1976), which holds that conspiracy is not established by mere knowledge or
approval of, or acquiescence in the object of the conspiracy. However, a person who aids
and abets with the knowledge of the existence of a conspiracy can be convicted of
conspiracy. Id.
Because of the complexity of instructions in this area, care should be taken to avoid this
and other collateral conspiracy instructions when there is no supporting evidence.
10.037 Scope of Proof of Conspiracy
To prove a conspiracy, it is not necessary to show a formal meeting or an express
agreement. A conspiracy may be inferred from circumstances showing a common criminal
objective and does not require proof that all means set forth in the charging document were
agreed upon or actually used nor that every person involved was a member of the
conspiracy.
SOURCE: DEVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, 3D ED.,
§ 27.04.
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the Statutory Criminal Instruction 10.031.
If a defendant engages in conduct outside of Arizona that constitutes a conspiracy to
commit an offense in Arizona and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy is committed in
Arizona by a co-conspirator, there is jurisdiction to proceed in Arizona. State v. Chan, 188
Ariz. 272, 275, 935 P.2d 850, 853 (App. 1996).
Because of the complexity in this area, care should be taken to avoid collateral
conspiracy instructions when there is no supporting evidence.
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10.038 Proof of Membership in Conspiracy
One may become a member of a conspiracy without full knowledge of all the details of
the conspiracy. On the other hand, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy but
happens to act in a way that furthers some object of the conspiracy does not thereby become
a conspirator.
Before you find that a defendant or any other person was a member of a conspiracy, the
evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy was knowingly formed
and that the defendant or other person knowingly participated in the unlawful plan with the
intent to promote or assist the carrying out of the conspiracy. One who knowingly joins an
existing conspiracy is as responsible as an originator or instigator of the conspiracy.
A person understanding the unlawful character of a plan who knowingly encourages,
advises, or assists the undertaking thereby also becomes a conspirator.
In determining whether a conspiracy exists, you should consider the actions and
statements of all of the alleged participants. However, in determining whether a particular
defendant was a member of the conspiracy, you should consider only that person’s acts and
statements. A person cannot be bound by the acts or statements of other participants until it
is established that a conspiracy existed, and that person was one of its members.
SOURCE: State v. Cohen, 173 Ariz. 497, 498-501, 844 P.2d 1147, 1148-1151 (1992).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
10.039 Acts and Statements of Co-Conspirators
Acts or statements of any co-conspirator which do not further the conspiracy or which
occur before its existence or after its termination may be considered as evidence only against
the person making them.
SOURCE: DEVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, 3D ED.,
§ 27.06.
U
SE NOTE: Great care should be given in the introduction of any statements made by a
person other than the defendant when the person is not available as a witness. There are
confrontation clause concerns that are addressed in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124
S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
If it appears beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that a conspiracy existed and
that a defendant was one of the members, then any member’s statements and acts occurring
thereafter may be considered by you as evidence as to that defendant, even though the
statements and acts may have occurred in the absence and without the knowledge of that
defendant, provided such statements and acts occurred during the conspiracy and in
furtherance of its purpose.
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10.0310 Consideration of Evidence of Success of Conspiracy
In considering the evidence relating to the offense of conspiracy, there may be liability
even if the people involved do not succeed in accomplishing their common object. In order
for a conspiracy to be proven, it is not necessary that the prosecution show that the
conspirators succeeded.
S
OURCE: DEVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, 3D ED.,
§§ 27.07 and 27.04.
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
The court shall instruct on the Statutory Criminal Instructions 10.031 on the elements
and 10.0312 for “overt act.
10.0312 Definition of “Overt Act” for Conspiracy
An “overt act” is any act knowingly committed by one of the conspirators in an effort to
accomplish some object of the conspiracy. This overt act need not be criminal in nature, but
it must be an act that tends toward accomplishment of the plan, and it must be knowingly
done in furtherance of some object of the conspiracy.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1003(A) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); State v. Dupuy, 116
Ariz. 151, 153-54, 568 P.2d 1049, 1051-52 (1977) and State v. Sullivan, 68 Ariz. 81, 90, 200
P.2d 346, 352 (1948); D
EVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS,
3D ED., § 27.07.
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
Proof of an overt act is required to show that some step has been taken toward
executing the agreement; any act that corroborates the agreement or shows that the
agreement is being put into effect is sufficient. State v. Gessler, 142 Ariz. 379, 383, 690 P.2d
98, 102 (App. 1984).
This instruction must be given where an overt act is required by statute. It is not
required where the object of the conspiracy is the commission of a felony upon the person
of another or where an offense under A.R.S. § 13-1508 (burglary) or A.R.S. § 13-1704
(arson) is an object of the conspiracy.
10.0313 Conspiracy Guilt of Substantive Offense
The defendant is charged with conspiracy and the crime[s] of _________.
These charges are independent, and the evidence should be considered separately for each
charge.
SOURCE: State v. Olea, 139 Ariz. 280, 294, 678 P.2d 465, 479 (App. 1983).
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USE NOTE: Commission of a substantive offense and conspiracy to commit it are separate
and distinct offenses. State v. Olea, 139 Ariz. 280, 294, 678 P.2d 465, 479 (App. 1983).
A defendant cannot be convicted of conspiracy if it is based on felony murder or if the
defendant had merely the requisite intent to commit the underlying felony; there must be an
agreement to kill and an intent to kill or promote or aid in the killing. Evanchyk v. Stewart, 202
Ariz. 476, 481, 47 P.3d 1114, 1119 (2002).
10.04 Facilitation
The crime of facilitation to commit [insert name of crime] requires proof of the
following:
1. The defendant, acting with knowledge that another person was committing or
intended to commit [insert name of crime], knowingly provided such other person
with the means or opportunity for the commission of [insert name of crime]; and
2. The defendant’s conduct in fact aided the other person in committing the offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1004 (statutory language as of April 23, 1980); In re Christopher R., 191
Ariz. 461, 462, 957 P.2d 1004, 1005 (App. 1997).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: Facilitation does not apply to a peace officer acting in an official capacity within
the scope of authority and in the line of duty, e.g., as an undercover agent. A.R.S. § 13-
1004(B).
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CHAPTER 11
Many of the homicide instructions in the 1989 edition of the RAJI Criminal Instructions
contained a comment that “[t]he latest version of § 13-503 makes intoxication a partial
defense only to the mental state of intentionally.” The comment was based on A.R.S. § 13-
503 which, prior to its amendment in 1993, stated:
§ 13-503. Effect of intoxication; consideration by jury
No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is
less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition, but when the
actual existence of the culpable mental state of intentionally or with the intent to
is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of
offense, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was
intoxicated at the time in determining the culpable mental state with which
he committed the act.
Laws 1980, Ch. 229, § 6.
A.R.S. § 13-503 now reads:
Effect of alcohol or drug use
Temporary intoxication resulting from the voluntary ingestion,
consumption, inhalation or injection of alcohol, an illegal substance under
chapter 34 of this title or other psychoactive substances or the abuse of
prescribed medications does not constitute insanity and is not a defense for
any criminal act or requisite state of mind.
The exception regarding voluntary intoxication and the mental state of “intentionally” was
eliminated. Therefore, the comments in the 1989 edition of the RAJI Criminal Instructions
based on the former A.R.S. § 13-503 should be considered incorrect.
Because lesser-included offense instructions are often given with first or second degree
murder instructions, the Committee believed it would be helpful to include a sample first
degree murder instruction including some possible lesser-included offenses and sample jury
verdict form.
11.02 Negligent Homicide
The crime of negligent homicide requires proof that the defendant:
1. caused the death of another person; and
2. failed to recognize a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing the death of another
person.
The risk must be such that the failure to perceive it is a gross deviation from what a
reasonable person would observe in the situation.
[The distinction between manslaughter and negligent homicide is this: for manslaughter
the defendant must have been aware of a substantial risk and consciously disregarded the
risk that [his] [her] conduct would cause death. Negligent homicide only requires that the
defendant failed to recognize the risk.]
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[If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either manslaughter or negligent
homicide but you have a reasonable doubt as to which it was, you must find the defendant
guilty of negligent homicide.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1102 (statutory language as of August 12, 2005.)
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language if this instruction is given as a lesser-included
offense instruction.
Because the culpable mental state is included in the instruction, there is no need to add
any additional language.
C
OMMENT: The statute provides that it “applies to an unborn child in the womb at any
stage of its development” and then gives three exceptions to its application. See A.R.S. § 13-
1102(B).
“Negligent homicide is distinguished from reckless manslaughter in that for the latter
offense, the defendant is aware of the risk of death and consciously disregards it, whereas,
for the former offense, he is unaware of the risk.” State v. Walton, 133 Ariz. 282, 291, 650
P.2d 1264, 1273 (App. 1982).
11.03A1 Manslaughter (Reckless)
The crime of manslaughter requires proof that the defendant:
1. caused the death of another person; and
2. was aware of and showed a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
of death.
The risk must be such that disregarding it was a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
[It is no defense that the defendant was unaware of the risk solely by reason of voluntary
intoxication as a result of the ingestion of alcohol or drugs.]
[Second degree murder and manslaughter may both result from recklessness. The
difference is that the culpable recklessness involved in manslaughter is less than the culpable
recklessness involved in second degree murder.]
[If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either second degree murder or
manslaughter but you have a reasonable doubt as to which it was, you must find the
defendant guilty of manslaughter.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(1) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Include the first bracketed paragraph only if there is evidence that the
defendant was intoxicated.
Use both the second and third bracketed paragraphs if this instruction is given as a
lesser-included offense instruction.
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COMMENT: The statute provides that it “applies to an unborn child in the womb at any
stage of its development” and then gives three exceptions to its application. See A.R.S. § 13-
1103(B).
11.03A2 Manslaughter by Sudden Quarrel or Heat of Passion
The crime of manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion requires proof that:
1. a. The defendant intentionally killed another person; or
b. The defendant caused the death of another person by conduct which the
defendant knew would cause death or serious physical injury; or
c. Under circumstances which showed an extreme indifference to human life, the
defendant caused the death of another person by consciously disregarding a
grave risk of death. The risk must be such that disregarding it was a gross
deviation from what a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have
done; and
2. The defendant acted upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion; and
3. The sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulted from adequate provocation by the
person who was killed.
[It is no defense that the defendant was unaware of the risk solely by reason of
intoxication.]
“Adequate provocation” means conduct or circumstances sufficient to deprive a
reasonable person of self-control. Words alone are not adequate provocation to justify
reducing an intentional killing to manslaughter. [There must not have been a “cooling off”
period between the provocation and the killing. A “cooling off” period is the time it would
take a reasonable person to regain self-control under the circumstances.]
[If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either second degree murder or
manslaughter but you have a reasonable doubt as to which it was, you must find the
defendant guilty of manslaughter.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(2) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language if this instruction is given as a lesser-included
offense instruction.
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining “intent” and
“intent – inference.”
C
OMMENT: “Adequate provocation” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1101(4). In State v. Doss, 116
Ariz. 156, 162, 568 P.2d 1054 (1977), the court held that “words alone are not adequate
provocation to justify reducing an intentional killing to manslaughter.” In State v. Ortiz, 158
Ariz. 528, 764 P.2d 13 (1988), the Arizona Supreme Court approved the definition contained
in the model instruction. If there is evidence to support an instruction on the “cooling-off”
period, use the bracketed language.
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The statute provides that it “applies to an unborn child in the womb at any stage of its
development” and then gives three exceptions to its application. See A.R.S. § 13-1103(B).
In State v. Eddington, 226 Ariz. 72, 244 P.3d 76 (App. 2011), the court suggested that
“heat-of-passion manslaughter” may not be a lesser-included offense of second-degree
murder. See also State v. Garcia, 220 Ariz. 49, 202 P.3d 514 (App. 2008).
11.03A3 Manslaughter by Aiding Suicide
The crime of manslaughter by aiding suicide requires proof that the defendant
intentionally provided the physical means that another person used to commit suicide, with
the knowledge that the person intended to commit suicide.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(3) (statutory language as of July 24, 2014).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition l Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining
“intent” and “intent – inference.”
C
OMMENT: Manslaughter by aiding suicide is not a lesser-included offense of first-degree
murder. State v. Khoshbin, 166 Ariz. 570, 804 P.2d 103 (App. 1990).
11.03A4 Manslaughter by Coercion
The crime of manslaughter by coercion requires proof that:
1. Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, the defendant
recklessly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death and thereby caused
the death of another person; and
2. The defendant was coerced to engage in the conduct by the use or threatened
immediate use of unlawful deadly physical force upon the defendant or another
person, which a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have been
unable to resist.
S
OURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(4) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c) defining “reckless.”
11.03A5 Manslaughter of Unborn Child
The crime of manslaughter of an unborn child requires proof that the defendant:
[1. Knew or should have known that the mother was pregnant; and
2.] Knowingly or recklessly caused the death of an unborn child by any physical injury
to the mother.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(5) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Criminal Instructions 1.0510(b) and 1.0510(c) for the mental
states of “knowingly” and “recklessly.”
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There are a number of exceptions set forth in A.R.S. § 13-1103(B).
C
OMMENT: Element 1 is bracketed. The statute reads:
A person commits manslaughter by knowingly or recklessly causing the
death of an unborn child by any physical injury to the mother.
Because this is a dangerous crime against children (see A.R.S. § 13-705), the Committee
was of the opinion that the statute requires that the defendant knew or should have known
that the mother was pregnant. A dangerous crime against children requires that the conduct
be directed against the child. Also, the statute could be viewed as a strict liability offense
where, for example, an unborn child dies as a result of injuries received in an automobile
accident. The general rule is that a statute should not be interpreted as imposing strict
liability. If the trial judge concludes that there is no requirement that the defendant knew or
should have known that the mother was pregnant, then the instruction should be given
without element 1.
In State v. Cotton, 197 Ariz. 584, 5 P.3d 918 (App. 2000), the court held that this statute
applies only to the killing of an unborn child and, therefore, the defendant could not be
charged with manslaughter under A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(5) where the child was born alive and
died the next day after its mother had been killed by the defendant.
In State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 173, 800 P.2d 1260, 1281 (1990), the court wrote:
Although the doctrine of transferred intent generally applies in criminal law,
a particular statute may be worded so as to preclude its application.
See W.
LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 253 n. 36 (1972). We hold that A.R.S. § 13-
1103(A)(5) is such a statute that precludes the doctrine of transferred intent
because it explicitly requires two separate mental states, one toward the
mother, and the other toward the unborn child. The defendant must (1)
knowingly or recklessly cause the death of an unborn child at any stage of its
development, and (2) death must be caused by a physical injury to the
mother of the unborn child that would be murder if the death of the mother
had occurred.
[FN1]
FN1.
We need not address the second criminal intent required by A.R.S. § 13-
1103(A)(5). We note that the statutory language appears susceptible to
differing interpretations. The phrase “if the death of the mother had occurred
might support an argument that the statute is inapplicable if the woman is
murdered, and is only applicable if she survives.
Defendant did not raise this
argument and, because we reverse his manslaughter conviction on other
grounds, we decline to decide the question.
The statute was amended in 2005 and the phrase “if the death of the mother had
occurred” was deleted. Because that phrase was deleted, there is likely no further
requirement of a “second criminal intent” under the statute.
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11.04 Second-Degree Murder
The crime of second-degree murder requires proof of one of the following:
1. The defendant intentionally caused the death of [another person] [an unborn child];
or
2. The defendant caused the death of [another person] [an unborn child] by conduct
which the defendant knew would cause death or serious physical injury; or
3. Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, the defendant
recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death and thereby caused
the death of [another person] [an unborn child]. The risk must be such that
disregarding it was a gross deviation from what a reasonable person in the
defendant’s situation would have done; or
[The difference between first-degree murder and second-degree murder is that second-
degree murder does not require premeditation by the defendant.]
[If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either first-degree murder or second-
degree murder and you have a reasonable doubt as to which it was, you must find the
defendant guilty of second-degree murder.].
[If you find the elements of second-degree murder proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must consider whether the homicide was committed upon a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim. If you unanimously find that the
homicide was committed upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate
provocation by the victim, then you must find the defendant guilty of manslaughter rather
than second-degree murder.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1104 (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.
Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining “intent” and
“intent – inference.”
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c) defining “reckless.”
Use the first and/or second bracketed language if this instruction is given as a lesser-
included offense instruction of first-degree murder.
Use the third bracketed language only when there is a claim that the homicide was
committed upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by
the victim.
C
OMMENT: The statute provides that it “applies to an unborn child in the womb at any
stage of its development” and gives three exceptions to its application. See A.R.S. § 13-
1104(B).
If the victim was under fifteen years of age or an unborn child, the crime is a “dangerous
crime against children” and sentencing is pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01. See A.R.S. § 13-
1104(C). If the victim was under fifteen years of age or an unborn child, a finding by the jury
regarding that fact should be made as part of its verdict.
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There is no crime of attempted second-degree murder if the defendant only knows that
his or her action would cause serious physical injury rather than death. See State v. Ontiveros,
206 Ariz. 539, 542, 81 P.3d 330, 333 (App. 2003). See also State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 280, ¶ 14,
349 P.3d 1117 (App. 2015).
In State v. Eddington, 226 Ariz. 72, 81-82, ¶¶ 29-33, 244 P.3d 76, 85-86 (App. 2010), the
Court of Appeals held that fundamental, prejudicial error did not result from instructing the
jury that it may only consider the offense of manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion if it first acquits or cannot reach a verdict on second-degree murder. See State v.
LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 438, 924 P.2d 441, 442 (1996). The Court recognized, however, that
the Arizona Supreme Court had already decided in Peak v. Acuña, 203 Ariz. 83, 84-85, ¶¶ 5-6,
50 P.3d 833, 834-35 (2002), that “heat-of-passion manslaughter” is not a true lesser-included
offense of second-degree murder, because manslaughter includes all of the elements of
second-degree murder and has the additional “circumstance” of being caused by a sudden
quarrel or heat of passion. Eddington recognized that juries are presumed to follow the
instructions, and a jury that follows the LeBlanc-modeled instruction for homicide lesser
offenses could never reach the question of whether there was a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion upon adequate provocation because the jury would have already found all of the
elements of second-degree murder proven and found the defendant guilty. A majority of the
committee recognized that the previous LeBlanc-modeled instruction rendered manslaughter
under A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(2) a nullity and modified the instruction to ensure that the jury
would consider whether the circumstance justifying the lesser offense was present.
11.04A Second-Degree Murder (Mother and Unborn Child)
The crime of second-degree murder requires proof that the defendant intentionally,
knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life recklessly
engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death and caused the death of another person
and thereby caused the death of an unborn child.
[The difference between first-degree murder and second-degree murder is that second-
degree murder does not require premeditation by the defendant.]
[If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either first-degree murder or second-
degree murder and you have a reasonable doubt as to which it was, you must find the
defendant guilty of second-degree murder.]
[If you find the elements of second-degree murder proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must consider whether the homicide was committed upon a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim. If you unanimously find that the
homicide was committed upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate
provocation by the victim, then you must find the defendant guilty of manslaughter rather
than second-degree murder.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1104 (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
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Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining “intent” and
“intent – inference.”
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c) defining “reckless.”
This instruction should only be given when the defendant’s culpable mental state was
directed at the mother of the unborn child, and the defendant’s conduct resulted in the death
of the mother and the unborn child.
Use the first and/or second bracketed language if this instruction is given as a lesser-
included offense instruction of first-degree murder.
Use the third bracketed language only when there is a claim that the homicide was
committed upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by
the victim.
C
OMMENT: The statute provides that it “applies to an unborn child in the womb at any
stage of its development” and gives three exceptions to its application. See A.R.S. § 13-
1104(B).
If the victim was under fifteen years of age or an unborn child, the crime is a “dangerous
crime against children” and sentencing is pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01. See A.R.S. § 13-
1104(C). If the victim was under fifteen years of age or an unborn child, a finding by the jury
regarding that fact should be made as part of its verdict.
There is no crime of attempted second-degree murder if the defendant only knows that
his or her action would cause serious physical injury rather than death. See State v. Ontiveros,
206 Ariz. 539, 542, 81 P.3d 330, 333 (App. 2003).
In State v. Eddington, 226 Ariz. 72, 81-82, ¶¶ 29-33, 244 P.3d 76, 85-86 (App. 2010), the
Court of Appeals held that fundamental, prejudicial error did not result from instructing the
jury that it may only consider the offense of manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion if it first acquits or cannot reach a verdict on second-degree murder. See State v.
LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 438, 924 P.2d 441, 442 (1996). The Court recognized, however, that
the Arizona Supreme Court had already decided in Peak v. Acuña, 203 Ariz. 83, 84-85, ¶¶ 5-6,
50 P.3d 833, 834-35 (2002), that “heat-of-passion manslaughter” is not a true lesser-included
offense of second-degree murder, because manslaughter includes all of the elements of
second-degree murder and has the additional “circumstance” of being caused by a sudden
quarrel or heat of passion. Eddington recognized that juries are presumed to follow the
instructions, and a jury that follows the LeBlanc-modeled instruction for homicide lesser
offenses could never reach the question of whether there was a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion upon adequate provocation because the jury would have already found all of the
elements of second-degree murder proven and found the defendant guilty. A majority of the
committee recognized that the LeBlanc-modeled instruction rendered manslaughter under
A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(2) a nullity and modified the instruction to ensure that the jury would
consider whether the circumstance justifying the lesser offense was present.
11.05 First-Degree Premeditated Murder
The crime of first-degree premeditated murder requires proof that the defendant:
1. caused the death of another person; and
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2. intended or knew that [he] [she] would cause the death of another person; and
3. acted with premeditation.
“Premeditation” means that the defendant intended to kill another human being or
knew [he] [she] would kill another human being, and that after forming that intent or
knowledge, reflected on the decision before killing. It is this reflection, regardless of the
length of time in which it occurs, that distinguishes first-degree murder from second degree
murder. An act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel
or heat of passion. [The time needed for reflection is not necessarily prolonged, and the
space of time between the intent or knowledge to kill and the act of killing may be very
short.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1105 (statutory language as of August 12, 2005.)
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining “intent” and
“intent – inference.”
If the court gives both the first-degree premeditated murder instruction and first-degree
felony-murder instruction, the court should include the following in the instruction:
You must unanimously agree that the State has proven “first-degree
murder” beyond a reasonable doubt before you may find the defendant
guilty of “first-degree murder.” However, all of you do not have to agree on
whether it was “premeditated murder” or “felony murder.”
The court also should include the following in the verdict form:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the
defendant “guilty” of “first-degree murder.”]
Please indicate the number of jurors who found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the offense of “first-degree murder” was committed as follows:
_____ Premeditated murder
_____ Felony murder
_____ Both premeditated murder and felony murder
C
OMMENT: In State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 65 P.2d 420 (2003), the Arizona Supreme
Court directed trial courts to give the definition of “premeditation” as set forth in this
instruction. The bracketed language of that definition is to be included “only when the facts
of the case require it.” Id. at 480, 65 P.2d at 429. Therefore, this definition should not be
modified.
The statute provides that it “applies to an unborn child in the womb at any stage of
its development.” See A.R.S. § 13-1105(C). Statutory Criminal Instruction 11.05A1 deals with
the unborn child situation.
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11.05A1 First-Degree Murder of an Unborn Child
The crime of first degree murder of an unborn child requires proof that the defendant
committed one of the following:
1. Intentionally or knowingly, with premeditation, caused the death of an unborn child;
or
2. Intentionally or knowingly, with premeditation, caused the death of a person and
thereby caused the death of an unborn child.
“Premeditation” means that the defendant intended to kill another human being or
knew [he] [she] would kill another human being, and that after forming that intent or
knowledge, reflected on the decision before killing. It is this reflection, regardless of the
length of time in which it occurs, that distinguishes first degree murder from second degree
murder. An act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel
or heat of passion. [The time needed for reflection is not necessarily prolonged, and the
space of time between the intent or knowledge to kill and the act of killing may be very
short.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining “intent” and
“intent – inference.”
C
OMMENT: In State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 65 P.2d 420 (2003), the Arizona Supreme
Court directed trial courts to give the definition of “premeditation” as set forth in this
instruction. The bracketed language of that definition is to be included “only when the facts
of the case require it.” Id. at 480, 65 P.2d at 429. Therefore, this definition should not be
modified.
The statute provides that it “applies to an unborn child in the womb at any stage of its
development” and gives three exceptions to its application. See A.R.S. § 13-1105(C).
11.05A3 First-Degree Murder of a Law Enforcement Officer
The crime of first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer requires proof that:
1. The defendant engaged in conduct intending or knowing that the conduct would
cause the death of a person, who the defendant knows is a law enforcement officer;
and
2. The law enforcement officer was in the line of duty.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(3) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining “intent” and
“intent – inference.”
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11.052 First-Degree Felony Murder
The crime of first-degree felony murder requires proof that:
1. The defendant [and another person] [and other persons] committed or attempted to
commit [insert one of the offenses listed in A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2)]; and
2. In the course of and in furtherance of this crime or immediate flight from this crime,
the defendant or another person caused the death of any person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: A.R.S. § 13-1105(B) provides that this offense “requires no specific mental state
other than what is required for the commission of any of the enumerated felonies.”
The court will need to instruct the jury on the predicate felony.
If the court gives both the first-degree premeditated murder instruction and first-degree
felony-murder instruction, the court should include the following in the instruction:
You must unanimously agree that the State has proven “first-degree
murder” beyond a reasonable doubt before you may find the defendant
guilty of “first-degree murder.” However, all of you do not have to agree on
whether it was “premeditated murder” or “felony murder.”
The court also should include the following in the verdict form:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the
defendant “guilty” of “first-degree murder.”]
Please indicate the number of jurors who found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the offense of “first-degree murder” was committed as follows:
_____ Premeditated murder
_____ Felony murder
_____ Both premeditated murder and felony murder
C
OMMENT: First-degree felony murder has no lesser-included offenses. State v. Bocharski,
200 Ariz. 50, 22 P.3d 43 (2001).
Sample Instruction with Lesser-Included Offenses and Verdict Form
The Charged Offense
I will now tell you about the crime with which [insert defendant’s name] is charged.
[Insert defendant’s name] is charged with one count of “first-degree murder.”
First-Degree Murder
The crime of first-degree murder requires proof that the defendant:
1. caused the death of another person; and
2. intended or knew that [he] [she] would cause the death of another person; and
3. acted with premeditation.
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“Premeditation” means that the defendant intended to kill another human being or
knew [he] [she] would kill another human being, and that after forming that intent or
knowledge, reflected on the decision before killing. It is this reflection, regardless of the
length of time in which it occurs, that distinguishes first-degree murder from second degree
murder. An act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel
or heat of passion. [The time needed for reflection is not necessarily prolonged, and the
space of time between the intent or knowledge to kill and the act of killing may be very
short.]
“Intentionally” or “With Intent To” Defined
“Intentionally” or “with intent to” means that a defendant’s objective is to cause that
result or to engage in that conduct.
Intent Inference
Intent may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. It
need not be established exclusively by direct sensory proof. The existence of intent is one of
the questions of fact for your determination.
“Knew” or “Knowingly” Defined
“Knew” or “knowingly” means that a defendant acted with awareness of, or belief in,
the existence of conduct or circumstances constituting an offense. It does not mean that a
defendant must have known the conduct is forbidden by law.
Included Mental States Knowingly
If the State is required to prove that the defendant acted “knowingly,” that requirement
is satisfied if the State proves that the defendant acted “intentionally.”
Lesser-Included Offenses of First-Degree Murder Sample Instruction and
Verdict Form
Second-Degree Murder
The crime of “first degree murder” includes the lesser offenses of “second degree
murder,” “manslaughter” and “negligent homicide.” You may consider the lesser offense of
“second degree murder” if either:
1. You find the defendant not guilty of “first-degree murder”; or
2. After full and careful consideration of the facts, you cannot agree on
whether to find
the defendant guilty or not guilty of “first-degree murder.”
The crime of second-degree murder requires proof of one of the following:
1. The defendant intentionally caused the death of [another person] [an unborn child];
or
2. The defendant caused the death of [another person] [an unborn child] by conduct
which the defendant knew would cause death or serious physical injury; or
3. Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, the defendant
recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death and thereby caused
the death of [another person] [an unborn child]. The risk must be such that
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disregarding it was a gross deviation from what a reasonable person in the
defendant’s situation would have done; or
4. The defendant intentionally, knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of
death and caused the death of another person and thereby caused the death of an
unborn child.
The above definitions of “intentionally,” “intent inference” and “knowingly” apply.
“Recklessly” means that a defendant is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that conduct will result in the death of another.
The risk must be such that
disregarding it is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would do in the situation.
If the State is required to prove that the defendant acted “recklessly,” that requirement is
satisfied if the State proves that the defendant acted “intentionally” or “knowingly.”
The difference between first-degree murder and second degree murder is that second
degree murder does not require premeditation by the defendant.
If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either first-degree murder or second
degree murder and you have a reasonable doubt as to which it was, you must find the
defendant guilty of second degree murder.
Manslaughter
You may consider the lesser offense of “manslaughter” if either:
1. You find the defendant not guilty of both “first-degree murder” and “second degree
murder”; or
2. After full and careful consideration of the facts, you cannot agree on whether to find
the defendant guilty or not guilty of “first-degree murder” or “second-degree
murder.”
The crime of manslaughter can be committed in two ways. The first is “reckless
manslaughter.” Reckless manslaughter requires proof that the defendant recklessly caused
the death of another person.
“Reckless” has the same definition as used above.
The second way to commit “manslaughter” is manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of
passion. Manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion requires proof that:
1. a. The defendant intentionally killed another person; or
b. The defendant caused the death of another person by conduct which the
defendant knew would cause death or serious physical injury; or
c. Under circumstances which showed an extreme indifference to human life, the
defendant caused the death of another person by consciously disregarding a
grave risk of death. The risk must be such that disregarding it was a gross
deviation from what a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have
done; and
2. The defendant acted upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion; and
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3. The sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulted from adequate provocation by the
person who was killed.
[It is no defense that the defendant was unaware of the risk solely by reason of
intoxication.]
“Adequate provocation” means conduct or circumstances sufficient to deprive a
reasonable person of self-control. Words alone are not adequate provocation to justify
reducing an intentional killing to manslaughter. [There must not have been a “cooling off”
period between the provocation and the killing. A “cooling off” period is the time it would
take a reasonable person to regain self-control under the circumstances.]
You must unanimously agree that the State has proven “manslaughter” beyond a
reasonable doubt before you may find the defendant guilty of “manslaughter.” However, all
of you do not have to agree on whether it was “reckless manslaughter” or “manslaughter by
sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”
If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either second-degree murder or
manslaughter but you have a reasonable doubt as to which it was, you must find the
defendant guilty of manslaughter.
Negligent Homicide
You may consider the lesser offense of “negligent homicide” if either:
1. You find the defendant not guilty of “first-degree murder,” “second-degree
murder,” and “manslaughter”; or
2. After full and careful consideration of the facts, you cannot agree on whether to find
the defendant guilty or not guilty of “first-degree murder,” “second-degree murder,”
or “manslaughter.”
The crime of negligent homicide requires proof that the defendant:
1. caused the death of another person; and
2. failed to recognize a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing the death of another
person.
The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it is a gross
deviation from what a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
The distinction between manslaughter and negligent homicide is this: for manslaughter
the defendant must have been aware of a substantial risk and consciously disregarded the
risk that [his] [her] conduct would cause death. Negligent homicide only requires that the
defendant failed to recognize the risk.
If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either manslaughter or negligent
homicide but you have a reasonable doubt as to which it was, you must find the defendant
guilty of negligent homicide.
You cannot find the defendant guilty of any lesser-included offense unless you find that
the State has proved each element of the lesser-included offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Verdict Count One (First-Degree Murder)
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled action, and upon our oaths,
do find the Defendant, [insert defendant’s name], on the charge of “first-degree murder” on
[insert date of the offense] as the result of the death of [insert victim’s name] as follows (check
only one):
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
_____ Unable to agree
[Lesser-Included Offense Verdict on “second degree murder”: If you find the defendant
“guilty” of “first-degree murder”, do not complete this portion of the verdict form. In other
words, complete this portion only if you find the defendant either “not guilty” of “first-
degree-murder” or you are unable to decide.]
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled action, and upon our
oaths, do find the Defendant, [insert defendant’s name], on the lesser-included offense of
“second degree murder” on [insert date of the offense] as the result of the death of [insert
victim’s name], as follows (check only one):
_____ Not guilty
_____ Guilty
_____ Unable to agree
[Lesser-Included Offense Verdict on “manslaughter”: If you find the defendant “guilty”
of “first-degree murder” or “guilty” of “second degree-murder,” do not complete this
portion of the verdict form. In other words, complete this portion only if you find the
defendant either “not guilty” of both “first-degree murder” and “second degree murder” or
you are unable to decide.]
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled action, and upon our
oaths, do find the Defendant, [insert defendant’s name], on the lesser-included offense of
“manslaughter” on [insert date of the offense] as the result of the death of [insert victim’s
name], as follows (check only one):
_____ Not guilty
_____ Guilty
_____ Unable to agree
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant “guilty” of
“manslaughter.”]
Please indicate the number of jurors who found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
offense of “manslaughter” was committed as follows:
_____ Reckless manslaughter
_____ Manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion
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_____ Both reckless manslaughter and manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of
passion
[Lesser-Included Offense Verdict on “negligent homicide”: If you find the defendant
“guilty” of “first-degree murder” or “guilty” of “second-degree murder” or “guilty” of
“manslaughter,” do not complete this portion of the verdict form. In other words, complete
this portion only if you find the defendant either “not guilty” of “first-degree murder,”
“second-degree murder,” and “manslaughter” or you are unable to decide.]
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled action, and upon our
oaths, do find the Defendant, [insert defendant’s name], on the lesser-included offense of
“negligent homicide” on [insert date of the offense] as the result of the death of [insert victim’s
name], as follows (check only one):
_____ Not guilty
_____ Guilty
Signed: ____________________________
Foreperson (Juror # _____)
Foreperson (please print name): _______________________
USE NOTE: This sample instruction and verdict form is provided to illustrate how to structure
the lesser-included instructions and verdict form in a first-degree murder case where the facts
support instructing on lesser-included offenses. This instruction and verdict must be modified
if the facts do not support all of the lesser-included offenses set forth in this sample instruction
and verdict form. For example, if “manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion” is not a
theory supported by the evidence, that theory must be deleted.
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CHAPTER 12
12.01 Endangerment
The crime of endangerment requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant disregarded a substantial risk that his or her conduct would cause
[imminent death/physical injury], and
2. The defendant’s conduct did in fact create a substantial risk of [imminent
death/physical injury].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1201 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Recklessly” and “Physical Injury” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
If an issue is whether there was a substantial risk of imminent death, a special form of
verdict should be used. State v. Carpenter, 141 Ariz. 29, 684 P.2d 910 (App. 1984).
The victim must be placed in actual substantial risk of imminent death in order for a
defendant to be found guilty of endangerment involving the substantial risk of imminent
death. State v. Doss, 192 Ariz. 408, 966 P.2d 1012 (App. 1998).
12.02 Threatening or Intimidating
The crime of threatening or intimidating requires proof that the defendant threatened or
intimidated by word or conduct:
1. to cause physical injury to another person; or
2. to cause serious damage to the property of another person; or
3. to cause, or in reckless disregard to causing, serious public inconvenience including,
but not limited to, evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or transportation
facility; or
4. to cause physical injury to another person or damage to the property of another
person in order to promote, further or assist, in the interests of or to cause, induce
or solicit, another person to participate in a criminal street gang, a criminal syndicate,
or a racketeering enterprise.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1202 (statutory language as of April 19, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: “Physical Injury” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
A special verdict form should be used to determine which subsection applies.
The State must prove that a reasonable person would foresee that the words would be
taken as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm; the State does not have to show
that the defendant had the ability to carry out the threat or that the defendant had the intent
to carry out the threat. In re Kyle M., 200 Ariz. 447, 27 P.3d 804 (App. 2001).
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The State does not have to show that the victim was in fact in fear; the subjective fear of
the victim is not necessary for the defendant to be guilty of threatening or intimidating. In re
Ryan A., 202 Ariz. 19, 39 P.3d 543 (App. 2002).
The felony offense of threatening and intimidating may also include the lesser
misdemeanor offense of threatening and intimidating. State v. Corona, 188 Ariz. 85, 932 P.2d
1356 (App. 1997).
12.03 Assault
The crime of assault requires the proof that the defendant:
1. [Intentionally/knowingly/recklessly] caused a physical injury to another person; or
2. Intentionally put another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical
injury; or
3. Knowingly touched another person with the intent to injure, insult, or provoke that
person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1203 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally,” “knowingly,” “recklessly,” and “physical injury” are defined in A.R.S.
§ 13-105.
A special verdict form should be used to determine which subsection applies.
12.04 Aggravated Assault General
The crime of aggravated assault requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant committed an assault, and
2. The assault was aggravated by at least one of the following factors:
The defendant caused serious physical injury to another person; or
The defendant used a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; or
The defendant committed the assault after entering the private home of another
with the intent to commit the assault; or
The defendant was eighteen years of age or older and the person assaulted was
fifteen years of age or under; or
The defendant knew or had reason to know that the person assaulted was a
peace officer; or
The defendant knew or had reason to know that the person assaulted was
someone summoned and directed by a peace officer; or
The defendant knew or had reason to know that the person assaulted was a
[code enforcement officer] [state park ranger] [municipal park ranger] [constable]
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[firefighter] [fire investigator] [fire inspector] [emergency medical technician]
[paramedic] [prosecutor] [public defender] [judicial officer] [while engaged in the
execution of any official duties] [if the assault results from the execution of
his/her official duties]; or
The defendant knew or had reason to know that the person assaulted was
someone summoned and directed by a [code enforcement officer] [state park
ranger] [municipal park ranger] [constable] [firefighter] [fire investigator] [fire
inspector] [emergency medical technician] [paramedic] performing any official
duties; or
The defendant committed the assault while the person assaulted was bound or
otherwise physically restrained; or
The defendant committed the assault while the assaulted person’s ability to resist
was substantially impaired; or
The defendant knew or had reason to know that the victim was a health care
provider or a person summoned and directed by such person performing
professional duties; or
The assault was committed by any means of force that caused temporary but
substantial disfigurement, temporary but substantial loss or impairment of any
body organ or part, or a fracture of any body part; or
The defendant was in violation of an order of protection issued against him or
her pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3602 or 13-3624.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1204 (statutory language as of August 9, 2017).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. §13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction
1.0510(a)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. §13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. §13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction 1.0510(c)).
"Code enforcement officer" is defined in A.R.S. § 39-123.
“Dangerous instrument” is defined in A.R.S. §13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction
1.058).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. §13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction
1.0510).
“Physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. §13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction 1.0529).
“Serious physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. §13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction
1.0534).
a. The court shall also instruct on assault (Statutory Criminal Instruction 12.03).
b. A special verdict form should be used to determine which subsection applies.
c. If assault is aggravated by a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument, or serious
physical injury, a special verdict form should be used if the victim is under 15 years of age.
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d. If assault is aggravated by a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument, serious physical
injury, or if the means of force used caused a temporary but substantial disfigurement,
temporary but substantial loss or impairment of any body organ of part, or a fracture of any
body part, a special verdict form should be used if the victim is a peace officer.
e. If the person who commits the assault is seriously mentally ill, as defined in A.R.S. §
36-550, or is inflicted with Alzheimer’s disease or related dementia, the specific provisions
relating to aggravated assaults on licensed health care providers do not apply [13-
1204(A)(10)].
f. When the offense is alleged to have arisen in violation of an order of protection, the
assault must have occurred as defined by A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1) or (3).
A.R.S. §13-1204(D) provides that it is not a defense to a prosecution for assaulting a
peace officer or a mitigating circumstance that the peace officer was not on duty or engaged
in the execution of official duties.
12.04B Aggravated Assault Domestic Violence
The crime of aggravated assault requires proof that:
1. The defendant [intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused any physical injury to
another person] [intentionally placed another person in reasonable apprehension of
imminent physical injury] [knowingly touched another person with the intent to
injure the person]; and
2. The defendant [intentionally/knowingly] [impeded the normal breathing or
circulation of blood of another person by applying pressure to the throat or neck]
[obstructed the nose and mouth of another person either manually or through the
use of an instrument]; and
3. [The defendant and the victim were married.] [The defendant and the victim are
married.] [The defendant and the victim reside in the same household.] [The
defendant and the victim resided in the same household.] [The defendant and the
victim have a child in common.] [The defendant or the victim is pregnant by the
other party.] [The victim is the defendant’s or defendant’s spouse’s parent,
grandparent, child, grandchild, brother or sister.] [The victim is the defendant or
defendant’s parent-in-law, grandparent-in-law, stepparent, step-grandparent,
stepchild, step-grandchild, brother-in-law or sister-in-law.] [The victim is a child who
resides or has resided in the same household as the defendant and is related by
blood to a former spouse of the defendant or to a person who resides or who has
resided in the same household as the defendant.] [The victim is the defendant or
defendant’s adopted child.] [The relationship between the victim and the defendant
was/had been a romantic or sexual relationship. The following factors may be
considered in determining whether the relationship between the victim and the
defendant was/had been a romantic or sexual relationship:
(a) The type of relationship.
(b) The length of the relationship.
(c) The frequency of the interaction between the victim and the defendant.
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(d) If the relationship has terminated, the length of time since the termination.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1204(B) and 13-3601(A) (statutory language as of July 29, 2010).
12.048 Aggravated Assault Upon Teacher or School Employee
The crime of aggravated assault upon a teacher or school employee requires proof of the
following:
1. The defendant committed an assault; and
2. The defendant knew or had reason to know that the person assaulted was a
[teacher/school nurse/school employee]; and
3. The defendant committed the assault [on school grounds/on grounds next to a
school/in a building or motor vehicle used for school purposes/while the teacher or school
nurse was visiting a private home in the course of professional duties/on any teacher
engaged in any authorized and organized classroom activity held off school grounds].
S
OURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(8) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Under most of the situations in A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(6), an assault upon a
teacher or an employee of a school is aggravated. However, the only employees of a school
subject to aggravated assault in a private home are teachers and school nurses. For the sake
of clarity, “nurse” is added here.
The court shall also instruct on assault (Statutory Criminal Instruction 12.03).
12.04.09A Aggravated Assault Control of Officer’s Firearm
The crime of aggravated assault requires proof that:
1. The defendant committed an assault; and
2. The defendant knowingly [took control] [attempted to exercise control] over the
firearm of [a peace officer] [a state department of corrections officer] [a department
of juvenile corrections officer] [a law enforcement agency officer] [a city/county jail
officer] [a city/county juvenile detention facility officer] [an officer of an entity that
had contracted with any state or federal agency responsible for sentenced or
unsentenced prisoners]; and
3. The defendant knew or had reason to know that the person assaulted was [a peace
officer] [state department of corrections officer] [a department of juvenile
corrections officer] [a law enforcement agency officer] [a city/county jail officer] [a
city/county juvenile detention facility officer] [an officer of an entity that had
contracted with any state or federal agency responsible for sentenced or unsentenced
prisoners].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(9)(a) (statutory language as of August 9, 2017).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall also instruct on assault (Statutory Criminal Instruction 12.03).
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The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
See Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0517 for the definition of “firearm.”
A.R.S. §13-1204(D) provides that it is not a defense to a prosecution for assaulting a
peace officer or a mitigating circumstance that the peace officer was not on duty or engaged
in the execution of official duties.
12.04.09B Aggravated Assault Control of Officer’s Weapon Other Than a
Firearm
The crime of aggravated assault requires proof that:
1. The defendant committed an assault; and
2. The defendant knowingly [took control] [attempted to exercise control] over any
weapon that was being used or attempting to be used by [a peace officer] [a state
department of corrections officer] [a department of juvenile corrections officer] [a
law enforcement agency officer] [a city/county jail officer] [a city / county juvenile
detention facility officer] [an officer of an entity that had contracted with any state or
federal agency responsible for sentenced or unsentenced prisoners]; and
3. The defendant knew or had reason to know that the person assaulted was [a peace
officer] [a state department of corrections officer] [a department of juvenile
corrections officer] [a law enforcement agency officer] [a city / county jail officer] [a
city/county juvenile detention facility officer] [an officer of an entity that had
contracted with any state or federal agency responsible for sentenced or unsentenced
prisoners].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(9)(b) (statutory language as of August 9, 2017).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall also instruct on assault (Statutory Criminal Instruction 12.03).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
A.R.S. §13-1204(D) provides that it is not a defense to a prosecution for assaulting a
peace officer or a mitigating circumstance that the peace officer was not on duty or engaged
in the execution of official duties.
12.04.09C Aggravated Assault Control of Officer’s Implement Other Than a
Firearm
The crime of aggravated assault requires proof that:
1. The defendant committed an assault; and
2. The defendant knowingly [took control] [attempted to exercise control] over any
implement that was being used or attempting to be used by [a peace officer] [a state
department of corrections officer] [a department of juvenile corrections officer] [a
law enforcement agency officer] [a city/county jail officer] [a city/county juvenile
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detention facility officer] [an officer of an entity that had contracted with any state or
federal agency responsible for sentenced or unsentenced prisoners]; and
3. The defendant knew or had reason to know that the person assaulted was [a peace
officer] [a state department of corrections officer] [a department of juvenile
corrections officer] [a law enforcement agency officer] [a city/county jail officer] [a
city/county juvenile detention facility officer] [an officer of an entity that had
contracted with any state or federal agency responsible for sentenced or unsentenced
prisoners].
“Implement” means an object that is designed for or that is capable of restraining or
injuring an individual, but does not include handcuffs.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(9)(c) (statutory language as of August 9, 2017).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall also instruct on assault (Statutory Criminal Instruction 12.03).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
A.R.S. §13-1204(D) provides that it is not a defense to a prosecution for assaulting a
peace officer or a mitigating circumstance that the peace officer was not on duty or engaged
in the execution of official duties.
12.04.10 Aggravated Assault Defendant in Custody
The crime of aggravated assault requires proof that:
1. The defendant committed an assault; and
2. At the time of the assault, the defendant was [imprisoned] [subject to custody] in
[the state department of corrections] [the department of juvenile corrections] [a law
enforcement agency] [a county/city jail] [a city/county juvenile detention facility] [an
entity having responsibility for sentenced or unsentenced prisoners]; and
The defendant knew or had reason to know that the person assaulted was, at the time of the
assault, acting in [his] [her] official capacity as an employee of [the state department of
corrections] [the department of juvenile corrections] [a law enforcement agency] [a
county/city jail] [a city/county juvenile detention facility] [an entity having responsibility for
sentenced or unsentenced prisoners].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(10) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall also instruct on assault (Statutory Criminal Instruction 12.03).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
12.05 Unlawfully Administering Intoxicating Liquors, or Drug
The crime of unlawfully administering liquor or drug requires proof of the following:
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1. The defendant knowingly introduced or caused to be introduced into the body of
another person [intoxicating liquors/narcotic drug/dangerous drug]; and
2. The person did not consent; and
3. It was for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1205 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Narcotic drug” and “dangerous drug” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
A special verdict form should be used if the victim is a minor.
12.06 Dangerous or Deadly Assault by a Prisoner
The crime of dangerous or deadly assault by a prisoner requires proof that the
defendant:
1. Was in the custody of [the department of corrections/a county jail/a city jail/a law
enforcement agency]; and
2. Committed an assault [involving the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a
deadly weapon or dangerous instrument]; or [by intentionally or knowingly inflicting
serious physical injury upon another person].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1206 (statutory language as of September 2, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
The court shall instruct on assault (Statutory Criminal Instruction 12.03).
“Intentionally,” “knowingly,” “deadly weapon,” “dangerous instrument,” and “serious
physical injury” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
Definition of “custody” in § 13-2501 defining the word as it relates to escape offenses
does not apply to § 13-1206 proscribing dangerous or deadly assault by a prisoner; “custody”
in latter statute must be read to mean the imposition of actual or constructive restraint
pursuant to an on-site arrest or court order or pursuant to detention in a correctional facility,
juvenile detention center, or state hospital. See State v. Newman, 141 Ariz. 554, 688 P.2d 180
(1984).
12.07 Prisoners [Committing Assault with Intent to Incite to Riot/Participating
in a Riot]
The crime of a prisoner [committing assault with intent to incite to riot/participating in a
riot] requires proof that the defendant:
Was in the custody of [the state department of corrections/a county or city jail]; and
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1. committed an assault upon another person with the intent to incite to riot; or
2. participated in a riot.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1207 (statutory language as of January 1, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“With the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
The court shall also instruct on assault if subsection (a) applies (Statutory Criminal
Instruction 12.03).
12.08 Assault; Vicious Animals
The crime of assault by a vicious animal requires proof that:
1. The defendant owned a dog that the defendant knew or had reason to know had a
propensity to attack, to cause injury or otherwise endanger the safety of human
beings without provocation, or that had been found to be a vicious animal by a court
of competent authority; and
2. The dog, while at large, bit, inflicted physical injury on, or attacked a human being.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1208 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly,” and “physical injury” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
12.09 Drive-By Shooting
The crime of drive-by shooting requires proof that:
1. The defendant intentionally discharged a weapon from a motor vehicle; and
2. The discharge was at a person, another occupied motor vehicle, or an occupied
structure.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1209 (statutory language as of October 1, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Motor Vehicle” is defined in A.R.S. § 28-101.
“Occupied structure” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101.
12.11 Discharging a Firearm at a Structure
The crime of discharging a firearm at a [residential] [nonresidential] structure requires
proof that the defendant knowingly:
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1. discharged a firearm; and
2. discharged at a [residential [nonresidential] structure.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1211 (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” and “firearm” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Residential structure,” “nonresidential structure,” and “structure” are defined in A.R.S.
§ 13-1211.
A special verdict form should be used to determine the type of structure.
A storage room that was under the same roof as the living quarters was found to be a
residential structure. See State v. Ekmanis, 183 Ariz. 180, 901 P.2d 1210 (App. 1995).
An almost completed home is not a residential structure because it has not been adapted
for human residence. See State v. Bass, 184 Ariz. 543, 911 P.2d 549 (App. 1995).
12.12 Prisoner Assault with Bodily Fluids
The crime of prisoner assault with bodily fluids requires proof that the defendant:
1. was a prisoner; and
2. threw or projected any saliva, blood, seminal fluid, urine or feces at or onto a person
who is a correctional facility employee or private prison security officer; and
3. knew or reasonably should have known the person was a correctional facility
employee or private prison security officer.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1212 (statutory language as of April 28, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” and “physical injury” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
12.14 Unlawful Mutilation
The crime of unlawful mutilation requires proof that the defendant:
[knowingly mutilated a female who was under eighteen years of age.]
[knowingly transported a female under eighteen years of age to another jurisdiction for
the purpose of mutilation.]
[recklessly transported a female under eighteen years of age to another jurisdiction where
mutilation was likely to occur.]
The consent of the minor on whom the mutilation is performed or the parents of the
minor is not a defense to a prosecution for unlawful mutilation.
“Mutilate” or “mutilation” means the partial or total removal of the clitoris, prepuce,
labia minora, with or without excision of the labia major, the narrowing of the vaginal
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opening through the creation of a covering seal formed by cutting and repositioning the
inner or outer labia, with or without removal of the clitoris, or any harmful procedure to the
genitalia, including pricking, piercing, incising, scraping or cauterizing.
[Mutilate and mutilation do not include procedures performed by a licensed physician
that are proven to be medically necessary due to a medically recognized condition.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1214 (statutory language as of July 24, 2014).
U
SE NOTE: Use statutory definition instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and its progeny, the trial judge
must instruct the jury to determine the minor’s age because a violation of this statute is a
Class 2 felony, unless the minor is under fifteen years of age, in which case the offense is
punishable as a dangerous crime against children pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-705. See statutory
criminal 7.05 for the instruction and verdict form if it is necessary for the jury to determine
whether the offense is a “dangerous crime against a child.”
C
OMMENT: The committee notes that the statute fails to set forth the burden of proof for
subsection f, or to whom that burden belongs.
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CHAPTER 13
13.01 Definition of Restrain
“Restrain” means to restrict a persons movements without consent, without legal
authority, and in a manner that interferes substantially with such persons liberty, by either
moving such person from one place to another or by confining such person. Restraint is
without consent if it is accomplished by [(physical force) (intimidation) (or) (deception)] [any
means including acquiescence of the victim if the victim is a child less than eighteen years
old or an incompetent person and victims lawful custodian has not acquiesced in the
movement or confinement.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1301(2) (statutory language as of April 23, 1980).
13.02 Custodial Interference
The crime of custodial interference requires proof that the defendant;
1. [took] [enticed] [kept] from lawful custody any [child] [incompetent person] entrusted
by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution; or
before a court order determining custodial rights denying that parent access to any
child, [took] [enticed] [withheld] any child from the other parent; or
had joint legal custody of the child and [took] [enticed] [withheld] the child from the
physical custody of the other custodian; or
intentionally failed or refused to return [or impeded the return] of the child to the
lawful custodian at the time the defendants access rights outside this state had expired;
and
2. knew or had reason to know that the defendant had no legal right to do so.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1302 (statutory language as amended in August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction 1.056(b)).
For A.R.S. §13-1302(a)(2) & (3), if justified by the facts, the following instruction should
be given:
It is not a crime if the defendant is the child’s parent and both of the following are
found:
1. Defendant had filed an emergency petition regarding custodial rights
with the superior court and had received a hearing date from the court;
and
2. Defendant had a good faith and reasonable belief that the child would
be in immediate danger if the child was left with the other parent.
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A.R.S. § 13-1302(D).
The state must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the exception to the crime
does not apply to the defendant.
Use Verdict Form 13.02 for Statutory Criminal Instruction 13.02.
COMMENT: Out of wedlockchildren are assumed to be in the custody of the mother until
paternity and custody are determined by a court.
A.R.S. § 13-1302(B). A.R.S. § 13-1302(B)
making the mother of child born out of wedlock legal custodian until paternity is established
is substantially related to important state interest and, therefore, is not a gender-based equal
protection violation nor does the statute violate due process. State v. Bean, 174 Ariz. 544, 851
P.2d 843 (App. 1992).
“Custody” includes parental authority and other lawful authority to have control of the
person; it does not mean arrest or incarceration as “custody” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-
2501(3).
A.R.S. § 13-1302(A)(2) does not require that there be ongoing custody proceedings
before a person may be charged with custodial interference.
Pending custody proceedings
are not a prerequisite to a prosecution for custodial interference under this section. State v.
Wood, 198 Ariz. 275, 277, 8 P.3d 1189, 1191 (App. 2000).
13.02 Verdict Form (Custodial Interference)
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above-entitled action, upon our oaths, do
find the Defendant, [insert the defendants name], on the charge of custodial interference as
follows (check only one):
_____ Not guilty
_____ Guilty
_____ Unable to agree
(Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant guilty of custodial
interference.)
We, the jury find as follows (check only one):
[____ the defendant was child’s [parent] [agent of a parent].
____ the defendant was not the child’s [parent] [agent of a parent].]
[____ the defendant was the incompetent person’s [custodian] [agent of the custodian].
____ the defendant was not the incompetent persons [custodian] [agent of the
custodian].]
We, the jury find as follows (check only one):
_____ the [child] [incompetent person] was [taken] [enticed] [kept] out of this state.
_____ the [child] [incompetent person] was not [taken] [enticed] [kept] out of this state.
We, the jury find as follows (check only one):
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_____ the [child] [incompetent person] was voluntarily returned without physical injury
prior to arrest or the issuance of an arrest warrant.
_____ the [child] [incompetent person] was not voluntarily returned without physical
injury prior to arrest or the issuance of an arrest warrant.
USE NOTE: These elements must be found by the jury in order to determine the
classification of the offense as a misdemeanor or a felony and sentencing range for the
offense. See A.R.S. § 13-1302(D); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); State v. Gross,
201 Ariz. 41, 31 P.3d 815 (App. 2001).
13.02C Defense to Custodial Interference
It is a defense to the charge of custodial interference if the defendant proves the
following had occurred:
1. The defendant had begun the process to obtain an order of protection or filed a
petition for custody within a reasonable period of time after taking the child and the
order of protection or petition states the defendants belief that the child was at risk
if left with the other parent; and
2. The defendant is the childs parent, had the right of custody and, before the events
giving rise to the charge of custodial interference, the defendant either:
a. had a good faith and reasonable belief that the taking, enticing or withholding
was necessary to protect the child from immediate danger; or
b. was a victim of domestic violence by the other parent and had a good faith and
reasonable belief that the child would be in immediate danger if the child was
left with the other parent.
The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, which is a lesser burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As stated earlier,
the state always has the burden of proving the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt,
and this burden never shifts during the trial.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means that a fact is more probably true
than not true.
If you find that the defendant has proved this defense by a preponderance of the
evidence then you must find the defendant not guilty of custodial interference.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1302(C) (statutory language as of August 21, 1998); Statutory Criminal
Instruction 2.025.
U
SE NOTE: This is a defense only to paragraph A, subsection 2 of A.R.S. § 13-1302. See
A.R.S. § 13-1302(C).
This instruction includes Statutory Criminal Instruction 2.025 so it need not be given.
The court may also wish to give Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2).
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COMMENT: In State v. Wood, 198 Ariz. 275, 8 P.3d 1189 (App. 2000), the court held that the
events giving rise to the charge of custodial interference must have already taken place
before custody proceedings began or the defense under this statute would be meaningless.
13.031 Unlawful Imprisonment
The crime of unlawful imprisonment requires proof that the defendant knowingly
restrained another person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1303 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Criminal Instruction 13.01 defining “restrain.”
C
OMMENT: This offense may be a lesser-included offense of kidnapping. State v. Detrich, 178
Ariz. 380, 873 P.2d 1302 (1994); State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 832 P.2d 593 (1992); State v.
Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349, 351, 681 P.2d 1368, 1370 (1984); State v. Tschilar, 200 Ariz. 427, 437,
27 P.3d 331, 341 (App. 2001); State v. Flores, 140 Ariz. 469, 682 P.2d 1136 (App. 1984); State
v. Mendibles, 126 Ariz. 218, 613 P.2d 1274 (App. 1980). However, if the evidence is that the
defendant is guilty of kidnapping or no crime at all, it is not error to not instruct on the
lesser-included offense of unlawful imprisonment.
State v. Lucas, 146 Ariz. 597, 604, 708 P.2d
81, 88 (1985).
13.032 Unlawful Imprisonment Defense
It is a defense to the crime of unlawful imprisonment if the following existed:
[The restraint was accomplished by a peace officer or a detention officer acting in good
faith in the lawful performance of his or her duty.] or
[1. The defendant was a relative of the person restrained; and
2. The defendant’s sole intent was to take lawful custody of the person restrained; and
3. The restraint was accomplished without physical injury to (insert name of the
victim).
“Relative” means a parent or stepparent, ancestor, descendant, sibling, uncle or aunt,
including an adoptive relative of the same degree through marriage or adoption, or a
spouse.]
The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, which is a lesser burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As stated earlier,
the state always has the burden of proving the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt,
and this burden never shifts during the trial.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means that a fact is more probably true
than not.
If you find that the defendant has proved this defense by a preponderance of the
evidence then you must find the defendant not guilty of unlawful imprisonment.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1301(1) and 13-1303(B)(2) (statutory language as of July 24, 2014).
13.04 Kidnapping
The crime of kidnapping requires proof that the defendant knowingly restrained another
person with the intent to:
[hold the person (for ransom) (as a shield) (or) (as a hostage)]
[hold the person for involuntary servitude]
[inflict (death) (physical injury) (or) (a sexual offense) on the person]
[aid in the commission of a felony]
[place the victim or a third person in reasonable fear of imminent physical injury to the
victim or such third person]
[interfere with the performance of a governmental or political function]
[seize or exercise control over any (airplane) (train) (bus) (ship) (other vehicle)].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1304 (statutory language as of May 16, 1985).
U
SE NOTE:
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.056(a)(1) and 1.056(a)(2) defining “intent” and
“intent – inference.”
Use Statutory Criminal Instruction 13.01 defining “restrain.”
If the restriction was with the intent to commit a sexual offense on the person, the court
should insert the name of the sexual offense and give an instruction defining the sexual
offense.
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-1304(B) provides that kidnapping is a class 2 felony unless the
victim is released voluntarily by the defendant without physical injury in a safe place prior to
arrest and prior to accomplishing any of the further enumerated offenses in subsection A.
In State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 192, 994 P.2d 395, 399 (2000), the Arizona Supreme Court
held that the factors listed in subsection B do not change the elements of kidnapping, that
kidnapping is presumptively a class 2 felony, that all of the elements in B must be met to
justify a decrease in the classification of the offense from a class 2 felony to a class 4 felony,
that subsection B is a mitigating factor relevant solely for sentencing purposes and that
because the defendant alone benefits from the presence of mitigating circumstances, it is
proper to place the burden of proving them on the defense by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Because this is a sentencing issue and mitigating factors may be determined by the
judge without a jury finding, no jury instruction or verdict form concerning subsection B has
been provided. See also State v. Tschilar, 200 Ariz. 427, 27 P.3d 331 (App. 2001).
The Eagle court also noted that the kidnapping statute does not require the defendant to
complete a predicate offense, such as a sexual assault; all that is required is the intent to
commit” a predicate offense.
Eagle, 196 Ariz. at 190, 994 P.2d at 397. If the defendant has
been convicted of both kidnapping and a predicate offense, the court may wish to review
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State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 778 P.2d 1204 (1989), which discusses the factors to consider
in deciding whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.
13.05 Access Interference
The crime of access interference requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly engaged in a pattern of behavior that prevented, obstructed or frustrated
a persons court ordered access rights to a child knowing or having reason to know
that the defendant had no legal right to do so; and
2. removed the child from this state.
“Access order” means a court order that allows a person to have direct access to a child.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1305 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b) defining “knowingly.”
C
OMMENT: The statute requires that the “access order” was issued pursuant to Title 25.
13.06 Unlawfully Obtaining Labor or Services
The crime of unlawfully obtaining labor or services requires proof that the defendant
knowingly obtained labor or services of another person by [causing or threatening to cause
bodily injury to that person or another person] [restraining or threatening to restrain that
person or another person without lawful authority and against that persons will]
[withholding that persons governmental records, identifying information or other personal
property].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1306 (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
13.07.01 Sex Trafficking
The crime of sex trafficking requires proof that the defendant knowingly transported
another person with [the intent to cause the other person to] [knowledge that the other
person will] engage in any prostitution or sexually-explicit performance by deception, force
or coercion.
“Coercion” means [abusing or threatening to abuse the law or the legal system]
[knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, possessing or withholding
another persons actual or purported passport or other immigration document, government
issued identification document, government record or personal property] [extortion] [causing
or threatening to cause financial harm to any person] [facilitating or controlling another
person’s access to a controlled substance].
“Force” means [to cause or threaten to cause serious harm to another person] [physically
restraining or threatening to physically restrain another person].
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“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual contact,
sexual intercourse, oral sexual contact or sadomasochistic abuse under a fee arrangement
with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
“Sexual contact” means any direct or indirect fondling or manipulating of any part of the
genitals, anus or female breast.
Sexual intercoursemeans penetration into the penis, vulva or anus by any part of the
body or by any object.
“Oral sexual contact” means oral contact with the penis, vulva or anus.
Sadomasochistic abusemeans flagellation or torture by or on a person who is nude or
clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume or the condition of being fettered,
bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
Sexually explicit performancemeans a live or public act or show intended to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interest of patrons.
[or]
The crime of sex trafficking requires proof that the defendant knowingly [recruited]
[enticed] [harbored] [provided] [obtained] another person for transport with [the intent to
cause the other person to] [knowledge that the other person will] engage in any prostitution
or sexually-explicit performance by deception, force or coercion.
“Coercion” means [abusing or threatening to abuse the law or the legal system]
[knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, possessing or withholding
another persons actual or purported passport or other immigration document, government
issued identification document, government record or personal property] [extortion] [causing
or threatening to cause financial harm to any person] [facilitating or controlling another
person’s access to a controlled substance].
“Force” means [to cause or threaten to cause serious harm to another person] [physically
restraining or threatening to physically restrain another person].
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual contact,
sexual intercourse, oral sexual contact or sadomasochistic abuse under a fee arrangement
with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
“Sexual contact” means any direct or indirect fondling or manipulating of any part of the
genitals, anus or female breast.
Sexual intercoursemeans penetration into the penis, vulva or anus by any part of the
body or by any object.
“Oral sexual contact” means oral contact with the penis, vulva or anus.
Sadomasochistic abusemeans flagellation or torture by or on a person who is nude or
clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume or the condition of being fettered,
bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
Sexually explicit performancemeans a live or public act or show intended to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interest of patrons.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1307(A) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009) and § 13-3211
(statutory language as of June 13, 2007).
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USE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(a)(1) defining “intentionally” or
1.056(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
13.07.02 Sex Trafficking of a Minor
The crime of sex trafficking of a minor requires proof that the defendant knowingly
transported another person under the age of eighteen with [the intent to cause the other
person to] [knowledge that the other person will] engage in any prostitution or sexually-
explicit performance.
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual contact,
sexual intercourse, oral sexual contact or sadomasochistic abuse under a fee arrangement
with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
“Sexual contact” means any direct or indirect fondling or manipulating of any part of the
genitals, anus or female breast.
“Sexual intercourse” means penetration into the penis, vulva or anus by any part of the
body or by any object.
“Oral sexual contact” means oral contact with the penis, vulva or anus.
Sadomasochistic abusemeans flagellation or torture by or on a person who is nude or
clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume or the condition of being fettered,
bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
Sexually explicit performancemeans a live or public act or show intended to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interest of patrons.
[or]
The crime of sex trafficking of a minor requires proof that the defendant knowingly
[recruited] [enticed] [harbored] [provided] [obtained] another person under the age of
eighteen for transport with [the intent to cause the other person to] [knowledge that the
other person will] engage in any prostitution or sexually-explicit performance.
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual contact,
sexual intercourse, oral sexual contact or sadomasochistic abuse under a fee arrangement
with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
“Sexual contact” means any direct or indirect fondling or manipulating of any part of the
genitals, anus or female breast.
Sexual intercoursemeans penetration into the penis, vulva or anus by any part of the
body or by any object.
“Oral sexual contact” means oral contact with the penis, vulva or anus.
Sadomasochistic abusemeans flagellation or torture by or on a person who is nude or
clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume or the condition of being fettered,
bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
Sexually explicit performancemeans a live or public act or show intended to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interest of patrons.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1307(B) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009) and § 13-3211
(statutory language as of June 13, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(a)(1) defining “intentionally” or
1.056(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
A.R.S. § 13-1307(D) provides that if this offense is committed against a person who is
under fifteen years of age, the offense is a dangerous crime against children punishable
pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01.”
Accordingly, if the victim is alleged to have been under the
age of fifteen, a separate jury finding should be made regarding the victim’s age.
13.07.A Sex Trafficking (Victim Eighteen Years of Age or Older)
The crime of sex trafficking requires proof that the defendant knowingly [recruited]
[enticed] [harbored] [transported] [provided] [obtained] by any means another person who
was eighteen years of age or older [with the intent of causing the other person to engage in
prostitution or sexually explicit performance by force, deception or coercion] [knowing that
the other person would engage in prostitution or sexually explicit performance by deception,
coercion or force].
“Coercion” means any of the following
(a) Abusing or threatening to abuse the law or the legal system.
(b) Knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, possessing or
withholding another persons actual or purported passport or other immigration
document, government issued identification document, government record or
personal property.
(c) Extortion.
(d) Causing or threatening to cause financial harm to any person.
(e) Facilitating or controlling another person’s access to a controlled substance.
“Force” includes causing or threatening to cause serious harm to another person or
physically restraining or threatening to physically restrain another person.
Sexually explicit performancemeans a live or public act or show intended to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interest of patrons.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1307 (statutory language as of July 29, 2010).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
13.07.B Sex Trafficking (Victim Under Eighteen Years of Age)
The crime of sex trafficking requires proof that the defendant knowingly [recruited]
[enticed] [harbored] [transported] [provided] [obtained] by any means another person who
was under eighteen years of age [with the intent of causing the other person to engage in
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prostitution or sexually explicit performance] [knowing that the other person would engage
in prostitution or sexually explicit performance].
Sexually explicit performancemeans a live or public act or show intended to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interest of patrons.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1307 (statutory language as of July 29, 2010).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
A.R.S. § 13-1307(D) provides that if this offense is committed against a person who is
under fifteen years of age, the offense is a dangerous crime against children punishable
pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-705.”
Accordingly, if the victim is alleged to have been under the age
of fifteen, a separate jury finding should be made regarding the victim’s age.
This instruction should only be used for offenses committed prior to August 9, 2017.
For offenses committed after that date, see A.R.S. § 13-3212; Statutory Criminal Jury
Instructions 32.12A and 32.12B.
13.08 Trafficking of Persons for Forced Labor or Services
The crime of trafficking of persons for forced labor or services requires proof that the
defendant knowingly:
[trafficked another person with the intent or knowledge that the other person would be
subject to forced labor or services]
[benefited, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture
that was engaged in an act of unlawfully obtaining labor or services]
[benefited, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture
that was engaged in an act of sex trafficking]
[benefited, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture
that was engaged in an act of trafficking of persons for forced labor or services]
[benefited, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture
that was engaged in an act of [recruitment] [enticement] [harboring] [transportation] [making
available to another] [obtaining] by any means a minor with the intent of causing the minor
to engage in prostitution or sexually explicit performance]
[benefited, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture
that was engaged in an act of [recruitment] [enticement] [harboring] [transportation]
[providing] [obtaining] by any means a minor knowing that the minor would engage in
prostitution or sexually explicit performance]
“Forced labor or services” means labor or services that are performed or provided by
another person and that are obtained through the defendant [either] [causing or threatening
to cause serious physical injury to any person] [or] [restraining or threatening to physically
restrain another person] [or] [withholding from another person that person’s government
records, identifying information or personal property].
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“Traffic” means to entice, recruit, harbor, provide, transport or otherwise obtain
another person by deception, coercion or force.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1308 (statutory language as of August 9, 2017).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b) defining “knowingly.”
“Unlawfully obtaining labor or services” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1306 (Statutory
Definition Instruction 13.06).
“Sex trafficking” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1307 (Statutory Definition Instruction 13.07).
“Prostitution is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3211(5).
“Sexually Explicit Performance” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1307(C)(3)
“Forced labor or services” does not include ordinary household chores and reasonable
disciplinary measures between a parent or legal guardian and the parent’s or legal guardian’s
child. A.R.S. §13-1308(C)(1)(b).
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CHAPTER 14
14.01.01 Definition of Oral Sexual Contact
“Oral sexual contact” means oral contact with the penis, vulva or anus.
14.01.02 Definition of “Position of Trust
Position of trust” means a person who is or was any of the following:
(a) The minor’s parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, legal guardian or foster parent.
(b) The minor’s teacher.
(c) The minor’s coach or instructor, whether the coach or instructor is an employee or
volunteer.
(d) The minor’s clergyman or priest.
(e) Engaged in a sexual or romantic relationship with the minor’s parent, adoptive
parent, legal guardian, foster parent or stepparent.
14.01.03 Definition of Sexual Contact
Sexual contactmeans any direct or indirect touching, fondling or manipulating of any part
of the genitals, anus or female breast by any part of the body or by any object or causing a
person to engage in such contact. It does not include direct or indirect touching or
manipulating during caretaking responsibilities, or interactions with a minor or vulnerable
adult that an objective, reasonable person would recognize as normal and reasonable under
the circumstances.
SOURCE: A.R.S. 13-1401(A)(3) (effective August 3, 2018)
14.01.04 Definition of Sexual Intercourse
Sexual intercoursemeans penetration into the penis, vulva or anus by any part of the
body or by any object or masturbatory contact with the penis or vulva.
14.01.05 Definition of Spouse
“Spouse” means a person who is legally married and cohabiting.
14.01.06 Definition of “Teacher”
“Teacher” means a certificated teacher or any person who provides instruction to pupils
in any school district, charter school or accommodation school, the Arizona state schools for
the deaf and the blind or a private school in this state.
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14.01.07 Definition of Without Consent
“Without consent” includes any of the following:
1. The victim is coerced by the immediate use or threatened use of force against a
person or property.
2. The victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder, mental defect,
drugs, alcohol, sleep or any other similar impairment of cognition and such
condition is known or should have reasonably been known to the defendant.
Mental defectmeans the victim is unable to comprehend the distinctively sexual
nature of the conduct or is incapable of understanding or exercising the right to
refuse to engage in the conduct with another.
3. The victim is intentionally deceived as to the nature of the act.
4. The victim is intentionally deceived to erroneously believe that the person is the
victim’s spouse.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1401 (statutory language as of July 3, 2015).
COMMENT: Simulated sexual intercourse by defendant rubbing his penis back and forth
between victims legs involved manual masturbatory contact with the peniswas “sexual
intercourse” within meaning of prohibition against sexual conduct with minor. State v. Crane,
166 Ariz. 3, 8, 799 P.2d 1380, 1385 (App. 1990), review denied.
In interpreting A.R.S. § 13-612, which defined the offense of rape, the court wrote that
the slightest penetration of vulva is sufficient to constitute sexual intercourse. State v.
Kidwell, 27 Ariz. App. 466, 467, 556 P.2d 20, 22 (App. 1976).
Prescribed mental state for crime of sexual abuse is intentionally or knowingly,and
since no contrary legislative purpose plainly appears, intentionally or knowinglyapplies to
all elements of sexual abuse statute, including without consent.State v. Witwer, 175 Ariz.
305, 856 P.2d 1183 (App. 1993).
In a case of lack of consent based on a mental disorder, the State must prove that the
mental disorder was an impairment of such a degree that it precluded the victim from
understanding the act of intercourse and its possible consequences. State v. Johnson, 155 Ariz.
23, 745 P.2d 81 (1987).
USE NOTE: “Certificated Teacher” is defined in A.R.S. § 15-501.
14.02 Indecent Exposure
The crime of indecent exposure requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant exposed [his or her genitals or anus] [the areola or nipple of her
breast or breasts]; and
2. Another person was present; and
3. The defendant was reckless about whether the other person, as a reasonable person,
would be offended or alarmed by the exposure.
[Indecent exposure does not include breast-feeding by a mother.]
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1402 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: A verdict form must indicate the age of the victim in order to classify the
offense as a misdemeanor or felony.
[Complete this section of the verdict form if you find the defendant guilty” of the charged
offense.]
We the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled action, find that the
other person present was:
_____ Fifteen years of age or older
_____ Under the age of fifteen
14.03 Public Sexual Indecency to a Minor
The crime of public sexual indecency to a minor requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in an act of sexual contact, oral
sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or bestiality; and
2. The defendant was reckless about whether a minor under the age of fifteen years
was present.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1403 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
Sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.03).
Oral sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.01).
Sexual intercourse is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.04).
“Bestiality” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1411 (Statutory Definition Instruction 14.11.01).
14.04 Sexual Abuse
The crime of sexual abuse requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in sexual contact with another
person; and
2. [The defendant knew the sexual contact was without consent].
or
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2. [The other person was under fifteen years of age; and
3. The sexual contact involved only the female breast].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1404 (statutory language as of January 1, 1994).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
Sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.03).
COMMENT: Sexual abuse is not a lesser included offense of the crime of child molestation.
State v. Patton, 136 Ariz. 243, 665 P.2d 587 (App. 1983).
The State must prove that the defendant knew the victim had not consented. State v.
Witwer, 175 Ariz. 305, 856 P.2d 1183 (App. 1993).
If the defendant was in a position of trust, it is not a defense to a prosecution for a
violation of this section that the other person consented if the other person was fifteen,
sixteen or seventeen years of age. A.R.S. § 13-1404(B).
14.05.01 Sexual Conduct with a Minor
The crime of sexual conduct with a minor requires proof that the defendant intentionally
or knowingly engaged in [sexual intercourse] [oral sexual contact] with a person under
eighteen years of age.
[If the minor was under the age of fifteen, the State is not required to prove that the
defendant knew the minor’s age.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1405 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997); State v. Falcone, 228
Ariz. 168, 264 P.3d 878 (App. 2011).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
Sexual intercourse is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.03).
Oral sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.01).
If the defendant raises the affirmative defense of lack of knowledge of the age of the
minor and the minor is 15, 16 or 17, refer to Statutory Criminal 14.07.02 or 14.07.05.
The jury will need to determine the age of the victim and the defendant for sentencing
purposes. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1406(B) and 13-705. See 7.05 Verdict Form.
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COMMENT: If the conduct was masturbatory contact, then the mandatory life sentence
under A.R.S. § 13-604.01(A) does not apply, but a life sentence may be imposed under
A.R.S. § 13-604.01(B). See A.R.S. § 13-1405.
Defendant’s placing his finger in his minor daughters vagina and placing his penis in
vagina were separate acts of “intercourse” that could serve as basis for separate convictions
and sentences. State v. McCuin, 167 Ariz. 447, 808 P.2d 332 (App. 1991), review granted, affirmed
in part, vacated in part, 171 Ariz. 171, 829 P.2d 1217 (1992).
Charge of single count of sexual misconduct with minor was duplicitous, creating real
possibility of nonunanimous jury verdict and thereby constituting reversible error, where
offense was alleged in indictment to have occurred on or aboutJanuary 18, victim
testified she had sex with defendant twice, once around middle of January and once on last
weekend of January, doctor testified that physical examination of victim revealed signs
consistent with sexual intercourse at end of January, defendant offered alibi offense
regarding last weekend of January and also denied ever having sexual intercourse with
victim, and jury was instructed that exact dates were not important. State v. Davis, 206 Ariz.
377, 79 P.3d 64 (2003), cert. den., 541 U.S. 1037 (2004).
Evidence that defendant propositioned television reporter posing as 14-year-old boy in
computer chat room, arranged a meeting, and came to the park as agreed, where he again
offered to engage in sexual conduct with actor hired by reporter to play part of boy, that
reporter and actor had both told defendant several times that boy was only 14 years old, and
that defendant acknowledged that he was offering to do something that could have gotten
him into trouble was sufficient to support conviction for attempted sexual conduct with a
minor. State v. Carlisle, 198 Ariz. 203, 8 P.3d 391 (App. 2000).
14.05.02 Sexual Conduct with a Minor Special Relationship
The crime of sexual conduct with a minor requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in [sexual intercourse] [oral sexual
contact] with another person; and
2. The other person was fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age; and
3. The defendant was or had been in a position of trust.
[“Teacher” means a teacher certified by the Arizona State Board of Education or any
other person who directly provides academic instruction to pupils in any school district,
charter school, accommodation school, the Arizona state schools for the deaf and the blind
or a private school in this state.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1405 (statutory language as of July 20, 2011).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use the bracketed language as appropriate for the facts of the case.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction
1.0510(a)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction 1.0510(b)).
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Sexual intercourse is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.03).
Oral sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.01).
“Position of trust” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Criminal Instruction
14.01.02).
The following factors may be considered in determining whether a relationship is
currently or was previously a sexual or romantic relationship:
1. The type of relationship,
2. The length of the relationship.
3. The frequency of the interaction between the two persons.
4. If the relationship has terminated, the length of time since the termination.
(A.R.S. § 13-1401(B)).
14.06.01 Sexual Assault
The crime of sexual assault requires proof that the defendant:
1. intentionally or knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with
another person; and
2. engaged in the act without the consent of the other person.
3. The defendant knew the act was without the consent of the other person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1406 (statutory language as of January 1, 2009); State v. Kemper, 227
Ariz. 452, ¶ 5, 258 P.3d 270 (App. 2011).
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SE NOTE: The court may need to determine the age of the victim and the defendant for
sentencing purposes. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1406(B) and 13-705. If that determination is needed,
use of the following verdict form is suggested:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant guilty of the
offense.]
We the jury, duly impaneled in above-entitled action, find that the other
person was (check only one):
_____ 15 years of age or older.
_____ 13 or 14 years of age.
_____ 12 years of age.
_____ under 12 years of age.
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find that the other person was 12
years of age or younger.]
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We the jury, duly impaneled in above-entitled action, find that the
defendant was (check only one):
_____ 18 years of age or older.
_____ under 18 years of age.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b).
“Sexual intercourse” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.03).
Oral sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.01).
Without consentis defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.05).
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OMMENT: The court of appeals in State v. Kemper, 227 Ariz. 452, ¶ 5, 258 P.3d 270 (App.
2011) (holding that an instruction that omitted the mens rea element that the conduct was
conducted without the consent of the victim was fundamental error).
14.06.02 Sexual Assault Aggravation Instruction if Use of Drugs Alleged
If you find the defendant guilty of sexual assault, you must then determine whether the
defendant intentionally or knowingly administered flunitrazepam, gamma hydroxy butyrate
or ketamine hydrochloride to other person without the other person’s knowledge.
“Intentionally” and “knowingly” have the same meanings previously set forth in these
instructions.
The State has the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. Your
decision must be set forth in a separate verdict form. Your decision regarding this allegation,
must be unanimous.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1406(B) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
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SE NOTE: This instruction should be used in conjunction with the sexual assault
instruction if the State has alleged the use of a drug listed in the statute.
When this allegation is made by the State, the following addition to the standard
“guilty”/”not guilty” verdict form is suggested:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant guilty of sexual
assault.]
We the jury find on the allegation that the defendant intentionally or
knowingly administered flunitrazepam, gamma hydroxy butyrate or ketamine
hydrochloride to other person without the other persons knowledge as
follows (check only one):
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_____ Was not proven.
_____ Was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
14.06.03 Sexual Assault Aggravation Instruction for the Allegation of Serious
Physical Injury
If you find the defendant guilty of sexual assault, you must then determine whether the
defendant intentionally or knowingly inflicted serious physical injury upon the person.
Serious physical injurymeans physical injury which created a reasonable risk of death,
or which caused serious and permanent disfigurement, serious impairment of health or loss
or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb.
“Intentionally” and “knowingly” have the same meanings previously set forth in these
instructions.
The State has the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. Your
decision must be set forth in a separate verdict form. Your decision regarding this allegation,
must be unanimous.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1406(D) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999) and 13-105
(statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: This instruction should be used in conjunction with the sexual assault
instruction if the State has alleged that the defendant inflicted serious physical injury on the
victim.
When this allegation is made by the State, the following addition to the standard
“guilty”/”not guilty” verdict form is suggested:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant guilty of sexual
assault.]
We the jury find on the allegation that the defendant intentionally or
knowingly inflicted serious physical injury upon the person as follows (check
only one):
_____ Was not proven.
_____ Was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the victim is twelve years of age or under and the defendant is eighteen years of age or
older, a mandatory life sentence must be imposed. If this is an issue, the court should include
the verdict form suggested in the sexual assault instruction use note.
14.07.01 Defense to Sexual Abuse
It is a defense to sexual abuse with a minor if:
1. The act was done in furtherance of lawful medical practice; or
2. At the time of the act, the defendant was the spouse of the victim.
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S
OURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1407(A) and (D) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
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SE NOTE: The affirmative defense instruction should be used. See Standard Criminal
Instruction 2.025.
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OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-1407(B) provides an additional defense to sexual contact as follows:
The victims lack of consent is based on incapacity to consent because the
victim was fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years of age, if at the time the
defendant engaged in the conduct constituting the offense the defendant did
not know and could not reasonably have known the age of the victim.
The statutory definition of without consent does not include the lack of capacity to
consent based on being the age of fifteen, sixteen or seventeen. Therefore, this defense has not
been included in the instruction because the defense could be construed to mean that lack of
consent can be based solely on the fact that the victim was fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of
age. This affirmative defense cannot be used to prove lack of consent under A.R.S. § 13-1404
based on age alone; the State must prove that the victim did not give consent. See State v. Getz,
189 Ariz. 561, 565-66, 944 P.2d 503, 507-08 (1997) (the sixteen-year-old victim consented to the
touching of her breasts and, therefore, the sexual abuse count should have been dismissed).
14.07.02 Defense to Sexual Conduct with a Minor
It is a defense to sexual conduct with a minor if:
1. The act was done in furtherance of lawful medical practice; or
2. The victim was fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years of age and, at the time the defendant
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, the defendant did not know and could
not reasonably have known the age of the victim; or
3. At the time of the act, the defendant was the spouse of the victim.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1407(A), (B) and (D) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
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SE NOTE: The affirmative defense instruction should be used. See Standard Criminal
Instruction 2.025.
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OMMENT: Paragraph 2 is based on A.R.S. § 13-1407(B) that provides a defense to sexual
conduct with a minor. However, “consent” is not an element of the offense of sexual
conduct with a minor. In an attempt to reconcile the defense to the elements of the offense,
the consent language has been deleted from the instruction. Whether this defense is viable in
view of State v. Getz, 189 Ariz. 561, 944 P.2d 503 (1997), the lack of consent as an element of
the offense, and because § 13-1407(B) is premised on the lack of consent, this is an issue left for
the trial judge to decide.
14.07.03 Emergency Occurrence Defense to Indecent Exposure, Sexual Abuse,
Sexual Conduct with a Minor, or Sexual Assault
It is a defense to [indecent exposure] [sexual abuse] [sexual conduct with a minor]
[sexual assault] if:
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1. The act was done by the defendant who [was a duly licensed physician] [was a
registered nurse] [was acting under the direction of a physician or nurse] [rendered
emergency care at the scene of an emergency occurrence]; and
2. The act consisted of administering a recognized and lawful form of treatment which
was reasonably adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient and
the treatment was administered in an emergency; and
3. The defendant reasonably believed that no one competent to consent could be
consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient,
would consent.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1407(C) (statutory language as of September 26, 2008).
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SE NOTE: The affirmative defense instruction should be used. See Standard Criminal
Instruction 2.025.
14.07.04 Lack of Sexual Interest Defense to Sexual Abuse and Molestation of
Child (To Be Used for Crimes Committed Prior to August 3, 2018)
It is a defense to [sexual abuse] [molestation of a child] if the defendant was not
motivated by a sexual interest.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1407(E) (statutory language prior to August 3, 2018).
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SE NOTE: The defense applies to sexual abuse of both a minor and an adult.
The affirmative defenseinstruction should be used. See Standard Criminal Instruction
2.025.
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OMMENT: In State v. Simpson, 217 Ariz. 326, ¶ 19, 173 P.3d 1027 (App. 2007), Division
One of the Court of Appeals held (1) sexual motivation is not an element of the crime of
child molestation under A.R.S. § 13-1410, and (2) the “lack of sexual interest” provision is an
affirmative defense. But in State v. Holle, 238 Ariz. 218, ¶¶ 6-26, 358 P.3d 639 (App. 2015),
Division Two reviewed statutory history and reached the conclusion that Simpson was
wrongly decided. Under Holle, the defendant has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had a sexual motivation. “To conclude otherwise would force
defendants to negate a ‘“fact[s] of the crime which the State is to prove in order to
convict.”’’ Id. ¶ 25 (quoting State v. Farley, 199 Ariz. 542, ¶ 11, 19 P.3d 1258,
1260 (App.
2001), quoting in turn Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207 (1977)).
14.07.05 Defense Based on Age to Sexual Conduct with a Minor or Aggravated
Luring a Minor for Sexual Exploitation
It is a defense to [sexual conduct with a minor] [aggravated luring a minor for sexual
exploitation if:
1. The minor was fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age; and
2. The defendant was under nineteen years of age or attending high school and was no
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more than twenty-four months older than the minor; and
3. The conduct was consensual.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1407(F) (statutory language as of September 26, 2008).
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SE NOTE: The affirmative defense instruction should be used. See Standard Criminal
Instruction 2.025.
14.09 Unlawful Sexual Conduct by Probation Department Employees
The crime of Unlawful Sexual Conduct by Probation Department Employee requires
proof of the following:
1. The defendant was [an adult probation department] [juvenile court] employee; and
2. The defendant knowingly coerced the victim to engage in [sexual contact], [oral
sexual contact] or [sexual intercourse]; and
3. The coercion was accomplished by [threatening to negatively influence the victims
supervision or release status] [offering to positively influence the victim’s supervision
or release status].
“Adult probation department employee” or “juvenile court employee” means an
employee of an adult probation department or the juvenile court who either:
(a) Through the course of employment, directly provides treatment, care, control or
supervision to a victim; or
(b) Provides presentence or predisposition reports directly to a court regarding the
victim.
“Victim” means a person who is either of the following:
(a) Subject to conditions of release or supervision by a court.
(b) A minor who has been referred to the juvenile court.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1409 (statutory language as of July 20, 2011).
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SE NOTE: The court needs to determine the age of the victim for sentencing purposes. See
§§ 13-1409(B). Therefore, use of the following verdict form is suggested:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant guilty of the
offense.]
We the jury, duly impaneled in above-entitled action, find that the other person was
(check only one):
___ 18 years of age or older.
___ At least 15 years of age, but under 18.
___ Under 15 years of age.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction 1.0510(b)).
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“Sexual intercourse” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Criminal Instruction
14.01.03).
“Oral sexual contact” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Criminal Instruction
14.01.01).
“Sexual contact” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 14.01.03).
14.10 Molestation of Child
The crime of molestation of a child requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant intentionally or knowingly [engaged in] [caused a person to engage in]
any direct or indirect touching, fondling or manipulation of any part of the genitals
or anus by any part of the body or by any object or causing a person to engage in
such contact with a child; and
2. The child was under 15 years of age.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1410 (statutory language as of January 1, 1994).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
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OMMENT: Sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 14.01.03). A.R.S. § 13-1410 excludes from the definition of sexual contactthe
female breast. In order to avoid the possibility of confusing the jurors with differing
definitions of sexual contact, the instruction is written to eliminate the words “sexual
contact.”
In a case addressing the predecessor statute to A.R.S. § 13-1410, the court held that a
good faith belief that the victim was over the age of eighteen was not a defense to rape in the
second degree. State v. Superior Court of Pima County, 104 Ariz. 440, 454 P.2d 982 (1969). Also,
lack of knowledge of the childs age is not a defense listed in A.R.S. § 13-1407. Therefore, it
is likely not a defense to molestation of a child that the defendant did not know the child
was under the age of fifteen.
14.11.01 Bestiality
The crime of bestiality requires proof of that the defendant knowingly engaged in oral
sexual contact, sexual contact or sexual intercourse with an animal.
“Animal” means a nonhuman mammal, bird, reptile or amphibian, either dead or alive.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1411 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
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Sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. §13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.03).
Oral sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.01).
Sexual intercourse is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.03).
COMMENT: There are three exceptions that apply to insemination of animals by the same
species, veterinarian medical practices and animal husbandry. A.R.S. § 13-1411(C).
14.11.02 Bestiality
The crime of bestiality requires proof of that the defendant knowingly caused another
person to engage in oral sexual contact, sexual contact or sexual intercourse with an animal.
“Animal” means a nonhuman mammal, bird, reptile or amphibian, either dead or alive.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1411 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: A verdict form must indicate the age of the victim to classify the offense:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant guilty of the
offense.]
We the jury, duly impaneled in above-entitled action, find that the other
person was:
_____ under 15 years of age.
_____ 15 years of age or older.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
Sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.03).
Oral sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.01).
Sexual intercourse is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.04).
COMMENT: There are three exceptions that apply to insemination of animals by the same
species, veterinarian medical practices and animal husbandry. A.R.S. § 13-1411(C).
14.17 Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child
The crime of continuous sexual abuse of a child requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant intentionally or knowingly, over a period of three months or more,
engaged in three or more acts of sexual conduct, sexual assault or molestation of a
child; and
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2. The other person was under fourteen years of age.
The State must prove that three or more acts were committed by the defendant.
However, you do not need to agree on the same act.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1417 (statutory language as of July 17, 1993).
Sexual assault is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1406 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.06.01).
Molestation of a childis defined in A.R.S. § 13-1410 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.10).
COMMENT: The trier of fact shall unanimously agree that the requisite number of acts
occurred but does not need to agree on which acts constitute the requisite number. A.R.S.
§ 13-1417(C); State v. Ramsey, 211 Ariz. 529, 124 P.3d 756 (App. 2005).
A.R.S. § 13-1417(D) states that any other felony sexual offense involving the victim shall
not be charged in the same proceeding with a charge under this section unless the other
charged felony sexual offense occurred outside the time period charged under this section or
the other felony sexual offense is charged in the alternative. A defendant may be charged
with only one count under this section unless more than one victim is involved. If more than
one victim is involved, a separate count may be charged for each victim.
14.18 Sexual Misconduct by Licensed Behavioral Health Professional
The crime of sexual misconduct by a licensed behavioral health professional requires
proof of the following:
1. The defendant was a licensed [behavioral health professional] [psychologist]
[psychiatrist]; and
2. The defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse with another
person; and
3. The other person was a client who was under the defendants care or supervision at
the time of the sexual intercourse.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1418 (statutory language as of July 1, 2004).
Use Note: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
Sexual intercourse is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.03).
This statute only applies to a defendant licensed pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 32-3251 et seq., 32-
1401 et seq., 32-1800 et seq., or 32-2061 et seq.
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14.19.1 Unlawful Sexual Conduct by Correctional Employee
The crime of unlawful sexual conduct by a correctional employee requires proof of the
following:
1. The defendant was employed by or contracted to provide services to [the state
department of corrections] [the department of juvenile corrections] [a private prison
facility] [a juvenile detention facility] [a city or county jail];
or
1. The defendant was [an official visitor] [a volunteer] [an agency representative] of [the
state department of corrections] [the department of juvenile corrections] [a private
facility] [a juvenile detention facility] [a city or county jail];
and
2. The defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in any act of sexual nature with
another person; and
3. The other person was in the custody of [the state department of corrections] [the
department of juvenile corrections] [a private prison facility] [a juvenile detention
facility] [a city or county jail] or an offender under the supervision of the state
department of corrections, the department of juvenile corrections or a city or
county.
Any act of a sexual naturemeans [any completed, attempted, threatened or requested
touching of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, pubic area or buttocks with the
intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire] [any act of exposing the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, pubic area or buttocks with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire] [any act
of photographing, videotaping, filming, digitally recording or otherwise viewing, with or
without a device, a prisoner or offender with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire,
either while the prisoner or offender is in a state of undress or partial dress or while the
prisoner or offender is urinating or defecating].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1419 (statutory language as of July 20, 2011).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b).
Sexual intercourse” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Criminal Instruction
14.01.04).
Oral sexual contact is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1405 (Statutory Criminal Instruction
14.01.01).
“Sexual contact” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 14.01.03).
A verdict form must indicate the age of the victim in order to classify the offense. The
following addition to the verdict form is suggested:
[Complete this section of the verdict form if you find the defendant “guilty”
of the charged offense.]
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We the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled action, find that the
other person was:
_____ At least 15 years of age, but not yet 18 years of age
_____ Under the age of 15
_____ 18 years of age or over
_____ 18 years of age or over
14.23 Violent Sexual Assault
The crime of violent sexual assault requires proof that the defendant:
1. committed [sexual abuse] [sexual conduct with a minor] [sexual assault] [molestation
of a child]; and
2. discharged, used or committed the threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument or intentionally or knowingly inflicted serious physical injury
to another; and
3. was previously convicted of a historical prior felony for a sexual offense, (name of
offense).
[Include a definition of historical prior felony that is appropriate for each of the
alleged prior felonies.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1423 (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: The court will need to give an instruction on the underlying offense in addition
to this instruction.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Sexual abuse” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1404 (Statutory Definition Instruction 14.04).
Sexual conduct with a minor is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1405 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 14.05.01 or 14.05.02).
Sexual assault is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1406 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.06.0103).
Molestation of a childis defined in A.R.S. § 13-1410 (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.01).
The court will need to include a definition of historical prior felonyin the jury
instruction. A.R.S. § 13-105provides:
“Historical prior felony conviction” means:
(a) Any prior felony conviction for which the offense of conviction:
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(i) Mandated a term of imprisonment except for a violation of
chapter 34 of this title involving a drug below the threshold
amount; or
(ii) Involved the intentional or knowing infliction of serious
physical injury; or
(iii) Involved the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument; or
(iv) Involved the illegal control of a criminal enterprise; or
(v) Involved aggravated driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs, driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs with a suspended, canceled, revoked or refused
driver license or driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs with two or more driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or drug convictions within a period of sixty
months; or
(vi) Involved any dangerous crime against children as defined in
section 13-705.
(b) Any class 2 or 3 felony, except the offenses listed in subdivision (a)
of this paragraph, that was committed within the ten years
immediately preceding the date of the present offense. Any time
spent on absconder status while on probation or incarcerated is
excluded in calculating if the offense was committed within the
preceding ten years. If a court determines a person was not on
absconder status while on probation that time is not excluded.
(c) Any class 4, 5 or 6 felony, except the offenses listed in subdivision
(a) of this paragraph, that was committed within the five years
immediately preceding the date of the present offense. Any time
spent on absconder status while on probation or incarcerated is
excluded in calculating if the offense was committed within the
preceding five years. If a court determines a person was not on
absconder status while on probation that time is not excluded.
(d) Any felony conviction that is a third or more prior felony
conviction.
State ex rel. Thomas v. Talamante, 214 Ariz. 106, 149 P.3d 484 (App. 2006) held that A.R.S.
§ 13-1423 established the crime of violent sexual assault and that a historical prior felony
conviction for a sexual offense is an element of that crime. Accordingly, the State is allowed
to offer evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction for a sexual offense.
COMMENT: If the prior conviction is from a foreign jurisdiction, the court must first
conclude that the elements of the foreign prior conviction include every element that would
be required to prove an enumerated Arizona offense, before the allegation may go to the
jury. State v. Crawford, 214 Ariz. 129, 131, ¶ 7, 149 P.3d 753, 755 (2007); State v. Roque, 213
Ariz. 193, 216-17, 141 P.3d 368, 391-92 (2006) (refusing to look beyond the language of the
[foreign] statutesto the complaint describing the defendants conduct in determining
whether prior California robbery conviction constituted a serious offense under A.R.S.
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§ 13-751); State v. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. 323, 334, 819 P.2d 909, 920 (1991) (reviewing Nevada
attempted murder statute to determine if that crime involved violence and holding that
sentencing courts may consider only the statute that the defendant [was] charged with
violating; it may not consider other evidence”).
14.24.01 Voyeurism
The crime of voyeurism requires proof that the defendant knowingly invaded the privacy
of another person without the knowledge of the other person for the purpose of sexual
stimulation.
A person’s privacy is invaded if both of the following apply:
1. The person had a reasonable expectation that the person would not be
photographed, videotaped, filmed, digitally recorded or otherwise viewed or
recorded.
2. The person was photographed, videotaped, filmed, digitally recorded or otherwise
viewed, with or without a device, either:
(a) while the person was in a state of undress or partial dress.
(b) while the person was engaged in sexual intercourse or sexual contact.
(c) while the person was urinating or defecating.
(d) in a manner that directly or indirectly captured or allowed the viewing of the
person’s genitalia, buttock or female breast, whether clothed or unclothed, that
was not otherwise visible to the public.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1424(A) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: The statute contains a number of exceptions. Those are set forth in A.R.S. § 13-
1424(D)(1) through (4).
14.24.02 Voyeurism
The crime of voyeurism requires proof that the defendant disclosed, displayed,
distributed or published a photograph, videotape, film or digital recording that when taken
knowingly invaded the privacy of another person without the consent or knowledge of the
person depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation.
A person’s privacy is invaded if both of the following apply:
1. The person had a reasonable expectation that the person would not be
photographed, videotaped, filmed, digitally recorded or otherwise viewed or
recorded.
2. The person was photographed, videotaped, filmed, digitally recorded or otherwise
viewed, with or without a device, either:
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(a) while the person was in a state of undress or partial dress.
(b) while the person was engaged in sexual intercourse or sexual contact.
(c) while the person was urinating or defecating.
(d) in a manner that directly or indirectly captured or allowed the viewing of the
person’s genitalia, buttock or female breast, whether clothed or unclothed, that
was not otherwise visible to the public.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1424(B) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
C
OMMENT: This portion of the statute does not expressly set forth a culpable mental state
for the defendant. It will fall to the trial court to decide whether to include a mental state in
the instruction. A.R.S. § 13-202(B) provides that if a statute omits a mental state, the offense
is one of strict liability. However, the court in State v. Slayton, 214 Ariz. 511, 154 P.3d 1057
(App. 2007) noted that strict liability offenses are not favored.
“Knowingly” was included in the instruction because subsection A requires that the
recording “knowingly invade[d] the privacy of the person.”
The statute contains a number of exceptions. Those are set forth in A.R.S. § 13-
1424(D)(1) through (4).
14.25.01 Unlawful Distribution of Recognizable Images
The crime of unlawful distribution of recognizable images requires proof that defendant
intentionally disclosed an image of another person who is identifiable from the image itself
or from information displayed in connection with the image if:
1. the person in the image is depicted in a state of nudity or engaged in specific sexual
activities; and
2. that depicted person has a reasonable expectation of privacy; and
3. the image is disclosed with the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten or coerce
the depicted person.
Evidence that a person has sent an image to another person using an electronic device
does not, on its own, remove the person’s reasonable expectation of privacy for that image.
Whether the depicted person has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a fact that you must
determine in light of all of the other evidence.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1425) (statutory language as of March 11, 2016).
U
SE NOTE: Use statutory definition instruction defining ‘intentionally” and “knowingly.”
“Disclose” means display, distribute, publish, advertise or offer.
“Disclosed by electronic means” means delivery to an email address, mobile device, tablet or
other electronic device and includes disclosure on a website.
“Harm” means physical injury, financial injury or serious emotional distress.
“Image” means a photograph, videotape, film or digital recording.
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“Specific sexual activities” has the same meaning prescribed in section 11 811, subsection d,
paragraph 18, subdivisions (a) and (b).
State of nudity” has the same meaning prescribed in section 11 811, subsection d,
paragraph 14, subdivision (a).
This section does not apply to any of the following:
1. The reporting of unlawful conduct.
2. Images involving voluntary exposure in a public or commercial setting.
3. An interactive computer service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), or an
information service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 153, with regard to content wholly
provided by another party.
4. Any disclosure that is made with the consent of the person who is depicted in the
image.
14.28 Sexual Extortion
The crime of “sexual extortion” requires proof that defendant knowingly communicated
a threat with the intent to coerce another person to [engage in sexual contact or sexual
intercourse] [allow the other person’s genitals, anus or female breast to be photographed,
filmed, videotaped or digitally recorded] [exhibit the other person’s genitals, anus or female
breast].
“Communicating a threat” means a threat to [damage the property of the other person]
[harm the reputation of the other person] [produce or distribute a photograph, film,
videotape or digital recording that depicts the other person engaged in sexual contact or
sexual intercourse or the exhibition of the other person’s genitals, anus, or female breast.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1428 (statutory language as of August 3, 2018).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Sexual contact” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401. Statutory Criminal Instruction 14.01.02.
“Oral sexual contact” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401. Statutory Criminal Instruction
14.01.01.
“Sexual intercourse” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401. Statutory Criminal Instruction
14.01.03.
An aggravation phase verdict form must indicate the age of the victim in order to
classify the offense. The following addition to the verdict form is suggested:
[Complete this section of the verdict form if you find the defendant “guilty” of the
charged offense.]
We the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled action, find that the other person was:
_____ At least 15 years of age, but not yet 18 years of age
_____ Under the age of 15
_____ 18 years of age or over
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CHAPTER 15
15.01(1) Definition of “Critical Public Service Facility”
“Critical public service facility” means:
(a) A structure or fenced yard that is posted with signage indicating it is a felony to
trespass or signage indicating high voltage or high pressure and is used by a rail, bus,
air or other mass transit provider, a public or private utility, any municipal
corporation, city, town or other political subdivision that is organized under state
law and that generates, transmits, distributes or otherwise provides natural gas,
liquefied petroleum gas, electricity or a combustible substance for a delivery system
that is not a retail-only facility, a telecommunications carrier or telephone company,
a municipal provider, a law enforcement agency, a public or private fire department
or an emergency medical service provider.
(b) A structure or fenced yard or any equipment or apparatus that is posted with signage
indicating it is a felony to trespass or signage indicating high voltage or high pressure
and is used to manufacture, extract, transport, distribute or store gas, including
natural gas or liquefied petroleum gas, oil, electricity, water or hazardous materials,
unless it is a retail-only facility.
15.01(2) Definition of “Enter or Remain Unlawfully”
“Enter or remain unlawfully” means an act of a person who enters or remains on
premises when such person’s intent for so entering or remaining is not licensed, authorized
or otherwise privileged except when the entry is to commit theft of merchandise displayed
for sale during normal business hours, when the premises are open to the public and when
the person does not enter any unauthorized areas of the premises.
15.01(3) Definition of “Entry”
“Entry” means the intrusion of any part of any instrument or any part of a person’s
body inside the external boundaries of a structure or unit of real property.
15.01(4) Definition of “Fenced Commercial Yard”
“Fenced commercial yard” means a unit of real property surrounded completely by
either fences, walls, buildings, or similar barriers or any combination thereof, and used
primarily for business operations or where livestock, produce or other commercial items are
located.
USE NOTE: In State v. Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508, 233 P.3d 621, ¶ 10 (App. 2010) the court
held that in order to sustain a conviction for third-degree burglary, the State must prove that
the fenced yard “is being used for some business purpose at the time of the illegal entry.”
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15.01(6) Definition of “Fenced Residential Yard”
“Fenced residential yard” means a unit of real property immediately surrounding or
adjacent to a residential structure and enclosed by a fence, wall, building or similar barrier, or
any combination thereof.
15.01(7) Definition of “In the Course of Committing”
“In the course of committing” means any acts performed by an intruder from the
moment of entry to and including flight from the scene of a crime.
15.01(8) Definition of “Manipulation Key”
“Manipulation key” means a key, device or instrument, other than a key that is designed
to operate a specific lock, that can be variably positioned and manipulated in a vehicle
keyway to operate a lock or cylinder, including a wiggle key, jiggle key or rocker key.
15.01(9) Definition of “Master Key”
“Master key” means a key that operates all the keyed locks or cylinders in a similar type
or group of locks.
15.01(10) Definition of “Nonresidential Structure”
“Nonresidential structure” means any structure other than a residential structure and
includes a retail establishment.
15.01(11) Definition of “Residential Structure”
“Residential structure” means any structure, movable or immovable, permanent or
temporary, adapted for both human residence and lodging whether occupied or not.
15.01(12) Definition of “Structure”
“Structure” means any vending machine, building, object, vehicle, railroad car or place
with sides and a floor, separately securable from any other structure attached to it and used
for lodging, business, transportation, recreation or storage.
15.01(13) Definition of “Vending Machine”
“Vending machine” means a machine that dispenses merchandise or service through the
means of currency, coin, token, credit card or other nonpersonal means of accepting
payment for merchandise or service received.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1501 (statutory language as of September 18, 2003).
15.04 Criminal Trespass in the First Degree
The crime of criminal trespass in the first degree requires proof that the defendant:
[knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in or on a residential structure or in a fenced
residential yard.]
[knowingly entered a residential yard and, without lawful authority, looked into the
residential structure in reckless disregard of infringing on the inhabitant’s right of
privacy.]
[knowingly and unlawfully entered real property subject to a valid mineral claim or lease,
with the intent to hold, work, take or explore for minerals.]
[knowingly entered or remained unlawfully on the property of another and burned,
defaced, mutilated, or otherwise desecrated a religious symbol or other religious property
of another without the express permission of the owner of the property.]
[knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in or on a critical public service facility.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1504 (statutory language as of September 19, 2003).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Enter or remain unlawfully,” “residential structure,” “fenced residential yard,” and
“critical public service facility” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-1501.
The court must instruct on the culpable mental state. “Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S.
§ 13-105.
C
OMMENT: A storage room that was under the same roof as the living quarters was found
to be a residential structure. State v. Ekmanis, 183 Ariz. 180, 181, 901 P.2d 1210, 1211 (App.
1995) (burglary case). An almost-completed home was found not to be a residential
structure. See State v. Bass, 184 Ariz. 543, 544-46, 911 P.2d 549, 550-52 (App. 1995) (burglary
case) (holding that an almost-completed log cabin was not a residential structure because it
was not yet adapted for human residence and lodging; it had no certificate of occupancy, no
water, no electricity and no doors). “[T]he entry into a lesser included structure of a
commercial building may or may not be a burglary of a residential structure, depending upon
the character of the use of the lesser included structure.” State v. Gardella, 156 Ariz. 340, 342,
751 P.2d 1000, 1002 (App. 1988) (finding that a hotel/motel laundry room was a
nonresidential structure). A person cannot burglarize his or her own residence. State v.
Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 436-37, 803 P.2d 425, 429-30 (App. 1990) (holding that there was
no factual basis for attempted second-degree burglary where the defendant sexually abused
his daughter in his own home).
15.05A1 Possession of Burglary Tools
The crime of possession of burglary tools requires proof that the defendant:
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1. possessed any explosive, tool, instrument, or other article adapted or commonly
used for committing burglary; and
2. intended to use or permit the use of such an item in the commission of a burglary.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1505 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
15.05A2.1 Possession of Master Key
The crime of possession of a master key requires proof that the defendant [bought]
[sold] [transferred] [possessed] [used] a master key.
“Master key” means a key that operates all the keyed locks or cylinders in a similar type
or group of locks.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1505(A)(2) and 13-1501(9) (statutory language as of September 18,
2003).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts.
15.05A2.2 Possession of Manipulation Keys
The crime of possession of manipulation keys requires proof that the defendant [bought]
[sold] [transferred] [possessed] [used] more than one manipulation key.
“Manipulation key” means a key, device or instrument, other than a key that is designed
to operate a specific lock, that can be variably positioned and manipulated in a vehicle
keyway to operate a lock or cylinder, including a wiggle key, jiggle key or rocker key.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1505(A)(2) and 13-1501(8) (statutory language as of September 18,
2003).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the fact of the case.
A.R.S. § 13-1505(B)(2) provides that it is not a violation of the statute to transfer,
possess or use “no more than one manipulation key, unless the manipulation key is
transferred, possessed or used with the intent to commit any theft or felony.” Accordingly,
use Statutory Criminal 15.05A2.2 if the allegation is that one manipulation key was possessed
with the intent to commit any theft or felony.
15.05A2.3 Possession of a Manipulation Key
The crime of possession of a manipulation key requires proof that the defendant, with
the intent to commit any theft or felony, [bought] [sold] [transferred] [possessed] [used] a
manipulation key.
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“Manipulation key” means a key, device or instrument, other than a key that is designed
to operate a specific lock, that can be variably positioned and manipulated in a vehicle
keyway to operate a lock or cylinder, including a wiggle key, jiggle key or rocker key.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1505(A)(2) and 13-1501(8) (statutory language as of September 18,
2003).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the fact of the case.
A.R.S. § 13-1505(B)(2) provides that it is not a violation of the statute to transfer,
possess or use “no more than one manipulation key, unless the manipulation key is
transferred, possessed or used with the intent to commit any theft or felony.”
15.06 Burglary in the Third Degree
The crime of burglary in the third degree requires proof that the defendant:
1. [entered or remained unlawfully in or on a [nonresidential structure] [fenced
commercial yard] [fenced residential yard]; and]
[entered into any part of a motor vehicle by use of a [manipulation] [master] key;
and]
2. did so with the intent to commit any [theft] [felony] therein.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1506 (statutory language as of September 19, 2003).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Nonresidential structure,” “fenced commercial yard,” and “fenced residential yard” are
defined in A.R.S. § 13-1501.
The court must instruct on the culpable mental state. “Knowingly” and “with the intent
to” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
C
OMMENT: An almost-completed home was found to be a nonresidential structure. See State
v. Bass, 184 Ariz. 543, 544-46, 911 P.2d 549, 550-52 (App. 1995) (holding that an almost-
completed log cabin was a nonresidential structure because it was not yet adapted for human
residence and lodging; it had no certificate of occupancy, no water, no electricity and no
doors). “[T]he entry into a lesser included structure of a commercial building may or may not
be a burglary of a residential structure, depending upon the character of the use of the lesser
included structure.” State v. Gardella, 156 Ariz. 340, 342, 751 P.2d 1000, 1002 (App. 1988)
(finding that a hotel/motel laundry room was a nonresidential structure).
15.07 Burglary in the Second Degree
The crime of burglary in the second degree requires proof that the defendant:
1. entered or remained unlawfully in or on a residential structure; and
2. did so with the intent to commit any theft or felony therein.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1507 (statutory language as of 1981).
U
SE NOTE: “Residential structure” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1501.
The court must instruct on the culpable mental state. “With the intent to” is defined in
A.R.S. § 13-105.
C
OMMENT: A storage room that was under the same roof as the living quarters was found
to be a residential structure. State v. Ekmanis, 183 Ariz. 180, 181, 901 P.2d 1210, 1211 (App.
1995). An almost-completed home was not found to be a residential structure. See State v.
Bass, 184 Ariz. 543, 544-46, 911 P.2d 549, 550-52 (App. 1995) (holding that an almost-
completed log cabin was not a residential structure because it was not yet adapted for human
residence and lodging; it had no certificate of occupancy, no water, no electricity and no
doors). “[T]he entry into a lesser included structure of a commercial building may or may not
be a burglary of a residential structure, depending upon the character of the use of the lesser
included structure.” State v. Gardella, 156 Ariz. 340, 342, 751 P.2d 1000, 1002 (App. 1988)
(finding that a hotel/motel laundry room was a nonresidential structure). A person cannot
burglarize his or her own residence. State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 436-37, 803 P.2d 425,
429-30 (App. 1990) (holding that there was no factual basis for attempted second-degree
burglary where the defendant sexually abused his daughter in his own home).
“[W]hen the nature of the structure is in question, burglary in the third degree
(nonresidential structure) is a lesser-included offense of burglary in the second degree
(residential structure).” State v. Bass, 184 Ariz. at 545, 911 P.2d at 551. “If there is a genuine
factual question about whether the structure is residential, the jury should be instructed on
both burglary in the second degree (residential structure) and burglary in the third degree
(nonresidential structure). If the State fails to offer substantial evidence that the structure
was residential, then the jury should be instructed on only the lesser-included offense of
burglary in the third degree (nonresidential structure).” 184 Ariz. at 546, 911 P.2d at 552.
15.08 First-Degree Burglary
The crime of burglary in the first degree requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant [or an accomplice] entered or remained unlawfully in or on a
[residential or nonresidential structure] [fenced commercial yard] [fenced residential
yard]; and
2. The defendant [or an accomplice] intended to commit any theft or felony herein;
and
3. At some time between the moment of entry through flight from the scene, the
defendant [or an accomplice] knowingly possessed [explosives] [a deadly weapon] [a
firearm] [a dangerous instrument].
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1508 and 13-1501(5) (statutory language as of 1988).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts. This instruction should be
followed with the basic definition(s) of residential and/or nonresidential burglary, Statutory
Criminal Instruction(s) 15.06 and/or 15.07.
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“Accomplice” is defined in Statutory Criminal Instruction 3.01; “deadly weapon” and
“dangerous instrument” are defined in Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510 and 1.0511.
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
“Enter or remain unlawfully,” “entry,” “fenced commercial yard,” “fenced residential
yard,” “fenced yard,” “in the course of committing,” “nonresidential structure,” “residential
structure,” and “structure” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-1501. See Statutory Instructions for
definitions in Chapter 15.
If there is a genuine factual question about whether the structure is residential, the jury
should be instructed on both burglary of a residential structure and burglary of a
nonresidential structure. If the State fails to offer substantial evidence that the structure was
residential, then the jury should be instructed on only the lesser-included offense of burglary
of a nonresidential structure. State v. Bass, 184 Ariz. 543, 546, 911 P.2d 549, 552 (App. 1995).
The class of felony is determined by the type of place burglarized. A burglary of a
nonresidential structure or fenced commercial yard or fenced residential yard is a class 3
felony while a burglary of a residential structure is a class 2 felony. A.R.S. § 13-1508(B). If
there is an issue regarding the character of the premises or if the instruction given to the jury
included all the types of premises, it is recommended that the following be added to the
standard “guilty/not guilty” verdict form:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant guilty of
burglary in the first degree.]
We the jury find that the place burglarized was a (check only one):
___ Residential structure
___ Nonresidential structure
___ Fenced residential yard
___ Fenced commercial yard
C
OMMENT: In State v. Eastlack, 180 Ariz. 243, 257, 883 P.2d 999, 1013 (1994), cert. denied,
514 U.S. 118 (1995), the court held that a weapon or dangerous instrument obtained by a
burglar during the burglary and held as “loot” does not by itself render the burglar “armed”
within the meaning of the first degree burglary statute. That holding was based on the
wording of the statute that required the state to prove that the defendant be “armed with . . .
a deadly weapon.” The statute was amended in 1988. The amendment replaced the “armed
with” requirement with “knowingly possess.” Accordingly, a weapon or dangerous
instrument obtained by a burglar during the burglary and held as “loot” can support a
conviction for first-degree burglary. State v. Tabor, 184 Ariz. 119, 907 P.2d 505 (App. 1995).
Possession of a dangerous instrument while remaining in the house where murder was
committed justified armed burglary instruction, even if defendant did not possess dangerous
instrument when entering or leaving the house. State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 409, 844 P.2d
566, 576, cert. denied, 509 U.S. 912 (1992).
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CHAPTER 16
16.006 Definition of “Tampering with Utility Property”
“Tampering with utility property” means any of the following if committed against
property that is owned or operated by a utility for the purposes of transmission or
distribution:
(a) rearranging, damaging, altering, interfering with or otherwise preventing the
performance of a normal or customary function of utility property.
(b) connecting any wire, conduit or device to any utility property without authorization.
(c) defacing, puncturing, removing, reversing or altering any utility property.
(d) preventing any meter from properly measuring or registering.
(e) taking, receiving, using or converting to personal use or the use of another any utility
service that has not been measured or authorized.
(f) diverting or changing the intended course or path of the utility service without the
authorization or consent of the utility.
(g) causing, procuring, permitting, aiding or abetting any person to do any of the acts
listed in this paragraph
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1601(6) (statutory language as September 13, 2013).
16.011 Definition of “Damaging or Damage”
“Damaging” or “damage” means any physical or visual impairment of any surface.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1601(1) and 13-1701 (statutory language as of October 1, 1997).
16.012 Definition of “Defacing”
“Defacing” means any unnecessary act of substantially marring any surface or place, by
any means, or any act of putting up, affixing, fastening, printing, or painting any notice upon
any structure, without permission from the owner.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1601(2).
16.013 Definition of “Litter”
“Litter” includes any rubbish, refuse, waste material, offal, paper, glass, cans, bottles,
organic or inorganic trash, debris, filthy or odoriferous objects, dead animals, or any foreign
substance of whatever kind or description, including junked or abandoned vehicles, whether
or not any of these items are of value.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1601(3).
16.014 Definition of “Property of Another”
“Property of another” means property in which any person other than the defendant has
an interest, including community property and other property in which the defendant also
has an interest [and, for damage caused by theft of scrap metal, the property of other
persons damaged directly or indirectly as a result of the acts of the defendant].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1601(4) (statutory language effective September 30, 2009).
USE NOTE: Use the bracketed language in cases involving theft of scrap metal.
16.015 Definition of Tamper
“Tamper” means any act of interference.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1601(5).
16.016 Definition of “Utility”
“Utility” means any enterprise, public or private, which provides gas, electric, steam,
water, sewer or communications services, as well as any common carrier on land, rail, sea or
air.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1601(6) (statutory language as of October 1, 1997).
16.02 Criminal Damage
The crime of criminal damage requires proof that the defendant recklessly, and without
express permission,
[defaced or damaged property of another person.]
[tampered with property of another person so as substantially to impair its function or
value.]
[damaged the property of a utility.]
[parked a vehicle in such a manner as to deprive livestock of access to the only
reasonably available water.]
[drew or inscribed a message, slogan, sign, or symbol that is made on any public or
private building, structure, or surface, except the ground.]
[or]
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The crime of criminal damage requires proof that the defendant without express
permission, intentionally tampered with utility property.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1602(A) (statutory language as of September 13, 2013).
USE NOTE: The crime of criminal damage can be committed recklessly or intentionally. Use
language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Damaging,” “defacing,” “property of another,” “tamper,” “utility, and “tampering
with utility property” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-1601.
The court must instruct on the culpable mental state. “Recklessly” or “intentionally” is
defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
In State v. Moran, 162 Ariz. 524, 784 P.2d 730, 732 (App. 1989), the court held, that
although not stated in the statute, “the absence of the property owner’s permission, though
unstated, is a necessary and implicit element of the crime.” The court also held that this
offense is not a crime of omission.
For sentencing for a reckless crime, it is necessary for the jury to determine the amount
of the damage. See Statutory Criminal Instruction 16.041 for cases not involving a utility.
Where the offense involves a utility, use Statutory Criminal Instructions 16.021 and/or
16.022.
16.021 Criminal Damage to a Utility
If you find the defendant guilty of “criminal damage and that the property damaged
was owned by a utility, you must determine the dollar amount of the resulting property
damage. Your finding must be set forth on the verdict form.
Source: A.R.S. § 13-1602(B)(2) (statutory language effective September 13, 2013).
16.022 Criminal Damage to a Utility - Verdict Form
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled action, and upon our oaths,
do find the defendant on the charge of “criminal damage” as follows (check only one):
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant “guilty” of
criminal damage.]
We the jury find (check one or both):
_____ There was property damage to the utility.
_____ Defendant intentionally tampered with utility property and the damage caused an
imminent safety hazard to any person.
[If you find that there was property damage to the utility, complete this portion of the
verdict form.]
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We the jury find that the amount of the property damage was (check only one):
_____ Less than $5,000.00
_____ $5,000.00 or more.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1602(B)(2) (statutory language effective September 13, 2013).
16.023 Criminal Damage Form of Verdict
We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled action, upon our oaths, do
find the defendant,
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
of Criminal Damage.
If you find the defendant guilty, then please decide whether the total amount of damage
caused by defendant’s conduct is (check only one):
_____ less than $250.
or
_____ $250 or more but less than $2,000.
or
_____ $2,000 or more but less than $10,000.
or
_____ $10,000 or more.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §13-1602 (statutory language as of September 13, 2013).
COMMENT: The findings contained in the special interrogatories determine the class of the
offense. The State has the burden of establishing damages and demonstrating the method
used to calculate the amount. State v. Brockell, 187 Ariz. 226, 928 P.2d 650 (App. 1996).
16.04 Aggravated Criminal Damage
The crime of aggravated criminal damage requires proof that the defendant intentionally
or recklessly, and without express permission,
[defaced, damaged, or in any way changed the appearance of any building, structure,
personal property, or place used for worship or any religious purpose.]
[defaced or damaged any building, structure, or place used as a school or as an
educational facility.]
[defaced, damaged, or tampered with any cemetery, mortuary, or personal property of
the cemetery, mortuary, or other facility used for the purpose of burial or memorializing
the dead.]
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[defaced, damaged or tampered with any utility or agricultural infrastructure of property,
construction site or existing structure for the purpose of obtaining nonferrous metals.]
“Nonferrous metals” means those metals which will not normally attract a magnet
including copper, brass and aluminum.
In determining the amount of damage to property, damages include the cost of repair or
replacement of the property that was damaged.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1604(A) and (C) (statutory language as of May 8, 2007); 44-1641
(statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
USE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court must instruct on the culpable mental state. “Intentionally” and “recklessly” are
defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Damaging,” “defacing,” and “tamper” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-1601.
Permission normally would come from the owner but could also come from some
person other than the owner who is authorized to grant permission, e.g., a supervisor. State v.
Moran, 162 Ariz. 524, 784 P.2d 730 (App. 1989).
For sentencing purposes, it is necessary for the jury to determine the amount of the
damage. See Statutory Criminal Instruction 16.041.
16.041 Aggravated Criminal Damage Form of Verdict
We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled action, upon our oaths, do
find the defendant,
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
of Aggravated Criminal Damage.
If you find the defendant guilty, then please decide whether the total amount of damage
caused by defendant’s conduct is (check only one):
_____ less than $1,500.
or
_____ $1,500 or more but less than $10,000.
or
_____ $10,000 or more.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1604 (statutory language as of 1994).
COMMENT: The findings contained in the special interrogatories determine the class of
felony.
Aggravated criminal damage in an amount of $10,000 or more is a class 4 felony. A.R.S.
§ 13-1604(B)(1).
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Aggravated criminal damage in an amount of $1,500 or more but less than $10,000 is a
class 5 felony. A.R.S. § 13-1604(B)(2).
In all other cases aggravated criminal damage is a class 6 felony. A.R.S. § 13-1604(B)(3).
16.05 Aggregation of Amounts for Criminal Damage
Amounts of damage caused in one scheme or course of conduct, whether to property of
one or more persons, may be aggregated to determine the total amount of damage.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1605 (statutory language as of August 3, 1984).
USE NOTE: “Aggregated” may be replaced with “added together” if the latter term is more
easily understood.
For sentencing purposes, it is necessary for the jury to determine the amount of the
damage caused. See Statutory Criminal Instruction 16.041.
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CHAPTER 17
17.01(1) Definition of “Damage”
“Damage” means any physical or visual impairment of any surface.
17.01(2) Definition of “Occupied Structure”
“Occupied structure” means any structure in which one or more human beings
[was/were present] [was/were likely to be present] [was/were so near as to be in equivalent
danger] at the time the [fire] [explosion] occurred. This term includes any dwelling house,
whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant.
17.01(3) Definition of “Property”
“Property” means anything other than a structure that has value, tangible or intangible,
public or private, real or personal, including documents evidencing value or ownership.
17.01(4) Definition of “Structure”
“Structure” means any [building] [object] [vehicle] [watercraft] [aircraft] [place with sides
and a floor] used for [lodging] [business] [transportation] [recreation] [storage].
17.01(5) Definition of “Wildland”
“Wildland” means any brush, covered land, cutover land, forest, grasslands or woods.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1701 (statutory language as of April 19, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate.
17.02 Reckless Burning
The crime of reckless burning requires proof that the defendant:
1. recklessly caused [a fire] [an explosion]; and
2. the [fire] [explosion] resulted in damage to [an occupied structure] [a structure]
[wildland] [property].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1702 (statutory language as of April 19, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
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“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c)).
“Damage,” “occupied structure,” “structure,” “wildland,” and “property” are defined in
A.R.S. § 13-1701 (Statutory Definition Instructions 17.01(1) through 17.01(5)).
Reckless burning is a lesser-included offense of arson of an occupied structure, arson of
a structure, arson of property and arson of an occupied jail or prison facility. State v. Bay, 150
Ariz. 112, 117, 722 P.2d 280, 285 (1986).
17.03 Arson of a Structure or Property
The crime of arson of [a structure] [property] requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly and unlawfully damaged [a structure] [property]; and
2. did so by knowingly causing a [fire] [explosion].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1703 (statutory language as of 1987).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” and “unlawful” are in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0510(b) and 1.0541).
“Damage,” “property,” and “structure” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-1701 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 17.01(1), 17.01(3) and 17.01(4)).
If the State has timely alleged that the crime was a dangerous offense, and if the fire
under the circumstances of the particular case was readily capable of causing death or serious
physical injury, the court should also include an instruction on “dangerous instrument” and
provide a jury verdict form that includes a question on whether a dangerous instrument was
used. State v. Wilson, 135 Ariz. 395, 395, 661 P.2d 659, 659 (App. 1983).
If the offense involves arson of property, the court shall include a jury verdict form that
requires the jury to value the property in order to determine if the offense is a misdemeanor
($100 or less), class 5 felony (more than $100 but not more than $1,000) or class 4 felony
(more than $1,000).
C
OMMENT: Reckless burning is a lesser-included offense of arson of an occupied structure,
arson of a structure, arson of property and arson of an occupied jail or prison facility. See
State v. Bay, 150 Ariz. 112, 117, 722 P.2d 280, 285 (1986).
A fire falls within the statutory definition of a “dangerous instrument,” thereby allowing
a jury to determine if it is a dangerous offense under A.R.S. § 13-704. State v. Wilson, 135
Ariz. 395, 395, 661 P.2d 659, 659 (App. 1983).
A trash dumpster is a structure. State v. Nichols, 181 Ariz. 56, 58, 887 P.2d 586, 588 (App.
1994).
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17.04 Arson of an Occupied Structure
The crime of arson of an occupied structure requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly and unlawfully damaged an occupied structure; and
2. did so by knowingly causing [a fire] [an explosion].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1704 (statutory language as of 1987).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” and “unlawful” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 1.0510(b) and 1.0541).
“Damage,” “property,” “occupied structure,” and “structure” are defined in A.R.S.
§ 13-1701 (Statutory Definition Instructions 17.01(1) through 17.01((4)).
There is a split of authority on whether a separate jury finding of dangerousness is
required for the crime of arson of an occupied structure. See State v. Gatliff, 209 Ariz. 362, 365
¶¶ 16 & 17, 102 P.3d 981, 984 (App. 2004) (division one panel holding that fire is always a
dangerous instrument in arson of an occupied structure, and, therefore, is an essential
element of the crime). But see State v. Wilson, 135 Ariz. 395, 395, 661 P.2d 659, 659 (App.
1983) (division two panel holding that fire may be a dangerous instrument if under the
circumstances of the particular case, it was readily capable of causing death or serious
physical injury). Because the supreme court denied review in Gatliff, there remains a split of
authority as to whether fire always is or may be a dangerous instrument. Therefore, until the
supreme court resolves this conflict, whenever the State has timely alleged that the crime was
a dangerous offense, and if the evidence shows that the fire was readily capable of causing
death or serious physical injury, the better practice may be to include an instruction on
“dangerous instrument” and provide a jury verdict form that includes a question on whether
a dangerous instrument was used.
C
OMMENT: Reckless burning is a lesser-included offense of arson of an occupied structure,
arson of a structure, arson of property and arson of an occupied jail or prison facility. See
State v. Bay, 150 Ariz. 112, 117, 722 P.2d 280, 285 (1986).
A trash dumpster is a structure. State v. Nichols, 181 Ariz. 56, 58, 887 P.2d 586, 588 (App.
1994).
17.05 Arson of an Occupied Jail or Prison Facility
The crime of arson of an occupied [jail] [prison facility] requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly caused a [fire] [explosion]; and
2. The [fire] [explosion] resulted in physical damage to a [jail] [prison facility].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1705 (statutory language as of 1989).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Damage” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1701 (Statutory Definition Instruction 17.01(1)).
If the State has alleged timely that the crime was a dangerous offense, and if the fire
under the circumstances of the particular case was readily capable of causing death or serious
physical injury, the court should also include an instruction on “dangerous instrument” and
provide a jury verdict form that includes a question on whether a dangerous instrument was
used. State v. Wilson, 135 Ariz. 395, 395, 661 P.2d 659, 659 (App. 1983).
C
OMMENT: Reckless burning is a lesser-included offense of arson of an occupied structure,
arson of a structure, arson of property and arson of an occupied jail or prison facility. See
State v. Bay, 150 Ariz. 112, 117, 722 P.2d 280, 285 (1986).
A fire falls within the statutory definition of a “dangerous instrument,” thereby allowing
a jury to determine if it is a dangerous offense under A.R.S. § 13-704. State v. Wilson, 135
Ariz. 395, 395, 661 P.2d 659, 659 (App. 1983).
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CHAPTER 18
18.01(1) Definition of “Check”
“Check” means any check, draft or other negotiable or non-negotiable instrument of any
kind.
18.01(2) Definition of “Control” or “Exercise Control”
“Control” or “exercise control” means to act so as to exclude others from using their
property except on the defendant’s own terms.
18.01(3) Definition of “Credit”
“Credit” means an express agreement with the drawee for the payment of a check.
18.01(4) Definition of “Deprive”
“Deprive” means to:
1. withhold the property interest of another permanently; or
2. withhold the property interest of another for so long a time period that a substantial
portion of its economic value or usefulness or enjoyment is lost; or
3. withhold the property interest of another with the intent to restore it only upon
payment of any reward or other compensation; or
4. transfer or dispose of the property interest of another so that it is unlikely to be
recovered.
18.01(5) Definition of “Draw”
“Draw” means making, drawing, uttering, preparing, writing or delivering a check.
18.01(6) Definition of “Funds”
“Funds” means money or credit.
18.01(7) Definition of “Issue”
“Issue” means to deliver or cause to be delivered a check to a person who thereby
acquires a right against the drawer with respect to the check. A person who draws a check
with the intent that it be so delivered is deemed to have issued it if the delivery occurs.
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18.01(8) Definition of “Material Misrepresentation”
“Material misrepresentation” means a pretense, promise, representation or statement of
present, past or future fact that is fraudulent and that, when used or communicated, is
instrumental in causing the wrongful control or transfer of property or services. The
pretense may be verbal or it may be a physical act.
18.01(9) Definition of “Means of Transportation”
“Means of transportation” means any vehicle.
18.01(10) Definition of “Obtain”
“Obtain” means to bring about or to receive the transfer of any interest in property,
whether to a defendant or to another, or to secure the performance of a service or the
possession of a trade secret.
18.01(11) Definition of “Pass”
“Pass” means, for a payee, holder or bearer of a check that previously has been or
purports to have been drawn and issued by another, to deliver a check, for a purpose other
than collection, to a third person who by delivery acquires a right with respect to the check.
18.01(12) Definition of “Property”
“Property” means any thing of value, tangible or intangible, including trade secrets.
18.01(13) Definition of “Property of Another”
“Property of another” means property in which any person other than the defendant has
an interest on which the defendant is not privileged to infringe, including property in which
the defendant also has an interest, notwithstanding the fact that the other person might be
precluded from civil recovery because the property was used in an unlawful transaction or
was subject to forfeiture as contraband. Property in possession of the defendant is not
deemed property of another person who has only a security interest in the property, even if
legal title is in the creditor pursuant to a security agreement.
18.01(14) Definition of “Services”
“Services” includes labor, professional services, transportation, cable television,
computer or communication services, gas or electricity services, accommodations in hotels,
restaurants or leased premises or elsewhere, admission to exhibitions and use of vehicles or
other movable property.
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18.01(15) Definition of “Value”
“Value” means the fair market value of the property or services at the time of the theft.
[The value of ferrous metal or nonferrous metal is the average fair market value of the metal
in the local area together with the repair or replacement value of any property from which
the metal was removed at the time of the theft.] [Written instruments that do not have a
readily ascertainable market value have as their value either the face amount of indebtedness
less the portion satisfied or the amount of economic loss involved in deprivation of the
instrument, whichever is greater.] When property has an undeterminable value, you shall
determine its value and, in reaching your decision, may consider all relevant evidence,
including evidence of the property’s value to its owner.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1801(A) (statutory language as of August 2, 2012).
18.01(15).01 Definition of “Value of Ferrous or Nonferrous Metal”
“Value” means the fair market value of the property or services at the time of the theft.
The value of ferrous metal or nonferrous metal is the average fair market value of the metal
as scrap metal in the local area together with the repair or replacement value of any property
from which the scrap metal was removed at the time of the theft. When property has an
undeterminable value, you shall determine its value and, in reaching your decision, may
consider all relevant evidence, including evidence of the property’s value to its owner.
“Ferrous metals” are those metals that will attract a magnet. “Nonferrous metals” are
those that will not normally attract a magnet including copper, brass and aluminum. “Scrap
metal” means secondhand or castoff material, except used beverage containers, and includes
insulated and uninsulated metallic cables.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1801(A) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009); A.R.S. § 44-
1641.
18.01(16) Definition of “Drawee”
“Drawee” means a person or business ordered in a check or draft to make payment.
18.01(17) Definition of “Drawer”
“Drawer” means a person who signs or is identified in a check or draft as the person
ordering payment.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 47-3103 (statutory language as of July 17, 1993).
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18.02.01 Theft
The crime of theft requires proof that the defendant, without lawful authority,
knowingly:
[controlled property of another with the intent to deprive the other person of such
property.]
[converted for an unauthorized term or use services or property of another entrusted to
the defendant or placed in the defendant’s possession for a limited, authorized term or
use.]
[obtained services or property of another by means of any material misrepresentation
with intent to deprive the other person of such services or property.]
[came into control of lost, mislaid or misdelivered property of another under
circumstances providing means of inquiry as to the true owner and
appropriated such
property to the defendant’s own use or another’s use without reasonable efforts to notify
the true owner.]
[controlled property of another knowing or having reason to know that the property was
stolen.]
[obtained services known to the defendant to be available only for compensation
without paying or without an agreement to pay the compensation or diverted another’s
services to the defendant’s own or another’s benefit without authority to do so.]
[controlled the ferrous or nonferrous metal of another with the intent to deprive the
other person of the metal.]
[controlled the ferrous or nonferrous metal of another knowing or having reason to
know that the metal was stolen.]
[purchased within the scope of the ordinary course of business the ferrous or nonferrous
metal of another person knowing that the metal was stolen.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1802(A) (statutory language as of September 13, 2013).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
In order to determine the value of the theft, the court shall use Statutory Criminal
Instruction 18.027.
The court shall use a verdict form that provides findings as to value of the property or
services taken, taking of a firearm, taking of property from the person of another, and taking
a dog for the purpose of dog fighting. See A.R.S. § 13-1802(E) (Statutory Criminal Verdict
Forms 18A1 and A2).
“In determining the classification of the offense, the state may aggregate in the
indictment or information amounts taken in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or
course of conduct, whether the amounts were taken from one or several persons.” A.R.S.
§ 13-1801(B). If the State has made this allegation, the court will need to fashion a verdict
form based on the manner in which the state has alleged the offense or offenses. The
committee was not able to fashion a standard verdict form for use in all cases. If the State
alleges only one count based on a scheme or course of conduct without also charging each
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individual theft in separate counts, the issues that will have to be decided are whether the
jury is allowed to decide the value of the theft and, if so, how the value of the theft is
determined if the State fails to prove the scheme or course of conduct.
If the defendant is charged with A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(5), the court may instruct on the
statutory permissible inference under A.R.S. § 13-2305 (Statutory Criminal Instruction
23.05).
If the evidence suggests that the theft occurred through the issuance of a bad check, the
court may instruct on the statutory presumption under A.R.S. § 13-1808. See Statutory
Criminal Instruction 18.08.2.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Control” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(2)).
“Deprive” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(4)).
“Material misrepresentation” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 18.01(8)).
“Obtain” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(10)).
“Property” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(12)).
“Property of another” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction
18.01(13)).
“Services” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(14)).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
C
OMMENT: State v. Dixon, 127 Ariz. 554, 622 P.2d 501 (App. 1981) held that a single act may
result in a theft conviction under any one or combination of the subsections of A.R.S.
§ 13-1802, even though the mens rea for the subsections varies, and that the jury need not be
unanimous as to which subsection was violated so long as they are unanimous on the
question of whether the defendant’s conduct constituted theft.
18.02.02 Theft (Vulnerable Adult)
The crime of theft from a vulnerable adult requires proof that the defendant, without
lawful authority:
1. knowingly took control, title, use or management of a vulnerable adult’s property;
and
2. at the time, was acting in a position of trust and confidence; and
3. acted with the intent to deprive the vulnerable adult of the property.
Position of trust and confidence means that a person is any of the following:
1. a person who has assumed a duty to provide care the vulnerable adult; or
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2. a joint tenant or a tenant in common with a vulnerable adult; or
3. a person who is in a fiduciary relationship with a vulnerable adult including a de
facto guardian or de facto conservator.
[“Vulnerable adult” means an individual who is eighteen years of age or older and who is
unable to protect [himself] [herself] from abuse, neglect or exploitation by others because of
a mental or physical impairment. Vulnerable adult includes an incapacitated person.]
[“Incapacitated person” means any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness,
mental deficiency, mental disorder, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic
intoxication or other cause to the extent that the person lacks sufficient understanding or
capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his/her person.]
[“De facto guardian” means any person who takes possession of the person of a
vulnerable adult, without right or lawful authority. A de facto guardian is subject to all of the
responsibilities that attach to a legally appointed guardian.]
[“De facto conservator” means any person who takes possession of the estate of a
vulnerable adult, without right or lawful authority. A de facto conservator is subject to all of
the responsibilities that attach to a legally appointed conservator or trustee.]
[“Abuse” means:
1. Intentional infliction of physical harm; or
2. Injury caused by negligent acts or omissions; or
3. Unreasonable confinement; or
4. Sexual abuse or sexual assault.]
[“Neglect” means a pattern of conduct without the person’s informed consent resulting
in deprivation of food, water, medication, medical services, shelter, cooling, heating or other
services necessary to maintain minimum physical or mental health.]
[“Exploitation” means the illegal or improper use of a vulnerable adult or his/her
resources for another’s profit or advantage.]
Source: A.R.S. § 13-1802(B) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009); § 46-456(I)
(statutory language as of September 30, 2009); § 46-451 (statutory language as of September
30, 2009); § 14-5101 (statutory language as of July 17, 1994).
Use Note: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
If the defendant is accused of taking control, title, use or management of the vulnerable
adult’s property, the Court should consider giving the inference instruction to the jury. See
Statutory Criminal Instruction 18.02.02A.
In order to determine the value of the theft, the court shall use Statutory Criminal
Instruction 18.027.
The court shall use a verdict form that provides findings as to value. (Statutory Verdict
Forms 18A1 and A2).
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In determining the classification of the offense, the state may aggregate in the indictment
or information amounts taken in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of
conduct, whether the amounts were taken from one or several persons. A.R.S.
§ 13-1801(B). If the State has made this allegation, the court will need to fashion a verdict
form based on the manner in which the State has alleged the offense or offenses. The
Committee was not able to fashion a standard verdict form for use in all cases. If the State
alleges only one count based on a scheme or course of conduct without also charging each
individual theft in separate counts, the issues that will have to be decided are whether the
jury is allowed to decide the value of the theft and, if so, how the value of the theft is
determined if the State fails to prove the scheme or course of conduct.
If the evidence suggests that the theft occurred through the issuance of a bad check, the
court may instruct on the statutory presumptions under A.R.S. 13-1808. See Statutory
Criminal Instruction 18.08.2.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally or with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Control” is defined in A.R.S. 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(2)).
“Deprive” is defined in A.R.S. 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(4)).
“Property” is defined in A.R.S. 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(12)).
“Property of another” is defined in A.R.S. 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction
18.01(13)).
“Services” is defined in A.R.S. 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(14)).
“Vulnerable adult” is defined in A.R.S. § 46-451 (Statutory Definition Instruction § 46-
451.09).
“Position of trust and confidence” is defined in A.R.S. § 46-456 (Statutory Non-Criminal
Definition Instruction 46-456(4)).
Comment: It is not a violation of A.R.S. §13-1802(B) if the person is an agent acting within
the scope of the agent’s duties as or on behalf of a health care institution that is licensed
under Title 36, Chapter 4 and that provides services to the vulnerable adult.
18.02.02A Inference Relating to Theft from Vulnerable Adult (for Offenses
Committed On or After September 30, 2009
The defendant has been accused of theft. The defendant’s intent to deprive the
vulnerable adult of property may be presumed if the defendant took [control] [title] [use]
[management] of a vulnerable adult’s property without adequate consideration to the
vulnerable adult.
You are free to accept or reject this presumption as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
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inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the offense of theft beyond a reasonable doubt
before you can find the defendant guilty.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1802(B) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
“Property” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(12)).
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-1802(B) provides for a mandatory presumption. There are no cases
pertaining to the presumption under A.R.S. § 13-1802(B), but mandatory presumptions are
deemed to be unconstitutional, because they shift the burden of proof to the defendant. State
v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon, Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307 (1985). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret the presumption in
the statute as a permissive one, which would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr,
150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must
be permissive to withstand constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the
defendant).
Prior to September 30, 2009, this inference was not contained in the statute.
18.02.02B Affirmative Defense to Theft from a Vulnerable Adult (for Offenses
Committed On or After September 30, 2009
The defendant has been accused of theft. It is a defense to such charge if the defendant
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that:
[the property was given as a gift consistent with a pattern of gift giving to the defendant
that existed before the adult became vulnerable.]
[the property was given as a gift consistent with a pattern of gift giving to a class of
individuals that existed before the adult became vulnerable.]
[the Superior Court of Arizona approved the transaction before the transaction
occurred.]
Preponderance of the evidence means that the fact is more probably true than not true.
If you find that the defendant has proven this defense by preponderance of the
evidence, you must find the defendant not guilty of this offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §13-1802(B) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
This affirmative defense is only available in prosecutions under A.R.S. 13-1802(B).
The court shall instruct on affirmative defense so as to inform the jury on the burden of
proof.
Affirmative defense is defined in A.R.S. 13-205 (Statutory Definition Instruction 2.025).
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Because the burden of proof for the defendant is preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall use Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of
proof.
“Property” is defined in A.R.S. 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(12)).
C
OMMENT: Prior to September 30, 2009, this affirmative defense was not contained in the
statute.
18.02.03 Inference Relating to Actions for Theft of Ferrous or Nonferrous Metal
The defendant has been accused of theft of scrap metal. Unless explained to your
satisfaction or there is proof that the defendant was either an automotive recycler or scrap
metal dealer and acquired the scrap metal in the ordinary course of the defendant’s business,
[the defendant’s awareness of the risk that the scrap metal was stolen / that the defendant
participated in its theft in some way may be presumed if the scrap metal was recently stolen]
[the defendant’s awareness of the risk that the scrap metal was stolen may be presumed if the
defendant sold the scrap metal at a price substantially below its fair market value].
You are free to accept or reject this presumption as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the offense of theft beyond a reasonable doubt
before you can find the defendant guilty.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1802(H) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
Should evidence be presented that the defendant was a “scrap metal dealer” or “automotive
recycler,” the court should consider including one or both definitions in the instruction.
“Scrap metal dealer” is defined in A.R.S. § 44-1641 and “automotive recycler” is defined in
A.R.S. § 28-4301.
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-1802(H) provides for a mandatory presumption. There are no cases
pertaining to the presumption under A.R.S. § 13-1802, but mandatory presumptions are
deemed to be unconstitutional, because they shift the burden of proof to the defendant. State
v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon, Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307 (1985). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret the presumption in
the statute as a permissive one, which would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr,
150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must
be permissive to withstand constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the
defendant).
18.02.04 Inference Relating to Actions for Theft of Ferrous or Nonferrous Metal
The defendant has been accused of theft of scrap metal. Sale of scrap metal at a price
substantially below its fair market value may give rise to an inference concerning the
defendant’s state of mind. That inference is that the defendant was aware of the risk that it
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had been stolen. This inference may be rebutted if the sale of the scrap metal is satisfactorily
explained, or there is proof that the defendant was either an automotive recycler or scrap
metal dealer and sold the scrap metal in the ordinary course of the defendant’s business.
You are free to accept or reject this presumption as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the offense of theft beyond a reasonable doubt
before you can find the defendant guilty.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1802(J)(2) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
Should evidence be presented that the defendant was a “scrap metal dealer” or “automotive
recycler,” the court should consider including one or both definitions in the instruction.
“Scrap metal dealer” is defined in A.R.S. § 44-1641 and “automotive recycler” is defined in
A.R.S. § 28-4301.
Comment: A.R.S. § 13-1802(J)(2) provides that proof of certain facts “may give rise to an
inference.” There are no cases pertaining to the presumption under A.R.S. § 13-1802, but
mandatory presumptions are deemed to be unconstitutional, because they shift the burden
of proof to the defendant. State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App.
1986), relying upon, Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). Therefore, it seems more
appropriate to interpret the presumption in the statute as a permissive one, which would
pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38
(App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must be permissive to withstand
constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the defendant).
18.027 Definition of Value in Theft Cases
If you decide that the defendant is guilty of theft, you must determine the fair market
value of the [property/service] at the time the defendant obtained control of the
[property/service] [the value of ferrous metal or nonferrous metal includes the amount of
any damage to the property of another caused as a result of the theft of the metal.].
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1801(14) and 13-1802(C) (statutory language as of August 2, 2012).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Value is defined by statute as the fair market value of the property or services at the time
of the theft. A.R.S. § 13-1801(14). State v. Salazar, 160 Ariz. 570, 774 P.2d 1360 (1989) holds
that it is fundamental error to define fair market value as the highest price an item will bring.
Retail or wholesale prices are admissible to fix the range of the fair market value. Id. The jury
should fix the fair market value “from evidence presented.” Id.
Theft can be committed by either taking property of services of another or controlling
the property of another (at some point after it was originally taken) knowing or having
reason to know that the property was stolen. A.R.S. § 13-1802(A). When a person is
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convicted of “controlling” stolen property knowing or having reason to know that the
person obtained control of the property. State v. Wolter, 197 Ariz. 190, 3 P.3d 1110 (2000).
18.028 Verdict Form Instruction for Chapter 18 Offenses
If you decide that the defendant is guilty of [theft] [misappropriation of charter school
monies] [shoplifting] [unlawful use of power of attorney], you must unanimously determine
the value within one of the ranges on the verdict form of the [property/service] at the time
the defendant [controlled] [obtained control of] [converted] the [(property) (service)].
[If you decide that the defendant is guilty of theft, you must unanimously determine if
the property was (taken from the person of another) (a firearm) (an animal taken for the
purpose of animal fighting) (a vehicle engine or transmission).]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1801(15) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000); 13-1802(E)
(statutory language as of September 30, 2009); 13-1805(G) (statutory language as of
September 21, 2006); 13-1815(B) (statutory language as of August 21, 1998); 13-1818
(statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
The court should use the definition of “value” as defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801(15). See
Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(15).
Value is defined by statute as the fair market value of the property or services at the time
of the theft. A.R.S. § 13-1801(15). State v. Salazar, 160 Ariz. 570, 774 P.2d 1360 (1989) holds
that it is fundamental error to define fair market value as the highest price an item will bring.
Retail or wholesale prices are admissible to fix the range of the fair market value. Id. The jury
should fix the fair market value “from evidence presented.” Id
18.03 Unlawful Use of Means of Transportation
The crime of unlawful use of means of transportation requires proof that the defendant
[knowingly took unauthorized control over another person’s means of transportation]
[knowingly was (transported/physically located) in a vehicle that the defendant knew or had
reason to know was in the unlawful possession of someone other than the owner of the
means of transportation].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1803 (statutory language as of August 6, 1999); State v. Kamai, 184 Ariz.
620, 622, 911 P.2d 626, 628 (App. 1995).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Control” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(2)).
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“Deprive” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(4)).
“Means of transportation” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 18.01(9)).
“Property” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(12)).
“Property of another” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction
18.01(13)).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
“Vehicle” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0536).
C
OMMENT: Unlawful use of means of transportation is a lesser included offense of theft of
means of transportation under A.R.S. § 13-1814(A)(1). State v. Kamai, 184 Ariz. 620, 622, 911
P.2d 626, 628 (App. 1995) (holding that the language of “without intent to permanently
deprive” does not describe an element of the crime but simply distinguishes unlawful use
from theft of means of transportation).
Mere unauthorized
entry into a vehicle or other similar trespassory conduct is
insufficient evidence to prove “control” and cannot support a conviction for unlawful use of
means of transportation. State v. Hoag, 165 Ariz. 215, 219, 797 P.2d 1233, 1237 (App. 1990)
(evidence that defendant was seen in another’s car pulling at a CB radio mounted under the
dashboard may prove some crime, but it was not a violation of A.R.S. § 13-1803).
18.04.01 Theft by Extortion
The crime of theft by extortion requires proof that the defendant knowingly [obtained]
[sought to obtain] property or services by threatening to, in the future,
[cause physical injury to anyone.]
[cause physical injury to anyone by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.]
[cause death or serious physical injury to anyone]
[cause damage to property.]
[engage in conduct constituting an offense.]
[accuse anyone of a crime.]
[bring criminal charges against anyone.]
[take or withhold action as a public servant.]
[cause a public servant to take or withhold action.]
[cause anyone to part with any property.]
[take or withhold action regarding an alleged claim of easement or other right of access
to an adjoining property if both of the following occur:
1. The claimant’s property interest was the result of a tax lien purchase or foreclos
ure;
and
2. The fair mar
ket value of the claimant’s property was equal to or less than the
amount paid by the claimant for the purchase of the tax lien or foreclosu
re,
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including taxes paid after the lien purchase and any costs and attorney fees paid in
connection with the lien foreclosure.
“Fair market value” means the most probable price, as of the date of the alleged theft, in
cash, or in terms equivalent to cash, or in other precisely revealed terms, after deduction of
prior liens and encumbrances with interest to the date of sale, for which the real property or
interest therein would sell after reasonable exposure in the market under conditions requisite
to fair sale, with the buyer and seller each acting prudently, knowledgeably and for self-
interest, and assuming that neither is under duress.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1804(A) (statutory language as of August 2, 2012); A.R.S. § 33-814(A)
(statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
This instruction omits A.R.S. § 13-1804(A)(6), which makes it a crime to threaten to
“expose a secret or an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject anyone to
hatred, contempt or ridicule or to impair a person’s credit or business,” because this
subsection was declared unconstitutional in State v. Weinstein, 182 Ariz. 564, 568, 898 P.2d
513, 517 (App. 1995) (holding that it encompasses protected speech and thus violates the
First Amendment).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Dangerous instrument” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0511).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510).
“Deprive” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(4)).
“Physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0529).
“Property” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(12)).
“Property of another” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction
18.01(13)).
“Public servant” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0533).
“Serious physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0534).
“Services” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(14)).
18.04.02 Affirmative Defense to Theft by Extortion under A.R.S. § 13-1804(A)(5)
or (7)
The defendant has been accused of theft by extortion for [accusing anyone of a crime]
[bringing criminal charges against anyone] [taking or withholding action as a public servant]
[causing a public servant to take or withhold action]. It is a defense to such charge if the
defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the property obtained by threat of
the [accusation] [lawsuit] [invocation of official action] was lawfully claimed as:
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[restitution or indemnification for harm done under circumstances to which the
(accusation/exposure/lawsuit/official action) relates].
[compensation for property that was (lawfully obtained/for lawful services)].
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that the fact is more probably true than not
true.
If you find that the defendant has proven this defense by preponderance of the
evidence, you must find the defendant not guilty of this offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1804(B) (statutory language as of September 21, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
This affirmative defense is only available in prosecutions under A.R.S. § 13-1804(A)(5)
or (7).
Due to A.R.S. § 13-1804(A)(6) being declared unconstitutional in State v. Weinstein, 182
Ariz. 564, 568, 898 P.2d 513, 517 (App. 1995) (holding that A(6) encompasses protected
speech and thus violates the First Amendment), the court should not instruct the jury on
that subsection, so there should be no need to assert the affirmative defense as to that
subsection.
The court shall instruct on “affirmative defense” so as to inform the jury on the burden
of proof.
“Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Definition Instruction
2.025).
Because the burden of proof for the defendant is preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall use Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of
proof.
“Obtain” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(10)).
“Property” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(12)).
18.05(1) Definition of “Continuing Criminal Episode”
“Continuing criminal episode” means theft of property with a value of $1,500.00 or
more if committed during at least three separate incidences within a period of ninety
consecutive days.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1805 (statutory language effective September 30, 2009).
18.05.01 Shoplifting
The crime of shoplifting requires proof that the defendant:
1. was in an establishment in which merchandise was displayed for sale; and
2. while in such establishment, knowingly obtained goods of another with the intent to
deprive the other person of such goods by,
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[removing any of the goods from the immediate display or from any other place
within the establishment without paying the purchase price.]
[charging the purchase price of the goods to a fictitious person or any person
without that person’s authority.]
[paying less than the purchase price of the goods by some trick or artifice such as
altering, removing, substituting or otherwise disfiguring any label, price or marking.]
[transferring the goods from one container to another container.]
[concealment.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1805(A) and (B) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Use Statutory Criminal Instruction 18.05.03 for the statutory presumption related to
shoplifting.
In order to determine the value of the theft, the court shall use Statutory Criminal
Instruction 18.027.
“In determining the classification of the offense, the state may aggregate in the
indictment or information amounts taken in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or
course of conduct, whether the amounts were taken from one or several persons.” A.R.S.
§ 13-1801(B). If the State has made this allegation, the court will need to fashion a verdict
form based on the manner in which the State has alleged the offense or offenses. The
Committee was not able to fashion a standard verdict form for use in all cases. If the State
alleges only one count based on a scheme or course of conduct without also charging each
individual theft in separate counts, the issues that will have to be decided are whether the
jury is allowed to decide the value of the theft and, if so, how the value of the theft is
determined if the State fails to prove the scheme or course of conduct.
If the defendant has been charged with shoplifting with two or more prior burglary,
shoplifting, robbery or theft offenses within the previous five years, or if committed prior to
September 19, 2007, with shoplifting by bringing in a device to facilitate shoplifting, the
court shall instead use Statutory Criminal Instruction 18.05.02.
The court shall use a verdict form that provides findings as to value of the property
shoplifted, whether the defendant shoplifted a firearm or whether property was shoplifted
during a continuing criminal episode. See A.R.S. § 13-1805(G) (Statutory Criminal Verdict
Form 18B).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1056(a)(1)).
“Obtain” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(10)).
C
OMMENT: Shoplifting is not a lesser-included offense of theft. State v. Embree, 130 Ariz. 64,
66, 633 P.2d 1057, 1059 (App. 1981).
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A.R.S. § 13-1805(B) provides for a mandatory presumption. There are no cases
pertaining to the presumption under A.R.S. § 13-1805, but mandatory presumptions are
deemed to be unconstitutional, because they shift the burden of proof to the defendant. State
v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307 (1985). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret the presumption in
the statute as a permissive one, which would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr,
150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must
be permissive to withstand constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the
defendant).
Prior to September 19, 2007, the use of an artifice, instrument, container, device or other
article that was intended to facilitate shoplifting was an element of the class 4 felony offense
of shoplifting. On September 19, 2007, the statute was amended to remove such use as an
element and to include such use as a presumption of the defendant’s necessary culpable
mental state to commit the offense.
18.05.02A Shoplifting [With an Artifice or Priors] (For Offenses Committed
Prior to September 19, 2007 and After September 29, 2009)
The crime of shoplifting requires proof that the defendant:
1. was in an establishment in which merchandise was displayed for sale; and
2. while in the establishment, knowingly obtained goods of another with the intent to
deprive the other person of such goods by:
[removing any of the goods from the immediate display or from any other place
within the establishment without paying the purchase price]
[charging the purchase price of the goods to a fictitious person or any person
without that person’s authority]
[paying less than the purchase price of the goods by some trick or artifice such as
altering, removing, substituting or otherwise disfiguring any label, price or marking]
[transferring the goods from one container to another container]
[concealment]
and
3. [has previously committed or been convicted within the five-year period prior to this
offense with two or more offenses involving (burglary/shoplifting/robbery/theft/
organized retail theft).]
[while in the course of shoplifting, entered the mercantile establishment with an
artifice, instrument, container, device or other article that was intended to facilitate
shoplifting.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1805(A), (B) and (I) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006 and
September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
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Use Statutory Criminal Instruction 18.05.03 for the statutory presumption related to
shoplifting.
If the defendant has been charged with shoplifting with no allegation of prior burglary,
shoplifting, robbery or theft offenses and no allegation of shoplifting by bringing in a device
to facilitate shoplifting, the court shall instead use Statutory Criminal Instruction 18.05.01.
The court shall use a verdict form that provides a finding of the prior convictions. See
A.R.S. § 13-1805(I) (Statutory Verdict Form 18B).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Obtain” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(10)).
C
OMMENT: Shoplifting is not a lesser-included offense of theft. State v. Embree, 130 Ariz. 64,
66, 633 P.2d 1057, 1059 (App. 1981).
A.R.S. § 13-1805(B) provides for a mandatory presumption. There are no cases
pertaining to the presumption under A.R.S. § 13-1805, but mandatory presumptions are
deemed to be unconstitutional, because they shift the burden of proof to the defendant. State
v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon, Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307 (1985). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret the presumption in
the statute as a permissive one, which would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr,
150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must
be permissive to withstand constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the
defendant).
Prior to September 19, 2007, the use of an artifice, instrument, container, device or other
article that was intended to facilitate shoplifting was an element of the class 4 felony offense
of shoplifting. On September 19, 2007, the statute was amended to remove such use as an
element and to include such use as a presumption of the defendant’s necessary culpable
mental state to commit the offense.
18.05.03B Inference Relating to Shoplifting (For Offenses Committed On or
After September 19, 2007)
The defendant has been accused of shoplifting. The defendant’s knowledge and intent to
commit shoplifting may be presumed if the defendant:
[knowingly concealed on the defendant’s person or on another person unpurchased
merchandise of such mercantile establishment while within the mercantile
establishment.]
[used an artifice, instrument, container, device or other artifice to facilitate the
shoplifting.]
You are free to accept or reject this presumption as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
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burden of proving each and every element of the offense of shoplifting beyond a reasonable
doubt before you can find the defendant guilty.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1805(B) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-1805(B) provides for a mandatory presumption. There are no cases
pertaining to the presumption under A.R.S. § 13-1805, but mandatory presumptions are
deemed to be unconstitutional, because they shift the burden of proof to the defendant. State
v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon, Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307 (1985). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret the presumption in
the statute as a permissive one, which would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr,
150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must
be permissive to withstand constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the
defendant).
Prior to September 19, 2007, the use of an artifice, instrument, container, device or other
article that was intended to facilitate shoplifting was an element of the class 4 felony offense
of shoplifting. On September 19, 2007, the statute was amended to remove such use as an
element and to include such use as a presumption of the defendant’s necessary culpable
mental state to commit the offense.
18.06.B Unlawful Failure to Return Rented or Leased Property
The crime of issuing a bad check requires proof that the defendant:
The crime of Unlawful Failure to Return Rented or Leased Property requires proof that
the defendant knowingly failed to:
1. Return the rented or leased [motor vehicle] [property] within 72 hours after the time
provided for return in the rental agreement; and
2. Return the rented or leased [motor vehicle] [property] without good cause; and
3. Give notice to and obtain permission of the lessor of the rented or leased [motor
vehicle] [property] to be late.
[If the (motor vehicle) (property) was not leased on a periodic tenancy basis, the person who
rented out the (motor vehicle) (property) shall have included the following information,
clearly written as part of the terms of the rental agreement:
1. The date and time the (motor vehicle) (property) is required to be returned.
2. The maximum penalties if the (motor vehicle) (property) is not returned within
seventy-two hours of the date and time listed in paragraph 1.]
[If the (motor vehicle) (property) was leased on a periodic tenancy basis without a fixed
expiration or return date, the lessor shall have included within the lease clear written notice
that the lessee was required to return the (motor vehicle) (property) within seventy-two
hours from the date and time of the failure to pay any periodic lease payment required by the
lease.]
[It is an affirmative defense that the Defendant was physically incapacitated and unable to
request or obtain permission of the lessor to retain the (motor vehicle) (property) or that the
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(motor vehicle) (property) itself was in such a condition, through no fault of Defendant, that
it could not be returned to the lessor within such time.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1806(B) (statutory language as of July 20, 2011).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction 1.0510(b)).
For the offense to be a felony, the property rented or leased must be a motor vehicle.
If the affirmative defense under § 13-1806(D) is asserted, the Court shall instruct on
Affirmative Defense (Statutory Criminal Instruction 2.025).
18.07.01 Issuing a Bad Check
The crime of issuing a bad check requires proof that the defendant:
1. [issued] [passed] a check; and
2. knew that [he] [she] did not have sufficient funds in or on deposit with a [bank]
[drawee] for the payment in full of such check as well as all other checks outstanding
at the time of issuance of such check.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1807(A) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: This offense is a felony only if the back check was $5,000.00 or more.
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court may instruct on the statutory presumptions under A.R.S. § 13-1808 (Statutory
Criminal Instruction 18.08.01).
If the defendant has asserted an affirmative defense under A.R.S. § 13-1807(B), the court
shall use Statutory Criminal Instruction 18.07.02a, .02b or .02c, as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Check” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(1).
“Draw” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(5).
“Funds” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(6).
“Issue” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(7).
“Pass” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(11).
“Drawee” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(16).
“Drawer” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(17).
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18.07.02 Affirmative Defenses to Theft by Issuing a Bad Check
The defendant has been accused of theft or property or services by issuing a bad check.
It is a defense to such charge if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that
[before the check was drawn, the person to whom the check was payable or the holder
of the check [knew] [had been expressly notified] [had reason to believe] that the
defendant did not have sufficient funds [on deposit] [to the defendant’s credit] with the
[bank] [drawee] to ensure payment on presentation of such check.
or
[the check was postdated to a later date, and sufficient funds for payment in full on such
check were on deposit with the [bank] [drawee] on such later date.]
or
[the insufficiency of funds resulted from an adjustment to the defendant’s account by
the [bank] [drawee], and the [bank] [drawee] did not give notice of such adjustment to
the defendant.]
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that the fact is more probably true than not
true.
If you find that the defendant has proven this defense by preponderance of the
evidence, you must find the defendant not guilty of this offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1807(B) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: The offense of issuing a bad check is a felony if the bad check was $5,000.00 or
more.
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
A.R.S. §§ 13-1808 (D), (E) and (F) provide the notice requirements for the bank or
drawee. The initial decision on whether notice in the form required by the statute was given
to the defendant of insufficient funds should be a matter determined by the court prior to
the giving of jury instructions. If the court determines that notice was given in the form
required by the statute, a jury determination may be required regarding the sufficiency of the
notice. For this issue, the following notice instruction is recommended:
Notice to the defendant that a check was dishonored by a bank or drawee may be actual
notice or notice in writing that was sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested or by regular mail that was supported by an affidavit of service by mailing. Written
notice must have been addressed to the defendant at the defendant’s address, which address
can be taken from the check, the records of the (bank/drawee) or the records of the person
to whom the check was issued or passed. Such written notice is presumed to have been
received by the defendant no later than five days after it was sent.
The court may instruct on the statutory presumptions under A.R.S. § 13-1808 (Statutory
Criminal Instruction 18.08.01).
The court shall instruct on “affirmative defense” so as to inform the jury on the burden
of proof.
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“Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Definition Instruction
2.025).
Because the burden of proof for the defendant is preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall use Standard Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of proof.
“Knowingly” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b).
“Check” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(1).
“Draw” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(5).
“Funds” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(6).
“Issue” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(7).
“Drawee” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(16).
“Drawer” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(17).
18.08.01 Inference Relating to Issuing a Bad Check
The defendant has been accused of issuing a bad check. In your determination, the
defendant’s knowledge of insufficient funds may be inferred if:
[the defendant had no account with the [bank] [drawee] at the time the defendant issued
the check.]
[the defendant had a closed account with the [bank] [drawee] at the time the defendant
issued the check.]
[the (bank/drawee) had refused payment for lack of funds on presentation of the check
within thirty days after the check was issued and the defendant failed to pay the (person
to whom the check was payable/holder of the check) the full amount due on the check,
together with reasonable costs, within twelve days after the defendant received notice of
such refusal.
Notice to the defendant that a check was dishonored by a bank or drawee may be actual
notice or notice in writing that was sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested or by regular mail that was supported by an affidavit of service by mailing. Written
notice must have been addressed to the defendant at the defendant’s address, which address
can be taken from the check, the records of the (bank/drawee) or the records of the person
to whom the check was issued or passed. Such written notice is presumed to have been
received by the defendant no later than five days after it was sent.]
You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the offense of issuing a bad check beyond a
reasonable doubt.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1808(A) (statutory language as of August 22, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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A.R.S. §§ 13-1808(D), (E) and (F) provide the notice requirements for the bank or
drawee. The initial decision on whether proper notice was given to the defendant of
insufficient funds should be a matter determined by the court prior to the giving of jury
instructions. If the court determines that proper notice was given, however, the jury should
probably have the opportunity to determine if it believes the notice was proper. For this
reason, the court should consider giving the bracketed paragraph of this instruction
regarding notice to the jury.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b).
“Check” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(1).
“Draw” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(5).
“Funds” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(6).
“Issue” is defined Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(7).
“Drawee” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(16).
“Drawer” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(17).
C
OMMENT: There are no cases pertaining to the rebuttable presumption under A.R.S. § 13-
1808(A)(2). Nonetheless, it is important to caution the jury that the presumption is not
mandatory and that it must look at all the facts and circumstances of the case in deciding
whether the presumption should be applied. See, e.g., State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724
P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must be permissive to satisfy
constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the defendant).
18.08.02 Inferences Relating to Theft of Property or Services by Issuing a Bad
Check
The defendant has been accused of the crime of theft based on the allegations that the
defendant obtained property or services by issuing or passing a bad check. In your
determination, the defendant’s intent to [deprive the owner of property] [avoid payment for
service] may be inferred if:
[the defendant had no account with the [bank] [drawee] at the time the defendant issued
the check.]
[the defendant had a closed account with the [bank] [drawee] at the time the defendant
issued the check.]
[the (bank/drawee) had refused payment for lack of funds on presentation of the check
within thirty days after the check was issued and the defendant failed to pay the (person
to whom the check was payable/holder of the check) the full amount due on the check,
together with reasonable costs, within twelve days after the defendant received notice of
such refusal.
Notice to the defendant that a check was dishonored by a bank or drawee may be actual
notice or notice in writing that was sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested or by regular mail that was supported by an affidavit of service by mailing. Written
notice must have been addressed to the defendant at the defendant’s address, which address
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can be taken from the check, the records of the (bank/drawee) or the records of the person
to whom the check was issued or passed. Such written notice is presumed to have been
received by the defendant no later than five days after it was sent.]
You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the offense of issuing a bad check beyond a
reasonable doubt.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1808(B) and (D) (statutory language as of August 22, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
A.R.S. §§ 13-1808 (D), (E) and (F) provide the notice requirements for the bank or
drawee. The initial decision on whether proper notice was given to the defendant of
insufficient funds should be a matter determined by the court prior to the giving of jury
instructions. If the court determines that proper notice was given, however, the jury should
probably have the opportunity to determine if it believes the notice was proper. For this
reason, the court should consider giving the bracketed paragraph of this Instruction
regarding notice to the jury.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1).
“Check” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(1)).
“Deprive is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(4).
“Draw” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(5).
“Funds” is defined Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(6).
“Issue” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(7).
“Pass” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(11).
“Services” is defined Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(14).
“Drawee” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(16).
“Drawer” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(17).
C
OMMENT: There are no cases pertaining to the rebuttable presumption under A.R.S. § 13-
1808(A)(2). Nonetheless, it is important to caution the jury that the presumption is not
mandatory and that it must look at all the facts and circumstances of the case in deciding
whether the presumption should be applied. See, e.g., State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724
P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must be permissive to satisfy
constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the defendant).
18.13 Unlawful Failure to Return a Motor Vehicle Subject to a Security Interest
The crime of unlawful failure to return a motor vehicle subject to a security interest
requires proof that:
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1. the defendant failed to make a payment on the lien for more than ninety days; and
2. the secured creditor sent a notice to the defendant in writing, by certified mail return
receipt requested, that the defendant was ninety days late in making a payment a
nd
was in default. T
he notice must have included the foll
owing:
a.
a statement stating: “You are now in default on loan agreement # _________. If
you fail to return the (year of vehicle, make, model) within thirty days, you will
be subject to criminal prosecution;” and
b.
the business address and hours of operation for return of the vehicle; and
c.
the maximum penalties for unlawful failure to return a motor vehicle subject to a
security interest; and
3. the defendant failed to cure the default within thirty days; and
4. the defendant, with the intent to hinder or prevent enforcement of the secured
creditor’s security interest, knowingly failed to:
[return the motor vehicle to the secured creditor.]
[allow the secured creditor to take possession of the motor vehicle.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1813 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
“Vehicle” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0536).
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-1813(B) requires that the original contract creating the security
interest contain (1) a statement that it is unlawful to fail to return a motor vehicle subject to
a security interest within 30 days after receiving the default notice; (2) a statement that notice
of default will be mailed to the address on the loan agreement and that it is the defendant’s
responsibility to keep the address current; and (3) the maximum penalties for the offense.
Because the determination of whether the contract is sufficient to support the offense will be
made prior to the jury’s instructions, there is no reason to include this requirement in the
instruction.
18.13.01 Affirmative Defense to Unlawful Failure to Return a Motor Vehicle
Subject to a Security Interest
The defendant has been accused of unlawful failure to return a motor vehicle subject to
a security interest. It is a defense to this charge if the defendant proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that:
[the defendant was physically incapacitated and unable to request or obtain permission
of the secured creditor to retain the motor vehicle.]
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[the motor vehicle itself was in a condition, through no fault of the defendant, that it
could not be returned to the secured creditor within the specified time.]
[the defendant had a security interest in the vehicle based upon a lawful right of rejection
or a justifiable revocation of acceptance of the vehicle.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1813(C) (statutory language as of August 21, 1998); 47-2711(C)
(statutory language as of 1984).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on “affirmative defense” so as to inform the jury on the burden
of proof.
“Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Definition Instruction
2.025).
Because the burden of proof for the defendant is preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall use Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of
proof.
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
“Vehicle” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0536).
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-1813(C)(3) specifically refers to a security interest pursuant to
A.R.S. § 47-2711(C). Thus, to avoid citing to a statutory reference in a jury instruction, the
third set of bracketed defenses is taken from A.R.S. § 47-2711(C), which pertains to a buyer’s
remedies upon rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of goods under the Uniform
Commercial Code.
18.14 Theft of Means of Transportation
The crime of theft of means of transportation requires proof that the defendant, without
lawful authority, knowingly:
[controlled another person’s means of transportation with the intent to permanently
deprive the person of the means of transportation.]
[converted for an unauthorized term or use another person’s means of transportation
that was entrusted to or placed in the defendant’s possession for a limited, authorized
term or use.]
[obtained another person’s means of transportation by means of any material
misrepresentation with intent to permanently deprive the person of the means of
transportation.]
[came into control of another person’s means of transportation that was lost or
misdelivered under circumstances providing means of inquiry as to the true owner and
appropriated the means of transportation to the defendant’s own or another’s use
without reasonable efforts to notify the true owner.]
[controlled another person’s means of transportation knowing or having reason to know
that the property was stolen.]
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1813 (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
If the defendant is charged with A.R.S. § 13-1814(A)(5), the court may instruct on the
statutory permissible inference under A.R.S. § 13-2305 (Statutory Criminal Instruction
23.05).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Control” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(2).
“Deprive” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(4).
“Means of transportation” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(9).
“Property” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(12).
“Property of another” is defined Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(13).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
“Vehicle” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0536).
C
OMMENT: State v. Dixon, 127 Ariz. 554, 622 P.2d 501 (App. 1981) held that a single act may
result in a theft conviction under any one or combination of the subsections of A.R.S.
§ 13-1802, even though the mens rea for the subsections varies, and that the jury need not be
unanimous as to which subsection was violated so long as they are unanimous on the
question of whether the defendant’s conduct constituted theft. Because the subsections of
A.R.S. § 13-1814 track those of A.R.S. § 13-1802, the same rationale should apply.
18.15 Unlawful Use of Power of Attorney
The crime of unlawful use of power of attorney requires proof that the defendant:
1. held a power of attorney pursuant to law as an agent for another person; and
2. [used] [managed] the assets or property of the other person with the intent to
unlawfully deprive the other person of such assets or property.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1815 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998); 14-5501 (statutory
language as of 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall use a verdict form that provides findings as to value (Statutory Verdict
Form 18A).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
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“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Deprive” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(4).
“Property” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(12).
“Property of another” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(13).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
C
OMMENT: In order to violate this statute, the power of attorney must be created pursuant
to A.R.S. § 14-5501.
18.16(1) Definition of “Merchant”
“Merchant” means a person who offers for sale or exchange at least six like items of new
and unused personal property in this state.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1816(F) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: This definition should only be used in conjunction with A.R.S. § 13-1816(C).
18.16.01 Unlawful Manufacture or Sale of a Theft Detection Shielding Device
The crime of unlawful manufacture or sale of a theft detection shielding device requires
proof that the defendant knowingly [manufactured] [sold] [offered for sale] [distributed] in
any way a [laminated] [coated] bag or device unique to shielding and marketed for shielding
that was intended to shield merchandise from detection by an electronic or magnetic theft
alarm sensor.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1816(A) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
18.16.02 Unlawful Possession of a Theft Detection Shielding Device
The crime of unlawful possession of a theft detection shielding device requires proof
that the defendant, with the intent to commit [theft] [shoplifting], knowingly possessed any
[laminated] [coated] bag or device unique to shielding and marketed for shielding that was
intended to shield merchandise from detection by an electronic or magnetic theft alarm
sensor.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1816(B) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall use the theft or shoplifting Instruction(s) as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
18.16.03 Unlawful Possession of a Theft Detection Device Remover
The crime of unlawful possession of a theft detection device remover requires proof that
the defendant:
1. knowingly possessed any tool or device that was designed to allow the removal of
any theft detection device from any merchandise; and
2. intended to use such tool or device to remove any theft detection device from any
merchandise without the permission of the merchant or person who [owned] [held]
the merchandise.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1816(C) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
“Merchant” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.16(1).
18.16.04 Unlawful Removal of a Theft Detection Device
The crime of unlawful removal of a theft detection device requires proof that the
defendant intentionally removed a theft detection device from merchandise before
purchasing that merchandise.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1816(D) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
18.17 Unlawful Possession, Use or Alteration of a Retail Sales Receipt or
Universal Product Code Label
The crime of unlawful [possession] [use] [alteration] of a [retail sales receipt] [universal
product code label] requires proof that the defendant intentionally [cheated] [defrauded] a
merchant by:
[possessing at least fifteen fraudulent (retail sales receipts/universal product code
labels).]
[possessing a device that manufactures fraudulent (retail sales receipts/universal product
code labels).]
[(possessing/uttering/transferring/making/altering/counterfeiting/reproducing) a (retail
sales receipt/universal product code label).]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1817 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
“Merchant” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 18.16(1).
18.18 Misappropriation of Charter School Monies
The crime of misappropriation of charter school monies requires proof that the
defendant, without lawful authority and with intent to defraud, converted monies provided
by the State of Arizona under a charter school contract in a manner that did not further the
purposes of the charter and was not reasonably related to the business of the charter school.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1818 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall use a verdict form that provides findings as to value (Statutory
Verdict Form 18C).
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“In determining the classification of the offense, the state may aggregate in the
indictment or information amounts taken in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or
course of conduct, whether the amounts were taken from one or several persons.” A.R.S.
§ 13-1801(B). If the State has made this allegation, the court will need to fashion a verdict
form based on the manner in which the state has alleged the offense or offenses. The
Committee was not able to fashion a standard verdict form for use in all cases. If the State
alleges only one count based on a scheme or course of conduct without also charging each
individual theft in separate counts, the issues that will have to be decided are whether the
jury is allowed to decide the value of the theft and, if so, how the value of the theft is
determined if the State fails to prove the scheme or course of conduct.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
18.19 Organized Retail Theft
[The crime of “organized retail theft” requires proof that the defendant, with the intent
to resell or trade the merchandise for money or for other value, acting alone or in
conjunction with another person, removed merchandise from a retail establishment without
paying the purchase price.]
[The crime of “organized retail theft” requires proof that the defendant, acting alone or
in conjunction with another person, used an artifice, instrument, container, device or other
article to facilitate the removal of merchandise from a retail establishment with the intent to
deprive the owner of the merchandise and without paying the purchase price.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1819 (statutory language effective September 30, 2009).
“Organized retail theft requires a simple, completed theft of goods, with additional
requirements of intent to resell or use of an artifice or device; at its core, it is common law
larceny. See 50
AM. JUR. 2D Larceny § 1 (2014). At common law, larceny requires intent to
deprive. Id. We therefore conclude the offense of organized retail theft necessarily involves
intent to deprive.” State v. Veloz, 236 Ariz. 532, ¶ 11, 342 P.3d 1272, 1276 (App. 2015), review
denied July 30, 2015).
18.20 Theft of Trade Secrets
The crime of theft of trade secrets requires proof that defendant intended to deprive or
withhold the exclusive control of a trade secret from its owner, or, with the intent to make
any use of a trade secret, did one of the following:
1. Took, transmitted, exhibited, conveyed, altered, destroyed, concealed or used a tra
de
secret without the pe
rmission of the owner.
2. Made or caused to be made a copy of a trade secret without the permission o
f the
owner.
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3. Received, purchased or possessed a trade secret, knowing that the trade secret has
been obtained by means described in paragraph 1 or 2.
It is not a defense to the crime of theft of trade secrets that the person charged,
returned, or intended to return the trade secret that was stolen, copied or obtained from
another.
“Trade secrets” means information, without regard to form, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, plan, drawing, design or process
that both:
1. Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.
2. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1820) (statutory language as of July 24, 2014).
U
SE NOTE: Use statutory definition instruction defining “intentionally.”
Verdict Form 18A1 (Theft & Unlawful Use of Power of Attorney) For All
Offenses Occurring Prior to September 21, 2006
IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ________________
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
___________________ PLAINTIFF,
vs.
JOHN DOE,
DEFENDANT.
Case No. CR ______________
On the charge of [theft] [unlawful use of power of attorney], we, the jury, duly
impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, unanimously find the defendant
(defendant’s name)
Not Guilty
Guilty
Complete the following portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant
“guilty” of [theft] [unlawful use of power of attorney].
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[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further
unanimously find that the [property] [services] [assets] had a value of:
$100,000.00 or More
$25,000.00 or More, But Less than $100,000.00
$3,000.00 or More, But Less than $25,000.00
$2,000.00 or More, But Less than $3,000.00
$1,000.00 or More, But Less than $2,000.00
$250.00 or More, But Less than $1,000.00
Less than $250.00]
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further
unanimously find that the allegation that the property was taken from the person of another
(check only one):
was proven
was not proven
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further
unanimously find that the allegation that the property was a firearm (check only one):
was proven
was not proven
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further
unanimously find that the allegation that the property was a dog taken for the purpose of
dog fighting (check only one):
was proven
was not proven
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1802(E) (statutory language as of statutory language as of July 18,
2000); 13-1815(B) (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
Use this verdict form when the defendant is charged with any theft offense under A.R.S.
§ 13-1802 or with unlawful use of power of attorney under A.R.S. § 13-1815 in order to
determine the class of felony if the crime occurred before September 21, 2006. Otherwise,
use Statutory Criminal Verdict Form 18A for crimes charged on or after September 21,
2006.
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0517).
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-1815(B) provides that a violation of A.R.S. § 13-1815 carries the
same classifications as theft pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1802.
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Verdict Form 18A2 (Theft & Unlawful Use of Power of Attorney) For All
Offenses Occurring On or After September 21, 2006
IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ________________
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
_________________ PLAINTIFF,
vs.
JOHN DOE,
DEFENDANT.
Case No. CR ______________
On the charge of [theft] [unlawful use of power of attorney], we, the jury, duly
impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, unanimously find the defendant
(defendant’s name)
Not Guilty
Guilty
Complete the following portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant
“guilty” of [theft] [unlawful use of power of attorney].
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further
unanimously find that the [property] [services] [assets] had a value of:
$100,000.00 or More
$25,000.00 or More, But Less than $100,000.00
$4,000.00 or More, But Less than $25,000.00
$3,000.00 or More, But Less than $4,000.00
$2,000.00 or More, But Less than $3,000.00
$1,000.00 or More, But Less than $2,000.00
Less than $1,000.00]
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further unanimously
find that the allegation that the property was taken from the person of another (check only
one):
was proven
was not proven
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further unanimously
find that the allegation that the property was a firearm (check only one);
was proven
was not proven
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[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further unanimously
find that the allegation that the property was a dog taken for the purpose of dog fighting
(check only one):
was proven
was not proven
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further unanimously
find that the allegation that the property was a vehicle engine or transmission (check only
one):
was proven
was not proven
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1802(E) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006); 13-1815(B)
(statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
Use this verdict form when the defendant is charged with any theft offense under A.R.S.
§ 13-1802 or with unlawful use of power of attorney under A.R.S. § 13-1815 in order to
determine the class of felony if the crime occurred on or after September 21, 2006.
Otherwise, use Statutory Criminal Verdict Form 18A for crimes charged before September
21, 2006.
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0517).
“Vehicle” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 10536).
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-1815(B) provides that a violation of A.R.S. § 13-1815 carries the
same classifications as theft pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1802.
If the property was taken from another, was a firearm or was a dog taken for the
purpose of dogfighting, the theft is a class 6 felony. If the property was a vehicle engine or
transmission, the theft is a class 4 felony, regardless of value. A.R.S. § 13-1802(E).
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Verdict Form 18B1 (Shoplifting) For All Offenses Occurring Prior to
September 21, 2006
IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ________________
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
________________ PLAINTIFF,
vs.
JOHN DOE,
DEFENDANT.
Case No. CR ______________
On the charge of shoplifting, we, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-
entitled cause, unanimously find the defendant (defendant’s name)
Not Guilty
Guilty
Complete the following portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant
“guilty” of shoplifting.
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further
unanimously find that the (property/services) had a value of:
More than $2,000.00
More than $250.00, But Less than $2,000.00
$250.00 or Less]
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further find that the
allegation that the shoplifting occurred during a continuing criminal episode (check only
one):
was proven
was not proven
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further find that the
allegation that the property was a firearm (check only one):
was proven
was not proven
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1805(G) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
Use this verdict form when the defendant is charged with shoplifting under A.R.S. § 13-
1805 to determine the class of felony if the crime occurred before September 21, 2006.
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Otherwise, use Statutory Criminal Verdict Form 18B2 for crimes charged after September
21, 2006 and before September 17, 2007 or use Statutory Verdict Form 18B3 for crimes
charged after September 17, 2007.
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0517).
“Continuing criminal episode” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1805(G).
Verdict Form 18B2 (Shoplifting) For All Offenses Occurring On or After
September 21, 2006 and Prior to September 19, 2007
IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ________________
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
_______________ PLAINTIFF,
vs.
JOHN DOE,
DEFENDANT.
Case No. CR ______________
On the charge of shoplifting, we, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-
entitled cause, unanimously find the defendant (defendant’s name)
Not Guilty
Guilty
Complete the following portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant
“guilty” of shoplifting.
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further
unanimously find that the (property/services) had a value of:
$2,000.00 or More
$1,000.00 or More, But Less than $2,000.00
Less than $1,000.00]
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further find that the
allegation that the shoplifting occurred during a continuing criminal episode (check only
one):
was proven
was not proven
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[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further find that the
allegation that the property was a firearm (check only one):
was proven
was not proven
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1805(G) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
Use this verdict form when the defendant is charged with shoplifting under A.R.S. § 13-
1805 to determine the class of felony if the crime was charged on or after September 21,
2006. Otherwise, use Statutory Criminal Verdict Form 18B1 for crimes charged before
September 21, 2006 or use Statutory Criminal Verdict Form 18B3 for crimes charged after
September 17, 2007.
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0517).
“Continuing criminal episode” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1805(G).
Verdict Form 18B3 (Shoplifting) For All Offenses Occurring On or After
September 19, 2007
IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ________________
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
_______________ PLAINTIFF,
vs.
JOHN DOE,
DEFENDANT.
Case No. CR ______________
On the charge of shoplifting, we, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-
entitled cause, unanimously find the defendant (defendant’s name)
Not Guilty
Guilty
Complete the following portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant
“guilty” of shoplifting.
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further
unanimously find that the (property/services) had a value of:
$2,000.00 or More
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$1,000.00 or More, But Less than $2,000.00
Less than $1,000.00]
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further find that the
allegation that the shoplifting occurred during a continuing criminal episode (check only
one):
was proven
was not proven
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further find that the
allegation that the shoplifting was done to promote, further, or assist any criminal street gang
or criminal syndicate (check only one):
was proven
was not proven
[We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further find that the
allegation that the property was a firearm (check only one):
was proven
was not proven
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1805(G) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
“Criminal street gang” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.057).
“Criminal syndicate” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2301 (Statutory Definition Instruction
23.01.C.07)
Use this verdict form when the defendant is charged with shoplifting under A.R.S. § 13-
1805 to determine the class of felony if the crime was charged on or after September 19,
2007. Otherwise, use Statutory Criminal Verdict Form 18B1 for crimes charged before
September 21, 2006 or use Statutory Verdict Form 18B2 for crimes charged after September
19, 2007.
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0517).
“Continuing criminal episode” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1805(G).
C
OMMENT: Effective September 19, 2007, the definition of “continuing criminal episode”
was amended to require a value and a longer time period. Additionally, a provision was
added making shoplifting done to promote, further, or assist a criminal street gang or
criminal syndicate a class 5 felony.
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Verdict Form 18C (Misappropriation of Charter School Monies)
IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ________________
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
________________ PLAINTIFF,
vs.
JOHN DOE,
DEFENDANT.
Case No. CR ______________
On the charge of misappropriation of charter school monies, we, the jury, duly
impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, unanimously find the defendant
(defendant’s name)
Not Guilty
Guilty
Complete the following portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant
“guilty” of misappropriation of charter school monies.
We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further unanimously
find that the charter school monies had a value of:
Less than $25,000.00
$25,000.00 or More
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1818 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use this verdict form when the defendant is charged with misappropriation of
charter school monies under A.R.S. § 13-1818 to determine the class of felony.
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CHAPTER 19
19.02 Robbery
The crime of robbery requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant took property of another person; and
2. The taking was from the other person’s person or immediate presence; and
3. The taking was against the other person’s will; and
4. The defendant used or threatened to use force against any person with the intent to
force surrender of the property or to prevent resistance to taking or keeping the
property.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1902 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: “Force” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1901(1) as “any physical act directed against a
person as a means of gaining control of property.”
“Property of another” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801(13) (Statutory Definition
Instruction 18.01(13)).
“Threat” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1901(4) as “a verbal or physical menace of imminent
physical injury to a person.”
The court should instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intent” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
19.03 Aggravated Robbery
The crime of aggravated robbery requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant took property of another person; and
2. The taking was from the other person’s person or immediate presence; and
3. The taking was against the other person’s will; and
4. The defendant used or threatened to use force against any person with the intent to
force surrender of the property or to prevent resistance to taking or keeping the
property; and
5. The defendant, in the course of committing the robbery, was aided by an accomplice
actually present at the scene.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1903 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: “Force” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1901(1) as “any physical act directed against a
person as a means of gaining control of property.”
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“In the course of committing” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1901(2) as “any of the
defendant’s acts beginning with the initiation and extending through the flight from a
robbery.”
“Property of another” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801(13) (Statutory Definition
Instruction 18.01(13)).
“Threat” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1901(4) as “a verbal or physical menace of imminent
physical injury to a person.”
The court should instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intent” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
The court should instruct on the definition of “accomplice.” “Accomplice” is defined in
A.R.S. § 13-301 (Statutory Definition Instruction 3.01).
19.04 Armed Robbery
The crime of armed robbery requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant took property of another person; and
2. The taking was from the other person’s person or immediate presence; and
3. The taking was against the other person’s will; and
4. The defendant used or threatened to use force against any person with the intent to
force surrender of the property or to prevent resistance to taking or keeping the
property; and
5. The defendant or an accomplice, in the course of committing the robbery, [was
armed with a (deadly weapon) (simulated deadly weapon) (firearm)] [or] [used or
threatened to use a (deadly weapon) (simulated deadly weapon) (dangerous
instrument)].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-1904 (statutory language as of 1983).
U
SE NOTE: “Force” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1901(1) as “any physical act directed against a
person as a means of gaining control of property.”
“In the course of committing” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1901(2) as “any of the
defendant’s acts beginning with the initiation and extending through the flight from a
robbery.”
“Property of another” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801(13) (Statutory Definition
Instruction 18.01(13)).
“Threat” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1901(4) as “a verbal or physical menace of imminent
physical injury to a person.”
The court should instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intent” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
C
OMMENT: “The A.R.S. § 13-1904(A)(1) elements of ‘armed with a deadly weapon’ or
‘armed with a simulated weapon’ are satisfied” if the “instrument was within the immediate
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possession or available for use” by the defendant or an accomplice. State v. Garza Rodriguez,
164 Ariz. 107, 111, 791 P.2d 633, 637 (1990); State v. Spratt, 126 Ariz. 184, 186, 613 P.2d 848,
850 (App. 1980). The weapon need not be displayed by the defendant or seen by the victim
to satisfy those elements, but it must be actually present at the time of the offense. Garza
Rodriguez, supra. The “mere verbal threat to use a deadly weapon” where the defendant does
not possess or have within his or her immediate control “a deadly weapon, dangerous
instrument or simulated weapon, does not satisfy the statutory requirement for a charge of
armed robbery.” Garza Rodriguez, 164 Ariz. at 112, 791 P.2d at 638. A “simulated deadly
weapon” can be a hand held under clothing giving the appearance of a handgun. State v.
Bousley, 171 Ariz. 166, 168, 829 P.2d 1212, 1214 (1992); State v. Ellison, 169 Ariz. 424, 427,
819 P.2d 1010, 1013, approved, 171 Ariz. 166, 168, 829 P.2d 1212, 1214 (1992). A “simulated
deadly weapon” can be a nasal inhaler used to simulate the barrel of a gun pressed to the
victim’s body. State v. Felix, 153 Ariz. 417, 419, 737 P.2d 393, 395 (App. 1986).
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20.02 Forgery
The crime of forgery requires proof that the defendant, with the intent to defraud,
[falsely made, completed or altered a written instrument] [knowingly possessed a forged
instrument] [offered or presented, whether accepted or not, a forged instrument or one
containing false information].
[“Written instrument” means:
(a) any paper, document or other instrument that contains written or printed matter or
its equivalent; or
(b) any token, stamp, seal, badge, trademark, graphical image, access device or other
evidence or symbol of value, right, privilege or identification.]
[“Forged instrument” means a written instrument that has been falsely made, completed
or altered.]
[“Falsely alters a written instrument” means to change a complete or incomplete written
instrument, without the permission of anyone entitled to grant it, by means of
counterfeiting, washing, erasure, obliteration, deletion, insertion of new matter, connecting
together different parts of the whole of more than one genuine instrument or transposition
of matter or in any other manner, so that the altered instrument falsely appears or purports
to be in all respects an authentic creation of its ostensible maker or authorized by the maker.]
[“Falsely completes a written instrument” means to transform an incomplete written
instrument into a complete one by adding, inserting or changing matter without the
permission of anyone entitled to grant it, so that the complete written instrument falsely
[“Falsely makes a written instrument” means to make or draw a complete or incomplete
written instrument that purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible maker but that
is not either because the ostensible maker is fictitious, or because, if real, the ostensible
maker did not authorize the making or drawing of the written instrument.]
[“Incomplete written instrument” means a written instrument that contains some matter
by way of content or authentication but that requires additional matter to render it a
complete written instrument.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2001(5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (12) (statutory language as of August 25,
2004); 13-2002 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the particular facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: For easier comprehension by the jury, the court may want to use the term
“apparent” instead of the word “ostensible” in the instruction.
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20.02.C Forgery in Connection with a Drop HouseDeleted
Users are advised that in United States v. State of Arizona, 119 F. Supp. 3d 955 (2014), the
court held that federal law preempts Arizona law governing human smuggling.
20.03 Criminal Possession of a Forgery Device
The crime of criminal possession of a forgery device requires proof that the defendant
[made or possessed with knowledge of its character and with the intent to commit fraud
any plate, die, or other device, apparatus, equipment, software, access device, article,
material, good, property or supply specifically designed or adapted for use in forging
written instruments.]
[made or possessed any device, apparatus, equipment, software, access device, article,
material, good, property or supply adaptable for use in forging written instruments with
the intent to use it or to aid or permit another to use it for purposes of forgery.]
[“Written instrument” means:
(a) any paper, document or other instrument that contains written or printed matter or
its equivalent; or
(b) any token, stamp, seal, badge, trademark, graphical image, access device or other
evidence or symbol of value, right, privilege or identification.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2001(12) and 13-2003 (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the particular facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
20.04 Criminal Simulation
The crime of criminal simulation requires proof that the defendant, with the intent to
defraud, [made] [altered] [presented or offered, whether accepted or not,] any object so that
it appeared to have an antiquity, rarity, source, authorship or value that it did not in fact
possess.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2004 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
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COMMENT: In State v. Rea, 145 Ariz. 298, 300, 701 P.2d 6, 8 (App. 1985), the court wrote
that:
[T]he criminal simulation statute was designed to address “the problems of
forged art treasures or the sale of faked antiques or rare natural objects.”
Given that history, we hold that “object” in A.R.S. § 13-2004 does not
include “written instrument” as defined in A.R.S. § 13-2001 and as used in
A.R.S. § 13-2002. Section 13-2004 thus defines an offense different from
forgery and cannot be a lesser-included offense within it.
20.06 Criminal Impersonation
The crime of criminal impersonation requires proof that the defendant,
[assumed a false identity with the intent to defraud another.]
[pretended to be a representative of some person or organization with the intent to
defraud.]
[pretended to be, or assumed a false identity of, an employee or a representative of some
person or organization with the intent to induce another person to provide or allow
access to property.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2006 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language that is appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
20.08 Taking the Identity of a Person or Entity
The crime of unlawful taking of another [(person’s) (entity’s)] identity requires proof that
the defendant knowingly [(took) (purchased) (manufactured) (recorded) (possessed) (used)]
any personal identifying information, or entity identifying information of another [(person)
(entity)] without the consent of that other [(person) (entity)] whether the [(person) (entity)] is
real or fictitious, with the intent to obtain or use the other [(person’s) (entity’s)] identity for
any unlawful purpose or to cause loss to the [(person) (entity)], whether or not the other
[(person) (entity)] suffered any economic loss as a result of the offense.
[“Personal identifying information” means any written document or electronic data that
does or purports to provide information concerning a name, signature, electronic identifier
or screen name, electronic mail signature, address or account, biometric identifier, driver or
professional license number, access device, residence or mailing address, telephone number,
employer, student or military identification number, social security number, tax identification
number, employment information, citizenship status or alien identification number, personal
identification number, photograph, birth date, savings, checking or other financial account
number, credit card, charge card or debit card number, mother’s maiden name, fingerprint or
retinal image, the image of an iris or deoxyribonucleic acid or genetic information.]
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[“Entity identifying information” includes, if the entity is a person other than a human
being, any written document or electronic data that does or purports to provide information
concerning the entity’s name, address, telephone number, employer identification number,
account number or electronic serial number, the identifying number of the entity’s
depository account or any other information or data that is unique to, assigned to or belongs
to the entity and that is intended to be used to access services, funds or benefits of any kind
that the entity owns or to which the entity is entitled.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2001(4) and (10); 13-2008 (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the particular facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
This section does not apply to a violation of A.R.S. § 4-241 (using a fake identification)
by a person who is under twenty-one years of age. See A.R.S. § 13-2008(D).
20.08.A Taking the Identity of a Person or Entity
The crime of unlawful taking of another [(person’s) (entity’s)] identity requires proof that
the defendant knowingly [(took) (purchased) (manufactured) (recorded) (possessed) (used)]
any personal identifying information, or entity identifying information of another [(person)
(entity)] without the consent of that other [(person) (entity)] whether the [(person) (entity)] is
real or fictitious, and with the intent to obtain or use the other [(person’s) (entity’s)] identity
for any unlawful purpose or to cause loss to the [(person) (entity)], whether or not the other
[(person) (entity)] suffered any economic loss as a result of the offense, or with the intent to
obtain or continue employment.
[“Personal identifying information” means any written document or electronic data that
does or purports to provide information concerning a name, signature, electronic identifier
or screen name, electronic mail signature, address or account, biometric identifier, driver or
professional license number, access device, residence or mailing address, telephone number,
employer, student or military identification number, social security number, tax identification
number, employment information, citizenship status or alien identification number, personal
identification number, photograph, birth date, savings, checking or other financial account
number, credit card, charge card or debit card number, mother’s maiden name, fingerprint or
retinal image, the image of an iris or deoxyribonucleic acid or genetic information.]
[“Entity identifying information” includes, if the entity is a person other than a human
being, any written document or electronic data that does or purports to provide information
concerning the entity’s name, address, telephone number, employer identification number,
account number or electronic serial number, the identifying number of the entity’s
depository account or any other information or data that is unique to, assigned to or belongs
to the entity and that is intended to be used to access services, funds or benefits of any kind
that the entity owns or to which the entity is entitled.]
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2008(A) (statutory language as of May 1, 2008); 13-2001(4) and (10)
(statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the particular facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
This section does not apply to a violation of A.R.S. § 4-241 (using a fake identification)
by a person who is under twenty-one years of age. See A.R.S.
§ 13-2008(D).
20.08.B Knowingly Accepting the Identity of Another Person
The crime of knowingly accepting the identity of another person requires proof that the
defendant, in hiring an employee, knowingly:
1. accepted any personal identifying information of another person from an individual
and knew that the individual was not the actual person identified by that
information; and
2. used that identity information for the purpose of determining whether the individual
who presented that identity information had the legal right or authorization to work
in the United States under federal law.
“Personal identifying information” means any written document or electronic data that
does or purports to provide information concerning a name, signature, electronic identifier
or screen name, electronic mail signature, address or account, biometric identifier, driver or
professional license number, access device, residence or mailing address, telephone number,
employer, student or military identification number, social security number, tax identification
number, employment information, citizenship status or alien identification number, personal
identification number, photograph, birth date, savings, checking or other financial account
number, credit card, charge card or debit card number, mother’s maiden name, fingerprint or
retinal image, the image of an iris or deoxyribonucleic acid or genetic information.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2008(B) (statutory language as of May 1, 2008); 13-2001(10) (statutory
language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
20.09.A Aggravated Taking of the Identity of a Person or Entity
The crime of aggravated taking of another’s identity requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly [took], [purchased], [manufactured], [recorded], [possessed] [used] any
[personal] [entity] identifying information, of another [person] [entity]; and
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2. The identifying information was for three or more [persons] [entities], real or
fictitious, without the consent of those [persons] [entities], with the intent to [obtain]
[use] those [persons’] [entities’] identities for any unlawful purpose or to cause loss
to those [persons] [entities], even though those [persons] [entities] suffered no actual
economic loss as a result of the offense.
or
1. knowingly [took], [purchased], [manufactured], [recorded], [possessed] [used] any
[personal] [entity] identifying information, of another [person] [entity]; and
2. The identifying information was for [a person] [an entity], including real or fictitious,
without the consent of that other [person] [entity], with the intent to [obtain] [use]
the other [person’s] [entity’s] identity for any unlawful purpose and caused any
[person] [entity] to suffer an economic loss of three thousand dollars or more.
or
[knowingly [took], [purchased], [manufactured], [recorded], [possessed] [used] any
[personal] [entity] identifying information, of another person, real or fictitious, with
the intent to obtain employment.]
[“Personal identifying information” means any written document or electronic data that
does or purports to provide information concerning a name, signature, electronic identifier
or screen name, electronic mail signature, address or account, biometric identifier, driver or
professional license number, access device, residence or mailing address, telephone number,
employer, student or military identification number, social security number, tax identification
number, employment information, citizenship status or alien identification number, personal
identification number, photograph, birth date, savings, checking or other financial account
number, credit card, charge card or debit card number, mother’s maiden name, fingerprint or
retinal image, the image of an iris or deoxyribonucleic acid or genetic information.]
[“Entity identifying information” includes, if the entity is a person other than a human
being, any written document or electronic data that does or purports to provide information
concerning the entity’s name, address, telephone number, employer identification number,
account number or electronic serial number, the identifying number of the entity’s
depository account or any other information or data that is unique to, assigned to or belongs
to the entity and that is intended to be used to access services, funds or benefits of any kind
that the entity owns or to which the entity is entitled.]
[If the defendant possessed three or more identities out of the regular course of
business, you may infer that the possession was for an unlawful purpose.
You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In considering whether the alleged unlawful conduct has been satisfactorily explained,
you are reminded that in the exercise of constitutional rights, a defendant need not testify.
The alleged unlawful conduct may be satisfactorily explained through other circumstances
and other evidence, independent of any testimony by a defendant.]
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2001(4) and (10) (statutory language as of July 24, 2014); 13-2009
(statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language that is appropriate for the case.
A.R.S. § 13-2009 “aggravates” the offense set forth in § 13-2008 by adding the element
that either the defendant took three or more identities or a victim suffered three thousand
dollars ($3,000.00) or more in economic loss. Additionally, if the defendant had the personal
identifying information or entity identifying information of three or more persons or entities,
the statute raises an inference that the possession of the information “out of the regular
course of business” was for an unlawful purpose.
The court should provide a special verdict to the jury in order to determine whether
there are three or more persons or entities whose identity was taken or whether any person
or entity suffered an economic loss of three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) or more.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
This section does not apply to a violation of A.R.S. § 4-241 (using a fake identification)
by a person who is under twenty-one years of age. See A.R.S. § 13-2009(C).
C
OMMENT: Permissive presumptions allow triers of fact to freely disregard the presumption
and are constitutional, if reasonable, because they do not shift the burden of proof or the
burden of persuasion. This is so because a permissive presumption is nothing more than an
inference. It allows the trier of fact to infer the presumed fact from proof of the basic facts,
but places no burden of any kind on the defendant. State v. Spoon, 137 Ariz. 105, 109, 669
P.2d 83, 87 (App. 1983). The court should also be aware that, “[a] statute that shifts the
burden of persuasion on an element of the offense to a criminal defendant violates due
process.” Sandstrom v Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523-24, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979).
It is important to caution the jury that the inference is not mandatory and that the jury
must look at all the facts and circumstances of the case in deciding whether the presumption
should be applied. State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986)
(recommending that the language as contained in this instruction is preferable, because it
expressly tells the jury that it is not compelled to draw the inference).
The use of the term “may give rise to an inference,” which is contained in the text of
this instruction, was specifically approved in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 569, 724 P.2d at 1238.
The paragraph pertaining to the defendant’s constitutional right not to testify was
specifically approved verbatim in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 568, 724 P.2d at 1237 (citing to
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973)).
20.09.B Knowingly Accepting the Identity of Another Person
The crime of knowingly accepting the identity of another person requires proof that
defendant, in hiring an employee, knowingly did both of the following:
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1. Accepted any personal identifying information of another person from an individual
and knew that the individual is not the actual person identified by that information.
2. Used that identity information for the purpose of determining whether the
individual who presented that identity information had the legal right or
authorization under federal law to work in the United States [as described and
determined under the processes and procedures under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2009 (statutory language as of July 24, 2014).
U
SE NOTE: Use statutory definition instruction defining “knowingly.”.
This section does not apply to a violation of A.R.S. § 4-241 (using a fake identification)
by a person who is under twenty-one years of age. See A.R.S. § 13-2009(C).
20.10 Trafficking in the Identity of Another Person or Entity
The crime of trafficking in the identity of another [(person) (entity)] requires proof that the
defendant knowingly:
1. [(sold) (transferred) (transmitted)] any [(personal) (entity)] identifying information of
another [(person) (entity)], including a real or fictitious [(person) (entity)], without the
consent of the other [(person) (entity)]; and
2. [for any unlawful purpose.]
[to cause loss to the other [(person) (entity)] whether or not the other [(person) (entity)]
actually suffered any economic loss.]
[to allow another person to obtain or continue employment.]
[“Personal identifying information” means any written document or electronic data that
does or purports to provide information concerning a name, signature, electronic identifier
or screen name, electronic mail signature, address or account, biometric identifier, driver or
professional license number, access device, residence or mailing address, telephone number,
employer, student or military identification number, social security number, tax identification
number, employment information, citizenship status or alien identification number, personal
identification number, photograph, birth date, savings, checking or other financial account
number, credit card, charge card or debit card number, mother’s maiden name, fingerprint or
retinal image, the image of an iris or deoxyribonucleic acid or genetic information.]
[“Entity identifying information” includes, if the entity is a person other than a human
being, any written document or electronic data that does or purports to provide information
concerning the entity’s name, address, telephone number, employer identification number,
account number or electronic serial number, the identifying number of the entity’s
depository account or any other information or data that is unique to, assigned to or belongs
to the entity and that is intended to be used to access services, funds or benefits of any kind
that the entity owns or to which the entity is entitled.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2010 (statutory language as of May 1, 2008); 13-2001(4) and (10)
(statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
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USE NOTE: Use the bracketed language that is appropriate for the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
This section does not apply to a violation of A.R.S. § 4-241 (using a fake identification)
by a person who is under 21 years of age. See A.R.S. § 13-2010(B).
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21.01.01 Definition of “Cancelled or Revoked Credit Card”
“Cancelled or revoked credit card” means a credit card that is no longer valid because
permission to use it has been suspended, revoked or terminated by the issuer of the credit
card by written notice sent by certified or registered mail addressed to the person to whom
the credit card was issued at such person’s last known address.
If there is evidence that written notice has been deposited as certified or registered
matter in the United States mail addressed to the person to whom the credit card was issued
at such person’s last known address, you may infer that the cardholder received such written
notice.
You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2101(1) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: “Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(3) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.03).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(6) (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.06).
Whenever the law allows the drawing of an inference, the court must instruct the jury on
rebuttable presumptions (inferences), which is included in this instruction. See State v. Mohr,
150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must
be permissive to satisfy constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the
defendant); State v. Forrester, 134 Ariz. 444, 451, 657 P.2d 432, 439 (App. 1982) (holding that
mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional).
21.01.02 Definition of “Cardholder”
“Cardholder” means any person who is [named on the face of a credit card to whom or
for whose benefit the credit card is issued by an issuer] [in possession of a credit card with
the consent of the person to whom the credit card was issued].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2101(2) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(3) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.03).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(6) (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.06).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
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21.01.03 Definition of “Credit Card”
“Credit card” means:
[any instrument or device, whether known as a credit card, charge card, credit plate,
courtesy card or identification card or by any other name, that is issued with or without
fee by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services or
anything else of value, either on credit or in possession or in consideration of an
undertaking or guaranty by the issuer of the payment of a check drawn by the
cardholder, on a promise to pay in part or in full therefor at a future time. The
indebtedness, whether all or any part thereof, that is represented by the promise to make
deferred payment may be secured or unsecured.]
[a debit card, electronic benefit transfer card or other access instrument or device, other
than a check that is signed by the account holder or other authorized signatory on the
deposit account, that draws funds from a deposit account in order to obtain money,
goods, services or anything else of value.]
[a stored value card, smart card or other instrument or device that enables a person to
obtain money, goods, services or anything else of value through the use of value stored
on the card, instrument or device.]
[the number that is assigned any such card, instrument or device defined above even if
the physical card, instrument or device is not used or presented.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2101(3) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
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SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Cardholder” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(2) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.02).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(6) (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.06).
“Obtain” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(10)).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
“Services” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(14)).
“Value” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(15)).
21.01.04 Definition of “Expired Credit Card”
“Expired credit card” means a credit card that is no longer valid because the date shown
on the credit card has expired.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2101(4) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
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SE NOTE:
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(3) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.03).
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21.01.05 Definition of “Incomplete Credit Card”
“Incomplete credit card” means a credit card that has not been stamped, embossed,
imprinted or written with matter that the issuer requires to appear on a credit card before it
can be used by a cardholder. A credit card is not considered incomplete under this definition
if only the signature of the cardholder is missing.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2101(5) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
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SE NOTE:
“Cardholder” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(2) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.02).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(3) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.03).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(6) (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.06).
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OMMENT: The statute uses the word “matter.” Depending on the facts of the case,
substituting the actual item missing may make the instruction clearer to the jury.
21.01.06 Definition of “Issuer”
“Issuer” means any business organization, state agency or financial institution, or its duly
authorized agent, that issues a credit card.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2101(6) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
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SE NOTE:
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(3) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.03).
21.01.07 Definition of “Merchant”
“Merchant” means a person who is authorized under a written contract with a
participating party to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value on
presentation of a credit card by a cardholder.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2101(7) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
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SE NOTE:
“Cardholder” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(2) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.02).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(3) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.03).
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“Participating party” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(8) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.08).
“Person” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0526).
“Services” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(14)).
“Value” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(15)).
21.01.08 Definition of “Participating Party”
“Participating party” means:
1. a business organization or financial institution that is obligated or permitted by
contract to acquire, by electronic transmission or other means from a merchant, a
sales slip or sales draft or instrument for the payment of money showing a credit
card transaction; and
2. from whom an issuer is obligated or permitted by contract to acquire, by electronic
transmission or other means, such sales slip, sales draft or instrument for the
payment of money showing a credit card transaction.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2101(8) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE:
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(3) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.03).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(6) (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.06).
“Merchant” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(7) (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.07).
21.01.09 Definition of “Receives” or “Receiving”
“Receives” or “receiving” means acquiring possession or control of a credit card or
accepting a credit card as security for a loan.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2101(9) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
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SE NOTE:
“Control” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(2)).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(3) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.03).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
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21.01.10 Definition of “Reencoder”
“Reencoder” means an electronic device that places encoded information from the
magnetic strip or stripe of a credit card onto the magnetic strip or stripe of another credit
card.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2101(10) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
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SE NOTE:
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(3) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.03).
21.01.11 Definition of “Scanning Device”
“Scanning device” means an electronic device used to access, read, scan, obtain,
memorize, transmit or store, temporarily or permanently, information encoded on a strip or
stripe of a credit card.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2101(11) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
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SE NOTE:
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101(3) (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.03).
“Obtain” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(10)).
21.02 Theft of a Credit Card or Obtaining a Credit Card by Fraudulent Means
The crime of theft of a credit card or obtaining a credit card by fraudulent means
requires proof that the defendant:
[controlled a credit card without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent with the intent to
deprive the other person of such property.]
[controlled a credit card without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent and converted for
an unauthorized term or use services or property of another entrusted to the defendant
or placed in the defendant’s possession for a limited, authorized term or use.]
[controlled a credit card without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent and obtained
services or property of another by means of any material misrepresentation with intent
to deprive the other person of such services or property.]
[controlled a credit card without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent that was lost,
mislaid or misdelivered under circumstances providing means of inquiry as to the
true owner and appropriated such credit card to the defendant’s own use or another’s
use without reasonable efforts to notify the true owner.]
[controlled a credit card without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent knowing or have
reason to know that the credit card was stolen.]
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[controlled a credit card without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent and obtained
services known to the defendant to be available only for compensation without paying
or an agreement to pay the compensation or diverted another’s services to the
defendant’s own or another’s benefit without authority to do so.]
[controlled a credit card without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent and knowingly
obtained/sought to obtain property or services with the use of the credit card by means
of a threat to do in the future the following:
(cause physical injury to anyone)
(cause physical injury to anyone by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument)
(cause damage to property)
(engage in conduct constituting an offense)
(accuse anyone of a crime)
(bring criminal charges against anyone)
(take or withhold action as a public servant)
(cause a public servant to take or withhold action)
(cause anyone to part with any property)]
(sold) (transferred) (conveyed) a credit card with the intent to defraud]
[with the intent to defraud, obtained possession, care, custody or control over a credit
card as security for debt]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2102 (statutory language as of August 25, 2004); 13-1802(A)
(statutory language as of September 21, 2006); 13-1804(A) (statutory language as of
September 21, 1999).
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SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Cardholder” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.02).
“Control” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(2)).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.03).
“Damage” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1701 (Statutory Definition Instruction 17.01(1)).
“Dangerous instrument” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0511).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510).
“Deprive” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(4)).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 21.01.06).
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“Material misrepresentation” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 18.01(8)).
“Obtain” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(10)).
“Person” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0526).
“Physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0529).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
“Property” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(12)).
“Property of another” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction
18.01(13)).
“Public servant” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0533).
“Services” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(14)).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541).
This instruction incorporates the elements of A.R.S. §§ 13-1802 and 13-1804, as required
by A.R.S. § 13-2102(A)(1).
It is recommended that the court not instruct on A.R.S. § 13-1804(A)(6), which makes it
a crime to threaten to “expose a secret or an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to
subject anyone to hatred, contempt or ridicule or to impair a person’s credit or business,”
because this subsection was declared unconstitutional in State v. Weinstein, 182 Ariz. 564, 568,
898 P.2d 513, 517 (App. 1995). That subsection has not been included in this instruction.
Because A.R.S. § 13-2102 includes conduct prescribed by A.R.S. § 13-1804, and because
A.R.S. § 13-1804 provides for an affirmative defense as to violations of A.R.S. § 13-
1804(A)(5) and (7), the court should give a comparable affirmative defense instruction if the
defense raises such a defense to a similar violation under A.R.S. § 13-2102. See Statutory
Criminal Instruction 21.02-1.
21.02-1 Affirmative Defense to Theft of a Credit Card or Obtaining a Credit
Card by Fraudulent Means under A.R.S. § 13-2102(A)(1), Incorporating
A.R.S. §§ 13-1804(A)(5) or (7) and 13-1804(B)
The defendant has been accused of theft of a credit card by extortion for [accusing
anyone of a crime] [bringing criminal charges against anyone] [taking or withholding action
as a public servant] [causing a public servant to take or withhold action]. It is a defense to
such charge if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the property
obtained by threat of the [accusation] [exposure] [lawsuit] [invocation of official action] was
lawfully claimed as:
[restitution or indemnification for harm done under circumstances to which the
(accusation/exposure/lawsuit/official action) relates].
[compensation for property that was (lawfully obtained/for lawful services)].
If you find that the defendant has proven this defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, you must find the defendant not guilty of this offense.
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“Preponderance of the evidence” means that the fact is more probably true than not
true.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2102 (statutory language as of August 25, 2004); 13-1804(B) (statutory
language as of September 21, 1999).
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SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
This affirmative defense is only available in prosecutions only under A.R.S. § 13-2102
that incorporate A.R.S. § 13-1804(A)(5) or (7).
Due to A.R.S. § 13-1804(A)(6) being declared unconstitutional in State v. Weinstein, 182
Ariz. 564, 568, 898 P.2d 513, 517 (App. 1995) (holding that (A)(6) encompasses protected
speech and thus violates the First Amendment), the court should not instruct the jury on
that subsection, so there should be no need to assert the affirmative defense as to that
subsection.
The court shall instruct on “affirmative defense” so as to inform the jury on the burden
of proof.
“Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Criminal Instruction
2.025).
Because the burden of proof for the defendant is preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall use Standard Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of proof.
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 21.01.03).
“Obtain” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 18.01(10)).
“Property” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Criminal l Instruction 18.01(12)).
21.03 Receipt of Anything of Value Obtained by Fraudulent Use of a Credit
Card
The crime of receipt of anything of value obtained by fraudulent use of a credit card
requires proof that the defendant:
[bought] [received] [attempted to buy] [attempted to receive] money, goods or services
or any other thing of value obtained by the fraudulent use of a credit card; and
knew or believed that such money, goods or services or any other thing of value was
obtained by the fraudulent use of a credit card.
You must determine the value of all money, goods, services or other things of value
obtained or attempted to be obtained. [You may total or aggregate the amount obtained
from one or more persons if the amounts obtained were pursuant to one scheme or course
of conduct.] You must set forth your finding of value on the verdict form. This will become
clearer when you review the verdict form. The State has the burden of proving the value
beyond a reasonable doubt.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2103 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
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SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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The court shall instruct on the offense of fraudulent use of a credit card (Statutory
Criminal Instruction 21.05).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Attempt” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1001 (Statutory Definition Instruction 10.01).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.03).
“Obtain” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(10)).
“Receives” or “receiving” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 21.01.09).
“Services” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(14)).
“Value” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(15)).
The court should submit a verdict form as to value, because the classes of offenses are
different based on the value of the money, goods, services or any other thing of value. See
Verdict Form 21.03A.
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OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-2103(B) provides that amounts obtained by fraudulent use of a
credit card pursuant to one course or scheme of conduct, whether from one or several
persons, may be aggregated in determining the classification of offense.
21.04 Forgery of Credit Card
The crime of forgery of credit card requires proof that the defendant, with intent to
defraud,
[altered a credit card.]
[falsely made, manufactured or fabricated an instrument or device purporting to be a
credit card without the issuer’s express authorization to do so.]
[caused to falsely make, manufacture or fabricate an instrument or device purporting to
be a credit card without the issuer’s express authorization to do so.]
[falsely embossed or altered a credit card or an instrument or device purporting to be a
credit card.]
[uttered a falsely made, embossed or altered credit card or an instrument or device
purporting to be a credit card.]
[being other than the cardholder, signed the name of an actual or fictitious person to a
credit card or an instrument for the payment of money that evidences a credit card
transaction.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2104 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
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SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
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“Cardholder” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.02).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.03).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.06).
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OMMENT: Under the predecessor statutes, it was not double punishment to be convicted
of both possession of a stolen credit card with intent to defraud and credit card forgery. State
v. Taylor, 27 Ariz. App. 140, 141, 551 P.2d 589, 590 (1976).
The statute uses the word “utters.” The court may wish to consider using a more
commonly understood word to enhance the jury’s understanding of the instruction. In State
v. Singh, 4 Ariz. App. 273, 419 P.2d 403 (1966), the court wrote:
We are concerned with the question of uttering, publishing, passing or
attempting to pass the forged documents. Uttering has been defined as
follows:
‘To utter and publish a forged instrument is to offer to pass it to another
with intent to prejudice, damage, or defraud, declaring or asserting directly
or indirectly by words or actions that it is good.’ Crawford v. State, 164 Neb.
231, 82 N.W.2d 1 (1957).
‘Uttering’ is a term of art used to distinguish the actual forgery from the
passing or publishing, and as used in the law of forgery is synonymous with
publishing:
The words ‘utter’ or ‘publish’, as used in the law of forgery, are
synonymous, and they mean to make any use, or to attempt any use of an
instrument, document or writing, whereby or in connection with which a
person asserts or represents to another, directly or indirectly, expressly or
impliedly, by words or conduct, that the instrument, document or writing is
genuine. People v. Larue, 28 Cal. App. 2d 748, 83 P.2d 725, 728.
See also State v. Culver, 103 Ariz. 505, 507, 446 P.2d 234, 236 (1968) (“To utter means to pass
or attempt to pass.”)
21.05 Fraudulent Use of Credit Card
The crime of fraudulent use of credit card requires proof that the defendant, with intent
to defraud:
[used a (credit card or credit card number obtained or retained in violation of law) (credit
card or credit card number that the defendant knew was forged, expired, cancelled or
revoked), for the purpose of obtaining or attempting to obtain money, goods, services or
any other thing of value.]
[obtained or attempted to obtain money, goods, services or any other thing of value by
representing, without the consent of the cardholder, that he/she was the holder of the
credit card.]
[obtained or attempted to obtain money, goods, services or any other thing of value by
representing that he/she was the holder of a credit card, which, in fact, had not been
issued.]
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You must determine the value of all money, goods, services or other things of value
obtained or attempted to be obtained by the defendant within a consecutive six-month
period. You must set forth your finding of value on the verdict form. This will become
clearer when you review the verdict form. The State has the burden of proving the value
beyond a reasonable doubt.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2105 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
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SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Attempt” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1001 (Statutory Definition Instruction 10.01).
“Cardholder” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.02).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.03).
“Expired credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.04).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.06).
“Obtain” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(10)).
“Services” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(14)).
“Value” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(15)).
The court must submit a verdict form as to value, because the classes of the offenses are
different based on the value of the money, goods, services or any other thing of value within
a consecutive six-month period. See Verdict Form 21.05A.
21.06 Possession of Machinery, Plate or Other Contrivance
The crime of possession of machinery, plate or other contrivance requires proof that the
defendant:
1. possessed, with intent to defraud, any machinery, plate or any other contrivance
designed to reproduce an instrument or device purporting to be the credit card of an
issuer who has not consented to the preparation of such credit card; and
2. knew the character of the machinery, plate or contrivance he/she possessed.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2106(A)(2) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Attempt” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1001 (Statutory Definition Instruction 10.01).
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“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.03).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.06).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
This instruction is taken only from A.R.S. § 13-2106(A)(2), because a violation is a class
6 felony, while a violation of A.R.S. § 13-2106(A)(1) is a class 1 misdemeanor.
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OMMENT: Because of the complex wording of the statute, the court may wish to consider
using simpler wording to enhance the jury’s understanding of the instruction. A suggested
alternate instruction is:
The crime of possession of machinery, plate or other contrivance
requires proof that the defendant:
1. possessed, with intent to defraud, any thing designed to reproduce
an item appearing to be a credit card without the consent of the
issuer; and
2. knew the purpose of the items that he/she possessed.
21.07 False Statement as to Financial Condition or Identity
The crime of false statement as to financial condition or identity requires proof that the
defendant,
1. for the purpose of procuring the issuance of a credit card, made or caused to be
made, either directly or indirectly, any false statement in writing as to a material fact,
knowing it to be false; and
2. intended that such statement be relied on regarding [the identity of the defendant or
any other person, firm or corporation] [the financial condition of the defendant or
any other person, firm or corporation].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2107 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
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SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.03).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.06).
“Material” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2701 (Statutory Definition Instruction 27.01(1)).
“Person” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0526).
“Statement” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2701 (Statutory Definition Instruction 27.01(2)).
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21.08 Fraud by Person Authorized to Provide Goods or Services
The crime of fraud by person authorized to provide goods or services requires proof
that the defendant knowingly:
[furnished money, goods, services or any other thing of value upon presentation of a
credit card the defendant knew was obtained or retained through theft by fraudulent
means;]
[furnished money, goods, services or any other thing of value upon presentation of a
credit card that the defendant knew was forged, expired, cancelled or revoked;]
[failed to furnish money, goods, services or any other thing of value that the defendant
represented in writing to the issuer or a participating party that the defendant had
furnished, and the defendant received payment for such;]
and
[the payment received by the defendant for all money, goods, services and any other
things of value] [the difference between the value of all money, goods, services and any
other things of value actually furnished by the defendant and the payment or payments
received by the defendant based upon the defendant’s representations] exceeded $100.00
in any consecutive six-month period.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2108 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
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SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Cancelled or revoked credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 21.01.01).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.03).
“Expired credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.04).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.06).
“Participating party” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.08).
“Person” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0526).
“Receives” or “receiving” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 21.01.09).
“Services” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(14)).
“Value” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(15)).
The last bracketed paragraph was included, because the offense is a felony only if the
value exceeded $100 in any consecutive six-month period. A.R.S. § 13-2108(C) and (D).
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21.09-1 Credit Card Transaction Record Theft (Defendant-Merchant)
The crime of credit card transaction record theft requires proof that the defendant:
1. was a merchant; and
2. acting with the intent to defraud, knowingly presented for payment to a participating
party a credit card transaction record of a sale that was not made by the defendant.
You must determine the value of the theft or thefts. [In determining the value, you may
total or aggregate the amount taken from one or more persons in credit card transaction
record theft that was committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.] Your
finding must be set forth on the verdict form. This will become clearer when you review the
verdict form. The State has the burden of proving the value beyond a reasonable doubt.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2109(A)(1) (statutory language as of July 13, 1995).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
The bracketed language should only be used if the indictment or information has alleged
a scheme or course of conduct.
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.03).
“Merchant” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.07).
“Participating party” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.08).
The court must submit a verdict form as to value, because the classes of offenses are
different based on the value of the credit card transaction record theft. See Verdict Form
21.09A. “In order to determine the classification of the offense, the state may aggregate in
the indictment or information amounts that were taken from one or more persons in credit
card transaction record theft that was committed pursuant to one scheme or course of
conduct.” A.R.S. § 13-2109(B). If the state has made this allegation, the court will need to
fashion a verdict form based on the manner in which the state has alleged the offense or
offenses. The committee was not able to fashion a standard verdict form for use in all cases.
If the state alleges only one count based on a scheme or course of conduct without also
charging each individual theft in separate counts, the issues that will have to be decided are
whether the jury is allowed to decide the value of the theft and, if so, how the value of the
theft is determined if the state fails to prove the scheme or course of conduct.
21.09-2 Credit Card Transaction Record Theft (Defendant Not a Merchant)
The crime of credit card transaction record theft requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly commanded, encouraged, requested or solicited a merchant to present for
payment to the participating party a credit card transaction record of a sale that was
not made by the merchant; and
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2. did not have the participating party’s authorization.
You must determine the value of the theft or thefts. [In determining the value, you may
total or aggregate the amount taken from one or more persons in credit card transaction
record theft that was committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.] Your
finding must be set forth on the verdict form. This will become clearer when you review the
verdict form. The State has the burden of proving the value beyond a reasonable doubt.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2109(A)(2) (statutory language as of July 13, 1995).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
The bracketed language should only be used if the indictment or information has alleged
a scheme or course of conduct.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.03).
“Merchant” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.07).
“Participating party” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.08).
The court should submit a verdict form as to value, because the classes of offenses are
different based on the value of the credit card transaction record theft. See Verdict Form
21.09A. “In order to determine the classification of the offense, the state may aggregate in
the indictment or information amounts that were taken from one or more persons in credit
card transaction record theft that was committed pursuant to one scheme or course of
conduct.” A.R.S. § 13-2109(B). If the State has made this allegation, the court will need to
fashion a verdict form based on the manner in which the State has alleged the offense or
offenses. The Committee was not able to fashion a standard verdict form for use in all cases.
If the State alleges only one count based on a scheme or course of conduct without also
charging each individual theft in separate counts, the issues that will have to be decided are
whether the jury is allowed to decide the value of the theft and, if so, how the value of the
theft is determined if the State fails to prove the scheme or course of conduct.
21.10-1 Unlawful Use of Scanning Device or Reencoder
The crime of unlawful use of scanning device or reencoder requires proof that the
defendant:
1. with the intent to defraud a cardholder, issuer or merchant, used a [scanning device]
[reencoder] to [scan] [reencode] information from a credit card; and
2. did not have the permission of the cardholder of such credit card to [scan]
[reencode] such information.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2110(A) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
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“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1056(a)(1)).
“Cardholder” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.02).
“Credit card” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.03).
“Issuer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.06).
“Merchant” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition l Instruction 21.01.07).
“Reencoder” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.10).
“Scanning device” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.11).
21.10-2 Unlawful Possession of Scanning Device or Reencoder
The crime of unlawful possession of a scanning device or reencoder requires proof that
the defendant, intentionally or knowingly [made] [possessed], with the intent to commit
fraud, any device, apparatus, equipment, software, article, material, good, property or supply
that is specifically designed or adapted for use as or in a [scanning device] [reencoder].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2110(B) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
“Reencoder” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 21.01.10).
“Scanning device” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
21.01.11).
This offense does not apply to peace officers or prosecutors in the performance of their
duties. A.R.S. § 13-2110(C).
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Verdict Form 21.03A Receipt of Anything of Value Obtained by Fraudulent Use
of a Credit Card)
IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ________________
The State Of Arizona,
Plaintiff,
vs.
John Doe,
Defendant.
Case No. CR ______________
On the charge of receipt of anything of value obtained by fraudulent use of a credit card,
we, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, find the defendant
(defendant’s name)
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
[Complete the next section of the verdict form if you find the defendant “guilty” of the
offense.]
We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further find that the
money, goods, services or any other thing of value had a value of:
_____ $1,000 or More
_____ $250 or More, But Less than $1,00
_____ Less than $250
_____ Unable to agree
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2103(B) (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: Use this verdict form when the defendant is charged with receipt of anything of
value obtained by fraudulent use of a credit card under A.R.S. § 13-2103 in order to
determine the class of offense. If the receipt of anything of value obtained by fraudulent use
of a credit card was less than $250.00, the offense is a class 1 misdemeanor.
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Verdict Form 21.05A Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card
IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ________________
The State Of Arizona,
Plaintiff,
vs.
John Doe,
Defendant.
Case No. CR ______________
On the charge of fraudulent use of a credit card, we, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn
in the above-entitled cause, find the defendant (defendant’s name)
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
Complete the next section of the verdict form if you find the defendant “guilty” of the
offense.]
We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further find that the
money, goods, services or any other thing of value had a value of:
_____ $1,000 or more in any consecutive six-month period
_____ $250 or more, but less than $1,000 in any consecutive six- month period
_____ Less than $250
_____ $______, but not in any consecutive six-month period
_____ Unable to agree
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2105(B) (statutory language as of July 21, 1997.
U
SE NOTE: Use this verdict form when the defendant is charged with fraudulent use of a
credit card under A.R.S. § 13-2105 in order to determine the class of felony. If the money,
goods, services or any other thing of value was less than $250.00 or did not occur in a
consecutive six-month period, the offense is a class 1 misdemeanor.
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Verdict Form 21.09A (Credit Card Transaction Record Theft No Scheme or
Course of Conduct Alleged)
IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ________________
The State of Arizona,
Plaintiff,
vs.
John Doe,
Defendant.
Case No. CR ______________
On the charge of credit card transaction record theft, we, the jury, duly impaneled and
sworn in the above-entitled cause, find the defendant (defendant’s name)
__ Not Guilty
__ Guilty
[Complete the next section of the verdict form if you find the defendant “guilty” of the
offense.]
We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, further find that the
theft had a value of:
[ $100,000 or more]
[ $25,000 or more but less than $100,000]
[ $3,000 or more but less than $25,000]
[ $2,000 or more but less than $3,000]
[ $1,000 or more but less than $2,000]
[ $500 or more but less than $1,000]
[ Less than $500]
Unable to agree
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2105(B) (statutory language as of July 21, 1997.
U
SE NOTE: Use this verdict form when the defendant is charged with credit card
transaction record theft under A.R.S. § 13-2109 in order to determine the class of felony. If
the value was less than $500, the offense is a class 1 misdemeanor. A.R.S. § 13-2109(D)
provides for mandatory prison upon a finding that the theft(s) involved at least $100,000.
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Value” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(15)).
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CHAPTER 22
22.04 Defrauding Secured Creditors
The crime of defrauding secured creditors requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly [destroyed, removed, concealed, encumbered, converted, sold, obtained,
transferred,
controlled or otherwise dealt with] property subject to a security interest;
and
2. acted with the intent to hinder or prevent the enforcement of that interest.
[“Control” means to act so as to exclude others from using their property except on the
defendant’s own terms.]
Security interest means an interest in personal property or fixtures that secures
payment or performance of an obligation.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2204 and 13-2201(3) (statutory language as of January 19, 1984 and
July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: The definition of security interest” refers to Title 47, Chapter 9, A.R.S.
§ 47-9101 et seq.
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
A.R.S. 13-2204(B) directs the court to use the definition of “control” in A.R.S. § 13-1801
(Statutory Criminal Instruction 18.01(2)).
22.05 Defrauding Judgment Creditors
The crime of defrauding judgment creditors requires proof that the defendant [secreted,
assigned, conveyed or otherwise disposed of] the defendants property with the intent to
defraud a judgment creditor or to prevent that property from being subjected to payment of
a judgment.
A “judgment creditoris a person or entity that has obtained a judgment for payment of
money or order of support against the defendant that is due and unpaid.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2205 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts.
C
OMMENT: “Judgment creditor” is not defined in A.R.S. § 13-2205. The instruction includes
a definition from A.R.S. §§ 12-1570(4) and 12-1598(8).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
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22.06 Fraud in Insolvency
The crime of fraud in insolvency requires proof that when proceedings were or were
about to be instituted for the appointment of a trustee, receiver or other person entitled to
administer property for the benefit of creditors or when any other assignment, composition
or liquidation for the benefit of creditors had been or was about to be made, the defendant
[destroyed, removed, concealed, encumbered, transferred or otherwise harmed or
reduced the value of the property with intent to defeat or obstruct the operation of any
law relating to the administration of property for the benefit of creditors.]
[knowingly falsified any writing or record relating to the property.]
[knowingly misrepresented
or refused to disclose to a receiver or other person entitled to
administer property for the benefit of creditors the existence, amount or location of the
property or any other information which the defendant could be legally required to
furnish to such administration.]
[obtained any substantial part of or interest in the debtors estate with intent to defraud
any creditor.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2206 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
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SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
Chapter 22 does not contain a definition of “debtor.”
“Debtor” is defined in A.R.S.
§ 44-1001 as a person who is liable on a claim. A.R.S. § 20-1603 defines “debtor” as a
borrower of money or a person possessing a commitment for a loan of certain funds or a
purchaser or lessee of goods, services, property, rights or privileges for which payment is
arranged through a credit transaction.”
Chapter 22 does not contain a definition of “creditor.”
A.R.S. § 44-1001 defines
“creditor” as a person who has a claim. A.R.S. § 20-1603 defines “creditor” as “the lender
of money or vendor or lessor of goods, services, property, rights or privileges, including a
lessor under a lease intended as a security, where payment is arranged through a credit
transaction. “Creditor” means also any successor to the right, title or interest of any such
lender, vendor or lessor or an affiliate, associate or subsidiary of any of them or any director,
officer or employee of any of them or any other person in any way associated with any of
them.”
22.07 Receiving Deposits in an Insolvent Financial Institution
The crime of receiving deposits in an insolvent financial institution requires proof that
the defendant,
as an officer, manager or other person participating in the direction of a
financial institution, received or permitted the receipt of a deposit, premium payment or
investment in the institution in excess of the amount insured by the federal deposit insurance
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corporation, the federal savings and loan insurance corporation or the national credit union
administration, knowing that the institution was insolvent.
[It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the person making the deposit,
premium payment or investment was fully informed of the financial condition of the
institution.]
Financial institutionmeans a bank, insurance company, credit union, savings and loan
association, investment trust or other organization held out to the public as a place of
deposit for funds or medium of savings or collective investment.
“Insolvent” means that, for any reason, a financial institution is unable to pay its
obligations in the ordinary or usual course of business or the present fair salable value of its
assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay its probable liabilities on its existing
debts as they become absolute and matured.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2207, 13-2201(3) and (4) (statutory language as of January 19, 1984
and July 6, 1988.)
U
SE NOTE: “Funds” means money or credit. A.R.S. § 13-1801(A)(6).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The affirmative defense
instruction is in Statutory Criminal Instruction 2.025.
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CHAPTER 23
23.01.A.01 Definition of “Collect an Extension of Credit”
“Collect an extension of credit” means to induce in any way any person to make
repayment of that extension.
23.01.A.02 Definition of “Creditor”
“Creditor” means any person making an extension of credit or any person claiming by,
under or through any person making an extension of credit.
23.01.A.03 Definition of “Debtor”
“Debtor” means any person to whom an extension of credit is made or any person who
guarantees the repayment of an extension of credit, or in any manner undertakes to
indemnify the creditor against loss resulting from the failure of any person to whom an
extension is made to repay the extension.
23.01.A.04 Definition of “Extend Credit”
“Extend credit” means to make or renew any loan or to enter into any agreement, tacit
or express, whereby the repayment or satisfaction of any debt or claim, whether
acknowledged or disputed, valid or invalid, and however arising, may or shall be deferred.
23.01.A.05 Definition of “Extortionate Extension of Credit”
“Extortionate extension of credit” means any extension of credit with respect to which it
is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time the extension is made that
delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment could result in the use of violence
or other criminal means to cause harm to the person or the reputation or property of any
person.
23.01.A.06 Definition of “Extortionate Means
“Extortionate means” means the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence
or other criminal means to cause harm to the person or the reputation or property of any
person.
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23.01.A.07 Definition of “Repayment of Any Extension of Credit”
“Repayment of any extension of credit” means the repayment, satisfaction or discharge
in whole or in part of any debt or claim, acknowledged or disputed, valid or invalid, resulting
from or in connection with that extension of credit.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2301(statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: The definitions are to be used for the purposes of §§ 13-2302, 13-2303 and 13-
2304.
23.01.B.01 Definition of “Dealer in Property”
“Dealer in property” means a person who buys and sells property as a business.
23.01.B.02 Definition of “Stolen Property”
“Stolen property” means “property of another” that has been the subject of any
unlawful taking. “Property of another” means property in which any person other than the
defendant has an interest on which the defendant is not privileged to infringe, including
property in which the defendant also has an interest [notwithstanding the fact that the other
person might be precluded from civil recovery because the property was used in an unlawful
transaction or was subject to forfeiture as contraband]. [Property in possession of the
defendant is not deemed property of another person who has only a security interest in the
property, even if legal title is in the creditor pursuant to a security agreement.]
23.01.B.03 Definition of “Traffic
“Traffic” means to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of stolen
property to another person, or to buy, receive, possess or obtain control of stolen property,
with the intent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of the property to
another person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2301 (statutory language as of January 1, 2006) and 13-1801 (statutory
language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: The definitions are to be used for the purposes of §§ 13-2305, 13-2306 and 13-
2307.
Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
23.01.C.01 Definition of “Animal Activity”
“Animal activity” means a commercial enterprise that uses animals for food, clothing or
fiber production, agriculture or biotechnology.
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23.01.C.02 Definition of “Animal Facility”
“Animal facility” means a building or premises where a commercial activity in which the
use of animals is essential takes place, including a zoo, rodeo, circus, amusement park,
hunting preserve and horse and dog event.
23.01.C.03 Definition of “Animal or Ecological Terrorism”
“Animal or ecological terrorism” means any commission of the offense of “illegally
conducting an enterprise” that involves all of the following:
1. At least three persons acted in concert; and
2. The offense involved the intentional or knowing infliction of property damage; and
3. The damage exceeded ten thousand dollars to the property; and
4. The property was used by a person for the operation of a [lawfully conducted animal
activity] [commercial enterprise that is engaged in a lawfully operated animal facility
or research facility]; and
5. [A deadly weapon or dangerous instrument was used] [Serious physical injury was
intentionally or knowingly inflicted on a person engaged in a lawfully conducted
animal activity or participating in a lawfully conducted animal facility or research
facility].
23.01.C.04 Definition of “Biological Agent”
“Biological agent” means any microorganism, virus, infectious substance or biological
product that may be engineered through biotechnology or any naturally occurring or
bioengineered component of any microorganism, virus, infectious substance or biological
product and that is capable of causing [death, disease or physical injury in a human, animal,
plant or other living organism] [the deterioration or contamination of air, food, water,
equipment, supplies or material of any kind].
23.01.C.05 Definition of “Combination”
“Combination” means persons who collaborate in carrying on or furthering the activities
or purposes of a criminal syndicate even though such persons may not know each other’s
identity, membership in the combination changes from time to time or one or more
members may stand in a wholesaler-retailer or other arm’s length relationship with others as
to activities or dealings between or among themselves in an illicit operation.
23.01.C.06 Definition of “Communication Service Provider”
“Communication service provider” means any person who is engaged in providing a
service that allows its users to send or receive oral, wire or electronic communications or
computer services.
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23.01.C.07 Definition of “Criminal Syndicate”
“Criminal syndicate” means any combination of persons or enterprises engaging, or
having the purpose of engaging, on a continuing basis in conduct that violates any one or
more provisions of any felony statute of this state.
23.01.C.08 Definition of “Explosive Agent”
“Explosive agent” means an [“explosive”] [flammable fuels in amounts over fifty
gallons] [fire accelerants in amounts over fifty gallons].
[“Explosive agent” excludes (fireworks*) (firearms) (a propellant actuated device)
(propellant actuated industrial tool) (a device that is commercially manufactured primarily for
the purpose of illumination) ( a rocket having a propellant charge of less than four ounces).]
[“Explosive” means any dynamite, nitroglycerin, black powder or other similar explosive
material including plastic explosives. The term “explosive” does not include ammunition or
ammunition components such as primers, percussion caps, smokeless powder, black powder
and black powder substitutes used for hand loading purposes.]
23.01.C.09 Definition of “Material Support or Resources”
“Material support or resources” includes money or other financial securities, financial
services, lodging, sustenance, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel,
transportation, disguises and other physical assets but does not include medical assistance,
legal assistance or religious materials.
23.01.C.10 Definition of “Public Establishment”
“Public establishment” means [a structure that is owned, leased or operated by this state
or a political subdivision of this state] [a health care institution].**
23.01.C.11 Definition of “Research Facility”
“Research facility” means a laboratory, institution, medical care facility, government
facility, public or private educational institution or nature preserve at which a scientific test,
experiment or investigation involving the use of animals is lawfully carried out, conducted or
attempted.
23.01.C.12 Definition of “Terrorism”
“Terrorism” means any felony, including any completed or preparatory offense that
involves the use of a deadly weapon or a weapon of mass destruction or the intentional or
knowing infliction of serious physical injury with the intent to either:
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(a) influence the policy or affect the conduct of this state or any of the political
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of this state.
(b) cause substantial damage to or substantial interruption of public communications,
communication service providers, public transportation, common carriers, public
utilities, public establishments or other public services.
23.01.C.13 Definition of “Toxin”
“Toxin” means the toxic material of plants, animals, microorganisms, viruses, fungi or
infectious substances or a recombinant molecule, whatever its origin or method of
reproduction, including:
(a) any poisonous substance or biological product that may be engineered through
biotechnology and that is produced by a living organism.
(b) any poisonous isomer or biological product, homolog or derivative of such
substance.
23.01.C.14 Definition of “Vector”
“Vector” means a living organism or molecule, including a recombinant molecule or
biological product that may be engineered through biotechnology, that is capable of carrying
a biological agent or toxin to a host.
23.01.C.15 Definition of “Weapon of Mass Destruction”
“Weapon of mass destruction” means:
(a) any device or object that is designed or that the person intends to use to cause
multiple deaths or serious physical injuries through the use of an explosive agent or
the release, dissemination or impact of a toxin, biological agent, poisonous chemical,
or its precursor, or any vector.
(b) except as authorized and used in accordance with a license, registration or
exemption by the radiation regulatory agency any device or object that is designed or
that the person intends to use to release radiation or radioactivity at a level that is
dangerous to human life.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2301(statutory language as of January 1, 2006), 13-3101 (statutory
language as of September 21, 2006) and 13-3001 (statutory language as of August 22, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
“Fireworks” is defined in A.R.S. § 36-1601.
“Health care institution” is defined in A.R.S. § 36-401.
“Dangerous instrument” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0511).
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“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510).
“Serious physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0534).
23.01.D.01 Definition of “Control”
“Control,” in relation to an enterprise, means the possession of sufficient means to
permit substantial direction over the affairs of an enterprise and, in relation to property,
means to acquire or possess.
23.01.D.02 Definition of “Enterprise”
“Enterprise” means any corporation, partnership, association, labor union or other legal
entity or any group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity.
23.01.D.03 Definition of “Financial Institution”
“Financial institution” means any business under the jurisdiction of the department of
financial institutions or a banking or securities regulatory agency of the United States, a
business coming within the definition of a bank, financial agency or financial institution or a
business under the jurisdiction of the securities division of the corporation commission, the
state real estate department or the department of insurance.
23.01.D.04 Definition of “Racketeering”
“Racketeering” means any act, including any preparatory or completed offense, that is
chargeable or indictable under the laws of the state or country in which the act occurred
[and, if the act occurred in a state or country other than this state, that would be chargeable
or indictable under the laws of this state if the act had occurred in this state], and that would
be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under the laws of this state [and, if
the act occurred in a state or country other than this state, under the laws of the state or
country in which the act occurred, regardless of whether the act is charged or indicted], and
the act involves
[terrorism, animal terrorism or ecological terrorism that results or is intended to result in
a risk of serious physical injury or death.]
[any of the following acts if committed for financial gain:
(i) Homicide.
(ii) Robbery.
(iii) Kidnapping.
(iv) Forgery.
(v) Theft.
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(vi) Bribery.
(vii) Gambling.
(viii) Usury.
(ix) Extortion.
(x) Extortionate extensions of credit.
(xi) Prohibited drugs, marijuana or other prohibited chemicals or substances.
(xii) Trafficking in explosives, weapons or stolen property.
(xiii) Participating in a criminal syndicate.
(xiv) Obstructing or hindering criminal investigations or prosecutions.
(xv) Asserting false claims including, but not limited to, false claims asserted through
fraud or arson.
(xvi) Intentional or reckless false statements or publications concerning land for sale
or lease or sale of subdivided lands or sale and mortgaging of unsubdivided
lands.
(xvii) Resale of realty with intent to defraud.
(xviii) Intentional or reckless fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.
(xix) Intentional or reckless sale of unregistered securities or real property securities.
(xx) A scheme or artifice to defraud.
(xxi) Obscenity.
(xxii) Sexual exploitation of a minor.
(xxiii) Prostitution.
(xxiv) Restraint of trade or commerce [in violation of A.R.S. § 34-252].
(xxv) Terrorism.
(xxvi) Money laundering.
(xxvii) Obscene or indecent telephone communications to minors for commercial
purposes.
(xxviii) Counterfeiting marks [as proscribed in A.R.S. § 44-1453].
(xxix) Animal terrorism or ecological terrorism.
(xxx) Smuggling of human beings.]
(xxxi) child prostitution.
(xxxii) sex trafficking.
(xxxiii) trafficking of persons for forced labor or services.]
(xxxiv) manufacturing, selling or distributing misbranded drugs [in violation of A.R.S.
§ 13-3406(A)(9)].
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23.01.D.05 Definition of “Records”
“Records” means any book, paper, writing, computer program, data, image or
information that is collected, recorded, preserved or maintained in any form of storage
medium.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2301(statutory language as of July 3, 2015).
U
SE NOTE: The definitions are to be used for the purposes of §§ 13-2312, 13-2313, 13-2304
and 13-2315.
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
23.01.E.01 Definition of “Access
“Access” means to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from or
otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system or network.
23.01.E.02 Definition of “Access Device”
“Access device” means any card, token, code, account number, electronic serial number,
mobile or personal identification number, password, encryption key, biometric identifier or
other means of account access, including a canceled or revoked access device, that can be
used alone or in conjunction with another access device to obtain money, goods, services,
computer or network access or any other thing of value or that can be used to initiate a
transfer of any thing of value.
23.01.E.03 Definition of “Computer”
“Computer” means an electronic device that performs logic, arithmetic or memory
functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.
23.01.E.04 Definition of “Computer Contaminant”
“Computer contaminant” means any set of computer instructions that is designed to
modify, damage, destroy, record or transmit information within a computer, computer
system or network without the intent or permission of the owner of the information,
computer system or network. Computer contaminant includes a group of computer
instructions, such as viruses or worms, that is self-replicating or self-propagating and that is
designed to contaminate other computer programs or computer data, to consume computer
resources, to modify, destroy, record or transmit data or in some other fashion to usurp the
normal operation of the computer, computer system or network.
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23.01.E.05 Definition of “Computer Program”
“Computer program” means a series of instructions or statements, in a form acceptable
to a computer that permits the functioning of a computer system in a manner designed to
provide appropriate product from the computer system.
23.01.E.06 Definition of “Computer Software”
“Computer software” means a set of computer programs, procedures and associated
documentation concerned with the operation of a computer system.
23.01.E.07 Definition of “Computer System”
“Computer system” means a set of related, connected or unconnected computer
equipment, devices and software, including storage, media and peripheral devices
23.01.E.08 Definition of “Critical Infrastructure Resource”
“Critical infrastructure resource” means any computer or communications system or
network that is involved in providing services necessary to ensure or protect the public
health, safety or welfare, including services that are provided by any of the following:
(a) medical personnel and institutions.
(b) emergency services agencies.
(c) public and private utilities, including water, power, communications and
transportation services.
(d) fire departments, districts or volunteer organizations.
(e) law enforcement agencies.
(f) financial institutions.
(g) public educational institutions.
(h) government agencies.
23.01.E.09 Definition of “False or Fraudulent Pretense”
“False or fraudulent pretense” means the unauthorized use of an access device or the
use of an access device to exceed authorized access.
23.01.E.10 Definition of “Financial Instrument”
“Financial instrument” means any [check] [draft] [money order] [certificate of deposit]
[letter of credit] [bill of exchange] [credit card] [marketable security] [any written instrument]
that is transferable for value.
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[“Written instrument” means:
(a) any paper, document or other instrument that contains written or printed matter or
its equivalent; or
(b) any token, stamp, seal, badge, trademark, graphical image, access device or other
evidence or symbol of value, right, privilege or identification.]
23.01.E.11 Definition of “Network”
“Network” includes a complex of interconnected computer or communication systems
of any type.
23.01.E.12 Definition of “Property”
“Property” means financial instruments, information, including electronically produced
data, computer software and programs in either machine or human readable form, and
anything of value, tangible or intangible.
23.01.E.13 Definition of “Proprietary or Confidential Computer Security
Information”
“Proprietary or confidential computer security information” means information about a
particular computer, computer system or network that relates to its access devices, security
practices, methods and systems, architecture, communications facilities, encryption methods
and system vulnerabilities and that is not made available to the public by its owner or
operator.
23.01.E.14 Definition of “Services”
“Services” includes computer time, data processing, storage functions and all types of
communication functions.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2301 (statutory language as of January 1, 2006) and 13-2001 (statutory
language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: The definitions are to be used for the purposes of §§ 13-2316, 13-2316.01 and
13-2316.02.
23.05 Permissible Inferences Relating to Theft under A.R.S. §§ 13-1802(A)(5)
and 13-1814(A)(5)
The defendant has been accused of [theft] [theft of means of transportation] by
controlling [property of another] [another person’s means of transportation] knowing or
having reason to know that the property was stolen.
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[Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, may give
rise to an inference that the defendant (was aware of the risk that such property had
been stolen/in some way participated in its theft).]
[Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price substantially below its fair
market value, unless satisfactorily explained, may give rise to an inference that the
defendant was aware of the risk that it had been stolen.]
[Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property by a dealer in property, (out of the
regular course of business/without the usual indication of ownership other than mere
possession), unless satisfactorily explained, may give rise to an inference that the
defendant was aware of the risk that it had been stolen.]
You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the offense of [theft] [theft of means of
transportation] beyond a reasonable doubt before you can find the defendant guilty.
[In considering whether possession of recently stolen property has been satisfactorily
explained, you are reminded that in the exercise of constitutional rights, a defendant need
not testify. Possession may be satisfactorily explained through other circumstances and other
evidence, independent of any testimony by a defendant.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-1802(C) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006); 13-1814(B)
(statutory language as of December 28, 1998); 13-2305 (statutory language as of 1987); State
v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1233, 1237-38 (App. 1986).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
The last paragraph is bracketed and should only be given if requested by the defendant.
It is important to caution the jury that the inference is not mandatory and that the jury
must look at all the facts and circumstances of the case in deciding whether the presumption
should be applied. State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986)
(recommending that the language as contained in this instruction is preferable, because it
expressly tells the jury that it is not compelled to draw the inference).
The use of the term “may give rise to an inference,” which is contained in the text of
this instruction, was specifically approved in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 569, 724 P.2d at 1238.
The bracketed paragraph pertaining to the defendant’s constitutional right not to testify
was specifically approved verbatim in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 568, 724 P.2d at 1237 (citing
to Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973)).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Control” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(2)).
“Issue” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 18.01(7)).
“Means of transportation” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 18.01(9)).
“Property” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(12)).
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“Property of another” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction
18.01(13)).
“Value” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Definition Instruction 18.01(15)).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
“Vehicle” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0536).
C
OMMENT: In State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 567, 724 P.2d 1236 (App. 1986), the court of
appeals, while noting that the statute speaks of inferences, not presumptions, held that an
instruction not worded in a manner consistent with the text of this instruction created an
unconstitutional mandatory presumption. The use of the instruction as worded above
maintains the permissive feature of the inference and satisfies due process. Id. at 568, 724
P.2d at 1237.
An instruction
that allows for a permissible inference under A.R.S. § 13-2305 d
oes not
amount to a comment on the evidence.
State v. Dixon, 127 Ariz. 554, 560, 622 P.2d 501, 507
(App. 1981).
23.06 Possession of Altered Property
The crime of possession of altered property requires proof that the defendant:
1. was a “dealer in property”; and
2. recklessly possessed property the permanent identifying features of which, includi
ng
serial numbers or lab
els, had been removed or in any fashion altered.
“Dealer in property” means a person who buys and sells property as a business.
It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the defendant had lawfully
obtained a special serial number or lawfully possessed the usual indicia of ownership in
addition to mere possession or had obtained the consent of the manufacturer of the
property.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2306 (statutory language as of October 1, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c)).
“Possess” and “possession” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory
Definition Instruction 1.0530 and 1.0535).
The affirmative
defense instruction is Statutory Criminal Instruction 2.025.
23.07.01 Trafficking in Stolen Property in the Second Degree
The crime of trafficking in stolen property in the second degree requires proof that the
defendant:
1. trafficked in the property of another; and
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2. was reckless concerning whether the property had been stolen.
“Traffic” means to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of stolen
property to another person, or to buy, receive, possess, or obtain control of stolen property,
with the intent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of the property to
another person.
“Stolen property” means property of another that has been the subject of any unlawful
taking.
“Property of another” means property in which any person other than the defendant has
an interest on which the defendant is not privileged to infringe.
“Property” means anything of value, tangible or intangible, including trade secrets.
“Control” or “exercise control” means to act so as to exclude others from using their
property except on the defendant’s own terms.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2307(A) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); 13-2301
(statutory language as of January 1, 2006); 13-1801 (statutory language as of September 30,
2009).
U
SE NOTE: The inference(s) in A.R.S. § 13-2305 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.05)
should be given when appropriate.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c)).
C
OMMENT: The court of appeals in State v. Noriega, 144 Ariz. 258, 259, 697 P.2d 341, 342
(App. 1984), held that a jury instruction on trafficking in stolen property in the second
degree needs to include a reckless culpable mental state in regard to whether the property
had been stolen.
23.07.02 Trafficking in Stolen Property in the First Degree
The crime of trafficking in stolen property in the first degree requires proof of the
following:
1. the defendant knowingly [initiated] [organized] [planned] [financed] [directed]
[managed] [supervised] the theft of the property of another; and
2. the defendant knowingly [initiated] [organized] [planned] [financed] [directed]
[managed] [supervised] the trafficking in the same property; and
3. the defendant knew such property was stolen.
“Traffic” means to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of stolen
property to another person, or to buy, receive, possess, or obtain control of stolen property,
with the intent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of the property to
another person.
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“Stolen property” means property of another that has been the subject of any unlawful
taking.
“Property of another” means property in which any person other than the defendant has
an interest on which the defendant is not privileged to infringe.
“Property” means anything of value, tangible or intangible, including trade secrets.
“Control” or “exercise control” means to act so as to exclude others from using their
property except on the defendant’s own terms.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2307(B) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); 13-2301 (statutory
language as of January 1, 2006); 13-1801 (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The inference(s) in A.R.S. § 13-2305 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.05) should be
given when appropriate.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
C
OMMENT: Trafficking in the second degree is a lesser included offense of trafficking in the
first degree. State v. DiGiulio, 172 Ariz. 156, 835 P.2d 488 (App. 1992). Because the jury
instruction omitted reference to “the theft,” the court found that the instruction lacked the
element that the defendant must participate in the theft of the property. Id. at 161, 493.
23.08.A Participating in a Criminal Syndicate
The crime of participating in a criminal syndicate requires proof that the defendant
[intentionally organized, managed, directed, supervised or financed a criminal syndicate
with the intent to promote or further the criminal objectives of the syndicate.]
[knowingly incited or induced others to engage in violence or intimidation to promote or
further the criminal objectives of a criminal syndicate.]
[furnished advice or direction in the conduct, financing or management of a criminal
syndicate’s affairs with the intent to promote or further the criminal objectives of a
criminal syndicate.]
[intentionally promoted or furthered the criminal objectives of a criminal syndicate by
inducing or committing any act or omission by a public servant in violation of his official
duty.]
“Criminal syndicate” means any combination of persons or enterprises that engaged, or
had the purpose of engaging, on a continuing basis in conduct that violated any one or more
provisions of any felony statute of this state.
“Combination” means persons who collaborate in carrying on or furthering the activities
or purposes of a criminal syndicate even though such persons may not know each other’s
identity, membership in the combination changes from time to time or one or more
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members may stand in a wholesaler-retailer or other arm’s length relationship with others as
to activities or dealings between or among themselves in an illicit operation.
“Enterprise” includes any corporation, association, labor union or other legal entity.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2308 (statutory language as of September 19, 2007); 13-2301
(statutory language as of January 1, 2006); 13-105 (statutory language as of September 21,
2006).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Public servant” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0533).
Comment: The statute provides that “a person shall not be convicted” of any offense in
§ 13-2308(A) “on the basis of accountability as an accomplice unless he participates in
violating” 13-2308(A) “in one of the ways specified.” A.R.S. § 13-2308(B).
If the defendant has been charged under A.R.S. § 13-2308(A)(5), use Statutory Criminal
Instruction 23.08.A.5.
23.08.A.5 Involving a Minor in Participating in a Criminal Syndicate
The crime of involving a minor in participating in a criminal syndicate requires proof
that the defendant [hired] [engaged] [used] a minor for the purpose of [completing]
[preparing to complete] any of the following:
[intentionally organizing, managing, directing, supervising or financing a criminal
syndicate with the intent to promote or further the criminal objectives of the syndicate.]
[knowingly inciting or inducing others to engage in violence or intimidation to promote
or further the criminal objectives of a criminal syndicate.]
[furnishing advice or direction in the conduct, financing or management of a criminal
syndicate’s affairs with the intent to promote or further the criminal objectives of a
criminal syndicate.]
[intentionally promoting or furthering the criminal objectives of a criminal syndicate by
inducing or committing any act or omission by a public servant in violation of his official
duty.]
“Criminal syndicate” means any combination of persons or enterprises that engaged, or
had the purpose of engaging, on a continuing basis in conduct that violated any one or more
provisions of any felony statute of this state.
“Combination” means persons who collaborate in carrying on or furthering the activities
or purposes of a criminal syndicate even though such persons may not know each other’s
identity, membership in the combination changes from time to time or one or more
members may stand in a wholesaler-retailer or other arm’s length relationship with others as
to activities or dealings between or among themselves in an illicit operation.
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“Enterprise” includes any corporation, association, labor union or other legal entity.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2308(A)(5) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007); 13-2301
(statutory language as of January 1, 2006); 13-105 (statutory language as of September 21,
2006).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Public servant” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0533).
C
OMMENT: The statute provides that “a person shall not be convicted” of any offense in
§ 13-2308(A) “on the basis of accountability as an accomplice unless he participates in
violating” 13-2308(A) “in one of the ways specified.” A.R.S. § 13-2308(B).
23.08.C Assisting a Criminal Syndicate
The crime of assisting a criminal syndicate requires proof that the defendant committed
[fill in the felony offense whether completed or preparatory] with the intent to promote or further the
criminal objectives of a criminal syndicate.
“Criminal syndicate” means any combination of persons or enterprises that engaged, or
had the purpose of engaging, on a continuing basis in conduct that violated any one or more
provisions of any felony statute of this state.
“Enterprise” includes any corporation, association, labor union or other legal entity.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2308(C) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007); 13-2301
(statutory language as of January 1, 2006); 13-105 (statutory language as of September 21,
2006).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
23.08.01 Terrorism
The crime of terrorism requires proof that the defendant intentionally or knowingly:
[engaged in an act of terrorism.]
[organized, managed, directed, supervised or financed an act of terrorism.]
[solicited, incited or induced others to promote or further an act of terrorism.]
[[without lawful authority] [when exceeding lawful authority], manufactured, sold,
delivered, displayed, used, made accessible to others, possessed or exercised control over
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a weapon of mass destruction knowing or having reason to know that the device or
object involved was a weapon of mass destruction.]
[made property available to another, by transaction, transportation or otherwise,
knowing or having reason to know that the property was intended to facilitate an act of
terrorism.]
[provided advice, assistance or direction in the conduct, financing or management of an
act of terrorism knowing or having reason to know that an act of terrorism had occurred
or may have resulted by:
(a) harboring or concealing any person or property.
(b) warning any person of impending discovery, apprehension, prosecution or
conviction. This subdivision does not apply to a warning that is given in connection
with an effort to bring another person into compliance with the law.
(c) providing any person with material support or resources or any other means of
avoiding discovery, apprehension, prosecution or conviction. “Material support or
resources” includes money or other financial securities, financial services, lodging,
sustenance, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel, transportation, disguises and other physical assets but does not include
medical assistance, legal assistance or religious materials.
(d) concealing or disguising the nature, location, source, ownership or control of
material support or resources.
(e) preventing or obstructing by means of force, deception or intimidation anyone from
performing an act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution or
conviction of any person or that might aid in the prevention of an act of terrorism.
(f) suppressing by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction any physical
evidence that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution or conviction of
any person or that might aid in the prevention of an act of terrorism.
(g) concealing the identity of any person.]
[provided advice, assistance or direction in the conduct, financing or management of a
terrorist organization]
“Terrorism” means any felony, including any completed or preparatory offense, that
involved the use of a deadly weapon or a weapon of mass destruction or the intentional or
knowing infliction of serious physical injury with the intent to:
(a) influence the policy or affect the conduct of this state or any of the political
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of this state, or
(b) cause substantial damage to or substantial interruption of public communications,
communication service providers, public transportation, common carriers, public
utilities, public establishments or other public services.
(c) Intimidate or coerce a civilian population and further the goals, desires, aims, public
pronouncements, manifestos or political objectives of any terrorist organization.
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“Terrorist organization” means any organization that is designated by the United States
Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 United States Code section 1189).
“Weapon of mass destruction” means:
(a) any device or object that was/is designed or that the person intended to use to cause
multiple deaths or serious physical injuries through the use of an explosive agent or
the release, dissemination or impact of a toxin, biological agent, poisonous chemical,
or its precursor, or any vector.
(b) except as authorized and used in accordance with a license, registration or
exemption by the radiation regulatory agency, any device or object that was designed
or that the person intended to use to release radiation or radioactivity at a level that
was dangerous to human life.
“Explosive agent” means an [“explosive”] [flammable fuels in amounts over fifty
gallons] [fire accelerants in amounts over fifty gallons].
[“Explosive agent” excludes (fireworks) (firearms) (a propellant actuated device)
(propellant actuated industrial tool) (a device that is commercially manufactured primarily for
the purpose of illumination) (a rocket having a propellant charge of less than four ounces).]
“Vector” means a living organism or molecule, including a recombinant molecule or
biological product engineered through biotechnology that was/is capable of carrying a
biological agent or toxin to a host.
“Biological agent” means any microorganism, virus, infectious substance or biological
product that may be engineered through biotechnology or any naturally occurring or
bioengineered component of any microorganism, virus, infectious substance or biological
product and that was/is capable of causing [death, disease or physical injury in a human,
animal, plant or other living organism] [the deterioration or contamination of air, food,
water, equipment, supplies or material of any kind].
“Toxin” means the toxic material of plants, animals, microorganisms, viruses, fungi or
infectious substances or a recombinant molecule, whatever its origin or method of
reproduction, including:
(a) any poisonous substance or biological product engineered through biotechnology
and that was/is produced by a living organism.
(b) any poisonous isomer or biological product, homolog or derivative of such
substance.
[“Communication service provider” means any person who is engaged in providing a
service that allows its users to send or receive oral, wire or electronic communications or
computer services.]
[“Public establishment” means [a structure that is owned, leased or operated by this state
or a political subdivision of this state] [a health care institution].]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2308.01 (statutory language as of August 9, 2017) and 13-3001
(statutory language as of August 22, 2002).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
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Use bracketed language as appropriate to the case.
“Intentionally” and “knowingly” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(b)).
“Dangerous instrument” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0511).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0510).
“Serious physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal Instruction
1.0534).
If the jury finds one aggravating circumstance listed in A.R.S. § 13-702(C), the court
may impose a life sentence. A.R.S. § 13-2308.01(C). If an aggravating circumstance is
alleged, use the Aggravating Circumstance instructions.
COMMENT: The statute further provides that this section does not apply to any person who
is permitted or licensed pursuant to Title 30, chapter 4 and 10 Code of Federal Regulations
part 30, or is a member or employee of the armed forces of the United States, a federal or
state governmental agency or any political subdivision of a state, a charitable, scientific or
educational institution or a private entity provided: (1) the person is engaged in lawful
activity within the scope of the person’s employment and the person is otherwise duly
authorized or licensed to manufacture, possess, sell, deliver, display, use, exercise control
over or make accessible to others any weapon of mass destruction or to otherwise engage in
any activity described in this paragraph, and (2) the person is in compliance with all
applicable federal and state laws in doing so.
23.08.01.A.4 Terrorism
This instruction has been incorporated into Statutory Criminal 23.08.01.
23.08.02.A Making a Terrorist Threat
The crime of Making a Terrorist Threat requires proof that the defendant:
1. Threatened to commit an act of terrorism; and
2. Communicated the threat to any other person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2308.02(A) (effective August 9, 2017).
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SE NOTE: The statute, A.R.S. §13-2308.02(A), was written without prescribing a culpable
mental state. See A.R.S. § 13-202(B); State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 487, 698 P.2d 732 (1985).
A.R.S. § 13-2308.02(C) provides that it is not a defense to a prosecution under this
section that the person did not have the intent or capability of committing the act of
terrorism.
“Terrorism” means any felony, including any completed or preparatory offense, that
involves the use of a deadly weapon or a weapon of mass destruction or the intentional or
knowing infliction of serious physical injury with the intent to do any of the following:
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(a) Influence the policy or affect the conduct of this state or any of the political
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of this state.
(b) Cause substantial damage to or substantial interruption of public communications,
communication service providers, public transportation, common carriers, public utilities,
public establishments or other public services.
(c) Intimidate or coerce a civilian population and further the goals, desires, aims, public
pronouncements, manifestos or political objectives of any terrorist organization.
A.R.S. §13-2301(C)(12).
23.08.02.B False Reporting of Terrorism
The crime of False Reporting of Terrorism requires proof that the defendant knowingly:
1. Made a false report of an act of terrorism; and
2. Communicated the false report to any other person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2308.02(B) (effective August 9, 2017).
U
SE NOTE: A.R.S. § 13-2308.02(C) provides that it is not a defense to a prosecution under
this section that the person did not have the intent or capability of committing the act of
terrorism.
“Terrorism” means any felony, including any completed or preparatory offense, that
involves the use of a deadly weapon or a weapon of mass destruction or the intentional or
knowing infliction of serious physical injury with the intent to do any of the following:
(a) Influence the policy or affect the conduct of this state or any of the political
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of this state.
(b) Cause substantial damage to or substantial interruption of public communications,
communication service providers, public transportation, common carriers, public utilities,
public establishments or other public services.
(c) Intimidate or coerce a civilian population and further the goals, desires, aims, public
pronouncements, manifestos or political objectives of any terrorist organization.
A.R.S. §13-2301(C)(12).
23.08.03 Unlawful Use of Infectious Biological substance or Radiological Agent
The crime of Unlawful Use of Infectious Biological Substance or Radiological Agent
requires proof that the defendant:
[intentionally caused injury to another person by means of [an infectious biological
substance] [a radiological agent]]
[intentionally or knowingly possessed [an infectious biological substance] [a radiological
agent] with the intent to injure another person]
[intentionally or knowingly manufactured, sold, gave, distributed, or used [an infectious
biological substance] [a radiological agent] with the intent to injure another person]
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[intentionally or knowingly destroyed, damaged, attempted to destroy, or attempted to
damage any facility, equipment, or material involved in the sale, manufacture, storage, or
distribution of [an infectious biological substance] [a radiological agent] with the intent
to injure another person by the release of the [substance][agent]]
[intentionally or knowingly gave, sent, placed in a public or private place [a simulated
infectious biological substance] [a simulated radiological agent] with the intent to terrify,
intimidate, threaten, or harass]
[intentionally or knowingly transported any radiological isotope or agent for the purpose
of committing [INSERT ANOTHER ACT IN VIOLATION OF THIS SECTION]]
[intentionally or knowingly adulterated or misbranded any radiological isotope]
[intentionally or knowingly manufactured, held, sold or offered to sell any radiological
isotope that is adulterated or misbranded]
[intentionally or knowingly altered, mutilated, destroyed, obliterated or removed any part
of the labeling of a radiological isotope]
[intentionally or knowingly engaged in any other act with respect to a radiological
isotope if the act was done when the article was possessed, transferred, transported or
held for sale and resulted in the article being adulterated or misbranded]
“Infectious biological substance" includes any bacteria, virus, fungus, protozoa, prion,
toxin or material found in nature that is capable of causing death or serious physical injury,
but does not include human immunodeficiency virus, syphilis or hepatitis.
“Radiological agent” includes any substance that is able to release radiation at levels that
are capable of causing death or serious bodily injury or at any level if used with the intent to
terrify, intimidate, threaten or harass.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2308.03 (effective August 9, 2017).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
A.R.S. § 13-2308.03(B)(4) provides that the placing or sending of a simulated infectious
biological substance or radiological agent without written notice attached to the substance or
agent in a conspicuous place that the substance or agent has been rendered inert and is
possessed for a curio or relic collection, display or other similar purpose is prima facie
evidence of an intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten or harass.
A.R.S. § 13-2308.03(C) provides that the possession of an infectious biological substance
or a radiological agent, unless satisfactorily explained, may give rise to an inference that the
person who is in possession of the substance or agent is aware of the risk that the substance
or agent may be used to commit an act in violation of this section.
A.R.S. § 13-2308.03(D) provides that this section does not apply to any person who is
permitted or licensed pursuant to title 30, chapter 4 and 10 code of federal regulations part
30, a member or employee of the armed forces of the United States, a federal or state
governmental agency or any political subdivision of a state, a charitable, scientific or
educational institution or a private entity if both of the following apply:
1. the person is engaged in lawful activity within the scope of the person’s employment
and the person is otherwise duly authorized or licensed to manufacture, possess, sell,
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deliver, display, use, exercise control over or make accessible to others any weapon
of mass destruction, infectious biological substance or radiological agent or to
otherwise engage in any activity described in this paragraph.
2. the person is in compliance with all applicable federal and state laws in doing so.
23.09 Bribery of a Sports Participant
The crime of bribery of a sports participant requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly [gave] [promised] [offered] to any “sports participant” any
benefit; and
2. The defendant’s conduct was done with the intent to influence that person to [lose]
[try to lose] [cause to be lost] [limit that person’s or that person’s team’s margin of
victory or defeat].
or
2. The defendant’s conduct was done with the intent to affect the [referee’s] [other
official’s] decisions or the performance of the [referee’s] [other official’s] duties in
any way, in a “sports event” in which the [referee] [other official] took part or was
expected to take part or had any duty or connection with the “sporting event.”
“Sports participant” means [insert the name of the participant from the list in the Use
Note alleged to have been bribed].
“Sports event” means [insert the name of the event from the list in the Use Note in
question.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2309 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” and “knowingly” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(b)).
“Sports event” is a baseball, football, hockey or basketball game, boxing, tennis, horse
race, dog race, or polo match, or any professional or amateur sport, or game.
“Sports participant” is professional or amateur baseball, football, hockey, polo, tennis,
horse race, dog race or basketball player or boxer or any player or referee or other official
who participated or expected to participate in any professional or amateur game or sport, or
to any manager, coach or trainer of any team or participant or prospective participant in any
such game, contest or sport.
Instruction 23.10 Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices
The crime of fraudulent schemes and artifices requires proof that the defendant
knowingly:
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1. Used false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises or material omissions;
and
2. acted pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud; and
3. as a result, obtained any benefit.
[The State must prove that the scheme or artifice to defraud was intended to defraud,
meaning it was intended to mislead another person for the purpose of gaining some benefit.]
Reliance on the part of any person is not required to prove this offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2310 (statutory language as of August 3, 2018); 13-105 (statutory
language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Benefit” and “Knowingly” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(b)).
If the offense involved a benefit of $100,000.00 or more or the manufacture, sale or
marketing of opioids, the defendant is not eligible for suspension of sentence, probation,
pardon or release from prison except pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-233(A) or (B), until the
sentence has been served, the defendant is eligible for release pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-
1604.07 or the sentence is commuted. A.R.S. § 13-2310(C). The jury must decide the value
of the benefit and/or whether the offense involved the manufacturer, sale or marketing of
opioids.
C
OMMENT: “[A] ‘scheme’ is a ‘plan,’ while an ‘artifice’ is an ‘evil or artful strategy.’ Thus, a
‘scheme or artifice’ is some ‘plan, device, or trick’ to perpetrate a fraud.” Ness v. Western Sec.
Life Ins. Co., 174 Ariz. 497, 503, 851 P.2d 122, 128 (App. 1992) (citing State v. Haas, 138 Ariz.
413, 675 P.2d 673 (1983)).
The bracketed language is not in the statute and is based on State v. Bridgeforth, 156 Ariz.
60, 750 P.2d 3 (1988).
23.11 Willful Concealment
The crime of willful concealment requires proof that the defendant, pursuant to a
scheme or artifice to defraud, in a matter related to the business conducted by any
department or agency of this State or any political subdivision, knowingly [falsified,
concealed or covered up a material fact by any trick, scheme or device] [made or used any
false writing or document knowing such writing or document contained any false, fictitious
or fraudulent statement or entry].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2311 (statutory language as of April 23, 1980).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
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For the purpose of this instruction, “agency” includes a public agency as defined by
A.R.S. § 38-502, paragraph 6. It is recommended that the name of the appropriate agency be
substituted for “agency” in the instruction.
C
OMMENT: “[A] ‘scheme’ is a ‘plan,’ while an ‘artifice’ is an ‘evil or artful strategy.’ Thus, a
‘scheme or artifice’ is some ‘plan, device, or trick’ to perpetrate a fraud.” Ness v. Western Sec.
Life Ins. Co., 174 Ariz. 497, 503, 851 P.2d 122, 128 (App. 1992) (citing State v. Haas, 138 Ariz.
413, 675 P.2d 673 (1983)).
23.12A Illegal Control of an Enterprise
The crime of illegal control of an enterprise requires proof that the defendant, through
“racketeering” or its proceeds, acquired or maintained, by investment or otherwise,
“control” of any “enterprise.”
“Racketeering” means any act, including any preparatory or completed offense, that is
chargeable or indictable under the laws of the state or country in which the act occurred
[and, if the act occurred in a state or country other than this state, that would be chargeable
or indictable under the laws of this state if the act had occurred in this state], and that would
be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under the laws of this state [and, if
the act occurred in a state or country other than this state, under the laws of the state or
country in which the act occurred, regardless of whether the act is charged or indicted], and
the act involves [terrorism, animal terrorism or ecological terrorism that results or is
intended to result in a risk of serious physical injury or death.] [any of the following acts if
committed for financial gain (insert crime from A.R.S. § 13-2301(D)(4)).]
“Control,” in relation to an enterprise, means the possession of sufficient means to
permit substantial direction over the affairs of an enterprise and, in relation to property,
means to acquire or possess.
“Enterprise” means any corporation, partnership, association, labor union or other legal
entity or any group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2312(A) (statutory language as of January 1, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language appropriate to the facts of the case.
23.12B Illegally Conducting an Enterprise
The crime of illegally conducting an enterprise requires proof that the defendant was
employed by or associated with an “enterprise” and the defendant [conducted the
enterprise’s affairs through “racketeering”] [participated directly or indirectly in the conduct
of the enterprise knowing that the enterprise was being conducted through “racketeering”].
“Racketeering” means any act, including any preparatory or completed offense, that is
chargeable or indictable under the laws of the state or country in which the act occurred
[and, if the act occurred in a state or country other than this state, that would be chargeable
or indictable under the laws of this state if the act had occurred in this state], and that would
be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under the laws of this state [and, if
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the act occurred in a state or country other than this state, under the laws of the state or
country in which the act occurred, regardless of whether the act is charged or indicted], and
the act involves [terrorism, animal terrorism or ecological terrorism that results or is
intended to result in a risk of serious physical injury or death.] [any of the following acts if
committed for financial gain (insert crime from A.R.S. § 13-2301(D)(4)).]
“Enterprise” means any corporation, partnership, association, labor union or other legal
entity or any group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2312(B) (statutory language as January 1, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language appropriate to the facts of the case.
23.12C(1) Illegal Control of an Enterprise Utilizing a Minor
The crime of illegal control of an enterprise utilizing a minor requires proof that the
defendant, through “racketeering” or its proceeds, acquired or maintained, by investment or
otherwise, “control” of any “enterprise” and the defendant hired, engaged, or used a person
under the age of eighteen for any conduct preparatory to or in completion of the offense.
“Racketeering” means any act, including any preparatory or completed offense, that is
chargeable or indictable under the laws of the state or country in which the act occurred
[and, if the act occurred in a state or country other than this state, that would be chargeable
or indictable under the laws of this state if the act had occurred in this state], and that would
be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under the laws of this state [and, if
the act occurred in a state or country other than this state, under the laws of the state or
country in which the act occurred, regardless of whether the act is charged or indicted], and
the act involves [terrorism, animal terrorism or ecological terrorism that results or is
intended to result in a risk of serious physical injury or death.] [any of the following acts if
committed for financial gain (insert crime from A.R.S. § 13-2301(D)(4)).]
“Enterprise” means any corporation, partnership, association, labor union or other legal
entity or any group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2312(C) (statutory language as of January 1, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language appropriate to the facts of the case.
23.12C(2) Illegally Conducting an Enterprise Utilizing a Minor
The crime of illegally conducting an enterprise utilizing a minor requires proof that the
defendant was employed by or associated with an “enterprise” and the defendant [conducted
the enterprise’s affairs through “racketeering”] [participated directly or indirectly in the
conduct of the enterprise knowing that the enterprise was being conducted through
“racketeering”] and the defendant hired, engaged, or used a person under the age of eighteen
for any conduct preparatory or in completion of the offense.
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“Racketeering” means any act, including any preparatory or completed offense, that is
chargeable or indictable under the laws of the state or country in which the act occurred
[and, if the act occurred in a state or country other than this state, that would be chargeable
or indictable under the laws of this state if the act had occurred in this state], and that would
be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under the laws of this state [and, if
the act occurred in a state or country other than this state, under the laws of the state or
country in which the act occurred, regardless of whether the act is charged or indicted], and
the act involves [terrorism, animal terrorism or ecological terrorism that results or is
intended to result in a risk of serious physical injury or death.] [any of the following acts if
committed for financial gain (insert crime from A.R.S. § 13-2301(D)(4)).]
“Enterprise” means any corporation, partnership, association, labor union or other legal
entity or any group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2312(C) (statutory language as of January 1, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language appropriate to the facts of the case.
23.16.A.1 Computer Tampering
The crime of computer tampering requires proof that:
1. The defendant [accessed] [altered] [damaged] [destroyed] a [computer] [computer
system] [network] [any part of a computer] [any part of a computer system] [any part
of a network]; and
2. The defendant’s conduct was [without authority] [in excess of defendant’s
authorization of use]; and
3. The defendant acted with the intent [to devise or execute any scheme or artifice to
defraud or deceive] [to control property or services by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations or promises].
[“Access” means to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from or
otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system or network.]
[“Computer” means an electronic device that performs logic, arithmetic or memory
functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.]
[“Computer system” means a set of related, connected or unconnected computer
equipment, devices and software, including storage, media and peripheral devices.]
[“False or fraudulent pretense” means the unauthorized use of an access device or the
use of an access device to exceed authorized access. “Access device” means any card, token,
code, account number, electronic serial number, mobile or personal identification number,
password, encryption key, biometric identifier or other means of account access, including a
canceled or revoked access device, that can be used alone or in conjunction with another
access device to obtain money, goods, services, computer or network access or any other
thing of value or that can be used to initiate a transfer of any thing of value.]
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[“Network” includes a complex of interconnected computer or communication systems
of any type.]
[“Property” means financial instruments, information, including electronically produced
data, computer software and programs in either machine or human readable form, and
anything of value, tangible or intangible.]
[“Services” includes computer time, data processing, storage functions and all types of
communication functions.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2316(A)(1) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000); definitions from
A.R.S. § 13-2301(E) (statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
23.16.A.2 Computer Tampering
The crime of computer tampering requires proof that the defendant, without authority
or in excess of defendant’s authorization of use, knowingly [altered] [damaged] [deleted]
[destroyed] any computer [program] [data].
“Computer” means an electronic device that performs logic, arithmetic or memory
functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.
“Computer system” means a set of related, connected or unconnected computer
equipment, devices and software, including storage, media and peripheral devices.
“Network” includes a complex of interconnected computer or communication systems
of any type.
[“Computer program” means a series of instructions or statements, in a form acceptable
to a computer, that permits the functioning of a computer system in a manner designed to
provide appropriate products from the computer system.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2316(A)(2) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000); definitions from
A.R.S. § 13-2301(E) (statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
The class of felony for this offense increases if the tampering was with a “critical
infrastructure resource.” See A.R.S. § 13-2316(E). If this allegation is made, the court will
need to include Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.16.E in the jury instructions and use the
verdict form set forth in the Use Note of that instruction.
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23.16.A.3 Computer Tampering
The crime of computer tampering requires proof that the defendant, [without authority]
[in excess of defendant’s authorization of use], knowingly introduced a computer
contaminant into any [computer] [computer system] [network].
“Computer contaminant” means any set of computer instructions that is designed to
modify, damage, destroy, record or transmit information within a computer, computer
system or network without the intent or permission of the owner of the information,
computer system or network. Computer contaminant includes a group of computer
instructions, such as viruses or worms, that is self-replicating or self-propagating and that is
designed to contaminate other computer programs or computer data, to consume computer
resources, to modify, destroy, record or transmit data or in some other fashion to usurp the
normal operation of the computer, computer system or network.
“Computer” means an electronic device that performs logic, arithmetic or memory
functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.
“Computer system” means a set of related, connected or unconnected computer
equipment, devices and software, including storage, media and peripheral devices.
“Network” includes a complex of interconnected computer or communication systems
of any type.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2316(A)(3) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000); definitions from
A.R.S. § 13-2301(E) (statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
The class of felony for this offense increases if the tampering was with a “critical
infrastructure resource.” See A.R.S. § 13-2316(E). If this allegation is made, the court will
need to include Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.16.E in the jury instructions and use the
verdict form set forth in the Use Note of that instruction.
23.16.A.4 Computer Tampering
The crime of computer tampering requires proof that the defendant, [without authority]
[in excess of defendant’s authorization of use], recklessly disrupted or caused the disruption
of [computer] [computer system] [network] services to any authorized user of a computer,
computer system or network.
or
The crime of computer tampering requires proof that the defendant, [without authority]
[in excess of defendant’s authorization of use], recklessly denied or caused the denial of
[computer] [network] services to any authorized user of a computer, computer system or
network.
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“Computer” means an electronic device that performs logic, arithmetic or memory
functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.
“Computer system” means a set of related, connected or unconnected computer
equipment, devices and software, including storage, media and peripheral devices.
“Network” includes a complex of interconnected computer or communication systems
of any type.
“Services” includes computer time, data processing, storage functions and all types of
communication functions.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2316(A)(4) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000); definitions from
A.R.S. § 13-2301(E) (statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c)).
The class of felony for this offense increases if the tampering was with a “critical
infrastructure resource.” See A.R.S. § 13-2316(E). If this allegation is made, the court will
need to include Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.16.E in the jury instructions and use the
verdict form set forth in the Use Note of that instruction.
23.16.A.5 Computer Tampering
The crime of computer tampering requires proof that:
1. The defendant recklessly used a [computer] [computer system] [network] to engage
in a [scheme] [course of conduct]; and
2. The defendant’s conduct was [without authority] [in excess of defendant’s
authorization of use]; and
3. The [scheme] [conduct] was directed at another person; and
4. The [scheme] [conduct] seriously [alarmed] [tormented] [threatened] [terrorized] the
person; and
5. The defendant’s conduct caused both a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress and served no legitimate purpose.
“Computer” means an electronic device that performs logic, arithmetic or memory
functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.
“Computer system” means a set of related, connected or unconnected computer
equipment, devices and software, including storage, media and peripheral devices.
“Network” includes a complex of interconnected computer or communication systems
of any type.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2316(A)(5) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000); definitions from
A.R.S. § 13-2301(E) (statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c)).
23.16.A.7 Computer Tampering
The crime of computer tampering requires proof that the defendant, [without authority]
[in excess of defendant’s authorization of use], knowingly obtained [any information that
was required by law to be kept confidential] [any records that were not public records] by
accessing a [computer] [computer system] [network] that was operated by [the State of
Arizona] [a political subdivision of the State of Arizona] [a medical institution].
“Access” means to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from or
otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system or network.
“Computer” means an electronic device that performs logic, arithmetic or memory
functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.
“Computer system” means a set of related, connected or unconnected computer
equipment, devices and software, including storage, media and peripheral devices.
“Network” includes a complex of interconnected computer or communication systems
of any type.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2316(A)(7) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000); definitions from
A.R.S. § 13-2301(E) (statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: In State v. Young, 223 Ariz. 447, 224 P.3d 447 (App. 2010), the court discussed
the elements of this particular offense. Regarding the issue of “authority,” the court wrote at
¶ 15:
Accordingly, the issue of authority for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-2316(A)(7)
turns on whether a person has authority to obtain the information or records
that are the object of the offense-not on whether the person has authority to
access the computer.
The court also addressed the meaning of the phrases “information that is required by
law to be kept confidential” and “any records that are not public records.” As to the first
phrase, the court noted that it “is easily understood” and information within that category
must be “protected by state or federal law.” See ¶¶ 20 and 21. Regarding the meaning of the
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phrase “any records that are not public records,” the court gave the phrase its plain meaning
and concluded that only “records that are not subject to the public records law: information
that must be kept confidential by law and private records” fall within that category. See ¶ 25.
23.16.A.8 Computer Tampering
The crime of computer tampering requires proof that the defendant, [without authority]
[in excess of defendant’s authorization of use], knowingly accessed a [computer] [computer
system] [network].
or
The crime of computer tampering requires proof that the defendant, [without authority]
[in excess of defendant’s authorization of use], knowingly accessed any [computer software]
[program] [data] that was contained in a [computer] [computer system] [network].
“Access” means to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from or
otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system or network.
“Computer” means an electronic device that performs logic, arithmetic or memory
functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.
“Computer program” means a series of instructions or statements, in a form acceptable
to a computer, that permits the functioning of a computer system in a manner designed to
provide appropriate products from the computer system.
Computer software” means a set of computer programs, procedures and associated
documentation concerned with the operation of a computer system.
“Computer system” means a set of related, connected or unconnected computer
equipment, devices and software, including storage, media and peripheral devices.
“Network” includes a complex of interconnected computer or communication systems
of any type.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2316(A)(8) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000); definitions from
A.R.S. § 13-2301(E) (statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
23.16.E Critical Infrastructure Instruction
If you find the defendant “guilty” of computer tampering, you then must determine
whether the computer, computer system or network involved was a “critical infrastructure
resource.” The State has the burden of proving this issue beyond a reasonable doubt.
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“Critical infrastructure resource” means any computer or communications system or
network that was involved in providing services necessary to ensure or protect the public
health, safety or welfare, including services that were provided by [insert the name of the
entity that provided the services; see the Use Note for the entity types listed in the statute].
Your decision on this issue must be unanimous. You are to set forth your finding about
this issue on the verdict form.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2316 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000) and 13-2301 (statutory
language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should be used if the defendant is charged with computer
tampering under A.R.S. § 13-2316(A)(2), (3) or (4). If the involved computer or network was
a “critical infrastructure resource,” the offense is a class 2 felony; otherwise, it is a class 4
felony. See A.R.S. § 13-2316(E).
The following types of entities are listed in the statute as critical infrastructure resource
service providers:
(a) Medical personnel and institutions.
(b) Emergency services agencies.
(c) Public and private utilities, including water, power, communications and
transportation services.
(d) Fire departments, districts or volunteer organizations.
(e) Law enforcement agencies.
(f) Financial institutions.
(g) Public educational institutions.
(h) Government agencies.
The following addition to the standard “guilty/not guilty” verdict form is suggested:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant
“guilty” of computer tampering.]
We the jury find the allegation that the computer, computer system or
network involved was a critical infrastructure resource (check only one):
_____ Was proven.
_____ Was not proven.
23.16.01 Unlawful Possession of an Access Device
The crime of unlawful possession of an access device requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly [possessed] [trafficked in] [published] [controlled] an
access device; and
2. The conduct of the defendant was without the consent of the [issuer] [owner]
[authorized user]; and
3. The defendant intended to [use] [distribute] that access device.
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“Access device” means any card, token, code, account number, electronic serial number,
mobile or personal identification number, password, encryption key, biometric identifier or
other means of account access, including a canceled or revoked access device, that can be
used alone or in conjunction with another access device to obtain money, goods, services,
computer or network access or any other thing of value or that can be used to initiate a
transfer of any thing of value.
“Access” means to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from or
otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system or network.
“Computer” means an electronic device that performs logic, arithmetic or memory
functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.
[If you find the defendant guilty of this offense, you then must decide the number of
access devices that the defendant possessed. The State has the burden of proving the
number beyond a reasonable doubt. Your decision on this issue must be unanimous and
must be set forth on the verdict form.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2316.01 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000) and 13-2301
(statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. §13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. §13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
The statute provides for an inference that the person intended to use or distribute the
devices if the defendant possessed, trafficked in, published or controlled five or more access
devices without the consent of the issuer, owner or authorized user. See A.R.S. § 13-
2316.01(B) and Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.16.01(b).
In order to determine the class of the felony offense, the jury must determine the
number of access devices the defendant possessed. The following addition to the standard
“guilty/not guilty” verdict form is suggested:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant
“guilty” of unlawful possession of an access device.]
We the jury find that the defendant unlawfully possessed (check only
one):
_____ One hundred or more access devices
_____ Five or more but fewer than one hundred access devices
_____ Fewer than five access devices
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23.16.01(B) Permissible Inference
Unless satisfactorily explained, you may infer that the defendant intended to use or
distribute the access devices if the defendant possessed, trafficked, published or controlled
five or more access devices without the consent of the issuer, owner or authorized user.
You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[In considering whether the possession, trafficking, publishing or control of the access
devices has been satisfactorily explained, you are reminded that in the exercise of
constitutional rights, a defendant need not testify. The alleged unlawful conduct may be
satisfactorily explained through other circumstances and other evidence, independent of any
testimony by a defendant.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2316.01(B) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: The last paragraph is bracketed and should only be given if requested by the
defendant.
It is important to caution the jury that the inference is not mandatory and that the jury
must look at all the facts and circumstances of the case in deciding whether the inference
should be applied. State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986)
(recommending that the language as contained in this instruction is preferable, because it
expressly tells the jury that it is not compelled to draw the inference).
The use of the term “may give rise to an inference,” which is contained in the text of
this instruction, was specifically approved in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 569, 724 P.2d at 1238.
The bracketed paragraph pertaining to the defendant’s constitutional right not to testify
was specifically approved verbatim in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 568, 724 P.2d at 1237 (citing
to Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973)).
23.16.02 Unauthorized Release of Proprietary or Confidential Computer Security
Information
The crime of unauthorized release of proprietary or confidential computer security
information requires proof that:
1. The defendant [communicated] [released] [published] proprietary or confidential
computer security information, security-related measures, algorithms or encryption
devices relating to a particular computer, computer system or network; and
2. The [communication] [release] [publication] was without the authorization of the
[computer’s] [computer system’s] [network’s] owner or operator.
“Proprietary or confidential computer security information” means information about a
particular computer, computer system or network that relates to its access devices, security
practices, methods and systems, architecture, communications facilities, encryption methods
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and system vulnerabilities and that is not made available to the public by its owner or
operator.
[“Computer” means an electronic device that performs logic, arithmetic or memory
functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.]
[“Computer system” means a set of related, connected or unconnected computer
equipment, devices and software, including storage, media and peripheral devices.]
[“Network” includes a complex of interconnected computer or communication systems
of any type.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2316.02 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000) and 13-2301
(statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
If the unauthorized release of proprietary or confidential computer security information
relates to a “critical infrastructure resource,” the offense is a class 4 felony; otherwise, it is a
class 6 felony. See A.R.S. § 13-2316.02(D). If this allegation is made, use Statutory Criminal
Instruction 23.16.02.D.
A.R.S. § 13-2316.02(B) exempts the following from this section:
1. The release by publishers, vendors, users and researchers of warnings or information
about security measures or defects in software, hardware or encryption products if
the release of the warnings or information is not specific to a particular owner’s or
operator’s computer, computer system or network.
2. The release of security information among the authorized users of a computer,
computer system or network or the notification to the owner or operator of a
computer, computer system or network of a perceived security threat.
3. The release of security information in connection with the research, development
and testing of security-related measures, products or devices if the release of the
security information is not specific to a particular owner’s or operator’s computer,
computer system or network.
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-2316.01(C) directs the court, at the end of a trial or grand jury
hearing, to preserve pursuant to A.R.S. § 44-405, any proprietary computer security
information admitted as evidence. The court must “preserve the secrecy” of the information
“by reasonable means” by such means as “sealing the records of the action or ordering a
person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court
approval.” A.R.S. § 44-405.
23.16.02.D Critical Infrastructure Instruction
If you find the defendant “guilty” of unauthorized release of proprietary or confidential
computer security information, you then must determine whether the computer, computer
system or network involved was a “critical infrastructure resource.” The State has the burden
of proving this issue beyond a reasonable doubt.
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“Critical infrastructure resource” means any computer or communications system or
network that was involved in providing services necessary to ensure or protect the public
health, safety or welfare, including services that were provided by [insert the name of the
entity that provided the services; see the Use Note for the entity types listed in the statute].
Your decision on this issue must be unanimous. You are to set forth your finding about
this issue on the verdict form.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2316.02 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000) and 13-2301
(statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should be used if the defendant is charged with unauthorized
release of proprietary or confidential computer security information under A.R.S. § 13-
2316.02. If the unauthorized release of proprietary or confidential computer security
information involved a “critical infrastructure resource,” the offense is a class 4 felony;
otherwise, it is a class 6 felony. See A.R.S. § 13-2316.02(D).
The following types of entities are listed in the statute as critical infrastructure resource
service providers:
(a) Medical personnel and institutions.
(b) Emergency services agencies.
(c) Public and private utilities, including water, power, communications and
transportation services.
(d) Fire departments, districts or volunteer organizations.
(e) Law enforcement agencies.
(f) Financial institutions.
(g) Public educational institutions.
(h) Government agencies.
The following addition to the standard “guilty/not guilty” verdict form is suggested:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant
“guilty” of computer tampering.]
We the jury find the allegation that the computer, computer system or
network involved was a critical infrastructure resource (check only one):
_____ Was proven.
_____ Was not proven.
23.17.A Money Laundering in the First Degree
The crime of money laundering in the first degree requires proof that the defendant:
1. committed money laundering in the second degree; and
2. [knowingly initiated, organized, planned, financed, directed, managed, supervised
or was in the business of money laundering.] [The money laundering was
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committed in the course of or for the purpose of facilitating terrorism or
murder.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2317 (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.17.B sets forth the instruction on money laundering in
the second degree.
Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.08.01 sets for the instruction on terrorism.
See Chapter 11 instructions for the homicide instructions.
23.17.B Money Laundering in the Second Degree
The crime of money laundering in the second degree requires proof that the defendant
[acquired or maintained an interest in, transacted, transferred, transported, received or
concealed the existence or nature of racketeering proceeds knowing or having reason to
know that they were the proceeds of an offense.]
[made property available to another by transaction, transportation or otherwise knowing
that it was intended to be used to facilitate racketeering.]
[conducted a transaction knowing or having reason to know that the property involved
was the proceeds of an offense and with the intent to conceal or disguise the nature,
location, source, ownership or control of the property or the intent to facilitate
racketeering.]
[intentionally or knowingly made a false statement, misrepresentation or false
certification or made a false entry or omitted a material entry in any application, financial
statement, account record, customer receipt, report or other document that is filed or
required to be maintained or filed under Arizona law (see title 6, chapter 12 for these
requirements).]
[intentionally or knowingly evaded or attempted to evade any legally required reporting
requirement, by causing any financial institution, money transmitter, trade or business to
fail to file the report, by failing to file a required report or record or by any other means.]
[intentionally or knowingly provided any false information or failed to disclose
information that caused any licensee, authorized delegate, money transmitter, trade or
business to either:
(a) fail to file any report or record that is required under Arizona law (see A.R.S.
§ 6-1241 for these requirements).
(b) file such a report or record that contains a material omission or misstatement of
fact.]
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[intentionally or knowingly falsified, concealed, covered up or misrepresented or
attempted to falsify, conceal, cover up or misrepresent the identity of any person in
connection with any transaction with a financial institution or money transmitter.]
[, in connection with a transaction with a financial institution or money transmitter,
intentionally or knowingly made, used, offered or presented or attempted to make, use,
offer or present, whether accepted or not, a forged instrument, a falsely altered or
completed written instrument or a written instrument that contained any materially false
personal identifying information.]
[(if the person was a money transmitter, a person engaged in a trade or business or any
employee of a money transmitter or a person engaged in a trade or business)
intentionally or knowingly accepted false personal identifying information from any
person or otherwise knowingly incorporated false personal identifying information into
any report or record that is required by Arizona law (see A.R.S. § 6-1241 for these
requirements).]
[intentionally conducted, controlled, managed, supervised, directed or owned all or part
of a money transmitting business for which a license is required by Arizona law (see title
6, chapter 12) unless the business was licensed pursuant to Arizona law (see title 6,
chapter 12) and complied with the money transmitting business registration
requirements under federal law (see 31 U.S.C. § 5330 for these requirements).]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2317 (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
A.R.S. § 13-2317(F) and (G) set forth definitions applicable to money laundering.
Include those definitions appropriate to the facts of the case.
The reporting requirements can be found in A.R.S. § 6-1241 and 31 Code of Federal
Regulations part 103 sets forth prohibited methods of structuring transactions.
23.17.C Money Laundering in the Third Degree
The crime of money laundering in the third degree requires proof that the defendant:
[, in the course of any transaction transmitting money, intentionally or knowingly
conferred or agreed to confer anything of value on a money transmitter or any employee
of a money transmitter that was intended to influence or reward any person for failing to
comply with any reporting requirement under Arizona law (see title 6, chapter 12 for the
reporting requirements).]
[intentionally or knowingly engaged in the business of receiving money for transmission
or transmitting money, as an employee or otherwise, and received anything of value
upon an agreement or understanding that it was intended to influence or benefit the
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person for failing to comply with any requirement under Arizona law (see title 6, chapter
12 for the reporting requirements).]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2317 (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
A.R.S. §§ 13-2317(F) and (G) set forth definitions applicable to money laundering.
Include those definitions appropriate to the facts of the case.
23.19.01 Smuggling of Human BeingsDeleted
Users are advised that in United States v. State of Arizona, 119 F. Supp. 3d 955 (2014), the
court held that federal law preempts Arizona law governing human smuggling.
23.19.02 Additional Finding Regarding Human SmugglingDeleted
Users are advised that in United States v. State of Arizona, 119 F. Supp. 3d 955 (2014), the
court held that federal law preempts Arizona law governing human smuggling.
23.20.01 Residential Mortgage Fraud
(based on A.R.S. § 13-2320(A)(1))
The crime of residential mortgage fraud requires proof that:
1. The defendant, with the intent to defraud, knowingly made a [deliberate
misstatement] [misrepresentation] [material omission]; and
2. The [deliberate misstatement] [misrepresentation] [material omission] was made
during the mortgage lending process; and
3. The [deliberate misstatement] [misrepresentation] [material omission] was relied
upon by a [mortgage lender] [borrower] [party to the mortgage lending process].
or
(based on A.R.S. § 13-2320(A)(2))
1. The defendant, with the intent to defraud, knowingly [used] [facilitated the use of] a
[deliberate misstatement] [misrepresentation] [material omission]; and
2. The [deliberate misstatement] [misrepresentation] [material omission] occurred
during the mortgage lending process; and
3. The [deliberate misstatement] [misrepresentation] [material omission] was relied
upon by a [mortgage lender] [borrower] [party to the mortgage lending process].
or
(based on A.R.S. § 13-2320(A)(3))
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1. The defendant received [any proceeds] [other monies] in connection with a
residential mortgage loan; and
2. The defendant knew that the [proceeds] [other monies] resulted from the [making]
[use] [facilitation of the use] of a [deliberate misstatement] [misrepresentation]
[material omission] that occurred during the mortgage lending process; and
3. The defendant knew that the [deliberate misstatement] [misrepresentation] [material
omission] was relied upon by a [mortgage lender] [borrower] [party to the mortgage
lending process].
or
(based on A.R.S. § 13-2320(A)(4))
1. The defendant, with the intent to defraud, [filed] [caused to be filed] with the office
of the county recorder of any county of this state any residential mortgage loan
document; and
2. The defendant knew that the document contained a [deliberate misstatement]
[misrepresentation] [material omission].
“Mortgage lending process” means the process through which a person seeks or obtains
a residential mortgage loan including solicitation, application, origination, negotiation of
terms, third-party provider services, underwriting, signing, closing and funding of the loan.
“Residential mortgage loan” means a loan or agreement to extend credit to a person that
is secured by a deed to secure debt, security deed, mortgage, security interest, deed of trust
or other document representing a security interest or lien on any interest in one to four
family residential property and includes the renewal or refinancing of any loan.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2320 (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
“Intentionally” and “knowingly” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(b)).
If the State has alleged that the defendant engaged in or conspired to engage or
participate in a “pattern of residential mortgage fraud,” use Statutory Criminal Instruction
23.20.02 and the verdict form addition set forth in the Use Note.
C
OMMENT: A reliance element was not included in the instruction for A.R.S. § 13-
2320(A)(4). The legislature included a reliance element in (A)(1) and (A)(2), but not in (A)(4).
An argument can be made that A.R.S. § 13-2320(C) imposes a reliance element in (A)(4).
The trial judge will need to decide the issue if raised.
23.20.02 Pattern of Residential Mortgage Fraud
If you find the defendant guilty of “residential mortgage fraud,” you must then decide
whether the defendant has engaged in a pattern of residential mortgage fraud.
In order to find that the defendant engaged in a “pattern of residential mortgage fraud,”
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
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1. The defendant has been found guilty of one or more counts of “residential mortgage
fraud;” and
2. The “residential mortgage fraud” involved two or more residential properties; and
3. The “residential mortgage fraud” had the same or similar [intents] [results]
[accomplices] [victims] [methods of commission].
or
4. The “residential mortgage fraud” was otherwise interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics.
Your decision on this issue must be unanimous. Your decision must be reflected on the
verdict form.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2320 (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: If this allegation is made by the State, the following addition to the standard
“guilty/not guilty” verdict form is suggested:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant
“guilty” of residential mortgage fraud.]
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn, find on the allegation that the
defendant engaged in a pattern of residential mortgage fraud, as follows
(check only one):
____ Proven.
____ Not Proven.
23.21.A Participating in a Criminal Street Gang
The crime of participating in a criminal street gang requires proof that the defendant
[intentionally organized, managed, directed, supervised or financed a criminal street gang
with the intent to promote or further the criminal objectives of the criminal street gang.]
[knowingly incited or induced others to engage in violence or intimidation to promote or
further the criminal objectives of a criminal street gang.]
[furnished advice or direction in the conduct, financing or management of a criminal
street gang’s affairs with the intent to promote or further the criminal objectives of a
criminal street gang.]
[intentionally promoted or furthered the criminal objectives of a criminal street gang by
inducing or committing any act or omission by a public servant in violation of the public
servant’s official duty.]
“Criminal street gang” means an ongoing formal or informal association of persons
whose members or associates individually or collectively engaged in the commission,
attempted commission, facilitation or solicitation of any felony act and that had at least one
individual who was a criminal street gang member.
“Criminal street gang member” means an individual to whom two of the following seven
criteria that indicate criminal street gang membership apply:
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(a) Self-proclamation.
(b) Witness testimony or official statement.
(c) Written or electronic correspondence.
(d) Paraphernalia or photographs.
(e) Tattoos.
(f) Clothing or colors.
(g) Any other indicia of street gang membership.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2321 (statutory language as of September 19, 2007) and 13-105
(statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: A.R.S. § 13-2321(E) provides that “use of a common name or common
identifying sign or symbol shall be admissible and may be considered in proving the
existence of a criminal street gang or membership in a criminal street gang.”
“Public servant” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0533).
23.21.B Assisting a Criminal Street Gang
The crime of assisting a criminal street gang requires proof that the defendant
committed [fill in the felony offense whether completed or preparatory] for the benefit of, at the
direction of or in association with any criminal street gang.
“Criminal street gang” means an ongoing formal or informal association of persons
whose members or associates individually or collectively engaged in the commission,
attempted commission, facilitation or solicitation of any felony act and that had at least one
individual who was a criminal street gang member.
“Criminal street gang member” means an individual to whom two of the following seven
criteria that indicate criminal street gang membership apply:
(a) Self-proclamation.
(b) Witness testimony or official statement.
(c) Written or electronic correspondence.
(d) Paraphernalia or photographs.
(e) Tattoos.
(f) Clothing or colors.
(g) Any other indicia of street gang membership.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2321(B) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007) and 13-105
(statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: A.R.S. § 13-2321(E) provides that “use of a common name or common
identifying sign or symbol shall be admissible and may be considered in proving the
existence of a criminal street gang or membership in a criminal street gang.”
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23.22 Unlawful Transaction Involving Drop HousesDeleted
Users are advised that in United States v. State of Arizona, 119 F. Supp. 3d 955 (2014), the
court held that federal law preempts Arizona law governing human smuggling.
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CHAPTER 24
24.01 Dissemination of Personal Information on the World Wide Web
The crime of dissemination of personal information on the worldwide web requires
proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly made available on the world wide web the personal
information of a [peace officer] [justice] [judge] [commissioner] [public defender]
[prosecutor]; [employee of the department of child safety who has direct contact
with families in the course of employment]; and
2. The dissemination of the personal information poses an imminent and serious threat
to the [peace officer’s,] [ justice’s,] [ judge’s,] [ commissioner’s,] [ public defender’s]
[prosecutor’s] [department of child safety employee’s] safety or the safety of that
person’s immediate family; and
3. The threat was reasonably apparent to the defendant to be serious and imminent.
“Personal information” means a [peace officer’s] [justice’s] [judge’s] [commissioner’s]
[public defender’s] [prosecutor’s] home address, home telephone number, pager number,
personal photograph, directions to the person’s home or photographs of the person’s home
or vehicle.
[“Commissioner” means a commissioner of the superior court.]
[“Immediate family” means a peace officer’s, justice’s, judge’s, commissioner’s, public
defender’s or prosecutor’s spouse, child or parent and any other adult who lives in the same
residence as the person.]
[“Judge” means a judge of the United States district court, the United States court of
appeals, the United States magistrate court, the United States bankruptcy court, the Arizona
court of appeals, the superior court or a municipal court.]
[“Justice” means a justice of the United States or Arizona supreme court or a justice of
the peace.]
[“Prosecutor” means a county attorney, a municipal prosecutor, the attorney general or a
United States attorney and includes an assistant or deputy United States attorney, county
attorney, municipal prosecutor or attorney general.]
[“Public defender” means a federal public defender, county public defender, county legal
defender or county contract indigent defense counsel and includes an assistant or deputy
federal public defender, county public defender or county legal defender.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2401 (statutory language as of July 3, 2015).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as needed based on the evidence presented at trial.
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-2401(B) provides that “it is not a violation of this section if an
employee of a county recorder, county treasurer or county assessor publishes personal
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information, in good faith, on the web site of the county recorder, county treasurer or
county assessor in the ordinary course of carrying out public functions.”
24.05 Compounding
The crime of compounding requires proof that the defendant knowingly accepted or
agreed to accept any financial benefit in exchange for:
1. refraining from seeking prosecution of [insert name of the criminal offense as
alleged in the indictment or information]; or
2. refraining from reporting to law enforcement authorities the commission or
suspected commission of [insert name of the criminal offense as alleged in the indictment or
information] or information relating to the criminal offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2405 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
C
OMMENT: The court must instruct on the predicate (compounded) offense to allow the
jury to decide if the State has proven the charge.
24.07 Tampering With a Public Record
The crime of tampering with a public record requires proof that, with the intent to
defraud or deceive, the defendant knowingly:
[made or completed a written instrument which purported to be a public record or a true
copy thereof, knowing the instrument had been falsely made.]
[altered an entry or made a false entry in a written instrument that was a public record or
a true copy of a public record.]
[with the intent that it be taken as genuine, presented or used a written instrument that
was, or purported to be, a public record or copy, knowing that it had been falsely made,
completed or altered, or that a false entry had been made.]
[recorded, registered or filed, or offered for recordation, registration or filing in a
governmental office or agency a written statement that had been falsely made, completed
or altered or in which a false entry had been made or that contained a false statement or
false information.]
[destroyed, mutilated, concealed, removed or otherwise impaired the availability of any
public record.]
[refused to deliver a public record in such person’s possession upon proper request of a
public servant entitled to receive such record for examination or other purposes.]
“Public record” means all official books, papers, written instruments or records created,
issued, received or kept by any governmental office or agency or required by law to be kept
by others for the information of the government.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2407 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining “intent” and
“intent – inference.”
24.08 Securing the Proceeds of an Offense
The crime of securing the proceeds of an offense requires proof that the defendant, with
intent to assist another in profiting or benefiting from the commission of [insert the name of
the criminal offense as alleged in the indictment or information], aided that other person in
securing the proceeds of that criminal offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2408 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining
“intent” and “intent – inference.”
C
OMMENT: The court must instruct on the predicate (compounded) offense to allow the
jury to decide if the State has proven the charge.
24.09 Obstructing Criminal Investigations or Prosecutions
The crime of obstructing criminal investigations or prosecutions requires proof that the
defendant knowingly:
[attempted by means of (bribery), (misrepresentation), (intimidation) or (force), or
(threats of force) to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or
testimony relating to a violation of any criminal statute to a peace officer, magistrate,
prosecutor or grand jury.]
[injured another person or property on account of the giving by the other person or by
any other person of any information or testimony relating to a violation of any criminal
statute to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2409 (statutory language as of 1984).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
24.11 Impersonating a Peace Officer
The crime of impersonating a peace officer requires proof that:
1. The defendant pretended to be a peace officer; and
2. The defendant engaged in any conduct with the intent to induce another to submit
to the defendant’s pretended authority or to rely upon the defendant’s pretended
acts. [and]
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3. [The crime of (insert name of one of the enumerated crimes) was committed by the
defendant while impersonating a peace officer.]
[It is not a defense that the law enforcement agency the person pretended to represent
did not in fact exist, or that the law enforcement agency the person pretended to represent
did not in fact possess the authority claimed for it.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2411(statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining
“intent” and “intent – inference.”
Use element three if the state alleges that the defendant committed one of the 26
enumerated crimes in this statute while impersonating a peace officer.
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-2411(D) provides that “‘peace officer’ has the same meaning
prescribed in section 1-215 and includes any federal law enforcement officer or agent who
has the power to make arrests pursuant to federal law.” A.R.S. § 1-215(28) provides that
“‘peace officers’ means sheriffs of counties, constables, marshals, policemen of cities and
towns, commissioned personnel of the department of public safety, peace officers who are
appointed by a multicounty water conservation district and who have received a certificate
from the Arizona peace officer standards and training board, police officers who are
appointed by community college district governing boards and who have received a
certificate from the Arizona peace officer standards and training board, police officers who
are appointed by the Arizona board of regents and who have received a certificate from the
Arizona peace officer standards and training board and police officers who are appointed by
the governing body of a public airport pursuant to section 28-8426 and who have received a
certificate from the Arizona peace officer standards and training board.”
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CHAPTER 25
25.01.1 Definition of “Contraband”
“Contraband” means any dangerous drug, narcotic drug, marijuana, intoxicating liquor
of any kind, deadly weapon, dangerous instrument, explosive or other article whose use or
possession would endanger the safety, security or preservation of order in a correctional
facility or a juvenile secure care facility, or of any person within a correctional or juvenile
secure care facility.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2501(1) (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: If it becomes an issue, the court may need to define the particular type of
facility in question.
25.01.2 Definition of “Correctional Facility”
“Correctional facility” means any place used for the confinement or control of a person:
1. charged with or convicted of an offense; or
2. held for extradition; or
3. pursuant to an order of court for law enforcement purposes.
Lawful transportation or movement incident to correctional facility confinement is
within the control of a correctional facility. However, being within the control of a
correctional facility does not include release on parole, on community supervision, on
probation or by other lawful authority upon the condition of subsequent personal
appearance at a designated place and time.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2501(2) (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
25.01.3 Definition of “Custody”
“Custody” means the imposition of actual or constructive restraint pursuant to an on-
site arrest or court order but does not include detention in a correctional facility, juvenile
detention center or state hospital.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2501(3) (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
25.01.4 Definition of “Escape”
“Escape” means:
1. departure from custody; or
2. departure from a juvenile secure care facility; or
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3. departure from a juvenile detention facility; or
4. departure from an adult correctional facility
in which a person is held or detained with knowledge that such departure is not permitted; or
5. failure to return to custody or detention following a temporary leave granted for a
specific purpose or for a limited period.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2501(4) (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
25.02 Escape in the Third Degree
The crime of escape in the third degree requires proof that the defendant:
1. was [arrested for] [charged with] [found guilty of] a misdemeanor or petty offense;
and
2. knowingly escaped or attempted to escape from custody.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2502 (statutory language as of 1983).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Custody” and “escape” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-2501 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 25.01.3 and 25.01.4).
25.03 Escape in the Second Degree
The crime of escape in the second degree requires proof that the defendant:
[knowingly escaped or attempted to escape from an adult correctional facility/a juvenile
detention facility/a juvenile secure care facility.]
[knowingly escaped or attempted to escape from custody as a result of being arrested
for/charged with/or found guilty of/a felony.]
[knowingly escaped or attempted to escape from the Arizona State Hospital if the
person was committed to the hospital for treatment as a sexually violent person.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2503 (statutory language as of August 2, 2012).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Correctional facility,” “custody” and “escape” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-2501
(Statutory Definition Instructions 25.01.2, 25.01.3 and 25.01.4).
Sexually violent persons are defined in Title 36, Chapter 37.
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25.04 Escape in the First Degree
The crime of escape in the first degree requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly escaped, or attempted to escape, from custody/an adult
correctional facility/a juvenile secure care facility/a juvenile detention facility; and
2. The escape, or attempt to escape, involved the defendant’s use or threatened use of
physical force/a deadly weapon/a dangerous instrument /against another person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2504 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Correctional facility,” custody” and “escape” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-2501 (Statutory
Criminal Instructions 25.01.2, 25.01.3 and 25.01.4).
25.05 Promoting Prison Contraband
The crime of promoting prison contraband requires proof that the defendant knowingly:
[took contraband into a correctional facility or the grounds of such facility.]
[conveyed contraband to any person confined in a correctional facility.]
[made, obtained, or possessed contraband while being confined in a correctional facility.]
[made, obtained, or possessed contraband while being lawfully transported or moved
incident to correctional facility confinement.]
[with reasonable grounds to believe there was a violation, or attempted violation, of
promoting secure care facility contraband, failed to immediately report the violation, or
attempted violation, to the official in charge of the facility or to a peace officer.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2505 (statutory language as of 1992).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
A violation based on the duty to report is a class 5 felony. With regard to all other bases
for violations, the classification of the offense depends on the nature of the contraband. See
A.R.S. § 13-2505(C). If the class 2 and class 5 are charged together or if the evidence
presented at trial shows different types of contraband supporting both the class 2 and class 5
offenses, then the court should use a separate finding on the verdict form such as:
(Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant guilty of
promoting prison contraband. You must find each specific item unanimously and beyond a
reasonable doubt.)
We, the jury, find that the contraband was (check all that apply):
_____ deadly weapon
_____ dangerous instrument
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_____ explosive
_____ dangerous drug
_____ narcotic drug
_____ marijuana
_____ other contraband
Include only those items that apply on the verdict form. This type of separate finding
should be used if there are multiple items of contraband even if all fall within the class 2
offense. If this type of finding is included on the verdict form, the court will need to include
definitions for “deadly weapon,” “dangerous instrument,” “explosive,” “dangerous drug,
“narcotic drug” and “marijuana.” A separate finding would not be needed if only one item
of contraband is alleged or shown at trial.
There are two circumstances to which the statute does not apply set forth in A.R.S. § 13-
2505(E).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Contraband” and “correctional facility” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-2501 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 25.01.1 and 25.01.2).
25.07 Failure to Appear in the First Degree
The crime of failure to appear in the first degree requires proof that the defendant:
1. was required by law to appear in connection with any felony; and
2. knowingly failed to appear as required, regardless of the disposition of the charge
requiring the appearance.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2507 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
25.08 Resisting Arrest
The crime of resisting arrest requires proof that:
1. A peace officer, acting under official authority, sought to arrest either the defendant
or some other person; and
2. The defendant knew, or had reason to know, that the person seeking to make the
arrest was a peace officer acting under color of such peace officer’s official authority;
and
3. The defendant intentionally prevented, or attempted to prevent, the peace officer
from making the arrest; and
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4. The means used by the defendant to prevent the arrest involved either the use or
threat to use physical force or any other substantial risk of physical injury to either
the peace officer or another.
Whether the attempted arrest was legally justified is irrelevant.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2508 (statutory language as of April 23, 1980).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” and “knowingly” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: This instruction was upheld by the court of appeals in State v. Cagle, 228 Ariz.
374, 377-78, 266 P.3d 1070, 1073-74, ¶¶11, 13 (App. 2011) (rejecting a defense argument
that the statute requires the intent to create a substantial risk of physical injury).
Case law protects on-duty peace officers dressed in uniform because the uniform
identifies the peace officer. It is less clear that this instruction should be used when the
evidence involves an off-duty peace officer without a uniform. See generally State v. Zavala, 136
Ariz. 389, 666 P.2d 489 (App. 1982); State v. Davis, 119 Ariz. 529, 582 P.2d 175 (App. 1978).
Generally, this instruction would not be warranted under a lesser-included offense analysis
when the crime of disorderly conduct (A.R.S. § 13-2904) is charged. Resisting arrest may be
committed without committing disorderly conduct. State v. Diaz, 135 Ariz. 496, 662 P.2d 461
(App. 1983).
Lawfulness of the arrest is not an issue. See State v. Windus, 207 Ariz. 328, 86 P.3d 384
(App. 2004). However, the use of excessive force by the peace officer may be a defense. See
A.R.S. § 13-404(B)(2); use Statutory Criminal Instruction 4.04.01.
There may be a need to define “arrest.” See A.R.S. §§ 13-3881 and 13-3888; State v.
Stroud, 209 Ariz. 410, 103 P.3d 912 (2005).
25.08(A)(3) Resisting Arrest (Passive Resistance)
The crime of resisting arrest requires proof that:
1. A peace officer, acting under official authority, sought to arrest either the defendant
or some other person; and
2. The defendant knew, or had reason to know, that the person seeking to make the
arrest was a peace officer acting under color of such peace officer’s official authority;
and
3. The defendant intentionally prevented, or attempted to prevent, the peace officer
from making the arrest by engaging in passive resistance.
“Passive resistance” means a nonviolent physical act or failure to act that is intended to
impede, hinder or delay the effecting of an arrest.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2805 (statutory language as of August 2, 2012).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
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“Intentionally” and “knowingly” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(b)).
25.081 Defense to Resisting Arrest
Mere argument with or criticism of a peace officer is not sufficient grounds, without
more, to find a person guilty of resisting arrest.
SOURCE: State v. Tages, 10 Ariz. App. 127, 457 P.2d 289 (1969); State v. Snodgrass, 121 Ariz.
409, 590 P.2d 948 (App. 1979); State v. Snodgrass, 117 Ariz. 107, 570 P.2d 1280 (App. 1977).
U
SE NOTE: In the appropriate circumstances, the failure to give a limiting instruction is
reversible error. State v. Tages, 10 Ariz. App. 127, 457 P.2d 289 (1969). This instruction is
required in order to avoid a constitutionally impermissible construction. Id. It is required
only when there is a factual question whether the conduct had exceeded “merely
remonstrating” against the peace officer. Id.
25.12 Hindering Prosecution in the First Degree
The crime of hindering prosecution in the first degree requires proof that the defendant:
1. intended to hinder the [apprehension/prosecution/conviction/punishment] of
another for any felony; and
2. rendered assistance to the other person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2510 (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally or with intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0510(a)(1).
“Rendered assistance to another person” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2510. The appropriate
definitions from that statute must be included with this instruction.
This offense is a class 5 felony. If the hindered prosecution involved terrorism or
murder, or if the hindering was committed with the intent to promote, further or assist a
criminal street gang, the offense is a class 3 felony. Therefore, if any of those facts are
alleged, the court will need to instruct the jury on the issue and include a finding on the
verdict form. The following sample instruction is offered as a guide:
Should you find the defendant “guilty” of hindering prosecution in the first
degree, you must decide whether the offense was committed with the intent
to promote, further or assist a criminal street gang. The state has the burden
of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.
“Intent” has the same meaning as set forth previously in these instructions.
“Criminal street gang” means an ongoing formal or informal association of
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persons whose members or associates individually or collectively engage in
the commission, attempted commission, facilitation or solicitation of any
felony act and who has at least one individual who is a criminal street gang
member.
“Criminal street gang member” means an individual to whom two of the
following seven criteria apply indicating criminal street gang membership:
(a) Self-proclamation.
(b) Witness testimony or official statement.
(c) Written or electronic correspondence.
(d) Paraphernalia or photographs.
(e) Tattoos.
(f) Clothing or colors.
(g) Any other indicia of street gang membership.
Your finding on this issue must be set forth on the verdict form.
The following addition to the standard “guilty / not guilty” verdict form is offered as a
guide:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant
“guilty” of hindering prosecution in the first degree.]
We, the jury, find as follows (check only one):
___ The offense was committed with the intent to promote, further or
assist a criminal street gang.
___ The offense was not committed with the intent to promote, further
or assist a criminal street gang.
25.14 Promoting Secure Care Facility Contraband
The crime of promoting secure care facility contraband requires proof that the
defendant knowingly:
[took contraband onto the grounds of or into a secure care facility under the jurisdiction
of the department of juvenile corrections.] or
[conveyed contraband to any person confined in a secure care facility under the
jurisdiction of the department of juvenile corrections.] or
[made, obtained or possessed contraband while in a secure care facility under the
jurisdiction of the department of juvenile corrections.]
[with reasonable grounds to believe there was a violation, or attempted violation, of
promoting secure care facility contraband, failed to immediately report the violation, or
attempted violation, to the official in charge of the facility or to a peace officer.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2514 (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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A violation based on the duty to report is a class 5 felony. With regard to all other bases
for violations, the classification of the offense depends on the nature of the contraband. See
A.R.S. § 13-2514(C). If the class 2 and class 5 are charged together or if the evidence
presented at trial shows different types of contraband supporting both the class 2 and class 5
offenses, then the court should use a separate finding on the verdict form such as:
(Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant guilty
of promoting prison contraband. You must find each specific item unanimously and
beyond a reasonable doubt.)
We, the jury, find that the contraband was (check all that apply):
_____ deadly weapon
_____ dangerous instrument
_____ explosive
_____ dangerous drug
_____ narcotic drug
_____ marijuana
_____ other contraband
Include only those items that apply on the verdict form. This type of separate finding
should be used if there are multiple items of contraband even if all fall within the class 2
offense. If this type of finding is included on the verdict form, the court will need to include
definitions for “deadly weapon”, “dangerous instrument”, “explosive”, “dangerous drug”,
“narcotic drug” and “marijuana.” A separate finding would not be needed if only one item
of contraband is alleged or shown at trial.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Contraband” and “correctional facility” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-2501 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 25.01.1 and 25.01.2).
A.R.S. § 13-2514(B) contains an exception “for information protected under attorney
client privilege” regarding the obligation to report a violation of this section.
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CHAPTER 26
26.01(1) Definition of “Employee”
“Employee” includes a person employed by an enterprise or an agent or fiduciary of a
principal.
26.01(2) Definition of “Employer”
“Employer” includes an enterprise or principal.
26.01(3) Definition of “Party Officer”
“Party officer” means a person who holds any position or office in a political party,
whether by election, appointment or otherwise.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2601 (statutory language as of 1979).
U
SE NOTE: If instructions 26.01(1) or (2) are used, the court should also instruct on the
definition of “enterprise” as defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0512).
26.02 Bribery of a Public Servant or Party Officer
The crime of bribery of a [public servant] [party officer] requires proof that the
defendant:
1. acted with corrupt intent; and
2. [offered, conferred, or agreed to confer any benefit upon a (public servant) (party
officer) with the intent to influence (his) (her) (their) vote, opinion, judgment,
exercise of discretion or other action in the person’s official capacity as a (public
servant) (party officer)];
[While a (public servant) (party officer), the defendant solicited, accepted or agreed
to accept any benefit upon an agreement or understanding that defendant’s vote,
opinion, judgment, exercise of discretion or other action as a (public servant) (party
officer) may thereby be influenced].
[It is no defense to a prosecution that the person sought to be influenced was not
qualified to act in the desired way because such person had not yet assumed office, lacked
jurisdiction or for any other reason.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2602(A) (statutory language as of 1982).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Benefit” and “public servant” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.052 and 1.0533).
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“Party officer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2601 (Statutory Definition Instruction 26.01(3)).
“Corrupt intent” is not defined in title 13. However, in State v. Walker, 185 Ariz. 228,
242, 914 P.2d 1320, 1334 (App. 1995), the court of appeals approved the trial court’s use of
the “intent” instruction combined with a definition of “corruptly” taken from A.R.S. § 1-
215. The trial court instruction stated, Corrupt in the context of the charge of bribery
means dishonest and being open to bribery or using a position of trust for dishonest gain.”
Ibid.
“Intent” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
26.03 Trading in Public Office
The crime of trading in public office requires proof that the defendant:
1.
acted with corrupt intent; and
2. [offered, conferred, or agreed to confer any benefit to a (public servant) (party officer)
with an agreement or understanding that the defendant will or may be appointed to a
public office or designated or nominated as a candidate for public office.]
[While a (public servant) (party officer), the defendant solicited, accepted, or agreed
to accept any benefit from another with an agreement or understanding that that
person will or may be appointed to a public office or designated or nominated as a
candidate for public office.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2603 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Benefit” and “public servant” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.052 and 1.0533).
“Party officer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2601 (Statutory Definition Instruction 26.01(3)).
“Corrupt intent” is not defined in title 13. However, in State v. Walker, 185 Ariz. 228,
242, 914 P.2d 1320, 1334 (App. 1995), the court of appeals approved the trial court’s use of
the “intent” instruction combined with a definition of “corruptly” found in A.R.S. § 1-215.
Corrupt in the context of the charge of bribery means dishonest and being open to bribery
or using a position of trust for dishonest gain.” Ibid.
26.05 Commercial Bribery Defined
The crime of commercial bribery requires proof that the defendant:
1. acted with corrupt intent; and
[2. conferred any benefit on an employee without the consent of the employee’s
employer so that such benefit would influence the conduct of the employee in
relation to the employer’s commercial affairs; and
3. the conduct of the employee caused economic loss to the employer.]
or
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[2. while an employee of (his) (her) employer, accepted any benefit from another person
so that such benefit would influence the defendant’s conduct in relation to the
employer’s commercial affairs; and
3. the conduct of the defendant caused economic loss to the employer or principal.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2605 (statutory language as of 1979).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
“Benefit” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.052).
“Employee” and “employer” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-2601 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 26.01(1) and 26.01(2).
“Corrupt intent” is not defined in title 13. However, in State v. Walker, 185 Ariz. 228,
242, 914 P.2d 1320, 1334 (App. 1995), the court of appeals approved the trial court’s use of
the “intent” instruction combined with a definition of “corruptly” taken from A.R.S. § 1-
215. The trial court instruction stated, Corrupt in the context of the charge of bribery
means dishonest and being open to bribery or using a position of trust for dishonest gain.”
Ibid.
“Intent” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
26.05 Commercial Bribery Form of Verdict
We, the jury, do find that the value of the benefit was (check only one):
_____ (1) more than $1,000
_____ (2) not less than $100 and not more than $1,000
_____ (3) less than $100
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2605(B) (statutory language as of 1979).
U
SE NOTE: This form of verdict is necessary to establish the class of the offense for
sentencing purposes.
26.06 Offer To Exert Improper Influence on Public Officer or Employee for
Consideration
The crime of offering to exert improper influence on a public officer or employee for
consideration requires proof that the defendant:
1. intentionally or knowingly obtained, or sought to obtain, any benefit from another
person; and
2. claimed or represented that the defendant could or would improperly influence the
action of a public servant.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2606 (statutory language as of April 30, 1980).
U
SE NOTE: “Benefit,” “intentionally,” “knowingly” and “public servant” are defined in
A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instructions 1.052, 1.0510(a)(1), 1.0510(b) and 1.0533).
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CHAPTER 27
27.01(1) Definition of “Material”
“Material” means that which could have affected the course or outcome of any
proceeding or transaction.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2701(1) (statutory language as of 1984).
COMMENT: The statute provides that the issue of materiality is a question of law. Therefore,
the trial court should make the initial determination of materiality. If the court finds the
statement to be material, then the jury makes an independent determination. Franzi v. Superior
Court in and for Pima County, 139 Ariz. 556, 562, 679 P.2d 1043, 1049 (1984).
27.01(2) Definition of “Statement”
“Statement” means any representation of fact including a representation of opinion,
belief, or other state of mind where such representation clearly relates to a state of mind
apart from or in addition to any facts which are the subject of the representation.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2701(2) (statutory language as of 1984).
27.01(3) Definition of “Sworn Statement”
“Sworn statement” means any statement knowingly
given under oath or affirmation
attesting to the truth of what is stated, including a notarized statement, whether or not given
in connection with an official proceeding.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2701(3) (statutory language as of 1984).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
27.02(A) Perjury
The crime of perjury requires proof that the defendant:
1. made a false [sworn statement] [unsworn declaration, certificate, verification or
statement that the person subscribed to be true under penalty of perjury]; and
2. believed the statement to be false when it was made; and
3. the statement was made regarding a material issue.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2702 (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
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USE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Material” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2701 (Statutory Definition Instruction 27.01(1)).
“Statement” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2701 (Statutory Definition Instruction 27.01(2)).
“Sworn statement” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2071 (Statutory
Definition Instruction
27.01(3)).
C
OMMENT: It is not necessary for the State to prove that a grand jury’s investigation was
actually impeded by false testimony that gave rise to the perjury prosecution, just that it
could have been. State v. Fodor, 179 Ariz. 442, 453-54, 880 P.2d 662, 673-74 (App. 1994). If
the answer is literally true, it cannot constitute perjury, even if the defendant intended to
mislead the questioner at the time the defendant made the statement. 179 Ariz. at 452, 880
P.2d at 672.
27.02(B) Perjury by Inconsistent Statements
The crime of perjury requires proof that:
1. the defendant made inconsistent statements; and
2. the statements were material; and
3. the defendant made the statements under oath; and
4. the defendant made the statements believing one of them to be false; and
5. one of the statements made was false.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2702 (statutory language as of July 20, 1996); 13-2705 (statutory language
as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: “Statement” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2701 (Statutory Definition Instruction
27.01(2)).
“Material” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2701 (Statutory Definition Instruction 27.01(1)).
COMMENT: Materiality is an element of perjury by inconsistent statements. State v. Krug, 96
Ariz. 225, 227, 393 P.2d 916, 917 (1964).
27.03 False Swearing
The crime of false swearing requires proof that the defendant:
1. made a false sworn statement; and
2. believed the statement to be false when it was made.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2703 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: “Statement” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2701 (Statutory Definition Instruction
27.01(2)).
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“Sworn statement” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2701 (Statutory Definition Instruction
27.01(3)).
27.06 Limitation on Defenses
It is not a defense to a prosecution for [false swearing] [perjury] when:
1. the statement was inadmissible under the rules of evidence; or
2. the oath or affirmation was taken or administered in an irregular manner; or
3. the defendant mistakenly believed the false statement to be immaterial.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2706(A) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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CHAPTER 28
28.01(1) Definition of “Juror”
“Juror” means any person who is a member of any impaneled jury or grand jury and
includes any person who has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective juror.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2801(1) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
28.01(2) Definition of “Official Proceeding”
“Official proceeding” means a proceeding heard before any legislative, judicial,
administrative or other governmental agency, or before any official authorized to hear
evidence under oath.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2801(2) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
C
OMMENT: Fee arbitration before a state bar committee is an “official proceeding.” State v.
Self, 135 Ariz. 374, 661 P.2d 224 (App. 1983).
28.01(3) Definition of “Physical Evidence”
“Physical evidence” means any article, object, document, record or other thing of
physical substance.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2801(3) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
28.01(4) Definition of “Testimony”
“Testimony” means oral or written statements, documents or any other material that
may be offered by a witness in an official proceeding.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2801(4) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
28.01(5) Definition of “Threat”
“Threat” means a communication or act to do in the future any of the following:
1. cause physical injury to anyone by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument; or
2. cause physical injury to anyone except as provided in paragraph 1; or
3. cause damage to property; or
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4. engage in other conduct constituting an offense; or
5. accuse anyone of a crime or bring criminal charges against anyone; or
6. take or withhold action as a public servant or cause a public servant to take or
withhold action; or
7. cause anyone to part with any property.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2801(5) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and 13-1804(A)
(statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Paragraph 6 of A.R.S. § 13-1804(A) provides:
Expose a secret or an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject
anyone to hatred, contempt or ridicule or to impair the person’s credit or
business.
This provision has been held unconstitutional. State v. Weinstein, 182 Ariz. 564, 568, 898
P.2d 513, 517 (App. 1995). Therefore, the Committee did not include paragraph 6 in this
instruction.
28.02 Influencing a Witness
The crime of influencing a witness requires proof that the defendant:
1. [threatened] [offered, conferred or agreed to confer any benefit to] a witness or a
person the defendant believed may be called as a witness in any official proceeding;
and
2. intended to [influence the testimony of that person] [induce that person to avoid
legal process summoning (him) (her) to testify] [induce that person to be absent
from any official proceeding to which that person had been legally summoned].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2802 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Criminal Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining
“intent” and “intent – inference.”
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 28.01(2) for the definition of “official proceeding.”
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 28.01(5) for the definition of “threat.
“Benefit” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(2) as “anything of value or advantage, present or
prospective.”
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
28.03 Receiving a Bribe by a Witness
The crime of receiving a bribe by a witness requires proof that the defendant:
1. was a witness in an official proceeding or believed that [he] [she] may be called as a
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witness in such a proceeding; and
2. knowingly solicited, accepted or agreed to accept any benefit with an understanding
or agreement that [testimony would be thereby influenced] [the defendant would
attempt to avoid legal process summoning the defendant to testify] [the defendant
would be absent from any official proceeding to which the defendant had been
legally summoned].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2803 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 28.01(2) for the definition of “official proceeding.”
“Benefit” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(2) as “anything of value or advantage, present or
prospective.”
“Solicit” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1002.
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
28.04 Tampering with a Witness
The crime of tampering with a witness requires proof that the defendant knowingly
communicated, directly or indirectly, with a witness in any official proceeding or a person
the defendant believed may be called as a witness to [unlawfully withhold any testimony]
[testify falsely] [be absent from any official proceeding to which that person had been legally
summoned] [evade a summons or subpoena].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2804 (statutory language as of July 24, 2014).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 28.01(2) for the definition of “official proceeding.”
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
28.05 Influencing a Juror
The crime of influencing a juror requires proof that the defendant:
1. threatened a juror or offered, conferred or agreed to confer a benefit upon a juror;
and
2. intended to influence the juror’s vote, opinion, decision or other action as a juror.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2805 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining
“intent” and “intent – inference.”
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Use Statutory Definition Instruction 28.01(1) for the definition of “juror.”
“Benefit” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(2) as “anything of value or advantage, present or
prospective.”
28.06 Receiving a Bribe by a Juror
The crime of receiving a bribe by a juror requires proof that the defendant:
1. was a juror; and
2. knowingly solicited, accepted, or agreed to accept, any benefit; and
3. understood or agreed that the defendant’s vote, opinion, decision or other action as
a juror may be influenced.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2806 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Criminal Instruction 28.01(1) for the definition of “juror.”
“Benefit” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(2) as “anything of value or advantage, present or
prospective.”
“Solicit” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1002.
28.07 Jury Tampering
The crime of jury tampering requires proof that the defendant:
1. other than as a part of the normal proceedings of a case, directly or indirectly
communicated with a juror; and
2. intended to influence the juror’s vote, opinion, decision or other action in the case.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2807 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining
“intent” and “intent – inference.”
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 28.01(1) for the definition of “juror.”
28.08 Misconduct by a Juror
The crime of misconduct by a juror requires proof that the defendant, while a juror, in
relation to an action or proceeding pending or about to be brought before the defendant as a
juror, knowingly [allowed an unauthorized communication to be made to the defendant]
[made a promise or agreement to decide for or against any party to a proceeding other than
as a part of a jury deliberation].
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2808 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 28.01(1) for the definition of “juror.”
Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
28.09 Tampering with Physical Evidence
The crime of tampering with physical evidence requires proof that the defendant:
1. [destroyed, mutilated, altered, concealed or removed physical evidence with the
intent to impair its verity or availability] [knowingly made, produced or offered any
false physical evidence] [prevented the production of physical evidence by an act of
force, intimidation or deception of any person]; and
2. Intended that such physical evidence be used, introduced, rejected or unavailable in
an official proceeding which was pending or which the defendant knew was about to
be instituted.
It is not a defense to a crime of tampering with physical evidence that the evidence in
question was inadmissible in court proceedings.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2809 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining
“intent” and “intent – inference.”
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 28.01(2) for the definition of “official proceeding.”
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 28.01(3) for the definition of “physical evidence.”
C
OMMENT: Presenting an altered check along with false testimony regarding the check in a
fee arbitration proceeding before the State Bar Committee on Arbitration of Fee Disputes
was sufficient for a conviction for tampering with physical evidence in official proceeding.
State v. Self , 135 Ariz. 374, 661 P.2d 224 (App. 1983).
“Verity” as used in element one may need clarification. Depending on the type of
evidence in question, the court may wish to consider using “genuineness,” “truthfulness,” or
“legitimacy.”
28.10 Interfering with Judicial Proceedings More Work needs to be done on
this one.
The crime of interfering with judicial proceedings requires proof that the defendant
knowingly disobeyed or resisted the lawful order, process, or other mandate of a court.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2810 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
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“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: A defendant charged with Interfering with Judicial Proceedings is not entitled
to a jury trial. Ottaway v. Smith, 210 Ariz. 490, 113 P.3d 1247 (App. 2005). This instruction is
intended for use where a defendant is charged with a felony for which a conviction for
Interfering with Judicial Proceedings is a necessary predicate.
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CHAPTER 29
29.03 Riot
The crime of riot requires proof that the defendant, while acting together with two or
more other persons, recklessly [used force or violence] [threatened to use force or violence,
if such threat was accompanied by immediate power of execution], which disturbed the
public peace.
“Public” means affecting or likely to affect a substantial group of persons.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2903 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c)).
29.04 Disorderly Conduct
The crime of disorderly conduct requires proof that the defendant knowingly or
intentionally disturbed the peace or quiet of a [neighborhood] [family] [person] by recklessly
[handling] [displaying] [discharging] a [deadly weapon] [dangerous instrument].
[“Deadly weapon” means anything designed for lethal use, including a firearm.]
[“Dangerous instrument” means anything that under the circumstances in which it is
used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used is capable of creating a substantial risk
of causing death or serious physical injury.]
[“Firearm” means any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or
other weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile
by the action of expanding gases, except that it does not include a firearm in permanently
inoperable condition.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2904 (statutory language as of April 19, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts.
If evidence has been raised that the offense of disorderly conduct is a lesser-included
offense of another offense, the court should give an instruction on lesser-included offenses.
(Standard Criminal Instruction 22).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” or “with intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b).)
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c)).
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COMMENT: Disorderly conduct under A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(6) is a lesser-included offense of
intentional aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. State v. Angle,
149 Ariz. 478, 479, 720 P.2d 79, 80 (1986).
Resisting arrest is not a lesser-included offense of disorderly conduct. State v. Diaz, 135
Ariz. 496, 497, 662 P.2d 461, 462 (App. 1983).
Disorderly conduct is not a lesser-included offense of obstructing justice. State v. OKelley,
117 Ariz. 34, 37, 570 P.2d 805, 808 (App. 1977).
Disorderly conduct is not a lesser-included offense of drive-by shooting. State v. Torres-
Mercado, 191 Ariz. 279, 282, 955 P.2d 35, 38 (App. 1997).
29.07 False Reporting
The crime of false reporting requires proof that the defendant [initiated] [circulated] a
report of a [bombing] [fire] [offense] [emergency] knowing that the report was false and
intending that the report would:
[cause action of any sort by [an official] [a volunteer agency] organized to deal with
emergencies.]
[place a person in fear of imminent serious physical injury.]
[(prevent) (interrupt) the occupation of any [building] [room] [place of assembly] [public
place] [means of transportation.]
[and
The defendant has a prior conviction of false reporting.]
[“Public” means affecting or likely to affect a substantial group of persons.]
[“Public agency” means this state, any city, county, municipal corporation or district, any
Arizona federally recognized Native American tribe or any other public authority that is
located in whole or in part in this state and that provides police, fire fighting, medical or
other emergency services.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2907 (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the case.
If the defendant has no prior conviction for false reporting, but is charged with more
than one count of false reporting, the instruction need not include the element of the prior
conviction.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
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29.10 Cruelty to Animals
The crime of [cruelty to animals] [interference with a working or service animal] requires
proof that the defendant:
[intentionally, knowingly or recklessly subjected any animal under the defendants
custody or control to cruel neglect or abandonment.]
[intentionally, knowingly or recklessly failed to provide medical attention necessary to
prevent protracted suffering to any animal under the defendant’s custody or control.]
[intentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicted unnecessary physical injury to any
animal.]
[recklessly subjected any animal to cruel mistreatment.]
[intentionally, knowingly or recklessly killed any animal under the custody or control of
another person without either legal privilege or consent of the owner.]
[recklessly interfered with, killed, or harmed a working or service animal without either
legal privilege or consent of the owner.]
[intentionally, knowingly or recklessly left an animal unattended and confined in a motor
vehicle under circumstances likely to result in physical injury to or death to the animal.]
[intentionally or knowingly subjected any animal under the defendants custody or
control to cruel neglect or abandonment that resulted in serious physical injury to the
animal.]
[intentionally or knowingly subjected any animal to cruel mistreatment.]
[intentionally or knowingly interfered with, killed, or harmed a working or service animal
without either legal privilege or consent of the owner.]
[intentionally or knowingly allowed any dog that was under the defendants custody or
control to interfere with, kill or cause physical injury to a service animal.]
[recklessly allowed any dog that was under the defendants custody or control to
interfere with, kill or cause physical injury to a service animal.]
[intentionally or knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized control over a service
animal with the intent to deprive the service animal handler of the service animal.]
“Animal” means a mammal, bird, reptile or amphibian.
[“Cruel mistreatment” means to torture or otherwise inflict unnecessary serious physical
injury upon an animal or to kill an animal in a manner that caused protracted suffering to the
animal.]
[“Cruel neglect” means to fail to provide an animal with necessary food, water or
shelter.]
[“Handler” means a law enforcement officer or any other person who has successfully
completed a course of training prescribed by the persons agency or the service animal
owner and who used a specially trained animal under the direction of the persons agency or
the service animal owner.]
[“Service animal” means an animal that has completed a formal training program that
assists its owner in one or more daily living tasks that are associated with a productive
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lifestyle and that is trained to not pose a danger to the health and safety of the general
public.]
[“Working animal” means a horse or dog that is used by a law enforcement agency that
is specially trained for law enforcement work and that is under the control of a handler.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2910 (statutory language as of August 22, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c)).
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OMMENT: A specific defense exists under A.R.S. § 13-2910(B). The defense relates to the
use of poisons in an attempt to protect people, livestock, and poultry or to control wild or
domestic rodents on the property.
29.10.01 Animal Fighting
The crime of animal fighting requires proof that the defendant knowingly:
[owned, possessed, kept or trained any animal with the intent that such animal engage in
an exhibition of fighting with another animal.]
[for amusement or gain, caused any animal to fight with another animal, or caused any
animals to injure each other.]
[permitted (insert specific act from either bracketed paragraph above) to be done on any
premises under the defendant’s charge or control.]
“Animal” means a mammal, bird, reptile or amphibian.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2910.01 (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
For cock fighting, see Criminal Jury Instruction 29.10.03.
This statute does not apply to prohibit or restrict activities permitted by or pursuant to
Title 3 nor to animals that are trained to protect livestock predation and engage in actions to
protect livestock.
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29.10.02 Presence at Animal Fight
The crime of presence at an animal fight requires proof that the defendant knowingly
was present at any place or building where preparations were being made for an exhibition
of the fighting of animals, or was present at such exhibition.
“Animal” means a mammal, bird, reptile or amphibian.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2910.02 (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: The instruction is consistent with the statute. As written, the statute appears to
create a strict liability offense for anyone present in a location where preparations are being
made for an animal fight even though the person has no knowledge of those preparations.
The same issue arises with A.R.S. § 13-2910.04, presence at cockfight.
29.10.03 Cockfighting
The crime of cockfighting requires proof that the defendant knowingly
[owned, possessed, kept or trained any cock with the intent that such cock engage in an
exhibition of fighting with another cock.]
[for amusement or gain, caused any cock to fight with another cock or caused any cocks
to injure each other.]
[permitted (list specific act from either paragraph above) to be done on any premises
under the defendant’s charge or control.]
“Cock” means any male chicken, including game fowl except for wild birds.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2910.03 (statutory language as of November 23, 1998) and A.R.S. § 17-
101 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally or with intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
C
OMMENT: The statute exempts “wildlife” as defined in A.R.S. § 17-101. The only
applicable exception is wild birds.
29.10.06 Defense to Cruelty to Animals and Bird Fighting
It is a defense to [cruelty to animals] [dog fighting] presence at [dog fight] [cockfighting]
that the activity charged involved the possession, training, exhibition or use of a bird or
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animal in the otherwise lawful sports of falconry, animal hunting, rodeos, ranching, or the
training or use of hunting dogs.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2910.06 (statutory language as of November 23, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
29.11 Interference with or Disruption of an Educational Institution
The crime of interference with or disruption of an educational institution requires proof
that the defendant:
[intentionally, knowingly or recklessly interfered with or disrupted the normal operations
of an educational institution by threatening to cause physical injury to any employee or
student of an educational institution or any person on the property of an educational
institution.]
[intentionally, knowingly or recklessly interfered with or disrupted the normal operations
of an educational institution by threatening to cause damage to any educational
institution, the property of any educational institution or the property of any employee
or student of an educational institution.]
[intentionally or knowingly entered or remained on the property of any educational
institution for the purpose of interfering with the lawful use of the property or in any
manner as to deny or interfere with the lawful use of the property by others.]
[intentionally or knowingly refused to obey a lawful order by the chief administrative
officer of an educational institution, or an officer or employee designated by the chief
administrative officer to maintain order, for the defendant to leave the property of an
educational institution if the officer or employee had reasonable grounds to believe:
1. any person or persons was/were committing any act that interfered with or
disrupted the lawful use of the property by others at the educational institution; or
2. any person entered on the property of an educational institution for the purpose of
committing any act that interfered with or disrupted the lawful use of the property
by others at the educational institution.]
“Educational institution” means any university, college, community college, high school
or common school in this state.
“Governing board” means the body, whether appointed or elected, that has the
responsibility for the maintenance and government of an educational institution.
“Interference with or disruption of” includes any act that might reasonably lead to the
evacuation or closure of any property of the educational institution or the postponement,
cancellation or suspension of any class or other school activity. An actual evacuation, closure,
postponement, cancellation or suspension is not required for the act to be considered an
interference or disruption.
“Property of an educational institution” means all land, buildings, and other facilities that
are owned, operated or controlled by the governing board of an educational institution and
that are devoted to educational purposes.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2911 (statutory language as of August 22, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c)).
C
OMMENT: To commit the offense under A.R.S. § 13-2911(A)(1), the prohibited act does
not need to be directed at a specific individual, educational institution or property of an
educational institution. A.R.S. § 13-2911(B).
29.12 Unlawful Introduction of Disease or Parasite
The crime of unlawful introduction of [disease] [parasite] requires proof that the
defendant:
1. knowingly introduced into the State of Arizona; and
2. a [disease] [parasite] of [animals] [poultry]; and
3. that constitutes a threat to [the livestock or poultry industry in Arizona] [human
health] [human life].
It is a defense to this crime if the disease or parasite is introduced as part of any research
conducted by the government or an educational institution.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2912 (statutory language as of August 22, 2002.)
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: The chapter does not define disease or parasite of animals or poultry.
The phrase “livestock or poultry industry in Arizona” is unclear. It may refer to the
livestock industry and the poultry industry, but industry is not stated in the plural, so it may
refer only to individual livestock and to poultry in the sense of a threat to the business or
industry of raising and processing poultry.
29.21B Harassment of a Public Officer or Employee
The crime of harassment of a public [officer] [employee] requires proof that:
1. the defendant, with the intent to harass, filed a nonconsensual lien; and
2. the nonconsensual lien was filed against a public [officer] [employee]; and
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3. the lien was not accompanied by an (order) (judgment) from a court of competent
jurisdiction authorizing the filing of the lien.]
[The lien was not issued by (a governmental entity) (a political subdivision) (an agency)
pursuant to its statutory authority.]
[The lien was not issued by (a validly licensed utility) (a validly licensed water delivery
company) (a mechanics lien claimant) (an entity created under covenants, conditions,
restrictions or declaration affecting real property)].
“Harassment” means conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable
person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms,
annoys or harasses the person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2921 (statutory language of as August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally or with intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
29.21.01 Aggravated Harassment
The crime of aggravated harassment requires proof that the defendant, [with intent to
harass] [knowing that the defendant was harassing another person]:
1. [anonymously or otherwise communicated or caused a communication with another
person by verbal, electronic, mechanical, telegraphic, telephonic or written means in
a manner that harassed;]
[continued to follow another person in or about a public place for no legitimate
purpose after being asked to desist;]
[repeatedly committed an act or acts that harassed another person;]
[surveiled or caused another person to surveil a person for no legitimate purpose;]
[on more than one occasion made a false report to a law enforcement, credit or
social service agency;]
[interfered with the delivery of any public or regulated utility to a person;]
and
2. [The harassment was done after a court had issued an (order of protection)
(injunction against harassment) against the defendant in the harassment victim’s
favor and the (order of protection) (injunction against harassment) had been served
and was still valid;]
[The defendant has been previously convicted of the offense of (insert previous
conviction of domestic violence here);]
and
3. The victim of the previously convicted offense was the same person alleged to have
been harassed in this case.
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“Harassment” means conduct directed at a specific person which would cause a
reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct in fact
seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person.
[“Convicted” means a person who was convicted of an offense including domestic
violence, or who was adjudicated delinquent for conduct that would constitute a
historical prior felony conviction if the juvenile had been tried as an adult for the offense
of domestic violence.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-2921.01(A) and (B) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004); 13-
2921 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally or with intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
29.22A Unlawful Interference with Emergency Public Safety Land Mobile
Radio Frequency Transmissions
The crime of unlawful interference with emergency public safety land mobile radio
frequency transmission requires proof that the defendant recklessly [interrupted] [impeded]
[directly interfered] with an emergency communication over a public safety land mobile radio
frequency communications network or system created for emergency communications.
“Emergency” means a situation in which a person is or is reasonably believed by the
person transmitting the communication to be in imminent danger of serious physical injury
or in which property is or is reasonably believed by the person transmitting the
communication to be in imminent danger of damage or destruction.
“Public safety land mobile radio frequency” means a frequency designated as such by
federal law.
“Public safety land mobile radio frequency communications network or system” means
those radio services and emergency communications systems that are designated as such by
federal law.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2922 (statutory language as of May 19, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(c)).
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29.23 Stalking
The crime of stalking requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly or intentionally engaged in a course of conduct that was directed toward
another person; and
[2. that conduct caused the victim to:
[suffer emotional distress or reasonably fear that the victim’s property will be
damaged or destroyed]
[suffer emotional distress or reasonably fear that the victim will be physically injured]
[suffer emotional distress or reasonably fear that the victim’s family member will be
physically injured]
[suffer emotional distress or reasonably fear that the victim’s domestic animal or
livestock will be physically injured]
[suffer emotional distress or reasonably fear that a person with whom the victim has
or has previously had a romantic or sexual relationship will be physically injured]
[suffer emotional distress or reasonably fear that a person who regularly resides in
the victim’s household or has resided in the victim’s household within the six
months before the last conduct occurred will be physically injured]
[reasonably fear death]
[reasonably fear the death of the victim’s family member]
[reasonably fear the death of the victim’s domestic animal]
[reasonably fear the death of the victim’s livestock]
[reasonably fear the death of a person with whom the victim has or has previously
had a romantic or sexual relationship]
[reasonably fear the death of a person who regularly resides in the victim’s
household or has resided in the victim’s household within the six months before the
last conduct occurred].
“Course of conduct” means directly or indirectly, in person or through one or more
third persons or by any other means, to do any of the following
A. Maintain visual or physical proximity to a specific person or directing verbal, written
or other threats, whether express or implied, to a specific person on two or more occasions
over a period of time, however short.
B. Use any electronic, digital or global positioning system device to surveil a specific
person or a specific persons internet or wireless activity continuously for twelve hours or
more or on two or more occasions over a period of time, however short, without
authorization.
C. Communicate, or cause to be communicated, words, images or language by or
through the use of electronic mail or an electronic communication that is directed at a
specific person without authorization and without a legitimate purpose on more than one
occasion.
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Course of conduct does not include constitutionally protected activity or other activity
authorized by law, the other person, the other persons authorized representative or if the
other person is a minor, the minor’s parent or guardian.
“Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering or distress that may, but does
not have to, require medical or other professional treatment or counseling.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2923 (statutory language as of August 6, 2016.)
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally or with intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
29.25 Hoax
The crime of hoax requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally engaged
in conduct that:
1. was likely to impart the false impression that an act of terrorism [was taking place]
[would take place]; and
2. [would reasonably be expected to cause] [Caused] an emergency response by a
governmental agency.
“Terrorism” means any felony that involves the use of a deadly weapon or a weapon of
mass destruction or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury with the
intent to [(influence policy or affect the conduct of the state or any of the political
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of this state) (cause substantial interruption of
public communications, communication service providers, public transportation, common
carriers, public utilities, public establishments, or other public services)].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2925 (statutory language as of August 22, 2002) and 13-2301 (statutory
language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally or with intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510).
“Serious physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0534).
“Weapon of mass destruction” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2301 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 23.01.C.15).
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29.26 Abandonment or Concealment of a Dead Body
The crime of abandonment or concealment of a dead body requires proof that the
defendant:
1. knowingly moved [a dead human body] [parts of a dead human body]; and
2. the move was with the intent to [(abandon) (conceal)] [(the dead human body) (parts
of a dead human body)].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-2926 (statutory language as of August 12, 2005.)
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally or with intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
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OMMENT: Under A.R.S. § 36-325, the person responsible for the remains has seven days
to submit the death certificate for registration to a local registrar.
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30.05.A Interception of Communications; Installation of Pen Register or Trap
and Trace Device
The crime of intercepting wire, electronic and oral communications requires proof that
the defendant intentionally:
[intercepted a wire or electronic communication to which (he) (she) was not a party, or
aided, authorized, employed, procured or permitted another to so do, without the
consent of either a sender or receiver thereof.] or
[intercepted a conversation or discussion at which (he) (she) was not present, or aided,
authorized, employed, procured or permitted another to so do, without the consent of a
party to such conversation or discussion.] or
[intercepted the deliberations of a jury or aided, authorized, employed, procured or
permitted another to so do.]
“Intercept” means the listening to or other acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other
device.
[“Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data or intelligence of any nature that is transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system but that does not include any
wire or oral communication, any communication made through a tone-only paging device or
any communication from a tracking device.]
[“Wire communication” means any aural transfer that is made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of any wire,
cable or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception,
including the use of a connection in a switching station, and that is furnished or operated by
any person who is engaged in providing or operating the facilities for the transmission of
communications.
“Aural transfer” means a communication containing the human voice at any point
between and including the point of origin and the point of reception.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3001 and 13-3005(A) (statutory language as of July 1, 1988).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining
“intent” and “intent – inference.”
30.05.B Installation of a Pen Register or Trap and Trace Device
The crime of installation of a [pen register] [trap and trace device] requires proof that the
defendant intentionally and without lawful authority [installed] [used] a [pen register] [trap
and trace device] on the telephone lines or communications facilities of another person
which were utilized for wire or electronic communication.
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[“Pen register” means a device or process that records or decodes electronic or other
impulses that identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line or
communication facility to which the device is attached or the dialing, routing, addressing or
signaling information that is transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or
electronic communication is transmitted but does not include the contents of any
communication, except when used in connection with a court order. A pen register does not
include a publicly available device or process that is otherwise lawful.]
[“Trap and trace device” means a device or process that captures the incoming electronic
or other impulses that identify the originating number of an instrument or device from
which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted or the dialing, routing, addressing
and signaling information that is reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
electronic communication but does not include the content of any communication, except
when used in connection with a court order. A trap and trace device does not include a
publicly available device or process that is otherwise lawful.]
“Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data or intelligence of any nature that is transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system but that does not include any
wire or oral communication, any communication made through a tone-only paging device or
any communication from a tracking device.
“Wire communication” means any aural transfer that is made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of any wire,
cable or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception,
including the use of a connection in a switching station, and that is furnished or operated by
any person who is engaged in providing or operating the facilities for the transmission of
communications.
“Aural transfer” means a communication containing the human voice at any point
between and including the point of origin and the point of reception.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3001 and 13-3005(B) (statutory language as of July 1, 1988).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining
“intent” and “intent – inference.”
30.06 Divulging Communication Service Information
The crime of divulging communication service information requires proof that:
[the defendant, intentionally and without lawful authority, obtained any knowledge of
the contents of a wire or electronic communication by connivance with a
communication service provider or its officer or employee.] or
[the defendant is a communications service provider, officer or employee of a
communications service provider and intentionally divulged to anyone but the person
for whom it was intended, except with the permission of the sender or the person for
whom it was intended, the contents or the nature of a wire or electronic communication
entrusted to the communications service provider for transmission or delivery.]
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“Communication service provider” means any person who is engaged in providing a
service that allows its users to send or receive oral, wire or electronic communications or
computer services.
“Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data or intelligence of any nature that is transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system but that does not include any
wire or oral communication, any communication made through a tone-only paging device or
any communication from a tracking device.
“Wire communication” means any aural transfer that is made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of any wire,
cable or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception,
including the use of a connection in a switching station, and that is furnished or operated by
any person who is engaged in providing or operating the facilities for the transmission of
communications.
“Aural transfer” means a communication containing the human voice at any point
between and including the point of origin and the point of reception.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3001 and 13-3006 (statutory language as of July 1, 1988).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining
“intent” and “intent – inference.”
30.08 Possession of an Interception Device
The crime of possession of an interception device requires proof that the defendant:
1. had in [his] [her] possession or control any device, contrivance, machine or
apparatus designed or primarily useful for the interception of wire, electronic or oral
communications; and
2. possessed or controlled the device with the intent to unlawfully use or employ or
allow the device, contrivance, machine or apparatus to be used or employed for the
interception of wire, electronic or oral communications, or having reason to know
the device, contrivance, machine or apparatus was intended to be so used.
“Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data or intelligence of any nature that is transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system but that does not include any
wire or oral communication, any communication made through a tone-only paging device or
any communication from a tracking device.
“Oral communication” means a spoken communication that is uttered by a person who
exhibits an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying the expectation but does not include any electronic communication.
“Wire communication” means any aural transfer that is made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of any wire,
cable or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception,
including the use of a connection in a switching station, and that is furnished or operated by
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any person who is engaged in providing or operating the facilities for the transmission of
communications.
“Aural transfer” means a communication containing the human voice at any point
between and including the point of origin and the point of reception.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3001 and 13-3008 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
Use Note: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining “intent” and
“intent – inference.”
30.19.A Surreptitious Recording
The crime of surreptitious [recording] [viewing] requires proof that the defendant
knowingly [photographed, videotaped, filmed, digitally recorded or by any other means used
a device to secretly view or record] [secretly viewed, with or without a device,] another
person without that person’s consent:
[1. While the person was in a restroom, bathroom, locker room, bedroom or other
location where the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy; and
2. The person was urinating, defecating, dressing, undressing, nude or involved in
sexual intercourse or sexual contact.]
[1. When the viewing was in a manner that directly or indirectly captured or allowed the
viewing of the person’s genitalia, buttock or female breast, whether clothed or
unclothed; and
2. The person’s body part was not otherwise visible to the public.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3019(A) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate. The first bracketed option is based on
A.R.S. § 13-3019(A)(1) and the second is based on A.R.S. § 13-3019(A)(2).
Use Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
A.R.S. § 13-3019(G) provides that “sexual contact” and “sexual intercourse” have the
same meanings prescribed in § 13-1401.
If a device was not used to commit the offense, the felony classification is reduced
except if the violation is a second or subsequent violation. A.R.S. § 13-3019(E).
30.19.B Disclosure of Surreptitious Recording
The crime of disclosure of surreptitious recording requires proof that the defendant
knowingly [disclosed] [displayed] [distributed] [published] a [photograph] [videotape] [film]
[digital recording] which the defendant knew was secretly recorded of another person
without that person’s consent while the person was either:
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1. in a restroom, bathroom, locker room, bedroom or other location where the person
had a reasonable expectation of privacy; or
2. urinating, defecating, dressing, undressing, nude or involved in sexual intercourse or
sexual contact.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3019(B) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
A.R.S. § 13-3019(E) provides that “sexual contact” and “sexual intercourse” have the
same meanings prescribed in section 13-1401.
C
OMMENT: Although the statute is not clear, the committee is of the opinion that the
defendant must know that the recording was secretly recorded. See United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994) holding that the mental state of knowingly “should apply
to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.”
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31.01.01 Definition of “Deadly Weapon”
“Deadly weapon” means anything that is designed for lethal use. The term includes a
firearm.
31.01.02 Definition of “Deface”
“Deface” means to remove, alter, or destroy the manufacturer’s serial number.
31.01.03 Definition of “Explosive”
“Explosive” means any dynamite, nitroglycerin, black powder or other similar explosive
material including plastic explosives. The term “explosive” does not include ammunition or
ammunition components such as primers, percussion caps, smokeless powder, black powder
and black powder substitutes used for hand loading purposes.
31.01.04 Definition of “Firearm”
“Firearm” means any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or
other weapon that will expel, is designed to expel or may readily be converted to expel a
projectile by the action of an explosive. Firearm does not include a firearm in permanently
inoperable condition.
31.01.05 Definition of “Improvised Explosive Device”
“Improvised explosive device” means a device that incorporates explosives or
destructive lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and that is designed to
destroy, disfigure, terrify or harass.
31.01.06 Definition of “Occupied Structure”
“Occupied structure” means any building, object, vehicle, watercraft, aircraft or place
with sides and a floor that is separately securable from any other structure attached to it, that
is used for lodging, business, transportation, recreation or storage and in which one or more
human beings either is or is likely to be present or so near as to be in equivalent danger at
the time the discharge of a firearm occurs. Occupied structure includes any dwelling house,
whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant.
31.01.07 Definition of “Prohibited Possessor”
“Prohibited possessor” means any person who:
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[pursuant to court order has been found to constitute a danger to himself/herself or to
others or have persistent or acute disabilities or grave disabilities and whose right to
possess a firearm has not been restored pursuant to Arizona law.]
[has been convicted within or without the State of Arizona of a felony or who has been
adjudicated delinquent for a felony [and whose civil right to possess or carry a gun or
firearm has not been restored.]]
[is at the time of possession serving a term of imprisonment in any correctional or
detention facility.]
[is at the time of possession serving a term of probation pursuant to a conviction for a
domestic violence offense or a felony offense, parole, community supervision, work
furlough, home arrest or release on any other basis or who is serving a term of probation
or parole pursuant to the interstate compact.]
[is a prohibited possessor under federal law for shipping or transporting any firearm or
ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce, or possessing any firearm or ammunition
in or affecting commerce, or receiving any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, while being an alien illegally or
unlawfully in the United States or having been admitted to the United States under a
non-immigrant visa of the Immigration and Nationality Act.]
[has been found incompetent and subsequently has not been found competent.]
[is found guilty except insane.]
You may consider this evidence only as to whether the defendant is a prohibited
possessor. [You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose.]
USE NOTE: Language within the bracketed portion of paragraph 2 should only be given
when the defendant has produced evidence demonstrating that his or her right to possess or
carry a firearm has been restored. See Statutory Criminal Instruction 31.02, Affirmative
Defense to Misconduct Involving Weapons under A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(b).
Language within the bracketed portion of the last paragraph should only be given when
appropriate. If, however, a defendant’s prohibited possessor status can be considered for
another reason, such as prior conviction that can be considered under Evidence Rule 609,
the bracketed language should be omitted.
31.01.08 Definition of “Prohibited Weapon”
“Prohibited weapon” means:
[an item that is a (bomb) (grenade) (rocket having a propellant charge of more than four
ounces) (mine) and that is explosive, incendiary or poison gas]
[a device that is designed, made or adapted to muffle the report of a firearm.]
[a firearm that is capable of shooting more than one shot automatically, without manual
reloading, by a single function of the trigger.]
[a rifle with a barrel length of less than sixteen inches.]
[a shotgun with a barrel length of less than eighteen inches.]
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[any firearm that is made from a rifle or a shotgun and that, as modified, has an overall
length of less than twenty-six inches.]
[an instrument, including a nunchaku, that consists of two or more sticks, clubs, bars or
rods to be used as handles, connected by a rope, cord, wire or chain, in the design of a
weapon used in connection with the practice of a system of self-defense.]
[a breakable container that contains a flammable liquid with a flashpoint of one hundred
fifty degrees Fahrenheit or less and that has a wick or similar device capable of being
ignited.]
[a chemical or combination of chemicals, compounds or materials, including dry ice, that
is (possessed) (manufactured) for the purpose of generating a gas to cause a mechanical
failure, rupture or bursting.]
[a chemical or combination of chemicals, compounds or materials, including dry ice, that
is (possessed) (manufactured) for the purpose of generating an (explosion) (detonation)
of the chemical or combination of chemicals compounds or materials.]
[an improvised explosive device.]
[any combination of parts or materials that is designed and intended for use in making or
converting a device into an item that is (list prohibited weapon from A.R.S. §13-
3101(A)(8)(a)(i), (vi) or (vii).]
The term “prohibited weapon” does not include any fireworks that are imported,
distributed or used in compliance with state laws or local ordinances, any propellant,
propellant actuated devices or propellant actuated industrial tools that are manufactured,
imported or distributed for their intended purposes or a device that is commercially
manufactured primarily for the purpose of illumination.
[The term “prohibited weapon” does not include any firearms or devices that are
registered in the national firearms registry and transfer records of the United States
Treasury Department or any firearm that has been classified as a curio or relic by the
United States that has been classified as a curio or relic by the United States Treasury
Department.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3101 (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The determination of whether a firearm is permanently inoperable under A.R.S. § 13-
3101(A)(4) is a question of fact. State v. Young, 192 Ariz. 303, 306-307, 965 P.2d 37, 40-41
(App. 1998) (noting that a disassembled or broken weapon may constitute a firearm if it can
be made operable with reasonable preparation, including the addition of a readily replaceable
part or the accomplishment of a quickly-effected repair).
Neither operability nor knowledge of operability of a firearm is an element of the
offense; rather, permanent inoperability is an affirmative defense. State v. Young, 192 Ariz.
303, 307, 965 P.2d 37, 41 (App. 1998).
If the State has alleged that the prohibited possessor has a felony conviction, the
defendant has the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s civil rights to possess or carry a gun or
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firearm has been restored. State v. Kelly, 210 Ariz. 460, 464-65, 112 P.3d 682, 686-87 (App.
2005).
If the State has alleged that the prohibited possessor has been found to constitute a
danger to himself / herself or others, the Court should insure that the finding was made
under A.R.S. § 36-540.
If the State alleged that the prohibited possessor was a prohibited possessor as defined
under federal law (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)) pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e) prior to
September 26, 2008,, the Court should insure that the federal finding was not made under 18
U.S.C. § 922(y) (pertaining to aliens admitted under non-immigrant visas). When the offense
occurred on or between August 24, 2004 and September 25, 2008, the State must prove all
of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), including the requirement that any firearm or
ammunition allegedly possessed by the defendant must have an interstate or foreign
commerce nexus. State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 530 ¶16, 169 P.3d 115, 120 ¶16
(App. 2007).
For alleged violations of A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e) [recodified as A.R.S. § 13-
3101(A)(7)(e)] occurring on or after September 26, 2008, the Committee was unable to find a
definition of “undocumented alien” in either federal or state statutes or case law. The
following definition of “alien” is taken from 8 U.S.C. §101(a)(3), which the court may
choose to use in its instruction: “The term “alien” means any person not a citizen or national
of the United States.” The term “undocumented” appears to be the commonly understood
meaning of the word. The categories of “nonimmigrant aliens” can be found in 8 U.S.C.
§1101(a)(15)(A)–(V).
In a prosecution alleging the possession of a sawed-off rifle or sawed-off shotgun under
A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(d) [now codified as A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(8)(a)(iv)], the State must
prove that the defendant knew that he or she possessed a sawed-off or short-barreled
shotgun or rifle, but the State does not have to prove that the defendant knew the specific
barrel or overall length that made it a statutorily prohibited weapon. State v. Young, 192 Ariz.
303, 311-12, 965 P.2d 37, 45-46 (App. 1998).
The State is not required to prove the non-registration of a prohibited weapon by the
United States Treasury Department, which is instead an affirmative defense to be proved by
the defense. State v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 621, 875 P.2d 850, 854 (App. 1994) (holding that
the failure of the police to test the weapon or to determine registration did not call for a
Willits instruction, because the burden of showing such is on the defendant).
In regard to a prohibited possessor under A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(67)(d) who was at the
time of possession serving a term of probation, parole, etc., as defined in Statutory Criminal
Definition Instruction 31.01.067, the offense is based upon the defendant being on
probation, etc., at the time of the possession, regardless of whether the underlying
conviction was vacated after the time of possession. State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, 169 ¶13,
150 P.3d 252, 256 ¶13 (App. 2007) (holding that the subsequent invalidation of the
underlying conviction is irrelevant and shall be precluded from evidence, argument and jury
instructions.)
The last bracketed paragraph in 31.01.08 applies only to A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(8)(a)(i), (ii),
(iii) and (iv).
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COMMENT: The reference to Arizona law in the first bracketed item in 31.01.07 is A.R.S.
§ 13-924 regarding the restoration of right to possess a firearm by mentally ill persons.
A flare gun is not a prohibited weapon. In Re Robert A., 199 Ariz. 485, 487, 19 P.3d
626, 628 (App. 2001) (holding that a flare gun falls within the exception in A.R.S. § 13-
3101(A)(7) [now codified as A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(8)(b)(ii)] regarding propellant actuated
devices commercially manufactured for the purpose of illumination).
The offense of misconduct involving prohibited weapons does not apply to a nunchaku
under A.R.S. § 13-3101(8)(a)(v) if the nunchaku is possessed for the purposes of preparing
for, conducting or participating in lawful exhibition, demonstrations, contests or athletic
events involving the use of such weapon. A.R.S. § 13-3102(H).
From August 25, 2004 to September 25, 2008, A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e) provided that
one was a prohibited possessor if that person was considered a prohibited possessor under
federal law (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)) As of September 26, 2008, A.R.S. §3-3101(A)(6)(e) was
recodified as A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(e)] and rewritten to remove that definition and replaced
with the requirement that the person was “an undocumented alien or a nonimmigrant alien
traveling with or without documentation in this state for business or pleasure or who is
studying in this state and who maintains a foreign residence abroad,” with certain exceptions.
Therefore, in regard to A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e), the following comments apply to any
offenses that occurred on or between August 25, 2004 and September 25, 2008:
With respect to Statutory Criminal Definition Instruction 31.01.06, A.R.S. § 13-
3101(A)(6)(e) provides that a person who would be a prohibited possessor under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(5), is also a prohibited possessor under Arizona law unless the person is exempted
by a provision in 18 U.S.C. § 922(y). See State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 530 ¶16,
169 P.3d 115, 120 ¶16 (App. 2007) (holding that the plain language of §13-3101(A)(6)(e)
adopts all of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(5), including the necessity to show a nexus to interstate or
foreign commerce).
While A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e) refers to the relevant federal statute by its U.S.C.
number, Statutory Criminal Definitional Instruction 31.01.06 has included the text of the
federal statute to make it more “jury friendly.” The statutory language of A.R.S. § 13-
3101(A)(6)(e) does not require that a defendant be previously convicted of a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) in order to be a prohibited possessor, only that the State prove a
defendant is in violation of the provisions of such federal statute. However, the trial court
should be aware that a federal preemption argument could be asserted in regard to the
element of proving a defendant’s immigration status in the absence of a prior federal
conviction. The United States Supreme Court in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-58 (1975)
held that a state statute could not regulate immigration, would be preempted if Congress
demonstrated a manifest intent to occupy the field and could not conflict with federal law.
In State v. Hernandez-Mercado, 124 Wash. 2d 368, 379-81, 879 P.2d 283, 290-291 (1994), the
Washington Supreme Court, relying upon DeCanas, affirmed a conviction under a similar,
but less specific, state firearms possession statute of a defendant who pled guilty to not being
a citizen and who had not been previously convicted of a federal alienage offense. The court
in Hernandez-Mercado held that the statute was not preempted by the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.) and the federal firearms laws (18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930),
and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Nonetheless, an Arizona appellate court has
not ruled on this issue. Absent further appellate clarification, there is the possibility that a
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state court jury would be held to be preempted from finding a violation of federal law absent
a prior federal conviction of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). If the preemption argument is accepted
by the trial court, the following instruction is suggested:
“Prohibited possessor” means any person who is a prohibited possessor under federal
law for a conviction in federal court of shipping or transporting any firearm or ammunition
in interstate or foreign commerce, or possessing any firearm or ammunition in or affecting
commerce, or receiving any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce, while being an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United
States or having been admitted to the United States under a non-immigrant visa of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.
In regard to A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(e), the following comment applies to any offenses
that occurred on or after September 26, 2008:
As of September 26, 2008, the legislature expanded the definition of prohibited
possessor under A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(e) from its previous limitation of a federal
prohibited possessor under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) to include all undocumented aliens and
nonimmigrant aliens, subject to certain enumerated exceptions. Therefore, as of September
26, 2008, a prohibited possessor under the statute is no longer limited to the requirements of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).
31.01.09 Definition of “Trafficking”
“Trafficking” means to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of a
weapon explosive to another person, or to buy, receive, possess or obtain control of a
weapon or explosive with the intent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise
dispose of the weapon or explosive to another person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3101 (statutory language as of August 2, 2012).
31.02.01 Definition of “Public Establishment”
“Public establishment” means a structure, vehicle or craft that is owned, leased or
operated by the State of Arizona or a political subdivision of the State of Arizona.
31.02.02 Definition of “Public Event”
“Public event” means a specifically named or sponsored event of limited duration either
conducted by a public entity or conducted by a private entity with a permit or license granted
by a public entity. Public event does not include an unsponsored gathering of people in a
public place.
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31.02.03 Definition of “School”
“School” means a public or nonpublic kindergarten program, common school or high
school.
31.02.04 Definition of “School Grounds”
“School grounds” means in, or on the grounds of, a school.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(K) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
31.07 Unlawful Discharge of Firearms
The crime of unlawful discharge of a firearm requires proof that the defendant, with
criminal negligence, discharged a firearm within or into the limits of a municipality.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §13-3107 (statutory language as of July 20, 2011).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Criminal negligence” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal Instruction
1.0510(d)).
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 31.01.04).
“Municipality” is defined in A.R.S. §13-3107 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 31.07.01).
This offense shall not apply if the firearm is discharged:
1. as allowed by Chapter 4;
2. on a properly supervised range;
3. To lawfully take wildlife during an open season established by the
Arizona Game and Fish Commission and subject to the limitations
prescribed by Title 17 and Arizona Game and Fish Commission rules
and orders. This paragraph does not prevent a city, town or county from
adopting an ordinance or rule restricting the discharge of a firearm
within one-fourth mile of an occupied structure. For purposes of this
paragraph, “take” has the same meaning prescribed in section 17-101.
4. for the control of nuisance wildlife by permit from the Arizona Game &
fish Department or the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service;
5. by special permit of the chief of police of the municipality;
6. as required by an animal control officer in the performance of official
duties;
7. using blanks;
8. more than one mile from any occupied structure as defined in §13-3101;
or
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9. in self-defense or defense of another person against an animal attack if a
reasonable person would believe that deadly physical force against the
animal is necessary and reasonable under the circumstances to protect
oneself or the other person.
A.R.S. § 13-3107(C).
C
OMMENT: In a case brought under the predecessor to this statute, A.R.S. §§ 13-917 and
917.01, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the intent to do bodily harm was not an
element of the statute. State v. Andrews, 106 Ariz. 372, 377, 476 P.2d 673, 678 (1970).
31.07.01 Definition of “Municipality”
“Municipality” means any city or town and includes any property that is fully enclosed
within the city or town.
31.07.02 Definition of “Properly Supervised Range”
“Properly supervised range” means a range that is operated:
1. by a club affiliated with the national rifle association of America, the amateur
trapshooting association, the national skeet association or any other nationally
recognized shooting organization, or by any public or private school, or
2. with the approval of any agency of the federal government, the State of Arizona, a
county or a city within which the range is located; or
3. with adult supervision for shooting air or carbon dioxide gas operated guns, or for
shooting in underground ranges on private or public property.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3107(D) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
31.16.01 Definition of “Body Armor”
“Body armor” means any clothing or equipment designed in whole or in part to
minimize the risk of injury from a deadly weapon.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3116(C) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: “Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(1) (Statutory Definition
Instruction 31.01.01).
31.17.01 Definition of “Authorized Remote Stun Gun”
“Authorized remote stun gun” means a remote stun gun that has all of the following:
1. an electrical discharge that is less than one hundred thousand volts and less than
nine joules of energy per pulse; and
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2. a serial or identification number on all projectiles that are discharged from the
remote stun gun; and
3. an identification and tracking system that, on deployment of remote electro
des,
dis
perses coded material that is traceable to the purchaser through records that ar
e
ke
pt by the manufacturer on all remote stun guns and all individual cartridges
sold;
and
4.
a training program that is offered by the manufacturer.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3117(E)(1) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
31.17.02 Definition of “Remote Stun Gun”
“Remote stun gun” means an electronic device that emits an electrical charge and that is
designed and primarily employed to incapacitate a person or animal either through contact
with electrodes on the device itself or remotely through wired probes that are attached to the
device or through a spark, plasma, ionization or other conductive means emitting from the
device.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3117(A)(2) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
31.023 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Prohibited Weapon)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that:
1. the defendant knowingly [manufactured] [possessed] [transported] [sold]
[transferred] a weapon; and
2. the weapon is a prohibited weapon.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(3) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
USE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Prohibited weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 31.01.07).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(31) (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
In State v. Young, 192 Ariz. 303, 311-12, 965 P.2d 37, 45-46 (App. 1998), a case alleging
a violation of A.R.S. § 13-3102, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the State
had to prove that he knew the specific characteristics of the weapon that made it
prohibited, i.e., the length of his sawed-off or short-barreled shotgun was under the legal
limit, but the court, relying upon a line of federal cases, required the State to prove a
less rigorous scienter requirement that the defendant knew that the weapon was sawed-
off or short-barreled. The court in Young specifically held that A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(3) is
not a strict liability crime and that the inclusion of this less rigorous scienter
requirement provides some level of
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knowledge to remove it from being a strict liability crime. The court and counsel may wish
to consider adding language to the instruction when the prohibited weapon involves a short-
barreled or sawed-off shotgun.
In State v. Kerr, 142 Ariz. 426, 433, 690 P.2d 145, 152 (App. 1984), the court held that the
definition of “possession” in A.R.S. § 13-105 is a correct instruction to give under A.R.S.
§ 13-3102(
A)(3), but it noted that constructive possession (defendant was merely in the
home of a registered firearm owner) was not sufficient to violate this subsection. Cf. State v.
Coley, 158 Ariz. 471, 471-72, 763 P.2d 535, 535-36 (App. 1988) (noting that Kerr was correct
as to A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(3), but that the giving of an instruction on constructive possession
was not error in regard to a violation of A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), which pertains to possession
by a prohibited possessor rather than possession of a prohibited weapon).
The State is not required to prove the nonregistration of a prohibited weapon by the
United States Treasury Department, which is instead an affirmative defense to be proved by
the defense. State v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 621, 875 P.2d 850, 854 (App. 1994) (holding that
the failure of the police to test the weapon or to determine registration did not call for a
Willits instruction, because the burden of showing such is on the defendant).
This offense shall not apply to:
1. A peace officer or anyone summoned by a peace officer to assist and while actually
assisting in the performance of official duties;
2. A member of the U.S. military forces or national guard in the performance of official
duties;
3. A war
den, deputy warden or correctional officer of the Arizona Department of
Corrections; or
4. A person specifically licensed, authorized or permitted pursuant to an
Arizona state
or federal statute.
A.R.S. § 13
-3102(C).
This offense shall not apply to:
1. The possessing, transporting, selling or transferring weapons by a museum as part of
its collection or an educational institution for educational purposes or by an
authorized employee of such museum or institution if:
a. Such museum
or institution is operated by the United States or the State
of
Arizona or
a political subdivision of the State of Arizona or by an organization
under federal law as a recipient of a charitable contribution; and
b. Reasonab
le precautions were taken with respect to theft or issue of such
material.
2. The regular and lawful transporting as merchandise.
3. Acquisition by a person by operation of law such as by gift, devise or descent or i
n a
fiduciar
y capacity as a recipient of the property or former property of an insolvent,
incapacitated or deceased p
erson.
A.R.S. § 13-3102(D).
This offense does not apply to the merchandise of an authorized manufacturer of or
dealer in prohibited weapons, when such material is intended to be manufactured, possessed,
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transported, sold or transferred solely for or to a dealer, a regularly constituted or appointed
state, county or municipal police department or police officer, detention facility, the military
service of any state or the United States, a museum or educational institution or a person
specifically licensed or permitted pursuant to federal or state law. A.R.S. § 13-3102(E).
This offense does not apply to a nunchaku under A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(e) if the
nunchaku is possessed for the purposes of preparing for, conducting or participating in
lawful exhibition, demonstrations, contests or athletic events involving the use of such
weapon. A.R.S. § 13-3102(H).
C
OMMENT: A flare gun is not a prohibited weapon. In Re Robert A., 199 Ariz. 485, 487, 19
P.3d 626, 628 (App. 2001) (holding that a flare gun falls within the exception in A.R.S. § 13-
3101(A)(7) regarding propellant actuated devices commercially manufactured for the
purpose of illumination).
The fact that there is a valid registration in the name of another is not a defense to actual
possession under A.R.S. § 13-3102. State v. Kerr, 142 Ariz. 426, 434, 690 P.2d 145, 153 (App.
1984).
31.023-A Misconduct Involving Weapons (Prohibited Weapon)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that:
1. the defendant knowingly [manufactured] [possessed] [transported] [sold]
[transferred] a weapon; and
2. the weapon is a prohibited weapon.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(3) (statutory language as of September 26, 2008).
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SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Use this instruction in all prohibited weapon cases except those involving dry ice. If the
offense involves dry ice, use Statutory Criminal Instruction 31.023-B.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Prohibited weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Criminal
Instruction 31.01.08).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0535).
In State v. Young, 192 Ariz. 303, 311-12, 965 P.2d 37, 45-46 (App. 1998), a case alleging
a violation of A.R.S. § 13-3102, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the state
had to prove that he knew the specific characteristics of the weapon that made it
prohibited, i.e., the length of his sawed-off or short-barreled shotgun was under the legal
limit, but the court, relying upon a line of federal cases, required the State to prove a
less rigorous scienter requirement that the defendant knew that the weapon was sawed-off
or short-barreled. The court in Young specifically held that A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(3) is not a
strict liability crime and that the inclusion of this less rigorous scienter requirement
provides some level of knowledge to remove it from being a strict liability crime. The
court and counsel may wish
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to consider adding language to the instruction when the prohibited weapon involves a short-
barreled or sawed-off shotgun.
In State v. Kerr, 142 Ariz. 426, 433, 690 P.2d 145, 152 (App. 1984), the court held that the
definition of “possession” in A.R.S. § 13-105 is a correct instruction to give under A.R.S.
§ 13-3102(
A)(3), but it noted that constructive possession (defendant was merely in the
home of a registered firearm owner) was not sufficient to violate this subsection. Cf. State v.
Coley, 158 Ariz. 471, 471-72, 763 P.2d 535, 535-36 (App. 1988) (noting that Kerr was correct
as to A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(3), but that the giving of an instruction on constructive possession
was not error in regard to a violation of A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), which pertains to possession
by a prohibited possessor rather than possession of a prohibited weapon).
The State is not required to prove the nonregistration of a prohibited weapon by the
United States Treasury Department, which is instead an affirmative defense to be proved by
the defense. State v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 621, 875 P.2d 850, 854 (App. 1994) (holding that
the failure of the police to test the weapon or to determine registration did not call for a
Willits instruction, because the burden of showing such is on the defendant).
This offense shall not apply to:
1. a peace officer or anyone summoned by a peace officer to assist and while actually
assisting in the performance of official duties;
2. a member of the U.S. military forces or national guard in the performance of official
duties;
3. a war
den, deputy warden or correctional officer of the Arizona Department of
Corrections; or
4. a person specifically licensed, authorized or permitted pursuant to an Arizona
state
or federal statute.
A.R.S. § 13
-3102(C).
This offense shall not apply to:
1. the possessing, transporting, selling or transferring weapons by a museum as part of
its collection or an educational institution for educational purposes or by an
authorized employee of such museum or institution if:
a. Such museum or institution is operated by the United States or the
State of
Arizona or
a political subdivision of the State of Arizona or by an organization
under federal law as a recipient of a charitable contribution; and
b. Reasonable precautions were taken with respect to theft or issue of such
material.
2. the regular and lawful transporting as merchandise.
3. acquisition by a person by operation of law such as by gift, devise or descent or
in a
fiduciar
y capacity as a recipient of the property or former property of an insolvent,
incapacitated or deceased p
erson.
A.R.S. § 13-3102(D).
This offense does not apply to the merchandise of an authorized manufacturer of or
dealer in prohibited weapons, when such material is intended to be manufactured, possessed,
transported, sold or transferred solely for or to a dealer, a regularly constituted or appointed
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state, county or municipal police department or police officer, detention facility, the military
service of any State or the U.S., a museum or educational institution or a person specifically
licensed or permitted pursuant to federal or state law. A.R.S. § 13-3102(E).
This offense does not apply to a nunchaku under A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(e) [now
codified as A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(8)(a)(v)] if the nunchaku is possessed for the purposes of
preparing for, conducting or participating in lawful exhibition, demonstrations, contests or
athletic events involving the use of such weapon. A.R.S. § 13-3102(H).
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OMMENT: A flare gun is not a prohibited weapon. In Re Robert A., 199 Ariz. 485, 487, 19
P.3d 626, 628 (App. 2001) (holding that a flare gun falls within the exception in A.R.S. § 13-
3101(A)(7) [now codified as A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(8)(b)(ii)] regarding propellant actuated
devices commercially manufactured for the purpose of illumination).
The fact that there is a valid registration in the name of another is not a defense to actual
possession under A.R.S. § 13-3102. State v. Kerr, 142 Ariz. 426, 434, 690 P.2d 145, 153 (App.
1984).
31.023-B Misconduct Involving Weapons (Prohibited Weapon Involving Dry
Ice)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that:
1. the defendant knowingly [manufactured] [possessed] [transported] [sold]
[transferred] a weapon; and
2. the weapon is a prohibited weapon; and
[3. the defendant knowingly possessed the dry ice with the intent to cause (injury
to)
(death) of an
other person.]
[3. the defendant knowingly possessed the dry ice with the intent to cause damage to
the property of another person.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(3) (statutory language as of July 31, 2009).
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SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Use this instruction if the offense involves dry ice. In all other prohibited weapon cases,
except those involving dry ice, use Statutory Criminal 31.023-A.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Intentionally” or “with intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
“Prohibited weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101. Statutory Criminal Instruction
31.01.08.
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(31) (Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0535).
This offense shall not apply to:
1. A peace officer or an
yone summoned by a peace officer to assist and while actually
assisting in the performance of official duties;
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2. A member of the U.S. military forces or national guard in the performance of official
duties;
3. A warden, deputy warden, community correctional officer, detention officer, special
investigator or correctional officer of the Arizona Department of Corrections or the
department of juvenile corrections; or
4. A person specifically licensed, authorized or permitted pursuant to an Arizona state
or federal statute.
A.R.S. §13-3102(C).
This offense shall not apply to:
1. The possessing, transporting, selling or transferring weapons by a museum as part of
its collection or an educational institution for educational purposes or by an
authorized employee of such museum or institution if:
a. Such museum or institution is operated by the United States or the State of
Arizona or a political subdivision of the State of Arizona or by an organization
under federal law as a recipient of a charitable contribution; and
b. Reasonable precautions were taken with respect to theft or issue of such
material.
2. The regular and lawful transporting as merchandise.
3. Acquisition by a person by operation of law such as by gift, devise or descent or in a
fiduciary capacity as a recipient of the property or former property of an insolvent,
incapacitated or deceased person.
A.R.S. § 13-3102(D).
This offense does not apply to the merchandise of an authorized manufacturer of or
dealer in prohibited weapons, when such material is intended to be manufactured, possessed,
transported, sold or transferred solely for or to a dealer, a regularly constituted or appointed
state, county or municipal police department or police officer, detention facility, the military
service of any State or the U.S., a museum or educational institution or a person specifically
licensed or permitted pursuant to federal or state law. A.R.S. § 13-3102(E).
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OMMENT: The fact that there is a valid registration in the name of another is not a defense
to actual possession under A.R.S. § 13-3102. State v. Kerr, 142 Ariz. 426, 434, 690 P.2d 145,
153 (App. 1984).
31.024 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Prohibited Possessor)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly possessed a [deadly] [prohibited] weapon; and
2. was a prohibited possessor at the time of possession of the weapon.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
USE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
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“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.01).
“Prohibited possessor” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.06).
“Prohibited weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.07).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(31) (Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0535).
If the State has established that the prohibited possessor has a felony conviction, the
defendant has the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s civil rights to possess or carry a gun or
firearm has been restored. State v. Kelly, 210 Ariz. 460, 464-65, 112 P.3d 682, 686-87 (App.
2005).
In State v. Coley, 158 Ariz. 471, 471-72, 763 P.2d 535, 535-36 (App. 1988), the court held
that the giving of an instruction on constructive possession was not error in regard to a
violation of A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4).
If the State has established that the prohibited possessor has been found to constitute a
danger to himself/herself or others, the court should insure that the finding was made under
A.R.S. § 36-540.
If the State has established that the defendant is a prohibited possessor under federal
law, the Court should insure that the federal finding was not made under 18 U.S.C. § 922(y)
(pertaining to aliens admitted under non-immigrant visas).
If the State established that the prohibited possessor was a prohibited possessor as
defined under federal law (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)) pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e) prior
to September 26, 2008, the court should insure that the federal finding was not made under
18 U.S.C. § 922(y) (pertaining to aliens admitted under non-immigrant visas). When the
offense occurred on or between August 24, 2004 and September 25, 2008, the State must
prove all of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), including the requirement that any
firearm or ammunition allegedly possessed by the defendant must have an interstate or
foreign commerce nexus. State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 530 ¶16, 169 P.3d 115,
120 (App. 2007).
For alleged violations of A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e) [now codified as A.R.S. § 13-
3101(A)(7)(e)] occurring on or after September 26, 2008, the Committee was unable to find a
definition of “undocumented alien” in either federal or state statutes or case law. The
following definition of “alien” is taken from 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(3), which the court may
choose to use in its instruction: “The term ‘alien’ means any person not a citizen or national
of the United States.” The term “undocumented” appears to be the commonly understood
meaning of the word. The categories of “nonimmigrant aliens” can be found in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(A)-(V).
COMMENT: The fact that there is a valid registration in the name of another is not a defense
to actual possession under A.R.S. § 13-3102. State v. Kerr, 142 Ariz. 426, 434, 690 P.2d 145,
153 (App. 1984).
From August 25, 2004
to September 25, 2008, A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e) provided that
one was a prohibited possessor if that person was considered a prohibited possessor under
federal law (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)) As of September 26, 2008, A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e) was
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recodified as A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(e) and rewritten to remove that definition and replaced
with the requirement that the person was “an undocumented alien or a nonimmigrant alien
traveling with or without documentation in this state for business or pleasure or who is
studying in this state and who maintains a foreign residence abroad,” with certain exceptions.
Therefore, in regard to A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e), the following comments apply to any
offenses that occurred on or between August 25, 2004 and September 25, 2008:
With respect to Statutory Criminal Definitional Instruction 31.01.06, A.R.S.
§ 13-3101(A)(6)(e) provides that a person who would be a prohibited
possessor under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), is also a prohibited possessor under
Arizona law unless the person is exempted by a provision in 18 U.S.C. §
922(y). See State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 530 16, 169 P.3d 115,
120 (App. 2007) (holding that the plain language of § 13-3101(A)(6)(e)
adopts all of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), including the necessity to show a nexus
to interstate or foreign commerce).
In regard to A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(e), the following comment applies to any offenses
that occurred on or after September 26, 2008:
As of September 26, 2008, the legislature expanded the definition of
prohibited possessor under A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(e) [previously codified as
A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e)] from its previous limitation of a federal
prohibited possessor under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) to include all
undocumented aliens and nonimmigrant aliens, subject to certain
enumerated exceptions. Therefore, as of September 26, 2008, a prohibited
possessor under the statute is no longer limited to the requirements of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).
31.025 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Selling or Transferring Deadly Weapon
to Prohibited Possessor)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that:
1. the defendant knowingly [sold] [transferred] a deadly weapon to another person; and
2. the other person was a prohibited possessor.
3. the defendant knew the other person was a prohibited possessor.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(5) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.01).
“Prohibited possessor” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.06).
If the State has alleged that the prohibited possessor has a felony conviction, the
defendant has the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion to show by a
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preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s civil rights to possess or carry a gun or
firearm has been restored. State v. Kelly, 210 Ariz. 460, 464-65, 112 P.3d 682, 686-87 (App.
2005).
If the State has alleged that the prohibited possessor has been found to constitute a
danger to himself/herself or others, the court should insure that the finding was made under
A.R.S. § 36-540.
If the State has alleged that the prohibited possessor is a prohibited possessor under
federal law, the court should insure that the federal finding was not made under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(y) (pertaining to aliens admitted under nonimmigrant visas).
31.026 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Defacing a Deadly Weapon)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that the defendant
knowingly defaced a deadly weapon.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(6) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.01).
“Deface” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 31.01.02).
31.027 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Possessing a Defaced Deadly Weapon)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that the defendant
knowingly possessed a defaced deadly weapon, knowing that the deadly weapon was
defaced.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(7) (statutory language as of July 13, 2009).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.01).
“Deface” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 31.01.02).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(31) (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
This offense shall not apply to:
1. A peace officer or an
yone summoned by a peace officer to assist and while actually
assisting in the performance of official duties;
2. A member of the U.S. military forces or national guard in the performance of offi
cial
duties;
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3. A warden, deputy warden, community correctional officer, detention officer, special
investigator or correctional officer of the Arizona Department of Corrections or the
department of juvenile corrections; or
4. A person specifically licensed, authorized or permitted pursuant to an Arizona state
or federal statute.
A.R.S. § 13-3102(C).
This offense shall not apply to:
1. The possessing, transporting, selling or transferring weapons by a museum as part of
its collection or an educational institution for educational purposes or by an
authorized employee of such museum or institution if:
a. Such museum or institution is operated by the United States or the State of
Arizona or a political subdivision of the State of Arizona or by an organization
under federal law as a recipient of a charitable contribution; and
b. Reasonable precautions were taken with respect to theft or issue of such
material.
2. The regular and lawful transporting as merchandise.
3. Acquisition by a person by operation of law such as by gift, devise or descent or in a
fiduciary capacity as a recipient of the property or former property of an insolvent,
incapacitated or deceased person.
A.R.S. § 13-3102(D).
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OMMENT: The fact that there is a valid registration in the name of another is not a defense
to actual possession under A.R.S. § 13-3102. State v. Kerr, 142 Ariz. 426, 434, 690 P.2d 145,
153 (App. 1984).
31.028 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Use or Possession of Deadly Weapon
during Commission of Drug Offense)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons during the commission of a felony drug
offense requires proof that the defendant:
1. committed the offense of (felony offense under chapter 34); and
2. during the commission of such offense, knowingly possessed a deadly weapon that
the defendant [used] [intended to use or could have used] to further the offense of
(felony offense under chapter 34).
[The offense of (insert the name of the felony drug offense under chapter 34) requires
proof that (insert the elements for the felony drug offense under chapter 34).]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(8) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006); State v.
Petrak, 198 Ariz. 260, 266, 8 P.3d 1174, 1180 (App. 2000).
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SE NOTE: This instruction must be used in place of an instruction that merely tracks the
statutory language. In State v. Petrak, 198 Ariz. 260, 8 P.3d 1174 (App. 2000), the court of
appeals held that the statutory language requires nothing more than, “a temporal nexus
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between possession of the weapon and commission of the offense,” which could lead to a
person being convicted of this offense if the drugs were found in a defendant’s house while
a deadly weapon might be found in the defendant’s car, completely unrelated to the drug
offense. Id. at 264, 8 P.3d at 1178. The court of appeals, while conceding that a conviction
for such unrelated possessions may have been intended by the legislature, expressed a
concern that such a strict interpretation of the statute might not withstand an overbreadth
challenge. Id. at 265, 8 P.3d at 1179. The court of appeals held that the trial court must
instruct the jury that it was required to find that, “the weapon was used or available for use
or was intended to further the drug offense.” Id. at 266, 8 P.3d at 1180. Factors tending to
establish the necessary nexus between the weapon and the drug offense include the spatial
proximity and accessibility of the weapon to the defendant and to the site of the drug
offense. Id.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use the bracketed language if the defendant has not been charged with the drug offense.
“Intentionally” and “knowingly” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(b)).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.01).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(31) (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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OMMENT: The fact that there is a valid registration in the name of another is not a defense
to actual possession under A.R.S. § 13-3102. State v. Kerr, 142 Ariz. 426, 434, 690 P.2d 145,
153 (App. 1984).
31.029 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Discharging Firearm at Occupied
Structure)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that the defendant
knowingly discharged a firearm at an occupied structure in order to [assist] [promote]
[further] the interests of a [criminal street gang] [criminal syndicate] [racketeering enterprise].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(9) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 31.01.04).
“Occupied structure” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.05).
“Criminal street gang” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.057).
“Criminal syndicate” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2301 (Statutory Definition Instruction
23.01.C.07).
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“Racketeering” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2301 (Statutory Definition Instruction
23.01.D.04).
“Enterprise” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2301 (Statutory Definition Instruction
23.01.D.02).
31.0212 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Possessing Deadly Weapon on
School Grounds Felony Allegation)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that:
1. the defendant knowingly possessed a deadly weapon on school grounds; and
2. the possession of such deadly weapon on school grounds occurred in connection
with conduct that violated (offense under A.R.S. §§ 13-2308(A)(5), 13-2312(C), 13-
3409 or 13-3411).
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(12) (statutory language as of June 13, 2009).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.01).
“School grounds” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3102 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.02.04).
Use language in parentheses as applicable to facts of case.
This offense is a misdemeanor unless the violation occurs in connection with conduct
which violates A.R.S. §§ 13-2308(A)(5), 13-2312(C), 13-3409 or 13-3411. In such cases, the
court should provide a special verdict form that specifies that this crime occurred in
connection with conduct that violates one of the above offenses. If the predicate offense is
not charged, the court will need to instruct the jury on the elements of the offense.
This offense shall not apply to:
1. A peace officer or anyone summoned by a peace officer to assist and while actually
assisting in the performance of official duties;
2. A member of the U.S. military forces or national guard in the performance of official
duties;
3. A warden, deputy warden, community correctional officer, detention officer, special
investigator or correctional officer of the Arizona Department of Corrections or the
department of juvenile corrections; or
4. A person specifically licensed, authorized or permitted pursuant to an Arizona state
or federal statute.
A.R.S. § 13-3102(C).
This offense shall not apply to the possession of a:
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1. Firearm that is not loaded and that is carried within a vehicle under the control of an
adult provided that if the adult leaves the vehicle, the firearm shall not be visible
from the outside of the vehicle and the vehicle shall be locked.
2. Firearm for use on school grounds in a program approved by a school.
A.R.S. § 13-3102(I).
31.0213 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Carrying Deadly Weapon in Nuclear
or Hydroelectric Plant)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that the defendant
knowingly and without legal authorization:
1. entered a [nuclear] [hydroelectric] generating station; and
2. carried a deadly weapon [on his/her person] [within the immediate control of any
person].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(13) (statutory language as of June 13, 2009).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.01).
This offense shall not apply to:
1. A peace officer or anyone summoned by a peace officer to assist and while actually
assisting in the performance of official duties;
2. A member of the U.S. military forces or national guard in the performance of official
duties;
3. A warden, deputy warden, community correctional officer, detention officer, special
investigator or correctional officer of the Arizona Department of Corrections or the
department of juvenile corrections; or
4. A person specifically licensed, authorized or permitted pursuant to an Arizona state
or federal statute.
A.R.S. § 13-3102(C).
31.0214 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Supplying Firearm to Another Person
Who Will Commit Felony)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that the defendant
knowingly [supplied] [sold] [gave possession or control of] a firearm to another person
knowing or having reason to know that the other person would use the firearm in the
commission of a felony.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(14) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 31.01.04).
“Felony” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0516).
31.0215 Misconduct Involving Weapons (Using Deadly Weapon in Terrorism
Act)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that the defendant
knowingly:
1. [(used) (possessed) (exercised control of) a deadly weapon in furtherance of any act
of terrorism.]
2. possessed or exercised control over a deadly weapon knowing or having reason to
know that it would be used to facilitate any act of terr
orism.]
“Terroris
m” means any felony, including any completed or preparatory offense, that
involves the use of a deadly weapon or a weapon of mass destruction or the intentional or
knowing infliction of serious physical injury with the intent to either:
(a) influence the policy or affect the conduct of this state or any of the political
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of this state.
(b) cause su
bstantial damage to or substantial interruption of publi
c
commun
ications, communication service providers, public transportatio
n,
common car
riers, public utilities, public establishments or other public services.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3102(A)(15), 13-2301 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Deadly weapon” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.01).
“Terrorism” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2301 (Statutory Definition Instruction 23.01.C.12).
“Facilitation” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1004 (Statutory Definition Instruction 10.04).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
“Preparatory offenses” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-1001 et seq.
31.0216 Misconduct Involving Weapons (To Further a Criminal Street Gang)
The crime of misconduct involving weapons requires proof that the defendant
knowingly:
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1. Trafficked [weapons] [explosives]; and
2. The trafficking was for financial gain to [assist] [promote] [further the interests] of a
[criminal street gang] [criminal syndicate] [racketeering enterprise].
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3102(a)(16) (statutory language as of August 2, 2012).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (statutory definition instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Trafficking” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101.
“Criminal street gang” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (statutory definition instruction 1.057).
“Criminal street gang member” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (statutory definition instruction
1.058).
“Criminal syndicate” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2301(C) (statutory definition instruction
23.01.C.07).
“Racketeering” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2301(D) (statutory definition instruction
23.01.D.04).
“Enterprise” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2301(D) (statutory definition instruction 23.01.D.02).
31.02(A)(4) Affirmative Defense to Misconduct Involving Weapons Under A.R.S.
§ 13-3101(A)(4)
The defendant has been accused of misconduct involving weapons [allege violation
pertaining to a firearm].
It is a defense to such charge if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the firearm was in a permanently inoperable condition at the time of the
offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3101 (statutory language as of August 25, 2004); 13-3102 (statutory
language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on “affirmative defense” so as to inform the jury on the burden
of proof.
“Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Definition Instruction
2.025).
Because the burden of proof for the defendant is preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall use Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of
proof.
The determination of whether a firearm is permanently inoperable under A.R.S.
§ 13-3101(A)(4) is a question of fact. State v. Young, 192 Ariz. 303, 306-307, 965 P.2d 37,
40-41 (App. 1998) (noting that a disassembled or broken weapon may constitute a firearm if
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it can be made operable with reasonable preparation, including the addition of a readily
replaceable part or the accomplishment of a quickly-effected repair).
Neither operability nor knowledge of operability of a firearm is an element of the
offense; rather, permanent inoperability is an affirmative defense. State v. Young, 192 Ariz.
303, 307, 965 P.2d 37, 41 (App. 1998).
31.02(A)(6) Affirmative Defense to Misconduct Involving Weapons under A.R.S.
§ 13-3101(A)(6)(b)
The defendant has been accused of misconduct involving weapons by being a prohibited
possessor due to a [felony conviction] [delinquency adjudication].
It is a defense to such charge if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant’s civil rights to possess or carry a gun or firearm had been
restored at the time of the offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3101 (statutory language as of August 25, 2004); 13-3102 (statutory
language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on “affirmative defense” so as to inform the jury on the burden
of proof.
“Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Definition Instruction
2.025).
Because the burden of proof for the defendant is preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall use Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of
proof.
If the State has alleged that the prohibited possessor has a felony conviction, the
defendant has the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s civil rights to possess or carry a gun or
firearm has been restored. State v. Kelly, 210 Ariz. 460, 464-65, 112 P.3d 682, 686-87 (App.
2005).
31.02(A)(7) Affirmative Defense to Misconduct Involving Weapons under A.R.S.
§ 13-3101(A)(7)(a), (b), (c) or (d)
The defendant has been accused of misconduct involving weapons [allege violation
pertaining to a prohibited weapon under § 13-3101(A)(7)(a), (b), (c) or (d)].
It is a defense to such charge if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that, at the time of the offense:
[the weapon or firearm alleged to be a prohibited weapon was registered in the national
firearms registry and transfer records of the United States Treasury Department.]
[the firearm alleged to be a prohibited weapon had been classified as a curio or relic by
the United States Treasury Department.]
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3101 (statutory language as of August 25, 2004); 13-3102 (statutory
language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on “affirmative defense” so as to inform the jury on the burden
of proof.
“Affirmative defense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-205 (Statutory Definition Instruction
2.025).
Because the burden of proof for the defendant is preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall use Standard Criminal Instruction 5b(2), which discusses the different burdens of
proof.
The State is not required to prove the nonregistration of a prohibited weapon by the
United States Treasury Department, which is instead an affirmative defense to be proved by
the defense. State v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 621, 875 P.2d 850, 854 (App. 1994) (holding that
the failure of the police to test the weapon or to determine registration did not call for a
Willits instruction, because the burden of showing such is on the defendant).
31.04 Depositing Explosives
The crime of depositing explosives requires proof that the defendant, with the intent to
physically endanger, injure, intimidate or terrify any person, knowingly deposited any
explosive on, in or near any vehicle, building or place where persons inhabit, frequent or
assemble.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3104 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(a)(1)).
“Explosive” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 31.01.03).
“Vehicle” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0536).
31.07 Unlawful Discharge of Firearms
The crime of unlawful discharge of a firearm requires proof that the defendant, with
criminal negligence, discharged a firearm within or into the limits of a municipality.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3107 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Criminal negligence” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(d)).
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 31.01.04).
“Municipality” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3107 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 31.07.01).
This offense shall not apply if the firearm is discharged:
1. as allowed by Chapter 4;
2. on a properly supervised ra
nge;
3. in an
area recommended as a hunting area by the Arizona Game & Fish
Department, approved and posted as required by the chief of police, but any such
area may be closed when deemed unsafe by the chief of police or the director of the
Game and Fish Departmen
t;
4. for the con
trol of nuisance wildlife by permit from the Arizona Game and Fish
Department or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service;
5. by special permit of the chief of police of the municip
ality;
6. as required by an animal control officer in the performance of official duties;
7. using blanks;
8. more than one mile from any occupied structure as defined in § 13-3101; or
9. in self-defense or defense of another person against an animal attack if a reasonab
le
person wou
ld believe that deadly physical force against the animal is necessary an
d
reasonab
le under the circumstances to protect oneself or the other person.
A.R.S. § 13-3107(C).
COMMENT: In a case brought under the predecessor to this statute, A.R.S. §§ 13-917 and
13-917.01, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the intent to do bodily harm was not an
element of the statute. State v. Andrews, 106 Ariz. 372, 377, 476 P.2d 673, 678 (1970).
31.09 Sale or Gift of Firearm to Minor
The crime of sale or gift of firearm to minor requires proof that the defendant, without
written consent of the minor’s parent or legal guardian, [sold] [gave] to a minor [a firearm]
[ammunition] [a toy pistol by which dangerous and explosive substances may be discharged].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3109 (statutory language as of July 17, 1994).
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SE NOTE: “Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.01.04).
“Explosive” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 31.01.03).
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“Minor” is defined in A.R.S. § 1-215(22) as “a person under the age of eighteen years.”
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OMMENT: This offense does not provide for a culpable mental state.
The statute contains two exceptions. It is not a crime if the act involved a temporary
transfer of firearms or ammunition by firearms safety instructors, hunter safety instructors,
competition coaches or their assistants if the minor’s parent or legal guardian gave consent
for the minor to participate in activities such as firearms or hunting safety courses, firearms
competition or firearms training. It is not a crime if the defendant accompanied minors, with
the consent of the minor’s parent or legal guardian, temporarily transferred firearms,
ammunition to one or more of such minors for the purpose of engaging in hunting, formal
or informal target shooting activities.
31.10 Misconduct Involving Simulated Explosive Devices
The crime of misconduct involving simulated explosive devices requires proof that the
defendant, with the intent to [terrify] [intimidate] [threaten] [harass]:
[intentionally (gave) (sent) a simulated explosive device to another person].
[intentionally placed a simulated explosive device in a private or public place].
“Simulated explosive device” means a simulation of an improvised explosive device that
a reasonable person would believe is an improvised explosive device.
“Improvised explosive device” means a device that incorporates explosives or
destructive lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and that is designed to
destroy, disfigure, terrify or harass.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3110 (statutory language as of September 26, 2008).
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SE NOTE: Statutory Criminal Instruction 31.10.01, the statutory presumption related to
misconduct involving weapons (simulated explosive devices), should be given with this
instruction.
Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” or “with intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
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OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-3110(B) provides for a mandatory presumption (the statute uses the
phrase “prima facie evidence,” which appears to convey the same meaning as a mandatory
presumption).There are no cases pertaining to this presumption or prima facie evidence, but
mandatory presumptions are deemed to be unconstitutional, because they shift the burden
of proof to the defendant. State v. Herrera, 176 Ariz. 21, 30-31, 859 P.2d 131, 140-41 (1993);
State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret the
presumption in the statute as a permissive one, which would pass constitutional muster. See,
e.g., State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a
statutory inference must be permissive to withstand constitutional due process and to avoid
burden-shifting to the defendant).
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31.10.01 Interference on Placing or Sending a Simulated Explosive Device
The defendant has been accused of misconduct involving simulated explosive device.
The defendant’s intent to [terrify] [intimidate] [threaten] [harass] may be inferred if the
defendant [placed] [sent] the simulated explosive device without attaching a written notice to
the device in a conspicuous place that the device had been rendered inert and was possessed
for the purpose of curio or relic collection, display or other similar purpose.
You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the offense of misconduct involving simulated
explosive device beyond a reasonable doubt before you can find the defendant guilty.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3110(B) (statutory language as of September 26, 2008).
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SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Use this instruction in conjunction with Statutory Criminal Instruction 31.10.
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OMMENT: A.R.S. § 13-3110(B) provides for a mandatory presumption by stating that the
placing or sending of a device without certain written disclosures creates prima facie evidence
of an element of the crime. See Norton v. Superior Court ex rel. Woods, 171 Ariz. 155, 157, 829
P.2d 345, 347 (App. 1992) (holding that inclusion of similar language in A.R.S. §12-2458(B)
unconstitutionally shifted the State’s burden of proof by establishing a mandatory, though
rebuttable presumption). Accord, State v. Herrera, 176 Ariz. 21, 30-31, 859 P.2d 131, 140-41
(1993); In the Matter of 1986 Chevrolet Corvette, 183 Ariz. 637, 639, 905 P.2d 1372, 1374 (1994);
Barlage v. Valentine, 210 Ariz. 270, 277 27, 110 P.3d 371, 378 (App. 2005). Mandatory
presumptions are deemed to be unconstitutional, because they shift the burden of proof to
the defendant. Norton v. Superior Court ex rel. Woods, supra; State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69,
724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). Therefore,
it seems more appropriate to interpret the presumption in the statute as a permissive one,
which would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724
P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must be permissive to
withstand constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the defendant).
31.11 Minors Prohibited From Carrying or Possessing Firearms
The crime of a minor prohibited from carrying or possessing a firearm requires proof
that the defendant:
1. was under eighteen years of age; and
2. was an unemancipated person; and
3. was not accompanied by a [parent] [grandparent] [guardian] [certified hunter safety
instructor acting with the consent of the defendant’s parent or guardian] [certified
firearms safety instructor acting with the consent of the defendant’s parent or
guardian]; and
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4. knowingly carried or possessed [on the defendant’s person] [within the defendant’s
immediate control] [in or on a means of transportation] a firearm [in any place that
was open to the public] [on a street] [on a highway] [on any private property owned
or leased by the defendant] [on any private property owned or leased by the
defendant’s parent, grandparent or guardian].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3111 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: The previous version of the statute was declared unconstitutional because it was
limited to counties with a population over 500,000. See In Re Cesar R., 197 Ariz. 437, 440, 4
P.3d 980, 983 (App. 1999). The legislature amended the statute and deleted the population
provision.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 31.01.04).
“Means of transportation” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1801 (Statutory Criminal Instruction
18.01(9)).
“Emancipation” is defined in A.R.S. § 12-2451.
The statute contains exceptions. It is not a crime if the defendant was fourteen, fifteen,
sixteen or seventeen and was engaged in:
A. lawful hunting or shooting events or marksmanship practice at established ranges or
other areas where the discharge of a firearm is not prohibited; or
B. lawful transportation of an unloaded firearm for the purpose of lawful hunting; or
C. lawful transportation of an unloaded firearm between the hours of 5:00 a.m. and
10:00 p.m. for the purpose of shooting events or marksmanship practice at
established ranges or other areas where the discharge of a firearm is not prohibited;
or
D. activities requiring the use of a firearm that are related to the production of crops,
livestock, poultry, livestock products, poultry products or ratites or in the
production or storage of agricultural commodities.
31.13.01 Possession of Firearm by Adjudicated Delinquent
The crime of possession of a firearm by an adjudicated delinquent requires proof that
the defendant:
1. was previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense that would be a felony if
committed by an adult; and
2. [possessed] [used] [carried] a firearm within ten years from the date of [the
adjudication] [the defendant’s release or escape from custody].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3113 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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USE NOTE: This instruction is used for a first offense and subsequent offense unless certain
circumstances apply. If those circumstances apply, the court will use Statutory Criminal
Instruction 31.13.02.
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 31.01.04).
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OMMENT: This offense does not provide for a culpable mental state. A first offense is a
class 5 felony. A subsequent offense under certain circumstances is a class 4 felony.
31.13.02 Subsequent Possession of Firearm by Adjudicated Delinquent
The crime of subsequent possession of a firearm by an adjudicated delinquent requires
proof that the defendant:
1. was previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense that if committed as an adult
would constitute the offense[s] of:
[burglary in the first degree]
[burglary in the second degree]
[arson]
[any felony offense involving the use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon
or dangerous instrument]
[a serious offense];
and
2. [possessed] [used] [carried] a firearm within ten years from the date of [the
adjudication] [the defendant’s release or escape from custody];
and
3. has been previously [adjudicated] [convicted] of the crime of possession of a firearm
by an adjudicated delinquent.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3113 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
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SE NOTE: This instruction shall be used for second or subsequent offenses if the
defendant has had a prior adjudication for one of the predicate offenses listed in the statute.
If the defendant is accused of a first or a subsequent offense where the defendant has not
had a prior adjudication for one of the predicate offenses, the court shall use Criminal
Statutory Instruction 31.13.01.
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 31.01.04).
“Burglary in the first degree” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1508 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 15.08).
“Burglary in the second degree” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1507 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 15.07).
“Arson” is defined in A.R.S. §§ 13-1702, -1703, -1704, and -1705 (Statutory Criminal
Instructions 17.02 through 17.05).
“Felony” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0516).
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“Serious offense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-706.
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OMMENT: This offense does not provide for a culpable mental state. A first offense is a
class 5 felony. A subsequent offense under certain circumstances is a class 4 felony.
31.16 Misconduct Involving Body Armor
The crime of misconduct involving body armor requires proof that the defendant
knowingly wore or otherwise used body armor during the commission of any felony offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3116 (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Body armor” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3116 (Statutory Definition Instruction 31.16.01).
“Firearm” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 (Statutory Definition Instruction 31.01.04).
“Felony” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0516).
31.17 Misconduct Involving Remote Stun Gun
The crime of misconduct involving remote stun gun requires proof that the defendant
knowingly used or threatened to use a remote stun gun or an authorized remote stun gun
against a law enforcement officer who is engaged in the performance of the officer’s official
duties.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3117 (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Authorized remote stun gun” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3117 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 31.17.01).
“Remote stun gun” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3117 (Statutory Definition Instruction
31.17.02).
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OMMENT: This offense does not preclude the prosecution of a person for the use of a
remote sun gun or authorized remote stun gun during the commission of a criminal offense.
A.R.S. § 13-3117(B).
This offense does not preclude a justification defense under chapter 4 of title 13. A.R.S.
§ 13-3117(B).
31.22 Misconduct Involving Remote Stun Gun
The crime of Unlawful Use of Electronic Firearm Tracking Technology requires proof
that the defendant [required a person to use electronic firearm tracking technology] [required
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a person to be subjected to electronic firearm tracking technology] [disclosed any identifiable
information about another person for the purpose of using electronic firearm tracking
technology] [disclosed any identifiable information about another person’s firearm for the
purpose of using electronic firearm tracking technology].
“Electronic firearm tracking technology” means a platform, system or device or a group
of systems or devices that uses a shared ledger, distributed ledger or block chain technology
or any other similar form of technology or electronic database for the purpose of storing
information in a decentralized or centralized way, that is not owned or controlled by any
single person or entity and that is used to locate or control the use of a firearm. electronic
firearm tracking technology does not include a law enforcement database, including the adult
probation enterprise tracking system, the juvenile online tracking system, the justice web
interface, the Arizona Criminal Justice Information System, the national crime information
center, the national integrated ballistic information network and a local records management
system that is used to manage or process stolen, lost, found, stored or evidentiary firearms.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3122 (effective August 9, 2017).
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SE NOTE: The statute, A.R.S. §13-3122, was written without expressly prescribing a
culpable mental state. See A.R.S. §13-202(B).
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
A.R.S. § 13-3122(B) provides that this section does not apply to any of the following:
1. A criminal justice employee (defined in A.R.S. § 13-3122(D)(1)) who obtains a search
warrant.
2. A pawnbroker or an employee of a pawnshop, secondhand dealer or auction house
while the pawnbroker or employee uses electronic firearm tracking technology to report
information to the sheriff or the sheriff’s designee pursuant to section 44-1625 or a similar
reporting requirement.
3. A probation, parole or surveillance officer who supervises a person who is serving a
term of probation, community supervision or parole.
4. The owner of a firearm if the owner consents in writing to the use of electronic
firearm tracking technology on that owner’s firearm.
31.129 Taking Prohibited Articles into Jail or onto Jail Grounds
The crime of taking prohibited articles into a jail or onto jail grounds requires proof that
the defendant, unauthorized by law, knowingly took [an intoxicating liquor] [a firearm] [a
weapon] [explosives] [marijuana] [a narcotic drug] [a dangerous drug] into [a jail] [the
grounds belonging to a jail].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 31-129 (statutory language as of August 3, 2018).
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SE NOTE: “Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(b).
Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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32.01 Enticing a Person for Purpose of Prostitution
The crime of enticing a person for purpose of prostitution requires proof that the
defendant knowingly enticed another person into a house of prostitution or elsewhere, for
the purpose of prostitution with another person.
“Entice” means to “tempt or to lure.” Enticement does not require that the other
person engage in what the defendant intended.
“House of prostitution” means any building, structure or place used for the purpose of
prostitution or lewdness or where acts of prostitution occur.
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct
under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3201 (statutory language as of 1982) and 13-3211(5) (statutory
language as of June 13, 2007).
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SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
The definition of “prostitution” was changed effective June 13, 2007. The new definition
is:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other
valuable consideration.
A.R.S. § 13-3211(5). For offenses committed before June 13, 2007, use the previous
definition, which was:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or
any other person.
The definition of “house of prostitution” appears in A.R.S. § 13-3211(2). The word
“entice” means to “tempt or to lure.” State v. Schwartz, 188 Ariz. 313, 319, 935 P.2d 891, 897
(App. 1996) (citing State v. Cook, 139 Ariz. 406, 678 P.2d 987 (App. 1984)). “Like solicitation,
enticement does not require that the victim engage in what the enticer intends.” Schwartz,
188 Ariz. at 319, 935 P.2d at 897.
32.02 Procurement by False Pretenses of Person for Purpose of Prostitution
Because of the changes that have been made in the statutes regarding what may be
unlawful sexual acts, the Committee questions the continued viability of A.R.S. § 13-3202 for
use in any criminal prosecution. Therefore, the Committee has not proposed an instruction
based on A.R.S. § 13-3202.
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32.03 Placing a Person in Prostitution
The crime of procuring or placing a person in a house of prostitution, or elsewhere, for
money or other valuable things requires, proof that the defendant knowingly:
1. received money or something else of value for, or on account of; and
2. procured or placed in a house of prostitution or elsewhere any person for the
purpose of engaging in prostitution.
“House of prostitution” means any building, structure or place used for the purpose of
prostitution or lewdness or where acts of prostitution occur.
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct
under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
“Sexual conduct” means sexual contact, sexual intercourse, oral sexual contact or
sadomasochistic abuse.
“Sexual contact” means any direct or indirect fondling or manipulating of any part of the
genitals, anus or female breast.
“Sexual intercourse” means penetration into the penis, vulva or anus by any part of the
body or by any object.
“Sadomasochistic abuse” means flagellation or torture by or on a person who is nude or
clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume or the condition of being fettered,
bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3203 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and 13-3211
(statutory language as of June 13, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
The definition of “prostitution” was changed effective June 13, 2007. A.R.S. § 13-
3211(5). The previous definition was:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or
any other person.
The definition of “house of prostitution” appears at A.R.S. § 13-3211(2). The meaning
of “sexual conduct” appears at A.R.S. § 13-3211(8). “Oral sexual contact” is defined at
A.R.S. § 13-3211(4). The meaning of “sexual contact” is at A.R.S. § 13-3211(9). “Sexual
intercourse” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3211(10). “Sadomasochistic abuse” is defined in A.R.S.
§ 13-3211(7).
32.04 Receiving Earnings of Prostitute
The crime of receiving earnings of a prostitute requires proof that the defendant
knowingly received money or some other valuable thing from the earnings of a person
engaged in prostitution.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3204 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
The definition of “prostitution” was changed effective June 13, 2007. The new definition is:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other
valuable consideration.
A.R.S. § 13-3211(5). For offenses committed before June 13, 2007, use the previous
definition, which was:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or
any other person.
C
OMMENT: The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the predecessor
statute of this provision in State v. Green, 60 Ariz. 63, 131 P.2d 411 (1942) (upholding former
A.R.S. § 13-584).
The preceding instruction was approved in State v. Rodgers, 134 Ariz. 296, 655 P.2d 1348
(App. 1982). The court also noted that it is sufficient to prove guilt that a defendant receive a
benefit, knowing that the proceeds come from the earnings of a prostitute, and it need not
be shown that he maintained his lifestyle from the proceeds of a prostitute. Id. at 304, 655
P.2d at 1356.
32.05 Causing Spouse to Become Prostitute
The crime of causing a spouse to become a prostitute requires proof that the defendant
knowingly by force, fraud, intimidation or threats, caused [his][her] spouse to [live in a house
of prostitution] [lead a life of prostitution].
“House of prostitution” means any building, structure or place used for the purpose of
prostitution or lewdness or where acts of prostitution occur.
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct
under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
S
OURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3205 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and 13-3211
(statutory language as of June 13, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
The definition of “house of prostitution” appears at A.R.S. § 13-3211(2).
The definition of “prostitution” was changed effective June 13, 2007. The new definition
is:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other
valuable consideration.
A.R.S. § 13-3211(5). For offenses committed before June 13, 2007, use the previous
definition, which was:
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“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or
any other person.
32.06 Taking a Child for Purpose of Prostitution
The crime of taking a minor from legal custody for the purpose of prostitution requires
that the defendant:
1. took a minor from the minor’s legal custodian; and
2. the purpose in taking the minor was for prostitution.
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct
under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3206 (statutory language as of August 18, 1987) and 13-3211
(statutory language as of June 13, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: The definition of “prostitution” was changed effective June 13, 2007.
The new definition is:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other
valuable consideration.
A.R.S. § 13-3211(5). For offenses committed before June 13, 2007, use the previous
definition, which was:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or
any other person.
C
OMMENT: Unlike the other sections of this chapter, this particular statute omits a mens rea
requirement. Research of the legislative history suggests that the legislature intended this to
be a strict liability offense. Strict liability offenses are allowed under Arizona law. See A.R.S.
§ 13-202(B). However, the Committee suggests that the trial court have the parties brief the
issue. If the court concludes that a mens rea requirement is needed, the Committee suggests
that minimally the jury be instructed on the statutory definition for “knowingly.”
“Knowingly” is defined in Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0510(b).
The Committee recommends using the term “legal custodian” in lieu of the statutory
phrase “father, mother, guardian or other person having legal custody of the minor.” A.R.S.
§ 13-1302 refers to “legal custody” in terms of entrusting a person by authority of law to the
custody of another.
Under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and its progeny, the trial judge must
instruct the jury to determine the minor’s age. This is because a violation of this statute in
general is a class 4 felony, unless the minor is under fifteen years of age, in which case the
offense of taking a child for prostitution is a class 2 felony punishable as a dangerous crime
against children under A.R.S. § 13-705. See Statutory Criminal Instruction 6.04.01 and verdict
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form for having the jury determine whether the offense is a “dangerous crime against a
child.”
32.07 Detention of Persons in a House of Prostitution for Debt
The crime of detaining any person in a house of prostitution for debt requires proof that
the defendant knowingly detained another person in a house of prostitution because of a
debt such person contracted or was claimed to have been contracted.
“House of prostitution” means any building, structure or place used for the purpose of
prostitution or lewdness or where acts of prostitution occur.
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct
under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3207 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and 13-3211
(statutory language as of June 13, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
The definition of “house of prostitution” appears at A.R.S. § 13-3211(2).
The definition of “prostitution” was changed effective June 13, 2007. The new definition
is:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other
valuable consideration.
A.R.S. § 13-3211(5). For offenses committed before June 13, 2007, use the previous
definition, which was:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or
any other person.
C
OMMENT: The statutory term “detain” is not defined. A.R.S. § 13-3102(2) defines a similar
term, “restrain” to mean bodily confinement or otherwise restricting liberty of movement.
The statute also does not require an “actual debt” as it provides for “a debt such person
has contracted or is said to have contracted.” A.R.S. § 13-3207.
32.08 Maintaining or Operating House of Prostitution
The crime of maintaining or operating a house of prostitution requires proof that the
defendant knowingly maintained or operated a house of prostitution or a prostitution
enterprise.
“House of prostitution” means any building, structure or place used for the purpose of
prostitution or lewdness or where acts of prostitution occur.
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct
under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
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“Prostitution enterprise” means any corporation, partnership, association or other legal
entity or any group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity engaged in
providing prostitution services.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3208 (statutory language as of 1982) and 13-3211 (statutory language
as of June 13, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
“House of prostitution” is defined at A.R.S. § 13-3211(2). “Prostitution enterprise” is
defined at A.R.S. § 13-3211(6).
The definition of “prostitution” was changed effective June 13, 2007. The new definition
is:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other
valuable consideration.
A.R.S. § 13-3211(5). For offenses committed before June 13, 2007, use the previous
definition, which was:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or
any other person.
C
OMMENT: Although the legislature titled this provision, “Keeping or residing in house of
prostitution,” the Committee chose to entitle it, “Maintaining or operating house of
prostitution” as conduct involving “working” or “residing” at a house of prostitution is a
misdemeanor. The Committee recommends State v. Rowan, 174 Ariz. 285, 848 P.2d 964
(App. 1992) review granted, aff’d in part, vac’d in part, 176 Ariz. 114, 859 P.2d 737 (1993), and
State v. Schwartz, 188 Ariz. 313, 935 P.2d 891 (App. 1996) for decisions addressing the
sufficiency of the evidence of elements for “prostitution enterprise” or “house of
prostitution.”
32.09 Pandering
The crime of pandering requires proof that the defendant knowingly [placed any person
in the charge or custody of any other person for the purpose of prostitution] [placed any
person in a house of prostitution with the intent that such person become a prostitute or
engage in an act of prostitution] [compelled, induced or encouraged any person to reside
with the defendant or another person for the purpose of prostitution] [compelled, induced
or encouraged any person to become a prostitute or engage in an act of prostitution].
“House of prostitution” means any building, structure, or place used for the purpose of
prostitution or lewdness or where acts of prostitution occur.
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct
under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3209 (statutory language as of June 24, 2014) and 13-3211 (statutory
language as of June 13, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
The definition of “house of prostitution” appears at A.R.S. § 13-3211(2).
The definition of “prostitution” was changed effective June 13, 2007. The new definition
is:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other
valuable consideration.
A.R.S. § 13-3211(5). For offenses committed before June 13, 2007, use the previous
definition, which was:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or
any other person.
C
OMMENT: This statute in general covers activity when a defendant knowingly places a
person in a house of prostitution for career purposes. In State v. Rodgers, 134 Ariz. 296, 305,
655 P.2d 1348, 1357 (App. 1982), the court held that in a pandering case the State need only
establish that a defendant encouraged another person to lead a life of prostitution, and that
there is no requirement that the defendant actually forced such person into prostitution.
32.10 Transporting Persons for Purpose of Prostitution or Other Immoral
Purpose
The crime of transporting another person for the purpose of prostitution [or other
immoral purpose] requires proof that the defendant knowingly:
1. transported a person by any conveyance, through or across this state; and
2. did so for the purpose of [prostitution] [concubinage] [an immoral purpose].
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct
under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3210 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978) and 13-3211
(statutory language as of June 13, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts.
The definition of “prostitution” was changed effective June 13, 2007. The new definition
is:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other
valuable consideration.
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A.R.S. § 13-3211(5). For offenses committed before June 13, 2007, use the previous
definition, which was:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or
any other person.
C
OMMENT: The final statutory sentence was excluded as jurisdiction is not an issue for the
jury’s consideration.
The statute does not contain a definition for “concubinage” or “other immoral
purpose.”
The phrase “through or across this state” means something more than merely driving
someone down the street. See State v. Rowan, 174 Ariz. 285, 288-89, 848 P.2d 864, 867-68
(App. 1992), affirmed in part, vacated in part, 176 Ariz. 114, 859 P.2d 737 (1993) (court declined
adoption of notion “that the distance traveled is immaterial” as to “transport through or
across this state” means “to transfer or convey someone from one end or boundary line of
this state to another, that is, from one side of Arizona to the other side.”)
32.11 Definitions
“House of prostitution” means any building, structure, or place used for the purpose of
prostitution or lewdness or where acts of prostitution occur.
“Operate and maintain” means to organize, design, perpetuate or control. Operate and
maintain includes providing financial support by paying utilities, rent, maintenance costs or
advertising costs, supervising activities or work schedules, and directing or furthering the
aims of the enterprise.
“Oral sexual contact” means oral contact with the penis, vulva or anus.
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct
under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
“Prostitution enterprise” means any corporation, partnership, association or other legal
entity or any group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity engaged in
providing prostitution services.
“Sadomasochistic abuse” means flagellation or torture by or on a person who is nude or
clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume or the condition of being fettered,
bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
“Sexual contact” means any direct or indirect fondling or manipulating of any part of the
genitals, anus or female breast.
“Sexual conduct” means sexual contact, sexual intercourse, oral sexual contact or
sadomasochistic abuse.
“Sexual intercourse” means penetration into the penis, vulva or anus by any part of the
body or by any object.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3211 (statutory language as of June 13, 2007).
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32.12A Child Sex Trafficking
The crime of child sex trafficking requires proof that the defendant knowingly
[caused any minor to engage in prostitution.]
[used any minor for the purposes of prostitution.]
[permitted a minor who is under the defendant’s custody or control to engage in
prostitution.]
[received any benefit for or on account of procuring or placing a minor in any place or in
the charge or custody of any person for the purpose of prostitution.]
[received any benefit pursuant to an agreement to participate in the proceeds of
prostitution of a minor.]
[financed, managed, supervised, controlled, or owned, either alone or in association with
others, prostitution activity involving a minor.]
[transported or financed the transportation of any minor with the intent that such minor
engage in prostitution.]
[engaged in prostitution with a minor.]
[recruited] [enticed] [harbored] [transported] [provided] [obtained] by any means a minor
[with the intent of causing the minor to engage in prostitution or sexually explicit
performance] [knowing that the minor would engage in prostitution or sexually explicit
performance].
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct
under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
“Sexually explicit performance” means a live or public act or show intended to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interest of patrons.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3212 (statutory language as of August 9, 2017).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
“Prostitution” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3211(a). “Benefit” is defined at A.R.S. § 13-105.
C
OMMENT: The phrase “through or across this state” means something more than merely
driving someone down the street. See State v. Rowan, 174 Ariz. 285, 288-89, 848 P.2d 864,
867-68 (App. 1992), review granted, aff’d in part, vac’d in part, 176 Ariz. 11, 859 P.2d 737 (1993)
(court rejected notion “that the distance traveled is immaterial” as to “transport. . . . through
or across this state” means to “transfer or convey someone from one end or boundary line
of this state to another, that is, from one side of Arizona to the other side.”)
Pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and its progeny, the trial judge
must instruct the jury to determine the minor’s age because a violation of this statute is a
class 2 felony, unless the minor is under fifteen years of age, in which case taking a child for
prostitution is punishable as a dangerous crime against children pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-
604.01. See Statutory Criminal 6.04.01 for the instruction and verdict form for having the
jury determine whether the offense is a “dangerous crime against a child.”
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A.R.S. § 13-3212(C) provides that it is not a defense to an offense charged under A.R.S.
§ 13-3212(A) and (B)(1) and (2) that “the other person is a peace officer posing as a minor or
a person assisting a peace officer posing as a minor.”
32.12B Child Sex Trafficking
The crime of child sex trafficking requires proof that the defendant knowingly
[engaged in prostitution with a minor who was under fifteen years of age.
[engaged in prostitution with a minor who the defendant knew was fifteen, sixteen or
seventeen years of age.]
[engaged in prostitution with a minor who is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age.]
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct under a
fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable consideration.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3212(B) (statutory language as of August 9, 2017).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b) defining “knowingly.”
The definition of “prostitution” was changed effective June 13, 2007. The new definition is:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other
valuable consideration.
A.R.S. §13-3211(5). For offenses committed before June 13, 2007, use the previous
definition, which was:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or
any other person.
A.R.S. § 13-3212(C) provides that it is not a defense to an offense charged under A.R.S. §
13-3212(A) and (B)(1) and (2) that “the other person is a peace officer posing as a minor or a
person assisting a peace officer posing as a minor.
32.14 Prostitution
The crime of “prostitution” requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly engaged or agreed or offered to engage in sexual conduct with another
person under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable
consideration; and
2. had been convicted of prostitution at least three times before committing the
present offense.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3211 (statutory language as of June 13, 2007) and 13-3214 (statutory
language as of September 21, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
“Sexual conduct” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 32.11.
The definition of “prostitution” used in element one was changed effective
June 13, 2007. The new definition is:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other
valuable consideration.
A.R.S. § 13-3211(5). For offenses committed before June 13, 2007, use the previous
definition, which was:
“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual
conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or
any other person.
C
OMMENT: A prior misdemeanor conviction under A.R.S. § 13-3214 qualifies as a prior
conviction. If the alleged prior conviction was a misdemeanor conviction under any city or
town ordinance, the court must compare the elements of the city or town ordinance to those
in § 13-3214; if they are the same or substantially similar, the misdemeanor conviction can be
used as a prior conviction. A.R.S. § 13-3214(C).
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33.01.01 Definition of “Amusement Gambling”
“Amusement gambling” means gambling involving a device, game or contest that is
played for entertainment if all of the following apply:
1. The player or players actively participate in the game or contest or with the device;
and
2. The outcome is not in the control to any material degree of any person other than
the player or players; and
3. The prizes are not offered as a lure to separate the player or players from their
money; and
4. Any of the following:
[No benefit is given to the player or players other than an immediate and unrecorded
right to replay that is not exchangeable for value.]
[The gambling is an athletic event and no person other than the player or players derives
a profit or chance of a profit from the money paid to gamble by the player or players.]
[The gambling is an intellectual contest or event, the money paid to gamble is part of an
established purchase price for a product, no increment has been added to the price in
connection with the gambling event and no drawing or lottery is held to determine the
winner or winners.]
[Skill and not chance is clearly the predominant factor in the game and the odds of
winning the game based upon chance cannot be altered, provided the game complies
with any licensing or regulatory requirements by the jurisdiction in which it is operated,
no benefit for a single win is given to the player or players other than a merchandise
prize which has a wholesale fair market value of less than ten (10) dollars or coupons
which are redeemable only at the place of play and only for a merchandise prize which
has a fair market value of less than ten (10) dollars and, regardless of the number of
wins, no aggregate of coupons may be redeemed for a merchandise prize with a
wholesale fair market value of greater than five hundred fifty (550) dollars.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3301(1) (statutory language as of July 3, 2015).
U
SE NOTE: “Gambling” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3301(4) (Statutory Definition Instruction
33.01.04).
“Player” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3301(5) (Statutory Definition Instruction 33.01.05).
C
OMMENT: The statutory language requiring that “the outcome is not in the control to any
material degree of any person other than the player or players” is not unconstitutionally vague.
State v. Takacs, 169 Ariz. 392, 396-97, 819 P.2d 978, 982-83 (App. 1991) (emphasis added).
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33.01.02 Definition of “Conducted as a Business”
“Conducted as a business” means gambling that is engaged in with the object of gain,
benefit or advantage, either direct or indirect, realized or unrealized, but not when incidental
to a bona fide social relationship.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3301(2) (statutory language as of November 25, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: “Gambling” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3301(4) (Statutory Definition Instruction
33.01.04).
The statutory phrase “conducted as a business” is not unconstitutionally vague. State v.
Takacs, 169 Ariz. 392, 397, 819 P.2d 978, 983 (App. 1991).
Bona fide” means “in or with good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit
or fraud.” Baseline Liquors v. Circle K Corp., 129 Ariz. 215, 220-21, 630 P.2d 38, 43-44 (App.
1981).
33.01.03 Definition of “Crane Game”
“Crane game” means an amusement machine which is operated by player controlled
buttons, control sticks or other means, or a combination of the buttons or controls, which is
activated by coin insertion into the machine and where the player attempts to successfully
retrieve prizes with a mechanical or electromechanical claw or device by positioning the claw
or device over a prize.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3301(3) (statutory language as of November 25, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: “Player” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3301(5) (Statutory Definition Instruction
33.01.05).
33.01.04 Definition of “Gambling” or Gamble
“Gambling” or “gamble” means one act of risking or giving something of value for the
opportunity to obtain a benefit from a game or contest of chance or skill or a future
contingent event but does not include bona fide business transactions which are valid under
the law of contracts including contracts for the purchase or sale at a future date of securities
or commodities, contracts of indemnity or guarantee and life, health or accident insurance.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3301(4) (statutory language as of November 25, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: Bona fide” means “genuine,” “made in good faith,” “without fraud or deceit.
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 8th Ed. (2004).
33.01.05 Definition of “Player”
“Player” means a natural person who participates in gambling.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3301(5) (statutory language as of November 25, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: “Gambling” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3301(4) (Statutory Definition Instruction
33.01.04).
33.01.06 Definition of “Regulated Gambling”
“Regulated Gambling” means
[gambling conducted in accordance with a tribal-state gambling compact or otherwise in
accordance with the requirements of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.]
[gambling to which all of the following apply:
1. It is operated and controlled in accordance with a statute, rule or order of this state
or of the United States; and
2. All federal, state or local taxes, fees and charges in lieu of taxes have been paid by
the authorized person or entity on any activity arising out of or in connection with
the gambling; and
3. If conducted by an “IRS federal tax-exempt organization,” the organization’s
records are open to public inspection; and
4. No player is under 21 years of age.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3301(6) (statutory language as of November 25, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: For cases prior to June 1, 2003, the age limit for regulated gambling under
A.R.S. § 13-3301(7) bars any player from being below the age of “majority,” as opposed to
the current age limit of 21.
“Gambling” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3301(4) (Statutory Definition Instruction 33.01.04).
“Player” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3301(5) (Statutory Definition Instruction 33.01.05).
An “IRS federal tax-exempt organization” is defined in A.R.S. § 43-1201.
33.01.07 Definition of “Social Gambling”
“Social gambling” means:
1. Gambling that is not conducted as a business; and
2. The players compete on equal terms, which means that no player enjoys an
advantage over any other player in a gamble under the conditions or rules of the
game or contest; and
3. No player receives, or becomes entitled to receive, any benefit, directly or indirectly,
other than the player’s winnings from the gamble; and
4. No other person receives or becomes entitled to receive any benefit, directly or
indirectly, from the gambling activity, including benefits of proprietorship,
management or unequal advantage or odds in a series of gambles; and
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5. No player is under 21 years of age.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3301(7) (statutory language as of November 25, 2002).
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SE NOTE: For cases prior to June 1, 2003, the age limit for social gambling under A.R.S.
§ 13-3301(7) bars any player from being below the age of “majority,” as opposed to the
current age limit of 21.
“Gambling” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3301(4) (Statutory Definition Instruction 33.01.04).
“Player” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3301(5) (Statutory Definition Instruction 33.01.05).
“Conducted as a business” is defined at A.R.S. § 13-3301(2) (Statutory Definition
Instruction 33.01.02).
The statutory language “compete on equal terms with each other in a gamble” did not
render the statute unconstitutionally vague. State v. Takacs, 169 Ariz. 392, 398, 819 P.2d 978,
984 (App. 1991).
33.021 Exclusions
The following conduct is not unlawful:
1 Amusement gambling;
2. Social gambling;
3. Regulated gambling if the gambling is conducted in accordance with the statutes,
rules or orders governing the gambling;
4. Gambling conducted at state, county or district fairs that complies with any of the
following:
[No benefit is given to the player or players other than an immediate and unrecorded
right to replay that is not exchangeable for value.]
[The gambling is an athletic event and no person other than the player or players derives
a profit or chance of a profit from the money paid to gamble by the player or players.]
[The gambling is an intellectual contest or event, the money paid to gamble is part of an
established purchase price for a product, no increment has been added to the price in
connection with the gambling event and no drawing or lottery is held to determine the
winner or winners.]
[Skill and not chance is clearly the predominant factor in the game and the odds of
winning the game based upon chance cannot be altered, provided the game complies
with any licensing or regulatory requirements by the jurisdiction in which it is operated,
no benefit for a single win is given to the player or players other than a merchandise
prize which has a wholesale fair market value of less than four dollars and, regardless of
the number of wins, no aggregate of coupons may be redeemed for a merchandise prize
with a wholesale fair market value of greater than thirty-five dollars.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3302(A) (statutory language as of April 17, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: “Benefit” is defined at A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.052).
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The definition of “amusement gambling” appears at A.R.S. § 13-3301(1) (Statutory
Definition Instruction 33.01.01).
“Social gambling” is defined at A.R.S. § 13-3301(7) (Statutory Definition Instruction
33.01.07).
The definition of “regulated gambling” appears at A.R.S. § 13-3301(6) (Statutory
Definition Instruction 33.01.06).
“Gambling” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3301(4) (Statutory Definition Instruction 33.01.04).
“Player” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3301(5) (Statutory Definition Instruction 33.01.05).
33.021.1 Tax Exempt Exclusions
As described below, an organization that has qualified as a tax-exempt organization
under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code may conduct a raffle, subject to the
following restrictions:
1. The nonprofit organization maintained this status and no member, director, officer,
employee, or agent of the nonprofit organization received any direct or indirect
pecuniary benefit other than being able to participate in the raffle on a basis equal to
all other participants.
2. The nonprofit organization has been in existence continuously in this state for a five
year period immediately before conducting the raffle.
3. No person except a bona fide local member of the sponsoring organization
participated directly or indirectly in the management, sales, or operation of the raffle.
[A tax-exempt organization is qualified if its make-up consists generally of any of the
following:
a. (labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations, other than cooperative
organizations);
b. (fraternal beneficiary societies, orders or organizations);
c. (corporations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary or educational purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals);
d. (business leagues, chambers of commerce, real estate boards or boards of trade,
not organized for profit);
e. (civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively
for the promotion of social welfare);
f. (clubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation and other non-
profitable purposes);
g. (teachers’ or public employees’ retirement fund organizations); or
h. (religious or apostolic organizations or corporations)].
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3302(B) (statutory language as of April 17, 2006); 43-1201 (statutory
language as of July 21, 1997.)
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USE NOTE: Bona fide” means “genuine,” “made in good faith,” “without fraud or deceit.
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 8th Ed. (2004).
C
OMMENT: A state, county or local historical society designated by this state or a county,
city or town to conduct a raffle may conduct such a raffle, subject to the provisions
contained in A.R.S. § 13-3302(C)(1)-(3).
33.03 Promotion of Gambling
The crime of promotion of gambling requires proof that the defendant knowingly
[conducted, organized, managed, directed, supervised or financed gambling for a benefit]
[furnished advice or assistance for the conduct, organization, management, direction,
supervision or financing of gambling for a benefit].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3303(A) (statutory language as of August 18, 1987).
U
SE NOTE: This offense does not include amusement, regulated or social gambling. See
A.R.S. § 13-3303(A).
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
“Benefit” is defined at A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.052).
“Gambling” is defined at A.R.S. § 13-3301(4) (Statutory Definition Instruction 33.01.04).
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34.021 Possession of Peyote
The crime of possession of peyote requires proof that:
1. the defendant knowingly possessed peyote; and
2. the substance was in fact peyote
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3402(A) (statutory language as of September 1, 1981).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Peyote” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
C
OMMENT: In State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, ¶22, 189 P.3d 374 (2008), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that possession of dangerous drugs is a lesser-included offense of
transportation for sale of a dangerous drug. In so holding, the court overruled a holding in
State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962) that created the element of “usable
quantity” for possession of a narcotic drug. The Cheramie court ruled that:
“A ‘usable quantity’ is neither an element of the possession offense nor
necessary to sustain a conviction for it. Rather, it is simply evidence from
which a factfinder may infer intent. Because Moreno and its progeny were
decided under a statute that imposed no mental state, proof of a ‘usable
quantity’ helped to ensure that defendants were convicted only after
knowingly committing a proscribed act. The statute now expressly requires a
knowing mental state, and establishing a ‘usable quantity’ remains an
effective way, in a case involving such a small amount that one might
question whether the defendant knew of the presence of drugs, to show that
the defendant ‘knowingly’ committed the acts described in A.R.S. § 13-
3407.”
Cheramie, supra, 374 P.3d at 378.
34.022 Sale or Transfer of Peyote
The crime of [sale] [transfer] of peyote requires proof that:
1. the defendant knowingly [sold] [transferred] peyote; and
2. the substance that was in fact peyote.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3402(A) (statutory language as of September 1, 1981).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
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“Peyote,” “sale” and “transfer” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
34.023 Offer to Sell or Transfer Peyote
The crime of [offering to sell] [offering to transfer] peyote requires proof that the
defendant knowingly [offered to sell] [offered to transfer] peyote.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3402(A) (statutory language as of September 1, 1981).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Peyote,” “sale,” “sell” and “transfer” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
C
OMMENT: There is no “usable amount” requirement for this offense. See State v. Rodarte,
173 Ariz. 331, 332, 842 P.2d 1344, 1345 (App. 1992).
34.024 Defense to Peyote Offenses
It is a defense to a charge of [possession] [sale] [transfer] [offer to sell] [offer to transfer]
peyote when the peyote is being used or is intended for use:
1. in connection with a bona fide practice of a religious belief; and
2. as an integral part of a religious exercise; and
3. in a manner not dangerous to public health, safety, or
morals.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3402(B) (statutory language as of September 1, 1981).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
34.03(A1) Unlawful Use of Vapor-Releasing Substance
The crime of unlawful use of a vapor-releasing substance containing a toxic substance
requires proof that the defendant knowingly [breathed] [inhaled] [drank] a vapor-releasing
substance containing a toxic substance.
A vapor-releasing substance containing a toxic substance includes [insert name of
substance or substances involved in the case].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3403(A)(1) (statutory language as of September 15, 1989).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Vapor-releasing substance containing a toxic substance” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401
(38)
as “paint
or varnish dispensed by the use of aerosol spray, or any glue, wh
ich releases
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vapors or fumes containing acetone, volatile acetates, benzene, butyl alcohol, ethyl alcohol,
ethylene dichloride, isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone,
pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, toluene, volatile ketones, isophorone, chloroform,
methylene chloride, mesityl oxide, xylene, cumene, ethylbenzene, trichloroethylene, mibk,
miak, mek or diacetone alcohol or isobutyl nitrite.”
C
OMMENT: The offense is titled “possession” of a vapor-releasing substance. However, the
offense is committed by unlawful use, not solely possession.
34.03(A2) Sale, Transfer, Offer to Sell or Offer to Transfer a Vapor-Releasing
Substance
The crime of [sale of] [transfer of] [offer to sell] [offer to transfer] a vapor-releasing
substance containing a toxic substance requires proof that the defendant knowingly:
1. [sold] [transferred] [offered to sell] [offered to transfer] a vapor-releasing substance;
and
2. The substance contained a toxic substance; and
3. The [sale] [transfer] [offer to sell] [offer to transfer] was to a person under eightee
n
year
s of age.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3403(A)(2) (statutory language as of September 15, 1989).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Sale” or “sell” means an exchange for anything of value or advantage, present or
prospective. A.R.S. § 13-3401(32).
“Transfer” means furnish, deliver or give away. A.R.S. § 13-3401(37).
“Vapor-releasing substance containing a toxic substance” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-
3401(38) as “paint or varnish dispensed by the use of aerosol spray, or any glue, which
releases vapors or fumes containing acetone, volatile acetates, benzene, butyl alcohol, ethyl
alcohol, ethylene dichloride, isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone,
pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, toluene, volatile ketones, isophorone, chloroform,
methylene chloride, mesityl oxide, xylene, cumene, ethylbenzene, trichloroethylene, mibk,
miak, mek or diacetone alcohol or isobutyl nitrite.”
C
OMMENT: There is no “usable amount” requirement for this offense. See State v. Rodarte,
173 Ariz. 331, 332, 842 P.2d 1344, 1345 (App. 1992).
34.03(A3) Unauthorized Sale, Transfer, Offer to Sell or Offer to Transfer a
Vapor-Releasing Substance
The crime of unauthorized [sale] [transfer] [offer to sell] [offer to transfer] of a vapor-
releasing substance containing a toxic substance requires proof that:
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1. The defendant knowingly [sold] [transferred] [offered to sell] [offered to transfer] a
vapor-releasing substance; and
2. The defendant knew the substance was a vapor-releasing substance containing a
toxic substance;
and
3. At the time of the [sale] [transfer] [offer to sell] [offer to transfer], the defendant was
not employed by or engaged in operating a licensed commercial establishment at a
fixed location regularly offering vapor-releasing substances containing toxic
substances for sale; and
4. The [sale] [transfer] [offered to sell] [offer to transfer] was not made in course of
employment or operation.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3403(A)(3) (statutory language as of September 15, 1989).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Sale” or “sell” means an exchange for anything of value or advantage, present or
prospective. A.R.S. § 13-3401(32).
“Transfer” means furnish, deliver or give away. A.R.S. § 13-3401(37).
“Vapor-releasing substance containing a toxic substance” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-
3401(38) as “paint or varnish dispensed by the use of aerosol spray, or any glue, which
releases vapors or fumes containing acetone, volatile acetates, benzene, butyl alcohol, ethyl
alcohol, ethylene dichloride, isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone,
pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, toluene, volatile ketones, isophorone, chloroform,
methylene chloride, mesityl oxide, xylene, cumene, ethylbenzene, trichloroethylene, mibk,
miak, mek or diacetone alcohol or isobutyl nitrite.”
34.03(B) Failure to Keep Records of Vapor-Releasing Glue
The crime of failure to maintain records of the [sale/transfer] of a vapor-releasing glue
containing a toxic substance requires proof that the defendant:
1. [sold] [transferred] a vapor-releasing glue containing a toxic substance; and
2. failed to do any one of the following:
[Require identification of the purchaser.]
[Record the name of the glue.]
[Record the date and hour of delivery.]
[Record the intended use of the glue.]
[Record the signature and address of the purchaser.]
[Record the signature of the seller or deliverer.]
[Keep the record for three years.]
[Make the record available to board inspectors and peace officers.]
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3403(B) (statutory language as of 1989).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Sale” and “transfer” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
34.03(C) Availability of Vapor-Releasing Glue Containing a Toxic Substance
The crime of failure to keep vapor-releasing glue containing a toxic substance in a place
unavailable to customers requires proof that the defendant:
1. was an operator of a commercial establishment
selling vapor-releasing glues; and
2. failed to keep vapor-releasing glue containing a toxic substance in a place unavailable
to customers without the assistance of the operator or an employee of the
establishment.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3403(C) (statutory language as of September 15, 1989).
U
SE NOTE: “Vapor-releasing substance containing a toxic substance” is defined in A.R.S.
§ 13-3401(38) as “paint or varnish dispensed by the use of aerosol spray, or any glue, which
releases vapors or fumes containing acetone, volatile acetates, benzene, butyl alcohol, ethyl
alcohol, ethylene dichloride, isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone,
pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, toluene, volatile ketones, isophorone, chloroform,
methylene chloride, mesityl oxide, xylene, cumene, ethylbenzene, trichloroethylene, mibk,
miak, mek or diacetone alcohol or isobutyl nitrite.”
34.03(D) Sign Needed for Vapor-Releasing Substance
The crime of failure to post a warning sign for vapor-releasing substances containing a
toxic substance requires proof that the defendant:
1. was an operator of a commercial establishment selling vapor-releasing paints and
varnishes containing a toxic substance dispensed by the use of any aerosol spray
device; and
2. failed to conspicuously display an easily legible sign not smaller than eleven by
fourteen inches stating: “Warning: inhalation of vapors can be dangerous.”
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3403(D) (statutory language as of September 15, 1989).
U
SE NOTE: “Vapor-releasing substance containing a toxic substance” is defined in A.R.S.
§ 13-3401(38) as “paint or varnish dispensed by the use of aerosol spray, or any glue, which
releases vapors or fumes containing acetone, volatile acetates, benzene, butyl alcohol, ethyl
alcohol, ethylene dichloride, isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone,
pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, toluene, volatile ketones, isophorone, chloroform,
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methylene chloride, mesityl oxide, xylene, cumene, ethylbenzene, trichloroethylene, mibk,
miak, mek or diacetone alcohol or isobutyl nitrite.”
34.039 Defense to Vapor-Releasing Substance
It is a defense to a charge of [sale] [transfer] of a vapor-releasing substance containing a
toxic substance that:
1. the transfer is from a parent to a child or a guardian to a ward; or
2. the [sale] transfer] is made for manufacturing or industrial purposes.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3403(E) (statutory language as of 1989).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Sale, transfer and vapor-releasing substance containing a toxic substance” are defined in
A.R.S. § 13-3401.
34.03.01 Sale of Delivery of Nitrous Oxide to a Minor
The crime of sale or delivery of nitrous oxide to a minor requires proof that the
defendant knowingly [sold] [gave] [delivered] to a person under eighteen years of age any
container exclusively containing nitrous oxide.
[It is a defense if the person under eighteen years of age is delivering or accepting
delivery in the person’s capacity as an employee.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3403.01 (statutory language as of April 18, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Sale” or “sell” means an exchange for anything of value or advantage, present or
prospective. A.R.S. § 13-3401(32).
34.04(A) Failure to Report the Sale, Transfer or Furnishing of a Precursor or
Regulated Chemical
The crime of failure to report the [sale] [transfer] [furnishing] of a precursor chemical or
regulated chemical requires proof that the defendant:
1. was a [manufacturer] [wholesaler] [person] who sold, transferred or furnished a
precursor chemical or regulated chemical to any person in this state; and
2. [knowingly failed to report all transactions to the department of public safety.]
[knowingly failed to maintain a record required by state law.]
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[knowingly furnished false information or omitted any material information in any
report or record submitted to the department of public safety.]
[knowingly caused another person to furnish false information or to omit any
material information in any report or record submitted to the department of public
safety.]
[knowingly participated in any wholesale or retail transaction, or series of
transactions, that is structured by a person with the intent to avoid the filing by any
party to the transaction of any report to the department of public safety.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3405(A) and (P) (statutory language as of October 1, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
A.R.S. § 13-3401(26) defines “precursor chemical I” as “any material, compound,
mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances and their
salts, optical isomers or salts of optical isomers:
(a) N-acetylanthranilic acid.
(b) Anthranilic acid.
(c) Ephedrine.
(d) Ergotamine.
(e) Isosafrole.
(f) Lysergic acid.
(g) Methylamine.
(h) N-ethylephedrine.
(i) N-ethylpseudoephedrine.
(j) N-methylephedrine.
(k) N-methylpseudoephedrine.
(l) Norephedrine.
(m) (-)-Norpseudoephedrine.
(n) Phenylacetic acid.
(o) Phenylpropanolamine.
(p) Piperidine.
(q) Pseudoephedrine.”
A.R.S. § 13-3401(27) defines “precursor chemical II” as “any material, compound,
mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances and their
salts, optical isomers or salts of optical isomers:
(a) 4-cyano-2-dimethylamino-4, 4-diphenyl butane.
(b) 4-cyano-1-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine.
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(c) Chlorephedrine.
(d) Chlorpseudoephedrine.
(e) Ethyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylate.
(f) 2-methyl-3-morpholino-1, 1-diphenylpropane-carboxylic acid.
(g) 1-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid.
(h) N-formyl amphetamine.
(i) N-formyl methamphetamine.
(j) Phenyl-2-propanone.
(k) 1-piperidinocyclohexane carbonitrile.
(l) 1-pyrrolidinocyclohexane carbonitrile.”
A.R.S. § 13-3401(30) defines “regulated chemical” as “the following substances in bulk
form that are not a useful part of an otherwise lawful product:
(a) Acetic anhydride.
(b) Hypophosphorous acid.
(c) Iodine.
(d) Sodium acetate.
(e) Red phosphorus.
(f) Gamma butyrolactone (GBL).
(g) 1, 4-butanediol.
(h) Butyrolactone.
(i) 1, 2 butanolide.
(j) 2-oxanalone.
(k) Tetrahydro-2-furanone.
(l) Dihydro-2(3H)-furanone.
(m) Tetramethylene glycol.”
A.R.S. § 13-3401(17) defines “manufacture” as “produce, prepare, propagate,
compound, mix or process, directly or indirectly, by extraction from substances of natural
origin or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction
and chemical synthesis. Manufacture includes any packaging or repackaging or labeling or
relabeling of containers. Manufacture does not include any producing, preparing,
propagating, compounding, mixing, processing, packaging or labeling done in conformity
with applicable state and local laws and rules by a licensed practitioner incident to and in the
course of his licensed practice.”
A.R.S. § 13-3401(18) defines “manufacturer” as “a person who manufactures a narcotic
or dangerous drug or other substance controlled by this chapter.”
“Sale” or “sell” means an exchange for anything of value or advantage, present or
prospective. A.R.S. § 13-3401(32).
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A.R.S. § 13-3401(40) defines “wholesaler” as “a person who in the usual course of
business lawfully supplies narcotic drugs, dangerous drugs, precursor chemicals or regulated
chemicals that he himself has not produced or prepared, but not to a person for the purpose
of consumption by the person, whether or not the wholesaler has a permit that is issued
pursuant to title 32, chapter 18. Wholesaler includes a person who sells, delivers or dispenses
a precursor chemical in an amount or under circumstances that would require registration as
a distributor of precursor chemicals under the federal act.”
34.04(C) Failure to Report the Sale, Transfer or Furnishing of a Precursor or
Regulated Chemical
The crime of failure to report the [sale] [transfer] [furnishing] of a precursor chemical or
regulated chemical requires proof that the defendant:
1. was a [manufacturer] [wholesaler] [retailer] [person] who sold, transferred or
furnished a precursor chemical or regulated chemical to a person in this state; and
2. [knowingly failed to report the transaction to the department of public safety;
[knowingly failed to maintain a record required by state law; and]
[knowingly furnished false information or omitted any material information in any
report or record to the department of public safety; and]
[knowingly caused another person to furnish false information or to omit any
material information in any report or record to the department of public safety; and]
[knowingly participated in any wholesale or retail transaction or series of transactions
that is structured by a person with the intent to avoid the filing by any party to the
transaction of any report to the department of public safety; and]
3. The report was not submitted within twenty-one days before delivery of the
substance.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3404(C) and (P) (statutory language as of October 1, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Precursor chemical I and II,” “regulated chemical,” “manufacturer” and “wholesaler”
are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definitions are contained in the Use Note for Statutory
Criminal Instruction 34.04(A).
A.R.S. § 13-3401(31) defines “retailer” as either “a person other than a practitioner who
sells any precursor chemical or regulated chemical to another person for purposes of
consumption and not resale, whether or not the person possesses a permit issued pursuant
to title 32, chapter 18” or “a person other than a manufacturer or wholesaler who purchases,
receives or acquires more than twenty-four grams of a precursor chemical.”
A.R.S. § 13-3404(C) does allow for the submission of reports on a monthly basis with
respect to repeated and regular transactions when: (1) there is a pattern of regular supply of
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the substance between the supplier and recipient; and (2) the recipient has an established
record of utilization of the substance for lawful purposes.
34.04(D) Failure to Report the Receipt of a Precursor or Regulated Chemical
from Outside the State
The crime of failure to report the receipt of a precursor chemical or regulated chemical
received from outside of this state requires proof that the defendant:
1. was a [manufacturer] [wholesaler] [retailer] [person] who received a precursor
chemical or regulated chemical; and
2. The chemical was received from a source outside of this state; and
3. [knowingly failed to report the transaction to the department of public safety.]
[knowingly failed to maintain a record required by state law.]
[knowingly furnished false information or omitted any material information in any
report or record submitted to the department of public safety.]
[knowingly caused another person to furnish false information or to omit any
material information in any report or record submitted to the department of public
safety.]
[knowingly participated in any wholesale or retail transaction or series of transactions
that is structured by a person with the intent to avoid the filing by any party to the
transaction of any report submitted to the department of public safety.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3404(D) and (P) (statutory language as of October 1, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Precursor chemical I and II,” “regulated chemical,” “manufacturer” and “wholesaler”
are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definitions are contained in the Use Note for Statutory
Criminal Instructions 34.04(A) and 34.04(C).
34.04(F) Failure to Report the Suspicious Sale, Transfer or Furnishing of a
Precursor or Regulated Chemical
The crime of failure to report the suspicious [sale] [transfer] [furnishing] of a precursor
chemical or regulated chemical requires proof that:
1. The defendant was a [manufacturer] [wholesaler] [retailer] [person] who sold,
transferred or furnished a precursor chemical or regulated chemical to a person in
this state; and
2. The transaction was of a suspicious nature; and
3. [The defendant knowingly failed to report the transaction to the department of
public safety.]
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[The defendant knowingly failed to maintain a record required by state law.]
[The defendant knowingly furnished false information or omitted any material
information in any report or record to the department of public safety.]
[The defendant knowingly caused another person to furnish false information or to
omit any material information in any report or record to the department of public
safety.]
[The defendant knowingly participated in any wholesale or retail transaction or series
of transactions that is structured by a person with the intent to avoid the filing by
any party to the transaction of any report to the department of public safety.]
[The defendant knowingly participated in any wholesale or retail transaction or series
of transactions that is structured by a person with the intent to avoid the filing by
any party to the transaction of any report to the department of public safety.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3404(F) and (P) (statutory language as of October 1, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Precursor chemical I and II,” “regulated chemical,” “manufacturer” and “wholesaler”
are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definitions are contained in the Use Note for Statutory
Criminal Instruction 34.04(A) and 34.04(C).
34.04(G) Failure to Report the Theft, Disappearance or Loss of a Precursor or
Regulated Chemical
The crime of failure to report the theft, disappearance or loss of a precursor chemical or
regulated chemical requires proof that the defendant discovered the [theft] [disappearance]
[loss] [excessive or unusual loss] of any precursor chemical or regulated chemical and
knowingly:
[failed to report in writing the [theft] [loss] to the department of public safety within
three days of such discovery.]
[failed to maintain a record required by state law.]
[furnished false information or omitted any material information regarding the [theft]
[loss] in any written report or record to the department of public safety.]
[caused another person to furnish false information or to omit any material information
regarding the [theft] [loss] in any written report or record to the department of public
safety.]
[participated in any wholesale or retail transaction or series of transactions that is
structured by a person with the intent to avoid the filing by any party to the transaction
of any report to the department of public safety.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3404(G) and (P) (statutory language as of October 1, 1999).
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U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Precursor chemical I and II,” “regulated chemical,” “manufacturer” and “wholesaler”
are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definitions are contained in the Use Note for Statutory
Criminal Instructions 34.04(A) and 34.04(C).
34.04(H) Failure to Maintain Records of a Precursor or Regulated Chemical
The crime of failure to maintain records of a precursor or regulated chemical requires
proof that the defendant:
1. was a [manufacturer] [wholesaler] [retailer] [other person]; and
2. knowingly failed to maintain a record of transactions for less than two years
involving the sale, transfer or furnishing of precursor chemicals or regulated
chemicals to any person in this state.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3404(H) and (P) (statutory language as of October 1, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Precursor chemical I and II,” “regulated chemical,” “manufacturer” and “wholesaler”
are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definitions are contained in the Use Note for Statutory
Criminal Instructions 34.04(A) and 34.04(C).
34.04.01(A) Possession or Sale of Precursor Chemicals
The crime of [possession] [sale] of precursor chemicals requires proof that the
defendant:
[knowingly possessed a precursor chemical II.]
[knowingly possessed more than twenty-four grams of pseudoephedrine, (-)-
norpseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine without a license or permit issued
pursuant to state law.]
[knowingly purchased more than three packages, not exceeding nine grams of
pseudoephedrine, (-)-norpseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine without a valid
prescription order, license or permit issued pursuant to state law.]
[knowingly possessed any ephedrine that was uncombined or that was the sole active
ingredient of a product or more than twenty-four grams of ephedrine that was combined
with another active ingredient in any ephedrine product without a license or permit
issued pursuant to state law.]
[knowingly purchased any ephedrine that was uncombined or that was the sole active
ingredient of a product or more than three packages, not exceeding nine grams of
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ephedrine that was combined with another active ingredient in any ephedrine product,
without a license or permit issued pursuant to state law.]
[sold, transferred, or otherwise furnished any precursor chemical, regulated chemical or
other substance or equipment with knowledge that the recipient would use the precursor
chemical, regulated chemical, substance or equipment to unlawfully manufacture a
dangerous drug or narcotic drug.]
[as a manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer, knowingly possessed any precursor chemical
or regulated chemical from which the label, the national drug control number or the
manufacturer’s lot number has been removed, altered or obliterated.]
[knowingly sold, transferred or otherwise furnished more than nine grams of any
precursor chemical without a license or permit issued pursuant to state law.]
[sold, transferred or furnished ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, (-)-norpseudoephedrine or
phenylpropanolamine in a total amount of more than nine grams in a single transaction
in this state to a recipient who did not possess a valid and current permit issued pursuant
to state law.]
[sold, transferred or otherwise furnished a precursor chemical in violation
of any rule of the Arizona State Board of Pharmacy or the department of public safety.]
[as a wholesaler or retailer purchased or otherwise acquired or received a precursor
chemical from any person who did not possess a valid and current permit issued
pursuant to state law.]
[knowingly participated in any transaction or series of transactions that were structured
by any person with the intent to avoid or circumvent the prohibitions or limits on sales
established by state law.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3404.01(A) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Precursor chemical I and II,” “regulated chemical,” “manufacturer” and “wholesaler”
are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definitions are contained in the Use Note for Statutory
Criminal Instructions 34.04(A) and 34.04(C).
“Prescription order” means either: (a) an order to a pharmacist for drugs or devices
issued and signed by a duly licensed medical practitioner in the authorized course of the
practitioner’s professional practice; or (b) an order transmitted to a pharmacist through word
of mouth, telephone or other means of communication directed by that medical practitioner.
A.R.S. § 32-1901.
“Sale” or “sell” means an exchange for anything of value or advantage, present or
prospective. A.R.S. § 13-3401(32).
“Transfer” means furnish, deliver or give away. A.R.S. § 13-3401(37).
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34.04.01(B) Sale or Transfer or Furnishing of a Precursor Chemical by a Retailer
The crime of [sale] [transfer] [furnishing] of a precursor chemical by a retailer requires
proof that:
1. The defendant was a retailer who knowingly [sold] [transferred] [furnished] a
precursor chemical; and
2. [The transaction did not occur in the normal course of business at a location allowed
by a valid permit.]
[The defendant did not have a valid and current permit issued by the Arizona State
Board of Pharmacy.]
[The defendant’s Arizona State Board of Pharmacy valid permit was not
prominently displayed at the premises where the transaction occurred.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3404.01(B) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Precursor chemical I and II,” “regulated chemical,” “manufacturer” and “wholesaler”
are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definitions are contained in the Use Note for Statutory
Criminal Instructions 34.04(A) and 34.04(C).
34.04.01(C) Sale of a Precursor Chemical by a Retailer
The crime of sale of a precursor chemical by a retailer requires proof that the defendant
was a retailer who sold more than a total of three packages exceeding nine grams of
ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, (-)-norpseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine in a single
transaction to a person without a valid prescription order.
“Prescription order” means either: (a) an order to a pharmacist for drugs or devices
issued and signed by a duly licensed medical practitioner in the authorized course of the
practitioner’s professional practice; or (b) an order transmitted to a pharmacist through word
of mouth, telephone or other means of communication directed by that medical practitioner.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3404.01(C) and 32-1901 (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: “Precursor chemical I and II” and “retailer” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
The definitions are set forth in the Use Notes for Statutory Criminal Instructions 34.04(A)
and 34.04(C).
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34.04.01(D) Sale or Transfer or Furnishing of Precursor Chemicals by a
Wholesaler
The crime of [sale] [transfer] [furnishing] of precursor chemicals by a wholesaler requires
proof that:
1. The defendant was a wholesaler who [sold] [transferred] [furnished] a precursor
chemical to any person; and
2. [The defendant did not have a valid and current permit issued pursuant to state law.]
[The recipient was not a pharmacy, practitioner or person or entity who had a permit
issued pursuant to state law.]
[The transaction involved payment in cash or money orders in an amount of more
than one thousand dollars.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3404.01(D) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court usually must instruct on the culpable mental state. No culpable mental state is
included in the statute so one was not included in the instruction.
“Precursor chemical I and II” and “wholesaler” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The
definitions are set forth in the Use Note for Statutory Criminal Instruction 34.04(A).
A.R.S. § 13-3401(24) defines “pharmacy” as “a licensed business where drugs are
compounded or dispensed by a licensed pharmacist.”
A.R.S. § 13-3401(25) defines “practitioner” as “a person licensed to prescribe and
administer drugs.”
34.04.01(E) Sale or Transfer or Furnishing of Precursor Chemicals by a
Manufacturer
The crime of [sale] [transfer] [furnishing] of precursor chemicals by a manufacturer
requires proof that:
1. The defendant was a manufacturer who [sold] [transferred] [furnished] a precursor
chemical to any person; and
2. [The recipient was not a pharmacy, practitioner or person or entity who had a license
or permit issued pursuant to state law.]
[The transaction involved payment in cash or money orders in an amount of more
than one thousand dollars.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3404.01(E) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Dangerous drug” and “narcotic drugs” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
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“Precursor chemical I and II,” regulated chemical,” “manufacturer,” “manufacture,”
“retailer” and “wholesaler” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definitions are set forth in
the Use Note for Statutory Criminal Instructions 34.04(A) and 34.04(C).
34.051 Possession or Use of Marijuana
The crime of [possession] [use]
of marijuana requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly [possessed] [used] marijuana; and
2. The substance was in fact marijuana.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3405(A)(1) and (3) (statutory language as of July 20, 1996); State v.
Murray, 162 Ariz. 211, 782 P.2d 329 (App. 1989).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Marijuana” and “produce” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
The class of the felony is determined by the amount of marijuana defendant possessed
or used. A.R.S. § 13-3405(B). Therefore, it is suggested that the following verdict form be
used:
We the jury duly empanelled and upon our oaths do find the
defendant on the charge of possession or use of marijuana as follows:
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
(Complete the next portion of this verdict form only if you find the
defendant guilty of possession or use of marijuana.)
We the jury find that the amount of marijuana the defendant
possessed or used was (check only one):
______ Less than two pounds.
______ Two pounds but less than four pounds.
______ Four pounds or more.
C
OMMENT: In State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, ¶22, 189 P.3d 374 (2008), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that possession of dangerous drugs is a lesser-included offense of
transportation for sale of a dangerous drug. In so holding, the court overruled a holding in
State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962) that created the element of “usable
quantity” for possession of a narcotic drug. The Cheramie court ruled that:
“A ‘usable quantity’ is neither an element of the possession offense nor
necessary to sustain a conviction for it. Rather, it is simply evidence from
which a factfinder may infer intent. Because Moreno and its progeny were
decided under a statute that imposed no mental state, proof of a ‘usable
quantity’ helped to ensure that defendants were convicted only after
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knowingly committing a proscribed act. The statute now expressly requires a
knowing mental state, and establishing a ‘usable quantity’ remains an
effective way, in a case involving such a small amount that one might
question whether the defendant knew of the presence of drugs, to show that
the defendant ‘knowingly’ committed the acts described in A.R.S. § 13-
3407.”
Cheramie, supra, 374 P.3d at 378.
34.052 Possession of Marijuana for Sale
The crime of possession of marijuana for sale requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly possessed marijuana;
and
2. The substance was in fact marijuana; and
3. The possession must be for the purpose of sale. “Sale” means an exchange for
anything of value or advantage, present or prospective.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3405(A)(2), 13-3401 (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b).
“Marijuana” and “sale” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
The class of the felony is determined by the amount of marijuana defendant possessed
for sale. A.R.S. § 13-3405(B). Therefore, it is suggested that the following verdict form be
used:
We the jury duly empanelled and upon our oaths do find the
defendant on the charge of possession of marijuana for sale as follows:
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
(Complete the next portion of this verdict form only if you find the
defendant guilty of possession of marijuana for sale.)
We the jury find that the amount of marijuana the defendant
possessed for sale was (check only one):
_____ Less than two pounds.
_____ Two pounds but not more than four pounds.
_____ More than four pounds.
C
OMMENT: COMMENT: In State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, ¶22, 189 P.3d 374 (2008), the
Arizona Supreme Court held that possession of dangerous drugs is a lesser-included offense
of transportation for sale of a dangerous drug. In so holding, the court overruled a holding
in State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962) that created the element of “usable
quantity” for possession of a narcotic drug. The Cheramie court ruled that:
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“A ‘usable quantity’ is neither an element of the possession offense nor
necessary to sustain a conviction for it. Rather, it is simply evidence from
which a factfinder may infer intent. Because Moreno and its progeny were
decided under a statute that imposed no mental state, proof of a ‘usable
quantity’ helped to ensure that defendants were convicted only after
knowingly committing a proscribed act. The statute now expressly requires a
knowing mental state, and establishing a ‘usable quantity’ remains an
effective way, in a case involving such a small amount that one might
question whether the defendant knew of the presence of drugs, to show that
the defendant ‘knowingly’ committed the acts described in A.R.S. § 13-
3407.”
Cheramie, supra, 374 P.3d at 378.
34.053 Production of Marijuana
The crime of production
of marijuana requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly [grew] [planted] [cultivated] [harvested] [dried] [processed]
[prepared for sale] marijuana; and
2. The substance was in fact marijuana.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3405(A)(1) and (3) (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Marijuana” and “sale” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
The class of the felony is determined by the amount of marijuana defendant produced.
A.R.S. § 13-3405(B). Therefore, it is suggested that the following verdict form be used:
We the jury duly empanelled and upon our oaths do find the
defendant on the charge of production of marijuana as follows:
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
(Complete the next portion of this verdict form only if you find the
defendant guilty of production of marijuana.)
We the jury find that the amount of marijuana the defendant
possessed or used was (check only one):
_____ Less than two pounds.
_____ Two pounds but not more than four pounds.
_____ More than four pounds.
C
OMMENT: There is no “usable amount” requirement for this offense. See State v. Rodarte,
173 Ariz. 331, 332, 842 P.2d 1344, 1345 (App. 1992).
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34.0541 Selling, Transporting, Importing, Transferring of Marijuana for Sale
The crime of [transporting marijuana for sale] [importing marijuana into this state]
[selling marijuana] [transferring marijuana] requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly [transported marijuana for sale] [imported marijuana into
this state ] [sold marijuana] [transferred marijuana]; and
2. The substance was in fact marijuana.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3405(A)(4) (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Marijuana,” “sale,” and “transfer” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
C
OMMENT: There is no “usable amount” requirement for this offense. See State v. Rodarte,
173 Ariz. 331, 332, 842 P.2d 1344, 1345 (App. 1992).
The class of the felony is determined by the amount of marijuana involved in the
offense. A.R.S. § 13-3405(B). Therefore, it is suggested that the following verdict form be
used:
We the jury duly empanelled and upon our oaths do find the defendant
on the charge of [transporting marijuana for sale] [importing marijuana into
this state for sale] [selling marijuana] [transferring marijuana] as follows:
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
(Complete the next portion of this verdict form only if you find the
defendant guilty of the offense charged.)
We the jury find that the amount of marijuana the defendant
[transported for sale] [imported into this state for sale] [sold] [transferred]
was (check only one):
_____ Less than two pounds.
_____ Two pounds or more.
34.0542 Offering to Transport, Import, or Transfer Marijuana
The crime of [offering to transport for sale] [offering to import into this state] [offering
to sell] [offering to transfer] marijuana requires proof that the defendant knowingly offered
to [transport for sale] [import into this state] [sell] [transfer] any marijuana.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3405(A)(4) (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
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“Marijuana” and “transfer” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
The class of the felony is determined by the amount of marijuana involved in the
offense. A.R.S. § 13-3405(B). Therefore, it is suggested that the following verdict form be
used:
We the jury duly empanelled and upon our oaths do find the defendant
on the charge of [offering to transport for sale] [offering to import into this
state] [offering to sell] [offering to transfer] marijuana requires proof that the
defendant knowingly offered to [transport for sale] [import into this state]
[sell] [transfer] as follows:
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
(Complete the next portion of this verdict form only if you find the
defendant guilty of the offense charged.)
We the jury find that the amount of marijuana involved] was (check
only one):
_____ Less than two pounds.
_____ Two pounds or more.
C
OMMENT: There is no “usable amount” requirement for this offense. See State v. Rodarte,
173 Ariz. 331, 332, 842 P.2d 1344, 1345 (App. 1992).
34.061 Possession/Use of a [Misbranded] [Prescription-Only] Drug
The crime of [possession] [use] of a [misbranded] [prescription-only] drug requires proof
that:
1. The defendant knowingly [possessed] [used] a prescription-only drug; and
2. The substance was in fact a [misbranded] [prescription-only] drug; and
3. The defendant did not obtain a valid prescription for the [misbranded] [prescription-
only] drug from a lawfully licensed prescriber.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3406(A)(1) (statutory language as of July 3, 2015).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets and parentheses as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Misbranded drug is defined in A.R.S. 32-1967.
“Prescription-only drug” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401(28) as not including a dangerous
drug or narcotic drug, but:
“(a) Any drug which because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful
effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its
use, is not generally recognized among experts, qualified by scientific
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training and experience to evaluate its safety and efficacy, as safe for use
except by or under the supervision of a medical practitioner.
(b) Any drug that is limited by an approved new drug application under the
federal act or section 32-1962 to use under the supervision of a medical
practitioner.
(c) Every potentially harmful drug, the labeling of which does not bear or
contain full and adequate directions for use by the consumer.
(d) Any drug required by the federal act to bear on its label the legend
‘Caution: Federal law prohibits dispensing without prescription’ or ‘RX
only’.”
Use the definition that is appropriate to the facts of the case.
C
OMMENT: In State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, ¶22, 189 P.3d 374 (2008), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that possession of dangerous drugs is a lesser-included offense of
transportation for sale of a dangerous drug. In so holding, the court overruled a holding in
State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962) that created the element of “usable
quantity” for possession of a narcotic drug. The Cheramie court ruled that:
“A ‘usable quantity’ is neither an element of the possession offense nor
necessary to sustain a conviction for it. Rather, it is simply evidence from
which a factfinder may infer intent. Because Moreno and its progeny were
decided under a statute that imposed no mental state, proof of a ‘usable
quantity’ helped to ensure that defendants were convicted only after
knowingly committing a proscribed act. The statute now expressly requires a
knowing mental state, and establishing a ‘usable quantity’ remains an
effective way, in a case involving such a small amount that one might
question whether the defendant knew of the presence of drugs, to show that
the defendant ‘knowingly’ committed the acts described in A.R.S. § 13-
3407.”
Cheramie, supra, 374 P.3d at 378.
34.062 Possession of Prescription-Only Drug for Sale
The crime of possession of a prescription-only drug for sale requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly possessed a prescription-only drug; and
2. The substance was in fact a prescription-only drug; and
3. The defendant did not possess a lawful license or permit to possess the prescription-
only drug; and
4. The possession was for purpose of sale.
“Sale” means an exchange for anything of value or advantage, present or prospective.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3406(A)(2) and 13-3401 (statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
Use Note: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Prescription-only drugs” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definition is contained in
the Use Note for Statutory Criminal Instruction 34.061.
C
OMMENT: In State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, ¶22, 189 P.3d 374 (2008), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that possession of dangerous drugs is a lesser-included offense of
transportation for sale of a dangerous drug. In so holding, the court overruled a holding in
State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962) that created the element of “usable
quantity” for possession of a narcotic drug. The Cheramie court ruled that:
“A ‘usable quantity’ is neither an element of the possession offense nor
necessary to sustain a conviction for it. Rather, it is simply evidence from
which a factfinder may infer intent. Because Moreno and its progeny were
decided under a statute that imposed no mental state, proof of a ‘usable
quantity’ helped to ensure that defendants were convicted only after
knowingly committing a proscribed act. The statute now expressly requires a
knowing mental state, and establishing a ‘usable quantity’ remains an
effective way, in a case involving such a small amount that one might
question whether the defendant knew of the presence of drugs, to show that
the defendant ‘knowingly’ committed the acts described in A.R.S. § 13-
3407.”
Cheramie, supra, 374 P.3d at 378.
34.063 Possession of Equipment and Chemicals to Manufacture Prescription-
Only Drug
The crime of possession of equipment and chemicals for the manufacture of a
prescription-only drug requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed equipment
and chemicals for the purpose of manufacturing a prescription-only drug without a valid
license or permit.
“Manufacture” means produce, prepare, propagate, compound, mix or process, directly
or indirectly, by extraction from substances of natural origin or independently by means of
chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis. Manufacture
includes any packaging or repackaging or labeling or relabeling of containers. Manufacture
does not include any producing, preparing, propagating, compounding, mixing, processing,
packaging or labeling done in conformity with applicable state and local laws and rules by a
licensed practitioner incident to and in the course of his licensed practice.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3406(A)(3) (statutory language as of August 9, 2001) and 13-3401(17)
(statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Prescription-only drugs” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definition is contained in
the Use Note for Statutory Criminal Instruction 34.061.
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34.067(1) Sale, Transfer, or Importation of a Prescription-Only Drug
The crime of [transport for sale] [import into this state] [sale] [transfer] of a prescription-
only drug requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly, and without lawful authorization, [transported for sale]
[imported into this state] [sold] [transferred] a prescription-only drug; and
2. The substance was in fact a prescription-only drug.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3406(A)(7) (statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Prescription-only drug” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definition is contained in
the Use Note for Statutory Criminal Instruction 34.061.
A.R.S. § 13-3401(32) defines “sale” or “sell” as “an exchange for anything of value or
advantage, present or prospective.”
A.R.S. § 13-3401(37) defines “transfer” as “furnish, deliver or give away.”
C
OMMENT: There is no “usable amount” requirement for this offense. See State v. Rodarte,
173 Ariz. 331, 332, 842 P.2d 1344, 1345 (App. 1992).
34.067(2) Offer to Sell, Offer to Transfer, Offer to Import a Prescription-Only
Drug
The crime of [offering to sell] [offering to transfer] [offering to transport for sale]
[offering to import into this state] a prescription-only drug requires proof that the defendant
knowingly, and without lawful authorization, [offered to sell] [offered to transfer] [offered to
transport for sale] [offered to import into this state] a prescription-only drug.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3406(A)(7) (statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Prescription-only drug” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401. The definition is contained in
the Use Note for Statutory Criminal Instruction 34.061.
A.R.S. § 13-3401(32) defines “sale” or “sell” as “an exchange for anything of value or
advantage, present or prospective.”
A.R.S. § 13-3401(37) defines “transfer” as “furnish, deliver or give away.”
C
OMMENT: There is no “usable amount” requirement for this offense. See State v. Rodarte,
173 Ariz. 331, 332, 842 P.2d 1344, 1345 (App. 1992).
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34.071 Possession of Dangerous Drug
The crime of [possession/use] of a [dangerous drug] requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant knowingly [possessed/used] a [dangerous drug] and
2. The substance was in fact a dangerous drug.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3407(A)(1) and (3) (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Dangerous drugs” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: In State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, ¶22, 189 P.3d 374 (2008), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that possession of dangerous drugs is a lesser-included offense of
transportation for sale of a dangerous drug. In so holding, the court overruled a holding in
State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962) that created the element of “usable
quantity” for possession of a narcotic drug. The Cheramie court ruled that:
“A ‘usable quantity’ is neither an element of the possession offense nor
necessary to sustain a conviction for it. Rather, it is simply evidence from
which a factfinder may infer intent. Because Moreno and its progeny were
decided under a statute that imposed no mental state, proof of a ‘usable
quantity’ helped to ensure that defendants were convicted only after
knowingly committing a proscribed act. The statute now expressly requires a
knowing mental state, and establishing a ‘usable quantity’ remains an
effective way, in a case involving such a small amount that one might
question whether the defendant knew of the presence of drugs, to show that
the defendant ‘knowingly’ committed the acts described in A.R.S. § 13-
3407.”
Cheramie, supra, 374 P.3d at 378.
34.07.01 Manufacturing Methamphetamine Causing Injury to a Person under
Fifteen
The crime of manufacturing methamphetamine under any circumstances causing injury
to a person under fifteen years of age requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly manufactured methamphetamine; and
2. The manufacture was under any circumstances that caused physical injury to a
person; and
3. The person was under fifteen years of age.
“Manufacture” means produce, prepare, propagate, compound, mix or process, directly
or indirectly, by extraction from substances of natural origin or independently by means of
chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis. Manufacture
includes any packaging or repackaging or labeling or relabeling of containers. Manufacture
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does not include any producing, preparing, propagating, compounding, mixing, processing,
packaging or labeling done in conformity with applicable state and local laws and rules by a
licensed practitioner incident to and in the course of his licensed practice.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3407.01 (statutory language as of August 15, 2005) and 13-3401(17)
(statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” and “physical injury” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0510(b) and 1.0529).
34.072 Possession of Dangerous Drug for Sale
The crime of possession of a dangerous drug for sale requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant knowingly possessed a dangerous drug; and
2. The substance was in fact a dangerous drug; and
3. The possession must be for purposes of sale. “Sale” means an exchange for anything
of value or advantage, present or prospective.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(2) (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Dangerous drug” and “sale” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: In State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, ¶22, 189 P.3d 374 (2008), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that possession of dangerous drugs is a lesser-included offense of
transportation for sale of a dangerous drug. In so holding, the court overruled a holding in
State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962) that created the element of “usable
quantity” for possession of a narcotic drug. The Cheramie court ruled that:
“A ‘usable quantity’ is neither an element of the possession offense nor
necessary to sustain a conviction for it. Rather, it is simply evidence from
which a factfinder may infer intent. Because Moreno and its progeny were
decided under a statute that imposed no mental state, proof of a ‘usable
quantity’ helped to ensure that defendants were convicted only after
knowingly committing a proscribed act. The statute now expressly requires a
knowing mental state, and establishing a ‘usable quantity’ remains an
effective way, in a case involving such a small amount that one might
question whether the defendant knew of the presence of drugs, to show that
the defendant ‘knowingly’ committed the acts described in A.R.S. § 13-
3407.”
Cheramie, supra, 374 P.3d at 378.
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34.076 Obtaining Dangerous Drug by Fraud
The crime of [obtaining] [procuring the administration of] a dangerous drug by fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, or subterfuge requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant knowingly [obtained] [procured the administration of] a dangerous
drug; and
2. The substance was in fact a dangerous drug; and
3. The defendant [obtained] [procured the administration of] a dangerous drug by
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or subterfuge.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(6) (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Dangerous drug” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
34.0771 Selling, Transporting, Importing, Transferring of Dangerous Drug for
Sale
The crime of [transporting dangerous drugs for sale] [importing dangerous drugs into
this state] [selling dangerous drugs] [transferring dangerous drugs] requires proof of the
following:
1. The defendant knowingly [transported dangerous drugs for sale] [imported
dangerous drugs into this state] [sold dangerous drugs] [transferred dangerous
drugs]; and
2. The substance was in fact a dangerous drug.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(7) (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Transfer” and “dangerous drug” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
C
OMMENT: There is no “usable amount” requirement for this offense. State v. Espinosa, 101
Ariz. 474, 421 P.2d 322 (1966). Based on the ruling in State v. Rodarte, 173 Ariz. 331, 842 P.2d
1344 (App. 1992), “usable amount” is a necessary element only for possession and possession
for sale cases.
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34.0772 Offering to Transport, Import, or Transfer Dangerous Drugs
The crime of [offering to transport for sale] [offering to import into this state] [offering to
sell] [offering to transfer] dangerous drugs requires proof that the defendant knowingly offered
to [transport for sale] [import into this state] [sell] [transfer] any dangerous drugs.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(7) (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Dangerous drug”, “sale” and “transfer” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
34.081 Possession or Use of a Narcotic Drug
The crime of [possession] or [use] of a narcotic drug requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant knowingly [possessed] or [used] a narcotic drug; and
2. The substance was in fact a narcotic drug.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(1) (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Narcotic drug” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: In State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, ¶ 22, 189 P.3d 374 (2008), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that possession of dangerous drugs is a lesser-included offense of
transportation for sale of a dangerous drug. In so holding, the court overruled a holding in
State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962) that created the element of “usable
quantity” for possession of a narcotic drug. The Cheramie court ruled that:
“A ‘usable quantity’ is neither an element of the possession offense nor
necessary to sustain a conviction for it. Rather, it is simply evidence from
which a factfinder may infer intent. Because Moreno and its progeny were
decided under a statute that imposed no mental state, proof of a ‘usable
quantity’ helped to ensure that defendants were convicted only after
knowingly committing a proscribed act. The statute now expressly requires a
knowing mental state, and establishing a ‘usable quantity’ remains an
effective way, in a case involving such a small amount that one might
question whether the defendant knew of the presence of drugs, to show that
the defendant ‘knowingly’ committed the acts described in A.R.S. § 13-
3407.”
Cheramie, supra, 374 P.3d at 378.
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34.082 Possession of Narcotic Drug for Sale
The crime of possession of a narcotic drug for sale requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant knowingly possessed a narcotic drug; and
2. The substance was in fact a narcotic drug; and
3. The possession must be for purposes of sale. “Sale” means an exchange for anything
of value or advantage, present or prospective.
SOURCE: A.R.S. 13-3408(A)(2) (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Narcotic drugs” and “sale” are defined in A.R.S. 13-3401.
C
OMMENT: In State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, ¶22, 189 P.3d 374 (2008), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that possession of dangerous drugs is a lesser-included offense of
transportation for sale of a dangerous drug. In so holding, the court overruled a holding in
State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962) that created the element of “usable
quantity” for possession of a narcotic drug. The Cheramie court ruled that:
“A ‘usable quantity’ is neither an element of the possession offense nor
necessary to sustain a conviction for it. Rather, it is simply evidence from
which a factfinder may infer intent. Because Moreno and its progeny were
decided under a statute that imposed no mental state, proof of a ‘usable
quantity’ helped to ensure that defendants were convicted only after
knowingly committing a proscribed act. The statute now expressly requires a
knowing mental state, and establishing a ‘usable quantity’ remains an
effective way, in a case involving such a small amount that one might
question whether the defendant knew of the presence of drugs, to show that
the defendant ‘knowingly’ committed the acts described in A.R.S. § 13-
3407.”
Cheramie, supra, 374 P.3d at 378.
34.086 Obtaining Narcotics by Fraud
The crime of [obtaining] [procuring the administration of] a narcotic drug by fraud requires
proof of the following:
1. The defendant [obtained] [procured the administration of] a narcotic drug; and
2. The defendant knew that the substance was a narcotic drug; and
3. The defendant [obtained] [procured the administration of] the narcotic drug by fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, or subterfuge.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(6) (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Narcotic drug” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
34.0871 Transporting or Importing Narcotics for Sale, Selling, Transferring
Narcotic Drugs
The crime of [transporting narcotic drugs for sale] [importing narcotic drugs into this state]
[selling narcotic drugs] [transferring narcotic drugs] requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant knowingly [transported a narcotic drug for sale] [imported a narcotic
drug into this state] [sold a narcotic drug] [transferred a narcotic drug]; and
2. The substance was in fact a narcotic drug.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(7) (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Narcotic drug” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: There is no “usable amount” requirement for this offense. State v. Espinosa, 101
Ariz. 474 421 P.2d 322 (1966). Based on the ruling in State v. Rodarte, 173 Ariz. 331, 842 P.2d
1344 (App. 1992), “usable amount” is a necessary element only for possession and possession
for sale cases.
34.0872 Offering to Transport, Import, Sell, Transfer Narcotics
The crime of [offering to transport for sale] [offering to import into this state] [offering to
sell] [offering to transfer] a narcotic drug requires proof that the defendant knowingly offered to
[transport for sale] [import into this state] [sell] [transfer] a narcotic drug.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(7) (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Narcotic drug” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
34.091 Involving or Using Minors in Drug Offenses
The crime of involving or using minors in drug offenses requires proof that:
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1. The defendant knowingly [hired] [employed] [used] a person to engage in conduct,
completed or preparatory, to commit [insert applicable offense from A.R.S. §§ 13-
3404 through 3408]; and
2. The defendant knew that the person [hired] [employed] [used] was under the age of
eighteen years.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3409(A)(1) (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
If appropriate, the court should provide a special verdict form for the jury to decide the
minor was under the age of fifteen. The statute mandates a sentence pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-
705 in such a case.
34.092 Involving or Using Minors in Drug Offenses
The crime of involving or using minors in drug offenses requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly [sold] [transferred] [offered to sell] [offered to transfer] a
prohibited substance [insert applicable prohibited substance from A.R.S. §§ 13-3404
through 3408] to a person; and
2. The defendant knew that the person to whom the prohibited substance was [sold]
[transferred] [offered] was under the age of eighteen years.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3409(A)(2) (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
A.R.S. § 13-3401(32) defines “sale” or “sell” as “an exchange for anything of value or
advantage, present or prospective.”
A.R.S. § 13-3401(37) defines “transfer” as “furnish, deliver or give away.”
If appropriate, the court should provide a special verdict form for the jury to decide the
minor was under the age of fifteen. The statute mandates a sentence pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-
705 in such a case.
34.111 Sale or Transfer of Drugs in a Drug Free School Zone
The crime of [sale / transfer] of [marijuana / peyote / dangerous drugs / narcotic drugs]
in a drug free school zone requires proof that the defendant was intentionally present in a
drug free school zone to [sell / transfer] [marijuana / peyote / dangerous drugs / narcotic
drugs].
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“Drug free school zone” means the area within three hundred feet of a school or its
accompanying grounds, any public property within one thousand feet of a school or its
accompanying grounds, a school bus stop or any school bus or bus contracted to transport
pupils to any school.
“School” means any public or nonpublic kindergarten program, common school or high
school.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3411(A)(1) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105. See Statutory Criminal Instruction
1.0510(a)(1).
“Dangerous drugs and narcotic drugs” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
A.R.S. § 13-3401(32) defines “sale” or “sell” as “an exchange for anything of value or
advantage, present or prospective.”
A.R.S. § 13-3401(37) defines “transfer” as “furnish, deliver or give away.”
34.112 Possession or Use of Drugs in a Drug Free School Zone
The crime of [possessing/using] of [marijuana/peyote/dangerous drugs/narcotic drugs]
in a drug free school zone requires proof that:
1. The defendant was in a drug free school zone; and
2. The defendant knowingly [possessed/used] [marijuana/peyote/dangerous drugs/
narcotic drugs]; and
3. The substance was [marijuana/peyote/a dangerous drug/a narcotic drug].
“Drug free school zone” means the area within three hundred feet of a school or its
accompanying grounds, any public property within one thousand feet of a school or its
accompanying grounds, a school bus stop or any school bus or bus contracted to transport
pupils to any school.
“School” means any public or nonpublic kindergarten program, common school or high
school.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3411(A)(2) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly,” “possess” and “possession” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105
(Statutory Criminal Instructions 1.0510(b), 1.0530 and 1.0535).
“Dan
gerous drugs” and “narcotic drugs” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
C
OMMENT: In State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, ¶22, 189 P.3d 374 (2008), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that possession of dangerous drugs is a lesser-included offense of
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transportation for sale of a dangerous drug. In so holding, the court overruled a holding in
State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962) that created the element of “usable
quantity” for possession of a narcotic drug. The Cheramie court ruled that:
“A ‘usable quantity’ is neither an element of the possession offense nor
necessary to sustain a conviction for it. Rather, it is simply evidence from
which a factfinder may infer intent. Because Moreno and its progeny were
decided under a statute that imposed no mental state, proof of a ‘usable
quantity’ helped to ensure that defendants were convicted only after
knowingly committing a proscribed act. The statute now expressly requires a
knowing mental state, and establishing a ‘usable quantity’ remains an
effective way, in a case involving such a small amount that one might
question whether the defendant knew of the presence of drugs, to show that
the defendant ‘knowingly’ committed the acts described in A.R.S. § 13-
3407.”
Cheramie, supra, 374 P.3d at 378.
34.113 Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs in a Drug Free School Zone
This crime requires proof that the defendant manufactured dangerous drugs in a drug
free school zone.
“Drug free school zone” means the area within three hundred feet of a school or its
accompanying grounds, any public property within one thousand feet of a school or its
accompanying grounds, a school bus stop or any school bus or bus contracted to transport
pupils to any school.
“School” means any public or nonpublic kindergarten program, common school or high
school.
“Manufacture” means produce, prepare, propagate, compound, mix or process, directly
or indirectly, by extraction from substances of natural origin or independently by means of
chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis. Manufacture
includes any packaging or repackaging or labeling or relabeling of containers. Manufacture
does not include any producing, preparing, propagating, compounding, mixing, processing,
packaging or labeling done in conformity with applicable state and local laws and rules by a
licensed practitioner incident to and in the course of his licensed practice.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3411(A)(3) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999) and 13-3401(17)
(statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: “Dangerous drug” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401.
34.15 Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
The crime of possession of drug paraphernalia requires proof of the following:
1. The defendant used, or possessed with the intent to use, drug paraphernalia to
[plant] [propagate] [cultivate] [grow] [harvest] [manufacture] [compound] [convert]
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[produce] [process] [prepare] [test] [analyze] [pack] [repack] [store] [contain]
[conceal] [inject] [ingest] [inhale] or otherwise introduce (name of drug) into the
human body; and
2. The item was drug paraphernalia.
“Drug paraphernalia” means all equipment, products and materials of any kind which
are used, intended for use or designed for use in [planting] [propagating] [cultivating]
[growing] [harvesting] [manufacturing] [compounding] [converting] [producing] [processing]
[preparing] [testing] [analyzing] [packaging] [repackaging] [storing] [containing] [concealing]
[injecting] [ingesting] [inhaling] or otherwise introducing (name of drug) into the human
body.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3415 (statutory language as of July 20, 1996).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“With the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
Additional specific descriptions of drug paraphernalia can be found in A.R.S. § 13-
3415(F)(2)(al) to fit the particular facts of a case. If relevant items are listed in the statute,
that particular language should be inserted following the last sentence in the paragraph
defining drug paraphernalia. For example in a case involving a film container in which a drug
was found, it would read, “It includes containers and other objects used, intended for use or
designed for use in storing or concealing drugs.” A.R.S. § 13-3415(F)(2)(j).
34.17 Use of Wire Communication or Electronic Communication in [Drug
Related] [Organized Crime Related] Transaction
The crime of Use of Wire Communication or Electronic Communication in a [Drug
Related] [Organized Crime Related] Transaction requires proof that the defendant used any
wire communication or electronic communication to [facilitate] [conspire to commit]:
[LIST NAME OF CHAPTER 23 OR 34 OFFENSE]
[The use of the wire communication or electronic communication was deemed to have
been committed at the place where the transmission[s] originated or at the place where the
[transmission was] [transmissions were] received.] {See use note regarding Willoughby below.}
[“Wire communication” means any aural transfer that is made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of any wire,
cable or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception,
including the use of a connection in a switching station, and that is furnished or operated by
any person who is engaged in providing or operating the facilities for the transmission of
communications.
A wire communication includes the use of a telephone, including but not limited to a
cellular telephone.
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“Aural transfer” means a communication containing the human voice at any point
between and including the point of origin and the point of reception.]
[“Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data or intelligence of any nature that is transmitted by wire, radio, electro-magnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system but that does not include any of the following:
1. Any wire or oral communication.
2. Any communication made through a tone-only paging device.
3. Any communication from a tracking device.
An electronic communication includes the use of digital display paging devices and
facsimile (fax) machines.
“Oral communication” means a spoken communication that is uttered by a person who
exhibits an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying the expectation but does not include any electronic communication.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3417 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000); 13-3001 (statutory
language as of august 22, 2002).
USE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state. The mental states are not
included here, because they could vary depending on whether facilitation or conspiracy is
alleged and depending on the elements of the underlying Chapter 23 or 34 offense.
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
In State v. Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 538, 892 P.2d 1319, 1327 (1995), the court noted
that “in the very rare case in which jurisdiction is legitimately in issue because of
contradicting jurisdictional facts, Arizona's territorial jurisdiction must be established beyond
a reasonable doubt by the jury.”
The court will need to instruct on the elements of the underlying Chapter 23 or 34
offense.
“Conspiracy” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1003 (Statutory Definition Instruction 10.031, et
seq.).
“Facilitation” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1004 (Statutory Definition Instruction 10.04).
The Committee has changed the title of the offense from that listed in the statute,
because the statute’s title refers only to drug related transactions, while the statute itself
includes both drug and organized crime transactions.
C
OMMENT: The offense is a class 4 felony, unless the jury finds that the defendant
facilitated a class 5 or 6 felony, which reduces the felony class to that of the facilitated
statute. There is no need to propose a special verdict form, because the court can make such
finding based on the standard verdict forms that would be used.
In discussing the terms “wire communication,” “oral communication” and “electronic
communication,” the Ninth Circuit has stated:
The definitions of wire communication and oral communication are not
mutually exclusive. Accordingly, different aspects of the same
communication might be differently characterized. For example, a person
who overhears one end of a telephone conversation by listening in on the
oral utterances of one of the parties is intercepting an oral communication.
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If the eavesdropper instead taps into the telephone wire, he is intercepting a
wire communication.
In Re United States for an Order Authorizing Roving Interception of Oral Communications, 349
F.3d 1132, 1138 & n.12 (9th Cir. 2003) (also holding that despite the apparent wireless
nature of cellular phones, communications using cellular phones are considered wire
communications under the federal statute [which is virtually identical to A.R.S. § 13-3417],
because cellular telephones use wire and cable connections when connecting call).
Digital display paging devices and facsimile (fax) machines are “electronic
communications.” Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 293 (4th Cir. 1995). Accord, United States v.
Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 949 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 856 (2004), cert. granted and
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005).
34.21.01 Using Building for Sale, Manufacture or Distribution of Dangerous or
Narcotic Drugs
The crime of Using a Building for [Sale] [Manufacture] [Distribution] of [Dangerous]
[Narcotic] Drugs requires proof that the defendant [leased] [occupied] a building and
intentionally used the building for the purpose of unlawfully [selling] [manufacturing]
[distributing] any [dangerous] [narcotic] drug.
“Building” means any part of a building or structure, including a room, space or
enclosure that may be entered through the same outside entrance.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3421(A) (statutory language as of July 17, 1993).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0541). Use
bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The Committee has chan
ged the title of the offense from that listed in the statute,
because the statute’s title omits “distribution,” while the statute itself includes “distribution”
as an element of the crime.
34.21.02 Fortification of a Building
The crime of Fortification of a Building requires proof that the defendant [leased]
[occupied] a building and, with the intent to suppress law enforcement entry, knowingly
[fortified] [allowed to be fortified] the building for the purpose of unlawfully [selling]
[manufacturing] [distributing] any [dangerous] [narcotic] drug.
“Building” means any part of a building or structure, including a room, space or
enclosure that may be entered through the same outside entrance.
“Fortified” means the use of steel doors, wooden planking, cross bars, alarm systems,
dogs or other means to prevent or impede entry into a building or structure.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3421(B) (statutory language as of July 17, 1993).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” and “knowingly” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(b)).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.05341).
Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
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CHAPTER 34.1
34.53 Manufacture or Distribution of Imitation Controlled Substance
The crime of manufacture or distribution of an imitation controlled substance requires
proof that the defendant [manufactured] [distributed] [possessed with intent to distribute] an
imitation controlled substance.
[It is no defense that the defendant believed the imitation controlled substance to be a
legitimate controlled substance.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3453 (statutory language as of July 24, 1982) and 13-3401(17)
(statutory language as of January 1, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
A.R.S. § 13-3451(3) defines “distribute” as “the actual, constructive or attempted
transfer, delivery or sale of, or dispensing to another of, an imitation controlled substance,
imitation prescription-only drug or imitation over-the-counter drug.”
A.R.S. § 13-3451(4) defines “imitation controlled substance” as “a drug, substance or
immediate precursor which does or does not contain a controlled substance that by texture,
consistency or color or dosage unit appearance as evidenced by color, shape, size or
markings, apart from any other representations, packaging or advertisements, would lead a
reasonable person to believe that the substance is a controlled substance but it is a
counterfeit preparation.”
A.R.S. § 13-3451(7) defines “manufacture” as “the production, preparation,
compounding, processing, encapsulating, packaging or repackaging, or labeling or relabeling
of an imitation controlled substance, imitation prescription-only drug or imitation over-the-
counter drug.”
A special verdict form may be needed if there is an allegation that the defendant was
eighteen years of age or older and distributed or intended to distribute the imitation
substance to a person under the age of eighteen. If proven, this changes the classification of
the offense. A.R.S. § 13-3453(D).
34.54 Manufacture or Distribution of Imitation Prescription-Only Drug
The crime of manufacture or distribution of an imitation prescription-only drug requires
proof that the defendant [manufactured] [distributed] [possessed with intent to distribute] an
imitation prescription-only drug.
[It is no defense to this crime that the defendant believed the imitation prescription-only
drug to be a legitimate prescription-only drug.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3454 (statutory language as of July 24, 1982).
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U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
A.R.S. § 13-3451(3) defines “distribute” as “the actual, constructive or attempted
transfer, delivery or sale of, or dispensing to another of, an imitation controlled substance,
imitation prescription-only drug or imitation over-the-counter drug.”
A.R.S. § 13-3451(6) defines “imitation prescription-only drug” as “a drug, substance or
immediate precursor which does or does not contain a prescription-only drug as defined by
section 32-1901 that by texture, consistency or color or dosage unit appearance as evidenced
by color, shape, size or markings, apart from any other representations, packaging or
advertisements, would lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is a
prescription-only drug but it is a counterfeit preparation.”
A.R.S. § 13-3451(7) defines “manufacture” as “the production, preparation,
compounding, processing, encapsulating, packaging or repackaging, or labeling or relabeling
of an imitation controlled substance, imitation prescription-only drug or imitation over-the-
counter drug.”
A special verdict form may be needed if there is an allegation that the defendant was
eighteen years of age or older and distributed or intended to distribute the imitation
substance to a person under the age of eighteen. If proven, this changes the classification of
the offense. A.R.S. § 13-3454(D).
34.55 Manufacture or Distribution of Imitation Over-the-Counter Drug
The crime of manufacture or distribution of imitation over-the-counter drug requires
proof that the defendant [manufactured] [distributed] [possessed with intent to distribute] an
imitation over-the-counter drug.
[It is no defense that the defendant believed the imitation over-the-counter drug to be a
legitimate over-the-counter drug.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3455 (statutory language as of July 24, 1982).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentionally” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
A.R.S. § 13-3451(3) defines “distribute” as “the actual, constructive or attempted
transfer, delivery or sale of, or dispensing to another of, an imitation controlled substance,
imitation prescription-only drug or imitation over-the-counter drug.”
A.R.S. § 13-3451(5) defines “imitation over-the-counter drug” as “an imitation of a
nonprescription drug as defined in section 32-1901 that by texture, consistency or color or
dosage unit appearance as evidenced by color, shape, size or markings, apart from any other
representations, packaging or advertisements, would lead a reasonable person to believe that
the substance is an over-the-counter drug.”
A.R.S. § 13-3451(7) defines “manufacture” as “the production, preparation,
compounding, processing, encapsulating, packaging or repackaging, or labeling or relabeling
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of an imitation controlled substance, imitation prescription-only drug or imitation over-the-
counter drug.”
A special verdict form may be needed if there is an allegation that the defendant was
eighteen years of age or older and distributed or intended to distribute the imitation
substance to a person under the age of eighteen. If proven, this changes the classification of
the offense. A.R.S. § 13-3455(D).
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CHAPTER 35
35.01(1) Definition of “Harmful to Minors”
“Harmful to minors” means that quality of any description or representation, in
whatever form, of nudity, sexual activity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sadomasochistic abuse, when both:
(a) To the average adult applying contemporary state standards with respect to what is
suitable for minors, it both:
(i) Appeals to the prurient interest, when taken as a whole. In order for an item as a
whole to be found or intended to have an appeal to the prurient interest, it is not
necessary that the item be successful in arousing or exciting any particular form
of prurient interest either in the hypothetical average person, in a member of its
intended and probable recipient group or in the trier of fact.
(ii) Portrays the description or representation in a patently offensive way.
(b) Taken as a whole does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
for minors.
35.01(2) Definition of “Item”
“Item” means any material or performance which depicts or describes sexual activity and
includes any book, leaflet, pamphlet, magazine, booklet, picture, drawing, photograph, film,
negative, slide, motion picture, figure, object, article, novelty device, recording, transcription,
live or recorded telephone message or other similar items whether tangible or intangible and
including any performance, exhibition, transmission or dissemination of any of the above.
An item also includes a live performance or exhibition, which depicts sexual activity to the
public or an audience of one or more persons. An item is obscene when all of the following
apply:
(a) The average person, applying contemporary state standards, would find that the
item, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. In order for an item as a
whole to be found or intended to have an appeal to the prurient interest, it is not
necessary that the item be successful in arousing or exciting any particular form of
prurient interest either in the hypothetical average person, in a member of its
intended and probable recipient group or in the trier of fact.
(b) The average person, applying contemporary state standards, would find that the item
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual activity as that term is
described in this section.
(c) The item, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
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35.01(3) Definition of “Knowledge of the Character”
“Knowledge of the character” means having general knowledge or awareness, or reason
to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry of that
which is reasonably susceptible to examination by the defendant both:
(a) That the item contains, depicts or describes nudity, sexual activity, sexual conduct,
sexual excitement or sadomasochistic abuse, whichever is applicable, whether or not
there is actual knowledge of the specific contents thereof. This knowledge can be
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, or both.
(b) If relevant to a prosecution for violating §§ 13-3506, 13-3506.01 or 13-3507, the age
of the minor, provided that an honest mistake shall constitute an excuse from
liability under this chapter if the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to
ascertain the true age of such minor.
35.01(4) Definition of “Nudity”
“Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or
buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less
than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the
depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
35.01(5) Definition of “Sadomasochistic Abuse”
“Sadomasochistic abuse” means flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in
undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or
otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed, for the purpose or in the
context of sexual gratification or abuse.
35.01(6) Sexual Activity
“Sexual activity” means:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, sadomasochistic abuse and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
35.01(7) Definition of “Sexual Conduct”
“Sexual conduct” means acts of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual intercourse, or
physical contact with a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if
such person is a female, breast.
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USE NOTE: The definition of “sexual conduct” in Chapter 35 should be used only for
offenses in Chapter 35 and not Chapter 35.1 offenses because Chapter 35.1 has its own
definition of “sexual conduct.” See State v. Yegan, 223 Ariz. 213, 221 P.3d 1027 (App. 2009).
35.01(8) Definition of “Sexual Excitement”
“Sexual excitement” means the condition of human male or female genitals when in a
state of sexual stimulation or arousal.
35.01(9) Definition of “Ultimate Sexual Acts”
“Ultimate sexual acts” means [vaginal sexual intercourse] [anal sexual intercourse]
[fellatio] [cunnilingus] [bestiality] [sodomy]. A sexual act is simulated when it depicts explicit
sexual activity which gives the appearance of consummation of ultimate sexual acts.
35.01(10) Definition of “Prurient”
“Prurient” means an unwholesome, morbid, degrading, or shameful interest in sex.”
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3501 (statutory language as of August 9, 2001); State v. Bauer, 159 Ariz.
443, 446, 768 P.2d 175, 178 (App. 1988) (for definition of “prurient.”)
USE NOTE: The definitions contain words, such as “flagellation,” “fettered,” “fellatio,” and
“cunnilingus” for example, that may not be familiar to the average juror. To prevent jurors
from violating the admonition by consulting a dictionary on their own and to make the
instructions more understandable, the court may wish to consider substituting a dictionary
definition for these uncommon terms after consulting with the parties. The trial court has
broad discretion in assisting jurors so long as the rights of the parties are not prejudiced.
State v. Patterson, 203 Ariz. 513, 56 P.3d 1097 (App. 2002).
“Sexual intercourse” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-1401(3) (Statutory Definition Instruction
14.01.03).
Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The legislature has used “contemporary state standard” as the test. The United States
Supreme Court has used “community standard” as part of the test in determining whether
the material is protected by the First Amendment. For example, see Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) and Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656
(2004). In State v. Lichon, 163 Ariz. 186, 190, 786 P.2d 1037, 1041 (App. 1989), the court
discussed how a juror is entitled to determine the standard. The court wrote:
In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 2901, 41 L.
Ed. 2d 590, 613 (1974), the United States Supreme Court held that a juror
could draw upon “his own knowledge of the views of the average person in
the community or vicinage from which he comes” in determining what the
community standard is. Id., 418 U.S. at 104, 94 S. Ct. at 2901. The court in
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Hamling was dealing with the question of whether the standard should be
nationwide, and was not called upon to consider how a jury should assess a
statewide standard. Based upon the general proposition quoted from
Hamling and upon our supreme court’s decision in State v. Bartanen, 121 Ariz.
454, 591 P.2d 546, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S. Ct. 174, 62 L. Ed. 2d 113
(1979), in which it was noted that as a practical matter jurors, in considering
the state standard, would resort to their knowledge of how people in their
own communities felt on the issue, we believe that a juror may consider, as a
factor, the views of the average person in the juror’s community in arriving
at an assessment of the statewide standard.
35.02 Production, Publication, Sale, Possession, or Presentation of Obscene
Items
The crime of [production] [publication] [sale] [possession] [presentation] of obscene
items requires proof that the defendant, with knowledge of the character of the item
involved, knowingly:
[printed, copied, manufactured, prepared, produced, or reproduced any obscene item for
purposes of sale or commercial distribution.]
[published, sold, rented, lent, transported or transmitted in intrastate commerce,
imported, sent or caused to be sent into this state for sale or commercial distribution, or
commercially distributed or exhibited any obscene item, or offered to do any such
things.]
[possessed any obscene item with the intent to sell, rent, lend, transport, or commercially
distribute.]
[presented or participated in presenting the live, recorded or exhibited performance of
any obscene item to the public or an audience for consideration or commercial purpose.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3502 (statutory language as of 1986).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Item,” “knowledge of the character,” “nudity,” “sexual activity,” “sexual conduct,”
“sexual excitement,” “sadomasochistic abuse” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3501 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 35.01(2) through 35.01(8).
“Prurient” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 35.01(10).
35.04 Coercing Acceptance of Obscene Articles or Publications
The crime of coercing acceptance of obscene articles or publications requires proof that
the defendant:
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[as a condition to any sale, allocation, consignment or delivery for resale of any paper,
magazine, book, periodical, or publication, required that the purchaser or consignee
receive for resale any other item, article, book or other publication which is obscene.]
[denied or threatened to deny any franchise or imposed or threatened to impose any
penalty, financial or otherwise, by reason of the failure or refusal of any person to accept
such items, articles, books, or publications, or by reason of the return thereof.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3504 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The definition of “obscene” is contained within the definition of “item” in Statutory
Criminal Instruction 35.01(2).
35.06 Furnishing Harmful Items to Minors
The crime of furnishing harmful items to minors requires proof that the defendant, with
knowledge of the character of the item involved, recklessly [furnished] [presented] [provided]
[made available] [gave] [lent] [showed] [advertised] [distributed] to minors any item that is
harmful to minors.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3506 (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: This section does not apply to the transmission or sending of items over the
internet. A.R.S. § 13-3506(B).
Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Recklessly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(c)).
“Knowledge of the character” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 35.01(3).
“Harmful to minors,” “item,” “nudity,” “sexual activity,” “sexual conduct,” “sexual
excitement,” “sadomasochistic abuse” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3501 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 35.01(1) through 35.01(8)).
“‘Prurient’ is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 35.01(10).
35.061 Furnishing Harmful Items to Minors (Internet Activity)Deleted
Users are advised that a permanent injunction was entered against enforcement of A.R.S.
13-3506.01 in American Civil Liberties Union v. Goddard, No. CIV.00-505 TUC ACM, 2004 WL
3770439 (D. Ariz. Apr. 23, 2004)
35.07 Public Display of Explicit Sexual Materials
The crime of public display of explicit sexual materials requires proof that the defendant
knowingly [placed explicit material upon public display] [failed to take prompt action to
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remove a display of explicit sexual materials from property in (his) (her) possession or under
(his) (her) control after learning of its existence].
“Explicit sexual material” means any drawing, photograph, film negative, motion picture,
figure, object, novelty device, recording, transcription or any book, leaflet, pamphlet,
magazine, booklet or other item, the cover or contents of which depicts human genitalia or
depicts or verbally describes nudity, sexual activity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement or
sadomasochistic abuse in a way which is harmful to minors. Explicit sexual material does not
include any depiction or description which, taken in context, possesses serious educational
value for minors or which possesses serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
“Public display” means the placing of material on or in a billboard, viewing screen,
theater marquee, newsstand, display rack, vending machine, window, showcase, display case
or similar place so that the explicit sexual material is easily visible or readily accessible from a
public thoroughfare, from the property of others, or in any place where minors are invited as
part of the general public.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3507 (statutory language as of 1986).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(b)).
“Harmful to minors,” “item,” “nudity,” “sexual activity,” sexual conduct,” “sexual
excitement,” and “sadomasochistic abuse” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3501 (Statutory
Definition Instruction 35.01(1) through 35.01(8)).
“Prurient” is defined in Statutory Definition Instruction 35.01(10).
35.09 Duty to Report
The crime of failing to report requires proof that the defendant:
1. was asked to record, film, photograph, develop or duplicate any visual or print
medium depicting sexual activity, whether or not the defendant was compensated;
and
2. knowingly failed to immediately report, or cause a report to be made, of such
request to a municipal or county peace officer.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3509 (statutory language as of 1986).
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SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b).
“Peace officer” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0525).
“Sexual activity” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3501 (Statutory Definition Instruction
35.01(6).
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35.12 Obscene or Indecent Telephone Communications to Minors for
Commercial Purposes
The crime of obscene or indecent telephone communications to minors for commercial
purposes requires proof that the defendant knowingly made by means of a telephone,
directly or by way of a recording device, any obscene or indecent communication for
commercial purposes to any person under the age of eighteen years.
The communication is unlawful regardless of whether the maker of the communication
placed the call.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3512 (statutory language as of June 6, 1988).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(b)).
The definition of “obscene” is contained within the definition of “item” in Statutory
Definition Instruction 35.01(2).
35.13 Sale or Distribution of Material Harmful to Minors through Vending
Machines
The crime of sale or distribution of material harmful to minors through vending
machines requires proof that the defendant knowingly [displayed] [sold] [offered to sell] in
any [coin-operated] [slug-operated] [mechanically-controlled] [electronically-controlled]
vending machine that was located in a public place, other than a public place from which
minors are excluded, any material that is harmful to minors.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3513 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Harmful to minors,” “item,” “internet,” “internet web site,” “nudity,” “sexual activity,”
“sexual conduct,” “sexual excitement” and “sadomasochistic abuse” are defined in A.R.S.
§ 13-3501 (Statutory Definition Instruction 35.01(1) through 35.01(8)).
“Minor” means a person under the age of eighteen years. A.R.S. § 1-215.
35.131 Defenses to Sale or Distribution of Material Harmful to Minors through
Vending Machines
It is a defense to sale or distribution of material harmful to minors through vending
machines that the defendant has taken reasonable steps to ascertain that the person is
eighteen years of age or older and has taken either of the following measures to restrict
access to the material that is harmful to minors:
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1. Required the person receiving the material that is harmful to minors to use an
authorized access or identification card to use the vending machine and has
established a procedure to immediately cancel the card of any person after receiving
notice that the card has been lost, stolen or used by persons under eighteen years of
age or that the card is no longer desired; or
2. Required the person receiving the material that is harmful to minors to use a token
in order to use the vending machine.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3513(B) (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
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CHAPTER 35.1
35.51(1) Definition of “Advertising”
“Advertising” or “advertisement” means any message in any medium that offers or
solicits any person to engage in sexual conduct in this state.
35.51(2) Definition of “Communication Service Provider”
Communication service provider” means any person who is engaged in providing a
service that allows its users to send or receive oral, wire or electronic communications or
computer services.
35.51(3) Definition of “Computer”
“Computer” means an electronic device that performs logic, arithmetic or memory
functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, software or communication facilities that are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.
35.51(4) Definition of “Computer System”
“Computer system” means a set of related, connected or unconnected computer
equipment, devices and software, including storage, media and peripheral devices.
35.51(5) Definition of “Exploitive Exhibition”
“Exploitive exhibition” means the actual or simulated exhibition of the genitals or pubic
or rectal areas of any person for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer.
35.51(6) Definition of “Minor”
“Minor” means a person or persons who were under eighteen years of age at the time a
visual depiction was created, adapted or modified.
35.51(7) Definition of “Network”
“Network” includes a complex of interconnected computer or communication systems
of any type.
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35.51(8) Definition of “Producing”
“Producing” means financing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing or
advertising for pecuniary gain.
35.51(9) Definition of “Remote Computing Service”
“Remote computing service” means providing to the public any computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communication system.
35.51(10) Definition of “Sexual Conduct”
“Sexual conduct” means actual or simulated:
(a) Sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal,
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex.
(b) Penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object except when done as part of a
recognized medical procedure.
(c) Sexual bestiality.
(d) Masturbation, for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer.
(e) Sadomasochistic abuse for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer.
(f) Defecation or urination for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer.
35.51(11) Definition of “Simulated”
“Simulated” means any depicting of the genitals or rectal areas that gives the appearance
of sexual conduct or incipient sexual conduct.
35.51(12) Definition of “Visual Depiction”
“Visual depiction” includes each visual image that is contained in an undeveloped film,
videotape or photograph or data stored in any form and that is capable of conversion into a
visual image.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3551 (statutory language as of July 24, 2014), 13-2301 and 13-3001
(statutory language as of August 22, 2002).
USE NOTE: Refer to Chapters 14 and 35 for additional definitions.
35.52 Commercial Sexual Exploitation of a Minor
The crime of commercial sexual exploitation of a minor requires proof that the
defendant knowingly:
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[used, employed, persuaded, enticed, induced, or coerced a minor to engage in or assist
others to engage in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct for the purpose of
producing any visual depiction or live act depicting such conduct.]
[used, employed, persuaded, enticed, induced, or coerced a minor to expose the genitals
or anus or the areola or nipple of the female breast for financial or commercial gain.]
[permitted a minor under the person’s custody or control to engage in or assist others to
engage in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct for the purpose of producing any
visual depiction or live act depicting such conduct.]
[transported or financed the transportation of any minor through or across this state
with the intent that the minor engage in prostitution, exploitive exhibition or other
sexual conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction or live act depicting such
conduct.]
[used an advertisement for prostitution that contains visual depiction of a minor.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3552 (statutory language as of July 24, 2014).
U
SE NOTE: Use statutory definition instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
“Used an advertisement for prostitution that contains visual depiction of a minor” does
not apply to an act that is prohibited by A.R.S. § 13-3555 or to websites or internet service
providers that host advertisements created and published by third parties and do not
participate in the creating or publishing the advertisements.
“Exploitive exhibition,” “minor,” “producing,” “sexual conduct,” “simulated” and
“visual depiction” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3551 (Statutory Definition Instructions 35.51(4)
et seq.).
C
OMMENT: The phrase “through or across this state” means something more than merely
driving someone down the street. See State v. Rowan, 174 Ariz. 285, 288-89, 848 P.2d 864,
867-68 (App. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 176 Ariz. 114, 859 P.2d 737 (1993)
(rejecting the notion “that the distance traveled is immaterial” and noting that to “transport
through or across this state” means “to transfer or convey someone from one end or
boundary line of this state to another, that is, from one side of Arizona to the other side.”)
Pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and its progeny, the trial judge
must instruct the jury to determine the minor’s age because violating this statute in general is
a class 2 felony, unless the minor is under fifteen years of age, in which case taking a child
for prostitution is punishable as a dangerous crime against children pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-
604.01.
The Committee thus recommends that the following verdict form be added:
If and only if you find that [insert name of defendant] is guilty of the crime
of Commercial Sexual Exploitation of a Minor, then and only then, you
must answer the following question by the checking the appropriate box:
We the jury, duly sworn and impaneled and upon our oaths, do find that the
minor is under fifteen years of age:
_____ Proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
_____ Not proven.
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35.53 Sexual Exploitation of a Minor
The crime of sexual exploitation of a minor requires proof that the defendant knowingly:
[(recorded) (filmed) (photographed) (developed) (duplicated) any visual depiction in
which a minor was engaged in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct.]
[(distributed) (transported) (exhibited) (received) (sold) (purchased) (electronically
transmitted) (possessed) (exchanged) any visual depiction in which a minor was engaged
in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct.]
S
OURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3553 (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental states.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(b)).
“Exploitive exhibition,” “minor,” “producing,” “sexual conduct,” “simulated” and
“visual depiction” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3551 (Statutory Definition Instructions 35.51(4)
et seq.).
C
OMMENT: Pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and its progeny, the trial
judge must instruct the jury to determine the minor’s age because violating this statute in
general is a class 2 felony, unless the minor is under fifteen years of age, in which case taking
a child for prostitution is punishable as a dangerous crime against children pursuant to
A.R.S. § 13-604.01.
The Committee thus recommends that the following verdict form be added:
If and only if you find that [insert name of defendant] is guilty of the crime
of Sexual Exploitation of a Minor, then and only then, you must answer the
following question by the checking the appropriate box:
We the jury, duly sworn and impaneled and upon our oaths, do find that the
minor is under fifteen years of age (check only one):
_____ Proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
_____ Not proven.
35.54 Luring a Minor for Sexual Exploitation
The crime of luring a minor for sexual exploitation requires proof that the defendant:
1. offered or solicited sexual conduct with another person; and
2. knew or had reason to know that the other person was a minor.
[It is not a defense that the other person was an adult posing as a minor.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3554 (statutory language as of June 13, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” and “peace officer” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instructions 1.0510(b)(1) and 1.0525).
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“Minor,” “sexual conduct” and “simulated” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3551 (Statutory
Definition Instructions 35.51(5), 35.51(9) and 35.51(10)).
C
OMMENT: The statute previously provided that it was not a defense if the other person
was a police officer posing as a minor. See Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, 136 P.3d 874
(2006), where the court held that the crime of “luring a minor” for sexual conduct was not
committed where the “minor” was an adult, non-police officer posing as a minor, but the
defendant could be held responsible for an attempt. The statute was amended to encompass
any adult, not just a police officer, posing as a minor. A.R.S. § 13-3554(B). The amendment
provides that “it is not a defense to this crime that the other person was not a minor.”
Pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and its progeny, the trial judge
must instruct the jury to determine the minor’s age because violating this statute in general is
a class 2 felony, unless the minor is under fifteen years of age, in which case taking a child
for prostitution is punishable as a dangerous crime against children pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-
604.01.
The Committee thus recommends that the following verdict form be added:
If and only if you find that [insert name of defendant] is guilty of the crime
of Luring a Minor for Sexual Exploitation, then and only then, you must
answer the following question by the checking the appropriate box (check
only one):
We the jury, duly sworn and impaneled and upon our oaths, do find that the
minor is under fifteen years of age:
_____ Proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
_____ Not proven.
35.56 Permissible Inference
Users are advised that the permissible inference section in A.R.S. § 13-3556 was struck down
as overbroad in State v. Hazlett, 2015 Ariz. 523 (App. 2003).
35.58 Admitting Minors to Public Displays of Sexual Conduct
The crime of admitting minors to public displays of sexual conduct requires proof that
the defendant:
1. was an [owner] [operator] [employee] of a business establishment where persons, in
the course of their employment, exposed their genitals, anus, areola or nipple of the
female breast; and
2. admitted a child under the age of eighteen to the establishment.
An (owner) (operator) (employee) is deemed to have knowledge of the person’s age if
the (owner) (operator) (employee) admitted a person to the establishment without evidence
of the person’s age by:
1. an unexpired driver license issued by any state or Canada if the license includes a
picture of the licensee; or
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2. a nonoperating identification license issued by the State of Arizona or an equivalent
form of identification license issued by any state or Canada if the license includes a
picture of the person and the person’s date of birth; or
3. an armed forces identification card; or
4. a valid unexpired passport or border crossing identification card which is issued by a
government or voter card issued by the government of Mexico and which contains a
photograph of the person and the person’s date of birth.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3558 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000) and 4-241 (statutory
language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
35.59 Defense to Sexual Exploitation of a Minor
It is a defense to the crime of sexual exploitation of a minor that on discovery of the
unsolicited suspected visual depictions involving the sexual exploitation of a minor the
defendant in good faith reported the discovery of the material.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3559 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: The statute provides that this is an “affirmative” defense.
C
OMMENT: The statute is unclear regarding to whom the report must be made in order to
avoid criminal liability.
35.60 Aggravated Luring a Minor for Sexual Exploitation
The crime of “aggravated luring a minor for sexual exploitation” requires proof that the
defendant:
1. used an electronic communication device to transmit at least one visual depiction of
material that was harmful to minors for the purpose of initiating or engaging in
communication with a recipient who the defendant knew or had reason to know was
a minor; and
2. knew the character and content of the material transmitted; and
3. by means of the communication, offered or solicited sexual conduct with the minor.
The offer or solicitation may have occurred before, contemporaneously with, after
or as an integrated part of the transmission of the visual depiction.
An “electronic communication device” means any electronic device that is capable of
transmitting visual depictions and includes a computer, computer system, computer
network, cellular telephone or wireless telephone.
“Harmful to minors” means that quality of any description or representation, in
whatever form, of nudity, sexual activity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sadomasochistic abuse, when both:
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a. to the average adult applying contemporary state standards with respect to what is
suitable for minors, it both:
i. appeals to the prurient interest, when taken as a whole. In order for an item
as a whole to be found or intended to have an appeal to the prurient interest, it
is not necessary that the item be successful in arousing or exciting any particular
form of prurient interest either in the hypothetical average person, in a member
of its intended and probable recipient group or in the trier of fact.
ii. portrays the description or representation in a patently offensive way.
b. taken as a whole does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
for minors.
“Knowledge of the character” means having general knowledge or awareness, or reason
to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry of that
which is reasonably susceptible to examination by the defendant that the item contains,
depicts or describes [nudity] [sexual activity] [sexual conduct] [sexual excitement]
[sadomasochistic abuse], whether or not there is actual knowledge of the specific contents
thereof. This knowledge can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, or both.
[“Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or
buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less
than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the
depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.]
[“Sadomasochistic abuse” means flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in
undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or
otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed, for the purpose or in the
context of sexual gratification or abuse.]
[“Sexual activity” means patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated or patently offensive representations or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, sadomasochistic abuse and lewd
exhibition of the genitals.]
[“Sexual conduct” means actual or simulated:
(a) Sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal,
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex.
(b) Penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object except when done as part of a
recognized medical procedure.
(c) Sexual bestiality.
(d) Masturbation, for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer.
(e) Sadomasochistic abuse for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer.
(f) Defecation or urination for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer.]
[‘Sexual excitement’ means the condition of human male or female genitals when in a
state of sexual stimulation or arousal.]
[“Ultimate sexual acts” means sexual intercourse, vaginal or anal, fellatio, cunnilingus,
bestiality or sodomy. A sexual act is simulated when it depicts explicit sexual activity which
gives the appearance of consummation of ultimate sexual acts.]
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3560 (statutory language as of September 26, 2008); 13-3501
(statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state. Use Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
If needed, use definition of “computer” in Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.01.E.05 or
“computer network” in Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.01.E.11. “Cellular telephone” and
“wireless telephone” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-4801.
It is not a defense that the recipient was not a minor.
If the minor is under the age of fifteen, the offense is punishable pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 13-604.01 as a dangerous crime against children. Therefore, pursuant to Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and its progeny, the trial judge should instruct the jury to
determine the minor’s age. The following verdict form is suggested:
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled action, and
upon our oaths, do find the Defendant, [insert defendant’s name], on the
charge of ‘aggravated luring a minor for sexual exploitation’ as follows
(check only one):
____ Not Guilty
____ Guilty
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant “guilty” of
“aggravated luring a minor for sexual exploitation.”]
We the jury find that on the date of the offense, the recipient was (check
only one):
____ under fifteen years of age.
____ was at least fifteen years of age, but under eighteen years of age.
Signed: ____________________________
Foreman (Juror # _____)
Foreman (please print name): _______________________
C
OMMENT: The statute previously provided that it was not a defense if the other person
was a police officer posing as a minor. See Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, 136 P.3d 874
(2006), where the court held that the crime of ‘luring a minor’ for sexual conduct was not
committed where the “minor” was an adult, non-police officer posing as a minor, but the
defendant could be held responsible for an attempt. The statute was amended to encompass
any adult, not just a police officer, posing as a minor. A.R.S. § 13-3554(B). The amendment
provides that “it is not a defense to this crime that the other person was not a minor.”
35.61 Unlawful Age Misrepresentation
The crime of “unlawful age misrepresentation” requires proof that
1. The defendant was at least eighteen years of age; and
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2. The defendant used an electronic communication device to knowingly misrepresent
the defendant’s age for the purpose of committing [insert name of sexual offense
listed in § 13-3821(A)] involving the recipient; and
3. The defendant knew or had reason to know that the recipient was a minor.
An “electronic communication device” means any electronic device that is capable of
transmitting visual depictions and includes a computer, computer system, computer
network, cellular telephone or wireless telephone.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3561 (statutory language as of December 31, 2008).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state. Use Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
If needed, use definition of “computer” in Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.01.E.05 or
“computer network” in Statutory Criminal Instruction 23.01.E.11. “Cellular telephone” and
“wireless telephone” are defined in A.R.S. § 13-4801.
It is not a defense that the recipient was not a minor.
If the minor is under the age of fifteen, the offense is punishable pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 13-604.01 as a dangerous crime against children. Therefore, it may be necessary for the jury
to make a finding regarding the age of the recipient. The following verdict form is suggested:
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled action, and
upon our oaths, do find the Defendant, [insert defendant’s name], on the
charge of ‘unlawful age misrepresentation’ as follows (check only one):
____ Not Guilty
____ Guilty
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant “guilty” of
“unlawful age misrepresentation.”]
We the jury find that on the date of the offense, the recipient was (check
only one):
____ under fifteen years of age.
____ was at least fifteen years of age, but under eighteen years of age.
Signed: ____________________________
Foreman (Juror # _____)
Foreman (please print name): _______________________
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CHAPTER 36
36.01 Definition of Domestic Violence Offense
The defendant commits a domestic violence offense if the defendant commits [list
applicable act or offense charged in the charging document and listed in A.R.S. § 13-3601A]
and:
[the defendant and the victim were married] [the defendant and the victim are married]
[the defendant and the victim reside in the same household] [the defendant and the victim
resided in the same household] [the defendant and the victim have a child in common] [the
defendant or the victim is pregnant by the other party] [the victim is the defendant’s or
defendant’s spouse’s parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother or sister] [the victim is
the defendant or defendant’s parent-in-law, grandparent-in-law, stepparent, step-
grandparent, stepchild, step-grandchild, brother-in-law or sister-in-law] [the victim is a child
who resides or has resided in the same household as the defendant and is related by blood to
a former spouse of the defendant or to a person who resides or who has resided in the same
household as the defendant] [the victim is the defendant or defendant’s adopted child] [the
relationship between the victim and the defendant was/had been a romantic or sexual
relationship. The following factors may be considered in determining whether the
relationship between the victim and the defendant was/had been a romantic or sexual
relationship:
(a) The type of relationship.
(b) The length of the relationship.
(c) The frequency of the interaction between the victim and the defendant.
(d) If the relationship has terminated, the length of time since the termination.].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3601(A) (statutory language as of July 29, 2010).
N
OTE: For any domestic violence felony offense charge where the victim is alleged to be
pregnant, the jury will have to make a separate finding that the victim was pregnant at the
time of the offense and the defendant knew the victim was pregnant at that time. A.R.S.
§ 13-3601(L).
36.01.2 Aggravated Domestic Violence
The crime of aggravated domestic violence requires proof that:
1 [the court must instruct the jury on the elements of each domestic violence offense
that has been charged]; and
2. [the defendant and the victim were married] [the defendant and the victim are
married] [the defendant and the victim reside in the same household] [the defendant
and the victim resided in the same household] [the defendant and the victim have a
child in common] [the defendant or the victim is pregnant by the other party] [the
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defendant and the victim are or were related by blood, court order or marriage] [the
victim is the defendant’s parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother or sister,
parent-in-law, grandparent-in-law, stepparent, step-grandparent, stepchild, step-
grandchild, brother-in-law or sister-in-law] [the victim is the defendant’s spouse’s
parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother or sister parent-in-law, grandparent-
in-law, stepparent, step-grandparent, stepchild, step-grandchild, brother-in-law or
sister-in-law] [the victim is a child who resides or has resided in the same household
as the defendant and is related by blood to a former spouse of the defendant or to a
person who resides or who has resided in the same household as the defendant] [the
victim is the defendant’s or defendant’s spouse’s adopted child] [the victim and the
defendant are or were in a romantic or sexual relationship. Factors to consider in
determining whether their past or present relationship was romantic or sexual
include: (a) the type of relationship; (b) the length of the relationship; (c) the
frequency of the interaction between the victim and the defendant; and (d) if the
relationship is over, the amount of time that has passed since it ended]; and
3. the defendant has been convicted of two or more domestic violence offenses; and
4. two prior domestic violence offenses were committed within eighty-four months of
the date of the current offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3601.02(A) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Regarding paragraph 1, if the court has already instructed the jury on the
offense alleged to have been a domestic violence offense, then the court need only include
the name of the charge.
Regarding paragraph 3, the court must make an initial determination as a matter of law
whether any alleged prior domestic violence offense arising in another state, a court of the
United States or a tribal court would, if committed in Arizona, have been a domestic
violence offense under Arizona law.
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts. For any domestic violence
felony offense charge where the victim is alleged to be pregnant, the jury will have to make
an additional separate finding that the victim was pregnant at the time of the offense and the
defendant knew the victim was pregnant at that time. A.R.S. § 13-3601(L).
C
OMMENT: The State must prove a defendant has been convicted of two or more prior
domestic violence offenses within the last five years, and not merely that he has committed
such offenses. State v. Gaynor-Fonte, 211 Ariz. 516, 123 P.3d 1153 (App. 2005). The defendant
cannot preclude the State from presenting evidence of prior convictions. Evidence of two
prior convictions for domestic violence were elements required to prove aggravated
domestic violence, and thus, the defendant could not require the State to accept a stipulation
to prior convictions or preclude the State from presenting the evidence to the jury. State v.
Newnom, 208 Ariz. 507, 508, 95 P.3d 950, 951 (App. 2004).
36.01.02 Domestic Violence Special Verdict Form
Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant guilty of (insert
name of applicable offense listed in A.R.S. § 13-3601).
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We, the jury, find as follows (check only one):
1. [list the first alleged domestic violence prior conviction, including the
date of the conviction and case number]
_____ Proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
_____ Not proven.
2. [list the next alleged domestic violence prior conviction, including the
date of the conviction and case number ]
_____ Proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
_____ Not proven.
3. [list the next alleged domestic violence prior conviction, including the
date of the conviction and case number]
_____ Proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
_____ Not proven.
[We the jury find that the defendant knew the victim was pregnant. (Check
only one.)
_____ Proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
_____ Not proven.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3601.02 (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The length of sentence varies based on the number of prior domestic violence
convictions. Therefore, the Committee suggests that each alleged prior domestic violence
conviction be listed separately on the verdict form to allow the jury to specifically decide the
prior convictions.
For any domestic violence felony offense listed in A.R.S. § 13-3601.02(A) or a felony
offense causing physical injury where the victim is alleged to be pregnant, the jury will have
to make an additional separate finding that the victim was pregnant and the defendant knew
the victim was pregnant at the time of the offense. This finding increases the sentence by
two years. A.R.S. § 13-3601(L).
36.03.01 Partial-Birth Abortion
The crime of partial-birth abortion requires proof that the defendant:
1. was a physician who knowingly performed a partial-birth abortion; and
2. thereby killed a human fetus.
“Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in which the person performing the
abortion does both of the following:
(a) Deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a
headfirst presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother or, in
the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside
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the body of the mother for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus.
(b) Performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery that kills the partially
delivered living fetus.
“Physician” means a doctor of medicine or a doctor of osteopathy who is licensed under
Arizona law or any other individual legally authorized by this state to perform abortions or
any individual who is not a physician or who is not otherwise legally authorized by this state
to perform abortions but who nevertheless directly performs a partial-birth abortion.
[It is a defense to the crime that the partial-birth abortion was necessary to save the life
of a mother whose life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness or physical
injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the
pregnancy itself.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3603.01 (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.056(a) and (b) to instruct on
“intentionally” and “knowingly.”
Use bracketed language as appropriate for the facts of the case.
36.06(A) Bigamy
The crime of bigamy requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly married another person; and
2. had another living spouse when the marriage occurred.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3606(A) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b) to instruct on “knowingly.”
36.06(B) Defenses to Bigamy
[It is a defense to bigamy if, prior to the alleged crime, a competent court has dissolved,
annulled, or voided the former marriage.]
[It is a defense to bigamy if the defendant’s spouse had been absent for five successive
years without being known to the defendant within that time to be living.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3606(B) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Although unclear, it would seem reasonable to put the burden of proof for this
defense on the defendant.
Use bracketed language as appropriate for the facts of the case.
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36.07 Marrying the Spouse of Another
The crime of marrying the spouse of another requires proof of the following:
1. the defendant married the spouse of another; and
2. the defendant knew the person [he] [she] was marrying was the spouse of another;
and
3. the spouse the defendant married would be guilty of bigamy.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3607 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state. “Knowingly” is defined in
A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b)).
Use Statutory Criminal Instructions 36.06(A) to define “bigamy” and 36.06(B) to define
“defense to bigamy”(if appropriate) when using this instruction.
C
OMMENT: The opinion of the Committee was that the statute should be interpreted to
require the defendant to know that the person being married was already married.
36.08 Incest
The crime of incest requires proof that:
1. the defendant knowingly [married] [committed sexual intercourse with] [committed
adultery with] another person; and
2. the defendant was eighteen or more years of age and the other person was eighteen
or more years of age; and
3. the defendant and the other person were [parent and child] [grandparent and
grandchild regardless of the degree] [brother and sister, including half-brother or
half-sister] [uncle and niece] [aunt and nephew] [first cousins] at the time.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3608 and 25-101 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state. “Knowingly” is defined in
A.R.S. § 13-105 Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b)).
Although the statute uses the term “fornication” in defining the crime of incest, for the
sake of clarity use the definition of “sexual intercourse” found in A.R.S. § 13-1401(3).
For the definition of “adultery,” see A.R.S. § 13-1408.
There is an exception/defense for first cousins contained in A.R.S. § 25-101(B).
36.09A Child Bigamy
The crime of child bigamy requires proof that the defendant [was at least eighteen years
of age, had a spouse and knowingly married a child] [was at least eighteen years of age and,
either alone or in association with others, knowingly directed, caused or controlled, the
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marriage of a child to a person who already had a spouse] [was at least eighteen years of age
and, either alone or in association with others, knowingly directed, caused or controlled the
marriage of a child if the child already had a spouse] [was at least eighteen years of age and
knowingly married a child if the child already had a spouse] [knowingly transported or
financed the transportation of a child to promote marriage between the child and a person
who already had a spouse] [knowingly transported or financed the transportation of a child
who already had a spouse to promote marriage between the child and another person].
“Spouses” means two persons living together as husband and wife, including the
assumption of those marital rights, duties and obligations that are usually manifested by
married people, including but not necessarily dependent on sexual relations.
[“Marriage” means the state of joining together as husband and wife through an
agreement, promise or ceremony regardless of whether or not a marriage license had been
issued.]
[“Marries” means to join together as husband and wife through an agreement, promise
or ceremony regardless of whether or not a marriage license had been issued.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3609 (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state. “Knowingly” is defined in
A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b)).
Use Instruction 36.09(B) “Defenses to Child Bigamy” (if appropriate) when using this
instruction.
“Marriage,” “marries” and “spouses” are all defined in A.R.S. § 13-3609(D)(1)(3) and
have been included in the text of the instruction because they apply only to this offense.
Use bracketed language as appropriate for the facts of the case.
36.09B Defenses to Child Bigamy
[It is a defense to child bigamy if, prior to the alleged crime, a competent court had
dissolved, annulled, or voided the former marriage.]
[It is a defense to child bigamy if the defendant’s spouse had been absent for five
successive years without being known to the defendant within that time to be living.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3609(B)(1) and (2) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Although unclear, it would seem reasonable to put the burden of proof for this
defense on the defendant.
Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
36.20 Failure to Report
The crime of failure to report requires proof that the defendant:
1. was [list the occupation of the defendant at the time of the offense; see Use Note for
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the occupations to which this statute applies]; and
2. reasonably believed that a minor had been the victim of [a reportable offense]
[physical injury] [abuse] [child abuse] [neglect that appears to have been inflicted on
the minor by other than accidental means or that is not explained by the available
medical history as being accidental in nature or who reasonably believes there has
been a denial or deprivation of necessary medical treatment or surgical care or
nourishment with the intent to cause or allow the death of an infant who is
protected by law]; and
3. failed to immediately [report] [cause reports to be made of] the offense by phone or
in person followed by a written report in seventy-two hours to [a peace officer or
child protective services] [a peace officer]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3620 (statutory language as of September 18, 2003).
U
SE NOTE: The statute applies to the following persons:
1. any physician, physician’s assistant, optometrist, dentist, osteopath,
chiropractor, podiatrist, behavioral health professional, nurse, psychologist,
counselor or social worker who develops the reasonable belief in the course
of treating a patient.
2. any peace officer, member of the clergy, priest or Christian Science
practitioner.
3. the parent, stepparent or guardian of the minor.
4. school personnel or domestic violence victim advocate who develop the
reasonable belief in the course of their employment.
5. any other person who has responsibility for the care or treatment of the
minor.
Note that for those in paragraph 1, the defendant must develop the reasonable belief in
the course of treating the patient. For those in paragraph 4, the defendant must develop the
reasonable belief in the course of their employment.
In element 2, put in the name of the reportable offense. “Reportable offenses” are listed
in A.R.S. § 13-3620(P)(4)(a)(d) as:
(a) Any offense listed in chapters 14 (sexual offenses) and 35.1(sexual exploitation of
minors) or A.R.S. § 13-3506.01 (furnishing harmful items to minors; Internet
activity).
(b) Surreptitious photographing, videotaping, filming or digitally recording of a minor
pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3019.
(c) Child prostitution pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3212.
(d) Incest pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3608.
The statute should be carefully reviewed because the exceptions are very narrow. A
limited exception is made for clergy, Christian Science practitioner and priest receiving a
communication or confession within the context of their religion. A.R.S. § 13-3620(A).
Another exception exists for A.R.S. §§ 13-1404 and 13-1405 reportable offenses involving
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consensual conduct and minors fourteen to seventeen years of age. A.R.S. § 13-3620(B).
Finally, there is a very narrow exception for a physician, psychologist or behavioral health
professional providing sex offender treatment. A.R.S. § 13-3620(C).
If the report concerns a person who does not have care, custody or control of the minor
then use the second bracketed part (peace officer only) part of instruction otherwise use first
bracketed part (peace officer or child protective services).
A special verdict form should be used to determine whether the offense is a
misdemeanor or a felony. Only the “reportable offenses” are felonies.
36.23A Child Abuse or Vulnerable Adult Abuse
The crime of [child] [vulnerable adult] abuse requires proof that the defendant,
1. [under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury],
2. [intentionally] [knowingly] [recklessly] [with criminal negligence],
3. [caused the (child) (vulnerable adult) to suffer physical injury].
[caused or permitted the person or health of the (child) (vulnerable adult) to be
injured, while having the care or custody of the (child) (vulnerable adult).]
[caused or permitted the (child) (vulnerable adult) to be placed in a situation where
the person or health of the (child) (vulnerable adult) was endangered, while having
the care or custody of the (child) (vulnerable adult).]
S
OURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3623 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: “Abuse,” “physical injury,” “serious physical injury,” “child” and “vulnerable
adult” (see Statutory Criminal Instruction 36.23.01) are all defined in A.R.S. § 13-3623(F),
and should be given in separate instructions.
Use bracketed language appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court must instruct on the culpable mental state. The culpable mental states are all
defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Chapter 1). If the jury is instructed that it may consider more
than one mental state, a separate jury finding may be necessary because the class of felony is
determined by the culpable mental state. See A.R.S. § 13-3623 (A)(1)–(3).
There is a narrow exception for health care providers and another for vulnerable adults
receiving spiritual treatment. A.R.S. § 13-3623(E)(1) and (2). There is also a narrow defense
to child abuse, which allows a parent or agent of the parent to leave an unharmed child, 72
hours old or younger, at a “safe haven provider.” A.R.S. § 13-3623.01.
C
OMMENT: The statute does not provide any definition for “care or custody.” The
Committee’s opinion is that the phrase should be given its ordinary meaning.
36.23B Child Abuse or Vulnerable Adult Abuse
The crime of [child] [vulnerable adult] abuse requires proof that the defendant,
1. [under circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious injury,]
2. [intentionally] [knowingly] [recklessly] [with criminal negligence],
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3. [caused the (child) (vulnerable adult) to suffer physical injury.]
[caused the (child) (vulnerable adult) to suffer abuse.]
[caused or permitted the person or health of the (child) (vulnerable adult) to be
injured, while having the care or custody of the (child) (vulnerable adult).]
[caused or permitted the (child) (vulnerable adult) to be placed in a situation where
the person or health of the (child) (vulnerable adult) was endangered, while having
the care or custody of the (child) (vulnerable adult).]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3623(B) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: “Abuse”; “physical injury”; “serious physical injury”; “child” and “vulnerable
adult” (see Statutory Definition Instruction 36.23.01) are all defined in A.R.S. § 13-3623(F),
and should be given in separate instructions.
Use bracketed language appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court must instruct on the culpable mental state. The culpable mental states are all
defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instructions, Chapter 1). If the jury is
instructed that it may consider more than one mental state, a separate jury finding may be
necessary because the class of felony is determined by the culpable mental state. See A.R.S. §
13-3623 (B)(1)–(3).
There is a narrow exception for health care providers and another for vulnerable adults
receiving spiritual treatment. A.R.S § 13-3623(E)(1) and (2). There is also a narrow defense
to child abuse, which allows a parent or agent of the parent to leave an unharmed child, 72
hours old or younger, at a “safe haven provider.” A.R.S. § 13-3623.01.
C
OMMENT: The statute does not provide any definition for “care or custody.” The
Committee’s opinion is that the phrase should be given its ordinary meaning.
36.23D Emotional Abuse of a Vulnerable Adult
Emotional abuse of a vulnerable adult requires proof that the defendant [intentionally]
[knowingly]:
[engaged in emotional abuse of a vulnerable adult who was a patient or resident in any
setting in which health care, health-related services or assistance with one or more of the
activities of daily living was provided.]
[subjected the vulnerable adult to emotional abuse, while in the defendant’s care or
custody.]
[permitted the vulnerable adult to be subjected to emotional abuse, while in the
defendant’s care or custody.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3623(D) (statutory language as of September 21, 2006).
U
SE NOTE: “Emotional Abuse” and “Vulnerable Adult” (see Statutory Criminal Instruction
36.23.01) are defined in A.R.S. § 13-3623(F)(3) and (F)(6) and should be given in separate
instructions.
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Use the bracketed language appropriate for the case.
The court must instruct on the culpable mental state as defined in A.R.S. § 13-105. Use
Statutory Definition Instructions 1.056(a)(1) for “intentionally” and 1.056(b) for
“knowingly.”
There is a narrow exception for health care providers and another for vulnerable adults
receiving spiritual treatment. A.R.S § 13-3623(E)(1) and (2).
C
OMMENT: The statute does not provide any definition for “care or custody.” The
Committee’s opinion is that the phrase should be given its ordinary meaning.
36.23.01 Definition of “Vulnerable Adult”
“Vulnerable adult” means an individual who is eighteen years of age or older and who is
unable to protect [himself] [herself] from abuse, neglect or exploitation by others because of
a mental or physical impairment.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3623(F) (statutory language as of December 14, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
36.28.11a Arizona Medical Marijuana Act Registered Qualifying Patient
It is a defense to the crime of [CRIME] that the defendant was authorized to [use]
[possess] marijuana under the terms of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act. Arizona law
authorizes persons with debilitating medical conditions to possess and use marijuana as
medicine, so long as such persons are registered qualifying patients with the Arizona
Department of Health Services.
To claim the protections of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, the defendant must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [he] [she]
1. was a registered qualifying patient and possessed a valid registry identification card
from the Arizona Department of Health Services permitting [him] [her] to use and
possess marijuana for medical use at the time of [his] [her] arrest; and
2. possessed an amount of marijuana that does not exceed the allowable amount.
The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that conduct related to marijuana was not
for the purpose of treating or alleviating the qualifying patient’s debilitating medical
condition or symptoms associated with the qualifying patient’s debilitating medical
condition.
[A defendant who possessed or smoked marijuana in a prohibited location may not
assert the defense.]
If you find that the defendant’s conduct was allowed under the Arizona Medical
Marijuana Act, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the charged offense[s].
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 36-2801, 36-2802, 36-2811; State v. Fields (Chase), 232 Ariz. 265, 304 P.3d
1088 (App. 2013); State v. Maestas, 244 Ariz. 9, ¶ 15, 417 P.3d 774, 778 (2018).
U
SE NOTE: “Possession” is defined pursuant to Standard Criminal 37.
“Medical use” is defined pursuant to Statutory Criminal 36.28.11f.
“Allowable amount” is defined pursuant to New Statutory Criminal 36.28.11g
(“Allowable Amount”).
Prohibited locations is defined pursuant to New Statutory Criminal 36.28.11h.
Registry Identification Card validity standards are set forth in A.R.S. § 36-2804.04.
COMMENT: In State v. Fields (Chase), 232 Ariz. 265, 304 P.3d 1088 (App. 2013), the court of
appeals explained the immunities and presumptions available under the Arizona Medical
Marijuana Act.
Cardholders who are on probation are entitled to assert the immunities. Reed-Kaliher v.
Hoggatt, 235 Ariz. 361 (App. 2014), aff’d, 237 Ariz. 119 (2015); Polk v. Hancock, 236 Ariz. 301
(App. 2014), vacated, 237 Ariz. 125 (2015).
36.28.11b Arizona Medical Marijuana Act Designated Caregiver
It is a defense to the crime of [CRIME] if the defendant was authorized to possess
marijuana under the terms of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act. [A designated caregiver
may also be a registered qualifying patient.] A designated caregiver may assist up to five other
registered qualifying patients.
The defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [he] [she]:
1. was a designated caregiver; an
d
2. possess
ed a valid registry identification card from the Arizona Department of Health
Services for each registered qualifying patient to whom the defendant was connected
in the Arizona Department of Health Services system; an
d
3. possess
ed no more than the allowable amount of marijuan
a at the time of [his][her]
arrest.
The presumptio
n may be rebutted by evidence that conduct related to marijuana was not
for the purpose of treating or alleviating the qualifying patient’s debilitating medical
condition or symptoms associated with the qualifying patient’s debilitating medical condition
pursuant to this chapter.
If you find that the defendant’s conduct was allowed under the Arizona Medical
Marijuana Act, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the charged offense[s].
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 36-2801, 36-2802, 36-2811; State v. Fields (Chase), 232 Ariz. 265, 304 P.3d
1088 (App. 2013); State v. Liwski, 238 Ariz. 184, 186 ¶¶ 8-9, 358 P.3d 605, 607 (App. 2015).
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USE NOTE: “Possession” is defined pursuant to Standard Criminal 37 (“Possession
Defined”).
“Allowable amount” is defined pursuant to Statutory Criminal 36.28.11g (“Allowable
Amount”).
“Designated caregiver” is defined in A.R.S. § 36-2801(5).
“Medical use” is defined pursuant to Statutory Criminal 36.2811f (“Medical use”).
Registry Identification Card validity standards are set forth in A.R.S. § 36-2804.04.
C
OMMENT: In State v. Fields (Chase), 232 Ariz. 265, 304 P.3d 1088 (App. 2013), the court of
appeals explained the immunities and presumptions available under the Arizona Medical
Marijuana Act.
Cardholders who are on probation are entitled to assert the immunities. Reed-Kaliher v.
Hoggatt, 235 Ariz. 361 (App. 2014), aff’d, 237 Ariz. 119 (2015); Polk v. Hancock, 236 Ariz. 301
(App. 2014), vacated, 237 Ariz. 125 (2015).
36.28.11c Arizona Medical Marijuana Act Authority to Cultivate
It is a defense to the crime of [CRIME] that the defendant was authorized to [cultivate]
marijuana under the terms of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act. Arizona law authorizes
persons with debilitating medical conditions to use marijuana as medicine, so long as such
persons are registered qualifying patients with the Arizona Department of Health Services.
The Arizona Department of Health Services allows [registered qualifying patients]
[designated caregivers] to cultivate marijuana legally if the person’s registration indicates that
they are authorized to cultivate.
To assert the defense, the defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. that [he][she] possessed a valid registry identification car
d from the Arizona
Depar
tment of Health Services permitting [him] [her] to cultivate marijuana for
medical use at the time of [his][her] ar
rest; and
2. possess
ed no more than the allowable amount of marijuana; and
3. the marijuana plants were kept in an enclosed, locked facility, except that the plan
ts
do not need to b
e in an enclosed, locked facility if the plants are being transported
because the defendant was
moving.
If you find t
hat the defendant’s conduct was allowed under the Arizona Medical
Marijuana Act, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the charged offense[s].
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 36-2801, 36-2802, 36-2806(E), 36-2811; State v. Fields (Chase), 232 Ariz.
265, 304 P.3d 1088 (App. 2013).
U
SE NOTE: “Possession” may be defined pursuant to Standard Criminal 37 (“Possession
Defined”).
“Allowable amount” is defined pursuant to Statutory Criminal 36.28.11g (“Allowable
Amount”).
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Prohibited locations is defined pursuant to Statutory Criminal 36.28.11h.
“Medical use” is defined pursuant to Statutory Criminal 36.28.11f.
This instruction should be given in conjunction with Statutory Criminal 36.28.11a
(“Registered Qualifying Patient”) or Statutory Criminal 36.28.11b (“Designated Caregiver”).
Registry Identification Card validity standards are set forth in A.R.S. § 36-2804.04.
C
OMMENT: In State v. Fields (Chase), 232 Ariz. 265, 304 P.3d 1088 (App. 2013), the court of
appeals explained the immunities and presumptions available under the Arizona Medical
Marijuana Act.
36.28.11d Arizona Medical Marijuana Act DUI Affirmative Defense
It is a defense to the crime of [CRIME] that the defendant was authorized to use
marijuana under the terms of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act. Arizona law authorizes
persons with debilitating medical conditions to use marijuana as medicine, so long as such
persons are registered qualifying patients with the Arizona Department of Health Services.
The defendant may establish the affirmative defense by showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that:
1. [he] [she] was a registered qualifying patient and possessed a valid registry
identification card from the Arizona Department of Health Services permitting
[him][her] to use marijuana for medical use at the time of [his][her] arrest, and
2. The concentration of the marijuana or its metabolites capable of causing impairment
was insufficient to impair [him][her] at the time of driving.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 36-2801, 36-2802, 36-2811; State v. Fields (Chase), 232 Ariz. 265, 304 P.3d
1088 (App. 2013); State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris, 234 Ariz. 343, 347, 322 P.3d 160, 164
(2014); Dobson v. McClennen, 238 Ariz. 389, 393 ¶ 20, 361 P.3d 374, 378 (2015); Ishak v.
McClennen, 241 Ariz. 364, 367 ¶ 14-15, 388 P.3d 1, 4 (App. 2016).
U
SE NOTE: Defendants may plead the immunities in the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act in
prosecutions under A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3), but not in prosecutions under A.R.S. § 28-
1381(A)(1).
Registered Qualifying Patient standards are set forth in A.R.S. § 36-2804.04.
Registry Identification Card validity standards are set forth in A.R.S. § 36-2804.04.
“Qualifying Patient” is defined in A.R.S. § 36-2801(13).
C
OMMENT: In State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris, 234 Ariz. 343, 347, 322 P.3d 160, 164 (2014),
the Arizona Supreme Court held that marijuana users do not violate A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3)
“based merely on the presence of a non-impairing metabolite that may reflect the prior usage
of marijuana.”
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In Dobson v. McClennen, 238 Ariz. 389, 393 ¶ 20, 361 P.3d 374, 378 (2015), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that it is an affirmative defense to A.R.S. § 281381(A)(3) if the
marijuana or its metabolite was in a concentration insufficient to cause impairment.
In Ishak v. McClennen, 241 Ariz. 364, 367 ¶ 14-15, 388 P.3d 1, 4 (App. 2016), the court of
appeals held that a defendant is not required to introduce expert testimony to avail himself
or herself of the affirmative defense as long as the defendant introduces evidence that he or
she was not actually impaired.
36.28.11e Arizona Medical Marijuana Act Visiting Qualifying Patient
A defendant who does not possess a valid registry identification card from the Arizona
Department of Health Services to use or possess marijuana qualifies may assert the
protections of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act if the defendant qualifies as a visiting
patient.
To assert the immunities as a visiting qualifying patient, the defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that [he] [she]:
1. is not an Arizona resident or has been in Arizona for less than thirty days; and
2. has been diagnosed with a qualifying debilitating medical condition by a person w
ho
is licensed with autho
rity to prescribe drugs to humans in the state of the person’s
residence or, in the case of a person who has been a resident of Arizona less than
thirty days, the state of the person’s former residence; an
d
3. possess
es a registry identification card or its equivalent issued under the laws
of
an
other state, district, territory, commonwealth or insular possession of the Unite
d
States that allows the
defendant to possess or use marijuana for medical purposes
in
the jurisdiction of iss
uance.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 36-2801, 36-2802, 36-2804.03, 36-2811; State v. Kemmish, 244 Ariz. 314,
¶ 11, 418 P.3d 1087, 1090 (App. 2018); State v. Abdi, 236 Ariz. 609, 611 ¶ 11, 343 P.3d 921,
923 (App. 2015).
U
SE NOTE: Registry Identification Card validity standards are set forth in A.R.S. § 36-
2804.04.
COMMENT: In State v. Kemmish, 244 Ariz. 314, ¶ 11, 418 P.3d 1087, 1090 (App. 2018), the
court of appeals held that A.R.S. § 36-2804.03(c) allows a visiting qualifying patient to
possess or use medical marijuana in Arizona if the patient has documentation that would
entitle him to do so under the medical marijuana laws of another state, regardless whether
another state’s medical marijuana law requires an identification card, a physician’s letter, or
some other documentation.
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The “visiting patient” defense applies only to qualifying patients and not to caregivers.
See State v. Abdi, 236 Ariz. 609, 611 ¶ 11, 343 P.3d 921, 923 (App. 2015); A.R.S. § 36-
2804.03(c).
36.28.11f Arizona Medical Marijuana Act Medical Use
“Medical use” means the acquisition, possession, cultivation, manufacture, use,
administration, delivery, transfer or transportation of marijuana or paraphernalia relating to
the administration of marijuana to treat or alleviate a registered qualifying patient's
debilitating medical condition or symptoms associated with the patient's debilitating medical
condition.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 36-2801.
36.28.11g Arizona Medical Marijuana Act – Allowable Amount
“Allowable amount of marijuana” means:
[With respect to a registered qualifying patient, 2.5 ounces of usable marijuana.]
[With respect to a registered qualifying patient authorized to cultivate, 2.5 ounces of
usable marijuana and 12 plants.]
[With respect to a registered qualifying patient and designated caregiver, 2.5 ounces of
usable marijuana for [himself] [herself] and 2.5 ounces of usable marijuana for each
registered qualifying patient for whom the defendant was the designated caregiver on
[DATE]. A designated caregiver may be linked to up to 5 registered qualifying patients in
addition to [himself] [herself].]
[With respect to a designated caregiver who is not also a registered patient, 2.5 ounces of
usable marijuana for each registered qualifying patient for whom the defendant was the
designated caregiver on [DATE].]
[With respect to a designated caregiver who is authorized to cultivate, 2.5 ounces of
usable marijuana and 12 marijuana plants for each registered qualifying patient for whom the
defendant was the designated caregiver on [DATE].]
[With respect to a registered qualifying patient who is also a designated caregiver and is
authorized to cultivate, 2.5 ounces of usable marijuana and 12 plants for [himself][herself],
and 2.5 ounces of usable marijuana and 12 plants for each registered qualifying patient for
whom the defendant was the designated caregiver on [DATE].]
“Usable marijuana” means the dried flowers of the marijuana plant, and any mixture or
preparation thereof, but does not include the seeds, stalks and roots of the plant and does
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not include the weight of any non-marijuana ingredients combined with marijuana and
prepared for consumption as food or drink.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 36-2801, 36-2802, 36-2811.
36.28.11h Arizona Medical Marijuana Act – Prohibited Locations
A [registered qualifying patient] [designated caregiver] is not permitted to knowingly
possess or engage in the medical use of marijuana [on a school bus] [on the grounds of a
preschool] [on the grounds of a primary school] [on the grounds of a secondary school] [in a
correctional facility].
A [registered qualifying patient] is not permitted to smoke marijuana [on public
transportation] [in a public place].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 36-2802; State v. Maestas, 244 Ariz. 9, ¶ 15, 417 P.3d 774, 778 (2018).
U
SE NOTE: “Possession” may be defined pursuant to Standard Criminal 37 (“Possession
Defined”).
“Knowingly” may be defined pursuant to Statutory Criminal 1.0510.01 “Included Mental
State – Knowingly”).
COMMENT: In State v. Maestas, 244 Ariz. 9, ¶ 15, 417 P.3d 774, 778 (2018), the Arizona
Supreme Court overturned A.R.S. § 15-108(A) on the ground that the list of locations where
an AMMA cardholder’s use or possession of medical marijuana is limited to the three
locations listed in A.R.S. § 36-2802.
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37.01(A)(1) Unlawful Use of Food Stamps
The crime of unlawful use of food stamps requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly [(used) (transferred) (acquired) (possessed) (redeemed)] food stamps; and
2. did so by means of a [(false statement or representation) (material omission) (failure
to disclose a change in circumstances) (fraudulent device)]; and
3. knew that the [(use) (transfer) (acquisition) (possession) (redemption)] of the food
stamps was not authorized.
“Food stamps” means food stamp coupons or electronically transferred food stamp
supplemental nutrition assistance program benefits.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3701(A)(1) (statutory language as of August 6, 2016).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
The verdict must include a value finding in order to determine the class of the offense.
Therefore, the following section should be included in the standard “guilty/not guilty”
verdict form:
[Complete this section of the verdict form if you find the defendant “guilty”
of the charged offense.]
We the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled action, find that the
defendant received the following: (check only one)
_____ More than $100
_____ $100 or less
37.01(A)(2) Unlawful Use of Counterfeit Food Stamps
The crime of unlawful use of counterfeit food stamps requires proof that the defendant
knowingly:
[(counterfeited) (altered)] (food stamps) (electronic benefit transfer cards)].
or
[(used) (transferred) (acquired) (possessed)] [(counterfeited) (altered)] [(food stamps)
(electronic benefit transfer cards)] that the defendant knew were [altered] [counterfeited].
“Food stamps” means food stamp coupons or electronically transferred food stamp
program benefits.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3701(A)(2) (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Possess” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0530).
C
OMMENT: The Committee added the nonstatutory phrase “that the defendant knew were
altered or counterfeited” to clarify that this is not a strict liability offense.
37.01(A)(3) Unlawful Appropriation of Food Stamps
The crime of unlawful appropriation of food stamps requires proof that the defendant:
1. [was entrusted with] [gained possession of] food stamps by virtue of the defendant’s
position as a public employee; and
2. knowingly appropriated the food stamps.
“Food stamps” means food stamp coupons or electronically transferred food stamp
program benefits.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3701(A)(3) (statutory language as of July 21, 1997.)
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Possession” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0535).
37.01(A)(4) Unlawful Use of Food Stamps
The crime of unlawful use of food stamps requires proof that the defendant knowingly
bought, sold, transferred, acquired or redeemed food stamps, or eligible food purchased with
food stamps, in exchange for cash or consideration other than eligible food.
“Food stamps” means food stamp coupons or electronically transferred supplemental
nutrition assistance program benefits.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3701(A)(4) (Statutory language as of August 6, 2016).
U
SE NOTE:
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction
1.0510(b)). “Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definitional Instruction
1.0541).
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37.02.01 Unlawful Excavating
The crime of unlawful excavating requires proof that, without obtaining a permit to do
so, the defendant:
1. knowingly excavated in or on [(any historic or prehistoric ruin) (a burial ground) (an
archaeological or vertebrate paleontological site) (a site with fossilized footprints) (a
site with man-made inscriptions or any other archaeological, paleontological or
historical feature)]; and
2. the excavation site was on lands owned or controlled by the State of Arizona or one
of its agencies.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 1-3702.01(A) (statutory language as of July 25, 1981).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
A.R.S. § 41-842 states the permit requirements.
A.R.S. § 41-841 describes the types of proscribed excavations. There is an exception for
“a duly authorized agent of an institution or corporation” listed in § 41-842.
37.04(A)(1) and (2) Adding Poison to Food, Drink or Medicine
The crime of adding poison to food, drink or medicine requires proof that the
defendant, with the intent to harm another human being, knowingly [introduced] [added]
[mingled] any [poison] [bacterium] [virus] [chemical compound] with any [(spring) (well)
(reservoir of water) (food) (drink) (medicine)] to be [(taken by a human being) (applied to
the body)].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3704(A)(1) and (2) (statutory language as of August 22, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
37.04(A)(3) Adding Harmful Substance to Food, Drink or Medicine
The crime of adding a harmful substance to food drink or medicine requires proof that
the defendant, with the intent to harm another human being, knowingly placed a [(needle)
(razor) (any harmful object or substance)] in any [(food) (water) (medicine)] and the [(food)
(water) (medicine)] was to be taken by a human being.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3704(A)(3) (statutory language as of August 22, 2002).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
37.05(A)(1) and (2) Unlawful Manufacturing or Distribution of Sounds or
Images from Recording Devices
The crime of unlawful manufacturing or distribution of sounds or images from
recording devices requires proof that the defendant knowingly [manufactured an article]
[distributed an article knowing that the sounds on the article have been transferred] without
the owner’s consent and the article was based on a recording first fixed in a phonorecord
before February 15, 1972.
“Article” means any phonograph record, disc, compact disc, tape, audio or video
cassette, wire film or other tangible medium that can record original or duplicate sounds or
images in whole or part.
“Phonorecord” means a material object containing sound recordings from which the
sounds can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated by any means. It does not
include sounds that accompany a motion picture or other audiovisual work. It does include
the material object in which the sound is first fixed.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-3705(A)(1) and (2); 13-3705(C); 13-3705(G)(1) and (6) (statutory
language as of September 27, 1990).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Distributing” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3705(G)(2) (Statutory Definition Instruction
37.05.02).
“Manufacturing” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3705(G)(4) (Statutory Definition Instruction
37.05.04).
“Owner” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3705(G)(5) (Statutory Definition Instruction
37.05.05).
Subsection A, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the statute only apply to recordings first fixed in a
phonorecord before February 15, 1972. See A.R.S. § 13-3705(C).
There is an exception for radio and television broadcasting contained in A.R.S. § 13-
3705(B).
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37.05(A)(3) and (4) Unlawfully Manufacturing or Distributing Transferred
Sounds or Images Without Name of the Manufacturer
The crime of unlawfully manufacturing or distributing a transferred sound or image
without the name of the manufacturer requires proof that the defendant knowingly
[(distributed) (manufactured)] [(an article that has sounds or images transferred to it) (the
outside packaging for an article)] that does not bear the manufacturer’s true name and
address in a prominent place on the outside box, cover or jacket.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3705(A) (3) and (4) (statutory language as of September 27, 1990).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Distributing” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3705(G)(2) (Statutory Definition Instruction
37.05.02).
“Manufacturing” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3705(G)(4) (Statutory Definition Instruction
37.05.04).
There is an exception for radio and television broadcasting contained in A.R.S. § 13-
3705(B).
37.05(A)(5) Unlawfully Transferring a Performance
The crime of unlawfully transferring a performance requires proof that the defendant,
with intent to gain commercial advantage or personal financial gain, knowingly [transferred]
[caused to be transferred] any performance, whether live before an audience or transmitted
by wire or through the air by radio or television, to an article without the owner’s consent to
the transfer.
“Article” means any phonograph record, disc, compact disc, tape, audio or video
cassette, wire film or other tangible medium that can record original or duplicate sounds or
images in whole or part.
S
OURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3705(A)(5) and (G)(1) (statutory language as of September 27, 1990).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Owner” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3705(G)(5) (Statutory Definition Instruction
37.05.05).
There is an exception for radio and television broadcasting contained in A.R.S. § 13-
3705(B).
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37.05(A)(6) Unlawfully Distributing a Recorded Performance
The crime of unlawfully distributing a recorded performance requires proof that the
defendant:
1. knowingly distributed an article; and
2. knew that article contained a performance, whether live before an audience or
transmitted by wire or through the air by radio or television, that was transferred
without the consent of the owner.
“Article” means any phonograph record, disc, compact disc, tape, audio or video
cassette, wire film or other tangible medium that can record original or duplicate sounds or
images in whole or part.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3705(A)(6) (statutory language as of September 27, 1990).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
The classification of the offense is determined by the number of recordings copied or
sold. Therefore, the court should include as part of the standard “guilty/not guilty” verdict
form, the interrogatory set forth below and use the sound recording or audiovisual recording
portions as applicable to the case:
[Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you have found the defendant “guilty”
of the charged offense.]
We, the jury, do find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense involves:
_____ one thousand or more articles containing sound recordings.
_____ one hundred or more but less than one thousand articles containing sound
recordings.
_____ less than one hundred articles containing sound recordings.
_____ one hundred or more audiovisual recordings.
_____ ten or more but less than one hundred audiovisual recordings.
_____ less than ten audiovisual recordings.
“Distributing” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3705(G)(2) (Statutory Definition Instruction
37.05.02).
“Owner” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3705(G)(5) (Statutory Definition Instruction
37.05.05).
There is an exception for radio and television broadcasting contained in A.R.S. § 13-
3705(B).
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37.05(B) Defense to Offenses Under A.R.S. § 13-3705(A)
A person is not guilty of [insert name of offense charged under § 13-3705(A)] if the
person:
1. was engaged in radio or television broadcasting; and
2. [transferred] [caused to be transferred] any sounds, other than a motion picture
soundtrack, intended for, or in connection with, the broadcast transmission or
related uses, or for archival purposes.
The defendant must prove this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. If you find
that the defendant has proved this defense, you must find the defendant “not guilty” of the
charged offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3705(B) (statutory language as of September 27, 1990).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
37.05.01 Article
“Article” means any phonograph record, disc, compact disc, tape, audio or video
cassette, wire film or other tangible medium that can record original or duplicate sounds or
images in whole or part.
37.05.02 Distributing
“Distributing” means the actual, constructive or attempted sale, rental, delivery,
possession, transportation, exhibition or advertisement of an article with intent to obtain
commercial advantage or personal financial gain or to promote the sale of any goods.
37.05.04 Manufacturing
“Manufacturing” means transferring or causing to be transferred any sounds or images
recorded on one article to another article with the intent to distribute the article.
37.05.05 Owner
“Owner” means the person who owns the original or master audio, video, or audiovisual
recording from which the transferred recorded sounds are directly or indirectly derived, or
who owns the rights to record or authorize the vending of a live performance.
37.05.06 Phonorecord
“Phonorecord” means a material object containing sound recordings from which the
sounds can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated by any means. It does not
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include sounds that accompany a motion picture or other audiovisual work. It does include
the material object in which the sound is first fixed.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3705(G) (statutory language as of September 27, 1990).
U
SE NOTE: The definition for “fixation of sounds” in A.R.S. § 13-3705(3) was not included
because the term is not used in any of the felony offense instructions.
37.07(A)(1) Telecommunication Fraud
The crime of telecommunications fraud requires proof that the defendant, with the
intent to defraud another of the lawful charge for telecommunication service, obtained or
attempted to obtain telecommunications service by:
[charging] [attempting to charge] [to an existing electronic mail address, telephone or
credit card number without the authority of the lawful holder, subscriber or person to
whom issued] [or] [to a nonexistent, counterfeit, revoked or canceled credit card
number].
or
[any method of code calling.]
or
[installing, rearranging or tampering with any facility or equipment.]
or
[use of any fraudulent means, method, trick or device.]
[“Credit card number” means the card number on a credit card, telephone calling card or
access device that is issued to a person by any supplier of telecommunications service and
that permits the person to whom the card or access device has been issued to obtain
telecommunication service.]
“Telecommunication service” includes electronic communication services, subscription
computer services, telephone and telegraph services and all other services that transmit
information by wire, radio, cellular, wireless transmission or similar means.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3707(A)(1) and (E) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
37.07(A)(2) Telecommunication Fraud
The crime of telecommunication fraud requires proof that the defendant, with the intent
that fraud be used or employed to evade a lawful telecommunication service charge, sold,
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rented, loaned, gave, transferred or disclosed, or attempted to transfer or disclose, or offered
or advertized for sale or rent [the number or code of an existing, canceled, revoked or
nonexistent telephone or credit card number, or an electronic mail address] [the numbering
or coding system used to issue telephone or credit card numbers, or account identification
codes].
“Credit card number” means the card number on a credit card, telephone calling card or
access device that is issued to a person by any supplier of telecommunications service and
that permits the person to whom the card or access device has been issued to obtain
telecommunication service.
“Telecommunication service” includes electronic communication services, subscription
computer services, telephone and telegraph services and all other services that transmit
information by wire, radio, cellular, wireless transmission or similar means.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3707(A)(2) and (E) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
37.07(A)(3) Telecommunication Fraud
The crime of telecommunication fraud requires proof that the defendant knowingly
made, constructed, manufactured, fabricated, erected, assembled or possessed any software,
instrument, apparatus, equipment or device, or any part thereof, that is designed or adapted
or that can be used to [obtain a telecommunication service by fraud in violation of (list
specific provisions of A.R.S. § 13-3707(A) (1) that were allegedly violated)] [conceal the
existence, place of origin or destination of a telecommunication from the provider or other
lawful authority in order to obtain telecommunication service by fraud in violation of (list
specific provisions of A.R.S. § 13-3707(A) (1) that were allegedly violated)].
“Telecommunication service” includes electronic communication services, subscription
computer services, telephone and telegraph services and all other services that transmit
information by wire, radio, cellular, wireless transmission or similar means that originates or
terminates or both originates and terminates in this state.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3707(A)(3) and (C) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
This subsection criminalizes making software, equipment or devices used to obtain
telecommunication service by fraud “in violation of this subsection.” Therefore, the
particular subsections that the accused allegedly violated should be included where the
parentheses indicate.
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Telecommunication services are obtained by fraud if the person charges or attempts to
charge the service to an account without the authority of the accountholder, charges or
attempts to charge the service to a nonexistent or invalid account, uses any method of code
calling, installs or tampers with a facility or equipment, or uses any other fraudulent means,
method, trick or device.
There are two exceptions to this crime listed in A.R.S. § 13-3707(B).
37.07(A)(4) Telecommunication Fraud
The crime of telecommunication fraud requires proof that the defendant knowingly sold,
rented, loaned, gave, transferred, disclosed, or attempted to transfer or disclose to another,
or offered or advertised for sale or rent, any
[software, instrument, apparatus, equipment or device that may be used to obtain
telecommunication service by fraud (list specific subsection of A.R.S. § 13-3707(A)(1)
that the accused allegedly violated) or that may be used to conceal the existence, place of
origin or destination of a telecommunication from the provider or other lawful authority
in order to obtain the telecommunication service by fraud (list specific subsection of
A.R.S. § 13-3707(A)(1) involved)] or
[plans, specifications or instructions to make software or equipment, or any part thereof,
with the intent to use it to obtain a telecommunication by (list specific subsection of
A.R.S. § 13-3707(A)(1) involved) or with the intent to use it to conceal the existence or
location of a telecommunication from the supplier or other lawful authority in order to
obtain the service by (list specific subsection of A.R.S. § 13-3707(A)(1) involved)] or
[plans, specifications or instructions intending them for use to make software or
equipment that is designed to obtain telecommunication service by fraud in violation of
(list specific subsection of A.R.S. § 13-3707(A)(1) involved) or that may be used to
conceal the existence or location of a telecommunication from the supplier or other
lawful authority in order to obtain the service by (list specific subsection of A.R.S. § 13-
3707(A)(3) involved)].
“Telecommunication service” includes electronic communication services, subscription
computer services, telephone and telegraph services and all other services that transmit
information by wire, radio, cellular, wireless transmission or similar means that originates or
terminates or both originates and terminates in this state.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3707(A)(4) and (E)(2) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
Section B of the statute exempts certain individuals from a violation of subsection
(A)(3).
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This subsection of the statute proscribes giving items or plans to others that allow them
to obtain telecommunication services or conceal the existence or whereabouts of a
telecommunication service from any lawful authority “by fraud in violation of this
subsection.” The fraudulent means appear in subsection (A)(1).
Telecommunication services are obtained by fraud if the person charges or attempts to
charge the service to an account without the authority of the accountholder, charges or
attempts to charge the service to a nonexistent or invalid account, uses any method of code
calling, installs or tampers with a facility or equipment, or uses any other fraudulent means,
method, trick or device.
Whether A.R.S. § 13-3707(4)(b) and (c) state separate crimes is unclear. There is a
question whether A.R.S. § 13-3707(4)(c) actually states a crime because the “such software”
language in (c) is vague. If the “such software” language implies a reference back to 4(a) and
(b), then it would state a crime.
37.09 Manufacture, Sale, or Distribution of Unauthorized Decoding Device
The crime of manufacturing, distributing or selling unauthorized decoding devices
requires proof that the defendant:
1. (manufactured) (distributed) (sold) (rented) (loaned) (offered for sale, rent or use)
(advertised for sale, rent or use); and
2. any device that the defendant intended for another person to use to obtain services
that are provided over or by a licensed cable television system; and
3. without payment for those services.
“Device” includes any component or combination of components capable of converting
a scrambled or coded cable television signal to a signal usable on a standard television
receiver.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3709(B) and (F) (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
Subsection (C) contains a rebuttable inference regarding intent. See Statutory Criminal
Instruction 37.09(C).
37.09(C) Rebuttable Inference of Intent
Unless satisfactorily explained, you may infer that the defendant intended that the device
be used by another person to obtain services from a licensed cable television system without
payment if, while advertising, selling, renting or lending, the person states that the recipient
of the device will be able to obtain cable television or other services without paying for
them.
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You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[In considering whether the alleged unlawful conduct has been satisfactorily explained,
you are reminded that in the exercise of constitutional rights, a defendant need not testify.
The alleged unlawful conduct may be satisfactorily explained through other circumstances
and other evidence, independent of any testimony by a defendant.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3707(C) (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: The last paragraph is bracketed and should only be given if requested by the
defendant.
It is important to caution the jury that the inference is not mandatory and that the jury
must look at all the facts and circumstances of the case in deciding whether the inference
should be applied. State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1233, 1237-38 (App. 1986)
(recommending that the language as contained in this instruction is preferable, because it
expressly tells the jury that it is not compelled to draw the inference).
The use of the term “may give rise to an inference,” which is contained in the text of
this instruction, was specifically approved in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 569, 724 P.2d at 1238.
The bracketed paragraph pertaining to the defendant’s constitutional right not to testify
was specifically approved verbatim in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 568, 724 P.2d at 1237 (citing
to Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973)).
37.13(A) Consideration for Medical Referral
The crime of consideration for medical referral requires proof that the defendant
knowingly offered, delivered, received or accepted any type of rebate, refund, commission,
preference or other consideration as compensation for referring a patient, client or customer
to any individual, pharmacy, laboratory, clinic or health-care institution that provides medical
or health-related services.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3713(A) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
It is a defense if the payments are from a medical researcher to a licensed physician in
connection with identifying and monitoring patients for a clinical trial regulated by the
United States Food and Drug Administration.
The verdict must include a value finding in order to determine the felony class.
Therefore, the following section should be included in the standard “guilty/not guilty”
verdict form:
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[Complete this section of the verdict form if you find the defendant “guilty”
of the charged offense.]
We the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled action, find that the
defendant received the following: (check only one)
_____ $1,000 or more
_____ More than $100 but less than $1,000
_____ $100 or less
37.13(B) Fraudulently Obtaining Medical or Health Coverage
The crime of fraudulently obtaining medical or health coverage requires proof that the
defendant knowingly:
1. sought health care through [the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System] [a
county authorized health care system]; and
2. [presented false information or misrepresented or concealed a material fact on an
application for medical or health coverage] [failed to notify the county of residence
of a change in a condition] that would have resulted in the termination of eligibility,
or would have changed the eligibility status, for medical or health coverage.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3713(B) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
The medical or health care coverage that is fraudulently obtained must be under the
AHCCCS provisions found in Title 36, Chapter 29 or a county health care system under
A.R.S. § 11-291.
37.13(C) Fraudulently Obtaining Medical or Health Care Coverage by Use of
False Identification
The crime of fraudulently obtaining medical or health care coverage by use of false
identification requires proof that the defendant:
1. knowingly obtained or attempted to obtain medical or health-care coverage pursuant
[to the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System] [to a county authorized
health care system]; and
2. by using any identification [that was not authorized by the Arizona Health Care Cost
Containment System.] [that was authorized by the Arizona Health Care Cost
Containment System, but was or would have been fraudulently obtained].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3713(C) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
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USE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
The verdict must include a value finding in order to determine the class of the offense.
Therefore, the following section should be included in the standard “guilty/not guilty”
verdict form:
[Complete this section of the verdict form if you find the defendant “guilty”
of the charged offense.]
We the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled action, find that the
defendant received the following: (check only one)
_____ $1,000 or more
_____ More than $100 but less than $1,000
_____ $100 or less
The medical or health care coverage that is fraudulently obtained must be under the
AHCCCS provisions found in Title 36, Chapter 29 or a county health care system under
A.R.S. § 11-291.
37.13(D) Counterfeiting or Altering Identification for the Purposes of
Fraudulently Obtaining Medical or Health Care Coverage
The crime of counterfeiting or altering identification for the purposes of fraudulently
obtaining medical or health-care coverage requires proof that the defendant knowingly
counterfeited or altered any means of identification or used, transferred, acquired or
possessed counterfeited or altered identification for the purposes of fraudulently obtaining
medical or health-care coverage provided pursuant [to the Arizona Health Care Cost
Containment System.] [to a county authorized health care system.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3713(D) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
The medical or health care coverage that is fraudulently obtained must be under the
AHCCCS provisions found in Title 36, Chapter 29 or a county health care system under
A.R.S. § 11-291.
37.13(E) Furnishing Identification for the Purposes of Fraudulently Obtaining
Medical or Health Care Coverage
The crime of furnishing identification for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining medical
or health coverage requires proof that the defendant, who was lawfully entitled to medical or
health-care coverage, knowingly furnished, gave or loaned the defendant’s means of
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identification to any person for the purposes of fraudulently obtaining medical or health-care
coverage provided pursuant [to the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System.] [to a
county authorized health care system.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3713(E) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use the bracketed language as appropriate to the facts.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
The medical or health care coverage that is fraudulently obtained must be under the
AHCCCS provisions found in Title 36, Chapter 29 or a county health care system under
A.R.S. § 11-291.
37.14 Aggravated or Multiple Insurance Code Violations
The crime of aggravated or multiple insurance code violations requires proof that:
1. [the defendant’s license was suspended or revoked at the time of the act;] [The
defendant was convicted of violating a provision of the insurance code and had no
license when the defendant performed the act;] and
2. the defendant knowingly performed any transaction that required a license under the
insurance code.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3714 (statutory language as of October 1, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
This statute specifically limits the offense to transactions that require a license under
Title 20, Chapter 2, articles 3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 of Arizona Revised Statutes.
The statute also specifically limits the offenses to persons who have been convicted of
violating a provision of Title 20, Chapter 2, articles 3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 or 3.4.
The statute is unclear whether the defendant must know of the license suspension when
the defendant undertakes the insurance transaction.
37.16 Failure to Give Notice of Dangerous-Crimes-Against-Children Conviction
The crime of failure to give notice of a dangerous-crime-against-children conviction
requires proof that the defendant:
1. was convicted of committing a dangerous crime against children or child abuse; and
2. failed to give notice of that fact when applying for employment or volunteering for
service with any business institution or organization that sponsors any activity in
which adults supervise children.
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Business institutions or organizations include schools, preschools, child-care providers
and youth organizations.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3716 (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
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SE NOTE: The conviction must be one that is defined in A.R.S. §§ 13-705, 13 3623(A) or
(B).
37.19 Fraudulently Obtaining Wireless Telecommunications Services or
Devices; Manufacturing, Distributing and Selling Unauthorized
Decoding Devices
The crime of [manufacturing] [distributing] [selling] unauthorized decoding devices
requires proof that the defendant:
1. [(manufactured) (distributed) (sold) (rented) (loaned) (offered) (advertised for sale,
rent or use)]; and
2. any device that the defendant intended for another person to use to obtain services
from a wireless telecommunications [(service) (device)] without payment for those
services.
[“Wireless telecommunications device” means an instrument, device, machine or
equipment that is capable of transmitting or receiving telephonic, electronic, or radio
communications or any part of such an instrument device, machine or equipment.
It includes computer circuits, computer chips, electronic mechanisms or other
components that are capable of facilitating the transmission or reception of telephonic,
electronic or radio communications.]
[“Wireless telecommunications service” includes any service that is provided for a charge
or compensation to facilitate the origination, transmission, emission or reception of signs,
signals, data, writings, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wireless telephone
equipment, including cellular telephone, wire, radio electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photo-optical system.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3719 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
There is a rebuttal inference set forth in A.R.S. § 13-3719. See Statutory Criminal
Instruction 37.19(C).
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37.19(C) Rebuttable Inference Regarding A.R.S. § 13-3719
Proof that the person [(advertising) (selling) (renting) (lending)] the device stated that it
would enable the user to obtain wireless telecommunication [(services) (devices)] without
payment permits you to infer, unless satisfactorily explained, that the device would be used
by another to obtain wireless telecommunications [(services) (devices)] without payment.
You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[In considering whether the alleged unlawful conduct has been satisfactorily explained,
you are reminded that in the exercise of constitutional rights, a defendant need not testify.
The alleged unlawful conduct may be satisfactorily explained through other circumstances
and other evidence, independent of any testimony by a defendant.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3719 (statutory language as of July 21, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: The last paragraph is bracketed and should only be given if requested by the
defendant.
It is important to caution the jury that the inference is not mandatory and that the jury
must look at all the facts and circumstances of the case in deciding whether the presumption
should be applied. State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986)
(recommending that the language as contained in this instruction is preferable, because it
expressly tells the jury that it is not compelled to draw the inference).
The use of the term “may give rise to an inference,” which is contained in the text of
this instruction, was specifically approved in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 569, 724 P.2d at 1238.
The bracketed paragraph pertaining to the defendant’s constitutional right not to testify
was specifically approved verbatim in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 568, 724 P.2d at 1237 (citing
to Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973)).
37.21(A)(1) Unlawfully Applying Tattoos, Brands, Scarifications and Piercings
to Minors
The crime of unlawfully applying tattoos, brands, scarifications, and piercings requires
proof that the defendant intentionally tattooed, pierced, branded, scarified, implanted or
mutilated the body of a person who is under 18 years old without the physical presence of
the parent or legal guardian of the minor who requested the procedure.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3721(A)(1) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
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“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
The definitions for these procedures are set out in A.R.S. § 13-3721(E). See Statutory
Criminal Instruction 37.21(E).
37.21(A)(2) Use of Unsterilized Needle to Tattoo or Pierce
The crime of using an unsterilized needle to tattoo or pierce requires proof that the
defendant tattooed or pierced another’s body [using a needle or any substance that will leave
color under the skin more than once] [using a needle that has not been sterilized with
equipment approved for use in state-licensed medical facilities].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3721(A)(2) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: A.R.S. § 36-401 et seq. governs sterilization procedures for state-licensed medical
facilities.
The definitions of these procedures are set forth in A.R.S. § 13-3721(E). See Statutory
Criminal Instruction 37.21(E).
37.21(A)(3) Using an Unauthorized Location to Tattoo, Brand, Scarify, Implant,
Mutilate or Pierce
The crime of using an unauthorized location to tattoo, brand, scarify, implant, mutilate
or pierce requires proof that the defendant engaged in the tattooing, branding, scarifying,
implanting, mutilating or body piercing out of a home, or a tent, trailer, trunk or other
impermanent structure.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3721(A)(3) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: The definitions of these procedures are set forth in A.R.S. § 13-3721(E). See
Statutory Criminal Instruction 37.21(E).
37.21(A)(4) Administering Anesthesia without a License
The crime of administering anesthesia without a license requires proof that the
defendant administered anesthesia without a license during the course of any procedure that
involves branding, scarifying, tattooing, implanting, mutilating or piercing another person’s
body.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3721(A)(4) (statutory language as of August 6,1999).
U
SE NOTE: A.R.S. § 32-101 et seq. governs persons who are licensed to administer
anesthesia and licensed health-care providers.
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37.21(B) Exception
A person does not violate this section [by piercing the ear of a minor who has written or
verbal permission from the minor’s parent or legal guardian] [by performing a procedure
prescribed by a licensed health care provider].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3721(B) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as applicable.
37.21(C) Defense
It is a defense to the charge of [(tattooing) (piercing) (branding) (scarifying) (implanting)
(mutilating)] a minor that the person performing the procedure asked for age identification
and relied on its accuracy in good faith.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3721(C) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as applicable.
37.21(E) Definitions
“Implant,” “mutilate,” “brand,” “scarify” or “pierce” means to mark the skin or other
body part with any indelible design, letter, scroll, figure, symbol, or other mark that is placed
on or under the skin or body part with an instrument and that cannot be removed without
surgery. It also means any design, letter, scroll, figure, symbol or other mark done by scarring
on or under the skin or other body part. Implant does not include cosmetic implants.
“Tattoo” means to mark the skin using a needle or other instrument with any indelible
design, letter, scroll, figure, symbol, or any other mark on or under the skin or other body
part that will leave color under the skin and that cannot be removed, repaired or
reconstructed without surgery. It also means any design, letter, scroll, figure, symbol or other
mark done by scarring upon or under the skin.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3721(E) (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
C
OMMENT: The definition in the statute for piercing, mutilating, and implanting does not
appear to include ear and other piercings, such as tongue studs, or navel, lip and eyebrow
rings, even though the statute creates an exception for ear piercings for minors.
37.24 Obtaining Utility Services by Fraud
The crime of obtaining utility services by fraud requires proof that the defendant
intentionally:
[connected or reconnected to property that a utility owned or used to provide utility
service without the utility’s consent or authorization.]
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[prevented a utility meter or other utility measuring device from accurately measuring the
service charges.]
[tampered with property that a utility owned or used.]
[without the utility’s consent or authorization, used, received or diverted utility services
knowing or having reason to know that the diversion, tampering or connection was
unlawful.]
[used any means to divert utility services or caused them to be diverted.]
[“Divert” means to change the intended course or path of electricity, gas or water
without the authorization or consent of the utility.]
[“Reconnection” means the restoration of utility service to a customer or person after
service has been legally disconnected by the utility.]
[“Tamper” means to rearrange, damage, alter, interfere with or otherwise prevent the
performance of a normal or customary function, including any of the following:
(a) Connecting any wire, conduit or device to any service, distribution or transmission
line that is owned or used by a utility.
(b) Defacing, puncturing, removing, reversing or altering any meter or any connections
to secure unauthorized or unmeasured utility service.
(c) Preventing any meter from properly measuring or registering.
(d) Knowingly taking, receiving, using or converting to personal use or the use of
another person any utility service without authorization or consent.
(e) Causing, procuring, permitting, aiding or abetting any person to do any of the acts
listed in this paragraph.]
[“Utility” means any public service corporation, agricultural improvement district or
other person that is engaged in the generation, transmission or delivery of electricity, water
or natural gas, including this state or any political subdivision of this state.]
[“Utility service” means the provision of services or commodities by the utility for
compensation.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3724(A)(1)–(5) and (E) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language that is appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Intentional” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0510(a)(1)).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
37.24(B) Rebuttable Inference
Unless satisfactorily explained, you may infer that the defendant intentionally violated
this section if any of the following occurred:
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1. An instrument, apparatus or device that was installed to obtain utility service without
paying full charge was found attached to the meter or other utility service measuring
device on the premises controlled by the defendant who [used] [received] the utility
service.
2. A meter was altered, tampered with, or bypassed resulting in no measurement or an
inaccurate measurement of utility services.
3. The defendant was an occupant of the premises or had an access to the service’s
delivery system to the premises and received a benefit from tampered or bypassed
equipment.
You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[In considering whether the alleged unlawful conduct has been satisfactorily
explained, you are reminded that in the exercise of constitutional rights, a defendant need
not testify. The alleged unlawful conduct may be satisfactorily explained through other
circumstances and other evidence, independent of any testimony by a defendant.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3724(B) (statutory language as of August 25, 2004).
U
SE NOTE: Use the bracketed language that is appropriate to the facts.
The last paragraph is bracketed and should only be given if requested by the defendant.
It is important to caution the jury that the inference is not mandatory and that the jury
must look at all the facts and circumstances of the case in deciding whether the presumption
should be applied. State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986)
(recommending that the language as contained in this instruction is preferable, because it
expressly tells the jury that it is not compelled to draw the inference).
The use of the term “may give rise to an inference,” which is contained in the text of
this instruction, was specifically approved in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 569, 724 P.2d at 1238.
The bracketed paragraph pertaining to the defendant’s constitutional right not to testify
was specifically approved verbatim in State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. at 568, 724 P.2d at 1237 (citing
to Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973)).
37.25 Interference with Monitoring Devices
The crime of interference with monitoring devices requires proof that the [defendant,
having been required to be on electronic monitoring or global position system monitoring,
removed or bypassed any device or equipment that was necessary for the electronic
monitoring or global position system monitoring] [defendant assisted any person who was
required to be on electronic monitoring or global position system monitoring in removing or
bypassing any device or equipment that was necessary for the electronic monitoring or
global position system monitoring].
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3725 (statutory language as of June 21, 2006).
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OMMENT: The statute does not specify who must require the monitoring device nor does
the statute set forth any mental state.
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38.21 Failure to Register as Sex Offender
The crime of failure to register requires proof that the defendant:
1. has been convicted of [list violation or attempted violation enumerated in
§ 13-3821(A)(120)]; and
2. knew or should have known of the requirement to register; and
3. failed to register with the sheriff within 10 days [after the conviction][after entering
and remaining in (insert name) County].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3821 (statutory language as of September 26, 2008).
U
SE NOTE: Also applies to crimes “committed in another jurisdiction that if committed in
this state would be a violation or attempted violation of any of the following offenses or an
offense that was in effect before September 1, 1978 and that, if committed on or after
September 1, 1978, has the same elements of an offense listed in this section.” A.R.S.
§ 13-3821(A).
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state. “Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S.
§ 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
C
OMMENT: In State v. Garcia, 156 Ariz. 381, 384, 752 P.2d 34, 37 (App. 1987), the court held
that the defendant had to have “actual knowledge of the need to register” or “proof of the
probability that he had knowledge of the requirement” to be convicted of this offense. The
committee interpreted this holding to require that the defendant “knew or should have
known” of the requirement to register.
38.22 Failure to Notify Change of Address or Change of Name
The crime of failure to notify change of address or change of name requires proof that
the defendant:
1. is required to register; and
2. [moved] [changed his/her name]; and
3. failed to notify in writing [and in person] the Sheriff of [insert name of county where
the defendant was registered] County within seventy-two hours of [moving]
[changing his/her name].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3822 (statutory language as of August 9, 2001).
U
SE NOTE: The notice must be in person and in writing if moving within a county or
changing name. The notice need only be in writing if moving outside the county. A.R.S.
§ 13-3822(B). The seventy-two-hour time limit excludes weekends and legal holidays if
moving within a county or changing name and arguably does not if moving outside a county.
A.R.S. § 13-3822(A).
Use bracketed language appropriate to the facts of the case.
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38.81 Arrest; How Made; Force and Restraint
An arrest is made by actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by such person’s
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. No unnecessary or unreasonable
force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subjected to any
greater restraint than necessary for the person’s detention.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3881 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction is included for use only where there is an issue of whether the
defendant was justified in using or threatening physical force against a police officer while
resisting an arrest based on a claim of use of unreasonable or unnecessary force by the
officer.
While a defendant is entitled to a justification defense if there is the slightest evidence to
support it, State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 104, 664 P.2d 646, 648 (1983), a trial judge need not
give requested instructions that are inapplicable. State v. O’Kelley, 117 Ariz. 34, 36, 570 P.2d
805, 807 (App. 1977) (holding that trial court correctly refused to give instruction on
unreasonable force when there was no evidence of unnecessary or unreasonable force at
time of arrest).
Evidence of force by an officer that occurs after an arrest does not entitle a defendant to
this instruction, because this instruction pertains only to unnecessary or unreasonable force
at the time of making the arrest. State v. O’Kelley, 117 Ariz. 34, 36, 570 P.2d 805, 807 (App.
1977).
C
OMMENT: The trial court should not confuse the procedure of arrest under A.R.S. § 13-
3881 with “effecting an arrest” in regard to the offense of resisting arrest under A.R.S. § 13-
2508. See State v. Mitchell, 204 Ariz. 216, 218-19, 62 P.3d 616, 618-19 (App. 2003) (noting that
§ 13-3881 primarily defines how an arrest is made, while § 13-2508 defines when an arrest is
effected; § 13-3881 describes the actual restraint or submission, while “effecting an arrest”
under § 13-2508 connotes successful, effective restraint or submission).
Police are permitted to draw their weapons during an investigative stop when they have
reasonable basis to fear for their safety, which alone does not convert an investigative Terry
stop into an arrest. In Re Roy L., 197 Ariz. 441, 445, 4 P.3d 984, 988 (App. 2000).
38.87 Method of Arrest by Officer by Virtue of a Warrant
When making an arrest based on a warrant, the officer was required to inform the
defendant of the reason for the arrest and that a warrant had been issued for the defendant’s
arrest unless:
1. the defendant fled or forcibly resisted before the officer had the opportunity to
inform the defendant; or
2. the giving of such information would have imperiled the arrest.
The warrant did not have to be in the officer’s possession at the time of the arrest.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3887 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
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USE NOTE: This instruction is included for use only where there is an issue of whether the
defendant was justified in using or threatening physical force against a police officer while
resisting an arrest based on a claim of use of unreasonable or unnecessary force by the
officer.
C
OMMENT: Evidence of force by an officer that occurs after an arrest does not entitle a
defendant to this instruction, because this instruction pertains only to unnecessary or
unreasonable force at the time of making the arrest. State v. O’Kelley, 117 Ariz. 34, 36, 570
P.2d 805, 807 (App. 1977).
38.88 Method of Arrest by Officer Without a Warrant
When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer was required to inform the
defendant of the officer’s authority and the reason for the arrest unless:
1. the defendant was engaged in the commission of a criminal offense; or
2. the defendant was pursued immediately after the commission of a criminal offense;
or
3. the defendant was pursued immediately after an escape; or
4. the defendant fled or forcibly resisted before the officer had the opportunity to
inform the defendant; or
5. the giving of such information would have imperiled the arrest.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-3888 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: “Offense” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105.
This instruction is included for use only where there is an issue of whether the defendant
was justified in using or threatening physical force against a police officer while resisting an
arrest based on a claim of use of unreasonable or unnecessary force by the officer.
C
OMMENT: Evidence of force by an officer that occurs after an arrest does not entitle a
defendant to this instruction, because this instruction pertains only to unnecessary or
unreasonable force at the time of making the arrest. State v. O’Kelley, 117 Ariz. 34, 36, 570
P.2d 805, 807 (App. 1977).
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43.4702 Conducting A Chop Shop
The crime of conducting a chop shop requires proof that the defendant knowingly
[owned or operated a chop shop] [transported a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part to or
from a chop shop] [sold or transferred to or purchased or received from a chop shop a
motor vehicle or motor vehicle part] [removed, destroyed, defaced or otherwise altered a
vehicle identification number with the intent to misrepresent or prevent the identification of
the motor vehicle or motor vehicle part] [bought, sold, transferred or possessed a motor
vehicle or motor vehicle part knowing that the motor vehicle identification number that was
placed on the motor vehicle or motor vehicle part by the manufacturer had been removed,
destroyed, defaced or otherwise altered].
“Chop shop” means any building, lot or other premises in which one or more persons
altered, destroyed, disassembled, dismantled, reassembled or stored at least one motor
vehicle or watercraft or two or more motor vehicle or watercraft parts from at least one
vehicle or watercraft that the person or persons knew were obtained by theft, fraud or
conspiracy to defraud with the intent to:
(a) alter, counterfeit, deface, destroy, disguise, falsify, forge, obliterate or remove the
identity of the motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts, including the vehicle
identification number for the purpose of misrepresenting or preventing the
identification of the motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts; or
(b) sell or dispose of the motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts.
[“Motor vehicle” means any self-propelled vehicle.]
“Vehicle identification number” means the number that the manufacturer or the United
States or a state department of transportation assigns to a motor vehicle for the purpose of
identifying the motor vehicle or a major component part of the motor vehicle. Vehicle
identification number includes any combination of numbers or letters.
[“Unidentifiable” or “preventing identification” means that specially trained investigative
personnel who are experienced in motor vehicle theft investigative procedures and motor
vehicle identification examination techniques could not establish the uniqueness of a motor
vehicle or motor vehicle part.]
[“Watercraft” means any boat designed to be propelled by machinery, oars, paddles or
wind action upon a sail for navigation on the water.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-4701 (statutory language as of September 21, 2006), 13-4702
(statutory language as of July 13, 1995) and 5-301(16) defining “watercraft” (statutory
language as of July 17, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
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Use Statutory Definition Instructions 1.0510(a)(1) and 1.0510(a)(2) defining “intent” and
“intent – inference.”
“Unidentifiable” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-4701(3), but the word is not used in the
statute. The committee has added “preventing identification” in an effort to tie the definition
to the wording of the statute. If the degree of alteration becomes an issue, this definition
should be included in the instruction.
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44.4802 Possession or Sale of Cloned Cellular or Wireless Telephones
The crime of possession or sale of cloned cellular or wireless telephones requires proof
that the defendant knowingly [possessed a cloned cellular or wireless telephone] [possessed
an instrument that was capable of acquiring electronic serial number and mobile
identification number combinations with the intent to clone a cellular or wireless telephone]
[sold a cloned cellular or wireless telephone].
“Cellular telephone” means a communication device that contains an electronic serial
number and the operation of which depends on the transmission of that electronic serial
number together with the mobile identification number in the form of radio signals through
cell sites and mobile switching stations.
“Cloned cellular or wireless telephone” means a cellular or wireless telephone in which
the manufacturer’s electronic serial number has been altered.
“Wireless telephone” means a communication device that transmits radio, satellite or
other mobile telephone communication.
[“Acquire” means to electronically capture, record, reveal or otherwise access by means
of any instrument, device or equipment a cellular or wireless telephone’s electronic serial
number or mobile identification number without the consent of the communication service
provider.
“Electronic serial number” means the unique numerical algorithm that the manufacturer
programs into the microchip of each wireless telephone.
“Mobile identification number” means the cellular or wireless telephone number that the
cellular or wireless telephone carrier assigns to the wireless telephone.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-4801 and 13-4802 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
COMMENT: Although the terms were not used by the legislature in establishing the elements
of the crime, there are definitions for “cloning paraphernalia” and “communication service
provider” in the definition section for this chapter. See A.R.S. § 13-4801.
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CHAPTER 45
45.4902 Criminal Trespass on Commercial Nuclear Generating Station
The crime of criminal trespass on a commercial nuclear generating station requires proof
that the defendant knowingly [entered or remained unlawfully in or on a commercial nuclear
generating station] [entered or remained unlawfully within a structure or fenced yard of a
commercial nuclear generating station].
“Commercial nuclear generating station” means an electric power generating facility that
is owned by a public service corporation, a municipal corporation or a consortium of public
service corporations or municipal corporations and that produces electricity by means of a
nuclear reactor. The generating station includes the property on which the facility is located.
“Enter” means the intrusion of any part of any instrument or any part of the defendant’s
body inside of a commercial nuclear generating station or a structure or fenced yard of a
commercial nuclear generating station.
“Entering or remaining unlawfully” means an act by the defendant who entered or
remained in or on a commercial nuclear generating station or a structure or fenced yard of a
commercial nuclear generating station if the defendant’s intent for entering or remaining was
not licensed, authorized or otherwise privileged.
[“Structure or fenced yard” means any structure, fenced yard, wall, building or other
similar barrier or any combination of structures, fenced yards, walls, buildings or other
barriers that surrounds a commercial nuclear generating station and that is posted with
signage indicating it is a felony to trespass.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-4901 and 13-4902 (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
Use Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b) defining “knowingly.”
45.4903 Justification Defense Armed Nuclear Security Guard
The defendant while performing the duties of an armed nuclear security guard was
justified in using physical force against another person at a commercial nuclear generating
station or structure or fenced yard of a commercial nuclear generating station if the
defendant reasonably believed that such force was necessary to prevent or terminate the
commission or attempted commission of [criminal damage] [misconduct involving weapons]
[criminal trespass on a commercial nuclear generating station].
The defendant while performing the duties of an armed nuclear security guard was
justified in using physical force up to and including deadly physical force against another
person at a commercial nuclear generating station or structure or fenced yard of a
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commercial nuclear generating station if the defendant reasonably believed that such force
was necessary to:
1. prevent the [commission of manslaughter] [second or first degree murder]
[aggravated assault] [kidnapping] [burglary in the second degree] [burglary in the first
degree] [arson of a structure or property] [arson of an occupied structure] [armed
robbery] [an act of terrorism]; or
2. defend [himself] [herself] or a third person from the use or imminent use of deadly
physical force.
The defendant while performing the duties of an armed nuclear security guard was
justified in threatening to use physical or deadly physical force if and to the extent a
reasonable armed nuclear security guard would have believed it necessary to protect [himself]
[herself] or others against another person’s potential use of physical force or deadly physical
force. You must measure the defendant’s belief against what a reasonable armed nuclear
security guard in the situation would have believed.
A person is justified in threatening or using deadly physical force only while the apparent
danger continues, and it ends when the apparent danger ends. The force used may not be
greater than reasonably necessary to defend against the apparent danger.
“Armed nuclear security guard” means a security guard who works at a commercial
nuclear generating station, who is employed as part of the security plan approved by the
nuclear regulatory commission and who meets the requirements mandated by the nuclear
regulatory commission for carrying a firearm.
“Commercial nuclear generating station” means an electric power generating facility that
is owned by a public service corporation, a municipal corporation or a consortium of public
service corporations or municipal corporations and that produces electricity by means of a
nuclear reactor. The generating station includes the property on which the facility is located.
“Structure or fenced yard” means any structure, fenced yard, wall, building or other
similar barrier or any combination of structures, fenced yards, walls, buildings or other
barriers that surrounds a commercial nuclear generating station and that is posted with
signage indicating it is a felony to trespass.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-4901 and 13-4903 (statutory language as of August 12, 2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The Arizona Supreme Court has required that an instruction under A.R.S. §§ 13-404 and
13-405 must include a reference to the reasonable person standard. State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz.
52, 60-61, 900 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1995). Because the threatening of deadly physical force by an
armed nuclear security guard in A.R.S. § 13-4903 requires a reasonable person standard, the
direction given in Grannis will likely apply in that situation, notwithstanding that A.R.S.
§ 13-4903(B) provides that this justification defense controls over A.R.S. §§ 13-404 and 13-
405.
C
OMMENT: This justification defense controls over those set forth in A.R.S. § 13-403,
13-404, 13-405, 13-406, 13-408, 13-409, 13-410 and 13-411. See A.R.S. § 13-4903(B).
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The court should note that there is a different standard used in the statute for
“threatening” the use of force by an armed nuclear security guard as opposed to the actual
use of force by the armed nuclear security guard. Threatening deadly physical force appears
to require an objective “reasonable armed nuclear security guard” standard. The actual use of
force, however, appears to be based on a subjective standard of what the defendant armed
nuclear security guard reasonably believed was necessary. There is no statutory definition of
“reasonable armed nuclear security guard,” and the Committee was unable to locate any
criminal cases providing such a definition. However, as an analogy to police officers, the
reader is directed to the following two cases that discuss reasonable police conduct: State v.
Superior Court, 185 Ariz. 47, 912 P.2d 51 (App. 1996); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332, 553 P.2d
1206 (1976).
The legislature’s 2006 amendments to the justification defenses set forth in Chapter 4 of
Title 13 did not include this defense. See Senate Bill 1145, Chapter 199, 47th Legislature, 2nd
Regular Session, 2006. Therefore, the trial court will need to decide whether this defense is
an “affirmative defense” with the defendant having the burden of proof or whether the state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant security guard did not act with
justification.
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CHAPTER 46
46.5002 Criminal Trespass on a Military Reservation or Facility
The crime of criminal trespass on a military reservation or facility requires proof that the
defendant knowingly entered or remained unlawfully within a structure or fenced yard of a
military reservation or facility.
“Enter” means the intrusion of any part of any instrument or any part of a person’s
body inside of a military reservation or facility or a structure or fenced yard of a military
reservation or facility.
“Entering or remaining unlawfully” means an act by a person who enters or remains in
or on a military reservation or facility or a structure or fenced yard of a military reservation
or facility if that person’s intent for entering or remaining is not authorized or otherwise
privileged.
“Military reservation or facility” means any land or facility that is owned or leased by or
designated to the Arizona National Guard.
“Structure or fenced yard” means any structure, fenced yard, wall, building or other
similar barrier or any combination of structures, fenced yards, walls, buildings or other
barriers that surrounds a military reservation or facility and that is posted with signage
indicating it is a felony to trespass.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-5002 and 13-5001 (statutory language as of July 7, 2008).
U
SE NOTE: The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
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28.622.01 Unlawful Flight From Pursuing Law Enforcement Vehicle
The crime of unlawful flight from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle requires proof of
the following two things:
1. The defendant, who was driving a motor vehicle, willfully
fled from or attempted to
elude a p
ursuing official law enforcement vehicle;
and
2. The law enforcement ve
hicle was appropriately marked showing it to be an
official
law enforcement vehicle.
An
act was done willfully if it was done knowingly. You may consider whether the
officer operated his emergency lights or siren in determining whether the defendant acted
willfully.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-622.01 and 28-624(C) (statutory language as of October 1, 1997); State
v.
Martinez, 230 Ariz. 382, 284 P.3d 893 (App. 2012).State v. Gendron, 166 Ariz. 562, 565,
804
P.2d
95, 98 (App. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds, 168 Ariz. 153, 812 P.2d 626 (1991)
(the
definition
of willfully in felony flight statute is equivalent to the definition of knowingly i
n
A.R.S. § 13
-105; In re Joel R., 200 Ariz. 512, 513-14, 29 P.3d 287, 288-89 (App. 2001)
.
U
SE NOTE: The court must instruct on the culpable mental state. “Knowingly” is defined in
A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
28.661 Leaving the Scene of an Injury or Fatal Accident
The crime of leaving the scene of an injury or fatal accident requires that the defendant:
1. was driving a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any
person;
and
2. [failed to immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close to
the
accident scene as pos
sible and immediately retu
rn to the accident scene.]
failed to remain at the scene of the accident until the defendan
t fulfilled the
duties
required by law of a dr
iver involved in an accident resulting in inju
ry or death.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-661 and 28-663 (statutory language as of October 1, 2011).
U
SE NOTE: Definitions of “physical injury” and “serious physical injury” should be given
from A.R.S. § 13-105, if at issue.
This instruction should be given with Statutory Non-Criminal Instruction 28.663
Driver’s Duty to Give Information and Assistance.
This instruction shall also be followed by the instruction concerning knowledge of
injury, if that is at issue – Statutory Non-Criminal Instruction 28.6611. See State v. Blevins, 128
Ariz. 64, 68, 623 P.2d 853, 857 (App. 1981) (holding that failure to instruct the jury on the
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issue of defendant’s knowledge of the personal injury was fundamental, reversible error
when defendant’s personal knowledge was at issue).
C
OMMENT: The term “accident” is broadly construed to include any vehicular incident
resulting in injury or death, whether or not such harm was intended. State v. Rodgers, 184
Ariz. 378, 380, 909 P.2d 445, 447 (App. 1995) (holding that statute applied when passenger
in defendant driver’s vehicle jumped from moving car and was struck and killed by another
car).
Leaving the scene is one crime, regardless of the number of persons injured. State v.
Powers, 200 Ariz. 363, 26 P.3d 1134 (2001).
The verdict form for this jury instruction is based on State v. Milligan, 87 Ariz. 165, 171,
349 P.2d 180, 184 (1960).
28.6611 Knowledge of Injury
The State must prove that the defendant actually knew of the injury to another or that
the defendant possessed knowledge that would lead to a reasonable anticipation that such
injury had occurred.
SOURCE: State v. Porras, 125 Ariz. 490, 493, 610 P.2d 1051, 1054 (1980).
U
SE NOTE: Use this instruction in conjunction with Statutory Non-Criminal Instruction
28.661.
Failure to instruct the jury on the issue of defendant’s knowledge of the personal injury
of the victim is fundamental, reversible error. State v. Blevins, 128 Ariz. 64, 68, 623 P.2d 853,
857 (App. 1981).
C
OMMENT: The reference to circumstantial evidence in the text of the previous RAJI was
removed, given the standard instruction on direct and circumstantial evidence.
28.6612 Leaving the Scene of an Injury or Fatal Accident Form of Verdict
We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled action, upon our oaths, do
find the defendant, on the charge of Leaving the Scene of an Injury or Fatal Accident (check
only one):
_____ Not Guilty
_____ Guilty
(Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you found the defendant “guilty” or
Leaving the Scene of an Injury or Fatal Accident.)
We, the jury duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled action do find beyond a
reasonable doubt that (check only one):
_____ The defendant was driving a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to
any person, other than death or serious physical injury;
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or
_____ The defendant was driving a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the
death, or serious physical injury, of any person.
(Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you decided that the defendant was
driving a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the death or serious physical injury of
any person.)
We, the jury duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled action do find beyond a
reasonable doubt on the allegation that the defendant caused the accident (check only one):
_____ Proved the defendant caused the accident.
_____ Not proved the defendant cause the accident.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-661(B) and (C) (statutory language as of 2011).
USE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate
The verdict form is based on State v. Milligan, 87 Ariz. 165, 171, 349 P.2d 180, 184
(1960).
“Physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0529).
“Serious physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. §13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction
1.0534).
C
OMMENT: The findings contained in the interrogatories determine the class of felony.
“A driver who is involved in an accident resulting in death or serious physical injury as
defined in § 13-105 and who fails to stop or to comply with the requirements of § 28-663 is
guilty of a class 3 felony, except that if a driver caused the accident the driver is guilty of a class
2 felony.” A.R.S. § 28-661(B).
“A driver who is involved in an accident resulting in an injury other than death or
serious physical injury as defined in § 13-105 and who fails to stop or to comply with the
requirements of § 28-663 is guilty of a class 5 felony.” A.R.S. § 28-661(C).
28.662 Leaving the Scene of an Accident
The crime of leaving the scene of an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle that
is driven or attended by a person requires that the defendant:
1. was driving a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to a vehicle that is
driven or attended by a person; and
2. [failed to immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close to the
accident scene as possible and immediately return to the accident scene.]
[failed to remain at the scene until the defendant fulfilled the duties required by law
of a driver involved in an accident resulting in damage to a vehicle driven or
attended by a person.]
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-662 and 28-663 (statutory language as of October 1, 2011).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should be given with Statutory Non-Criminal Instruction
28.663 Driver’s Duty to Give Information and Assistance.
C
OMMENT: The term “accident” is broadly construed to include any vehicular incident
resulting in injury or death, whether or not such harm was intended. State v. Rodgers, 184
Ariz. 378, 380, 909 P.2d 445, 447 (App. 1995) (holding that statute applied when passenger
in defendant driver’s vehicle jumped from moving car and was struck and killed by another
car).
The verdict form for this jury instruction is based on State v. Milligan, 87 Ariz. 165, 171,
349 P.2d 180, 184 (1960).
28.663 Driver’s Duty to Give Information and Assistance
The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of a person
or damage to a vehicle that driven or attended by a person shall:
1. give the driver’s name and address and the registration number of the vehicle the
driver was driving; and
2. on request, exhibit the person’s driver license to the person struck or the driver or
occupants of, or person attending, a vehicle collided with; and
3. render reasonable assistance to a person injured in the accident, including making
arrangements for the carrying of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for
medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if the
carrying is requested by the injured person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-663 (statutory language as of October 1, 1997).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction must be given in conjunction with Statutory Non-Criminal
Instructions 28.661 and/or 28.662.
28.675 Causing Death by Use of Vehicle
The crime of causing death by use of a vehicle requires proof that:
1. The defendant was not allowed to operate a motor vehicle because
[the defendant’s driving privilege was revoked for any reason.]
[the defendant’s driving privilege was suspended.]
[the defendant, in order to obtain a driver’s license,
1. knowingly used a false or fictitious name; or
2. knowingly made a false statement; or
3. knowingly concealed a material fact; or
4. committed fraud; or
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5. made a false affidavit; or
6. knowingly [swore] [affirmed] falsely to a matter or thing required to be
[sworn to] [affirmed].]
[the defendant did not have a valid driver’s license and a proper endorsement, if
required and defendant was not exempt from having a valid driver’s license and a
proper endorsement.],
and
2. The defendant, while operating a motor vehicle, caused the death of another person;
and
3. The defendant committed the following violation: [The court should instruct the
jury on the violation alleged under A.R.S. § 28-675(A)(3).]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-675 (statutory language as of January 11, 2011).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court must insure that the reason for the suspension falls within those specified in
the statute. See A.R.S. § 28-675(B). The State is required to prove as part of its case the
reason for the suspension.
Subsection 1 definitions:
“Material” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2701(1) (Statutory Definition Instruction 27.01(1)).
“Fraud” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2310 (Statutory Definition Instruction 23.10).
The court must instruct on the traffic violation alleged to have caused the death of
another person, as listed in subsection 3. The court will need to craft an instruction based on
the traffic violation alleged. See the following:
“Failing to stop before a red signal” is defined in A.R.S. § 28-645(A)(3)(a).
“Driving on roadways laned for traffic” is defined in A.R.S. § 28-729.
“The laws for a vehicle at an intersection” are defined in A.R.S. §§ 28-771 and -773.
“The laws for turning left at an intersection” are defined in A.R.S. § 28-772.
“The laws of right-of-way at a crosswalk” are defined in A.R.S. § 28-792.
“The requirement to exercise due care” is defined at A.R.S. § 28-794.
“The laws for approaching a school crossing” are defined at A.R.S. § 28-797(F), (G),
(H), and (I).
“Failing to stop before a stop sign” is defined at A.R.S. § 28-855(B).
“The laws for approaching a school bus displaying a stop signal and alternately flashing
lights” is defined at A.R.S. § 28-857(A).
The State must prove that the defendant knew or should have known that the license
was suspended or revoked. State v. Agee, 181 Ariz. 58, 61, 887 P.2d 588, 591 (App. 1994);
State v. Rivera, 177 Ariz. 476, 479, 858 P2d 1059, 1062 (App. 1994). The knowledge of
suspension or revocation may be presumed if the notice of suspension or revocation was
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mailed to the last known address pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 28-448 and 28-3318. See Statutory
Non-Criminal Instruction 28.3318. This permissive presumption may be rebutted by
presenting some evidence that the defendant did not know that the license was suspended or
revoked. State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz. 90, 94, 722 P.2d 258, 262 (1986).
In the event that the State alleges that the defendant committed fraud in order to obtain
a driver’s license, the court must instruct on the underlying fraud offense.
In the event that the State alleges that the defendant knowingly used a false or fictitious
name, knowingly made a false statement, knowingly concealed a material fact in order to
obtain a driver’s license, and/or knowingly swore or affirmed falsely to a matter or thing
required to be sworn to or affirmed, the Court must instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
28.676 Causing Serious Physical Injury by Use of a Vehicle
The crime of causing serious physical injury by use of a vehicle requires proof that:
1. The defendant was not allowed to operate a motor vehicle because
[the defendant’s driving privilege was revoked for any reason.]
[the defendant’s driving privilege was suspended.]
[The defendant, in order to obtain a driver’s license,
1. knowingly used a false or fictitious name; or
2. knowingly made a false statement; or
3. knowingly concealed a material fact; or
4. committed fraud; or
5. made a false affidavit; or
6. knowingly [swore] [affirmed] falsely to a matter or thing required to be
[sworn to] [affirmed].]
[the defendant did not have a valid driver’s license and a proper endorsement, if
required and defendant was not exempt from having a valid driver’s license and a
proper endorsement.]
and
2. The defendant, while operating a motor vehicle, caused serious physical injury to
another person; and
3. The defendant committed the following violation: [The court should instruct the
jury on the violation alleged under A.R.S. § 28-675(A)(3).]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-676 (statutory language as of January 11, 2011).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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The Court must insure that the reason for the suspension falls within those specified in
the statute. See A.R.S. § 28-675(B). The State is required to prove as part of its case the
reason for the suspension.
Subsection 1 definitions:
“Material” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2701(1) (Statutory Definition Instruction 27.01(1)).
“Fraud” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2310 (Statutory Definition Instruction 23.10).
“Serious physical injury” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(38) (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.0534).
The court must instruct on the traffic violation alleged to have caused the death of another
person, as listed in subsection 3. The court will need to craft an instruction based on the
traffic violation alleged. See the following:
“Failing to stop before a red signal” is defined in A.R.S. § 28-645(A)(3)(a).
“Driving on roadways laned for traffic” is defined in A.R.S. § 28-729.
“The laws for a vehicle at an intersection” are defined in A.R.S. §§ 28-771 and -773.
“The laws for turning left at an intersection” are defined in A.R.S. § 28-772.
“The laws of right-of-way at a crosswalk” are defined in A.R.S. § 28-792.
“The requirement to exercise due care” is defined at A.R.S. § 28-794.
“The laws for approaching a school crossing” are defined at A.R.S. § 28-797(F), (G),
(H), and (I).
“Failing to stop before a stop sign” is defined at A.R.S. § 28-855(B).
“The laws for approaching a school bus displaying a stop signal and alternately
flashing lights” is defined at A.R.S. § 28-857(A).
The State must prove that the defendant knew or should have known that the license
was suspended or revoked. State v. Agee, 181 Ariz. 58, 61, 887 P.2d 588, 591 (App. 1994);
State v. Rivera, 177 Ariz. 476, 479, 858 P2d 1059, 1062 (App. 1994). The knowledge of
suspension or revocation may be presumed if the notice of suspension or revocation was
mailed to the last known address pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 28-448 and 28-3318. See Statutory
Non-Criminal Instruction 28.3318. This permissive presumption may be rebutted by
presenting some evidence that the defendant did not know that the license was suspended or
revoked. State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz. 90, 94, 722 P.2d 258, 262 (1986).
In the event that the State alleges that the defendant committed fraud in order to obtain
a driver’s license, the court must instruct on the underlying fraud offense.
In the event that the State alleges that the defendant knowingly used a false or fictitious
name, knowingly made a false statement, knowingly concealed a material fact in order to
obtain a driver’s license, and/or knowingly swore or affirmed falsely to a matter or thing
required to be sworn to or affirmed, the court must instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
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TITLE 28 DUI
28.1321 Refusal to Submit to Test
Any person who operates a motor vehicle within the state gives consent to a test or tests of
[his] [her] blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance for the purposes of determining the
alcoholic content of [his] [her] blood if arrested for driving under the influence.
A refusal to submit to chemical test under the Implied Consent Law occurs when the
conduct of the arrested motorist is such that a reasonable person in the officer’s position
would be justified in believing that such motorist was capable of refusal and exhibited an
unwillingness to submit to the test.
If you find that the defendant refused to submit to a test, you may consider such evidence
together with all the other evidence in determining whether the State has proven the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-1321 (statutory language as of September 1, 2006); Campbell v. Superior
Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); McNutt v. Superior Court of Arizona, 133 Ariz. 7, 648
P.2d 122 (1982); State v. Holland, 147 Ariz. 453, 711 P.2d 592 (1985); Kunzler v. Pima County
Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 568, 744 P.2d 669 (1987); Kunzler v. Miller, 154 Ariz. 570, 744 P.2d
671 (1987); and Hively v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 572, 744 P.2d 673 (1987).
C
OMMENT: The statement in the 1989 RAJI that a motorist was not entitled to the
assistance of counsel in deciding whether to submit to a test has been deleted because it was
an incorrect statement of law. No mention of the right to consult with counsel is included
because introduction of evidence that the defendant requested to speak to counsel would be
an impermissible comment on the defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights. See State v.
Juarez, 161 Ariz. 76, 80, 81, 775 P.2d 1140, 1144, 1145 (1989) (“[I]n a criminal DUI case, the
accused has the right to consult with an attorney, if doing so does not disrupt the
investigation” and “Informing the driver that he may not call his attorney before taking the
test misstates the law and violates the driver’s right to consult with counsel under the sixth
amendment of the United States Constitution and article 2, section 24 of the Arizona
Constitution.”).
28.1381(A)(1)-APC Actual Physical Control Defined
In determining the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle, you should
consider the totality of circumstances shown by the evidence and whether the defendant’s
current or imminent control of the vehicle presented a real danger to [himself] [herself] or
others at the time alleged. Factors to be considered might include, but are not limited to:
1. whether the vehicle was running;
2. whether the ignition was on;
3. where the ignition key was located;
4. where and in what position the driver was found in the vehicle;
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5. whether the person was awake or asleep;
6. whether the vehicle’s headlights were on;
7. where the vehicle was stopped;
8. whether the driver had voluntarily pulled off the road;
9. time of day;
10. weather conditions;
11. whether the heater or air conditioner was on;
12. whether the windows were up or down;
13. any explanation of the circumstances shown by the evidence.
This list is not meant to be all-inclusive. It is up to you to examine all the available
evidence and weigh its credibility in determining whether the defendant actually posed a
threat to the public by the exercise of present or imminent control of the vehicle while
impaired.
SOURCE: State v. Zaragoza, 221 Ariz. 49, 209 P.3d. 629 (2009).
U
SE NOTE: The Arizona Supreme Court in Zaragoza noted that this instruction should be
used where actual physical control is in issue. Id. at ¶ 21.
28.1381(A)(1)-1 Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under the Influence
The crime of driving or actual physical control while under the influence requires proof
that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant was under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor
releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs
or vapor releasing substances] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical
control]; and
3. The defendant was impaired to the slightest degree by reason of being under the
influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor releasing substance containing a
toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs or vapor releasing substances].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(1) (statutory language as of January 1, 2012).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual
physical control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual
physical control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in
the instruction. In some cases there may be issues of actual physical control and
circumstantial evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both
choices. See State ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898
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P.2d 474 (1995) (police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding
the keys and seated in the stopped car).
If “actual physical control” is an issue, see the definition of that term at Instruction
28.1381(A)(1)APC.
“Drive” means to operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. A.R.S.
§ 28-101(17).
28.1381(A)(2) Driving or Actual Physical Control With an Alcohol Concentration
of 0.08 or More Within Two Hours of Driving
The crime of driving or actual physical control with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or
more within two hours of driving requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(2) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual physical
control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual physical
control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in the
instruction. In some cases there may be issues of actual physical control and circumstantial
evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both choices. See State
ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d 474 (1995)
(police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding the keys and seated
in the stopped car).
If “actual physical control” is an issue, see the definition of that term at Statutory Non-
Criminal Instruction 28.1381(A)(1)-APC.
The State must prove that the driver was 0.08 or more within two hours based upon
alcohol consumed at or prior to driving or actual physical control. If there was drinking after
the defendant’s driving or being in actual physical control, it could not be considered in
determining whether the driver was 0.08 or above at the time of driving or being in actual
physical control.
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28.1381(A)(3) – Driving or Actual Physical Control While There Is a Drug in the
Defendants Body
The crime of driving or actual physical control while there is a drug in the defendant’s body
requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had in [his] [her] body [(name of drug)] [a metabolite of (name of
drug)] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual physical
control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual physical
control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in the
instruction. In some cases there may be issues of actual physical control and circumstantial
evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both choices. See State
ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d 474 (1995)
(police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding the keys and seated
in the stopped car).
If “actual physical control” is an issue, see the definition of that term at Statutory Non-
Criminal Instruction 28.1381(A)(1)-APC.
Insert the name of the particular drug, e.g. “codeine, amphetamine,” which is in the
body or has been metabolized in the body. The proscribed drugs are any of those found in
A.R.S. § 13-3401.
In those cases where a driver ingests a legal substance which through a bodily process
unknown to a person of average intelligence and common experience, that substance is
transformed into a prohibited substance, the driver is not liable under A.R.S. § 13-
1381(A)(3). State v. Boyd, 201 Ariz. 27, 31 P.3d 140 (App. 2001).
C
OMMENT: “A person using a drug prescribed by a medical practitioner licensed pursuant
to title 32, chapter 7, 11, 13 or 17 is not guilty of violating subsection A, paragraph 3 of this
section.” A.R.S. § 28-1381(D). The statutory defense applies to only A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3).
28.1381(A)(4) Driving or Actual Physical Control of a Commercial Motor
Vehicle With an Alcohol Concentration of 0.04 or More
The crime of driving or actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle with an
alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a commercial motor
vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(4) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
D
EFINITIONS:
“Commercial driver license” means a license that is issued to an individual and that
authorizes the individual to operate a class of commercial motor vehicles.
“Commercial motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle or combination of motor vehicles
used to transport passengers or property if the motor vehicle either:
(a) Has a gross combined weight rating of twenty-six thousand one or more pounds
inclusive of a towed unit with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than ten
thousand pounds.
(b) Has a gross vehicle weight rating of twenty-six thousand one or more pounds.
(c) Is a school bus.
(d) Is a bus.
(e) Is used in the transportation of materials found to be hazardous for the purposes of
the hazardous materials transportation act 49 United States Code §§ 5101 through
5127 and is required to be placarded under 49 Code of Federal Regulations
§ 172.504, as adopted by the department pursuant to chapter 14 of this title.
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual physical
control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual physical
control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in the
instruction. In some cases there may be issues of actual physical control and circumstantial
evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both choices. See State
ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d 474 (1995)
(police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding the keys and seated
in the stopped car).
If “actual physical control” is an issue, see the definition of that term at Statutory Non-
Criminal Instruction 28.1381(A)(1)-APC.
The State must prove that the driver was 0.04 or more within two hours based upon
alcohol consumed at or prior to driving or actual physical control. If there was drinking after
the defendant’s driving or being in actual physical control, it could not be considered in
determining whether the driver was 0.04 or above at the time of driving or being in actual
physical control.
28.1381(D) Affirmative Defense to Driving or Actual Physical Control While
There Is a Drug in the Defendant’s Body
A person using a drug as prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner who is authorized
to prescribe the drug is not guilty of driving or actual physical control while there is a drug in
the defendant’s body.
The defendant has raised the affirmative defense of using a drug as prescribed with
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respect to the charged offense of driving or actual physical control while there is a drug in
the defendant’s body. The burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt always remains on the State. However, the burden of proving the
affirmative defense of using a drug as prescribed is on the defendant. The defendant must
prove the affirmative defense of using a drug as prescribed by a preponderance of evidence.
If you find that the defendant has proven the affirmative defense of using a drug as
prescribed by a preponderance of the evidence, you must find the defendant not guilty of
the offense of driving or actual physical control while there is a drug in the defendant’s body
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-1381(D) (statutory language as of August 6, 2016); Statutory Criminal
2.025.
U
SE NOTE: This is a defense to § 28-1381(A)(3) if the person is using a drug as prescribed
by a medical practitioner who is licensed under any section of Title 32 and is authorized to
prescribe the drug.
Proof of “a preponderance of the evidence” means that a fact is more probably true than
not true.
C
OMMENT: “Section 28-1381(D) provides a narrow safe harbor for a defendant charged
with violating 28-1381(A)(3). State v. Bayardi, 230 Ariz. 195, 198, ¶ 10, 281 P.3d 1063, 1066
(App. 2012).
28.1381(G) Presumptions of Intoxication
The amount of alcohol in a defendant’s [blood] [breath] [bodily substance] gives rise to
the following presumptions:
1. If there was at that time 0.05 percent or less by concentration of alcohol in the
defendant’s [blood] [breath] [bodily substance], it may be presumed that the
defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
2. If there was at that time an excess of 0.05 percent but less than 0.08 percent by
concentration of alcohol in the defendant’s [blood] [breath] [bodily substance], such
fact does not give rise to any presumption that the defendant was or was not under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.
3. If there was at that time 0.08 percent or more by concentration of alcohol in the
defendant’s [blood] [breath] [bodily substance], it may be presumed that the
defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
These are rebuttable presumptions. In other words, you are free to accept or reject these
presumptions after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Even with these
presumptions, the State has the burden of proving each and every element of the offense of
driving under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt before you can find the defendant
guilty.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-1381(G) and (H) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
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USE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The statute provides that these presumptions shall not be construed as limiting the
introduction and consideration of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question
of whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
28.1381-MJ Registered Qualifying Patient (Medical Marijuana)
A registered qualifying patient shall not be considered under the influence of marijuana
solely because of the presence of metabolites or components of marijuana that appear in
insufficient concentration to cause impairment.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 36-2802 (statutory language as of December 15, 2010).
28.1381-MS Mental State
The crime of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs does not
require proof of a culpable mental state. The defendant is not required to know that [he] [she]
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.
SOURCE: State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 184 Ariz. 409, 411, 909 P.2d 476,
478 (App. 1995); State v. Parker, 236 Ariz. 474, 666 P.2d 1083 (1983); A.R.S. § 13-202(B)
(construction of statutes with respect to culpability).
28.1382(A) Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under the Extreme
Influence of Intoxicating Liquor
The crime of driving or actual physical control while under the extreme influence of
intoxicating liquor requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of [0.20] [0.15] or more within two
hours of [driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-1382(A) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007). The effective
date for 0.18 legislation is December 1, 1998. The effective date for 0.15 legislation is 1:00
p.m. on April 14, 2001. The effective date for 0.20 legislation is September 19, 2007, and
amended effective January 1, 2009.
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
For crimes committed before January 1, 2009, it is recommended that a special verdict
form be used requiring the jury to make a finding of whether the alcohol concentration was
either more than 0.15 but less than 0.20 or 0.20 or more. This finding is necessary because it
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determines the length of incarceration. The legislature amended the statute effective January
1, 2009. The amendment makes it clear that the offenses of 0.15 and 0.20 are separate
offenses; therefore, a special verdict form likely will not be needed because 0.15 and 0.20 will
likely be charged in separate counts or separate verdict forms will be used for lesser-included
offenses.
The under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual
physical control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual
physical control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in
the instruction. In some cases, there may be issues of actual physical control and
circumstantial evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both
choices. See State ex rel O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898
P.2d 474 (1995) (police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding
the keys and seated in the stopped car).
If “actual physical control” is an issue, see the definition of that term at Statutory Non-
Criminal Instruction 28.1381(A)(1)-APC.
The third element must be given for an offense occurring on or after July 18, 2000 when
that legislation became effective. The State must prove that the driver’s alcohol
concentration was at or over the statutory level within two hours based upon alcohol
consumed at or prior to driving or actual physical control. If there was drinking after the
driving or actual physical control, such consumption should not be considered in
determining whether the driver as at or over the statutory level within two hours of driving
or being in actual physical control.
28.1383(A)(1)-1 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under the
Influence While [License][Privilege to Drive] Was [Suspended]
[Canceled][Revoked][Refused][Restricted]
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while under the influence while
[license to drive] [privilege to drive] is [suspended] [canceled] [revoked] [refused] [restricted]
requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant was under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor
releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs
or vapor releasing substances] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical
control]; and
3. The defendant was impaired to the slightest degree by reason of being under the
influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor releasing substance containing a
toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs or vapor releasing substances];
and
4. The defendant’s [license to drive] [privilege to drive] was [suspended] [canceled]
[revoked] [refused] [restricted] at the time the defendant was [driving] [in actual
physical control]; and
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5. The defendant knew or should have known that the defendant’s [driver license to
drive][privilege to drive] was [suspended] [canceled] [revoked] [refused] [restricted]
at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical control].
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(1) and 28-1381(A)(1) (statutory language as of January 1,
2012).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual
physical control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual
physical control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in
the instruction. In some cases there may be issues of actual physical control and
circumstantial evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both
choices. See State ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898
P.2d 474 (1995) (police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding
the keys and seated in the stopped car).
The State must prove that the defendant knew or should have known that the license
was suspended or revoked. State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 487, 489, 698 P.2d 732, 734 (1985);
State v. Agee, 181 Ariz. 58, 61, 887 P.2d 588, 591 (App. 1994); State v. Rivera, 177 Ariz. 476,
479, 858 P2d 1059, 1062 (App. 1994). The knowledge of suspension or revocation may be
presumed if the notice of suspension or revocation was mailed to the last known address
pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 28-448 and 28-3318. See Statutory Non-Criminal Instruction 28.3318.
This permissive presumption may be rebutted by presenting some evidence that the
defendant did not know that the license was suspended or revoked. State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz.
90, 94, 722 P.2d 258,62 (1986).
C
OMMENT: Driving under the influence can be established by either direct or circumstantial
evidence of driving, or by establishing that the defendant was in actual physical control of a
vehicle. The offense of driving while a license or privilege to drive was suspended, canceled,
or revoked (hereinafter driving on a suspended license) requires either direct or
circumstantial evidence of driving. There is no actual physical control element for driving
while on a suspended license. Therefore, if actual physical control is part of the greater
charge of aggravated driving under the influence, driving on a suspended license is not a
lesser-included offense. State v. Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, 208, 986 P.2d 239, 241 (App. 1999).
Because aggravated driving under the influence can occur on any property and driving on a
suspended license can only occur on a public highway, driving on a suspended license is not
a lesser-included offense unless the charging document establishes that the driving occurred
on a public highway. State v. Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, 209, 986 P.2d 239, 242 (App. 1999).
A.R.S. 28-1383(A)(1) “prohibits a person from, among other activities, committing a
DUI offense ‘while a restriction is placed’ on her right to drive because of a prior DUI
offense.” State v. Skiba, 199 Ariz. 539, 19 P.3d 1255, 1257 (App. 2001).
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28.1383(A)(1)-2 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under the
Influence While [License][Privilege to Drive] Was [Suspended]
[Canceled] [Revoked] [Refused] [Restricted] With Lesser-
Included Offense of Driving or Actual Physical Control While
Under the Influence
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while under the influence while
defendant’s [license to drive] [privilege to drive] is [suspended] [canceled] [revoked] [refused]
[restricted] includes the lesser offense of driving or actual physical control while under the
influence. You may consider the lesser offense of driving or actual physical control while under
the influence if either:
1. You find the defendant not guilty of aggravated driving or actual physical control
while under the influence; or
2. After full and careful consideration of the facts, you cannot agree on whether to find
the defendant guilty or not guilty of aggravated driving or actual physical control
while under the influence.
You cannot find the defendant guilty of [insert the lesser offense] unless you find that
the State has proved each element of [insert the lesser offense] beyond a reasonable doubt.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(1) and 28-1381(A)(1) (statutory language as of January 1,
2012); State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 924 P.2d 441 (1996).
U
SE NOTE: Use choices in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual physical
control of a vehicle. Use the [driving/actual physical control] choices in brackets as
appropriate to the facts. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual physical
control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in the
instruction. In some cases, there may be issues of actual physical control and circumstantial
evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both choices. See State
ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d 474 (1995)
(police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding the keys and seated
in the stopped car).
28.1383(A)(1)-3 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control With an Alcohol
Concentration of 0.08 While [License] [Privilege to Drive] Was
[Suspended] [Canceled] [Revoked] [Refused] [Restricted]
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control with an alcohol concentration
of 0.08 while [license to drive][privilege to drive] is [suspended] [canceled][revoked][refused]
[restricted] requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
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3. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
4. The defendant’s [license to drive] [privilege to drive] was [suspended] [canceled]
[revoked] [refused] [restricted] at the time the defendant was [driving]/[in actual
physical control]; and
5. The defendant knew or should have known that the defendant’s [driver’s license to
drive] [privilege to drive] was [suspended] [canceled] [revoked] [refused] [restricted]
at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical control].
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(1) and 28-1381(A)(2) (statutory language as of January 1,
2012).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual
physical control of a vehicle. Use the [driving]/[actual physical control] choices in brackets
as appropriate to the facts. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual physical
control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in the
instruction. In some cases, there may be issues of actual physical control and circumstantial
evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both choices. See State
ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d 474 (1995)
(police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding the keys and seated
in the stopped car).
The State must prove that the defendant knew or should have known that the license
was suspended or revoked. State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 487, 489, 698 P.2d 732, 734 (1985);
State v. Agee, 181 Ariz. 58, 61, 887 P.2d 588, 591 (App. 1994); State v. Rivera, 177 Ariz. 476,
479, 858 P2d 1059, 1062 (App. 1994). The knowledge of suspension or revocation may be
presumed if the notice of suspension or revocation was mailed to the last known address
pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 28-448 and 28-3318. See Statutory Non-Criminal Instruction 28.3318.
This permissive presumption may be rebutted by presenting some evidence that the
defendant did not know that the license was suspended or revoked. State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz.
90, 94, 722 P.2d 258, 262 (1986).
C
OMMENT: Driving under the influence can be established by either direct or circumstantial
evidence of driving, or by establishing that the defendant was in actual physical control of a
vehicle. The offense of driving while a license or privilege to drive was suspended, canceled,
or revoked (hereinafter driving on a suspended license) requires either direct or
circumstantial evidence of driving. There is no actual physical control element for driving
while on a suspended license. Therefore, if actual physical control is part of the greater
charge of aggravated driving under the influence, driving on a suspended license is not a
lesser-included offense. State v. Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, 208, 986 P.2d 239, 241 (App. 1999).
Because aggravated driving under the influence can occur on any property and driving on a
suspended license can only occur on a public highway, driving on a suspended license is not
a lesser-included offense unless the charging document establishes that the driving occurred
on a public highway. State v. Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, 209, 986 P.2d 239, 242 (App. 1999).
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A.R.S. § 28-1383(A)(1) “prohibits a person from, among other activities, committing a
DUI offense ‘while a restriction is placed’ on her right to drive because of a prior DUI
offense.” State v. Skiba, 199 Ariz. 539, 19 P.3d 1255, 1257 (App. 2001).
28.1383(A)(1)-4 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While There Is a
Drug in the Defendant’s Body While [License to Drive]
[Privilege to Drive] Was [Suspended] [Canceled] [Revoked]
[Refused] [Restricted]
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while there is a drug in the
defendant’s body while [license to drive] [privilege to drive] is [suspended] [canceled]
[revoked] [refused] [restricted] requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had in [his] [her] body [(name of drug)] [a metabolite of (name of
drug)] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The defendant’s [license to drive] [privilege to drive] was [suspended] [canceled]
[revoked] [refused] [restricted] at the time the defendant was [driving] [in actual
physical control]; and
4. The defendant knew or should have known that the defendant’s [driver license to
drive] [privilege to drive] was [suspended] [canceled] [revoked] [refused] [restricted]
at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical control].
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(1) and 28-1381(A)(3) (statutory language as of January 1,
2012).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual
physical control of a vehicle. Use the [driving/actual physical control] choices in brackets as
appropriate to the facts. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual physical
control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in the
instruction. In some cases, there may be issues of actual physical control and circumstantial
evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both choices. See State
ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d 474 (1995)
(police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding the keys and seated
in the stopped car).
The State must prove that the defendant knew or should have known that the license
was suspended or revoked. State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 487, 489, 698 P.2d 732, 734 (1985);
State v. Agee, 181 Ariz. 58, 61, 887 P.2d 588, 591 (App. 1994); State v. Rivera, 177 Ariz. 476,
479, 858 P2d 1059, 1062 (App. 1994). The knowledge of suspension or revocation may be
presumed if the notice of suspension or revocation was mailed to the last known address
pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 28-448 and 28-3318. See Statutory Non-Criminal Instruction 28.3318.
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This permissive presumption may be rebutted by presenting some evidence that the
defendant did not know that the license was suspended or revoked. State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz.
90, 94, 722 P.2d 258, 262 (1986).
C
OMMENT: Driving under the influence can be established by either direct or circumstantial
evidence of driving, or by establishing that the defendant was in actual physical control of a
vehicle. The offense of driving while a license or privilege to drive was suspended, canceled,
or revoked (hereinafter driving on a suspended license) requires either direct or
circumstantial evidence of driving. There is no actual physical control element for driving
while on a suspended license. Therefore, if actual physical control is part of the greater
charge of aggravated driving under the influence, driving on a suspended license is not a
lesser-included offense. State v. Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, 208, 986 P.2d 239, 241 (App. 1999).
Because aggravated driving under the influence can occur on any property and driving on a
suspended license can only occur on a public highway, driving on a suspended license is not
a lesser-included offense unless the charging document establishes that the driving occurred
on a public highway. State v. Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, 209, 986 P.2d 239, 242 (App. 1999).
A.R.S. 28-1383(A)(1) “prohibits a person from, among other activities, committing a
DUI offense ‘while a restriction is placed’ on her right to drive because of a prior DUI
offense.” State v. Skiba, 199 Ariz. 539, 19 P.3d 1255, 1257 (App. 2001).
28.1383(A)(2)-1 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under the
Influence Two Convictions Within Eighty-Four Months
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while under the influence with
two prior convictions within eighty-four months requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant was under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor
releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs
or vapor releasing substances] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical
control; and
3. The defendant was impaired to the slightest degree by reason of being under the
influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor releasing substance containing a
toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs or vapor releasing substances];
and
4. The defendant had been convicted twice for driving under the influence; and
5. The two driving-under-the-influence offenses were committed within eighty-four
months of the date of the current offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(2) and 28-1381(A)(1) (statutory language as of September 19,
2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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The under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual
physical control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual
physical control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in
the instruction. In some cases, there may be issues of actual physical control and
circumstantial evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both
choices. See State ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898
P.2d 474 (1995) (police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding
the keys and seated in the stopped car).
A.R.S. § 28-1383(B) provides that the dates of commission of the offenses are the
determining factors in applying this eighty-four-month provision.
C
OMMENT: A rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to prior convictions used to
enhance a sentence or as an element of a crime. “When the State seeks to use a prior
conviction as a sentence enhancer or as an element of a crime, the State must first prove the
existence of the prior conviction. At the time, the presumption of regularity attaches to the
final judgment. If the defendant presents some credible evidence to overcome the
presumption, the State must fulfill its duty to establish that the prior conviction was
constitutionally obtained.” State v. McCann, 200 Ariz. 27, 31, 21 P.3d 845, 849 (2001),
overruling State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907 (1968), and State v. Renaud, 108 Ariz.
417, 499 P.2d 712 (1972).
28.1383(A)(2)-2 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control With an Alcohol
Concentration of 0.08 or More Within Two Hours of Driving
Two Convictions Within Eighty-Four Months
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control with an alcohol concentration
of 0.08 or more within two hours of driving requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
4. The defendant had been convicted twice for driving under the influence; and
5. The two driving-under-the-influence offenses were committed within eighty-four
months of the date of the current offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(2) and 28-1381(A)(2) (statutory language as of September 19,
2007).
U
SE NOTE: The under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in
actual physical control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual
physical control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in
the instruction. In some cases, there may be issues of actual physical control and
circumstantial evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both
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choices. See State ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898
P.2d 474 (1995) (police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding
the keys and seated in the stopped car).
A.R.S. § 28-1383(B) provides that the dates of commission of the offenses are the
determining factors in applying this eighty-four-month provision.
C
OMMENT: A rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to prior convictions used to
enhance a sentence or as an element of a crime. “When the State seeks to use a prior
conviction as a sentence enhancer or as an element of a crime, the State must first prove the
existence of the prior conviction. At the time, the presumption of regularity attaches to the
final judgment. If the defendant presents some credible evidence to overcome the
presumption, the State must fulfill its duty to establish that the prior conviction was
constitutionally obtained.” State v. McCann, 200 Ariz. 27, 31, 21 P.3d 845, 849 (2001),
overruling State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907 (1968), and State v. Renaud, 108 Ariz.
417, 499 P.2d 712 (1972).
28.1383(A)(2)-3 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While There Is a
Drug in the Defendant’s Body Two Convictions Within
Eighty-Four Months
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while there is a drug in the
defendant’s body with two prior convictions within eighty-four months requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had in [his] [her] body [(name of drug)] [a metabolite of (name of
drug)] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The defendant had been convicted twice for driving under the influence; and
4. The two driving-under-the-influence offenses were committed within eighty-four
months of the date of the current offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(2) and 28-1381(A)(3) (statutory language as of September 19,
2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual
physical control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual
physical control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in
the instruction. In some cases, there may be issues of actual physical control and
circumstantial evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both
choices. See State ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898
P.2d 474 (1995) (police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding
the keys and seated in the stopped car).
A.R.S. § 28-1383(B) provides that the dates of commission of the offenses are the
determining factors in applying this sixty-month provision.
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COMMENT: A rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to prior convictions used to
enhance a sentence or as an element of a crime. “When the State seeks to use a prior
conviction as a sentence enhancer or as an element of a crime, the State must first prove the
existence of the prior conviction. At the time, the presumption of regularity attaches to the
final judgment. If the defendant presents some credible evidence to overcome the
presumption, the State must fulfill its duty to establish that the prior conviction was
constitutionally obtained.” State v. McCann, 200 Ariz. 27, 31, 21 P.3d 845, 849 (2001),
overruling State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907 (1968), and State v. Renaud, 108 Ariz.
417, 499 P.2d 712 (1972).
28.1383(A)(3)-1 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under the
Influence While There Is a Person Under the Age of Fifteen
Years in the Vehicle
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while under the influence
while there is a person under the age of fifteen years in the vehicle requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant was under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor
releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs
or vapor releasing substances] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical
control]; and
3. The defendant was impaired to the slightest degree by reason of being under the
influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor releasing substance containing a
toxic substance][any combination of liquor, drugs or vapor releasing substances]; and
4. A person under fifteen years of age was in the vehicle at the time of the offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(3) and 28-1381(A)(1) (statutory language as of September 1,
2001).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Users are advised to consult State v. Miller (Oliveri), 226 Ariz. 190, 245 P.3d 454 (App.
2011) regarding the use of “ability to drive” as part of the instruction. The opinion directed
that the RAJI instruction not be given as currently written. The opinion did not suggest how
the instruction should be rewritten.
Under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual physical
control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual physical
control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in the
instruction. In some cases, there may be issues of actual physical control and circumstantial
evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both choices. See State
ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d 474 (1995)
(police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding the keys and seated
in the stopped car).
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28.1383(A)(3)-2 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control With an Alcohol
Concentration of 0.08 or More Within Two Hours of Driving
While There Is a Person under the Age of Fifteen Years in the
Vehicle
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control with an alcohol concentration
of 0.08 or more within two hours of driving while there is a person under the age of fifteen
years in the vehicle requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
4. A person under fifteen years of age was in the vehicle at the time of the offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(3) and 28-1381(A)(2) (statutory language as of September 19,
2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual physical
control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual physical
control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in the
instruction. In some cases, there may be issues of actual physical control and circumstantial
evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both choices. See State
ex rel O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d 474 (1995)
(police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding the keys and seated
in the stopped car).
28.1383(A)(3)-3 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While There Is a
Drug in the Defendant’s Body While There Is a Person Under
the Age of Fifteen Years in the Vehicle
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while there is a drug in the
defendant’s body while there is a person under the age of fifteen years in the vehicle requires
proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had in [his] [her] body [(name of drug)] [a metabolite of (name of
drug)] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. A person under fifteen years of age was in the vehicle at the time of the offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(3) and 28-1381(A)(3) (statutory language as of September 19,
2007).
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USE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Under the influence offenses can be committed while driving or while in actual physical
control of a vehicle. If there is only evidence of driving, do not include actual physical
control in the instruction. If there is no issue of driving, do not refer to driving in the
instruction. In some cases, there may be issues of actual physical control and circumstantial
evidence of driving. In those cases, the jury instruction should include both choices. See State
ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d 474 (1995)
(police observed cloud of dust in field and then found defendant holding the keys and seated
in the stopped car).
28.1383(A)(4)-1 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Subject to
an Interlock Device and Under the Influence
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while subject to an interlock
device and under the influence requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant was under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor
releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs
or vapor releasing substances] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical
control]; and
3. The defendant was impaired to the slightest degree by reason of being under the
influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor releasing substance containing a
toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs or vapor releasing substances];
and
4. The defendant had been ordered to equip any motor vehicle operated by the
defendant with a certified ignition interlock device.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(4) and 28-1381(A)(1) (statutory language as of January 1,
2012).
28.1383(A)(4)-2 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Subject to
an Interlock Device and an Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 or
More Within Two Hours of Driving
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while subject to an interlock
device and an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of driving requires
proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of
[driving][being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
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4. The defendant had been ordered to equip any motor vehicle operated by the
defendant with a certified ignition interlock device.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(4) and 28-1381(A)(2) (statutory language as of January 1,
2012).
28.1383(A)(4)-3 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Subject to
an Interlock Device and There Is a Drug in the Defendant’s
Body
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while subject to an interlock
device and there is a drug in the defendant’s body requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had in [his] [her] body [(name of drug)] [a metabolite of (name of
drug)] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The defendant had been ordered to equip any motor vehicle operated by the
defendant with a certified ignition interlock device.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(4) and 28-1381(A)(3) (statutory language as of January 1, 2012).
28.1383(A)(4)-4 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under the
Extreme Influence of Intoxicating Liquor While Subject to an
Interlock Device
The crime of driving or actual physical control while under the extreme influence of
intoxicating liquor while subject to an interlock device requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more within two hours of
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
4. The defendant had been ordered to equip any motor vehicle operated by the
defendant with a certified ignition interlock device.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(4) and 28-1382 (statutory language as of January 1, 2012).
28.1383(A)(5)-1 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Driving
the Wrong Way on a Highway and Under the Influence
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while driving the wrong way
on a highway and under the influence requests proof that:
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1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant was under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor
releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs
or vapor releasing substances] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical
control]; and
3. The defendant was impaired to the slightest degree by reason of being under the
influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor releasing substance containing a
toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs or vapor releasing substances];
and
4. The defendant drove the wrong way on a highway.
“Wrong way” means vehicular movement that is in a direction opposing the legal flow
of traffic. Wrong way does not include median crossing or a collision where a motor vehicle
comes to a stop facing the wrong way.
___________________
S
OURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(5), (N)(2) and 28-1381(A)(1) (statutory language as of
August 3, 2018).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts
D
EFINITIONS:
“Highway” means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way if a part of
the way is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. See A.R.S. § 28-
101(61) (statutory language as of August 3, 2018).
28.1383(A)(5)-2 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Driving
the Wrong Way on a Highway and an Alcohol Concentration of
0.08 or More Within Two Hours of Driving
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while driving the wrong way
on a highway and an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of driving
requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state;
and
2. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours
of [driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or
while [driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
4. The defendant drove the wrong way on a highway.
“Wrong way” means vehicular movement that is in a direction opposing the legal
flow of traffic. Wrong way does not include median crossing or a collision where a motor
vehicle comes to a stop facing the wrong way.
___________________
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(5), (N)(2) and 28-1381(A)(2) (statutory language as of
August 3, 2018).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
D
EFINITIONS:
“Highway” means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way if a part of
the way is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. See A.R.S. § 28
101(61) (statutory language as of August 3, 2018).
28.1383(A)(5)-3 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Driving
the Wrong Way on a Highway and There Is a Drug in the
Defendant’s Body
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while driving the wrong way
on a highway and there is a drug in the defendant’s body requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had in [his] [her] body [(name of drug)] [a metabolite of (name of
drug)] at the time of [driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The defendant drove the wrong way on a highway.
“Wrong way” means vehicular movement that is in a direction opposing the legal flow
of traffic. Wrong way does not include median crossing or a collision where a motor vehicle
comes to a stop facing the wrong way.
___________________
S
OURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(5), (N)(2) and 28-1381(A)(3) (statutory language as of
August 3, 2018).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts
D
EFINITIONS:
“Highway” means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way if a part of
the way is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. See A.R.S. § 28
101(61) (statutory language as of August 3, 2018).
28.1383(A)(5)-4 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Driving
the Wrong Way on a Highway and a Commercial Motor Vehicle
with an Alcohol Concentration of 0.04 or More
The crime of aggravated driving or actual physical control while driving the wrong way
on a highway and there is a drug in the defendant’s body requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a commercial motor
vehicle; and
2. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more; and
3. The defendant drove the wrong way on a highway.
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“Wrong way” means vehicular movement that is in a direction opposing the legal flow
of traffic. Wrong way does not include median crossing or a collision where a motor vehicle
comes to a stop facing the wrong way.
___________________
S
OURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(5), (N)(2) and 28-1381(A)(4) (statutory language as of
August 3, 2018).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts
D
EFINITIONS:
“Highway” means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way if a part of
the way is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. See A.R.S. § 28-
101(61) (statutory language as of August 3, 2018).
“Commercial driver license” means a license that is issued to an individual and that
authorizes the individual to operate a class of commercial motor vehicles. See A.R.S. § 28
3001 (statutory language as of August 9, 2017).
“Commercial motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle or combination of motor vehicles
used to transport passengers or property if the motor vehicle either:
(a) Has a gross combined weight rating of twenty-six thousand one or more pounds
inclusive of a towed unit with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than ten
thousand pounds.
(b) Has a gross vehicle weight rating of twenty-six thousand one or more pounds.
(c) Is a school bus.
(d) Is a bus.
(e) Is used in the transportation of materials found to be hazardous for the purposes of
the hazardous materials transportation act 49 United States Code §§ 5101 through
5127 and is required to be placarded under 49 Code of Federal Regulations §
172.504, as adopted by the department pursuant to chapter 14 of title 28.
See A.R.S. § 28–1301(3) (statutory language as of August 3, 2018).
28.1383(A)(5)-5 Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Driving
the Wrong Way on a Highway Under the Extreme Influence of
Intoxicating Liquor
The crime of driving or actual physical control while driving the wrong way and while
under the extreme influence of intoxicating liquor requires proof that:
1. The defendant [drove] [was in actual physical control of] a vehicle in this state; and
2. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more within two hours of
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
3. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[driving] [being in actual physical control of] the vehicle; and
4. The defendant drove the wrong way on a highway.
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“Wrong way” means vehicular movement that is in a direction opposing the legal flow
of traffic. Wrong way does not include median crossing or a collision where a motor vehicle
comes to a stop facing the wrong way.
___________________
S
OURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-1383(A)(5), (N)(2) and 28-1382(A) (statutory language as of August
3, 2018).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts
D
EFINITIONS:
“Highway” means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way if a part of
the way is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. See A.R.S. § 28
101(61) (statutory language as of August 3, 2018).
28.1383(B) Eighty-Four Month Provision
1. The dates of the commission of the offenses are the determining factor in applying
the eighty-four month provision.
2. The time that a probationer is found to be on absconder status or the time that a
person is incarcerated in any state, federal, county or city jail or correctional facility
is excluded when determining the eighty-four month period.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 28-1383(B) (statutory language as of September 19, 2007).
28.3318 Presumption of Receipt of Notice
Once mailed by the Motor Vehicle Department, the defendant is presumed to have
received notice of the [suspension] [revocation] [cancellation] [restriction]. The State is not
required to prove actual receipt of the notice or actual knowledge of the [suspension]
[revocation] [cancellation] [restriction]. Compliance with the notice provision required by
state law of the [suspension] [cancellation] [revocation] [restriction] may be presumed if the
notice of [suspension] [cancellation] [revocation] [restriction] was mailed by the Motor
Vehicle Department to the defendant at the address provided to the Department on the
licensee’s application or provided to the Department pursuant to a notice of change of
address or other source, including the address on a traffic citation received by the
Department.
You are free to accept or reject this presumption as triers of fact. You must determine
whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any
presumption that the law permits you to make. Even with the presumption, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt before
you can find the defendant guilty.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 28-3318 (statutory language as of September 18, 2003) and 28-3473
(statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
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USE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The State must prove that the defendant knew or should have known that the license
was suspended or revoked. State v. Agee, 181 Ariz. 58, 61, 887 P.2d 588, 591 (App. 1994);
State v. Rivera, 177 Ariz. 476, 479, 858 P.2d 1059, 1062 (App. 1994). The knowledge of
suspension or revocation may be presumed if the notice of suspension or revocation was
mailed to the last known address pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 28-448 and 28-3318. This permissive
presumption may be rebutted by presenting some evidence that the defendant did not know
that the license was suspended or revoked. State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz. 90, 94, 722 P.2d 258,
262 (1986).
C
OMMENT: In Lee v. State, 218 Ariz. 235, ¶ 8, 182 P.3d 1169 (2008), the court addressed the
common law “mail delivery rule.” The court wrote:
That is, proof of the fact of mailing will, absent any contrary evidence,
establish that delivery occurred. If, however, the addressee denies receipt,
the presumption of delivery disappears, but the fact of mailing still has
evidentiary force. [Citation omitted.] The denial of receipt creates an issue of
fact that the factfinder must resolve to determine if delivery actually
occurred.
Whether the same principles apply to the statutory presumption is unresolved.
36.2802(D) Affirmative Defense of Insufficient Concentration of Marijuana to Cause
Impairment
The defendant has raised the affirmative defense that the marijuana, or its metabolite,
was not present in a sufficient quantity to cause impairment with respect to the charged
offense of driving or actual physical control while there is marijuana in the defendant’s body.
The defendant must prove both of the following:
1. The defendant’s use was authorized by the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act
(AMMA), and
2. The marijuana, or any metabolite, found in defendant’s body was present in an
insufficient concentration to cause impairment.
The burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt always
remains on the State. However, the burden of proving the affirmative defense of insufficient
concentration to cause impairment is on the defendant. The defendant must prove the
affirmative defense of insufficient concentration to cause impairment by a preponderance of
the evidence.
If you find that the defendant has proven the affirmative defense of insufficient
concentration to cause impairment by a preponderance of evidence, you must find the
defendant not guilty of the offense of driving or actual physical control while there is
marijuana in the defendant’s body.
If the defendant was a Medical Marijuana cardholder at the time of the offense, the
defendant’s use is presumed to be authorized by AMMA. The State may rebut this
presumption.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 36-2802(D), 36-2811(A)(1), 36-2811(A)(2) (statutory language as of
December 14, 2010); Statutory Criminal 2.025.
USE NOTE: This is a defense available to a registered qualifying patient to § 28-
1381(A)(3).
Proof of “a preponderance of the evidence” means that a fact is more probably true than
not true.
COMMENT: “Section 36-2802(D), rather than § 28-1381(D), defines the affirmative
defense available to a registered qualifying patient to an (A)(3) charge. If their use of
marijuana is authorized by § 36-2802(D), such patients cannot be deemed to be under the
influence―and thus cannot be convicted under (A)(3)―based solely on concentrations of
marijuana or its metabolite insufficient to cause impairment. Possession of a registry card
creates a presumption that a qualifying patient is engaged in the use of marijuana pursuant to
the AMMA, so long as the patient does not possess more than the permitted quantity of
marijuana. A.R.S. § 36-2811(A)(1). That presumption is subject to rebuttal as provided under
§ 36-2811(A)(2).” Dobson v. McClennen, 238 Ariz. 389, 393 ¶ 19, 361 P.3d 374, 378 (2015).
“[T]he AMMA does not immunize a medical marijuana cardholder from prosecution under
§ 28-1381(A)(3), but instead affords an affirmative defense if the cardholder shows that the
marijuana or its metabolite was in a concentration insufficient to cause impairment.” Dobson
v. McClennen, 238 Ariz. at 390 ¶ 2, 361 P.3d at 375.
“The patient may establish an affirmative defense to such a charge by showing that his or
her use was authorized by the AMMA―which is subject to the rebuttable presumption
under § 36-2811(A)(2)―and that the marijuana or its metabolite was in a concentration
insufficient to cause impairment. The patient bears the burden of proof on the latter point
by a preponderance of the evidence, as with other affirmative defenses.” Dobson v. McClennen,
238 Ariz. 389, 393 ¶ 20, 361 P.3d 374, 378 (2015).
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TITLE 5
WATERCRAFT OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS
5.395(A)(1)-APC Actual Physical Control Defined
In determining whether the defendant was in actual physical control of the motorized
watercraft, you should consider the totality of the circumstances shown by the evidence and
whether the defendant’s current or imminent control of the motorized watercraft presented
a real danger to [himself] [herself] or others at the time alleged.
SOURCE: State v. Zaragoza, 221 Ariz. 49, 209 P.3d. 629 (2009).
U
SE NOTE: There is no definition of “actual physical control” in Title 5. The court may
wish to consider including a list of factors similar to those in the approved instruction from
Zaragoza which included:
1.
Whether the vehicle was ru
nning;
2.
Whether the ignition was o
n;
3.
Where the ignition key was located;
4.
Where and in what position the driver was found in the vehicle;
5. Whether the person was awake or asleep;
6.
Whether the vehicle’s headlights were on;
7.
Where the vehicle was stop
ped;
8.
Whether the driver had voluntarily pulled off the road;
9.
Time of day;
10. Weather conditions;
11.
Whether the heater or air conditioner was on;
12.
Whether the windows were up or down;
13.
Any explanation of the circumstances shown by the evidence.
This list is not meant to be all-inclusive. It is up to you to examine all the availab
le
evidence an
d weigh its credibility in determining whether the defendant actually posed a
threat to the public by the exercise of present or imminent control of the vehicle while
impaired.
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5.395(A)(1) Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized Watercraft
While Under the Influence
The crime of operating or actual physical control of a motorized watercraft while under the
influence requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
within this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant was under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor
releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, dr
ugs
or vapor releasing substan
ces] at the time of [operating] [being in actual physical
control]; and
4. The defendant’s ability to operate a motorized watercraft was impaired to the
slightest degree by reason of being under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any
drug] [a vapor releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of
liquor, drugs or vapor releasing substances].
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 5-395(A)(1) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
A.R.S. § 5-301 Definitions: (Statutory language as of July 17, 1994). These definitions apply
to all Title 5 instructions.
1. “Commercial motorized
watercraft” means a motorized watercraft that carries
passengers or property for a valuable consideration that is paid to the owner, charterer,
operator or agent or to any other person interested in the watercraft.
2.
“Commission” means the Arizona game and fish commission.
3.
“Department” means the Arizona game and fish department.
4. “Motorboat” means any watercraft that is not more than sixty-five feet in length and
that is propelled by machinery whether or not such machinery is the principal source of
propulsion.
5. “Motorized watercraft” me
ans any watercraft that is propelled by machinery whether or
not the machinery is the principal source of propulsion
.
6.
Operate” means to operate or be in actual physical control of a watercraft w
hile on
public waters.
7. “Op
erator” means a person who operates or is in actual physical control of a watercraft
while on public waters.
8. “Pe
rson” includes any individual, firm, corporation, partnership or association, and any
agent, assignee, trustee, executor, receiver or representative thereof.
9. “Public waters” means any body of water which is publicly owned or which the public is
permitted to use without permission of the owner upon which a motorized watercraft
can be navigated, including that part of waters common to interstate boundaries which is
within the boundaries of this state.
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10. “Revocation” means invalidating the certificate of number, numbers and annual
validation decals issued by the department to a watercraft and prohibiting the operation
of the watercraft on the waters of this state during a period of noncompliance with this
chapter.
11. “Sailboard” means any board of less than fifteen feet in length which is designed to be
propelled by wind action upon a sail for navigation on the water by a person operating
the board.
12. “Special anchorage area” means an area set aside and under the control of a federal, state
or local governmental agency, or by a duly authorized marina operator or concessionaire
for the mooring, anchoring or docking of watercraft.
13. “Underway” means that a watercraft on public waters is not at anchor, is not made fast
to the shore or is not aground.
14. “Undocumented watercraft” means any watercraft which does not have and is not
required to have a valid marine document as a watercraft of the United States.
15. “Wakeless speed” means a speed that does not cause the watercraft to create a wake, but
in no case in excess of five miles per hour.
16. “Watercraft” means any boat designed to be propelled by machinery, oars, paddles or
wind action upon a sail for navigation on the water, or as may be defined by rule of the
commission.
17. “Waterway” means any body of water, public or private, upon which a watercraft can be
navigated.
5.395(A)(2) Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized Watercraft
With an Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 or More Within Two Hours
of Operating
The crime of operating or actual physical control of a motorized watercraft with an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of operating requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
within this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of
[operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized watercraft; and
4. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized watercraft.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 5-395(A)(2) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
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5.395(A)(3) Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized Watercraft
While There Is a Drug in the Defendant’s Body
The crime of operating or actual physical control of a motorized watercraft while there is
a drug in the defendant’s body requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
within this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant had in [his] [her] body [(name of drug)] [a metabolite of (name of
drug)] at the time of [operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized
watercraft.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 5-395(A)(3) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
Insert the name of the particular drug, e.g.,“codeine, amphetamine,” which is in the body
or has been metabolized in the body. The proscribed drugs are any of those found in A.R.S.
§ 13-3401.
In those cases where a driver ingests a legal substance which through a bodily process
unknown to a person of average intelligence and common experience, that substance is
transformed into a prohibited substance, the driver is not liable under A.R.S. § 13-
1381(A)(3). State v. Boyd, 201 Ariz. 27, 31 P.3d 140 (App. 2001).
C
OMMENT: “A person using a drug as prescribed by a medical practitioner licensed pursuant
to title 32, chapter 7, 11, 13 or 17 is not guilty of violating subsection A, paragraph 3 of this
section.” A.R.S. § 5-395(C). The statutory defense applies to only A.R.S. § 5-395(A)(3)
(statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
5.395(A)(4) Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Commercial Motorized
Watercraft With an Alcohol Concentration of 0.04 or More
The crime of operating or actual physical control of a commercial motorized watercraft
with an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
within this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The motorized watercraft is a commercial motorized watercraft; and
4. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 5-395(A)(4)(statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
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5.395(C) Affirmative Defense to Operating or Actual Physical Control While
There Is a Drug in the Defendant’s Body
A person using a drug as prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner who is authorized
to prescribe the drug is not guilty of operating or actual physical control while there is a drug
in the defendant’s body.
The defendant has raised the affirmative defense of using a drug as prescribed with
respect to the charged offense of operating or actual physical control while there is a drug in
the defendant’s body. The burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt always remains on the State. However, the burden of proving the
affirmative defense of using a drug as prescribed is on the defendant. The defendant must
prove the affirmative defense of using a drug as prescribed by a preponderance of evidence.
If you find that the defendant has proven the affirmative defense of using a drug as
prescribed by a preponderance of the evidence, you must find by the defendant not guilty of
the offense of operating or actual physical control while there is a drug in the defendant’s
body.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 5-395(C) (statutory language as of August 6, 2016); Statutory Criminal
2.025.
U
SE NOTE: This is a defense to § 5-395 (A)(3) if the person is using a drug as prescribed by
a medical practitioner who is licensed under any section of Title 32 and who is authorized to
prescribe the drug.
Proof of “a preponderance of the evidence” means that a fact is more probably true than
not true.
5.395(F) Presumptions of Intoxication
The amount of alcohol in a defendant’s [blood] [breath] [bodily substance] gives rise to
the following presumptions:
1. If there was at that time 0.05 percent or less by concentration of alcohol in the
defendant’s [blood] [breath] [bodily substance], it may be presumed that the
defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
2. If there was at that time an excess of 0.05 percent but less than 0.08 percent by
concentration of alcohol in the defendant’s [blood] [breath] [bodily substance], such
fact does not give rise to any presumption that the defendant was or was not under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.
3. If there was at that time 0.08 percent or more by concentration of alcohol in the
defendant’s [blood] [breath] [bodily substance], it may be presumed that the
defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
These are rebuttable presumptions. In other words, you are free to accept or reject these
presumptions after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Even with these
presumptions, the State has the burden of proving each and every element of the offense of
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driving under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt before you can find the defendant
guilty.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 5-395(F) and (G) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The statute provides that these presumptions shall not be construed as limiting the
introduction and consideration of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question
of whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
5.397(A)(1) & (2) Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized Watercraft
While Under the Extreme Influence of Intoxicating Liquor
The crime of operating or actual physical control of a motorized watercraft while under
the extreme influence of intoxicating liquor requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
in this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of [0.15 or more but less than 0.20]
[0.20 or more] within two hours of [operating] [being in actual physical control of]
the motorized watercraft; and
4. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized watercraft.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 5-397(A)(1) and (2) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: The user is advised that this instruction applies to one or the other sections of
A.R.S. § 5-397(A)(1) the 0.15 or more but less than 0.20 and A.R.S. § 5-397 (A)(2) the 0.20
or more within two hours. Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
5.396(A)(1)-1 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized
Watercraft While Under the Influence Three or More
Convictions Within Eighty-Four Months
The crime of aggravated operating or actual physical control of a motorized watercraft
while under the influence with three or more prior convictions within eighty-four months
requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
in this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant was under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor
releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs
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or vapor releasing substances] at the time of [operating] [being in actual physical
control]; and
4. The defendant’s ability to operate a motorized watercraft was impaired to the
slightest degree by reason of being under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any
drug] [a vapor releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of
liquor, drugs or vapor releasing substances].
5. The defendant had been convicted three or more times of operating a motorized
watercraft while under the influence; and
6. The dates of the offenses giving rise to the prior convictions were within eighty-four
months of the date of the current offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 5-395, 5-396(A)(1) and 5-397 (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
A.R.S. § 5-396(B) provides that the dates of commission of the offenses are the
determining factors in applying this eighty-four-month provision.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
C
OMMENT: A rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to prior convictions used to
enhance a sentence or as an element of a crime. “When the State seeks to use a prior
conviction as a sentence enhancer or as an element of a crime, the State must first prove the
existence of the prior conviction. At the time, the presumption of regularity attaches to the
final judgment. If the defendant presents some credible evidence to overcome the
presumption, the State must fulfill its duty to establish that the prior conviction was
constitutionally obtained.” State v. McCann, 200 Ariz. 27, 31, 21 P.3d 845, 849 (2001),
overruling State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907 (1968), and State v. Renaud, 108 Ariz. 417,
499 P.2d 712 (1972).
5.396(A)(1)-2 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized
Watercraft With an Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 or More Within
Two Hours of Operating Three Convictions Within Eighty-
Four Months
The crime of aggravated operating or actual physical control of a motorized watercraft
with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of operating with three
prior convictions requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
in this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of
[operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized watercraft; and
4. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized watercraft; and
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5. The defendant had been convicted three or more times of operating a motorized
watercraft while under the influence; and
6. The dates of the offenses giving rise to the prior convictions were within eighty-four
months of the date of the current offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 5-396(A)(1) and 5-395(A)(2) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
A.R.S. § 5-396(B) provides that the dates of commission of the offenses are the
determining factors in applying this eighty-four-month provision.
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the case.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
C
OMMENT: A rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to prior convictions used to
enhance a sentence or as an element of a crime. “When the State seeks to use a prior
conviction as a sentence enhancer or as an element of a crime, the State must first prove the
existence of the prior conviction. At the time, the presumption of regularity attaches to the
final judgment. If the defendant presents some credible evidence to overcome the
presumption, the State must fulfill its duty to establish that the prior conviction was
constitutionally obtained.” State v. McCann, 200 Ariz. 27, 31, 21 P.3d 845, 849 (2001),
overruling State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907 (1968), and State v. Renaud, 108 Ariz. 417,
499 P.2d 712 (1972).
5.396(A)(1)-3 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized
Watercraft While There Is a Drug in the Defendant’s Body
Three or More Convictions Within Eighty-Four Months
The crime of aggravated operating or actual physical control of a motorized watercraft
while there is a drug in the defendant’s body with three prior convictions within eighty-four
months requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
in this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant had in [his] [her] body [(name of drug)] [a metabolite of (name of
drug)] at the time of [operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized
watercraft; and
4. The defendant had been convicted three or more times of operating a motorized
watercraft while under the influence; and
5. The prior convictions were committed within eighty-four months of the date of the
current offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 5-396(A)(1) and 5-395(A)(3) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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A.R.S. § 5-396(B) provides that the dates of commission of the offenses are the
determining factors in applying this sixty-month provision.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
C
OMMENT: A rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to prior convictions used to
enhance a sentence or as an element of a crime. “When the State seeks to use a prior
conviction as a sentence enhancer or as an element of a crime, the State must first prove the
existence of the prior conviction. At the time, the presumption of regularity attaches to the
final judgment. If the defendant presents some credible evidence to overcome the
presumption, the State must fulfill its duty to establish that the prior conviction was
constitutionally obtained.” State v. McCann, 200 Ariz. 27, 31, 21 P.3d 845, 849 (2001),
overruling State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907 (1968), and State v. Renaud, 108 Ariz. 417,
499 P.2d 712 (1972).
5.396(A)(2)(a)-1 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of a
Motorized Watercraft While Under the Influence While
There Is a Person Under the Age of Fifteen Years Aboard the
Motorized Watercraft
The crime of aggravated operating or being actual physical control of a motorized
watercraft while under the influence while there is a person under the age of fifteen years in
the motorized watercraft requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
in this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant was under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor
releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs
or vapor releasing substances] at the time of [operating] [being in actual physical
control]; and
4. The defendant’s ability to drive a motorized watercraft was impaired to the slightest
degree by reason of being under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a
vapor releasing substance containing a toxic substance][any combination of liquor,
drugs or vapor releasing substances]; and
5. A person under fifteen years of age was aboard the motorized watercraft at the time
of the offense, and
6. The defendant recklessly endangered the person who is under fifteen years of age
with a substantial risk of physical injury.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 5-395(A)(1) and 5-396(A)(2)(a) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
The court must instruct on the culpable mental state. See Standard Criminal Instruction
1.0510(c) for the definition of “recklessly.”
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COMMENT: Peterson v. Jacobson, 2 Ariz. App. 593, 411 P.2d 31(App. 1966) (crime of reckless
driving and that of driving while intoxicated are separate and distinct offenses and are
established by different evidence).
5.396(A)(2)(a)-2 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of a
Motorized Watercraft With an Alcohol Concentration of 0.08
or More Within Two Hours of Operating While There Is a
Person Under the Age of Fifteen Years Aboard the
Motorized Watercraft
The crime of aggravated operating or actual physical control of a motorized watercraft
with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of operating while there is a
person under the age of fifteen years abroad the motorized watercraft requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
in this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of
[operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized watercraft; and
4. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized watercraft; and
5. A person under fifteen years of age was aboard the motorized watercraft at the time
of the offense, and
6. The defendant recklessly endangered the person who is under fifteen years of age
with a substantial risk of physical injury.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 5-395(A)(2) and 5-396(A)(2)(a) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
The court must instruct on the culpable mental state. See Standard Criminal Instruction
1.0510(c) for the definition of “recklessly.”
5.396(A)(2)(a)-3 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of a
Motorized Watercraft Under the Influence of Intoxicating
Liquor or Drugs While There Is a Person Under Fifteen
Aboard The Motorized Watercraft
The crime of aggravated operating or actual physical control while there is a person
under the age of fifteen years aboard the motorized watercraft requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
in this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
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3. The defendant had in [his] [her] body [(name of drug)] [a metabolite of (name of
drug)] at the time of [operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized
watercraft; and
4. A person under fifteen years of age was aboard the motorized watercraft at the time
of the offense, and
5. The defendant recklessly endangered the person under fifteen years of age with a
substantial risk of physical injury.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 5.395(A)(3) and 5-396(A)(2)(a) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
The court must instruct on the culpable mental state. See Standard Criminal Instruction
1.0510(c) for the definition of “recklessly.”
C
OMMENT: For Reckless Boating with Minor: Peterson v. Jacobson, 2 Ariz. App. 593, 411 P.2d
31 (App. 1966) (crime of reckless driving and that of driving while intoxicated are separate
and distinct offenses and are established by different evidence.
5.396(A)(2)(b)-1 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of a
Motorized Watercraft While Under the Influence While
There Is a Person Under the Age of Fifteen Years Aboard
The Motorized Watercraft With One Prior
The crime of aggravated operating or being actual physical control of a motorized
watercraft while under the influence while there is a person under the age of fifteen years
abroad the motorized watercraft with one prior requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
in this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant was under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a vapor
releasing substance containing a toxic substance] [any combination of liquor, drugs
or vapor releasing substances] at the time of [operating] [being in actual physical
control]; and
4. The defendant’s ability to drive a motorized watercraft was impaired to the slightest
degree by reason of being under the influence of [intoxicating liquor] [any drug] [a
vapor releasing substance containing a toxic substance][any combination of liquor,
drugs or vapor releasing substances]; and
5. A person under fifteen years of age was aboard the motorized watercraft at the time
of the offense, and
6. The defendant has a prior conviction for a violation of A.R.S. § 5-395; and
7. The date of the offense giving rise to the prior conviction was within eighty-four
months of the date of the current offense.
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 5-395(A)(1) and 5-396(A)(2)(b) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
5.396(A)(2)(b)-2 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control a Motorized
Watercraft With an Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 or More
Within Two Hours of Operating While There Is a Person
Under the Age of Fifteen Years Aboard the Motorized
Watercraft With One Prior
The crime of aggravated operating or actual physical control of a motorized watercraft
with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of operating while there is a
person under the age of fifteen years aboard the motorized watercraft with one prior
conviction requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
in this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of
[operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized watercraft; and
4. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized watercraft; and
5. A person under fifteen years of age was aboard the motorized watercraft at the time
of the offense, and
6. The defendant has a prior conviction for a violation of A.R.S. § 5-395; and
7. The date of the offense giving rise to the prior conviction was within eighty-four
months of the date of the current offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 5-395(A)(2) and 5-396(A)(2)(b) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
5.396(A)(2)(b)-3 Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of a
Motorized Watercraft Under the Influence of Intoxicating
Liquor or Drugs While There Is a Person Under Fifteen
Aboard With One Prior
The crime of aggravated operating or actual physical control of a motorized watercraft
while there is a person under the age of fifteen years aboard the motorized watercraft with
one prior violation of A.R.S. § 5-395 requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
in this state; and
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2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant had in [his] [her] body [(name of drug)] [a metabolite of (name of
drug)] at the time of [operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized
watercraft; and
4. A person under fifteen years of age was aboard the motorized watercraft at the time
of the offense, and
5. The defendant has a prior conviction for a violation of A.R.S. § 5-395; and
6. The date of the offense giving rise to the prior conviction was within eighty-four
months of the date of the current offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 5-395(A)(3) and 5-396(A)(2)(b) (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in the brackets as appropriate to the facts.
Under the current statute, the prior may only be for a violation of A.R.S. § 5-395; not an
A.R.S. § 5-396 violation.
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
5.396(A)(2)(c) Aggravated Operating or Actual Physical Control of a Motorized
Watercraft While Under the Extreme Influence While There Is a
Person Under the Age of Fifteen Years in the Motorized
Watercraft
The crime of aggravated operating or actual physical control of a motorized watercraft
while under the extreme influence while there is a person under the age of fifteen years
aboard the motorized watercraft requires requires proof that:
1. The defendant [operated] [was in actual physical control of] a motorized watercraft
in this state; and
2. The motorized watercraft was underway; and
3. The defendant had an alcohol concentration of [0.15 or more but less than 0.20]
[0.20 or more] within two hours of [operating] [being in actual physical control of]
the motorized watercraft; and
4. The alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed either before or while
[operating] [being in actual physical control of] the motorized watercraft; and
5. A person under fifteen years of age was aboard the motorized watercraft at the time
of the offense.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 5-396(A)(2)(c) and 5-397 (statutory language as of January 1, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: The user is advised that this instruction applies to one or the other sections of
A.R.S. § 5-397(A)(1) the 0.15 or more but less than 0.20 and A.R.S. § 5-397 (A)(2) the 0.20
or more within two hours. Use language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
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“A person who is convicted under subsection A, paragraph 2, subdivision (c) of this
section shall serve at least the minimum term of incarceration required pursuant to § 5-397.”
A.R.S. § 5-396(F).
Refer to the Use Note in Instruction 5.395(A)(1) for needed definitions.
36.2802(D) Affirmative Defense of Insufficient Concentration of Marijuana to Cause
Impairment
The defendant has raised the affirmative defense that the marijuana, or its metabolite,
was not present in a sufficient quantity to cause impairment with respect to the charged
offense of driving or actual physical control while there is marijuana in the defendant’s body.
The defendant must prove both of the following:
1. The defendant’s use was authorized by the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act
(AMMA), and
2. The marijuana, or any metabolite, found in defendant’s body was present in an
insufficient concentration to cause impairment.
The burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt always
remains on the State. However, the burden of proving the affirmative defense of insufficient
concentration to cause impairment is on the defendant. The defendant must prove the
affirmative defense of insufficient concentration to cause impairment by a preponderance of
the evidence.
If you find that the defendant has proven the affirmative defense of insufficient
concentration to cause impairment by a preponderance of evidence, you must find the
defendant not guilty of the offense of driving or actual physical control while there is
marijuana in the defendant’s body.
If the defendant was a Medical Marijuana cardholder at the time of the offense, the
defendant’s use is presumed to be authorized by AMMA. The State may rebut this
presumption.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 36-2802(D), 36-2811(A)(1), 36-2811(A)(2) (statutory language as of
December 14, 2010); Statutory Criminal 2.025.
USE NOTE: This is a defense available to a registered qualifying patient to § 28-
1381(A)(3).
Proof of “a preponderance of the evidence” means that a fact is more probably true than
not true.
COMMENT: “Section 36-2802(D), rather than § 28-1381(D), defines the affirmative
defense available to a registered qualifying patient to an (A)(3) charge. If their use of
marijuana is authorized by § 36-2802(D), such patients cannot be deemed to be under the
influence―and thus cannot be convicted under (A)(3)―based solely on concentrations of
marijuana or its metabolite insufficient to cause impairment. Possession of a registry card
creates a presumption that a qualifying patient is engaged in the use of marijuana pursuant to
the AMMA, so long as the patient does not possess more than the permitted quantity of
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marijuana. A.R.S. § 36-2811(A)(1). That presumption is subject to rebuttal as provided under
§ 36-2811(A)(2).” Dobson v. McClennen, 238 Ariz. 389, 393 ¶ 19, 361 P.3d 374, 378 (2015).
“[T]he AMMA does not immunize a medical marijuana cardholder from prosecution under
§ 28-1381(A)(3), but instead affords an affirmative defense if the cardholder shows that the
marijuana or its metabolite was in a concentration insufficient to cause impairment.” Dobson
v. McClennen, 238 Ariz. at 390 ¶ 2, 361 P.3d at 375.
“The patient may establish an affirmative defense to such a charge by showing that his or
her use was authorized by the AMMA―which is subject to the rebuttable presumption under
§ 36-2811(A)(2)―and that the marijuana or its metabolite was in a concentration insufficient
to cause impairment. The patient bears the burden of proof on the latter point by a
preponderance of the evidence, as with other affirmative defenses.” Dobson v. McClennen, 238
Ariz. 389, 393 ¶ 20, 361 P.3d 374, 378 (2015).
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TITLE 14
14.5101.01 Definition of Incapacitated Person
“Incapacitated person” means any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness,
mental deficiency, mental disorder, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic
intoxication or other cause, except minority, to the extent that the person lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his or
her person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 14-5101(1) (statutory language as of July 17, 1994).
U
SE NOTE: The term “incapacitated person” is included within the definition of “vulnerable
adult” as defined in A.R.S. § 46-451 (Statutory Definition Instruction 46-451.09).
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TITLE 25
25.500(1) Definition of “Support”
“Support” means the provision of maintenance or subsistence and includes medical
insurance coverage and uncovered medical costs for the child, arrearages, interest on
arrearages, past support, interest on past support and reimbursement for expended public
assistance. [If the defendant’s obligations were ordered in a Title IV-D case under the Social
Security Act, the term also includes spousal maintenance that was included in the same order
that directed child support.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 25-500(9) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The additional definition of support in the statute pertaining to spousal maintenance in
social security cases should be used cautiously to insure that the spousal maintenance order
involves support for the child. Otherwise, the bracketed language would have no relevance
to the criminal offense of failure of parent to provide support for a child.
25.500(2) Definition of “Arrearage”
“Arrearage” means the total unpaid support owed, including child support, past support,
spousal maintenance and interest.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 25-500(1) (statutory language as of July 18, 2000).
25.511 Failure of Parent to Provide for a Child
The crime of failure of a parent to provide for a child requires proof that the defendant:
1. was a parent of a minor child; and
2. knowingly failed to furnish reasonable support for such minor child.
In determining whether the defendant failed to furnish reasonable support, you shall
consider all assets, earnings and entitlements of the defendant, and whether the defendant
made all reasonable efforts to obtain the necessary funds.
Inability to furnish support is not a defense to this offense if the defendant voluntarily
remained idle, voluntarily decreased [his] [her] income or voluntarily incurred other financial
obligations.
[If there has been evidence of the defendant’s previous employment or the defendant’s
lack of a physical or mental disability precluding employment, you may infer that the
defendant is capable of full-time employment at least at the federal adult minimum wage.
You are not required to make this inference. You must determine whether the facts and
circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any inference which the law
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permits you to make. You are reminded that the State has the burden of proving each and
every element of the offense of shoplifting beyond a reasonable doubt.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 25-511 (statutory language as of August 6, 1999).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts. Do not use the
bracketed language if the defendant was a non-custodial parent who was under the age of 18
years and still attending high school at the time of the offense.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Support” is defined in A.R.S. § 25-500 (Title 25 Statutory Definition Instruction 25-
500(1)).
C
OMMENT: The statute provides for an affirmative defense that the defendant complied
with a valid court order that was in effect at the time of the offense that set forth an amount
of support for the minor child or provided that the defendant was unable to furnish
reasonable support. A.R.S. § 25-511(B).
The statute also provides an exception that should have been ruled on by the Court prior
to trial or during a Rule 20 proceeding. This exception allows the Court to determine
whether the defendant, the defendant’s parents or a legal guardian is not obligated to
contribute to the child’s support if maternity or paternity was the result of the parent’s sexual
contact with a person who has been found guilty of sexual conduct with a minor under
A.R.S. § 13-1405 or sexual assault under A.R.S. § 13-1406. A.R.S. §§ 25-511(A) and 25-
500(F).
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TITLE 35
35.301 Misuse of Public Monies
The crime of misuse of public monies requires proof that the defendant was a [public
officer] [justice of the peace] [constable] [person] charged with the receipt, safekeeping,
transfer or disbursement of public money, and the defendant:
[without authority of law, appropriated public money, or any portion thereof, to the
defendant’s own use, or to the use of another.]
[knowingly loaned public money, or any portion thereof.]
[knowingly failed to keep public money in the defendant’s possession until disbursed or
paid out by authority of law.]
[without authority of law knowingly deposited public money, or any portion thereof, in a
bank, or with a banker or other person, except on special deposit for safekeeping.]
[knowingly kept a false account, or made a false entry or erasure in an account of, or
relating to public money.]
[(altered) (falsified) (concealed) (destroyed) (obliterated) an account of, or relating to
public money with an intent to defraud or deceive.]
[knowingly refused or omitted to pay over, on demand, public monies in the defendant’s
hands, upon presentation of a draft, order or warrant drawn upon such monies by
competent authority.]
[knowingly omitted or refused to transfer public money when a transfer was required by
law.]
[knowingly transferred public money when not authorized or directed by law.]
[knowingly omitted or refused to pay over to an officer or person authorized by law to
receive public money, any public money received by the defendant when a duty was
imposed by law to pay over the public money.]
“Public money” includes bonds and evidence of indebtedness, and money belonging to,
received or held by, state, county, district, city or town officers in their official capacity.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 35-301 (statutory language as of April 23, 1980); 35-302 (statutory
language as of April 23, 1980).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal
1.0510(a)(1)).
C
OMMENT: The actual statutory caption for this offense is “Duties and liabilities of
custodian of public monies.” However, this statute is commonly referred to as “Misuse of
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Public Monies.” Because that is a more accurate description of the offense, the Committee
used the latter title for the instruction.
There is no statute of limitations for a crime involving misuse of public monies. A.R.S.
§ 13-107.
There is no definition of “public officer” in Title 35. There is a definition of “public
officer” in A.R.S. § 38-101, which states that the definition applies to Title 38. For this
reason, the Committee believed it was not appropriate to incorporate this definition in this
instruction.
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TITLE 38
38.101 Definition of “Officer” or “Public Officer”
“Officer” or “public officer” means the incumbent of any office, member of any board
or commission, or the deputy or assistant exercising the powers and duties of the officer,
other than clerks or mere employees of the officer.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 38-101 (statutory language as of 1939).
38.421 Stealing, Destroying, Altering or Secreting Public Record
The crime of stealing, destroying, altering or secreting public record requires proof that
the defendant:
1. [was not a public officer; and]
2. [was a public officer having custody of any (record/map/book/paper or proceeding
of any court), which was (filed or deposited in any public office/placed in the
defendant’s hands for any purpose); and]
3. knowingly and without lawful authority [commits theft of] [destroys] [mutilates]
[defaces] [alters] [falsifies] [removes] [secretes] [permits another person to (list one or
more of foregoing acts)] all or any part of any (record/map/book/paper or
proceeding of any court), which was (filed or deposited in any public office/placed
in the defendant’s hands for any purpose).
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 38-421 (statutory language as of October 1, 1978).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts. Use only one paragraph
1 depending on whether the defendant was a public officer.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.056(b)).
“Unlawful” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 1.0541).
“Theft” is def
ined in A.R.S. § 13-1802 (Statutory Criminal Instruction 18.02-1).
“Officer” or “Public officer” is defined in A.R.S. § 38-101 (Statutory Title 38 Non-Criminal
Instruction 38-1.01).
The instruction must include a finding of whether the defendant is or is not a public
officer, because it affects the class of felony. A.R.S. § 38-421.
C
OMMENT: There is no statute of limitations for a crime involving falsification of public
records. A.R.S. § 13-107; State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz. App. 246, 248-49, 492 P.2d 742, 744-45
(1972).
If the defendant is a public officer, the offense is a class 4 felony, while a nonpublic
officer’s violation of this statute is a class 6 felony. A.R.S. § 38-421.
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TITLE 39
39.161 Presentment of False Instrument for Filing
The crime of presentment of false instrument for filing requires proof of the following:
1. the defendant [acknowledged] [certified] [notarized] [procured] [offered] to [file]
[register] [record] an instrument in a public office; and
2. the defendant knew that the instrument was [false] [forged]; and
3. the instrument, if genuine, could be [filed] [registered] [recorded] under the law.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 39-161 (statutory language as of April 23, 1980).
U
SE NOTE: Use the language in brackets as appropriate to the facts.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b)).
“Instrument” includes “written instrument,” which is defined in A.R.S. § 13-2001. See
A.R.S. § 39-161.
COMMENT: Unlike the crime of forgery, intent to defraud is not an element of this crime.
State v. Edgar, 124 Ariz. 472, 474, 605 P.2d 450, 452 (1979).
While there is no statute of limitations for a crime involving falsification of public
records, the usual statute of limitations for a felony applies to the offense of presentment of
false instrument for filing. State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz. App. 246, 248-49, 492 P.2d 742, 744-45
(1972).
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TITLE 41
41.1661 Definition of Correctional Officer
“Correctional officer” is defined as a person, other than an elected official, who is
employed by the State of Arizona or a county, city or town in Arizona and who is
responsible for the supervision, protection, care, custody or control of inmates in a state,
county or municipal correctional institution, including counselors, but excluding secretarial,
clerical and professionally trained personnel.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 41-1661 (statutory language as of June 26, 1997).
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TITLE 44
44.1453.B.1 Use of Counterfeit Marks with One Prior Conviction
The crime of “use of counterfeit marks with one prior conviction” requires proof that
the defendant:
1. knowingly, and with the intent to [sell] [distribute], [used/displayed/advertised/
distributed/offered for sale/sold/possessed] any [item that bore a counterfeit mark]
[service that was identified by a counterfeit mark]; and
2. was previously convicted of “use of counterfeit marks.
[A person who knowingly has possession, custody or control of at least twenty-six items
that bear a counterfeit mark is presumed to possess the items with the intent to sell or
distribute the items. You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must
determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant
any inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt before
you can find the defendant guilty.]
A “counterfeit mark” means any unauthorized reproduction or copy of intellectual
property or intellectual property that is affixed to any item that is knowingly sold, offered for
sale, manufactured or distributed or to any identifying services offered or rendered without
the authority of the intellectual property owner. “Intellectual property” means any
trademark, service mark, trade name, label, term, device, design or word that is adopted or
used by a person to identify that person’s goods or services.
[“Service mark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify services provided or sold by that
person and to distinguish the services from services provided or sold by others.]
[“Trademark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify goods made or sold by that person
and to distinguish the goods from goods made or sold by others.]
[“Item” includes any component that is designed, marketed or otherwise intended to be
used on or in connection with any goods or services or any component of a finished
product.]
________________________
S
OURCE: A.R.S. §§ 44-1453(A), (B)(1), (E) and (M) (statutory language as of September 26,
2008); 44-1441 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.056(a)(1)).
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 44-1453(E) provides for a mandatory presumption. There are no cases
pertaining to the presumption, but mandatory presumptions are deemed to be
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unconstitutional, because they shift the burden of proof to the defendant. State v. Mohr, 150
Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
(1985). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret the presumption in the statute as a
permissive one, which would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564,
568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must be permissive
to withstand constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the defendant).
44.1453.B.2 Use of Counterfeit Marks
The crime of “use of counterfeit marks” requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly, and with the intent to [sell] [distribute],
[used/displayed/advertised/ distributed/offered for sale/sold/possessed] any [item
that bore a counterfeit mark] [service that was identified by a counterfeit mark]; and
2. [The offense involved more than one hundred but fewer than one thousand items
that bore the counterfeit mark.]
[The total retail value of all of the [items that bore] [services that were identified by]
a counterfeit mark was more than one thousand dollars but less than ten thousand
dollars.]
[A person who knowingly has possession, custody or control of at least twenty-six
items that bear a counterfeit mark is presumed to possess the items with the intent
to sell or distribute the items. You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers
of fact. You must determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the
evidence in this case warrant any inference that the law permits you to make. Even
with the inference, the State has the burden of proving each and every element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt before you can find the defendant guilty.]
A “counterfeit mark” means any unauthorized reproduction or copy of intellectual
property or intellectual property that is affixed to any item that is knowingly sold, offered for
sale, manufactured or distributed or to any identifying services offered or rendered without
the authority of the intellectual property owner. “Intellectual property” means any
trademark, service mark, trade name, label, term, device, design or word that is adopted or
used by a person to identify that person’s goods or services.
[“Service mark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify services provided or sold by that
person and to distinguish the services from services provided or sold by others.]
[“Trademark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify goods made or sold by that person
and to distinguish the goods from goods made or sold by others.]
[“Item” includes any component that is designed, marketed or otherwise intended to be
used on or in connection with any goods or services or any component of a finished
product.]
[In determining the total quantity of items, you are to consider all items that the
defendant manufactured, used, displayed, advertised, distributed, offered for sale, sold or
possessed and that bore a counterfeit mark.]
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[For items that bear a counterfeit mark and that are components of a finished product,
“retail value” means the manufacturer’s suggested retail price of the finished product on or
in which the component would be utilized. For all other items that bear a counterfeit mark
or services that are identified by a counterfeit mark, “retail value” means the manufacturer’s
suggested retail price for those items or services. The “total retail value” is the retail value of
all items or services that the defendant manufactured, used, displayed, advertised,
distributed, offered for sale, sold or possessed and that bore a counterfeit mark or that were
identified by a counterfeit mark.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 44-1453(A), (B)(2), (L) and (M) (statutory language as of July 3, 2015);
44-1441 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.056(a)(1)).
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 44-1453(E) provides for a mandatory presumption. There are no cases
pertaining to the presumption, but mandatory presumptions are deemed to be
unconstitutional, because they shift the burden of proof to the defendant. State v. Mohr, 150
Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
(1985). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret the presumption in the statute as a
permissive one, which would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564,
568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must be permissive
to withstand constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the defendant).
44.1453.D.1 Use of Counterfeit Marks With Two Prior Convictions
The crime of “use of counterfeit marks with two prior convictions” requires proof that
the defendant:
1. knowingly, and with the intent to [sell] [distribute], [used/displayed/advertised/
distributed/offered for sale/sold/possessed] any [item that bore a counterfeit mark]
[service that was identified by a counterfeit mark]; and
2. was previously convicted two or more times of “use of counterfeit marks.”
[A person who knowingly has possession, custody or control of at least twenty-six items
that bear a counterfeit mark is presumed to possess the items with the intent to sell or
distribute the items. You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must
determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant
any inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt before
you can find the defendant guilty.]
A “counterfeit mark” means any unauthorized reproduction or copy of intellectual
property or intellectual property that is affixed to any item that is knowingly sold, offered for
sale, manufactured or distributed or to any identifying services offered or rendered without
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the authority of the intellectual property owner. “Intellectual property” means any
trademark, service mark, trade name, label, term, device, design or word that is adopted or
used by a person to identify that person’s goods or services.
[“Service mark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify services provided or sold by that
person and to distinguish the services from services provided or sold by others.]
[“Trademark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify goods made or sold by that person
and to distinguish the goods from goods made or sold by others.]
[“Item” includes any component that is designed, marketed or otherwise intended to be
used on or in connection with any goods or services or any component of a finished
product.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 44-1453(A), (D)(1) and (M) (statutory language as of September 26,
2008); 44-1441 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.056(a)(1)).
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 44-1453(E) provides for a mandatory presumption. There are no cases
pertaining to the presumption, but mandatory presumptions are deemed to be
unconstitutional, because they shift the burden of proof to the defendant. State v. Mohr, 150
Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
(1985). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret the presumption in the statute as a
permissive one, which would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564,
568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must be permissive
to withstand constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the defendant).
44.1453.D.2 Use of Counterfeit Marks
The crime of “use of counterfeit marks” requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly, and with the intent to [sell] [distribute], [used/displayed/
advertised/distributed/offered for sale/sold/possessed] any [item that bore a counterfeit
mark] [service that was identified by a counterfeit mark]; and
2. [The offense involved one thousand or more items that bore the counterfeit mark.]
[The total retail value of all of the [items that bore] [services that were identified by]
a counterfeit mark was ten thousand dollars or more.]
[A person who knowingly has possession, custody or control of at least twenty-six
items that bear a counterfeit mark is presumed to possess the items with the intent
to sell or distribute the items. You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers
of fact. You must determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the
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evidence in this case warrant any inference that the law permits you to make. Even
with the inference, the State has the burden of proving each and every element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt before you can find the defendant guilty.]
A “counterfeit mark” means any unauthorized reproduction or copy of intellectual
property or intellectual property that is affixed to any item that is knowingly sold, offered for
sale, manufactured or distributed or to any identifying services offered or rendered without
the authority of the intellectual property owner. “Intellectual property” means any
trademark, service mark, trade name, label, term, device, design or word that is adopted or
used by a person to identify that person’s goods or services.
[“Service mark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify services provided or sold by that
person and to distinguish the services from services provided or sold by others.]
[“Trademark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify goods made or sold by that person
and to distinguish the goods from goods made or sold by others.]
[“Item” includes any component that is designed, marketed or otherwise intended to be
used on or in connection with any goods or services or any component of a finished
product.]
[In determining the total quantity of items, you are to consider all items that the
defendant manufactured, used, displayed, advertised, distributed, offered for sale, sold or
possessed and that bore a counterfeit mark.]
[For items that bear a counterfeit mark and that are components of a finished product,
“retail value” means the manufacturer’s suggested retail price of the finished product on or
in which the component would be utilized. For all other items that bear a counterfeit mark
or services that are identified by a counterfeit mark, “retail value” means the manufacturer’s
suggested retail price for those items or services. The “total retail value” is the retail value of
all items or services that the defendant manufactured, used, displayed, advertised,
distributed, offered for sale, sold or possessed and that bore a counterfeit mark or that were
identified by a counterfeit mark.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 44-1453(A), (D)(2), (L) and (M) (statutory language as of July 3, 2015);
44-1441 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.056(a)(1)).
C
OMMENT: A.R.S. § 44-1453(E) provides for a mandatory presumption. There are no cases
pertaining to the presumption, but mandatory presumptions are deemed to be
unconstitutional, because they shift the burden of proof to the defendant. State v. Mohr, 150
Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
(1985). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret the presumption in the statute as a
permissive one, which would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564,
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568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must be permissive
to withstand constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the defendant).
44.1453.C Manufacturing or Producing Items of Services with Counterfeit
Marks
The crime of “manufacturing or producing items or services with counterfeit marks”
requires proof that the defendant, with the intent to sell or distribute, knowingly
[manufactured] [produced] any [item that bore a counterfeit mark] [service that was
identified by a counterfeit mark].
[A person who knowingly has possession, custody or control of at least twenty-six items
that bear a counterfeit mark is presumed to possess the items with the intent to sell or
distribute the items. You are free to accept or reject this inference as triers of fact. You must
determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant
any inference that the law permits you to make. Even with the inference, the State has the
burden of proving each and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt before
you can find the defendant guilty.]
A “counterfeit mark” means any unauthorized reproduction or copy of intellectual
property or intellectual property that is affixed to any item that is knowingly sold, offered for
sale, manufactured or distributed or to any identifying services offered or rendered without
the authority of the intellectual property owner. “Intellectual property” means any
trademark, service mark, trade name, label, term, device, design or word that is adopted or
used by a person to identify that person’s goods or services.
[“Service mark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify services provided or sold by that
person and to distinguish the services from services provided or sold by others.]
[“Trademark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify goods made or sold by that person
and to distinguish the goods from goods made or sold by others.]
[“Item” includes any component that is designed, marketed or otherwise intended to be
used on or in connection with any goods or services or any component of a finished
product.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 44-1453(C) and (M) (statutory language as of September 26, 2008); 44-
1441 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b)).
“Intentionally” or “with the intent to” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 1.056(a)(1)).
Comment: A.R.S. § 44-1453(E) provides for a mandatory presumption. There are no cases
pertaining to the presumption, but mandatory presumptions are deemed to be
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unconstitutional, because they shift the burden of proof to the defendant. State v. Mohr, 150
Ariz. 564, 568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986), relying upon Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
(1985). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to interpret the presumption in the statute as a
permissive one, which would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564,
568-69, 724 P.2d 1237-38 (App. 1986) (holding that a statutory inference must be permissive
to withstand constitutional due process and to avoid burden-shifting to the defendant).
44.1455 Use of Unauthorized Copy of Computer Software
The crime of “use of unauthorized copy of computer software” requires proof that:
1. The defendant knowingly used, other than for personal, noncommercial use, an
unauthorized copy of computer software; and
2. The computer software when used [depicted] [incorporated] [displayed] [caused to
be depicted, incorporated or displayed] a trademark or service mark that had been
registered in Arizona for computer software.
[“Service mark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify services provided or sold by that
person and to distinguish the services from services provided or sold by others.]
[“Trademark” means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination of these
items that is adopted and used by a person to identify goods made or sold by that person
and to distinguish the goods from goods made or sold by others.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 44-1455 and 44-1441 (statutory language as of August 21, 1998).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
The court shall instruct on the culpable mental state.
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.056(b)).
577
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TITLE 46
46.451.01 Definition of “Abuse”
Abuse” means:
1. Intentional infliction of physical harm; or
2. Injury caused by negligent acts or omissions; or
3. Unreasonable confinement; or
4. Sexual abuse or sexual assault.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 46-451(A)(1) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
46.451.02 Definition of “De Facto Conservator
“De facto conservator” means any person who takes possession of the estate of a
vulnerable adult, without right or lawful authority. A de facto conservator is subject to all of
the responsibilities that attach to a legally appointed conservator or trustee.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 46-451(A)(2) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: “Vulnerable adult” is defined in A.R.S. § 46-451 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 46-451.09).
46.451.03 Definition of “De Facto Guardian”
“De facto guardian” means any person who takes possession of the person of a
vulnerable adult, without right or lawful authority. A de facto guardian is subject to all of the
responsibilities that attach to a legally appointed guardian.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §46-451(A)(3) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: “Vulnerable adult” is defined in A.R.S. § 46-451 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 46-451.09).
46.451.04 Definition of “Exploitation”
“Exploitation” means the illegal or improper use of a vulnerable adult or the vulnerable
adult’s resources for another’s profit or advantage.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 46-451(A)(4) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
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46.451.05 Definition of “Informed Consent”
“Informed consent” means any of the following:
1. A written expression by the person that the person fully understands the potential
risks and benefits of the withdrawal of food, water, medication, medical services,
shelter, cooling, heating or other services necessary to maintain minimum physical or
mental health and that the person desires that the service be withdrawn; or
2. Consent to withdraw food, water, medication, medical services, shelter, cooling,
heating or other services necessary to maintain minimum physical or mental health
as permitted by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction; or
3. A declaration made pursuant to law regarding living wills and/or health care
directives; or
4. Consent by another person under a durable power of attorney relating to health care
services to withdraw food, water, medication, medical services, shelter, cooling,
heating or other services necessary to maintain minimum physical or mental health.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 46-451(A)(5) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: The reference to subsection (A)(3) on living wills and health care directives is
found in Title 36, Chapter 32 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.
46.451.06 Definition of “Neglect”
“Neglect” means a pattern of conduct without the person’s informed consent resulting
in deprivation of food, water, medication, medical services, shelter, cooling, heating or other
services necessary to maintain minimum physical or mental health.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 46-451(A)(6) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
46.451.09 Definition of “Vulnerable Adult”
“Vulnerable adult” means an individual who is eighteen years of age or older and who is
unable to protect himself or herself from abuse, neglect or exploitation by others because of a
physical or mental impairment. Vulnerable adult includes an incapacitated person.
SOURCE: A.R.S. 46-451(A)(9) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Incapacitated person is defined in A.R.S. § 14-5101 (Statutory Definition
Instruction 14-5101).
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46.455 Endangerment of a Vulnerable Adult
The crime of “endangerment of a vulnerable adult” requires proof that:
1. The defendant was [employed] [a de facto guardian] [a de facto conservator]
[appointed by a court] to provide care to a vulnerable adult
2. The defendant caused or permitted [the life of the vulnerable adult to be
endangered] [the health of the vulnerable adult to be injured or endangered] by
neglect.
[“Vulnerable adult” means an individual who is eighteen years of age or older and who is
unable to protect [himself] [herself] from abuse, neglect or exploitation by others because of
a mental or physical impairment. “Vulnerable adult” includes an incapacitated person.]
[“Incapacitated person” means person who is impaired by reason of mental illness,
mental deficiency, mental disorder, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic
intoxication or other cause to the extent that the person lacks sufficient understanding or
capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his/her person.]
[“De facto guardian” means any person who takes possession of the person of a
vulnerable adult, without right or lawful authority. A de facto guardian is subject to all of the
responsibilities that attach to a legally appointed guardian.]
[“De facto conservator” means any person who takes possession of the estate of a
vulnerable adult, without right or lawful authority. A de facto conservator is subject to all of
the responsibilities that attach to a legally appointed conservator or trustee.]
[“Abuse” means:
1. Intentional infliction of physical harm; or
2. Injury caused by negligent acts or omissions; or
3. Unreasonable confinement; or
4. Sexual abuse or sexual assault.]
[“Neglect” means a pattern of conduct without the person’s informed consent resulting
in deprivation of food, water, medication, medical services, shelter, cooling, heating or other
services necessary to maintain minimum physical or mental health.]
[“Exploitation” means the illegal or improper use of a vulnerable adult or his/her
resources for another’s profit or advantage.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 46-455 (statutory language effective September 30, 2009).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate to the facts of the case.
46-456.04 Definition of “Position of Trust and Confidence”
“Position of trust and confidence” means that a person is any of the following:
1. a person who has assumed a duty to provide care to the vulnerable adult; or
2. a joint tenant or a tenant in common with a vulnerable adult; or
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3. a person who is in a fiduciary relationship with a vulnerable adult including a de
facto guardian or de facto conservator.
SOURCE: A.R.S. 46-456(I) (statutory language as of September 30, 2009).
“Vulnerable adult” is defined in A.R.S. § 46-451 (Statutory Definition Instruction 46-451.09).
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NON-CAPITAL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
INSTRUCTIONS
In the first phase of this trial you have returned a verdict of guilty. Now we are about to begin
the second phase of the trial. The State has alleged aggravating circumstances in this case. Under
Arizona law, the jury must decide whether the aggravating circumstances exist. The law requires
the State to prove these specific aggravating circumstances to you beyond a reasonable doubt.
Based on that allegation, we are now beginning an Aggravating Circumstance hearing.
Before evidence is presented, you must start with the presumption that the alleged
aggravating circumstance is not proven. The State must present evidence to prove an
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. If you conclude that the State has not
met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the alleged aggravating
circumstance not proven. The defendant is not required to testify or produce evidence of any
kind. The decision on whether to testify or produce evidence is left to the defendant, acting
with the advice of an attorney. The defendant’s decision not to testify or produce evidence is
not evidence of the existence of any aggravating circumstance.
It is your duty as a juror to decide this case by applying these jury instructions to the facts
as you determine them. You must follow these jury instructions. You may also rely on the jury
instructions that were read and given to you earlier. They are the rules you should use to decide
this case.
It is your duty to determine what the facts are in the case by determining what actually
happened. Determine the facts only from the evidence produced in court. When I say
“evidence,” I mean the testimony of witnesses and exhibits introduced in court during the
earlier trial, as well as any testimony or exhibits introduced at the Aggravation Circumstance
hearing. You should not guess about any fact. You must not be influenced by sympathy or
prejudice. You must not be concerned with any opinion that you feel that I have about the
facts. You, as jurors, are the sole judges of what happened.
You must consider all these instructions. Do not pick out one instruction or part of one
and ignore the others. As you determine the facts, however, you may find that some
instructions no longer apply. You must then consider the instructions that do apply, together
with the facts as you have determined them.
The lawyers will again talk to you about the law and the evidence. What the lawyers say is
not evidence, but it may help you to understand the law and the evidence.
You must decide whether the State has proven an alleged aggravating circumstance by
determining what the facts in the case are and applying these jury instructions. You must not
consider the possible punishment in reaching a decision. Punishment is left to the judge.
You are to determine what the facts in the case are from the evidence produced in court
during the trial or the Aggravating Circumstance hearing. If the Court sustained an objection
to a lawyer’s question, you must disregard it and any answer given. Any testimony stricken
from the court record must not be considered.
Evidence may be direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between direct
and circumstantial evidence. It is for you to determine the importance to be given to the
evidence, regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial.
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In considering the evidence, you must decide whether to believe the witnesses and their
testimony. As you do this, you should consider the testimony in light of all the other evidence
in the case. This means you may consider such things as the witnesses’ ability and opportunity
to observe, their manner and memory while testifying, any motive or prejudice they might
have, and any inconsistent statements they may have made.
The State has the burden of proving any aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt. In civil cases, it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not or that
its truth is highly probable. In criminal cases such as this, the State’s proof must be more
powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced that the alleged
aggravating circumstance is proven. There are very few things in this world that we know with
absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every
doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the
alleged aggravating circumstance is proven, you must find that the alleged aggravating
circumstance exists. If, on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that the alleged
aggravating circumstance is not proven, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt
and find the alleged aggravating circumstance not proven.
The State has alleged the following aggravating circumstances:
1.
2.
3.
Each aggravating circumstance is a separate and distinct allegation. You must decide each
aggravating circumstance separately on the evidence with the law applicable to it, uninfluenced
by your decision on any other aggravating circumstance. You may find that the State has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, all, some, or none of the aggravating circumstances. Your finding for
each aggravating circumstance must be stated on the interrogatory.
All of you must agree before you may find an aggravating circumstance “proven beyond a
reasonable doubt” or “not proven”. Your foreperson will be in charge during your deliberations
and will sign the verdict form.
You will be given a verdict form on which to indicate your decision. It reads as follows:
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IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ________________
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
PLAINTIFF,
vs.
JOHN DOE,
DEFENDANT.
Case No. CR ______________
We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, do find upon our oaths, the
following:
Proven
Not Proven
Aggravating circumstance(s).
1. 1.Th 1. The victim, John Smith, is 65 or more years of age.
2. The offense involved presence of an accomplice.
3. The offense involved the infliction of serious physical injury
to the victim, Jane Smith.
__________________________
FOREPERSON
USE NOTE: The verdict form must note each alleged aggravating circumstance. In multiple
defendant trials, a separate verdict form must be prepared for each defendant. In multiple
victim cases, it may be necessary to make a specific reference to a victim for a particular
aggravating circumstance.
Some words and phrases describing an aggravating circumstance may need to be defined
for the jury. Definitions may be found in the Statutory Criminal Instructions, Capital Case
Definitions, A.R.S. § 13-105, or various chapters for Titles 1, 13, 14, 28, 38, and 41 offenses.
If a dangerous offense has been alleged as an aggravating circumstance, the Court
should give Criminal Instruction 7.04.
If a dangerous crime against a child has been alleged as an aggravating circumstance,
the Court should give Criminal Instruction 7.05.
If the defendant’s release status has been alleged as an aggravating circumstance, the
Court should give Criminal Instruction 7.08-C and/or 7.08-D.
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COMMENT: In State ex rel. Smith v. Conn [Tinnell, Real Party in Interest], 209 Ariz. 195, ¶¶ 1015,
98 P. 3d 881 (App. 2004), the court held that the allegation of aggravating circumstances need
not be included in the charging document. Rather, the State may allege aggravating
circumstances by filing a timely notice under Rule 16.1(b), Ariz. R. Crim. P. See also State v.
Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232, 239, ¶ 23, fn. 7, 109 P.3d 571, 578 (App. 2005) (“We reject this argument
and note that our supreme court has concluded that even in capital cases, the indictment need
not specify aggravating factors in support of the death penalty.”); State v. Nichols, 201 Ariz. 234,
238, ¶ 15, 33 P.3d 1172, 1176 (App.2001).
In State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618 (2005), the Arizona Supreme Court held
that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a right to jury trial, as applied to Arizona’s general
felony sentencing scheme, does not require that a sentencing judge consider only those
aggravating factors found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in determining whether to
impose an aggravated sentence, but that the judge may find and consider additional aggravating
factors once a single aggravating factor has been found by the jury, is inherent in the jury’s
verdict, or has been admitted by the defendant. See also State v. Molina, 211 Ariz. 130, ¶ 16, 118
P.3d 1094 (App. 2005) (“[S]o long as one aggravating factor is either in compliance with or
exempt from the dictates of Blakely, ‘the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge to
find and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the
maximum prescribed in that statute.’” [Citation omitted.]).
The Committee felt the word “circumstance” should be used over “factor” because the
statute uses the word “circumstance.” Also, it is consistent with the terminology used in the
Capital Instructions.
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FOREWORD TO THE COURT
INTRODUCTION TO CAPITAL CASE SENTENCING INSTRUCTIONS
(NOT TO BE READ TO THE JURY)
These instructions are for a capital sentencing hearing. These instructions are divided
into two separate sectionsone for the eligibility phase and one for the penalty phase. The
eligibility phase focuses on alleged aggravating circumstances. Eligibility for a death sentence
is considered at the first stage. Actual imposition of a death sentence is considered at the
second stage, if that stage is necessary. The Eligibility Phase Instructions are read to the
jurors before the State presents its evidence regarding aggravating circumstances. If the State
proves at least one aggravating circumstance, then the Penalty Phase Instructions are read to
the jurors before the evidence regarding mitigation is presented.
These instructions assume that there is a single defendant. Appropriate modifications
should be made if there is more than one defendant. In such cases the jury must be
instructed to give separate consideration to each defendant, and a separate verdict form
should be used for each defendant.
Some of these instructions assume that there is a single murder victim involved in the
case. Appropriate modifications should be made when there is more than one murder
victim.
Some of these instructions assume that the defendant has been convicted after a trial.
Appropriate modifications should be made when the defendant pled guilty.
The court may have dismissed alternate jurors prior to the guilt phase deliberations.
When a conviction for first-degree murder occurs and the State seeks the death penalty,
these jurors must then be recalled and instructed for the sentencing phase before again being
dismissed as alternates, in case an alternate juror eventually takes the place during the
sentencing phase of a previously deliberating juror.
The court may wish to substitute the actual names of the defendant or victim
throughout the instructions if it would clarify the instructions for the jurors.
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Capital Case 1.0 Degree of Participation Instruction
Before determining whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or
death, you must determine whether the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant either:
1. killed; or
2. attempted to kill; or
3. intended that a killing take place; or
4. was a “major participant” in the commission of [list predicate felony or felonies] and
was “recklessly indifferent” regarding a person’s life.
In determining whether the defendant was a “major participant” in the felony, some
factors to consider include: the degree to which the defendant participated in the planning of
the felony; whether the defendant possessed a weapon or furnished weapon(s) to any
accomplice(s); the degree to which the defendant participated in the felony; and the scope of
the defendant’s knowledge of the completion of the felony.
A defendant acts with “reckless indifference” to human life when that defendant
knowingly engages in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death to another
human being. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the conscious disregard of
such risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation. A finding of “reckless indifference” cannot be based solely
upon a finding that the defendant was present at the time of the killing, merely participated
in a crime resulting in a homicide or failed to render aid to the victims or call for help. The
defendant’s culpability ultimately rests on whether the defendant knew that the criminal
activities of the defendant and/or any of the other participants were likely to result in the
death of the person.
You must give consideration to the defendant’s individual degree of participation
and individual culpability in the killing.
If you do not find at least one of the four factors listed above, then you shall impose a
life sentence on the defendant for the person’s death.
[Each of you must find that at least one factor has been proven, but you all need not
find that it is the same factor.] or
[You all must find that at least one factor has been proven. You must be unanimous on
one factor.]
Your finding and vote must be set forth on the verdict form.
SOURCE: This is the Enmund/Tison instruction. A.R.S. § 13-703.01(P) (statutory language
as of August 12, 2005) (“The trier of fact shall make all factual determinations required by
this section or the Constitution of the United States or this state to impose a death sentence.
. . . If the state bears the burden of proof, the issue shall be determined in the aggravation
phase.”); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (felony murder case) (holding that major
participation in the felony committed, combined with a reckless indifference to human life,
satisfies the Enmund culpability requirement); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)
(felony murder case) (holding that the focus must be on the defendant’s culpability, and not
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on that of those committing the underlying felony); State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 13-14, ¶¶ 47-
52, 226 P.3d 370, 382-83 (2010) (holding that juries should not be instructed to consider
failure to report the crime in determining if the defendant was a major participant, but that
factor may be relevant in determining if a defendant acted with reckless indifference, (citing
State v. Lacy, 187 Ariz. 340, 351-52, 929 P.2d 1288, 1299-1300 (1996) (holding that, “reckless
indifference may be implicit when one ‘knowingly engag[es] in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death.’ [Tison], 481 U.S. at 157[,]” “[i]n almost every felony murder case .
. . there is a failure by the defendant to stop and render aid or call for help. There must be
something more if the concept of ‘reckless indifference’ is to provide any meaningful
guidance for determining which defendant should suffer the ultimate penalty[,]” and that the
defendants’ culpability ultimately rested on the fact that the defendants, “subjectively
appreciated that their acts were likely to result in the taking of innocent life. [Tison] at 152.”);
State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 23, 926 P.2d 468, 490 (1996) (discussing “major participant”
factors); State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 114, 865 P.2d 765, 775 (1993) (discussing “major
participant” factors); State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 412-13, 844 P.2d 566, 579-80 (1992)
(holding that the death penalty may be imposed if the defendant was a major participant in
the predicate felony and acted with reckless disregard for human life); State v. Robinson, 165
Ariz. 51, 62, 796 P.2d 853, 864 (1990) (discussing “major participant” factors).
The burden of proof for this finding is beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tison, 160
Ariz. 501, 502, 774 P.2d 805, 806 (1989).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should be given during the eligibility phase in a felony
murder case where accomplices were involved in the killing. Because the State has the
burden of proving the Enmund/Tison finding, and pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-752(P), which
states in part that, “[i]f the state bears the burden of proof, the issue shall be determined in
the aggravation phase[,]” the Enmund/Tison finding must be proved by the State at some
point during the eligibility phase. However, § 13-752(P), does not state whether: (1) the
Enmund/Tison evidence/arguments should be presented, a finding regarding that issue
should be made, and if the State carries its burden there, the aggravating circumstances
evidence/arguments should then be presented and a finding made; or (2) the
evidence/arguments regarding Enmund/Tison and the aggravating circumstances should be
presented, and findings then made regarding both. The Arizona Supreme Court has noted
that the Enmund/Tison finding should be made during the aggravation phase, but that
bifurcation may be appropriate in some cases to avoid unfair prejudice to the defendant, for
example, in cases where evidence about an aggravating circumstance was not presented in
the guilt phase. See State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, ¶¶ 40-46, 226 P.3d 370 (2010) (trial court’s
refusal to bifurcate did not unfairly prejudice the defendant because evidence of his
involvement in an earlier robbery would have been admissible in separate Enmund/Tison
phase to establish his reckless indifference to human life; thus, the jury would still have heard
about the most damning of his prior convictions during a separate Enmund/Tison phase).
The Committee’s definition of “reckless indifference” is based on the language of A.R.S.
§ 13-105. An argument can be made that the standard is a subjective standard instead of a
reasonable person standard. See State v. Lacy, supra.
The Committee’s instruction omits the language that the defendant “intended the use of
deadly force.” Although this language was used in Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797, this appears to
be a reformulation of the language appearing in the language of #3 in the Committee’s
instruction, supra.
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For the definitions of “intended” and “recklessly,” see A.R.S. § 13-105.
C
OMMENT: This instruction combines the law from the relevant statutes and case law. The
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not permit the death penalty to
be imposed on a person, “who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is
committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing
take place or that lethal force will be employed.” Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797. “[M]ajor
participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is
sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.
There is a substantial issue whether the jury must be unanimous on one factor, and if so,
whether a verdict form indicating the numerical split for each factor should be included so
that it can be determined if the jury was unanimous on one factor. Whether the jury must
find one factor unanimously has not been decided by the Arizona Supreme Court or United
States Supreme Court. Use one of the bracketed sentences depending on how the trial court
resolves the issue.
Option One
The following verdict form is suggested if the trial court decides that unanimity on any
one factor is not needed:
We the jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt on the allegation that the
defendant killed, attempted to kill, intended that a killing take place or was a major
participant in the commission of [list predicate felony or felonies] and was recklessly
indifferent regarding a person’s life, as follows (check only one):
______ Proved.
______ Not Proved.
You do not need to be unanimous on any one factor, but all of you must find that at
least one factor has been proven.
_____________________
Foreperson
Option Two:
The following verdict form is suggested if the trial court decides that unanimity on any
one factor is not needed, but wishes to have the jury set forth its numerical vote:
We the jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt on the allegation that the
defendant killed, attempted to kill, intended that a killing take place, or was a “major
participant” in the commission of [predicate felony or felonies] and was “recklessly
indifferent” regarding a person’s life, as follows (check only one):
______ Proved.
______ Not Proved.
You do not need to be unanimous on any one factor, but all of you must find that at
least one factor has been proven.
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If you find that the Defendant killed, attempted to kill, intended that a killing take place,
or was a “major participant” in the commission of [predicate felony or felonies] and was
“recklessly indifferent” regarding a person’s life, please also indicate the following: (You may
find more than one factor)
_____ Number of jurors finding that the defendant killed.
_____ Number of jurors finding that the defendant attempted to kill.
_____ Number of jurors finding that the defendant intended that a killing take place.
_____ Number of jurors finding that the defendant was a “major participant” in the
commission of [predicate felony or felonies] and was “recklessly indifferent” regarding a
person’s life.
_____________________
Foreperson
Option Three
The following verdict form is suggested if the trial court decides that unanimity on at
least one factor is required:
We the jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the following alleged
factor or factors was/were proved (check any that apply):
_____ The defendant killed;
_____ The defendant attempted to kill;
_____ The defendant intended that a killing take place;
_____ The defendant was a major participant in the commission of [list predicate
felony or felonies] and was recklessly indifferent regarding a person’s life.
To check a factor, all twelve of you must find that the factor has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
______________________
Foreperson
Option Four
The following verdict form is suggested if the trial court decides that unanimity on at
least one factor is required and that the jury must set forth its numerical vote:
We the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that the following alleged factor or factors
was/were proved (set forth the number of jurors who find for each factor):
_____ The defendant killed.
_____ The defendant attempted to kill.
_____ The defendant intended that a killing take place.
_____ The defendant was a “major participant” in the commission of [list predicate
felony or felonies] and was “recklessly indifferent” regarding a person’s life.
_____________________
Foreperson
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Capital Case 1.0.1 Accomplice Liability
[Caution: This instruction will not apply to all of the statutory aggravators. To any
aggravator to which it does apply, the court may wish to incorporate the instruction
into the instruction regarding that aggravating circumstance.]
In the phase where you found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, you were
instructed that a defendant can be criminally responsible for the actions of the defendant’s
accomplices. Those instructions regarding accomplices apply only to that phase; they do not
apply in the current phase of the trial, or in any later phase that might occur.
In the current phase of the trial, the actions of other individuals are not attributed, or
imputed, to the defendant. Your determination of whether or not the State has proved an
aggravating circumstance must be based on the defendant’s own actions and own mental
state. This determination must be based only on what the defendant did, what the defendant
intended, what the defendant knew would happen, or what the defendant was reasonably
certain would happen.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(F); State v. Carlson, 202 Ariz. 570, 582-83, 48 P.3d 1180, 1192-93
(2002) (“There is no vicarious liability for cruelty in capital cases absent a plan intended or
reasonably certain to cause suffering. The plan must be such that suffering before death
must be inherently and reasonably certain to occur, not just an untoward event.” Mere
foreseeability, which is all that is required to establish accomplice guilt, cannot serve as a
“benchmark for death in capital cases [as it] would not permit the aggravators to serve their
constitutional purpose of narrowing the class of first-degree murderers who can be
sentenced to death.”); State v. Anderson (II), 210 Ariz. 327, 353-54, 111 P.3d 369, 395-96
(2005) (stating that the Eighth Amendment does not forbid applying an aggravating
circumstance to a defendant who was, “present and actively participated in the … murder[],”
where the defendant hit the victim with a lantern, but the accomplice administered the fatal
blow with a cinderblock that was handed to him by the defendant); State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz.
1, 24-25, 926 P.2d 468, 491-92 (1996) (affirming conviction where defendant planned the
murder, provided transportation and a gun to the actual killer known to the defendant to be
violent, selected the two robbery victims, issued instructions to leave no witnesses, remained
present at the scene, and knew that one victim would watch the execution of the other and
that, as a result, the killing would be cruel); cf. State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 587, 769 P.2d
1017, 1033 (1989) (disapproving portion of cruelty finding where defendant shot victim once
in head, believed him to be dead, and did not intend victim to wander desert blind for 5 days
before dying; however, cruelty finding was approved on the ground of victim’s mental
suffering prior to being shot).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction should only be given where (1) evidence shows that there was
an accomplice involved; and (2) an aggravating circumstance is charged that requires the jury
to assess the defendant’s mental state. In a case involving accomplices, the instruction is not
appropriate where the only charged aggravating circumstances relate to the status of the
defendant, such as (F)(1), (2) and/or (7), but may be appropriate for the other aggravating
circumstances.
This instruction should not be confused with the Enmund/Tison accomplice liability rule,
which permits a defendant convicted of felony murder to become eligible for the death
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penalty when an accomplice actually killed the victim if, at a minimum, the defendant was a
major participant in the underlying felony and demonstrated a reckless indifference to
human life. The Enmund/Tison accomplice liability theory is distinct from the application of
aggravating circumstances at the sentencing phase. See Carlson, 202 Ariz. at 582 n.7, 48 P.3d
at 1192 n.7.
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ELIGIBILITY PHASE
Capital Case 1.1 Nature of the HearingTo be used for offenses occurring
before August 2, 2012
Members of the jury, I will now instruct you on the law governing these sentencing
proceedings after a finding of guilt of first-degree murder.
The defendant in this case has been convicted of the crime of first-degree murder.
Under Arizona law every person guilty of first-degree murder shall be punished by death, [or
imprisonment for life without the possibility of release from prison,] [or imprisonment for
life with the possibility of release after 25 [35] years.]
This hearing may include as many as two phases. During this current phase, the jury
decides whether any aggravating circumstances exist. If the jury unanimously decides beyond
a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating circumstance exists, then the second phase
of the hearing begins.
If the State does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance
exists, the judge will sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of
release, or life imprisonment with the possibility of release after 25 [35] years. If the jury
unanimously decides beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance does exist,
each juror will decide if mitigating circumstances exist and then, as a jury, you will decide
whether to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment or death. If the sentence is life
imprisonment then the judge will sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment without
the possibility of release from prison, or life imprisonment with the possibility of release
from prison after 25 [35] years.
If the defendant is sentenced to “life with the possibility of release,” parole is not
currently available. The defendant’s only option is to petition the Board of Executive
Clemency for release. If that Board recommends to the Governor that the defendant should
be released, then the Governor would make the final decision regarding whether the
defendant would be released.
“Life without the possibility of release from prison” means exactly what it says. The
sentence of “life without possibility of release from prison” means the defendant will never
be eligible to be released from prison for any reason for the rest of the defendant’s life.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-751(A), -752(A), (C)(F), (H) (statutory language until August 1,
2012); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 166-67 & n.7 (1994) (life penalty instruction);
State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 103, ¶¶ 64-65, 357 P.3d 119, 138 (2015); Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S.
Ct. 1818 (2016).
U
SE NOTE: The bracketed information regarding the term of years addresses the following
requirement: “If the defendant is sentenced to life, the defendant shall not be released on
any basis until the completion of the service of twenty-five calendar years if the murdered
person was fifteen or more years of age and thirty-five years if the murdered person was
under fifteen years of age.” A.R.S. § 13-752(A).
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C
OMMENT: Because “natural life” is a term of art that the jurors may not understand, the
Committee has substituted within the instruction the phrase, “life without possibility of
release from prison.”
Capital Case 1.1 A Nature of the Hearing For Offenses Occurring On or After
August 2, 2012
Members of the jury, I will now instruct you on the law governing these sentencing
proceedings after a finding of guilt of first-degree murder.
The defendant in this case has been convicted of the crime of first-degree murder.
Under Arizona law every person found guilty of first-degree murder shall be punished by
death or imprisonment for life without the possibility of release from prison [or
imprisonment for life with the possibility of release after 25 [35] years].
This hearing may include as many as two phases. During this current phase, the jury
decides whether any aggravating circumstances exist. If the jury unanimously decides beyond
a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating circumstance exists, then the second phase
of the hearing begins.
If the State does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance
exists, the judge will sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of
release [or life imprisonment with the possibility of release after 25 [35] years]. If the jury
unanimously decides beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance does exist,
each juror will decide if mitigating circumstances exist and then, as a jury, you will decide
whether to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment or death. If the sentence is life
imprisonment then the judge will sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the
possibility of release [or life imprisonment with the possibility of release after 25 [35] years].
If the defendant is sentenced to “life with the possibility of release,” parole is not
currently available. The defendant’s only option is to petition the Board of Executive
Clemency for release. If that Board recommends to the Governor that the defendant should
be released, then the Governor would make the final decision regarding whether the
defendant would be released.
“Life without the possibility of release from prison” means exactly what it says. The
sentence of “life without possibility of release from prison” means the defendant will never
be eligible to be released from prison for any reason for the rest of the defendant’s life.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-751(A), -752(A), (C)(F), (H) (statutory language as of August 2,
2012); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 166-67 & n.7 (1994) (life penalty instruction);
State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 103, ¶¶ 64-65, 357 P.3d 119, 138 (2015); Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S.
Ct. 1818 (2016).
U
SE NOTE: The bracketed information regarding the term of years addresses the following
requirement: “If the defendant is sentenced to life, the defendant shall not be released on
any basis until the completion of the service of twenty-five calendar years if the murdered
person was fifteen or more years of age and thirty-five years if the murdered person was
under fifteen years of age.” A.R.S. § 13-752(A).
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Defendant must be sentenced to life without the possibility of release if convicted of
premeditated murder, or killing of a police officer. Life with the possibility of release is an
option only for felony murder where the victim is not a police officer. If the jury is not
unanimous regarding premeditated murder, the judge may sentence the defendant to either
life sentence.
C
OMMENT: Because “natural life” is a term of art that the jurors may not understand, the
Committee has substituted within the instruction the phrase, “life without possibility of
release from prison.”
Capital Case 1.2 Duties of the Jury
The law that applies to this hearing is stated in these instructions, and it is your duty to
follow all of the instructions. You must not single out certain instructions and disregard
others.
In deciding whether an aggravating circumstance exists, you are not to be swayed by
mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling.
Race, color, religion, national ancestry, gender or sexual orientation should not influence
you.
I do not mean to indicate any opinion regarding the facts or what your verdict should be
by these instructions, nor by any ruling or remark that I have made.
Performance of your duties as jurors is vital to the administration of justice.
SOURCE: RAJI Preliminary Criminal Instruction 1 and Standard Criminal Instruction 1 (non-
capital) (2005); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-45 (1987).
Capital Case 1.3 Evidence
You are to apply the law to the evidence and in this way decide whether the State has
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance exists.
The evidence you shall consider consists of the testimony [and exhibits] the court
admitted in evidence [at trial and the evidence admitted at this hearing] [at this hearing.]
It is the duty of the court to rule on the admissibility of evidence. You shall not concern
yourselves with the reasons for these rulings. You shall disregard questions [and exhibits]
that were withdrawn, or to which objections were sustained.
Evidence that was admitted for a limited purpose shall not be considered for any other
purpose.
You shall disregard testimony [and exhibits] the court has not admitted, or the court has
stricken.
[The lawyers may stipulate certain facts exist. This means both sides agree those facts
exist and are part of the evidence.]
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SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-751(D), -752(I); RAJI Preliminary Criminal Instructions 3, 5, 6 and 7
and Standard Criminal Instructions 3 and 4 (non-capital) (2005).
U
SE NOTE: Regarding the bracketed language in the second paragraph, the appropriate
phrase should be used according to whether the jurors previously deliberated at a guilt phase
trial and found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, or whether the jurors did not so
deliberate because the defendant instead pleaded guilty and is now proceeding to a
sentencing trial.
Capital Case 1.4 Burden of Proof
Before evidence is presented, you must start with the presumption that the alleged
aggravating circumstance is not proven. The State must present evidence to prove any
alleged aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is not required
to testify or produce evidence of any kind. The decision on whether to testify or produce
evidence is left to the defendant, acting with the advice of an attorney. The defendant’s
decision not to testify or produce evidence is not evidence of the existence of any
aggravating circumstance.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(B).
Capital Case 1.5 Definition of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The State has the burden of proving any alleged aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt. This means that the State must prove each element of each alleged
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced that the
alleged aggravating circumstance is proven. There are very few things in this world that we
know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that
overcomes every doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly
convinced that any alleged aggravating circumstance is proven, then you must make that
finding. If, on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that the alleged aggravating
circumstance is not proven, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find
the alleged aggravating circumstance is not proven.
SOURCE: State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995); Standard Criminal
Instruction 5b(1).
U
SE NOTE: A reasonable doubt instruction must be given at the close of a case, even if it
has been previously mentioned in the judge’s preliminary instructions. State v. Romanosky, 176
Ariz. 118, 121 n.1, 859 P.2d 741, 744 n.1 (1993); State v. Marquez, 135 Ariz. 316, 660 P.2d
1243 (App. 1983). The Committee recommends that the court use Capital Case Instruction
1.5 and not deviate from Portillo.
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Capital Case 1.5.1 Order of Aggravation Phase
The State may make an opening statement giving you a preview of the State’s case.
Defendant may then make an opening statement outlining the defense’s case or may
postpone it until after the State’s case has been presented. What is said in opening
statements is neither evidence nor argument. The purpose of an opening statement is to help
you prepare for anticipated evidence.
The State will present its evidence. After it finishes, Defendant may present evidence.
Defendant is not required to produce any evidence, and is not required to testify. If the
Defendant does produce evidence, the State may present rebuttal evidence. With each
witness there is a direct examination, a cross examination by the opposing side, and finally a
redirect examination. Jurors may [then] submit questions in writing, but are not obligated to
do so.
After the evidence is completed, I will read to you the final instructions. These
instructions detail the rules of law that you are required to follow in reaching your decision
on the aggravating circumstances alleged.
The parties then will make closing arguments to tell you what they think the evidence
shows, how they believe the law applies and how they think you should decide the issues in
this proceeding. The prosecutor has the right to open and close the argument because the
State has the burden of proof. Just as in opening statements, what is said in closing
arguments is not the law, nor is it evidence but it may help you to understand the law and
the evidence.
You will then deliberate in the jury room to decide the issues and render a verdict. Once you
reach a verdict, you will return to open court and the verdict will be read with you and the
parties present.
Capital Case 1.6 Aggravating Circumstances
The State has alleged that the following aggravating circumstance[s] exist[s] in this case:
[1. The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States, and
under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death could be or was imposed;]
[2. The defendant was previously convicted of a serious offense, either preparatory
or completed. Convictions for serious offenses committed on the same occasion as the
homicide, or not committed on the same occasion but consolidated for trial with the
homicide, shall be treated as a serious offense under this paragraph];
[3. In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk
of death to another person or persons in addition to the person murdered during the
commission of the offense;]
[4. The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise
of payment, of anything of pecuniary value;]
[5. The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in
expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value;]
[6. The defendant committed the offense in an
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[a. especially cruel] or
[b. especially heinous or depraved] manner;]
[7. The defendant committed the offense while in the custody of, or on authorized
or unauthorized release from, the state department of corrections, a law enforcement
agency or a county or city jail [or while on probation for a felony offense];]
[8. The defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides, and those
homicides were committed during the commission of the offense;]
[9. The defendant was at least eighteen years of age at the time the offense was
committed, and the murdered person was under fifteen years of age, or was seventy
years of age or older;] [The murdered person was an unborn child in the womb at any stage
of its development;]
[10. The murdered person was an on-duty peace officer who was killed in the course
of performing the officer’s official duties, and the defendant knew, or should have
known, that the murdered person was a peace officer;]
[11. The defendant committed the offense with the intent to promote, further or
assist the objectives of a criminal street gang or criminal syndicate or to join a criminal
street gang or criminal syndicate;]
[12. The defendant committed the offense to prevent a person’s cooperation with
an official law enforcement investigation, to prevent a person’s testimony in a court
proceeding, in retaliation for a person’s cooperation with an official law enforcement
investigation or in retaliation for a person’s testimony in a court proceeding;]
[13. The offense was committed in a cold, calculated manner without pretense of
moral or legal justification;]
[14. The defendant used a remote stun gun or an authorized remote stun gun in the
commission of the offense. For the purposes of this factor:
“Authorized remote stun gun” means a remote stun gun that has all of the
following: (i) An electrical discharge that is less than one hundred thousand volts and
less than nine joules of energy per pulse; (ii) A serial or identification number on all
projectiles that are discharged from the remote stun gun; (iii) An identification and
tracking system that, on deployment of remote electrodes, disperses coded material that
is traceable to the purchaser through records that are kept by the manufacturer on all
remote stun guns and all individual cartridges sold; (iv) A training program that is
offered by the manufacturer.
“Remote stun gun” means an electronic device that emits an electrical charge and
that is designed and primarily employed to incapacitate a person or animal either
through contact with electrodes on the device itself or remotely through wired probes
that are attached to the device or through a spark, plasma, ionization or other conductive
means emitting from the device.]
In determining whether an aggravating circumstance is proven, you may consider only
those aggravating circumstances listed in these instructions.
As to each aggravating circumstance alleged, you may choose one of the following: (1)
you may unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged aggravating
circumstance is proven; or (2) you may unanimously find that the alleged aggravating
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circumstance is not proven. If you cannot unanimously agree whether an aggravating
circumstance is proven or not proven, leave the verdict form blank for that circumstance
and your foreperson shall tell the judge.
If you unanimously find that an aggravating circumstance is proven or not proven, you
must indicate this finding on the verdict form.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-751(F), -752(E); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (purpose of
aggravating circumstances); State v. Tucker, 205 Ariz. 157, 169, 68 P.3d 110, 122 (2003)
(same).
U
SE NOTE: The trial judge should list only the aggravating circumstance(s) of which the
defendant was notified prior to trial.
Use bracketed material as applicable.
If the homicide was committed on or after May 26, 2003, the circumstance in numbered
paragraph 2 [(F)(2) factor] may include the bracketed portion, and the (F)(7) factor
(paragraph 7) may include the bracketed portion. The court should also review definitional
Capital Case Instructions 1.6(a)(e) and determine whether any of those instructions should
be given regarding an alleged aggravating circumstance.
The circumstances listed in bracketed paragraphs numbered 11 through 14 [(F)(11)
through (F)(14) and the “unborn child” portion of (F)(9)] may apply only if the homicide
was committed on or after August 12, 2005.
The statutory language of A.R.S. § 13-752(F)(9) has been altered to reflect the holding in
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005) (“[T]he death penalty cannot be imposed upon
juvenile offenders[.]”)
Capital Case 1.6(a)(1) Definition of “Serious Offense” (for offenses occurring on
or after July 17, 1993)
A “serious offense,” as referred to in these instructions, means any of the following
offenses, as either a preparatory offense or a completed offense, if committed in this state
[or any offense committed outside this state that if committed in this state would constitute
one of the following offenses]:
[1. First-degree murder.]
[2. Second-degree murder.]
[3. Manslaughter.]
[4. Aggravated assault resulting in serious physical injury or committed by the use,
threatened use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.]
[5. Sexual assault.]
[6. Any dangerous crime against children.]
[7. Arson of an occupied structure.]
[8. Robbery.]
[9. Burglary in the first degree.]
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[10. Kidnapping.]
[11. Sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age.]
[12. Burglary in the second degree.]
[13. Terrorism.]
A conviction occurs when a jury, or the court, finds the defendant guilty of an offense,
or the defendant pleads guilty to a charge.
[Convictions for serious offenses committed on the same occasion as the homicide, or
not committed on the same occasion but consolidated for trial with the homicide, shall be
treated as a serious offense.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-751(F)(2), (I) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005), -751.01(A),
(C), (P) (statutory language as of August 1, 2002); State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 310-11, 4 P.3d
345, 365-66 (2000).
USE NOTE: This instruction shall be given only if the State alleges the (F)(2) circumstance.
The instruction should relate to the specific serious offense alleged.
For first-degree murder offenses occurring before July 17, 1993, see Capital Case
Instruction 1.6(a)(2).
Arizona’s preparatory offenses, along with their corresponding statutory definitions and
RAJIs, are:
Attempt, A.R.S. § 13-1001(A) (Statutory Criminal Instruction 10.01);
Solicitation, A.R.S. § 13-1002(A) (Statutory Criminal Instruction 10.02);
Conspiracy, A.R.S. § 13-1003(A) (Statutory Criminal Instruction 10.031); and
Facilitation, A.R.S. § 13-1004(A) (Statutory Criminal Instruction 10.04).
If the defendant’s conviction for the serious offense occurred out of state, the elements
of the out-of-state offense must necessarily establish the elements of the Arizona offense
alleged as a prior serious offense. Whether the State is able to prove this beyond a reasonable
doubt may be the subject of motions that will need to be ruled on by the court under the
Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules 13.5(c) and Rules 16.1(b) and (c), 16.6(b)
(challenging the legal sufficiency of an alleged aggravating circumstance in a capital case),
and/or Rule 20(a) and (b) (motion for judgment of acquittal before and/or after verdict).
The options listed in 12 and 13 above are available for first-degree murders committed
on or after August 12, 2005.
The bracketed language at the end of the instruction should be given if the homicide
occurred on or after May 26, 2003.
Regarding the “serious offense” finding, the court must be sure that the fact finder in
the prior case found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed every
element that would be required to prove the Arizona offense. State v. Ault, 157 Ariz. 516,
521, 759 P.2d 1320, 1325 (1988) (non-capital case involving California prior convictions that
resulted from a jury trial).
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If the prior conviction is from a foreign jurisdiction, the court must first conclude that
the elements of the foreign prior conviction include every element that would be required to
prove an enumerated Arizona offense, before the allegation may go to the jury. State v.
Crawford, 214 Ariz. 129, 131, 149 P.3d 753, 755, ¶ 7 (2007); State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 216-
17, 141 P.3d 368, 391-92 (2006) (refusing to “look beyond the language of the [foreign]
statutes” to the complaint describing the defendant’s conduct in determining whether prior
California robbery conviction constituted a “serious offense” under A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(2));
State v. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. 323, 334, 819 P.2d 909, 920 (1991) (reviewing Nevada attempted
murder statute to determine if that crime involved violence and holding that sentencing
courts “may consider only the statute that the defendant [was] charged with violating; it may
not consider other evidence”).
If the court concludes that the foreign offense is a serious offense, but the title of the
foreign conviction does not match the title of a defined Arizona serious offense, the title of
the foreign offense should be included in the instruction.
C
OMMENT: For crimes committed prior to July 17, 1993, the statutory language for the
(F)(2) factor was different. It stated that the (F)(2) factor applied to a prior “felony in the
United States involving the use or threat of violence on another person.” Under the prior
interpretation of the factor, courts were to look at the statutory definition of the prior crime,
and not its specific factual basis, and determine whether the prior conviction satisfied (F)(2).
State v. Richmond, 180 Ariz. 573, 578, 886 P.2d 1329, 1334 (1994). “If, under the statutory
definition, the defendant could have committed and been convicted of the crime without
using or threatening violence, the prior conviction may not qualify as a statutory aggravating
circumstance under § 13-703(F)(2).” State v. Walden, 183 Ariz. 595, 616-17, 905 P.2d 974,
995-96 (1995); State v. Romanosky, 162 Ariz. 217, 228, 782 P.2d 693, 704 (1989). “Violence”
was defined as the exertion of any physical force with the intent to injure or abuse. State v.
Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 549, 804 P.2d 72, 82 (1990).
Capital Case 1.6(b) Definition of “Grave Risk of Death to Another”
The “grave risk of death to another” aggravating circumstance is proven if the
defendant’s act of committing murder placed a [“third person”] [bystander] in the “zone of
danger.” This circumstance applies if the State proves that:
1. during the course of the murder, the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that
created a real and substantial likelihood that a specific [third person] [bystander]
might suffer fatal injury; and
2. the defendant knew of the [third person’s] [bystander’s] presence, although the
defendant did not have to know the [third person’s] [bystander’s] identity; and
3. the [third person] [bystander] was not an intended victim of the defendant.
The mere presence of a [third person] [bystander] is insufficient to prove this
aggravating circumstance and the actual intent to kill the [third person] [bystander] precludes
finding this as an aggravating circumstance.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(3) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); State v. Johnson,
212 Ariz. 425, 431, 133 P.3d 735, 741 (2006) (mere presence of a third person insufficient to
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prove aggravator; intent to kill third person precludes finding the aggravator); State v. Carreon,
210 Ariz. 54, 67, 107 P.3d 900, 913 (2005) (using “specific third person” language); State v.
McMurtrey, 151 Ariz. 105, 108, 726 P.2d 202, 205 (1986) (holding that the (F)(3) circumstance
does not apply when the person in the zone of danger is the intended victim of the murder).
USE NOTE: This instruction shall be given only if the State alleges the (F)(3) circumstance.
This circumstance is not proven simply where bystanders are present or the defendant
points a gun at another to facilitate escape. See e.g., State v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 69, 881 P.2d
1158, 1174 (1994) (holding that, the general rule is that mere presence of bystanders or
pointing a gun at another to facilitate escape does not bring a murderous act within A.R.S.
§13-703(F)(3). . . . Our inquiry is whether, during the course of the killing, the defendant
knowingly engaged in conduct that created a real and substantial likelihood that a specific
third person might suffer fatal injury.”); compare State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 158, 163, 568
P.2d 1054, 1056, 1061 (1977) (finding (F)(3) circumstance where victim was shot and killed
in a crowded college gymnasium and another student standing nearby was wounded; the
relevant inquiry was knowledge of the victim’s presence, not the victim’s identity), with State
v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 502, 707 P.2d 289, 300 (1985) (holding that defendant did not place
convenience store manager or other store customers in danger when he shot directly and
purposefully at cashier, even though the other persons could have sustained injury during the
armed robbery, because shooting was not “random and indiscriminate”).
This circumstance is not proven where persons are present in another room, but not
actually placed in danger. See Carreon, 210 Ariz. at 67, 107 P.3d at 913 (reversing the (F)(3)
circumstance finding where the shots fired during the murderous attack were aimed in the
opposite direction from the bedroom of the children in the apartment; thus, “none of the
bullets fired during that attack placed the boys in danger.”).
Whether the (F)(3) circumstance should be presented to the jury may be the subject of
motions that will need to be ruled on by the court under the Arizona Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rules 13.5(c) and Rules 16.1(b) & (c), 16.6(b) (challenging the legal sufficiency of
an alleged aggravating circumstance in a capital case), and/or Rule 20(a) and (b) (motion for
judgment of acquittal before and/or after verdict).
“Knowingly” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105 (Statutory Definition Instruction 1.0510(b)).
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OMMENT: This instruction defines “zone of danger” by enumerating the four main
ingredients identified by the Arizona Supreme Court that make up this very fact-intensive
concept: (1) proximity (not mere presence); (2) time (during the course of the murder); (3)
level of intent (knowingly create a risk, without intending to kill/actually murder the third
person); and (4) conduct (creating a real and substantial likelihood of fatal injury).
In State v. Johnson, supra, the court approved an instruction that used the word
“bystander.” The court in Johnson used both “bystander” and “third person.” The committee
has included both “bystander” and “third person” to be used as appropriate.
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Capital Case 1.6(c) Definition for “Consideration for the Receipt, or in
Expectation of the Receipt, of Anything of Pecuniary
Value”
In order to find this aggravating circumstance, you must find that the State has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s motive, cause or impetus for the
commission of the first-degree murder was consideration for the receipt, or the expectation
of receipt of pecuniary value. This finding may be based on tangible evidence and/or
[strong] circumstantial evidence. “Pecuniary value” may be money or property.
Mere taking of items of value before, during or after the first-degree murder is not
enough to establish this aggravating circumstance.
You need not find that consideration for the receipt, or the expectation of the receipt of,
the pecuniary value was the sole motivation or cause of the first-degree murder in order to
find that this circumstance exists. However, the existence of a pecuniary motive at some
point during the events surrounding the first-degree murder is not enough to establish this
aggravating circumstance. There must be a connection between the motive and the killing.
The mere fact that the person was killed, and the defendant made a financial gain, does not
by itself establish this aggravating circumstance.
[While a conviction of robbery or burglary indicates a taking of property, the conviction
does not itself prove that the motivation for the killing was the consideration for the receipt,
or the expectation of, the receipt of pecuniary value.]
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(5) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); “[A] conviction
for felony murder predicated on robbery or armed robbery does not automatically prove the
(F)(5) aggravator.” State v. Anderson (II), 210 Ariz. 327, 341-42, 111 P.3d 369, 383-84 (2005)
(where the court also stated that, the superior court properly instructed the jury on this
aggravating factor” where the (F)(5) instruction included the language, “[a] finding of
pecuniary gain may be based on tangible evidence or strong circumstantial evidence,” and the
court was reviewing whether a misstatement of the law regarding the (F)(5) circumstance by
the prosecutor should cause a reversal (emphasis added)); State v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 54, 67,
107 P.3d 900, 913 (2005) (holding that, “[t]he finding of pecuniary gain may be based on
tangible evidence or strong circumstantial evidence.”); State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 471, 94
P.3d 1119, 1166 (2004) (holding that the expectation of pecuniary gain must be a, “motive,
cause or impetus for the murder, and not merely a result of the murder[,]” and that the State
is required to, “establish the connection between the murder and the motive through direct
or strong circumstantial evidence.”); State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 360, 363 n.2, 93 P.3d 1076,
1079 n.2 (2004) (rejecting “but for” requirement, i.e., receipt of item(s) of pecuniary value
need not be the only cause of the murder); State v. Sansing, 200 Ariz. 347, 353, 356, 26 P.3d
1118, 1124, 1127 (2001) (holding that to prove the (F)(5) circumstance, the State must prove,
“a connection between a pecuniary motive and the killing itself; the expectation of pecuniary
gain must be a motive for the murder[,]”
“[w]e reserve the death penalty for murders
committed during a robbery or burglary for those cases in which the facts clearly indicate a
connection between a pecuniary motive and the killing itself[,]” and that, “[t]he murder,
which occurred at least an hour after the victim’s arrival, did not facilitate the defendant’s
ability to secure pecuniary gain, particularly in light of the fact that he bound the victim
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almost as soon as she entered his home.”); State v. Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 513, 975 P.2d 94,
103 (1999) (holding that the State failed to prove the (F)(5) circumstance, even though
Medina said prior to the murder that he intended to steal the victim’s car and radio, and he
then beat and kicked the victim and repeatedly drove over the victim with his (Medina’s)
car); State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 439, 967 P.2d 106, 114 (1998) (regarding the (F)(5)
circumstance, “[w]e have held that when one comes to rob, the accused expects pecuniary
gain and this desire infects all other conduct.”).
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SE NOTE: This instruction shall be given only if the State alleges the (F)(5) circumstance.
The court should define “value” on a case-by-case basis, in light of the evidence
presented. For example, the “value” at issue in Carreon was money, while the “value” at issue
in Anderson (II) was a truck.
Use bracketed material as applicable.
Whether the (F)(5) circumstance should be presented to the jury may be the subject of
motions that will need to be ruled on by the court under the Arizona Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rules 13.5(c) and Rules 16.1(b) and (c), 16.6(b) (challenging the legal sufficiency
of an alleged aggravating circumstance in a capital case), and/or Rule 20(a) and (b) (motion
for judgment of acquittal before and/or after verdict).
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OMMENT: The Committee could not reach a consensus on whether the word “strong”
when referring to “circumstantial evidence” should be included in the RAJI instruction, so
the word “strong” appears in brackets. Some members of the Committee believe that the
term “strong circumstantial evidence” is confusing, does not add anything to the fact that
the circumstance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and does not consider the
situation where there is tangible and circumstantial evidence to support the aggravating
circumstance. Those members of the Committee suggest that the word “strong” contradicts
the general instruction concerning “direct and circumstantial evidence.”
Other members of the Committee believe that the term “strong circumstantial evidence”
is not confusing, and it informs the jurors that if they rely, at least in part, on circumstantial
evidence, that evidence must be “strong” circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, that
distinction has been drawn by the Arizona Supreme Court regarding the (F)(5) circumstance,
and its intent was to distinguish the (F)(5) circumstance from other situations where
circumstantial evidence may be presented. Additionally, use of the word “strong” does not
preclude the State from presenting both tangible and circumstantial evidence in the same
trial.
As noted above in the source section, the word “strong” was used in the instruction
discussed in Anderson (II). That instruction read in full:
The pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance only applies if you find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense as
consideration for the receipt or in expectation of the receipt of anything of
pecuniary value.
In order to prove this factor, the State must prove that the expectation
of pecuniary gain was a motive, cause, or impetus for murder and not merely
the result of it.
A finding of pecuniary value may be based on tangible evidence or
strong circumstantial evidence. While pecuniary gain need not be the
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exclusive cause of the murder, you may not find that the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance exists merely because the person was killed and at
the same time the defendant made a financial gain.
Anderson (II), 210 Ariz. at 341-42, 111 P.3d at 383-84; see also State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, 67,
¶ 52, 163 P.3d 1006, 1017 (2007).
Capital Case 1.6(d) Definition of “Especially Cruel, Heinous or Depraved”
Concerning this aggravating circumstance, all first-degree murders are to some extent
heinous, cruel or depraved. However, this aggravating circumstance cannot be found to exist
unless the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was “especially” cruel,
“especially” heinous, or “especially” depraved. “Especially” means “unusually great or
significant.”
The terms “especially cruel,” or “especially heinous or depraved” are considered separately;
therefore, the presence of any one circumstance is sufficient to establish this aggravating
circumstance. However, to find that this aggravating circumstance is proven, you must find that
“especially cruel” has been proven unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt or that “especially
heinous or depraved” has been proven unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt.
Especially Cruel
The term “cruel” focuses on the victim’s pain and suffering. To find that the murder was
committed in an “especially cruel” manner you must find that the victim consciously suffered
physical or mental pain, distress or anguish prior to death. The defendant must know or should
have known that the victim would suffer.
Especially Heinous or Depraved
The term “especially heinous or depraved” focuses upon the defendant’s state of mind at the
time of the offense, as reflected by the defendant’s words and acts. A murder is especially
heinous if it is hatefully or shockingly evil, in other words, grossly bad. A murder is especially
depraved if it is marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deterioration. To
determine whether a murder was “especially heinous or depraved,” you must find that the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant exhibited such a mental state at the
time of the killing by engaging in at least one of the following actions: [list only the options that
apply]
1. Relished the murder; or
2. Inflicted gratuitous violence on the victim beyond that necessary to kill; or
3. Needlessly mutilated the victim’s body; or
4. The murder victim was a child and there was a parental or special [full-time] [caregiver]
relationship of trust between the victim and the defendant.
Relished the Murder
The defendant “relished the murder” if the defendant, by words or actions, savored the
murder. These words or actions must show debasement or perversion, and not merely that the
defendant has a vile state of mind or callous attitude.
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Statements suggesting indifference, as well as those reflecting the calculated plan to kill,
satisfaction over the apparent success of the plan, extreme callousness, lack of remorse, or
bragging after the murder are not enough unless there is evidence that the defendant actually
relished the act of murder at or near the time of the killing.
Inflicted Gratuitous Violence
To find that the defendant “inflicted gratuitous violence,” you must find that the defendant
intentionally inflicted violence clearly beyond what was necessary to kill the victim, and that the
defendant continued to inflict this violence after the defendant knew or should have known that
the [defendant had inflicted a fatal injury] [victim was dead].
Needless Mutilation
“Needlessly mutilating” means that the defendant, apart from the killing, committed acts
after the victim’s death and separate from the acts that led to the death of the victim, with
the intent to disfigure the victim’s body. “Needlessly mutilating” indicates a mental state
marked by debasement.
Verdict Form
Even if you determine that “especially cruel” and “especially heinous or depraved” have
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you can only consider this as one aggravating
circumstance, which is why you will find only one choice on the verdict form. There is an
interrogatory on the verdict form that you must complete to set out your findings regarding
“especially cruel” and/or “especially heinous or depraved”.
A unanimous finding of “especially cruel” and/or “especially heinous or depraved”
establishes this aggravating circumstance.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(6) (statutory language as of October 1, 1978); State v. Bocharski, 218
Ariz. 476, ¶ 87, 189 P.3d 403 (2008) (defining gratuitous violence to include that State must also
show that the defendant continued to inflict violence after he knew or should have known that a
fatal action had occurred); State v. Wallace, 219 Ariz. 1, 191 P.3d 164 (2008); State v. Tucker, 215
Ariz. 298, 160 P.3d 177 (2007); State v. Andriano, 215 Ariz. 497, 161 P.3d 540 (2007); State v.
Velazquez, 216 Ariz. 300, 166 P.3d 91 (2007); State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 352 n.19, 111 P.3d
369, 394 n.19 (2005) (defining gratuitous violence and using “clearly beyond” language); State v.
Carlson, 202 Ariz. 570, 581-83, 48 P.3d 1180, 1191-93 (2002) (especial cruelty); State v. Canez, 202
Ariz. 133, 161, 42 P.3d 564, 592 (2002) (holding that re especial cruelty, defendant knew or
should have known that victim would consciously suffer); State v. Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 513, 975
P.2d 94, 103 (1999) (disjunctive); State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 67-68, 969 P.2d 1168, 1179-80
(1999) (relishing); State v. Miles, 186 Ariz. 10, 18-19, 918 P.2d 1028, 1036-37 (1996) (holding that a
finding of especially cruel, heinous or depraved,is a single (F)(6) factor, and the trial judge
erred when he characterized them as two separate (F)(6) factors.”); State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9,
37, 906 P.2d 542, 570 (1995) (especial cruelty); State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 605-06, 886 P.2d 1354,
1361 (1994) (witness elimination/extraordinary circumstances language); State v. Richmond, 180
Ariz. 573, 580, 886 P.2d 1329, 1336 (1994) (mutilation); State v. King, 180 Ariz. 268, 284-85, 883
P.2d 1024, 1040-41 (1994) (witness elimination alone insufficient); State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118,
124-26, 865 P.2d 779, 785-87 (1993) (holding that proof of parent/child relationship, along with
victim being helpless and murder being senseless, satisfied especially heinous or depraved
circumstance); State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 115, 865 P.2d 765, 776 (1993) (holding the same
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where defendant was child’s full-time caregiver for several months before the murder and
therefore had a special relationship with the child); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 178, 800
P.2d 1260, 1286 (1990) (gratuitous violence); State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 242, 762 P.2d 519,
529 (1988) (individual definitions of especially heinous or depraved).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction shall be given only if the State alleges the (F)(6) circumstance. The
jury should only be instructed on the theory or theories that the State is pursuing.
“Especially” means unusually great or significant. See M
ERRIAM WEBSTERS COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1997), 396 (defining “especially”). All first-degree murders are to some
extent heinous, cruel or depraved; therefore, to be especially cruel, heinous or depraved, a
murder must be more heinous, cruel or depraved than usual. State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 503,
707 P.2d 289, 301 (1985). In other words, the murder must have been committed in such a way
as to, “set [the] Defendant’s’ acts apart from the norm of first degree murder.State v. Brookover,
124 Ariz. 38, 41, 601 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1979).
The language of “a murder is especially cruel when there has been the infliction of pain and
suffering in an especially wanton and insensitive or vindictive manner” as used in defining
“especially cruel” in the Anderson II instruction was deemed “not require[d]” in State v. Tucker, 215
Ariz. 298, ¶ 29-33, 160 P.3d 177-81 (2007). See also State v. Andriano, 215 Ariz. 497, 161 P.3d 540
(2007) and State v. Velazquez, 216 Ariz. 300, 166 P.3d 91 (2007) in which instructions were
approved without the bracketed language.
Especially Cruel
The language of “a murder is especially cruel when there has been the infliction of pain
and suffering in an especially wanton and insensitive or vindictive manner” as used in
defining “especially cruel” in the Anderson II instruction was deemed “not require[d]” in State
v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, ¶ 29 33, 160 P.3d 177 (2007). See also State v. Andriano, 215 Ariz.
497, 161 P.3d 540 (2007) and State v. Velazquez, 216 Ariz. 300, 166 P.3d 91 (2007) in which
instructions were approved without the bracketed language; State v. Cropper, 223 Ariz. 522,
13, 225 P.3d 579 (2010) (citing Tucker and Anderson II, the Court noted that its “cases make
clear that an (F)(6) instruction is sufficient if it requires the state to establish that the victim
consciously experienced physical or mental pain and the defendant knew or should have
known that the victim would suffer”); State v. Snelling, 225 Ariz. 182, 190, ¶ 39, 236 P.3d 409,
417 (2010) (F(6) aggravator was not proved where there was no evidence that the victim
“consciously suffered mental anguish or physical pain”).
Gratuitous Violence
After considering the case law, the committee could not agree what the Arizona Supreme
Court meant by “a fatal action had occurred,” whether the victim was dead when the additional
violence was inflicted, or whether a fatal injury had been inflicted before the additional violence
was inflicted. The bracketed language sets forth the two views of the majority of the committee.
The minority view was to use the supreme court’s language of “a fatal action had occurred” in
the instruction and that “the victim was dead” option should not be included in the instruction.
The trial court will need to select the appropriate language based on the facts of the case and the
court’s interpretation of the case law.
In State v. Wallace, 219 Ariz. 1, ¶ 24, 191 P.3d 164 (2008), the Arizona Supreme court held
that “a ‘less violent alternative’ instruction is not appropriate in gratuitous violence cases.”
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Relished the Murder
The language in the instruction is taken from State v. Johnson, 212 Ariz. 425, 133 P.3d 735
(2006), where the Arizona Supreme Court “commended” this instruction to the trial courts.
The defendant’s statements about the murder made after the killing may be admissible to
show that the defendant savored the murder at the time of the killing. See State v. Hampton, 213
Ariz. 167, 140 P.3d 950 (2006).
Witness Elimination
The Committee has not included “witness elimination” as a possible finding supporting the
“especially heinous” or “especially depraved” finding. See e.g., State v. Barreras, 181 Ariz. 516, 522,
892 P.2d 852, 858 (1995) (discussing the 3-optioned test for “witness elimination”). For murders
committed on or after August 12, 2005, witness elimination is a “stand alone” aggravating
circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(12). Therefore, also using it as a factor for the (F)(6)
circumstance finding would result in impermissible double counting.
The bracketed language below may be given if the State seeks to prove “witness
elimination.” The court should keep in mind that if the State, for first-degree murders occurring
on or after August 12, 2005, has alleged “witness elimination” as a “stand-alone” aggravating
factor, also instructing on this option as part of the “heinous or depraved” (F)(6) option may
result in double counting and/or double jeopardy problems.
For murders committed before that date, witness elimination may be a factor supporting the
“especially heinous” or “especially depraved” finding. An example of an instruction regarding
witness elimination when used in that context follows:
[In addition, you may consider whether the following circumstances were proven:
1. The murder was senseless; and
2. The victim was helpless; and
3. A motive for the killing was to eliminate a potential witness to another crime.
That the victim has been murdered does not always mean that there has been witness
elimination. In determining whether this circumstance applies, you must find that the facts
show one of the following:
1. The murder victim was a witness to some other crime, and was killed to prevent the
murder victim from testifying about the other crime; or
2. The defendant made a statement that witness elimination was a motive for the
murder; or
3. The extraordinary circumstances of the crime show that witness elimination was a
motive.]
Senselessness and Helplessness
The Arizona Supreme Court has held that “senselessness” and “helplessness” may be
considered in determining “especially heinous or depraved,” but those findings, individually
or together, are not enough to prove this prong, unless the State also proves at least one of
the four factors listed in the instruction listed under the heading “Especially Heinous or
Depraved.” All murders are “senseless” because of their brutality and finality. Yet not all are
senseless as the term is used to distinguish those first-degree murders that warrant a death
sentence from those that do not. Rather, a “senseless” murder is one that is unnecessary to
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achieve the defendant’s objective. “Helplessness” means that the victim is unable to resist.
See, e.g., State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 250, 947 P.2d 315, 327 (1997) (defining “senseless”
and discussing that ordinarily this finding, even when coupled with “helplessness,” is
insufficient to satisfy “heinous or depraved”); State v. Miles, 186 Ariz. 10, 18-19, 918 P.2d
1028, 1036-37 (1996) (defining “helplessness”).
Child Victim and Parental or Special Relationship
“Full-time” and “caregiver” are bracketed in this factor. In State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104,
865 P.2d 765 (1993), the defendant was the full-time caregiver for the victim for four
months. The committee believed that the opinion was subject to different interpretations as
to whether this factor is limited to a full-time caregiver or whether it could be applied also to
a caregiver or other person who has an established relationship of trust with the child, but is
not the child’s full-time caregiver.
C
OMMENT: In State v. Hampton, supra, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that it “expressly
approved” the instruction in Anderson II. The instruction given in Anderson II is as follows:
The terms “heinous” and “depraved” focus on the defendant’s mental state and attitude
at the time of the offense as reflected by his words and actions. A murder is especially
heinous if it is hatefully or shockingly evil. A murder is depraved if marked by debasement,
corruption, perversion or deterioration.
In order to find heinousness or depravity, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant exhibited such a mental state at the time of the offense by doing at least one
of the following acts:
One, relishing the murder. In order to relish a murder the defendant must show by his
words or actions that he savored the murder. These words or actions must show debasement
or perversion, and not merely that the defendant has a vile state of mind or callous attitude.
Statements suggesting indifference, as well as those reflecting the calculated plan to kill,
satisfaction over the apparent success of the plan, extreme callousness, lack of remorse, or
bragging after the murder are not enough unless there is evidence that the defendant actually
relished the act of murder at or near the time of the killing.
Two, inflicted gratuitous violence on the victim clearly beyond that necessary to kill.
Three, needlessly mutilated the victim’s body. In order to find this factor, it must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a separate purpose beyond
murder to mutilate the corpse.
The term “cruel” focuses on the victim’s state of mind. Cruelty refers to the pain and
suffering the victim experiences before death. A murder is especially cruel when there has
been the infliction of pain and suffering in an especially wanton and insensitive or vindictive
manner. The defendant must know or should have known that the victim would suffer.
A finding of cruelty requires conclusive evidence that the victim was conscious during
the infliction of the violence and experienced significant uncertainty as to his or her ultimate
fate. The passage of time is not determinative.
The committee’s proposed instruction incorporates extensive case law regarding F(6) to
encompass fact situations beyond those in Anderson II.
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The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Tucker, supra, approved the following instruction
regarding cruelty:
Concerning this aggravating circumstance, all first-degree murders are to
some extent heinous, cruel or depraved. However, this aggravating circumstance
cannot be found to exist unless the murder is especially heinous, cruel or
depraved, that is, where the circumstances of the murder raise it above the
norm of other first-degree murders. “Especially” means beyond the norm,
standing above or apart from others.
The terms “cruel”, [“]heinous”, or “depraved” are to be considered
separately, but proof of any one of these factors is sufficient to establish this
aggravating circumstance.
Cruelty involves the infliction of physical pain and/or mental anguish on
a victim before death. A crime is committed in an especially cruel manner
when a defendant either intended or knew that the manner in which the
crime is committed would cause the victim to experience physical pain
and/or mental anguish before death. The victim must be conscious for at
least some portion of the time when the pain and/or anguish was inflicted.
Some cases defining especially cruel have included the phrase “mental anguish” and others
have included the phrase “mental distress.” See e.g., State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 160, 692 P.2d
991, 1009 (1984) (using “mental distress”); State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19, 30, 97 P.3d 844, 855
(2004) (using “mental anguish”). The instruction uses “pain” in place of “distress” or “anguish”
because “pain” is neutral and permits counsel to argue both “distress” and “anguish.” See State v.
Anderson (II), 210 Ariz. 327, 354, 360 n. 18, 111 P.3d 369, 396, 402 n. 18 (2005) and Carlson,
supra (using “pain”).
“Extreme” as an adjective describing mental anguish or physical pain is not included in the
“especially cruel” definition because in State v. Andriano, supra, ¶67, the Arizona Supreme Court
held that it is not required. See also State v. Hampton, supra. In State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, ¶98, 140
P.3d 899 (2006), the trial judge defined “especially cruel” as “the infliction of either extreme
physical pain or extreme mental anguish” upon the victim. In footnotes 17 and 19, the court
noted that “extreme pain” or “extreme mental anguish” must be proved. See Ellison, footnotes 17
and 19. In other cases, however, the word “extreme” has not been used.
Regarding expanding the definition of “heinous or depraved,” the court has noted that, “to
do so on a case-by-case basis would institute a regime of ad hoc sentencing, destroying the
definitional consistency that preserves the constitutional validity of our sentencing process.
If we could expand the meaning of the (F)(6) factor’s broad language to encompass the facts
of each case on the basis of our intuitive conclusion as to the proper penalty, we would
indeed have abandoned the struggle to provide a consistent narrowing definition and
conceded that the factor is unconstitutionally vague.” Barreras, 181 Ariz. at 523, 892 P.2d at
859 (internal citations omitted). However, the Gretzler factors, “are not absolutely exclusive,”
(citing Milke). Nevertheless, “they provide a consistent and rationally reviewable standard for
the otherwise vague (F)(6) ‘especially heinous cruel or depraved’ factor, thus ensuring the
continuing constitutionality of our death penalty statute and facilitating our independent
review.” 181 Ariz. at 521, 892 P.2d at 857. Caution should be exercised in expanding the
factors. See State v. Hampton, supra, at ¶ 2 (2006).
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Capital Case 1.6(e) Definition for “During the Commission of the Offense”
To find that the defendant committed one or more homicides “during the commission
of the offense,” you must find [that the other homicide was] [those other homicides were]
related in
1. time, and
2. space, and
3. motivation
to the first-degree murder at issue.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(8); see, e.g., State v. Dann, 206 Ariz. 371, 373, 79 P.3d 58, 60
(2003) (requiring all 3 subfactors of time, space and motivation); State v. Rogovich, 188 Ariz.
38, 45, 932 P.2d 794, 801 (1997); State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 393, 814 P.2d 333, 350 (1991).
U
SE NOTE: This instruction shall be given only if the State alleges the (F)(8) circumstance.
Use applicable bracketed material.
Capital Case 1.6(f) Definition of “Cold, Calculated Manner Without Pretense of
Moral or Legal Justification”
The State alleges that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated manner without
pretense of moral or legal justification. This aggravating circumstance requires more than the
premeditation necessary to find a defendant guilty of first-degree murder. This aggravating
circumstance cannot be found to exist unless the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant exhibited a cold-blooded intent to kill that is more contemplative, more
methodical, more controlled than that necessary to prove premeditated first-degree murder.
In other words, a heightened degree of premeditation is required.
“Cold” means the murder was the product of calm and cool reflection.
“Calculated” means having a careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder.
This aggravating circumstance focuses on the defendant’s state of mind at the time of
the offense, as reflected by the defendant’s words and acts. To determine whether a murder
was committed in a cold, calculated manner without pretense of moral or legal justification
you must find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant:
1. had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident;
and
2. exhibited a cool and calm reflection for a substantial period of time before killing; and
3. had no pretense of moral or legal justification or excuse.
A “pretense of moral or legal justification” is any claim of justification or excuse that,
though insufficient to reduce the degree of murder, nevertheless rebuts the otherwise cold,
calculated nature of the murder.
____________
S
OURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(13); based on State of Florida jury instruction 7.11 PENALTY
PROCEEDINGS – CAPITAL CASES; Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 88-89 (Fla. 1994). The
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Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the use of the RAJI instruction for this circumstance in
State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, 280 P.3d 604 (2012).
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SE NOTE: If the jury considering this aggravator was not the jury that determined guilt, the
court should include the definition of “premeditation.” See Statutory Instruction 11.05.
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Capital Case Verdict Form 1
ARIZONA SUPERIOR COURT
_______________ COUNTY
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
PLAINTIFF,
vs.
JOHN DOE,
DEFENDANT.
Case No. __________
We, the jury, empanelled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, do upon our oaths
unanimously find the following aggravating circumstance or circumstances as shown by the
circumstance or circumstances checked:
Proven Beyond a
Reasonable
Doubt
Not Proven
Aggravating circumstance related to the death of
[victim’s name here].
The Defendant has been convicted of another offense
in the United States for which under Arizona law a
sentence of life imprisonment or death could be or
was imposed.
The Defendant was previously convicted of a serious
offense, either preparatory or completed.
In the commission of the offense the Defendant
knowingly created a grave risk of death to another
person or persons in addition to the person murdered
during the commission of the offense.
The Defendant procured the commission of the
offense by payment, or promise of payment, of
anything of pecuniary value.
The Defendant committed the offense as
consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the
receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
The Defendant committed the offense in an
especially cruel, heinous or depraved manner.
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The Defendant committed the offense while in the
custody of or on authorized or unauthorized release
from the state department of corrections, a law
enforcement agency or a county or city jail [or while
on probation].
The Defendant has been convicted of one or more
other homicides, and those homicides were
committed during the commission of the offense.
The Defendant was at least eighteen years of age at
the time the offense was committed and the murdered
person was under fifteen years of age or was seventy
years of age or older.
or
The murdered person was an unborn child at any
state of its development.
The murdered person was an on duty peace officer
who was killed in the course of performing the
officer’s official duties and the defendant knew, or
should have known, that the murdered person was a
peace officer.
The Defendant committed the offense with the intent
to promote, further or assist the objectives of a
criminal street gang or criminal syndicate or to join a
criminal street gang or criminal syndicate.
The Defendant committed the offense to prevent a
person’s cooperation with an official law enforcement
investigation, to prevent a person’s testimony in a
court proceeding, in retaliation for a person’s
cooperation with an official law enforcement
investigation or in retaliation for a person’s testimony
in a court proceeding.
The offense was committed in a cold, calculated
manner without pretense of moral or legal
justification.
The Defendant used a remote stun gun or an
authorized remote stun gun in the commission of the
offense.
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[If you have unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was
committed in an especially cruel and/or especially heinous or depraved manner, then you
must answer the following interrogatories:
We, the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, do upon our oaths
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in an especially
cruel manner (check only one):
________ Yes
________ No
We, the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, do upon our oaths
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in an especially
heinous or depraved manner (check only one):
________ Yes
________ No
____________________
FOREPERSON]
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-751(F), -752(E).
U
SE NOTE: The verdict form shall include only the theory or theories that the State is
pursuing. Use the bracketed material only if the State is pursuing the (F)(6) circumstance.
If aggravation findings are made as to more than one victim, separate verdict forms shall
be used for each victim.
The especially cruel finding is separate from the especially heinous or depraved finding
because cruelty has been defined, analyzed and reviewed separately from heinousness or
depravity. See, e.g., State v. Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 513, 975 P.2d 94, 103 (1999); State v. Beaty,
158 Ariz. 232, 242, 762 P.2d 519, 529 (1988).
Regarding hung juries at the eligibility phase, the proper procedure is specified in A.R.S.
§ 13-703.01(J): “[I]f . . . the jury is unable to reach a verdict on any of the alleged aggravating
circumstances and the jury has not found that at least one of the alleged aggravating
circumstances has been proven, the court shall dismiss the jury and shall impanel a new jury.
The new jury shall not retry the issue of the defendant’s guilt or the issue regarding any of
the aggravating circumstances that the first jury found not proved by unanimous verdict. If
the new jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the court shall impose a sentence of life
or natural life on the defendant.”
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PENALTY PHASE
Capital Case 2.1 Nature of Hearing and Duties of Jury
Members of the jury, at this phase of the sentencing hearing, you will determine whether
the defendant will be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.
The law that applies is stated in these instructions and it is your duty to follow all of
them whether you agree with them or not. You must not single out certain instructions and
disregard others.
You must not be influenced at any point in these proceedings by conjecture, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. You are not to be swayed by mere sympathy not
related to the evidence presented during the penalty phase.
You must not be influenced by your personal feelings of bias or prejudice for or against
the defendant or any person involved in this case on the basis of anyone’s race, color,
religion, national ancestry, gender or sexual orientation.
Both the State and the defendant have a right to expect that you will consider all the
evidence, follow the law, exercise your discretion conscientiously and reach a just verdict.
I do not mean to indicate any opinion on the evidence or what your verdict should be by
any ruling or remark I have made or may make during this penalty phase. I am not allowed
to express my feelings in this case, and if I have shown any you must disregard them. You
and you alone are the triers of fact.
SOURCE: Preliminary Criminal Instruction 1 and Standard Criminal Instruction 1 (non-
capital) (2005); CALJIC 8.84.1 (modified); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987)
(“We think a reasonable juror would . . . understand the instruction not to rely on ‘mere
sympathy’ as a directive to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced
from the evidence adduced during the penalty phase.”)
Capital Case 2.2 Evidence
You are to apply the law to the evidence and in this way decide whether the defendant
will be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.
The evidence you shall consider consists of the testimony [and exhibits] the court
admitted in evidence during the trial of this case, during the first part of the sentencing
hearing, and during the second part of the sentencing hearing.
It is the duty of the court to rule on the admissibility of evidence. You shall not concern
yourselves with the reasons for these rulings. You shall disregard questions [and exhibits]
that were withdrawn or to which objections were sustained.
Evidence that was admitted for a limited purpose shall not be considered for any other
purpose.
You shall disregard testimony [and exhibits] that the court has not admitted, or the court
has stricken.
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[The lawyers may stipulate certain facts exist. This means both sides agree that evidence
exists and is to be considered by you during your deliberations at the conclusion of the trial.
You are to treat a stipulation as any other evidence. You are free to accept it or reject it, in
whole or in part, just as any other evidence.]
During the first part of the sentencing hearing, you found that the State had proved that
[a statutory aggravating circumstance exists] [statutory aggravating circumstances exist]
making the defendant eligible for the death sentence. During this part of the sentencing
hearing, the defendant and the State may present any evidence that is relevant to the
determination of whether there is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to call for a
sentence less than death. The State may also present any evidence that demonstrates that the
defendant should not be shown leniency, which means a sentence less than death.
Mitigating circumstances may be found from any evidence presented during the trial,
during the first part of the sentencing hearing or during the second part of the sentencing
hearing.
You should consider all of the evidence without regard to which party presented it. Each
party is entitled to consideration of the evidence whether produced by that party or by
another party.
You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and what weight is to be given
the testimony of each witness. In considering the testimony of each witness, you may take
into account the opportunity and ability of the witness to observe, the witness’ memory and
manner while testifying, any interest, bias or prejudice the witness may have, the
reasonableness of the testimony of the witness considered in a light of all the evidence, and
any other factors that bear on credibility and weight.
The attorneys’ remarks, statements and arguments are not evidence, but are intended to
help you understand the evidence and apply the law.
The attorneys are entitled to make any objections that they deem appropriate. These
objections should not influence you, and you should make no assumptions because of
objections by the attorneys.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-751(C), -752(G); Preliminary Criminal Instructions 3, 5, 6 and 7 and
Standard Criminal Instructions 3 and 4 (non-capital) (2005).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed material as applicable.
Capital Case 2.3 Mitigation
Mitigating circumstances are any factors that are a basis for a life sentence instead of a
death sentence, so long as they relate to any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s
character, propensity, history or record, or circumstances of the offense.
Mitigating circumstances are not an excuse or justification for the offense, but are
factors that in fairness or mercy may reduce the defendant’s moral culpability.
Mitigating circumstances may be offered by the defendant or State or be apparent from
the evidence presented at any phase of these proceedings. You are not required to find that
there is a connection between a mitigating circumstance and the crime committed in order to
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consider the mitigation evidence. Any connection or lack of connection may impact the
quality and strength of the mitigation evidence. You must disregard any jury instruction
given to you at any other phase of this trial that conflicts with this principle.
[The circumstances proposed as mitigation by the defendant for your consideration in
this case are:
[List the factors]. You are not limited to these proposed mitigating circumstances in
considering the appropriate sentence. You also may consider anything related to the
defendant’s character, propensity, history or record, or circumstances of the offense.]
The fact that the defendant has been convicted of first-degree murder is unrelated to the
existence of mitigating circumstances. You must give independent consideration to all of the
evidence concerning mitigating circumstances, despite the conviction.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(G); State v. Pandelli, 215 Ariz. 114, 126, ¶ 33, 161 P.3d 557, 569
(2007) (the defendant need not prove that the mitigating circumstances were the direct cause
of the offense); Smith v. Texas, 125 S. Ct. 400, 404 (2004); Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562,
2570 (2004); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (holding that capital sentencers must be allowed to consider, “as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of the defendant’s character or record and circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
590-91 (1977) (Mitigating circumstances are “circumstances which do not justify or excuse the
offense, but which, in fairness or mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the
degree of moral culpability.”); State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, 322, ¶ 106, 160 P.3d 177, 201
(2007).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed material as applicable. The defendant shall provide the court with
a list of mitigating circumstances, but the defense is not required to list the circumstances.
Capital Case 2.4 Duty to Consult with One Another
As jurors, you have a duty to discuss the case with one another and to deliberate in an
effort to reach a just verdict. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after
you consider the evidence impartially with your fellow jurors. During your deliberations, you
should not hesitate to re-examine your own views and change your opinion if you become
convinced that it is wrong. However, you should not change your honest belief concerning
the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinions of your fellow jurors, or
for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
SOURCE: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions, 2nd ed. 31.04 (modified).
USE NOTE: In State v. Andriano, 215 Ariz. 497, ¶¶ 59-60, 161 P.3d 540 (2007), an instruction
based on Rule 22.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, that included a “duty to
deliberate” was given as an impasse instruction. The Arizona Supreme Court approved use
of the instruction in that context.
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Capital Case 2.5 Victim Impact Information
A relative of the victim made a statement relating to personal characteristics and
uniqueness of the victim and the impact of the murder on the victim’s family. You may
consider this information to the extent that it rebuts mitigation. You may not consider the
information as a new aggravating circumstance.
SOURCE: State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, ¶ 92, 160 P.3d 177 (2007); State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz.
116, 140, 140 P.3d 899, 923 (2006).
Capital Case 2.6 Mitigation Assessment and the Sentence Burden of Proof
[The State may not rely upon a single fact or an aspect of the offense to establish more
than one aggravating circumstance. Therefore, if you have found that two or more of the
aggravating circumstances were proved beyond a reasonable doubt by a single fact or aspect
of the offense, you are to consider that fact or aspect of the offense only once. In other
words, you shall not consider twice any fact or aspect of the offense.]
While all twelve of you had to unanimously agree that the State proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, you do not need to
unanimously agree on a particular mitigating circumstance. Each one of you must decide
individually whether any mitigating circumstance exists.
You are not limited to the mitigating circumstances offered by the defendant. You must
also consider any other information that you find is relevant in determining whether to
impose a life sentence, so long as it relates to an aspect of the defendant’s background,
character, propensities, record, or circumstances of the offense.
The defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of any mitigating circumstance
that the defendant offers by a preponderance of the evidence. That is, although the
defendant need not prove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must
convince you by the evidence presented that it is more probably true than not true that such
a mitigating circumstance exists. In proving a mitigating circumstance, the defendant may
rely on any evidence already presented and is not required to present additional evidence.
You individually determine whether mitigation exists. In light of the aggravating
circumstance[s] you have found, you must then individually determine if the total of the
mitigation is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. “Sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency” means that mitigation must be of such quality or value that it is adequate, in the
opinion of an individual juror, to persuade that juror to vote for a sentence of life in prison.
Even if a juror believes that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are of the same
quality or value, that juror is not required to vote for a sentence of death and may instead
vote for a sentence of life in prison. A juror may find mitigation and impose a life sentence
even if the defendant does not present any mitigation evidence.
A mitigating factor that motivates one juror to vote for a sentence of life in prison may
be evaluated by another juror as not having been proved or, if proved, as not significant to
the assessment of the appropriate penalty. In other words, each of you must determine
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whether, in your individual assessment, the mitigation is of such quality or value that it
warrants leniency in this case.
The law does not presume what is the appropriate sentence. The defendant does not
have the burden of proving that life is the appropriate sentence. The State does not have the
burden of proving that death is the appropriate sentence. It is for you, as jurors, to decide
what you individually believe is the appropriate sentence.
In reaching a reasoned, moral judgment about which sentence is justified and
appropriate, you must decide whether the totality of the mitigating factors is sufficiently
substantial to call for leniency. To do this, you must consider the quality and the strength of
aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as the facts and circumstances of the case. This
assessment is not a mathematical one, but instead must be made in light of each juror’s
individual, qualitative evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the case, the severity of
the aggravating factors, and the quality or value of the mitigating factors found by each juror.
If you unanimously agree there is mitigation sufficiently substantial to call for leniency,
then you shall return a verdict of life. If you unanimously agree there is no mitigation, or the
mitigation is not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, then you shall return a verdict of
death.
Your decision is not a recommendation. Your decision is binding. If you unanimously
find that the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment, your foreperson shall sign
the verdict form indicating your decision. If you unanimously find that the defendant should
be sentenced to death, your foreperson shall sign the verdict form indicating your decision.
If you cannot unanimously agree on the appropriate sentence, your foreperson shall tell the
judge.
SOURCE: A.R.S. §§ 13-703(C), (E), -703.01(G); e.g., State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 144, 856 P.2d
792, 805 (1993) (holding that if one fact is used to establish two aggravating circumstances,
that fact may not be considered twice when assessing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances); State v. Granville (Baldwin), 211 Ariz. 468, 471-73, 123 P.3d 662, 665-67 (2005)
(holding that: (1) A.R.S. § 13-703(E) does not create a “presumption of death,” and that, “a
jury may return a verdict of life in prison even if the defendant decides to present no
mitigation evidence at all.” ¶ 12; (2) “Even if a juror believes that the aggravating and
mitigating factors are equally balanced, A.R.S. § 13-703(E) does not require the juror to
impose the death penalty. Rather, each juror may vote for a sentence of death or against it
as each sees fit in light of the aggravating factors found by the jury and the mitigating
evidence found by each juror. The finding of an aggravating factor simply renders the
defendant eligible for the death penalty; it does not require that he receive it.” n.3; (3) The
phrase “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency” means that, “the mitigation must be of
such quality or value that it is adequate, in the opinion of an individual juror, to persuade
that juror to vote for a sentence of life in prison.” ¶ 18; (4) “[T]he determination whether
mitigation is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency . . . is a sentencing decision to be
made by each juror based upon the juror’s assessment of the quality and significance of the
mitigating evidence that the juror has found to exist. . . . [A] juror may not vote to impose
the death penalty unless he or she finds, in the juror’s individual opinion, that ‘there are no
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.’ A.R.S. § 13-703(E). In
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other words, each juror must determine whether, in that juror’s individual assessment, the
mitigation is of such quality or value that it warrants leniency.” ¶ 21.
In State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, n. 6, 351 P.3d 1079, n. 6 (2015), the supreme court noted
that use of the terms “compared against” in this instruction might confuse or mislead jurors.
“Terms such as ‘balance,’ ‘outweigh,’ and ‘compare’ should not be used.” It suggested “a
more precise instruction should be fashioned.”
In State v. Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219, 227, 293 P.3d 495, 503 (2012), the supreme court noted that
“We consider the quality and the strength, not simply the number, of aggravating and
mitigating factors.” Id. at ¶ 41.
U
SE NOTE: Bracketed portion to be used only if the State alleged two aggravators based on
one fact or event.
Capital Case 2.7 Order of This Phase
This phase of the trial, unless otherwise directed by the court, will proceed as follows:
The defense may make an opening statement. The State may then make an opening
statement or may defer until the close of the defense case. Again, what counsel says in
opening statements is not evidence.
The victims’ relatives may make a statement relating to the personal characteristics of the
victim and the impact of his/her murder on his/her family. [They are not allowed to offer
any opinion or recommendation regarding an appropriate sentence. Victim impact evidence
is not an aggravating circumstance and you cannot consider it as such. Victim impact
evidence may be considered to rebut the mitigation presented. You are to consider this
information only for this limited purpose.]
The defense may offer evidence in support of mitigation.
The State may make an opening statement if it was deferred, and may offer evidence to
demonstrate that the defendant should not be shown leniency. [This evidence is not a new
aggravating circumstance.]
The defense may offer evidence in rebuttal to the State’s evidence.
The defendant may make a statement, but he/she is not required to do so. You cannot
hold this against him/her if he/she chooses to not make a statement.
The court will then give you the final instructions on the law.
The parties will present final arguments, with the defense having the opportunity to
make an opening and a closing argument.
You will then deliberate to decide on a verdict. Once you agree on a verdict, you will
return to court where the verdict will be read with the parties present.
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Capital Case 2.8 Jury Not to Consider Financial Cost of Penalty
You must decide the appropriate sentence based on the facts of the case and by applying
these jury instructions. You must not consider the financial cost of any possible punishment
when deciding whether to sentence the defendant to life in prison or death.
SOURCE: State v. Clabourne, 194 Ariz. 379, 388, ¶ 40, 983 P.2d 748, 757 (1999).
Capital Case 2.9 State’s Evidence
The defendant and the state may present any evidence that is relevant to the
determination of whether there is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency. Regardless of whether defendant presents evidence of mitigation, the State may
present any evidence that demonstrates that defendant should not be shown leniency. This
evidence may include evidence regarding defendant's character, propensities, criminal record
or other acts. You may individually consider the State’s evidence in determining the
existence of a mitigating circumstance or in assessing its quality or value. You shall not
consider this part of the state’s evidence as aggravation, but only in determining whether
defendant should be shown leniency.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-752(G) (statutory language as of August 2, 2012); State ex rel. Thomas v.
Granville (Baldwin), 211 Ariz. 468, 473 ¶ 18, 123 P.3d 662, 667 (2005); State v. Nordstrom, 230
Ariz. 110, 280 P.3d 1244 (2012). But see State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 140 P.3d 950 (2006).
Capital Case 2.10 Intellectual Disability
A defendant who is otherwise eligible for the death penalty may not be sentenced to
death if he/she is determined by you to have an intellectual disability under the law. It is the
defendant’s burden to prove whether he/she has an intellectual disability by a
preponderance of the evidence. That is, although the defendant need not prove its existence
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must convince you by the evidence presented that
it is more probably true than not true. The defendant may rely on any evidence presented by
either party at any phase of the trial.
You must find that the defendant has an intellectual disability under the law if the
defense proves each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. The defendant has a mental deficit that involves a full scale intelligence quotient (IQ)
of seventy or lower when taking into account the margin of error for the type of IQ
test administered; and
2. The defendant has significant impairment in adaptive behavior; and
3. Both of these conditions existed before the defendant reached age eighteen.
“Adaptive behavior” means the effectiveness or degree to which the defendant meets
the standard of personal independence and social responsibility expected of a person of his
age and cultural group.
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Thus, if you are convinced by the evidence that it is more probably true than not true
that the defendant has an intellectual disability under the law, you must vote for a life
sentence.
If you each individually do not find that the defendant meets all of the criteria for an
intellectual disability under the law, you may still consider this evidence as a mitigating
circumstance which, alone or with any other mitigating circumstance you believe proven,
may be deemed by you to be sufficiently substantial to call for a life sentence.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-753; State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254 ¶¶ 128-39, 386 P.3d 798
(January 12, 2017) (holding trial court did not err by instructing the jury that it must impose
a life sentence if it found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant is intellectually
disabled).
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FOREWORD TO THE COURT
INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE INSTRUCTIONS
(NOT TO BE READ TO THE JURY)
These instructions are presented to aid the court in giving a legally correct instruction if
the court decides to give an instruction on a specific statutory mitigating circumstance when
requested by counsel. See A.R.S. § 13-751(G)(1)(5). If the court does give one or more of
these instructions, the court should also instruct that these are not exclusive mitigating
circumstances, and that each juror may consider any mitigating circumstance that the juror
considers relevant in deciding the appropriate sentence.
These instructions are based on the mitigating circumstances listed in A.R.S. § 13-
751(G)(1) through (5). The Committee has not attempted to draft non-statutory variations
of these mitigating circumstances because the variations are too numerous. It should be
made clear to the jury that statutory mitigation does not preclude the defendant from
presenting and arguing any other mitigating circumstance that may call for leniency.
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Capital Case 3.1 Mitigation Evidence
The evidence you shall consider in determining mitigation includes any aspect of the
defendant’s character, propensities, or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that might justify a penalty less severe than death. Mitigating circumstances may include but
are not limited to the following:
1. significant impairment
2. unusual and substantial duress
3. relatively minor participation
4. death not reasonably foreseeable
5. the defendant’s age.
You may consider any mitigating evidence in deciding whether leniency is appropriate.
This includes any variation of the mitigating circumstances that I have specifically defined in
these instructions. You are not limited to considering these mitigating circumstances.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(G) (statutory language as of August 12, 2005.)
Capital Case 3.2 Significant Impairment
It is a mitigating circumstance that the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of [his] [her] conduct, or to conform [his] [her] conduct to the requirements of
law, was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
The defendant has the burden of proving this mitigating circumstance by a preponderance
of the evidence.
“Significantly impaired” means that the defendant suffered from [mental illness]
[personality disorder] [character disorder] [substance abuse] [alcohol abuse] at or near the
time of the offense, that substantially reduced the defendant’s ability to appreciate the
wrongfulness of the conduct or conforming [his][her] conduct to the requirements of the
law.
If any juror finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was
significantly impaired, then that juror shall consider this impairment as a mitigating
circumstance when determining whether to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment
or
death.
The effect you give to any mitigation is left to your sound discretion in determining
whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(G)(1) (statutory language as of August 1, 2002); State v. Gallegos,
178 Ariz. 1, 17-19, 870 P.2d 1097, 1113-15 (1994) (substance/alcohol abuse); State v.
McMurtrey I, 136 Ariz. 93, 101-02, 664 P.2d 637, 645-46 (1983) (character/personality
disorder).
U
SE NOTE: Use bracketed language as appropriate.
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Capital Case 3.3 Duress
It is a mitigating circumstance that the defendant was under unusual and substantial
duress, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
“Duress” means any illegal imprisonment, or legal imprisonment used for an illegal
purpose, or threats of bodily or other harm, or other means amounting to or tending to
coerce the will of another, and actually inducing him or her to do an act contrary to his or
her free will.
If any juror finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was under
unusual and substantial duress, then that juror shall consider such duress as a mitigating
circumstance when determining whether to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment or
death.
The effect you give to any mitigation is left to your sound discretion in determining
whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(G)(2) (statutory language as of August 1, 2002).
Capital Case 3.4 Relatively Minor Participation
It is a mitigating circumstance that although the defendant was legally accountable for
the conduct of another, [his] [her] participation was relatively minor, although not so minor
as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
The defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another if [he] [she]:
[was made accountable for such conduct by the statute defining the offense]
[acting with the culpable mental state sufficient for the commission of the offense,
caused another person, whether or not such other person was capable of forming the
culpable mental state, to engage in such conduct]
[was an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense].
“Relatively minor” means that the defendant’s involvement in the [homicide] [name of
underlying felony offense] as an accomplice did not involve the defendant actually killing the
victim, attempting to kill the victim, or intending to kill the victim.
If any juror finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s participation
was relatively minor, that juror shall consider such participation as a mitigating circumstance
when determining whether to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment or death.
The effect you give to any mitigation is left to your sound discretion in determining
whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(G)(3) (statutory language as of August 1, 2002); A.R.S. § 13-
303(A) (statutory language as of April 23, 1980).
U
SE NOTE: Although similar to the felony murder/Enmund/Tison instruction, this
instruction is to be given when the case involves accomplices to premeditated murder, or
accomplices to the underlying offense for a felony murder charge.
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Regarding the bracketed portions in the paragraph describing “relatively minor,” use
“homicide” if the defendant was an accomplice to premeditated murder. Use the name of
the underlying felony offense if the defendant was charged with felony murder.
Use bracketed portions regarding legal accountability as appropriate. If the portion
regarding “accomplice” applies, the instruction, defining “accomplice,” must also be given.
For the definition of “intending,” see A.R.S. § 13-105.
Capital Case 3.5 Death Not Reasonably Foreseeable
It is a mitigating circumstance that the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen
that [his] [her] conduct during the commission of the offense would either:
1. cause the death of the victim; or,
2. create a grave risk of causing the death of the victim.
“Could not have reasonably foreseen” means that a person situated in the defendant’s
position at the time of the offense could not have intended or known that [his] [her] conduct
would result in the death of victim.
If any juror finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant could not have
reasonably foreseen the victim’s death, then that juror shall consider such unforeseeability as
a mitigating circumstance when determining whether to sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment or death.
The effect you give to any mitigation is left to your sound discretion in determining
whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
S
OURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(G)(4) (statutory language as of August 1, 2002); State v. Bolton, 182
Ariz. 290, 314, 896 P.2d 830, 854 (1995).
U
SE NOTE: For the definitions of “intended” and “known,” see A.R.S. § 13-105.
Capital Case 3.6 Age
The defendant’s age may be a mitigating circumstance.
“Age” is not limited solely to chronological age. You may also consider, but are not
limited to considering, the defendant’s level of intelligence, maturity, ability to be
manipulated by others, involvement in the crime and past experience when determining
whether this mitigating circumstance exists.
If any juror finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s age was a
mitigating circumstance, then that juror shall consider the defendant’s age when determining
whether to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment or death.
The effect you give to any mitigation is left to your sound discretion in determining
whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
SOURCE: A.R.S. § 13-751(G)(5) (statutory language as of August 1, 2002); State v. Poyson, 198
Ariz. 70, 81, 7 P.3d 79, 90 (2000) (age of nineteen and “low average” intelligence sufficient
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to prove mitigation); State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 21, 951 P.2d 869, 886 (1997) (age of 20
sufficient to prove mitigation where defendant was, “immature and easily influenced,” and
was a, “follower, easily manipulated and pushed to do what others with stronger willpower
wanted him to do.”); State v. Jackson, 186 Ariz. 20, 31, 918 P.2d 1038, 1049 (1996) (“In
addition to youth, we consider defendant’s level of intelligence, maturity, involvement in the
crime, and past experience.”).
U
SE NOTE: Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005) (“[T]he death penalty cannot be
imposed upon juvenile offenders[.]”).
The “age” mitigating circumstance is not limited to youthful/minor offenders. It may
also be considered as mitigation for elderly defendants. State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 406, 694
P.2d 222, 236 (1985).
Capital Case Verdict Form 2
ARIZONA SUPERIOR COURT
_______________ COUNTY
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
PLAINTIFF,
vs.
JOHN DOE,
DEFENDANT.
Case No.________
VERDICT
We, the jury, empanelled and sworn in the above-entitled cause, do upon our oaths
unanimously find, having considered all of the facts and circumstances of this case, that the
Defendant should be sentenced to:
[ ] “LIFE”
(In which case the Defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment with or
without the possibility of release)
[ ] “DEATH”
(In which case the Defendant shall be sentenced to death)
FOREPERSON
SOURCE: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal 2nd ed. (1994) 34.09.
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U
SE NOTE: Regarding hung juries at the penalty phase, the proper procedure is specified in
A.R.S. § 13-752(K): “[I]f . . . the jury is unable to reach a verdict, the court shall dismiss the
jury and shall impanel a new jury. The new jury shall not retry the issue of the defendant’s
guilt or the issue regarding any of the aggravating circumstances that the first jury found by
unanimous verdict to be proved or not proved. If the new jury is unable to reach a
unanimous verdict, the court shall impose a sentence of life or natural life on the defendant.”
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Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) .................................................................................... 91, 137
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) ........................................................... 443
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) ........................................................... 443
Barlage v. Valentine, 210 Ariz. 270, 110 P.3d 371 (App. 2005) ........................................................... 378
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) ................................................. 235, 273, 296, 486, 491, 495
Baseline Liquors v. Circle K. Corp., 129 Ariz. 215 630 P.2d 38 (App. 1981) ....................................... 402
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) ..................................... 93, 133, 386, 391, 451-53, 456, 586
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 553 (1947) ........................................................................... 101
Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 1995) ...................................................................................... 435
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) ........................................................................................ 596, 617
Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971) .......................................................... 518
Cherry v. Araneta, 203 Ariz. 532, 57 P.3d 391 (App. 2002) ...................................................................95
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) .................................................................................................... 619
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979) ............................................... 83, 85, 86
Crawford v. State, 164 Neb. 231, 82 N.W.2d 1 (1957).......................................................................... 248
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) .............................................................. 103
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1975) ..................................................................................................... 355
Dobson v. McClennen, 238 Ariz. 389, 361 P.3d 374 (2015) ......................................... 471, 472, 542, 557
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982 ................................................................ 508, 589, 590, 592, 627
Evanchyk v. Stewart, 202 Ariz. 476, 481, 47 P.3d 1114, 1119 (2002) ................................................. 105
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) .................................. 192–94, 200–02, 377, 378, 572–75, 577
Franzi v. Superior Court in and for Pima County, 139 Ariz. 556, 679 P.2d 1043 (1984) ...................... 323
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). ..................................................................................................22
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1974) ............................... 443
Hively v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 572, 744 P.2d 673 (1987) .............................................................. 518
In Re Cesar R., 197 Ariz. 437, 4 P.3d 980 (App. 1999) ....................................................................... 379
In re Christopher R., 191 Ariz. 461, 957 P.2d 1004 (App. 1997) ......................................................... 105
In re Joel R., 200 Ariz. 512, 29 P.3d 287 (App. 2001) .......................................................................... 511
In re Kyle M., 200 Ariz. 447, 27 P.3d 804 (App. 2001) ........................................................................ 123
In Re Robert A., 199 Ariz. 485, 19 P.3d 626 (App. 2001) .................................................. 355, 361, 363
In Re Roy L., 197 Ariz. 441, 4 P.3d 984 (App. 2000) .......................................................................... 498
In re Ryan A., 202 Ariz. 19, 39 P.3d 543 (App. 2002) ........................................................................ 124
In Re United States for an Order Authorizing Roving Interception of Oral Communications, 349
F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................................... 435
In the Matter of 1986 Chevrolet Corvette, 183 Ariz. 637, 905 P.2d 1372 (1994) ................................... 378
Ishak v. McClennen, 241 Ariz. 364, 388 P.3d 1 (App. 2016) ....................................................... 471, 472
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Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 88-89 (Fla. 1994) .................................................................................. 612
Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) ................................................................................................ 15
Korzep v. Superior Court (Ellsworth), 172 Ariz. 534, 838 P.2d 1295 (App. 1991) ................................. 79
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 772 (1946) ............................................................................. 101
Kunzler v. Miller, 154 Ariz. 570, 744 P.2d 671 (1987) .......................................................................... 518
Kunzler v. Pima County Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 568, 744 P.2d 669 (1987) ....................................... 518
Lee v. State, 218 Ariz. 235, 182 P.3d 1169 (2008) ................................................................................ 541
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) ....................................................................................................... 619
Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016) ....................................................................................... 594, 595
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) ................................................................................................. 35
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) ................................................................................................ 619
McNutt v. Superior Court of Arizona, 133 Ariz. 7, 648 P.2d 122 (1982) .............................................. 518
Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, 136 P.3d 874 (2006) ............................................................... 453, 456
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) .......................................................................................................... 35
Ness v. Western Sec. Life Ins. Co., 174 Ariz. 497, 851 P.2d 122 (App. 1992) ...................................... 285
Norton v. Superior Court ex rel. Woods, 171 Ariz. 155, 829 P.2d 345 (App. 1992) ............................. 378
Ottaway v. Smith, 210 Ariz. 490, 113 P3d 1247 (App. 2005) .............................................................. 332
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) ........................................................................................... 156
People v. Burres, 101 Cal. App. 3d 341, 161 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1980) ....................................................... 42
People v. Larue, 28 Cal. App. 2d 748, 83 P.2d 725, 728 ....................................................................... 248
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) ................................................................ 35
Peterson v. Jacobson, 2 Ariz. App. 593, 411 P.2d 31(App. 1966) .................................................. 552, 553
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) ...................................................................................... 101
Polk v. Hancock, 236 Ariz. 301 (App. 2014), vacated, 237 Ariz. 125 (2015) .............................. 469, 470
Ramirez v. Chavez, 71 Ariz. 239, 226 P.2d 143 (1951) ........................................................................... 67
Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, 235 Ariz. 361 (App. 2014) ....................................................................... 469, 470
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) ....................................................................................... 600, 629
Sandstrom v Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979) .................................... 235
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) ............................................................................ 594, 595
Smith v. Texas, 125 S. Ct. 400 (2004) ..................................................................................................... 619
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris, 234 Ariz. 343, 322 P.3d 160 (2014) ............................................... 471
State ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown (Juan-Pascal, real party in interest), 182 Ariz. 525, 898 P.2d
474 (1995) ....................................................................................................................... 51922, 52532
State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 184 Ariz. 409, 909 P.2d 476 (App.
1995) ...................................................................................................................................................... 524
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State ex rel. Smith v. Conn [Tinnell, Real Party in Interest], 209 Ariz. 195, 98 P. 3d 881
(App. 2004) .......................................................................................................................................... 586
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525 169 P.3d 115 (App. 2007) ........... 354, 355, 365, 371, 372
State ex rel. Thomas v. Talamante, 214 Ariz. 106, 149 P.3d 484 (App. 2006) ..................................... 163
State ex rel. Woods v. Cohen, 173 Ariz. 497, 844 P.2d 1147 (1992) .............................................. 101, 102
State v. Abdi, 226 Ariz. 361, 248 P.3d 209 (App. 2011) .......................................................................81
State v. Abdi, 236 Ariz. 609, 343 P.3d 921 (App. 2015 ............................................................... 472, 473
State v. Adams, 155 Ariz. 117, 745 P.2d 175 (App. 1987) .....................................................................99
State v. Agee, 181 Ariz. 58, 887 P.2d 588 (App. 1994) .............................. 515, 517, 526, 528, 529, 541
State v. Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232, 109 P.3d 571 (App. 2005) ................................................................. 586
State v. Allen, 223 Ariz. 125, 220 P.3d 245 (2009) ..................................................................................20
State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 803 P.2d 425 (App. 1990) ............................................................ 169
State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 800 P.2d 1260 (1990) .................................................. 23, 111, 608
State v. Anderson (II), 210 Ariz. 327, 111 P.3d 369 (2005) ................................................. 592, 604, 611
State v. Andrews, 106 Ariz. 372, 476 P.2d 673 (1970) .................................................................. 358, 376
State v. Andriano, 215 Ariz. 497, 161 P.3d 540 (2007)................................................ 607, 608, 611, 619
State v. Angelo, 166 Ariz. 24, 800 P.2d 11 (App. 1990) ..........................................................................56
State v. Angle, 149 Ariz. 478, 720 P.2d 79 (1986)................................................................................. 334
State v. Arce, 107 Ariz. 156, 483 P.2d 1395 (1971) .................................................................................30
State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 360, 93 P.3d 1076 (2004) ....................................................................... 604
State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 832 P.2d 593 (1992) ........................................................................... 138
State v. Ault, 157 Ariz. 516, 759 P.2d 1320 (1988) ............................................................................. 611
State v. Barr, 115 Ariz. 346, 565 P.2d 526 (App. 1977) ................................................................... 69, 70
State v. Barreras, 181 Ariz. 516, 892 P.2d 852 (1995)..................................................................... 30, 609
State v. Bartanen, 121 Ariz. 454, 591 P.2d 546 (1979) .......................................................................... 444
State v. Bass, 184 Ariz. 543, 911 P.2d 549 (App. 1995) ................................................. 132, 169, 171-73
State v. Bass, 198 Ariz. 571, 12 P.3d 796 (2000) ............................................................................... 52, 53
State v. Bauer, 159 Ariz. 443, 768 P.2d 175 (App. 1988) ..................................................................... 443
State v. Bay, 150 Ariz. 112, 722 P.2d 280 (1986)........................................................ 83, 85, 86, 182–84
State v. Bayardi, 230 Ariz. 195, 281 P.3d 1063 (App. 2012)................................................................ 523
State v. Bean, 174 Ariz. 544, 851 P.2d 843 (App. 1992) ...................................................................... 136
State v. Beasley, 205 Ariz. 334, 70 P.3d 463 (App. 2003) ........................................................................97
State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 762 P.2d 519 (1988) ....................................................................... 608, 616
State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, 52 P.3d 804 (App. 2002) ............................................................... 10, 97
State v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 875 P.2d 850 (App. 1994) ...................................... 354, 360, 362, 375
State v. Blevins, 128 Ariz. 64, 623 P.2d 853 (App. 1981) ..................................................................... 511
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State v. Bocharski, 200 Ariz. 50, 22 P.3d 43 (2001). .............................................................................. 117
State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 189 P.3d 403 (2008) ............................................................................. 607
State v. Bojorquez, 138 Ariz. 495, 675 P.2d 1314 (1984) ..................................................... 59, 69, 71, 74
State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 896 P.2d 830 (1995) .............................................................................. 628
State v. Bousley, 171 Ariz. 166, 829 P.2d 1212 (1992) .......................................................................... 227
State v. Bowie, 119 Ariz. 336, 580 P.2d 1190 (1978) ............................................................................... 19
State v. Boyd, 201 Ariz. 27, 31 P.3d 140 (App. 2001) ................................................................... 521, 546
State v. Bridgeforth, 156 Ariz. 60, 750 P.2d 3 (1988) ............................................................................. 285
State v. Brookover, 124 Ariz. 38, 601 P.2d 1322 (1979) ........................................................................ 608
State v. Brooks, 127 Ariz. 130, 618 P.2d 624 (App. 1980) ..................................................................... 22
State v. Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, 986 P.2d 239 (App. 1999) ..................................................... 26, 528, 530
State v. Burciaga, 146 Ariz. 333, 705 P.2d 1384 (App. 1985) ................................................................ 23
State v. Burge, 167 Ariz. 25, 804 P.2d 754 (1990) ....................................................................... 60, 63, 65
State v. Cagle, 228 Ariz. 374, 266 P.3d 1070 (App. 2011) ................................................................... 315
State v. Caldera, 141 Ariz. 634, 688 P.2d 642 (1984) ................................................................................. 45
State v. Camino, 118 Ariz. 89, 574 P.2d 1308 (App. 1977) .................................................................... 32
State v. Canedo, 125 Ariz. 197, 608 P.2d 774 (1980) .............................................................................. 23
State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133, 42 P.3d 564 (2002) .................................................................................... 607
State v. Cannon, 148 Ariz. 72, 713 P.2d 273 (1985). ......................................................................... 24, 26
State v. Carlisle, 198 Ariz. 203, 8 P.3d 391 (App. 2000) ................................................................ 99, 151
State v. Carlson, 202 Ariz. 570, 48 P.3d 1180 (2002) ........................................................... 592, 593, 607
State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 351 P.3d 1079 (2015) .......................................................................... 622
State v. Carpenter, 141 Ariz. 29, 684 P.2d 910 (App. 1984) ................................................................. 123
State v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 54, 107 P.3d 900 (2005) .................................................................... 603, 604
State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 692 P.2d 991 (1984) ........................................................................... 611
State v. Carson, 243 Ariz. 463, 410 P.3d 1230 (2018) .......................................................... 61–65, 76, 82
State v. Carter, 118 Ariz. 562, 578 P.2d 991 (1978) ................................................................................ 20
State v. Celaya, 135 Ariz. 248, 660 P.2d 849 (1983). .............................................................................. 29
State v. Chan, 188 Ariz. 272, 935 P.2d 850 (App. 1996) .................................................................... 102
State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, 189 P.3d 374 (2008) ................................................ 401, 416, 417, 421
..................................................................................................................... 422, 424, 425, 427, 428, 431
State v. Childs, 113 Ariz. 318, 553 P.2d 1192 (1976) .............................................................................. 25
State v. Clabourne, 194 Ariz. 379, 388, ¶ 40, 983 P.2d 748, 757 (1999) ............................................. 623
State v. Clow, 130 Ariz. 125, 634 P.2d 576 (1981) .................................................................................. 18
State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 709 P.2d 1336 (1985) ......................................................................... 52, 53
State v. Coley, 158 Ariz. 471, 763 P.2d 535 (App. 1988) ..................................................... 360, 362, 365
State v. Conroy, 131 Ariz. 528, 642 P.2d 873 (App. 1982) ..................................................................... 29
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State v. Contreras, 122 Ariz. 478, 595 P.2d 1023 (App. 1979) ................................................................33
State v. Cook, 139 Ariz. 406, 678 P.2d 987 (App. 1984) ..................................................................... 383
State v. Corona, 188 Ariz. 85, 932 P.2d 1356 (App. 1997) ............................................................ 19, 124
State v. Cotton, 197 Ariz. 584, 5 P.3d 918 (App. 2000) ........................................................................ 111
State v. Cousin, 136 Ariz. 83, 664 P.2d 233 (App. 1983) ........................................................................29
State v. Cox, 214 Ariz. 518, 155 P.3d 357 (App. 2007) ..........................................................................30
State v. Crane, 166 Ariz. 3, 799 P.2d 1380 (App. 1990)....................................................................... 148
State v. Crawford, 214 Ariz. 129, 149 P.3d 753 (2007) ................................................................. 163, 602
State v. Cropper, 223 Ariz. 522, ¶ 13, 225 P.3d 579 (2010) .................................................................. 608
State v. Culver, 103 Ariz. 505, 446 P.2d 234 (1968).............................................................................. 248
State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 931 P.2d 1133 (App. 1996)......................................................................99
State v. Dale, 121 Ariz. 433, 590 P.2d 1379 (1979) ....................................................................................
State v. Dann, 206 Ariz. 371, 79 P.3d 58 (2003) ................................................................................... 612
State v. Davis, 119 Ariz. 529, 582 P.2d 175 (App. 1978) ..................................................................... 315
State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377, 79 P.3d 64 (2003) ................................................................................... 151
State v. Decello, 111 Ariz. 46, 523 P.2d 74 (1974) ....................................................................................53
State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969) .........................................................................35
State v. Detrich, 178 Ariz. 380, 873 P.2d 1302 (1994) .......................................................................... 138
State v. Diaz, 135 Ariz. 496, 662 P.2d 461 (App. 1983) .............................................................. 315, 334
State v. Diaz, 166 Ariz. 442, 803 P.2d 435 (App. 1990) .........................................................................30
State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 926 P.2d 468 (1996) ................................................................ 24, 589, 592
State v. DiGiulio, 172 Ariz. 156, 835 P.2d 488 (App. 1992) ............................................................... 276
State v. Dixon, 127 Ariz. 554, 622 P.2d 501 (App. 1981)................................................... 189, 210, 274
State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 969 P.2d 1168 (1998) ......................................................................... 34, 607
State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 568 P.2d 1054 (1977) ...................................................................... 109, 603
State v. Doss, 192 Ariz. 408, 966 P.2d 1012 (App. 1998) .............................................................. 62, 123
State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 404, 783 P.2d 1184, 1196 (1989) .......................................... 60, 63, 65
State v. Dupuy, 116 Ariz. 151, 568 P.2d 1049 (1977) ........................................................................... 104
State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 994 P.2d 395 (2000) ........................................................................ 33, 139
State v. Eastlack, 180 Ariz. 243, 883 P.2d 999 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 118 (1995) .................. 173
State v. Eddington, 226 Ariz. 72, 244 P.3d 76 (App. 2011) ................................................. 110, 113, 114
State v. Edgar, 124 Ariz. 472, 605 P.2d 450 (1979) .............................................................................. 567
State v. Edmisten, 220 Ariz. 517, 207 P.3d 770 (App. 2009) ........................................................... 31, 35
State v. Ekmanis, 183 Ariz. 180, 901 P.2d 1210 (App. 1995) ............................................ 132, 169, 172
State v. Ellison, 169 Ariz. 424, 819 P.2d 1010, approved, 171 Ariz. 166,
829 P.2d 1212 (1992) .......................................................................................................................... 227
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State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 140 P.3d 899 (2006) ..................................................................... 611, 620
State v. Embree, 130 Ariz. 64, 633 P.2d 1057 (App. 1981) .......................................................... 199, 201
State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254, 386 P.3d 798 (2017) ............................................................. 624
State v. Espinosa, 101 Ariz. 474, 421 P.2d 322 (1966) ..................................................................... 426, 429
State v. Far West Water & Sewer, Inc., 224 Ariz. 173, 228 P.3d 909 (App. 2010) ............................... 56
State v. Farley, 199 Ariz. 542, 19 P.3d 1258 (App. 2001) .................................................................... 156
State v. Felix, 153 Ariz. 417, 737 P.2d 393 (App. 1986) .............................................................. 113, 227
State v. Fields (Chase), 232 Ariz. 265, 304 P.3d 1088 (App. 2013) ................................................ 469–71
State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 804 P.2d 72 (1990)........................................................................... 36, 602
State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 717 P.2d 866 (1986) ........................................................................ 83–86
State v. Flores, 140 Ariz. 469, 682 P.2d 1136 (App. 1984) .................................................................. 138
State v. Fodor, 179 Ariz. 442, 880 P.2d 662 (App. 1994) ..................................................................... 324
State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz. App. 246, 492 P.2d 742 (1972) ................................................................ 565, 567
State v. Forrester, 134 Ariz. 444, 657 P.2d 432 (App. 1982) ................................................................ 239
State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332, 553 P.2d 1206 (1976) .............................................................. 72, 74, 507
State v. Freeland, 176 Ariz. 544, 863 P.2d 263 (App.1993) .................................................................... 52
State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 870 P.2d 1097 (1994) ............................................................................. 626
State v. Garcia, 156 Ariz. 381, 752 P.2d 34 (App. 1987) ..................................................................... 497
State v. Garcia, 165 Ariz. 547, 799 P.2d 888 (App. 1990) ..................................................................... 92
State v. Garcia, 220 Ariz. 49, 202 P.3d 514 (App. 2008) ..................................................................... 110
State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 226 P.3d 370 (2010) ................................................................................. 589
State v. Gardella, 156 Ariz. 340, 751 P.2d 1000 (App. 1988) ............................................. 169, 171, 172
State v. Garza Rodriguez, 164 Ariz. 107, 791 P.2d 633 (1990) ............................................................. 227
State v. Gatliff, 209 Ariz. 362, 102 P.3d 981 (App. 2004) .................................................................... 183
State v. Gaynor-Fonte, 211 Ariz. 516, 123 P.3d 1153 (App. 2005) ...................................................... 460
State v. Gendron, 166 Ariz. 562, 804 P.2d 95 (App. 1990) ......................................... 29, 69–71, 74, 511
State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 812 P.2d 626 (1991) ....................................................... 69–71, 74, 511
State v. Gessler, 142 Ariz. 379, 690 P.2d 98 (App. 1984) ..................................................................... 104
State v. Getz, 189 Ariz. 561, 944 P.2d 503 (1997) ................................................................................... 155
State v. Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219, 293 P.3d 495 (2012) ............................................................................. 622
State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349, 681 P.2d 1368 (1984) ....................................................................... 138
State v. Gooch, 139 Ariz. 365, 678 P.2d 946 (1984) ................................................................................ 29
State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 778 P.2d 1204 (1989) .......................................................................... 140
State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 900 P.2d 1 (1995) ................................ 57, 58, 60, 63, 67, 68, 70–76, 79
State v. Granville (Baldwin), 211 Ariz. 468, 123 P.3d 662 (2005) ................................................. 621, 623
State v. Green, 117 Ariz. 92, 570 P.2d 1265 (App. 1977) ..................................................................... 102
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State v. Green, 200 Ariz. 496, 29 P.3d 271 (2001)....................................................................................23
State v. Green, 60 Ariz. 63, 131 P.2d 411 (1942) ................................................................................... 385
State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 967 P.2d 106 (1998) ............................................................................. 605
State v. Gross, 201 Ariz. 41, 31 P.3d 815 (App. 2001) ................................................................... 97, 137
State v. Gunnison, 127 Ariz. 110, 618 P.2d 604 (1980) .......................................................... 43, 100, 101
State v. Haas, 138 Ariz. 413, 675 P.2d 673 (1983) ................................................................... 30, 31, 285
State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 140 P.3d 950 (2006) .......................................................... 609–11, 623
State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841 (1970) ...............................................................................20
State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, 280 P.3d 604 (2012) ............................................................................ 613
State v. Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 863 P.2d 861 (1993) .................................................................................33
State v. Hernandez-Mercado, 124 Wash. 2d 368, 879 P.2d 283 (1994)................................................. 355
State v. Herrera, 176 Ariz. 21, 859 P.2d 131 (1993) ...................................................................... 377, 378
State v. Herrera, 203 Ariz. 131, 51 P.3d 353 (App. 2002) .......................................................................19
State v. Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508, 233 P.3d 621 (App. 2010) .................................................................. 167
State v. Hoag, 165 Ariz. 215, 797 P.2d 1233 (App. 1990) ................................................................... 196
State v. Holland, 147 Ariz. 453, 711 P.2d 592 (1985) ........................................................................... 518
State v. Holle, 238 Ariz. 281, 358 P.3d 639 (App. 2015) ..................................................................... 156
State v. Hollenback, 212 Ariz. 12, 126 P.3d 159 (App. 2005) .................................................................93
State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 12 P.3d 997 (2000) ................................................................................26
State v. Howland, 134 Ariz. 541, 658 P.2d 194 (App. 1982)............................................................ 83, 86
State v. Huerstel, 206 Ariz. 93, 75 P.3d 698 (2003) ..................................................................................38
State v. Huffman, 137 Ariz. 300, 670 P.2d 405 (App. 1983) ...................................................................43
State v. Hunter, 136 Ariz. 45, 664 P.2d 195 (1983) .......................................................................... 32, 34
State v. Hussain, 189 Ariz. 336, 942 P.2d 1168 (App. 1997) ..................................................................75
State v. Ives, 187 Ariz. 102, 927 P.2d 762 (1996) .....................................................................................24
State v. Jackson, 186 Ariz. 20, 918 P.2d 1038 (1996) ...................................................................... 29, 629
State v. Jansing, 186 Ariz. 63, 918 P.2d 1081 (1996)................................................................................29
State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz. 90, 722 P.2d 258 (1986) ................................... 516, 517, 526, 528, 530, 541
State v. Johnson, 155 Ariz. 23, 745 P.2d 81 (1987) ................................................................................ 148
State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 72 P.3d 343 (App. 2003) .......................................................................51
State v. Johnson, 212 Ariz. 425, 133 P.3d 735 (2006) ............................................................................ 609
State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 4 P.3d 345 (2000) .................................................................................... 601
State v. Juarez, 161 Ariz. 76, 775 P.2d 1140 (1989) .............................................................................. 518
State v. Kamai, 184 Ariz. 620, 911 P.2d 626 (App. 1995) ........................................................... 195, 196
State v. Kelly, 190 Ariz. 532, 950 P.2d 1153 (1991) .................................................................................91
State v. Kelly, 210 Ariz. 460, 112 P.3d 682 (App. 2005) ............................................. 354, 365, 367, 374
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State v. Kemmish, 244 Ariz. 314, 418 P.3d 1087 (App. 2018) .............................................................. 472
State v. Kemper, 227 Ariz. 452, ¶ 5, 258 P.3d 270 (App. 2011) ................................................... 152, 153
State v. Kerr, 142 Ariz. 426, 690 P.2d 145 (App. 1984) ................................................ 360–65, 368, 369
State v. Khoshbin, 166 Ariz. 570, 804 P.2d 103 (App. 1990) ................................................................ 110
State v. Kidwell 27 Ariz. App. 466, 556 P.2d 20 (App. 1976) .............................................................. 148
State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 763 P.2d 239 (1988) ............................................................................. 83–85
State v. King, 180 Ariz. 268, 883 P.2d 1024 (1994) .............................................................................. 607
State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 235 P.3d 240 (2010) .................................................................. 60, 61, 63, 64
State v. Klokic, 219 Ariz. 241, 196 P.3d 844(App2008) ......................................................................... 27
State v. Koch, 138 Ariz. 99, 673 P.2d 297 (1983) .................................................................................... 18
State v. Korzep, 165 Ariz. 490, 799 P.2d 831 (1990) ............................................................................... 75
State v. Krug, 96 Ariz. 225, 393 P.2d 916 (1964) .................................................................................. 324
State v. Kuhs, 223 Ariz. 376, 224 P.3d 192 (2010) .................................................................................. 38
State v. Lacy, 187 Ariz. 340, 929 P.2d 1288 (1996) .............................................................................. 589
State v. Lara, 183 Ariz. 233, 902 P.2d 1337 (1995) ................................................................................ 28
State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 814 P.2d 333 (1991) ............................................................................. 612
State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 924 P.2d 441 (1996) .................................................... 28, 113, 114, 527
State v. Lichon, 163 Ariz. 186, 786 P.2d 1037 (App. 1989) ................................................................. 443
State v. Liwski, 238 Ariz. 184, 358 P.3d 605 (App. 2015) ................................................................... 469
State v. Lockner, 20 Ariz. App. 367, 513 P.2d 374 (1973). .................................................................... 62
State v. Lopez, 163 Ariz. 108, 786 P.2d 959 (1990) .......................................................................... 33, 51
State v. Lucas, 146 Ariz. 597, 708 P.2d 81 (1985) ................................................................................. 138
State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 664 P.2d 646 (1983) ................................................................................ 62
State v. Luque, 171 Ariz. 198, 829 P.2d 1244 (App.1992) ........................................................................9
State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 357 P.3d 119 (2015) ........................................................................ 594, 595
State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 357 P.3d 119 (2015) ................................................................................ 594
State v. Maestas, 244 Ariz. 9, 417 P.3d 774 (2018) ....................................................................... 469, 474
State v. Magana, 178 Ariz. 416, 874 P.2d 973 (App. 1994). .................................................................. 29
State v. Maldonado, 206 Ariz. 339, 78 P.3d 1060 (App. 2003)............................................................... 10
State v. Malory, 113 Ariz. 480, 557 P.2d 165 (1976) ............................................................................... 66
State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, 150 P.3d 165 (App. 2007) ................................................................ 354
State v. Marquez, 135 Ariz. 316, 660 P.2d 1243 (App. 1983) .............................................................. 597
State v. Martinez, 175 Ariz. 114, 854 P.2d 147 (App. 1993).................................................................. 34
State v. Martinez, 198 Ariz. 5, 6 P.3d 310 (App. 2000) .......................................................................... 39
State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618 (2005) ......................................................................... 586
State v. Martinez, 230 Ariz. 382, 284 P.3d 893 (App. 2012 ................................................................. 511
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State v. McCann, 200 Ariz. 27, 21 P.3d 845 (2001) .......................................................... 531–33, 54951
State v. McCuin, 167 Ariz. 447, 808 P.2d 332 (App. 1991), review granted, affirmed in part,
vacated in part, 171 Ariz. 171, 829 P.2d 1217 (1992) ....................................................................... 151
State v. McKeon, 201 Ariz. 571, 38 P.3d 1236 (App. 2002) ....................................................... 31, 86–89
State v. McMurtrey, 151 Ariz. 105, 726 P.2d 202 (1986) .............................................................. 603, 626
State v. McVay, 127 Ariz. 18, 617 P.2d 1134 (1980) ...............................................................................22
State v. Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 975 P.2d 94 (1999) ............................................................. 605, 607, 616
State v. Mendibles, 126 Ariz. 218, 613 P.2d 1274 (App. 1980) ............................................................ 138
State v. Miles, 186 Ariz. 10, 918 P.2d 1028 (1996) ....................................................................... 607, 610
State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 865 P.2d 779 (1993) .............................................................................. 607
State v. Milligan, 87 Ariz. 165, 349 P.2d 180 (1960) ....................................................................... 512–14
State v. Mitchell, 204 Ariz. 216, 62 P.3d 616 (App. 2003) ................................................................... 498
State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 724 P.2d 1233 (App. 1986) .................... 192–94, 200–02, 206, 207, 235
.................................................................. 239, 273, 274, 296, 377, 378, 486, 491, 495, 572–77
State v. Molina, 211 Ariz. 130, 118 P.3d 1094 (App. 2005) ................................................................ 586
State v. Montano, 204 Ariz. 413, 65 P.3d 61 (2003) .................................................................................23
State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 94 P.3d 1119 (2004) ............................................................................. 604
State v. Moran, 162 Ariz. 524, 784 P.2d 730, 732 (App. 1989) ................................................... 177, 179
State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962) ....................................................... 401, 416–28, 432
State v. Morse, 127 Ariz. 25, 617 P.2d 1141 (1980) .............................................................................. 104
State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19, 97 P.3d 844 (2004) ............................................................................ 611
State v. Murray, 162 Ariz. 211, 782 P.2d 329 (App. 1989) .................................................................. 416
State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 906 P.2d 542 (1995) .......................................................................... 33, 607
State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 222 (1985) ............................................................................... 629
State v. Nguyen, 208 Ariz. 316, 318, 93 P.3d 516, 518 (App. 2004) ......................................................10
State v. Nichols, 181 Ariz. 56, 887 P.2d 586 (App. 1994) ................................................... 182, 183, 185
State v. Nichols, 201 Ariz. 234, 33 P.3d 1172 (App.2001) ................................................................... 586
State v. Nieto, 186 Ariz. 449, 924 P.2d 453 (1996) ..................................................................................23
State v. Nordstrom, 230 Ariz. 110, 280 P.3d 1244 (2012) ..................................................................... 623
State v. Noriega, 142 Ariz. 474, 690 P.2d 775 (1984 ................................................................... 60, 63, 65
State v. Noriega, 144 Ariz. 258, 697 P.2d 341 (App. 1984) ................................................................. 275
State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 928 P.2d 706 (App. 1996) ....................................................................34
State v. Nottingham, 231 Ariz. 21, 289 P.3d 949 (App. 2012) ................................................................35
State v. Nunez, 159 Ariz. 594, 769 P.2d 1040 (App. 1989) ....................................................................99
State v. O’Kelley, 117 Ariz. 34, 570 P.2d 805 (App. 1977) .................................................. 334, 498, 499
State v. Olea, 139 Ariz. 280, 678 P.2d 465 (App. 1983) ..................................................... 104, 105, 109
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State v. Olsen, 157 Ariz. 603, 760 P.2d 603 (App. 1988) ........................................................... 69, 70, 74
State v. Ontiveros, 206 Ariz. 539, 81 P.3d 330(App. 2003) .................................................... 99, 113, 114
State v. Ortiz, 158 Ariz. 528, 764 P.2d 13 (1988) ................................................................................. 109
State v. Ortiz, 238 Ariz. 329, 360 P.3d 125 (App. 2015) ....................................................................... 91
State v. Pandelli, 215 Ariz. 114, 161 P.3d 557 (2007) ........................................................................... 619
State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, 296 p.3D 54 (2013) ........................................................................................ 35
State v. Parker, 236 Ariz. 474, 666 P.2d 1083 (1983) .............................................................................. 524
State v. Parra, 10 Ariz. App. 427, 459 P.2d 344 (1969) ......................................................................... 26
State v. Patterson, 203 Ariz. 513, 56 P.3d 1097 (App. 2002). ......................................................... 91, 403
State v. Patterson, 230 Ariz. 270, 283 P.3d 1 (2012) ................................................................................ 92
State v. Patton, 136 Ariz. 243, 665 P.2d 587 (App. 1983) .................................................................... 152
State v. Petrak, 198 Ariz. 260, 8 P.3d 1174 (App. 2000)...................................................................... 368
State v. Petzolt, 172 Ariz. 272, 836 P.2d 982 (App.1991) ...................................................................... 19
State v. Phillips, 202 Ariz. 427, 46 P.3d 1048 (2002) .............................................................................. 55
State v. Porras, 125 Ariz. 490, 610 P.2d 1051 (1980) ............................................................................ 512
State v. Portillo, 179 Ariz. 116, 876 P.2d 1151 (App. 1994).................................................. 34, 101, 102
State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 898 P.2d 970 (1995).......................................................... 11, 16, 17, 597
State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 363, 26 P.3d 1134 (2001) ............................................................................. 512
State v. Poyson, 198 Ariz. 70, 7 P.3d 79 (2000) ...................................................................................... 628
State v. Preston, 197 Ariz. 461, 4 P.3d 1004 (App. 2000) ....................................................................... 54
State v. Quatsling, 24 Ariz. App. 105, 536 P.2d 226 (1975) ................................................................... 42
State v. Ramsey, 211 Ariz. 529, 124 P.3d 756 (App. 2005) .................................................................. 160
State v. Rea, 145 Ariz. 298, 701 P.2d 6 (App. 1985) ............................................................................ 231
State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907 (1968) ............................................................. 531–33, 549
State v. Renaud, 108 Ariz. 417, 499 P.2d 712 (1972) ....................................................... 531–33, 549–51
State v. Richmond, 180 Ariz. 573, 886 P.2d 1329 (1994) .............................................................. 602, 607
State v. Rivera, 177 Ariz. 476, 479, 858 P2d 1059, 1062 (App. 1994) .............................. 515, 517, 526
................................................................................................................................................. 528, 529, 541
State v. Roberts, 139 Ariz. 117, 677 P.2d 280 (App. 1983) .................................................................... 22
State v. Robinson, 165 Ariz. 51, 796 P.2d 853 (1990) ............................................................................ 598
State v. Rodarte, 173 Ariz. 331, 842 P.2d 1344 (App. 1992) ............... 402, 403, 418–20, 423, 426, 429
State v. Roderick, 9 Ariz. App. 19, 448 P.2d 891 (1968) ...................................................... 385, 389, 395
State v. Rodgers, 134 Ariz. 296, 655 P.2d 1348 (App. 1982) ........................................................ 512, 514
State v. Rodgers, 184 Ariz. 378, 909 P.2d 445 (App. 1995) .................................................................... 35
State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 961 P.2d 1006 (1998) ........................................................................ 612
State v. Rogovich, 188 Ariz. 38, 932 P.2d 794 (1997) ............................................................................. 602
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State v. Romanosky, 162 Ariz. 217, 782 P.2d 693 (1989) ...................................................................... 597
State v. Romanosky, 176 Ariz. 118, 859 P.2d 741 (1993) ...................................................................... 163
State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 141 P.3d 368 (2006) .............................................................................. 602
State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 886 P.2d 1354 (1994) .................................................................................. 607
State v. Rowan, 174 Ariz. 285, 848 P.2d 964 (App. 1992) review granted,
aff’d in part, vac’d in part, 176 Ariz. 114, 859 P.2d 737 (1993) ................................ 388, 390, 391, 451
State v. Ruelas, 165 Ariz. 326, 798 P.2d 1335 (App. 1990) ....................................................................29
State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 859 P.2d 169 (1993) .........................................................................26
State v. Rutledge, 205 Ariz. 7, 66 P.3d 50 (2003) ......................................................................................19
State v. Salazar, 160 Ariz. 570, 774 P.2d 1360 (1989) ................................................................. 194, 195
State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 844 P.2d 566 (1992) ............................................................ 29, 175, 589
State v. Salazar, 27 Ariz. App. 620, 557 P.2d 552 (1976) .................................................................... 102
State v. Salinas, 106 Ariz. 526, 479 P.2d 411 (1971) ...............................................................................20
State v. Sanchez, 174 Ariz. 44, 846 P.2d 857 (App. 1993) ......................................................................99
State v. Sansing, 200 Ariz. 347, 26 P.3d 1118 (2001) ............................................................................ 604
State v. Scarborough, 110 Ariz. 1, 514 P.2d 997 (1973 ..............................................................................30
State v. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. 323, 819 P.2d 909 (1991) .................................................................... 164, 602
State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 947 P.2d 315 (1997) ........................................................................ 610
State v. Schwartz, 188 Ariz. 313, 935 P.2d 891 (App. 1996) ........................................................ 383, 388
State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 856 P.2d 792 (1993) ................................................................................ 621
State v. Self , 135 Ariz. 374, 661 P.2d 224 (App. 1983) ............................................................... 327, 331
State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, 78 P.3d 732 (2003) ..................................................................................92
State v. Settle, 111 Ariz. 394, 531 P.2d 151 (1975) ..................................................................................33
State v. Sierra-Cervantes, 201 Ariz. 459, 37 P.3d 432 (App. 2001) ..........................................................52
State v. Simpson, 217 Ariz. 326, 173 P.3d 1027 (App. 2007).............................................................. 156
State v. Siner, 205 Ariz. 301, 69 P.3d 1022 (App. 2003) .........................................................................51
State v. Singh, 4 Ariz. App. 273, 419 P.2d 403 (1966) ......................................................................... 248
State v. Skiba, 199 Ariz. 539, 19 P.3d 1255 (App. 2001) ................................................... 526, 529, 530
State v. Slayton, 214 Ariz. 511, 154 P.3d 1057 (App. 2007) ................................................................ 165
State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 707 P.2d 289 (1985) ............................................................... 23, 603, 608
State v. Smith, 197 Ariz. 333, 4 P.3d 388 (App. 1999) ............................................................................10
State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, 86 P.3d 370 (2004) ..................................................................................23
State v. Snelling, 225 Ariz. 182, 190, ¶ 39, 236 P.3d 409, 417 (2010) ................................................. 608
State v. Snodgrass, 117 Ariz. 107, 570 P.2d 1280 (App. 1977) ............................................................. 316
State v. Snodgrass, 121 Ariz. 409, 590 P.2d 948 (App. 1979) ............................................................... 316
State v. Spoon, 137 Ariz. 105, 669 P.2d 83 (App. 1983) ....................................................................... 235
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State v. Spratt, 126 Ariz. 184, 613 P.2d 848 (App. 1980) .............................................................. 45, 227
State v. Stroud, 209 Ariz. 410, 103 P.3d 912 (2005).............................................................................. 315
State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 865 P.2d 765 (1993) ............................................................. 589, 607, 610
State v. Sucharew, 205 Ariz. 16, 66 P.3d 59 (App. 2003) ........................................................................ 53
State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 69 P.3d 1006 (App. 2003) ................................................................... 11
State v. Sullivan, 68 Ariz. 81, 200 P.2d 346 (1948) ....................................................................... 102, 104
State v. Superior Court of Pima County, 104 Ariz. 440, 454 P.2d 982 (1969) ........................................ 158
State v. Superior Court, 185 Ariz. 47, 912 P.2d 51 (App. 1996) .............................................. 72–74, 507
State v. Tabor, 184 Ariz. 119, 907 P.2d 505 (App. 1995)..................................................................... 173
State v. Tages, 10 Ariz. App. 127, 457 P.2d 289 (1969) ....................................................................... 316
State v. Takacs, 169 Ariz. 392, 819 P.2d 978 (App. 1991) .................................................. 395, 396, 398
State v. Tamplin, 146 Ariz. 377, 706 P.2d 389 (App. 1985) ................................................................... 92
State v. Taylor, 169 Ariz. 121, 817 P.2d 488 (1991) .......................................................................... 24, 75
State v. Taylor, 27 Ariz. App. 140, 551 P.2d 589 (1976) ...................................................................... 248
State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 944 P.2d 1194 (1997) ....................................................... 16, 17, 24, 25
State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 65 P.2d 420 (2003) ......................................................... 115, 116, 120
State v. Torres-Mercado, 191 Ariz. 279, 955 P.2d 35 (App. 1997) ........................................................ 334
State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 951 P.2d 869 (1997) .................................................................................. 629
State v. Tschilar, 200 Ariz. 427, 27 P.3d 331 (App. 2001) ............................................................ 138, 139
State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 759 P.2d 579 (1988) ......................................................................... 33, 34
State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, 160 P.3d 177 (2007) ...................................... 600, 607, 608, 611, 619, 620
State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 984 P.2d 16 (1999) ........................................................................ 16
State v. Van Dyke, 127 Ariz. 335, 621 P.2d 22 (1983) ........................................................................... 18
State v. Velazquez, 216 Ariz. 300, 166 P.3d 91 (2007) ..................................................................... 607, 608
State v. Venegas, 137 Ariz. 171, 669 P.2d 604 (App. 1983) ................................................................... 92
State v. Vickers, 159 Ariz. 532, 768 P.2d 1177 (1989) ........................................................................... 29
State v. Vild, 155 Ariz. 374, 746 P.2d 1304 (App. 1987) ...................................................................... 25
State v. Walden, 183 Ariz. 595, 905 P.2d 974 (1995) ............................................................................ 602
State v. Walker, 185 Ariz. 228, 914 P.2d 1320 (App. 1995) ........................................................ 320, 321
State v. Wallace, 219 Ariz. 1, 191 P.3d 164 (2008) ........................................................................ 607, 608
State v. Walters, 155 Ariz. 548, 748 P.2d 777 (1987). ............................................................................. 21
State v. Walton, 133 Ariz. 282, 650 P.2d 1264 (App. 1982) ................................................................ 108
State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 769 P.2d 1017 (1989) .......................................................................... 592
State v. Weinstein, 182 Ariz. 564, 898 P.2d 513 (App. 1995) ............................. 197, 198, 245, 246, 328
State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 770 P.2d 328 (1989) .................................................................................. 16
State v. Williams, 136 Ariz. 52, 664 P.2d 202 (1983) .............................................................................. 22
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State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 487, 698 P.2d 732 (1985) ......................................... 29, 281, 526, 528, 529
State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 854 P.2d 131 (1993) ...............................................................................92
State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964) ..................................................................................33
State v. Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 892 P.2d 1319 (1995) .................................................................... 434
State v. Wilson, 135 Ariz. 395, 661 P.2d 659 (App. 1983) ...................................................... 45, 182–84
State v. Wilson, 185 Ariz. 254, 914 P.2d 1346 (App. 1995) ....................................................................32
State v. Windus, 207 Ariz. 328, 86 P.3d 384 (App. 2004) .................................................................... 315
State v. Witwer, 175 Ariz. 305, 856 P.2d 1183 (App. 1993) ........................................................ 148, 150
State v. Wolter, 197 Ariz. 190, 3 P.3d 1110 (2000) ............................................................................... 195
State v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 881 P.2d 1158 (1994) .............................................................................. 603
State v. Wood, 198 Ariz. 275, 8 P.3d 1189 (App. 2000) ....................................................................... 136
State v. Yegan, 223 Ariz. 213, 221 P.3d 1027 (App. 2009) .................................................................. 443
State v. Young, 192 Ariz. 303, 965 P.2d 37 (App. 1998) ................... 292, 353, 354, 359, 361, 373, 374
State v. Zaragoza, 221 Ariz. 49, 209 P.3d. 629 (2009) .......................................................................... 543
State v. Zavala, 136 Ariz. 389, 666 P.2d 489 (App. 1982) ................................................................... 315
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) .....................................................................................................15
Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004) .............................................................................................. 619
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) .......................................................................................... 69, 70, 74
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) ............................................................................................ 588, 627
United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 856 (2004),
cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543
U.S. 1100 (2005) .................................................................................................................................. 435
United States v. Southwell, 432 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2005) ........................................................................85
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994) ............................................................ 349
Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) ..............................................................................................26
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) ............................................................................................ 600