24.01: Classics of Western Philosophy
Haslanger
This brings out the idea that soul is form, body is matter, and that you would not have the one without the
either—contrary to Plato, they are interdependent.
C. Second comparison: body and soul are like an axe and ‘the account of an axe’.
Suppose that a tool, e.g. an axe, were a natural body, then being an axe would have been its essence and so
its soul. (412b14)
This comparison brings out the idea that soul might be a certain kind of ability: what it is to be an axe (what is
involved in the account, or definition, of an axe) is to be able to cut wood. The form of an axe is not just a certain
shape (unlike the form of a statue), but a certain shape organized to do something. If the axe loses that ability, it
ceases to be an axe, except in name. But the ability to cut is not some mysterious invisible being, capable of
separation from the wood and steel of the axe. Likewise for the soul.
D
. Third comparison: body and soul are like the eye and sight.
Suppose that the eye were an animal—sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance of the eye
which corresponds to the account, the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye
is no longer an eye, except in name—no more than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure. (412b19-22)
This comparison brings out more vividly the idea that soul might be a certain kind of ability. The form of an eye
is not just a certain shape, but a certain power. Sight is the ability to see: and without that ability, there is no eye,
strictly speaking. But again, sight is not some mysterious, invisible being, capable of existing without the eye-jelly.
Likewise for the soul:
As the pupil [eye-jelly] plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body constitutes the
animal. From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate that certain
parts of it are (if it has parts)... (413a4)
So Aristotle provides an alternative to materialism and dualism.
3
. Forms of life
Soul is what makes something alive. But life brings different capacities in different sorts of things. Life in an
apple tree, or a dog, or a human, entails different abilities. Soul enables a living thing to fulfill the powers or
functions of that kind of thing, whether nutrition, movement, perception or thought. In fact, soul is identical to those
powers and functions. However, this does not mean that one is only alive if one is constantly exercising one’s full
capacities! That is because there are two grades or levels of capacities.
Now the word ‘actuality’ has two senses corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge and the
actual exercise of knowledge.” (412a22).
This is all best explained with examples. Consider a human infant. We might say that an infant can speak Greek,
meaning that they have a capacity to learn the language. Once someone learns a language, they aren’t
constantly speaking, however. So we might say of someone sitting quietly that they can speak Greek. This
capacity is different from the infant’s capacity. Moreover, a person who can speak Greek in the second sense
might also be actively speaking Greek. This gives us three levels of potentiality/actuality:
i. First potentiality (1P): infant can speak Greek if they undergo certain significant changes (learning the
language)
ii. Second potentiality (2P)/first actuality (1A): quiet speaker can speak Greek if prompted to – the first
potentiality has been actualized, even if the speaker isn’t actually speaking.
iii. Second actuality (2A): person actually speaking Greek
Another way to put this: something at the 1P stage has a capacity for a capacity; at the 2P/1A stage is has that
capacity; and at the 2A stage it is exercising that capacity. Matter, in a sense, is pure potentiality; form is what
realizes that potential, but then brings along further potential.
This gives us the resources to understand the full definition of soul: “soul is the first actuality of a natural body
that is potentially alive. . . 412a27,” and again, “soul is the first actuality of a natural organic body” (412b5). The
soul of an apple tree brings apple tree capacities; the soul of a dog, dog capacities; the soul of a human, human
capacities. The exercise of these capacities makes us fully alive and fully who we are.
Pojman, Louis P., and Lewis Vaughn. Classics of Philosophy. 3rd edition. Oxford University Press, 2010 © Oxford University Press. All rights
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