2
exclude a defendant who meets any single disqualifying condition listed in subsections (A)
through (C). See United States v. Palomares, 52 F.4th 640, 642 (5th Cir. 2022) (“To be
eligible for safety valve relief, a defendant must show that she does not have more than
4 criminal history points, does not have a 3-point offense, and does not have a 2-point
violent offense.”); United States v. Haynes, 55 F.4th 1075 (6th Cir. 2022) (same); United
States v. Pace, 48 F.4th 741, 756 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[A] defendant who meets any one of
subsections (A), (B), or (C) does not qualify for safety-valve relief.”); United States v.
Pulsifer, 39 F.4th 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 2022) (“A court will find that § 3553(f)(1) is satisfied
only when the defendant (A) does not have more than four criminal history points, (B) does
not have a prior three-point offense, and (C) does not have a prior two-point violent
offense.”). Specifically, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the word “and” is conjunctive in a
“distributive” sense rather than in a “joint” sense. Thus, the phrase “does not have” is
distributed across all three subsections (i.e., should be read as repeated before each of the
three conditions) such that a defendant is ineligible for safety valve relief if the defendant
meets any one of the three conditions. Pulsifer, 39 F.4th at 1022 (“The distributive reading
therefore gives meaning to each subsection in § 3553(f)(1), and we conclude that it is the
better reading of the statute.”); see also Palomares, 52 F.4th at 642 (“We agree with the
Eighth Circuit that Congress’s use of an em-dash following ‘does not have’ is best
interpreted to ‘distribute’ that phrase to each following subsection.”); Haynes, 55 F.4th
at 1080 (“We agree with the Eighth Circuit that, of the interpretations on offer here, ‘[o]nly
the distributive interpretation avoids surplusage.’”).
The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, in contrast, have held that the “and” connecting
subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of section 3553(f)(1) is “conjunctive” and joins together the
enumerated characteristics in those provisions. United States v. Jones, 60 F.4th 230
(4th Cir. 2023); United States v. Lopez, 998 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2021); United States v.
Garcon, 54 F.4th 1274 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). Accordingly, a defendant “must have
(A) more than four criminal-history points, (B) a prior three-point offense, and (C) a prior
two-point violent offense, cumulatively,” to be disqualified from safety valve relief under
section 3553(f). Lopez, 998 F.3d at 433. Unlike the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits interpret the word “and” to be conjunctive in a “joint,” rather
than “distributive,” sense. On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted a petition for
a writ of certiorari in Pulsifer to resolve this question. See Pulsifer v. United States,
39 F.4th 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 2023 WL 2227657 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2023)
(No. 22-340).
Using fiscal year 2021 data, Commission analysis estimated that of 17,520 drug trafficking
offenders, 11,866 offenders meet the non-criminal history requirements of the safety valve
(18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2)–(5)). Of those 11,866 offenders, 5,768 offenders have no more than
one criminal history point and would be eligible under the unamended pre-First Step Act
criminal history requirement. Under a disjunctive interpretation of the expanded criminal
history provision, 1,987 offenders would become eligible. The remaining 4,111 offenders
would be ineligible. In comparison, under the Ninth Circuit’s conjunctive interpretation of
the expanded criminal history provision, 5,778 offenders would become eligible. The
remaining 320 offenders would be ineligible.
Part A of the proposed amendment would implement the provisions of the First Step Act
expanding the applicability of the safety valve provision by amending §5C1.2 and its