USAID Africa: PARADISE LOST? LESSONS FROM 25 YEARS OF

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Madagascar Environmental Interventions Time Line

Mad popn Political situation

GNI per

capita and

GDP Growth

# interntl

visitors

Significant Policy measures Institutional measures

Policy oriented

Interventions

Parks and Reduce

Pressures on

resources

Governance

Health, Economics,

Infrastructure projects

Environment,

Economic

Growth, DG,

other **

Total p.capita

% of total

USAID Mad

funds

Health, food

aid, disaster

and famine

assistance**

Total p.capita

of to

tal

USAID Mad

funds

Other

1984 9,524,414

Ratsiraka

340 2% 12,000

Malagasy strategy for Conservation

and Development adopted

PL 480 funded micro‐

projects

1985 9,778,464

Ratsiraka

$310 1%

International Conference

1986 10,047,896

Ratsiraka

$290 2%

1st national survey of Mad protected

areas

1987 10,332,258

Ratsiraka

$260 1%

NEAP discussions begin with World

Bank

1988 10,631,581

Ratsiraka

$240 3%

Fonds Forestier National

1989 10,945,312

Ratsiraka

$220 4%

Ranomafana Park created DEBT for NATURE

PVO‐NGO

NRMS

1990 11,272,999

Ratsiraka

$230 3% 40,000

Madagascar Environmental Charter

and NEAP become official

Creation ONE, ANAE, ANGAP

$16.5m $1.50

%89

$2.1m $0.20

11%

35% Primary school

completion rate

1991 11,614,758 $210 ‐6%

Multi‐donor secretariat created in

SAVEM $11.3m $1.00

%60

$7.6m $0.70

%40

1992 11,970,837 $230 1%

Mad signs Framework Convention

on Climate Change (FCC)

DEAP put in place; ONE becomes

operational

$41.8m $3.50

%87

$6.0m $0.50

%13

popn growth rate 2.8%;

contraceptive prevalence

rate (CPR) for modern

methods 5%

1993 12,340,943 $240 2%

KEPEM

APPROPOP

$44.5m $3.60

92%

$4.0m $0.30

1994 12,724,636 Zafy $240 0%

D/G Creation Min of Env

CAP

$28.5m $2.20

%88

$3.8m $0.30

%12

USAID funds to Madagascar

EP I :

$49m*

USAID supported Interventions (projects > ~$1m)

Crisis

10 month

General Strike

Political

instability

Protected Area

Management Project

and Conservation

Through

Development at

several PAs

CAP

%88

%12

1995 13,121,371 Zafy $240 2% 78,000

Law on Foundations Ranomafana Park Mgmt plan

$26m $2.00

$89

$3.2m $0.20

%11

1996 13,531,083 Zafy $250 2% 83,000

Banking and currency reforms

GELOSE law

Tany Meva Created; ANGAP starts

managing Isalo PA

RARY

$15.1m $1.10

81%

$3.5m $0.30

19%

44 Protected Areas, 1.4m

ha, 2.3% total land area

1997 13,953,183

Ratsiraka

$260 4% 101,000

Forestry Law

ANGAP begins managing 7 PAs;

Madagascar delegation attends

CITES Conference

MITA

$14.5m $1.00

%80

$3.7m $0.30

20%

Contraceptive Prevalence

Rate (CPR) 10%

1998 14,385,954

Ratsiraka

$260 4% 121,000

Constitutional Revision;

Decentralization

MIRAY LDI

$19.9m $1.40

73%

$7.5m $0.50

27%

1999 14,827,223

Ratsiraka

$250 5% 138,000

Environment/Economic Growth;

MECIE

(

rev

)

ado

ted

PAGE

EHP JSI

$11.9m $0.80

50%

$11.9m $0.80

50%

2000 15,275,362

Ratsiraka

$250 5% 160,000

Strategy for Poverty Reduction

(PSRP)

Sustainable Financing

Commission

ILO

$13.8m $0.90

55%

$11.5m $0.80

45%

36% primary school

completion rate

2001 15,729,518

Ratsiraka

$270 6% 170,000

Provincial Governors put in place:

Rural Development Action Plan;

Gestion Contractualisée des Forêts

(GCF); Code de Gestion des Aires

Protégées (COAP)

International workshop on

Sustainable Financing

FCER RECAP

$15.3m $1.00

35%

$28.3m $1.80

65%

2002 16,189,796

Crisis

$240‐13% 62,000

Presidential decree banning fires

$11.9m $0.70

38%

$19.7m $1.20

62%

2003 16,656,727

Ravalomanana

$290 10% 139,000

Durban Vision announced; Kyoto

Protocol ratified

Durban Vision Group; Min of Env

and DEF merge

MENABE

$14.3m $0.90

35%

$26.2m $1.60

65%

CPR 18% (27% urban, 16%

rural)

2004 17,131,317

Ravalomanana

$300 5% 229,000

Regions created; Protected Areas

Code; MECIE (2); Conservation

Priority Setting exercise; Law on

Foundations Revised

BIANCO created JARIALA PTE MIARO MISONGA

BAMEX Santenet I and II

$12.5m $0.70

34%

$24.1m $1.40

66%

2005 17,614,261

Ravalomanana

$310 5% 277,000

Madagascar ratifies Kyoto Protocol;

New Forestry Policy (incl creation of

regional forest commissions)

SAPM ministerial Order; new Mining

Code; first approval of sale of carbon

credits by MoE; new Protected Areas

Code; Madagascar signs MCA

compact

FAPBM created

ERI

GDA/LARO

$11.4m $0.60

29%

$27.4m $1.60

71%

58% primary school

completion rate

$33.45m

EP II:

$41m +$8.9m cyclone relief

compact

2006 18,105,439

Ravalomanana

$300 5% 312,000

Poverty reduction stra tegy paper;

MAP; Forest fire management

system; new Tenure Policy

$12.7m $0.70

26%

$37m $2.00

74%

2007 18,604,365

Ravalomanana

$340 6%

$9.8m $0.50

17%

$48.3m $2.60

83%

Protected areas represent

3% of Madagascar's land

mass with intention to

double to 6% by 2012

2008 19,110,941

Ravalomanana

$410 7% 345,000

11.8m $0.60

21%

$43m $2.20

79%

2009

Crisis

156,000

2010

EP III

NB Recent apparent improvements in PC income are somewhat misleading when it comes to economic growth and its impact on resource use since, as pointed out in rece nt World Bank documents, almost none of this income growth has been transferred to remote rural areas where there is the most agricultural pressure on forest

resources; Dates are intended to indicate general flow of events and are not precise in terms of months or partial years; where policies are concerned there may be minor discrepancies depending on when law was voted and decrees were actually issued.

social and economic indicators from the World Bank quick query site .

* USAID Env/RD program funding (source L Gaylord personal communication)

** USAID funding levels are approximate and based on information provided by Barbara Dickinson (from USAID loans and grants Greenbook); They do not include $104m of Millenium Challenge Corporation Funds (2005‐2008)

Dates of laws vary due to imprecisions concerning when the law was actually voted, decrees promulgated, etc.

Project dates are approximate

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USAID Projects Madagascar 1984‐2009

This is a partial list of projects, focusing on those most closely related to environmental concerns

Project Initials Project Name Years Focus or interventions Implementing Partner(s)

Approximate

Funding level

Funded under

USAID sector or

Partner

web site

Conservation‐Development

Operational Program Grants

1988‐1994

Test linkages between conservation and

development in 4 PAs

WWF, Duke University and North Carolina

State, Missouri Botanical Garden

$4.1m

Operational Program

Grants

Debt‐for‐Nature 1989‐2002

Training nature protection agents; forest

management transfers

WWF

$2.5m from

USAID

Debt for Nature

PVO‐NGO NRMS

Natural Resources

Management Support

1989‐1995 Reinforce NGO capacity World Learning, CARE, WWF

$.21m (for

Madagascar)

centrally funded

(NGO/PVO‐NRMS)

SAVEM

Sustainable Approaches to

Viable Environmental

Management

1991‐2000

National Park Management, strengthen

ANGAP, ICDPs around 7 PAs

TRD (Institutional support to ANGAP),

PACT with major subgrants (ICDP) to WWF,

VITA, CARE, SUNY‐Stonybrook,CI, ANGAP

$26.6m +

$13.4m

Contract and

cooperative agreement

www.pactworld.org/cs/savem

KEPEM

Knowledge and Effective

Policies for Environmental

Management

1993‐1997

(implementation

delayed by the

political crisis)

Policy and Institutional strengthening :

ONE

ARD

$33m

(non‐project

assistance) + $9m

project assistance

Contract, budget

support to GoM

TRADEM

1991‐1995

Commercialization of natural resource

roducts

~$0.5m Agriculture and NRO

APPROPOP

Madagascar Population

ort Pro

ect

1993‐98 family planning support around ICDPs Management Sciences for Health Health

CAP

Commercial Agriculture

Promotion Pro

ect

1994‐1999 Economic growth poles Chemonics International $24.2m

Economic Growth

Contract

MITA (PEI‐PEII

Transition

Project)

Managing Innovative

Transitions in Agreement

1997‐1998 Support for ANGAP decentralization PACT/Forest Management Trust $3m

Environment/RD

cooperative agreement

RARY

Rary means "to weave" in

Malagasy

1996‐2000

Public debate of complex economic and

social policy questions

PACT ??? Governance www.pactworld.org/cs/rary

MIRAY

Miray means "to be united" in

Mala

1998‐2004

Develop national capacity to manage

rotected areas

PACT, WWF, CI $12.3m www.pactworld.org/cs/miray

JSI

Jireo Salama Isika 1999‐2003

child survival, nutrition, STD, family

planning at the community and service

deliver

level

John Snow International Research and

Training

$16.8m Health

LDI (followed by

PTE during the

transition to ERI)

Landscape Development

Interventions

1998‐2004

Eco‐regional activities to conserve the

forest corridors and improve the well‐

being of farmers living near those

corridors

Chemonics International $22m

Environment‐Rural

Development

PAGE

Environmental Management

Support Project

1999‐2002

Environmental policy and institutional

strengthening

IRG/Winrock, Harvard Insitute for

International Development

$6.2m EPIQ

EHP II

Environmental Health Project 1999‐2004

monitoring and evaluation of linked

interventions in the field

AED $1.2m

USAID/Washington

Global Health Bureau

ILO

Ilo means "light" in Malagasy 2000‐2003 Capacity building for civil society PACT, Cornell

$2.4m

(governance) +

$.57m (election

monitoring)

D/G Cooperative

Agreement

www.pactworld.org/cs/ilo

MGHC

Malagasy Green and Healthy

Communities

2001‐2007

Supported Malagasy NGO Vohary Salama;

worked on health, population,

environment, and income generation

activities

John Snow International Research and

Training

$728,000 Packard Foundation

www.voharysalama.org

FCER

FCE Railway Rehabilitation 2001‐2005

Rehabilitate the FCE railway after 2000

clones

Chemonics International $4.7m

Supplenental cyclone

funds

RECAP

Rehabilitate CAP roads (roads

built by the CAP project)

2001‐2005

Rehabilitate farm to market roads in LDI

intervention areas after 2000 cyclones

Chemonics International $5.5m

Supplenental cyclone

funds

BAMEX

Business and Market

Expansion

2004‐2008 Economic benefits and value chains Chemonics International $5.3m

Environment/Economi

c Growth MOBIS

ERI

Eco‐Regional Initiatives 2004‐2009

Eco‐regional activities to conserve the

forest corridors and improve the well‐

being of farmers living near those

corridors

DAI $2.0m

Environment/RD

MOBIS

SanteNet I

Health Network 2004‐2008

Increasing demand, availability, and

quality of select health and FP products

and services (cte and national level)

Chemonics International 16.5m Health Contract

QMM‐USAID GDA

(LARO)

Linking Actors Regional

Opportunities

2003‐2005‐2008

Program to mitigate negative social and

environmental consequences of the

Qitfer mine

PACT, PSI, CARE

$3m QMM; $3m

USAID

Joint funding

Qitfer/USAID central

fundin

EMI

Extra Mile initiative 2005‐2008

Increase remote rural community

(including those adjacent to threatened

forests

)

access to FP

CARE, JSI, R&T $225,000 Health Central Funding

Menabe

Menabe Biodiversity Corridor 2003‐2010

Build forest connectivity through

management and revenue‐generating

incentives including eco‐tourism

CI $3m ??

Cooperative

Agreement through

Biodiversity Corridor

Planning and

Implementation

Program

MIARO

Protect (in Malagasy) 2004‐2009

Expansion of Protected Area Network

through co‐management

CI, with subgrants to WCS, WWF, ANGAP $6.3m

Environment/RD

Cooperative

reement

Jariala

Forest Management (in

Mala

)

2004‐2009

Policy and Institutional support (esp

reform of DGEF)

IRG $12.2m

Environment/RD

contract

www.jariala.org

MISONGA

Managing Information and

Strengthening Organizations

for Networked Governance

Approaches

2004‐2006

(ended 2 years

early when

money ran out)

promote civil society, improve

information flows between citizenry and

government, improve government

responsiveness, reduce corruption

PACT, CRS $8.2m initially

Environment/RD and

D/G funding

www.pactworld.org/cs/misonga

VARI

Utilizing small‐scale irrigation

systems for household and

market‐oriented agricultural

production in Anosy Region

2006‐2009

Farmer to farmer extension, technical

assistance for water management and

farming systems

CARE $.59m

Cooperative

Agreement

VAHATRA

Laying Foundation for Strong

Local Governance and

Livelihoods Security

2007‐2009

Build commune capacity around a shared

watershed, with attention on improving

environment, food security and livelihood

sitatuations.

CRS $.19m

Cooperative

Agreement

In 2005, Madagascar signed a compact with MCA for a $110m project over four years. The three focus areas were : land tenure reform, financial sector reform, and agricultural business development.

The program was terminated in 2009 due to the political crisis.

Please note : these are not official funding levels and should be considered approximate. There is no standard system in USAID for documenting project funding levels/expenditures and it was difficult to obtain comparable information.

PARADISE LOST?

LESSONS FROM 25 YEARS OF USAID

ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMS IN MADAGASCAR

Written by Karen Freudenberger

July 2010

Prepared by:

International Resources Group

1211 Connecticut Ave. Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 289-0100

DISCLAIMER

This publication is made possible by the support of the American People through the United States

Agency for International Development (USAID.). It was prepared by International Resources Group

(IRG).The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reect the views of the

United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .V

A Brief History of NEAP, the Environment Programs,

Community-based natural resource management

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX

List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

and USAID Interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The National Environmental Action Plan ............................. 7

The Environmental Programs.............................................................................. 8

USAID Interventions ........................................... 10

Mission history .................................................................................................... 10

An overview of USAID’s environmental projects........................................ 13

Partnerships ....................................................................................................... 18

Overall major accomplishments...................................................................... 24

USAID’s approach ............................................................................................. 27

Policies and Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Improved, environmentally friendly policy framework.................. 31

Institutional strengthening ....................................... 33

Environmental Institutions and Structures.................................................... 33

Sustainable Financing .......................................................................................... 38

Discussion ........................................................................................................... 40

Protected Area Designation and Management . . . . . . . . . . . 43

The National Parks ............................................. 43

The Durban Vision/SAPM ........................................ 44

Operationalizing the Vision ............................................................................... 45

Discussion............................................................................................................. 47

(CBNRM): co-management....................................... 48

Discussion............................................................................................................. 51

Reducing Pressures on Resources by Surrounding Communities . 53

ICDPs ....................................................... 53

The Eco-regional approach....................................... 54

Persuading farmers to abandon tavy.......................................................................55

Fire.......................................................................................................................... 59

Discussion............................................................................................................. 60

Efforts to align conservation and livelihood objectives ................. 60

Payments for Ecosystem Services ................................................................... 62

Discussion............................................................................................................. 64

Stepping Back:Assessing Results in Terms of the Overall Impact on

Increasing Chinese (and other non-Western Investment)

Firewood and construction wood exploitation ....................... 65

Valorizing Natural Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Commercial forest exploitation ................................... 67

Natural Products Markets ....................................... 69

Eco-tourism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Problematic characteristics of malagasy governance ................... 73

Business as usual ................................................................................................. 73

Are crises normal?.............................................................................................. 75

Local Government ............................................. 76

Civil Society .................................................. 77

Characteristics of Malagasy civil society........................................................ 77

USAID efforts to strengthen civil society...................................................... 78

Civil society, politics, and fear........................................................................... 80

Governance and the environment ................................. 80

Discussion............................................................................................................. 82

Madagascar’s Natural Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

The bottom line ............................................... 85

With so many positive results, why haven’t we saved the forests? ........ 86

Scaling up: the logic............................................................................................. 86

Scaling down: the reality .................................................................................... 87

The economy ....................................................................................................... 87

Is Madagascar different? ........................................ 88

Externalities .................................................. 90

Climate Change................................................................................................... 90

in Madagascar....................................................................................................... 91

U.S. politics and aid policies ...................................... 93

What Next? .................................................. 94

Three scenarios ................................................................................................. 95

Conclusion ................................................... 98

Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

FOREWORD

As my three years in Madagascar draw to a close, I am experiencing a mixture of emotions, ranging

from hope to despair. I vividly recall how I felt coming here in 2007, full of optimism and excitement

about great possibilities for Madagascar, after too many years of missed opportunities for prosperity,

progress, growth, and development. I came with a particular enthusiasm for the apparent dawning

of a new age of protecting and appreciating Madagascar’s unparalleled biodiversity, and I was

particularly eager to contribute to that momentum. Indeed, many different considerations brought

me to Madagascar, but none was stronger than my desire to contribute to safeguarding the Grand

Isle’s irreplaceable environmental treasure chest.

Today, after months of unexpected turmoil and crisis, I still maintain hope that Madagascar will

soon see a return to political stability and constitutional order. This is necessary for the sake of the

long-suffering Malagasy people, and it is also necessary for the security of Madagascar’s once again

threatened environment. These resurgent environmental threats constitute a full-blown “crisis within

a crisis,” one that threatens Madagascar’s long-term prosperity and viability at least as much as the

surrounding political crisis. The world needs to pay attention to both, before Madagascar goes

the way of Easter Island, Haiti, and other fragile, unique island environments already destroyed by

mankind.

My friend Karen Freudenberger has done a monumental job capturing in this document the

complex, rich and important work of USAID over the last 25 years. Insights from her many years

living and working in Madagascar are evident throughout this report. The achievements -- and the

shortcomings -- of the programs supported by the U.S. government are important ones to reect

upon. I hope that donors, partners and policy-makers, international and Malagasy, will ruminate on

the lessons, questions and suggestions offered in this study, in order to transform future efforts into

richer, deeper, and more durable successes.

Anyone who reads this document will see that there is still so much more work to be done. They

will also see that while we have made some gains over the years, they have been fragile. Often,

these “successes” have constituted the mere slowing of destructive processes, rather than their

permanent reversal. So we are very far from winning this critical battle to secure productive natural

resources and our globally important heritage. International NGOs, local civil society organizations,

civil servants and communities have continued to push forward and support the cause of healthy

and sustainable management of Madagascar’s wonderfully important natural resources despite

the temporary suspension of donor support, an evident lack of political will, and increasingly

difcult circumstances. They are to be lauded for their persistence and dedication. But they need

signicantly more help.

Since the coup d’état in March 2009, biodiversity-rich sites and the local communities that are

dependent upon them have been under attack by unscrupulous proteers seeking to take advantage

of a general breakdown in law and order and other governance systems to extract the country’s

natural resources, particularly its precious hardwoods and minerals. While not new, this illegal logging

has now reached unprecedented levels, with reports indicating that nearly 7000 cubic meters per

month -- or approximately 400 trees per day – are being cut in some regions. I am told that the

problem is at least 20-fold more acute than ever before.

And where there is illegal logging, there are other illegal activities. Threatened animals, including

several particularly endangered species of rare lemurs and tortoises, are being captured for export

and for food at rates that ensure their extinction in the wild, unless this trend can be reversed.

These plants and wildlife are found nowhere else on earth. Prots reaching local poachers and

foresters amount to mere pennies on every dollar, and the total value of lost resources is far inferior

to the cost of restoring them. Furthermore, monies gained from these illegal activities are laundered

through Madagascar’s nancial systems, further undermining local and national economies and

integrity.

We ALL need to recognize that Madagascar is being mined to death, not just for minerals but for

every resource found here. As Prince Phillip said famously 25 years ago,“Madagascar is committing

national suicide.” Sadly, this is as true today as it was then, just as USAID started it pioneering path

toward heightened environmental awareness and political engagement in support of sustainable

development here.

If continued unchecked, the current level of unsustainable resource extraction and environmental

degradation will undermine post-conict recovery and future economic growth potential for the

country. This ultimately will exacerbate poverty and food insecurity for the growing population

and accelerate the irreversible loss of biodiversity so unique to Madagascar. The ongoing illegal

logging and mineral extraction for export may signicantly limit options for future development in

agriculture, forestry, mining, and tourism, all key to promoting and achieving economic stability and

sustainability in the country.

Additionally, the ability of forests to serve their essential functions of water retention and ltration

is being impacted. There are important implications of these ecosystem services on an island

where nearly half of the population obtains water from surface water sources, and only 23 percent

of the population has access to clean drinking water. The immediate erosion of forests leads to

sedimentation of rivers and streams. And, as downstream siltation of rice and other agricultural elds

becomes more severe, the livelihoods and nutrition of Malagasy people are threatened.

The outlook for the near future is increasingly somber. The Malagasy people have difcult choices to

make to secure for themselves a more stable future. It will take courage and commitment to break

the current state of inertia. It will take vision, dedication, selessness, and a commitment to good

governance to map a sustainable future for not only a select few, but for the Malagasy nation as a

whole.

In spite of all these daunting challenges, I am encouraged to see that in many rural communities

where USAID and others have worked for years, the local populations themselves are stepping

up to defend their surrounding environment: they know more than anyone what is at stake. I am

further encouraged to see the strengthening of Malagasy civil society working in an organized fashion

for the environment: this was unknown here a quarter century ago, and is another important gain to

build upon. The U.S. government, primarily through USAID, has stood by the Malagasy people with

its humanitarian programs throughout this latest crisis. We also stand ready to resume our historic

support for programs that secure a healthy Malagasy environment for the benet of its people. If

we can restart these programs soon, perhaps it will not be too late. But this, in turn, will depend on

progress agreed to by Malagasy political leaders – progress that has been sadly slow in coming.

Niels Marquardt, US Ambassador to Madagascar, 2007-2010

PREFACE

This is an opportunity I wish had not been presented to us. Following Madagascar’s unconstitutional

change in government in March 2009, USAID foreign assistance to Madagascar was thrown into

limbo resulting ultimately in the suspension of our environmental programs in Madagascar.

At the time, some existing agreements and contracts were reaching their natural conclusion and

USAID was in the process of launching a fresh set of initiatives with traditional and new partners.

The Bureau for Africa under the Biodiversity Analysis and Technical Support (BATS) program had

recently completed an Environmental Threats and Opportunities Assessment as part of a year-

long reection between USAID and its partners.This process culminated in a national stocktaking

workshop in August 2008.

Absent the suspension, the next generation of USAID support to the conservation of biodiversity

in Madagascar was poised to begin. Instead, because of the suspension, it was incumbent on us to

gather our experience before people, products, and partnerships were dissipated to the four winds.

The purpose of this assignment was to conduct a 25-year retrospective of USAID support to the

conservation of biological diversity in Madagascar, assess the current situation, and help launch a

wider discussion of how USAID might respond when and if the ability to re-engage with Madagascar

presents itself.

BATS has taken a lead role in reviewing USAID’s conservation experience in Africa, understanding

lessons learned, and charting the way forward. Reports to date include: Protecting Hard-won

Ground: USAID Experience and Prospects for Biodiversity Conservation in Africa; USAID Support

to the Community-based Natural Resource Management Program in Namibia: LIFE Program Review,

and A Vision for the Future of Biodiversity in Africa.This paper is the most recent product in that

series.

USAID recently decided to more systematically assess the impact of its programs and to make that

information more broadly available. Such transparency will facilitate exchanges of information and

allow us to learn from one another.This effort precedes that commitment but is fully consistent with

it.

International Resources Group (IRG) was one of our implementing partners in Madagascar, leading

the 2004-2009 effort in policy and institutional support. As such, it is well qualied to lead the study.

Karen Freudenberger, author of the study, has long and diverse experience in Madagascar and in

the rest of the world. A specialist in participatory research, her interviewing and research skills will

be quickly apparent to the reader.The rst draft was presented to a workshop in Washington, DC,

where a wide variety of people currently or historically active in Madagascar participated. A later

draft was reviewed by an even larger community of practitioners.

I am proud to present this paper to you.

Tim Resch, Bureau Environmental Advisor

USAID Bureau for Africa, Ofce of Sustainable Development

VII

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Just as USAID’s work in Madagascar has been the result of a massive collaborative effort, so also

has my attempt to capture the results of that effort depended on many generous collaborators.

My apologies, rst and foremost, to the many people I was not able to contact in the course of this

research, and particularly the enormous number of Malagasy colleagues who have contributed so

mightily to this cause but were not easy to nd from my current perch in Vermont. Please do not

feel slighted and be assured that I thought of you every day as I struggled with this document and

gained inspiration from your devotion and continued efforts.

To those the world over who did answer my call for help at various points, I offer you my

heartfelt thanks. And double thanks to those many who answered my emails within a day or

two, demonstrating their still active concern and interest. As I will point out in the text, the

Madagascar environment program beneted from an extraordinary depth of commitment and

collaboration. Many who worked on the program over the years helped in the preparation and

review of this document, which would not have been possible as a solitary venture. I hope I will

not miss any of you, as I cite the long list of helpful contributors: Andy Keck, Ashley Marcus, Asif

Shaikh, Carlos Gallegos, Christian Burren, Christian Kull, Daniela Raik, Doreen Robinson, Derick

Brinkerhoff, Erika Styger, Frank Hawkins, George Carner, John Pielemeier, Jean Michel Duls, Jean Solo

Ratsisompatrarivo, Jennifer Talbot, Julia Jones, Heather D’Agnes, Kristin Patterson, Leon Rajaobelina,

Lisa Steele, Lynne Gafkin, Marie de Longcamp, Michael Brown, Nanie Ratsifandrihamanana, Nirinjaka

Ramasinjatovo, Martin Nicoll, Matt Sommerville, Michael Brown, Oliver Pierson, Paul Ferraro, Paul

Porteous, Philip DeCosse, Richard Carroll, Richard Marcus, Steve Dennison,Tiana Razamahatratra,

Todd Johnson,Tim Resch,Tom Erdmann, and Tony Pryor.

In addition, a workshop in Washington early in the writing process allowed numerous people to

provide guidance. In addition to many of those named above, the following people participated in

that workshop and I thank them for their time and valuable input: Richard Carroll, David Isaak, Jaime

Cavelier, Steve Watkins, Matthew Edwardsen, Jason Ko,Terri Lukas, Natalie Bailey, Luke Kozumbo,

Doug Clark, and David Hess.

Among those I must single out for particular thanks is Lisa Gaylord who was extraordinarily

generous in answering all of my questions, at all hours of day and night, and yet let the story (which

is in many ways her story) unfold without interference or attempts to inuence its direction. Few

who worked on Madagascar’s environment program did not at one time or another spend an

evening (or many) at Lisa’s house, struggling with issues from the mundane to the monumental.This

paper might be considered the culmination of those discussions, or perhaps a palate refresher before

the next round.

I am also grateful to Mark and Annika Freudenberger who tolerated endless dinner time musings as

they helped me get the ideas sorted out.

Thank you all for caring enough to help me make this document as good and as accurate as I could.

Having said that, it will never be good enough or accurate enough.The job was immense, the story

complex, and the time and pages available far too limited to do it justice. At a certain point, I have to

decide that we’d said enough, have to count on the wisdom of readers to delve deeper and further,

and have to hope that continuing discussions will set the record straight.The errors of fact and

judgment that remain in spite of our collective best efforts are, regrettably, my own and I apologize

for them.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AGEX Agences d’Exécution

(Implementing agencies, including ONE, ANGAP, etc.)

AGERAS Appui à la Gestion Régionalisée de l’Environnement et à

l’Approche Spatiale (Support to Landscape Ecology Approach)

ANAE Association Nationale d’Action Environnementale

(National Association for Environmental Action)

ANGAP Association Nationale pour le Gestion des Aires Protégées

(National Association for the Management of Protected Areas)

ANGEF Association Nationale pour la Gestion des Forêts

(National Association for the Management of Forests)

APN Agents for the Protection of Nature

ARD Associates in Rural Development

ARSIE Association du Réseau Système d’Information Environnemental

(Environmental Information system Network Association)

BAMEX Business and Market Expansion (USAID project)

CAP Commercial Agriculture Project

CBNRM Community-based Natural Resource Management

CC PTE Cercle de Concertation – Partenaires Techniques

et Financiers – Environnement

CELCO Coordination Unit (under the Ministry of Environment/DEF)

Conservation International

CIM Comité Interministériel pour l’Environnement

(Interministerial Committee for the Environment)

CLB Communauté Locale de Base

COAP Code des Aires Protégés (Protected Area Management Legislative Code)

COBA Communauté de Base (Grass-roots Community)

COMODE Conseil Malgache des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales

pour le Développement (Malagasy Council of NGOs)

CMP Comité Multi-local de Planication (Local Planning Committee)

CRD Comité Régional de Développement (Regional

Development Committee)

CRS Catholic Relief Services

CSLCC President’s Council to Fight Corruption

DAI Development Alternatives, Inc.

DEAP Droits d’Entrée dans les Aires Protégés (Protected Area entrance fee)

DEF Direction des Eaux et Forêts (Malagasy Water and Forestry Service)

DfN Debt for Nature

DG Democracy and Governance

DSRP Document Stratégique sur la Réduction de Pauvreté

(Strategic Document for Poverty Reduction)

EG Economic Growth

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

ENV/RD Environment and Rural Development

EP Environment Program

EPA Administrative Public Entity

EPIQ Environmental Policy and Institutional Strengthening

Indenite Quantity Contract

ERI Eco-regional Initiatives (USAID project)

ETOA Environmental Threats and Opportunities Assessment

ETP Ecology Training Program

EU European Union

FAPBM Fund for Protected Areas and Biodiversity in Madagascar

FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations

FCE Fianarantsoa Côte Est Railway

FCER FCE Railway Rehabilitation Project (USAID project)

FER Fonds d’Entretien Routière (Road Maintenance Fund)

FFN Fonds Forestier National (National Forestry Fund)

GBF Groupe de Bailleurs de Fonds (Donors Group)

XII

GCF Gestion Contractualisée Forestière (Forest Management Contract)

GDA Global Development Alliance

GEF Global Environment Facility

GELOSE Gestion Local Sécurisée (Secured Local Management)

GIS Geographic Information System

GNP Gross National Product

GoM Government of Madagascar

GPS Global Positioning System

GRAP Plan de Gestion du Réseau des Aires Protégées

(Management Plan for Protected Areas)

GTZ Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (German

Government corporation for international development

ha hectares

HAT Haute autorité de la transition (High Transitional Authority)

ICDP Integrated Conservation and Development Project

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFC International Finance Corporation

IMF International Monetary Fund

INSTAT Institut National de la Statistique (National Institute of Statistics)

IRG International Resources Group

IUCN International Union for the Conservation of Nature

JSI Jereo Isika Salama (USAID health project)

JSI John Snow International (project implementer)

LARO Linking Actor for Regional Development Opportunity

(component of SAVEM project)

KEPEM Knowledge and Effective Policies for Environmental Management

LDI Landscape Development Interventions

MITA Managing Innovative Transitions in Agreement (USAID project)

MAP Madagascar Action Plan

XIII

MCA Millennium Challenge Account

MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation

MECIE Mise en Compatibilité des Investissements avec l’Environnement

MIARO Biodiversity Conservation Project (USAID project)

MISONGA Managing Information and Strengthening Organizations for

Network Governance Approach (USAID Project)

MinEnv Ministère de l’Environnement (Ministry of Environment)

MRPA Managed Resource Protected Areas

NEAP National Environmental Action Plan

NGO Non-governmental Organization

NHWP Nature, Health,Wealth, and Power

NRM Natural Resource Management

NWP Nature,Wealth, and Power

ONE Ofce Nationale de l’Environnement (National Environment Ofce)

PA Protected Area

PASA Participating Agencies Service Agreement

PACT Private Agencies Collaborating Together

PAGE Projet d’Appui à la Gestion de l’Environnement (USAID Project)

PFNSCM Plate-forme Nationale de la Société Civile Malgache

(National Platform for Malagasy Civil Society)

PTE Programme de Transition Eco-régional (USAID Project)

PVO-NGO NRMS Private Voluntary Organization-Non-governmental

Organization Natural Resource Management

PVO Private Voluntary Organization

QMM QIT-Fer Minerals Madagascar

REBIOMA Réseau de biodiversité de Madagascar

REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

SAGE Service d’Appui à la Gestion Environnementale

SAPM Système des Aires Protégées (System of Protected Areas)

XIV

SAVEM Sustainable Approaches for Viable Environmental

Management (USAID Project)

SO Strategic Objective

SRI System of Rice Intensication

SUNY State University of New York

TR&D Tropic Research and Development

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USFS U.S. Forest Service

VCS Voluntary Carbon Standard

WB World Bank

WCS Wildlife Conservation Society

WWF World Wildlife Fund / World Wide Fund for Nature

ZIE Zone d’Intérêt Eco-touristique (Eco-tourism Development Zone)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) opened its Madagascar Mission in 1984 and

rapidly became one of the principal actors in developing and implementing the three Environmental

Programs (EPs) that operationalized the 1990 National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP).This

retrospective is written 25 years later (with the Environmental Program suspended due to the 2009

coup d’état) to take stock of where we have come in efforts to save Madagascar’s threatened natural

resources and to set the stage for discussions regarding future program directions.The paper focuses

specically on USAID’s environmental programs, while recognizing that USAID interventions took

place in a context that involved many different partners.

When USAID opened its doors in Madagascar, the country was coming out of a decade of serious

economic stagnation and environmental decline (some 400,000 hectares (ha) of forest were lost

each year).The NEAP sought to protect Madagascar’s biodiversity heritage (which meant, in practice,

saving the forests on which the biodiversity depended) and to improve the living conditions of the

population.

Slash-and-burn agriculture by very poor farmers is one of the primary threats to Madagascar’s

forests. As such, it was recognized early on that there was little hope of protecting forests without

also addressing (1) fundamental economic issues that maintain rural people in abject poverty and

(2) rapid population growth (close to 3% a year) that has caused Madagascar’s population to more

than double in the roughly 25 years covered by this paper. Consequently, USAID’s program has

consistently promoted synergies between the health and environment sectors. (The Madagascar

population-environment program is a worldwide model for this approach.)

USAID’s programs have, in principle, mirrored the NEAP emphasis on linking environmental

conservation and improved livelihoods. In the rst decade (1984 to 1994), USAID had robust

funding and strong economic and agricultural programs that complemented work on the

environment and social services. In 1994, after Madagascar failed to meet its structural adjustment

commitments, the Mission was demoted and suffered major funding cuts to nearly all programs

except health and population.

Environmental programs in Madagascar were spared only because of the Congressional biodiversity

earmark.The earmark has been instrumental in assuring continued funding for the environment but

has at the same time reinforced a relatively narrow biodiversity focus. In the absence of other funds,

the Madagascar program has faced consistent difculties in addressing complementary issues such as

agriculture and economic growth.While transformation of Madagascar’s economy might well have

been impossible even with more robust agricultural and economic development funding, there can

be no doubt that success on the environment front has been constrained by broader economic

development failure, particularly in Madagascar’s rural areas.

USAID’s environment programs in Madagascar roughly followed the three phases of the national

Environment Programs. EP I (1991-1996) funding totaled some $49 million. Programs focused on

(1) making the newly establish Protected Areas (PAs) work and (2) establishing the foundations for

environmental management through institutional strengthening and human resource development.

The key national environment sector institutions (The National Environment Ofce, or ONE,

and National Association for the Management of Protected Areas, or ANGAP) were established

and closely mentored during this phase.The largest project was an Integrated Conservation

and Development Project (ICDP) that funded social and economic development activities in

communities adjacent to seven national parks.

Evaluations highlighting the limitations of the ICDP approach (both in Madagascar and elsewhere in

the world) led to a paradigm shift in thinking toward the eco-regional approach that characterized

project interventions in EP II (1997-2002) and EP III (2003-2008).These projects focused on

identifying systemic threats to natural resources over larger landscapes (specically focusing

on alternatives to slash-and-burn agriculture), while policy interventions continued to address

institutional weaknesses and the legal framework needed to implement sustainable resource

management.Throughout the program’s history, there have been efforts to increase civil society

capacity and improve governance.

This paper reviews progress and challenges in four domains: Policy and Institutions, Protected Areas,

Reducing Pressures on Resources by Surrounding Communities, and Economic Valorization of

Natural Resources.

On the Policy and Institutions front, there has been major progress in promulgating legislation

needed to improve management of natural resources, and developing the tools needed to

operationalize improved management. Legal frameworks for forest management, environmental

impact assessment, and co-management of forest resources are among the notable advances in the

policy domain. Similarly, semi-autonomous institutions to manage the national parks and coordinate

environmental activities were established and trained. Much effort has gone into assuring sustainable

nancing for the national park system and local environment interventions through the creation of

two endowed foundations.The endowments are not yet fully funded, but they are well on the way.

While the legal framework and the toolkit to implement the environmental laws are now relatively

complete, the effective use of these tools continues to be hampered by notoriously weak and

corrupt government structures.

Protected Areas. Madagascar has had an ambitious national park system since colonial times but

at the start of EP I, there were only two publicly accessible parks. Lack of capacity at the Water and

Forestry Service (DEF) had created a de facto open access situation and many protected areas were

being deforested at an alarming rate.The creation of ANGAP (later renamed Madagascar National

Parks) and partnerships with international operators reestablished an effective park system. By EP II,

day-to-day park management responsibilities had largely been transferred to Madagascar National

Parks.

In 2003, President Marc Ravalomanana announced at the International Union for Conservation

of Nature (IUCN) conference in Durban that 6 million hectares would be put under protected

area status.This dramatic move – known as the Durban Vision – spearheaded by the international

conservation organizations, increased the area under protection from 3% to 10% of the country’s

land.While this program is still being implemented, there is widespread concern that the speed of

implementation and belated attention to concerns of local communities has created a backlash of

resentments that will be difcult to overcome.

Initial experiences with co-management (local communities and the State) of natural forests were

already underway, but the Durban Vision announcement accelerated the transfer of management

responsibilities from the State (which lacks capacity to carry out the task) to local communities.

Somewhat less than half the 6 million ha under protected area status will be under the authority of

Madagascar National Parks, while the rest will be under some sort of co-management agreement

with either local communities or the private sector.While State management of these huge

protected areas is clearly not feasible under current Malagasy conditions, co-management has also

proved to be problematic, especially when economic benets turn out to be less than what the

community expects or are perceived to be insufcient compensation for foregoing traditional slash-

and-burn agriculture.

Reducing Pressures on Resources by Surrounding Communities. While logging and

harvesting for fuelwood continue to motivate serious deforestation in some areas of the country,

slash-and-burn agriculture remains the biggest source of forest transformation nationwide. USAID

programs have invested signicant efforts to reduce these pressures in selected biodiversity

conservation areas. A range of alternative agricultural practices have been proposed and, while

there has been signicant variation in adoption rates, deforestation rates in the areas where project

activities have been most intense have declined. Nevertheless, these projects recognize that farm

level interventions are insufcient to effectuate changes in production practices at the scale needed

to save Madagascar’s forests.Without improved infrastructures (transport and irrigation) and national

economic policies that promote rural development, there is little chance of persuading farmers to

abandon unsustainable subsistence agriculture practices.

Several USAID initiatives have focused on valorizing natural resources. Some efforts have

been devoted to improving eco-tourism ventures and markets for natural products. While both

show potential, the magnitude of benets will ultimately depend on larger economic factors and the

State’s ability to control negative impacts. USAID projects have also worked with the government to

designate signicant forest areas as sustainable production zones, usually under private (sometimes

community) management. It is estimated that at least 2 million ha are needed to assure domestic

requirements for fuel and building wood (to date, about a third of this area has been so designated

by the Ministry of Environment).While there have been major advances in preparing the technical

and administrative approaches to implementing sustainable production zones, actual contracting has

been slow and only a tiny proportion of the sites have actually been tendered. It is thus too early to

assess the success of this approach.

This retrospective concludes that in spite of numerous project successes, Madagascar’s environment

is in signicantly worse shape now than it was 25 years ago. In 1990, Madagascar had about 11

million ha of forest and 11 million people.Today the country has about 9 million ha of forest and 20

million people. Forest clearing has slowed (from about 0.83% annually between 1990-2000 to 0.53%

annually since 2000) but more than a million hectares of forest were lost in the 15 years between

1990 and 2005. Furthermore, the remaining forests have become increasingly vulnerable: 80% of

Madagascar’s forests are now located within 1 km of a non-forest edge.

The reasons for this are humbling in their magnitude and complexity. (Anyone who tells you that

they have an easy answer to Madagascar’s environmental problems should be immediately suspect,

a caution necessary because Madagascar seems to be a magnet for people who think they have

the “magic bullet.”) Not-good-enough governance is without doubt a factor that underlies all

others. Systemic corruption, crises that have become a normal part of the political landscape, and

short-term resource management strategies that benet transient leaders but not the population at

large are pernicious characteristics that persist through changes of government.These governance

issues have insidious effects that make it difcult, if not impossible, to create the economic conditions

necessary to scale up promising environmental interventions (e.g. sustainable improvements in

infrastructure, implementation of rice pricing, and other policies favorable to the rural economy).

In the end, environmental preservation is hostage to economic development and economic

development is hostage to good governance.

We are now at a point where time is running out for the prized biodiversity Madagascar holds in its

charge.This report’s nal section lays out three broad options – scenarios – for future interventions.

It is purposefully provocative in an attempt to open up the debate and lay out issues that may

otherwise be neglected in a more conventional “stay-the-course” strategy.

Scenario 1: Forget it; it’s already too late and nothing we can realistically do will

save Madagascar’s remaining forest resources. This scenario proposes that USAID invest its

scarce resources somewhere else where the context is more favorable to a positive and sustainable

outcome.

Scenario 2: Keep on track – Do more of the same, but do it better. This scenario

proposes reprioritizing USAID intervention areas to identify those where we anticipate having the

greatest impact, adding signicantly more resources with assurances that funding will continue for at

least another 20 years, and developing a program around the best practices that have been identied

up until now (but with more sustained attention to economic growth and the promotion of civil

society institutions).

Scenario 3: Madagascar’s biodiversity ends justify the means – Break all the rules and

go for it. This scenario essentially recognizes that the international community values Madagascar’s

biodiversity far more highly than do its government and its people.We must therefore be prepared

to pay for its protection.This approach would require a massive commitment of international aid into

the distant future. Funds would be used for direct payments to communities that forego activities

harmful to the environment and to fund infrastructure, education, and other structural factors as

needed to help the economy transform and develop.The demands of this approach would far

surpass USAID’s capacity, but the agency might play a useful role in conceptualizing the approach and,

perhaps, implementing a discrete set of activities as needed to maintain its presence at the table.

INTRODUCTION

Madagascar’s biodiversity is unique: 98% of its mammals, 91% of

its reptiles, and 80% of its owering plants are found nowhere

else on earth. (Photo credit: Karen Freudenberger)

A hectare of forest lost in Madagascar has a greater negative impact on global biodiversity than a

hectare of forest lost virtually anywhere else on earth (U.S. Forest Service).

Concerted efforts

to save Madagascar’s natural forests

began in the mid 1980s when Madagascar

and its partners began preparing the rst Madagascar National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP).

The U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) opened its Madagascar Mission in 1984 and

rapidly became one of the principal actors in

developing and implementing the three successive

Environmental Programs (EPs).Twenty-ve years later,

this paper takes a step back to look at challenges

encountered, actions implemented, lessons learned, and

progress made towards conservation and development

goals.This retrospective is being written in the midst of

the third political crisis since the USAID Mission

opened (the fourth since Madagascar gained

independence).With USAID’s Environmental Program

currently suspended, we rst review the road(s) taken

to get us to where we are today before looking at

potential paths into the future.

Work toward the objectives of the NEAP has involved

uncountable numbers of actors, both Malagasy and

international.This retrospective focuses explicitly on

USAID-funded interventions with the idea of recording

the evolution of this grand and visionary experiment

and learning some of its key lessons.The focus on USAID’s effort does not mean to belittle the

interventions of other participants; indeed the commendably collaborative nature of the venture

makes it impossible in most case to attribute either results or blame to particular actors. Progress,

elusive as it is, must be celebrated regardless of its source and we must forthrightly acknowledge our

collective disappointments in order to learn their lessons.

Even for those of us who were present at or near the inception of this effort, it is stunning to recall

how much we didn’t know and how much had not yet happened a mere 25 years ago. Madagascar

had only two, barely accessible, national parks open to the public and 12,000 international visitors

1 http://www.fs.fed.us/global/globe/africa/madagascar.htm.

2 Madagascar’s environment had been of interest for centuries, as described by Andriamialisoa and

Landgrand (Andriamialisoa and Langrand 2003), who offer a fascinating history of Madagascar’s scientic

exploration going back to the 1600s.

3 While Madagascar’s environment obviously comprises vastly more than forests, the period covered by this

paper was primarily focused on forests and the biodiversity that depends on the maintenance of those

forests. Consequently, this topic receives the major emphasis here.

a year.We had little more than the vaguest (poorly documented) hypotheses about Madagascar’s

natural resource wealth and why it was disappearing.

The extent to which these and other things

have changed will be addressed in the body of this paper.

For the moment, however, we should acknowledge the veritable volcanic eruption of research,

analyses, planning documents, evaluations, and project reports that occurred in the years since

the NEAP was launched – tens of thousands of pages have been written about Madagascar’s

environment and efforts to save it (Goodman and Benstead’s magnicent 2004 tome The Natural

History of Madagascar alone runs to more than 1,700 pages).This wealth of accreted information

is cause for celebration.We have tried to keep this report reasonably short to render it accessible

to a wide gamut of readers. It cannot, in its brevity, possibly capture the richness of Madagascar’s

environmental story or even USAID’s part in it. Readers who wish to delve further are invited to

consult the “key references” for each section of the paper that go into greater depth on various

topics.Those seeking more information should note that key reference documents were chosen in

part because they have extensive bibliographies. Most of the publicly available key documents are

included on the CD that accompanies this paper.

Iharana

Sambava

Antalaha

Morombe

Toliara

Madagascar

Mahanoro

Betroka

Betioky

Bekily

Antsohihy

Antanimora

Ankazobe

Andapa

Analalava

Ambilobe

Ambalavao

Vatomandry

Morafenobe

Midongy Atsimo

Marovoay

Mandritsara

Maintirano

Madirovalo

Fenoarivo Atsinanana

Ambovombe

Ambodifototra

Ambatofinandrahana

Ambato Boeny

Antsiranana

Morondava

Ambatolampy

Ambanja

Tolanaro

Moramanga

Maroantsetra

Mananjary

Manakara

Hell-Ville

Farafangana

Arivonimamo

Antsirabe

Ambositra

Ambatondrazaka

Fianarantsoa

Toamasina

Mahajanga

Antananarivo

4 The 1988 Proposed Environmental Action Plan wrote:“Madagascar’s data base is not current and reliable

enough to allow for planning and action. Environment in particular has no indicator of the status of natural

resources and their evolution over time.This is particularly regrettable since, in the 1960s, Madagascar was

considered a model country for collection and management of basic data in the African context.There has

since been a progressive deterioration in the data system.” (World Bank; et al. 1988, 41).

A BRIEF HISTORY

OF NEAP, THE

ENVIRONMENT

PROGRAMS, AND USAID

INTERVENTIONS

In the 1980s, recognizing the critical role of both environment and economic policies in the

sustainable development of poor nations, the World Bank (WB) began to encourage African

countries to adopt more comprehensive environmental strategies. Madagascar was coming out

of a decade of serious economic and environmental decline (roughly 400,000 ha of forests were

lost every year in the decade between 1975 and 1985).The WB estimated that the economic

costs of environmental degradation (forest and soil loss, the need to rebuild infrastructures due to

erosion, diminished agricultural productivity etc.) cost the country between 5 and 15% of GNP

annually (WB, et al. 1988, 9). Donors at the time were also concerned that duplication of efforts and

confusion over who was doing what in the environmental eld was facilitating corruption.The NEAP

would create a framework and a mechanism for clarifying donor roles.To reinforce this message,

World Bank loans were made contingent on the promulgation of an environment plan to dene its

conservation and development priorities.

The Smithsonian Institution played a key and perhaps little known role in developing Madagascar’s

NEAP. As early as 1988, the Smithsonian signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the

Madagascar Ministry of Scientic Research and Technological Development to facilitate research

permits and scientic exchanges.The Smithsonian then hosted a number of the working groups

that brought together scientists, representatives of the conservation organizations, and ofcials

from the World Bank, USAID, and other policy makers to lay out the issues that would become the

framework for the NEAP (Corson 2008).

THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLAN

In 1990, after several years of preparation, Madagascar’s legislature voted for the Environmental

Charter as a foundation for the rst NEAP in Africa.The plan represented a dramatic shift away from

viewing the State’s role in environmental management primarily in terms of exclusion and policing,

5 A key document for this section is USAID/Biodiversity Analysis and Technical Support 2008.

6 This cost was assessed at $100 million to $290 million/year: 75% attributed to forest destruction, 15% due

to decreased agricultural productivity, and 10% due to increased costs for maintenance of infrastructures

(NEAP 1988, 28). Bruce Larson (Larson 1994) believes that this gure was overstated, particularly in

regards to the opportunity costs associated with agricultural land use and the conversion of forests to

agriculture.

7 The World Bank promised Madagascar about $120 million of funding for EP I on the condition that

legal and institutional changes were made, including formalizing the NEAP. The passage of the 1990

Environmental Charter fullled this requirement (Gezon 1997) (USAID/Biodiversity Analysis and Technical

Support 2008).

as it had been since colonial times. Instead, from the outset it joined the dual goals of protecting the

environment and improving living conditions, a principle that has been woven into every intervention

funded by USAID since.

The six objectives as dened in Madagascar’s NEAP were to:

i. Protect and manage the national heritage of biodiversity, with a special

emphasis on parks, reserves, and gazetted natural forests, in conjunction

with the sustainable development of their surrounding areas

ii. Improve the living conditions of the population through the protection

and management of natural resources in rural areas with an emphasis

on watershed protection, reforestation, and agro-forestry

iii. Promote environmental education, training, and communication

iv. Develop mapping and remote sensing tools to meet the

demand for natural resources and land management

v. Develop environmental research capacities for terrestrial, coastal, and marine ecosystems

vi. Establish mechanisms for managing and monitoring the environment.

The NEAP itself was seen as one-third of a “tripod” needed for

Madagascar to escape the vicious cycle of deepening poverty

and accelerating environmental degradation. Along with the

NEAP to address environment concerns, the other two “legs”

were (1) structural adjustment to reform basic economic

policies and (2) poverty reduction programs (including

population policies).

The Environmental Programs

To get from the general principles of the NEAP to operational

programs, in 1988 the World Bank formed a series of working

groups that mobilized about 150 Malagasy from government,

academia, and civil society alongside about 40 international

environment experts (many of whom are still involved today).

The working group proposals were then approved by the

National Assembly.The grand plan for implementing the NEAP

was divided into three successive Environmental Programs:

From EP I to EP II, the emphasis shifted from the

integrated conservation and development (ICDP)

approach to protecting much vaster corridors

linking national parks. (Here: the corridor between

Ranomafana and Andringitra parks.) (Photo credit:

Mark Freudenberger)

  

     

  

 

          

      

 

       

    

      

Table I: Madagascar’s NEAP Implementation

NEAP Phase Main purpose, objectives, orientation

EP I

NEAP start-up phase

• Set up institutional frameworks

• Set up program nancing

• Establish program procedures, norms, and performance criteria

• Establish environmental monitoring mechanisms

• Establish coordination mechanisms

• Conduct pilot operations and action research with a view to EP II

EP II

Action oriented phase – intensication of actions initiated in EP I

• Carry out concrete actions in biodiversity conservation,

soil conservation, cartography, and land registration

• Integrate the NEAP into the national development plan

• Reinforce program coordination

EP III

Mainstreaming Phase – environmental “reex” to become automatic

• Complete integration of NEAP into the national development plan

• Populations, collectives, ministries, and non-governmental

organization (NGOs) should be actively implementing

techniques of environmental management

• State structures should be systematically applying the

environmental concept in sector policies and programs

• National plans and programs make environment and

conservation a driver for sustainable development

The total funding (from all donors during EP I, II, and III) has been estimated at approximately $450

million for environment activities with another 50% for related programs that were not formally part

of the NEAP process but in some way contributed to it (e.g., agriculture and health interventions).

The United States contributed about $120 million to Madagascar’s environment program over this

period.

USAID/Biodiversity Analysis and Technical Support 2008, 76.

USAID INTERVENTIONS

Mission history

USAID’s Madagascar Mission opened in 1984

(though limited funding, particularly for food security

interventions, had begun as early as 1962).This occurred as Madagascar was coming out of a period

(the Second Republic, starting in 1975) when the Ratsiraka regime had advocated extreme socialism

and made foreign assistance from the west unwelcome. Facing acute debt and budgetary crises, the

Government of Madagascar (GoM) had signed its rst agreement with the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) in 1980, thereby opening the door to donor assistance.

Predating the NEAP, USAID’s rst environmental intervention (1986) was in support of an applied

research study on the country’s unique ora and fauna. Another early project looked at forest

management above irrigated rice perimeters (PL 480 funding), foreshadowing the linkage between

natural resources and food security.This was followed by a grant to World Wildlife Fund / World

Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) to carry out early integrated conservation and development work

in the Beza Mahafaly Reserve (1987) and then other operational program grants that anticipated the

integrated conservation and development (ICDP) approach, focusing on Amber Mountain, Masoala,

Ranomafana, and Andohahela.These initial grants helped prepare the Agency to play a larger role

when the NEAP was announced and donor support was solicited.The new Mission was also able

to draw on the experience of American research and conservation institutions that were already

active in Madagascar and who helped to dene the most critical issues and priority areas. By 1990,

USAID was ready to commit to a long-term environmental program, already anticipating three

implementation phases over a 15-year period.

Downsizing of the Mission and the biodiversity earmark. When EP I was launched in

1991, USAID-Madagascar was a major (Category A) Mission with more than a dozen direct hire

employees and signicant programs in agriculture/economic growth, environment, health, and

governance. At this time, the other lead institution supporting the NEAP was the World Bank, but

the Bank’s key staff people (both the Resident Representative and the EP I manager) were based in

Washington. By default, USAID became the lead actor for the Environmental Program.

The “power mission” was short-lived, however. In tacit recognition that program success was unlikely

if the basic structure of the economy was out of whack (social and economic indicators had also

plummeted during the socialist era), USAID made its continuing support contingent on Madagascar’s

adherence to a structural adjustment program.When Madagascar failed to meet the requirements,

a decision was made in 1994 to reduce U.S. assistance.The Mission was demoted to Category B

(with further “demotions” in later years) and suffered major funding cuts.The Environment Program

9 Catherine Corson’s dissertation, Mapping the Development Machine: the US Agency for International

Development’s Biodiversity Conservation Agenda in Madagascar, is a key document for this section.

10 Critical events in the recent environmental history prior to USAID’s arrival include Madagascar’s hosting

(1970) of the Second International Conference on the Rational Utilization and the Conservation of Nature

in Madagascar, the dramatic loss of forests during the 1970s when the Ratsiraka government encouraged

citizens to “take back” the natural resources previously protected by colonial laws, the 1984 passage of

Madagascar’s National Conservation Strategy (which followed IUCN guidelines), and the 1985 Second

International Conference on Conservation and Development, held in Antananarivo.We must also not

forget that estimates suggest that as many as 4 million ha of forests were decimated between 1900 and

1940 under the colonial administration due to logging, the introduction of cash crops such as coffee (which,

in taking the best land, pushed farmers to clear new elds from the forests), and wood extraction as

needed to power steam engines and build infrastructure. (Jarosz 1993).

The progressive integration of population/health and

environment sector activities is one of the considerable

achievements of the Madagascar program.

Initially, there were independently planned and implemented health

activities and environment activities that both happened to be in

Madagascar. Under EP I, a deliberate decision was made to carry

out family planning interventions where USAID was nancing

ICDPs. From EP II on, family planning was not a stand alone service

program but was nested within broader health programs, and

integration of health and environment interventions took place

nationally and right down to the community level.

The integrated approach is now deeply woven into the fabric

of both environmental and health interventions in Madagascar.

Neither sector will say that the collaboration has been easy and

there are persistent references to “differences in culture” between

the two sectors, as well as a myriad of logistical and practical

considerations that arise when coordinating large and complex

projects operating on different time frames. All actors seem

to agree that the added efforts are justied, however, and are

convinced of the conceptual validity of the approach even when

the benets are difcult to quantify.

One important qualitative benet of integration has been the

reduction of gender bias in both domains: eld agents have

noticed that when environmental and health concerns are

discussed together, men (previously marginalized in family planning

discussions) become more openly interested in contraception,

while women (often sidelined in environmental discussions) have

taken a more active role in natural resource management.

was one of the few spared, thanks in

part to the biodiversity earmark

that

has represented the backbone of the

program since 1990 and Madagascar’s

importance as a biodiversity hotspot.

Aside from its health programs,

the Madagascar mission has never

returned to the funding levels it

enjoyed in the early 1990s

and by

2009 the Mission had only three

direct hire employees.

USAID has recognized from

the outset that success on the

environment is contingent on

economic growth, but the programs

to support that vision have been

sadly lacking.The biodiversity

earmark has motivated a consistent

environmental focus, but has also

acted as a constraint in terms of

the breadth of activities that can be

funded. (In fact, the earmark allows

more exibility than might initially be

expected since it requires missions

to address threats to biodiversity.This

partially opened the door to working

on agriculture, economic growth, and

other related issues but the emphasis

has always necessarily been on stricter

biodiversity objectives.) The Mission

has made vigorous attempts over the

years to attract additional Democracy

and Governance (DG) and Economic

11 The biodiversity earmark represents an instruction from Congress to focus funds on the conservation of

biological diversity and the protection of tropical forests. In 1987, the earmark was $5 million; for 2010 it

is $205 million (worldwide). Until 2005, the earmark was “soft” and strongly encouraged spending in this

direction. In 2005, the earmark became “hard” which obliged USAID to spend a certain amount of its

budget on biodiversity interventions.The biodiversity earmarks were taking place at the same time that

the agency was generally downsizing. In practice this meant that the more money put into biodiversity,

the less available for other programs (only about 25% of USAID’s budget is discretionary and not subject

to earmarks).When USAID and the Department of State prioritized biodiversity programs in a 2007-08

exercise, Madagascar was one of the top ve priority countries. All of this helps to explain why the Mission

has continued to receive signicant environmental funding (and even remain open) when 12 other Africa

missions were closed under the Bush Administration.This was particularly a threat when the Millennium

Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a compact in Madagascar (2005) that might otherwise have eclipsed

the USAID mission.The biodiversity funds kept at least the core part of the environmental program intact.

But it also helps to explain why funds for other complementary programs (agriculture, economic growth)

and other environmental programs (such as alternative fuel and energy, agroforestry, pollution) that do not

t under the stipulations of the biodiversity earmark have been so difcult to capture.

12 From 1992-95, the Madagascar Mission spent an average of $2.80 per capita per year on non-health and

food aid projects (agriculture, environment, DG, and EG). Between 2005 and 2008, the annual per capita

spending for such programs had fallen to $0.60. In comparison, health and food aid spending, which was

about $0.32 per capita annually during the earlier period, rose to an annual per capita average of $1.95

between 2005 and 2008.

Growth (EG) funds as those programs have come in and out of vogue, but has had only limited

success. Governance and Economic Growth interventions have been intermittent and, for most of

the past 15 years, have occupied only a marginal space in the

portfolio.

Health and Environment.

The exception to this has

been the health sector. Dened as “humanitarian” in nature,

it has been largely spared the cuts that decimated other

sectors. Efforts to integrate certain parts of the health and

environment portfolios have been undertaken since EP I and

have been signicantly strengthened over time to the point

that the Madagascar program has become a worldwide model

(with the Philippines) for this integrated approach.The rst

University of Michigan Population/Environment Fellow was

assigned to Madagascar in 1997, working with the Commercial

Agriculture Project (CAP) (environment/economic-growth) and

APPROPOP (population services) projects in the Fianarantsoa

region.Three other Population/Environment Fellows (one

working on each of the threatened corridors and one in

Antananarivo) followed; all played important roles in nurturing

this cross-sectoral relationship, either centrally or in eld

implementation.

During EP I, the focus was on providing family planning services

in the ICDPs. In Toliara,Toamasina, and Fianarantsoa provinces,

the environment projects partnered with the APROPOP

population support project to increase family planning services,

especially in the remote areas immediately adjacent to national The integration of health, family planning, and

parks.

environmental programs in priority conservation

areas has been an important feature of USAID’s

Under EP II’s landscape approach, the task was more difcult

Madagascar program. In this photo, a family

due to the larger geographic expanses to be covered in

planning demonstration in Tsaratanana, in the

extremely remote areas and the fact that there was no health Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor. (Photo credit:

project specically tasked with providing services in these Kristen Patterson)

areas. A Packard Foundation grant (Madagascar Green Health

Communities) to Jereo Isika Salama (JSI) encouraged their

collaboration with Landscape Development Interventions

(LDI) to promote family planning in lower density population areas where rapid population growth

increases pressures on natural resources of the forest corridors.This is signicant because these

areas would not otherwise have fallen within the health program target zones that usually focus on

higher density (“bigger bang for the buck”) population areas.

Partly as a result of working together in this remote and challenging context, the vision became

more sophisticated. Initially, collaboration grew out of a perceived need to slow population growth

that was undermining the ability of environment/rural development projects to achieve per capita

improvements (e.g., in rice production) as needed to reduce pressures on natural resources. As

such, the early focus was on getting contraceptives into areas around the Protected Area (PAs) and

corridors. By the late 1990s, there was growing recognition that health interventions could play a

more signicant role in promoting conservation activities. Specically, it became clear that doing

13 Key document for this section is Gafkin, Scaling up Population and Environment Approaches in Madagascar:

A Case Study.

family planning without providing for basic health needs made little sense and that responding to

health issues (demonstrating concern for their family’s well-being) was a good way to build trust with

local communities as a basis for addressing natural resource issues.

In 2005, the Madagascar Mission went a step further in adopting the Nature,Wealth, and Power

(NWP) framework developed under USAID/FRAME. Notably, the Mission and its partners

decided to adapt the framework to incorporate health and nutrition concerns, renaming it Nature,

Health,Wealth, and Power (NHWP) and emphasizing again the linkages between environment,

economic development, health – including family planning – and nutrition, and governance.The

parallel provision of services (ensuring that health and family planning services were available

where environmental projects were working) evolved into a more integrated approach with the

introduction of the Champion Community (village) approach during EP II.This approach, which was

later also applied at the Commune

(county) level, helped communities to identify achievable goals

in health, environment, economic development, education, and governance.Villages (or communes)

then worked in partnership with the various projects to achieve the goals they had dened and

celebrated success at a community event.

With positive reinforcement from the center, eld level collaboration between health and

environment projects continued to progress under EP III, particularly in projects working around

the forest corridors. In addition, USAID/Washington’s Population, Health and Environment Program

directly funded the three major conservation programs (Conservation International – CI,WWF,

Wildlife Conservation Society – WCS) in Madagascar to implement family planning and other key

health interventions (e.g., nutrition) in other biodiversity priority areas where they were working.

An overview of USAID’s environmental projects

USAID environmental interventions must be understood both in the context of how the NEAP

t (or didn’t) into Madagascar’s larger development strategy and the evolution of the USAID

portfolio.While the NEAP recognized the need for economic growth from the outset, the GoM’s

own poverty reduction strategy (DSRP) was not dened until 2003, more than a decade after the

environmental plan was announced.This meant that environment programs (in general, not only

those under USAID auspices) have always stretched to address livelihood and economic growth

issues in the absence of some very key “enabling” conditions such as the absence of a functional

agricultural extension service. Conceptually, the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP, promulgated in 2006,)

remedied the imbalances in proposing a holistic and integrated development vision. But progress in

implementing that vision was hampered by serious governance problems, culminating in the 2009

coup d’état.

This section briey introduces the USAID projects during each phase of the NEAP implementation.

For now we present only those that were primarily funded under USAID’s Environment-Rural

Development (Env/RD) strategic objective or had a primary focus on environmental issues. As

noted above, however, one of the strengths of the Mission was its integration of program activities,

particularly between the health and environment sectors. Annex I (see attached CD) presents a

more complete listing of projects implemented during the EP years.

14 Language in the Congressional Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (2001) specically targeted family

planning funds to areas “where population growth threatens biodiversity or endangered species.” Soon

after, USAID’s Global Health Bureau/Ofce of Population began to support an integrated Population,

Health and Environment Program.This program supported the Population-Environment program. In

Madagascar, the USAID Env/RD and Health and Population (HPN) ofces created a common strategic

objective in the Mission’s 1992-97 Strategic Plan. By 2003-08, the two programs had a shared sub-

intermediate result: “Demand and availability of family planning services, products and practices in priority

conservation areas increased.”

15 A commune is a collection of 10-20 villages and hamlets, usually representing about 10,000-15,000 people,

with a principal village as its “chef-lieu.”

EP I (1991-1996):

This period represented the most intensive USAID involvement, totaling

nearly $50 million of environmental projects. In addition, over this period, USAID funds (not just for

the environment) represented more than 80% of total economic assistance to Madagascar, making

it a major player.The interventions have been described as a “cascade of initiatives,” emphasizing the

extent to which they intervened in multiple domains, at multiple scales.

The two major focus areas for EP I were making the newly established Protected Areas work

(whether from a policy, institutional, or grass-roots perspective) and establishing the foundations for

environmental management through institutional strengthening and human resource development.

The main projects in USAID’s environmental portfolio during EP I were the following.

Conservation/Development Operational Program Grants (1988-

1992): As a precursor to integrated conservation and development projects,

four grants were awarded to conservation organizations as a rst step in

testing the linkage between conservation and development objectives in four

priority PAs (Amber Mountain, Masoala, Ranomafana, and Andohahela).

Debt for Nature (DfN)

(1989-1994-2002): This project started prior to EP

I and initiated some of the approaches that were integrated into later projects.The

project trained a nationwide cadre (400) of locally recruited nature protection agents

(APN), and later trained and supported Water and Forestry agents and ofces, some

in remote areas. In the second phase of the project (with Dutch nancing), DfN

pioneered some of the early forest management transfers to local communities.

PVO-NGO NRMS (1989-95): A centrally funded, four-country project that

reinforced local environment and development NGOs and created NGO coordinating

bodies (COMODE); PVO-NGO NRMS also provided extensive training.

Sustainable Approaches for Viable Environmental Management (SAVEM)

(1991-98): Helped to establish and then mentored ANGAP to take over management

responsibilities for Madagascar’s PAs; created basic tools for park management, including

establishing and formalizing boundaries, assessing and documenting eco-systems, identifying

watersheds and population pressures; funded ICDP activities immediately adjacent to

seven PAs including initial forays into eco-tourism and some park infrastructures, did

some road rehabilitation work near parks. Managing Innovative Transitions in

Agreement (MITA) (1997-98) was a bridge project from SAVEM to EP II that helped

ANGAP to decentralize in order to take on increased park management responsibilities.

TRADEM (1991-95): Sought to generate sustainable income and economic

benets from the marketing and sustainable trade of natural resource products.This

project remained at the design stage and was never fully funded or implemented.

16 A key document for this early period is Sowers et al, Protecting Biological Diversity: Madagascar Case Study,

1994.

17 Debt for Nature was a concept rst proposed by WWF in the 1980s.The idea was that developed

country banks held large debts from approximately 20 poor countries that were unlikely ever to repay

these debts. Burdened by debt payments, they were unable to devote resources to conservation activities.

The Debt for Nature program would cancel a portion of the debt and in exchange the beneciary

country would increase its support for conservation activities (French, et al. 1995, A-2)

Knowledge and Effective Policies for Environmental Management (KEPEM)

(1993-97): Provided non-project assistance

focused on policy and institutional

strengthening as needed to sustain conservation activities.Worked with the GoM to

develop environmental plans, to create and institutionally support both the ONE and

Tany Meva, to reform the taxation system on forest products, to begin the environmental

impact assessment process, and to develop environmental monitoring systems.

CAP (1994-99): Focused on commercialization of agricultural products, including

related infrastructure investments such as farm to market roads, agricultural

processing plants. Began working on commodity chains, eco-tourism, and some

other economic issues that would later be picked up under the LDI project.

EP II (1997-2002): Evaluations of EP I, which largely mirrored evaluations of ICDP approaches

elsewhere in the world, identied the limits of working in very restricted areas around national

parks using approaches that were sometimes considered rather “hit-and-miss.”There was a growing

recognition that local level interventions needed to be both more strategic and more comprehensive

to deal with the multiple causes of unsustainable forest use.This led to a major paradigm shift in

thinking toward what became known as the eco-regional or landscape approach. Projects more

systemically analyzed threats to natural resources, looking not just at immediate proximate causes,

but also at pressures from more distant areas and structural issues affecting resource use decisions.

It was no longer considered sufcient to protect only selected high biodiversity parks; now

conservationists were also eyeing larger blocks of forest deemed essential to species survival over

evolutionary time. Madagascar was at the forefront of testing and applying the landscape approach,

which was also being rolled out in other environmental programs around the world.

The result was clusters of eco-regional projects that focused on ve zones: the Mantadia-Zahamena

and Ranomafana-Andringitra forest corridors, the Mahajanga-Bealanana landscape, the Northern

(Antsiranana) ecological zone, and the South East (Tolagnaro) ecological zone. (The rst three had

major project activities; the Antsiranana dossier was limited to eco-tourism, and the only project in

the south was the Global Development Alliance (GDA) with Rio Tinto/QMM.) These priority zones

were determined using careful analysis of available scientic information, including the degree of

fragmentation, level of threat, and perceived potential to successfully reduce those threats.

At the policy level, efforts continued to improve the policy framework and, especially, to

operationalize policies that had been put into place but as yet had limited impact. Overall, funding

for this phase was much reduced relative to what had been available under EP I. Perversely, this

corresponded with a recognized need for greater and more consistent coverage in the target zones,

leading to a signicant disconnect between the magnitude of the vision and the resources available

to implement the strategy. Halfway through the implementation period, funding constraints forced

reductions of the Mahajanga-Bealanana program.

18 During this period, non-project assistance was a fairly common approach used by USAID, which used it

for sectoral assistance (unlike the World Bank or the IMF that used non-project assistance to promote

economic reform via general budget support to Ministries of Finance). A series of key policy measures

would be dened, for example, with benchmarks for assessing progress. As those benchmarks were

reached, the next tranche of funds would be released. Shortly after KEPEM, USAID reduced the use of

non-project assistance except in a very few cases.

19 These corridors have been called by different names over the years and have been adjusted over time

as new information on biodiversity priorities has become available. (Most recently, the Mantadia corridor

has been called Ankehiny-Zahamena and the Andringitra corridor is called Fandriana-Vandrozo.) We will

continue to call them by the names of the principal parks they connect since that nomenclature will be

more familiar to many readers.

20 Several prominent conservationists have lamented that USAID’s focus has never included the dry forests,

which are extremely high priority areas.

Projet d’Appui à la Gestion de l’Environnement (PAGE) (1999-2002):

Worked to strengthen Tany Meva, ONE, ANGAP, and the Ministry of Environment on

decision-making skills and “accompanying measures” (training, monitoring, procedures,

manuals) needed to implement key environmental policies (e.g. the Environmental

Impact Assessment package); worked on creating the institutional and policy framework

that would facilitate sustainable nancing, especially for the national park system;

created a documentation center (at ONE) to increase access to environmental

information; carried out early design work for a carbon fund pilot project (Makira).

MIRAY (1998-2004): Promoted a framework favorable to environmental management

at all levels from national to local; provided national and eld level assistance to ANGAP,

ONE, and DEF to improve park and forest management, supported newly decentralizing

government ofces (disseminated eco-regional planning training and tools through regional

AGERAS – Support to Landscape Ecology Approach – ofces); supported civil society

environmental organizations (Comité Multi-local de Planication – CMP, Comité Régional

de Développement – CRD); developed environmental communications strategies and

built three park interpretation centers as part of the eco-tourism development model.

Landscape Development Interventions (LDI) – Programme de Transition

Eco-régional (PTE) (1998-2004): Implemented landscape approach to resource

management, focusing on the two forest corridors and the Mahajanga landscape; tested

and disseminated alternatives to tavy agriculture; supported eco-tourism initiatives; made

limited infrastructure investments (market roads and local irrigation systems), especially

as needed to promote increased production and/or commercialization; created and

mentored the KoloHarena farmers cooperatives, offering farmers alternatives to slash-

and-burn agriculture; supported the demonstration farm in Beforona (near Moramanga)

to provide extension services to farmers. PTE was the transition project that allowed LDI

to continue operating until the new Eco-regional Initiatives (ERI) project was signed.

Fianarantsoa Côte Est Railway Rehabilitation Project (FCER) and

RECAP (2001-2005): Mobilized supplemental funds to repair transport and

agricultural infrastructures (in focal corridors) destroyed by the devastating cyclones

of 2000; rebuilt the FCE railway and rehabilitated several farm to market roads.

EP III (2003-2008): By EP III, key actors within USAID recognized that EP I and II had been

handicapped by the fact that the programs had been highly donor driven, with little buy-in from

the Malagasy government. EP III made a strong effort to incorporate more donors, more sectors,

and more government input. For USAID, the basic technical approaches of EP II were continued,

while acknowledging their still limited impact.The number of eco-regions was ofcially reduced to

three

(all within the eastern rainforest) and the corridors were lengthened to address conservation

concerns.The Madagascar Mission adopted the Nature, Health,Wealth, and Power conceptual model.

Forest management focused primarily on transferring forest management rights and responsibilities

to local communities.There was an increased emphasis on generating economic benets from the

remaining forests and plantations. USAID encouraged its projects to coordinate and create synergies

with other donors and development actors, both at the national and regional levels. Nationally, this

phase was supposed to mainstream environmental concerns into all aspects of macro-economic

planning.

Eco-regional Initiatives (ERI) (2004-2009): Continued the landscape approaches

started under LDI, created “Alliances” with other actors working in the same geographic

zones (environment, health, and governance, among others); evolved away from center-

based agricultural extension and toward farmer-to-farmer approaches; mentored community

21 Andasibe-Zahamena, Ranomafanta-Andringitra, South East (Tolagnara).

associations to assume responsibilities as co-managers of local forest resources; continued

reinforcement of KoloHarena farmer associations including, especially, their capacity to

engage in commercial activities; created (with Business and Market Expansion – BAMEX)

KoloHarena Federations at the regional and national levels.With partners, implemented

the Champion Communities approach with prizes for communities that reached their

objectives in the health, governance, economics, environment, and education sectors.

Managing Information and Strengthening Organizations for Network

Governance Approach (MISONGA) (2004-06): Focused on strengthening civil

society (with advocacy training) and improving information ows between government

and the citizenry (established documentation centers, promoted rural radio around

the forest corridors, introduced e-governance pilot sites to provide information

about GoM policies and make it available throughout the country); managed the

“governance” component of Champion Communities (known in Malagasy as Commune

Mendrika) and promoted greater transparency and anti-corruption measures

(especially at the regional level).This is an example of a project that began to address

governance issues, but whose funding was pulled when DG funding was reduced.

BAMEX (2004-08): The BAMEX program was initially funded under the Economic

Growth Strategic Objective (SO) with joint funding from the environment SO. When the

Economic Growth SO was dropped from the Madagascar portfolio in 2006, the BAMEX

activities funded through biodiversity earmarks were transferred to be managed under the

Env/RD SO.The rst BAMEX phase was national, focusing on promising value chains (litchi

fruit, rice, gourmet coffee, gemstones, etc.) and addressing constraints at each step of the

chain. Business centers were established to support emerging ventures; attempts were made

to reform certain key economic/business policies that hindered investment (i.e. a law to

encourage the use of biofuels) and development of rural economies (i.e. rice pricing policies).

From 2006, the project was scaled back; certain interventions were partly absorbed by ERI

and the new MCC project, and the project re-focused on commercial agriculture around the

forest corridors, with particular attention to helping the KoloHarena farmer cooperatives.

Jariala (2004-09): Provided policy and institutional support, especially in the forestry sector;

created Forest Observatories in an attempt to enhance transparency of forest governance,

created policies and procedures to transfer commercial harvesting rights to private operators

(especially in KoloAla “production forests” and underexploited plantations); tested improved

charcoal production methods; supported capacity building for central and local DEF ofces.

MIARO (Biodiversity Conservation Project) (2004-09): Focused on

biological integrity of critical habitats: helped improve management of PAs and

worked on SAPM (Système des Aires Protégées) implementation; supported

communities and authorities to implement co-management of protected areas (with

a focus on the USAID eco-regions); worked on sustainable nancing issues.

Menabe Biodiversity Corridor (2007-09): Built forest connectivity

though decentralized management and revenue generating activities.

VARI (2006-09): Introduced irrigation technologies to improve water management

and increase rice yields; encouraged production of market-oriented crops; developed

regional marketing networks of producers and operators to advance selected value-

chains; promoted improved land use and natural resource management plans.

The current situation. EP III ofcially ended in 2008. USAID’s projects supporting EP III goals

were mostly scheduled to end in 2009.A new round of project planning was undertaken in order to

ensure continuity between old and new projects. Instead, the political crisis,

which started in early

2009, and U.S. government frustration with the blatant unwillingness of the new regime to adhere

to democratic principles (or even to Madagascar’s own constitution) led to a decision to suspend all

non-humanitarian U.S. government programs in July 2009. Biodiversity conservation programs might

have been exempted from the suspension as they have “notwithstanding authority” (allowing them

to be managed independently of decisions governing other programs due to their contribution to

global priorities), but the U.S. government chose not to invoke this authority in spite of considerable

lobbying from the conservation organizations and other concerned parties.The State Department

decision to suspend the Madagascar program reected U.S. policy at the highest levels and was likely

inuenced by the spate of other coup-like incidents

in Africa at about the same time.

Cooperative agreements and contracts for all USAID’s outstanding environmental programs were

terminated and new procurements and awards could not proceed (unlike 2002 when project

activities continued, though expatriate staff funded under USAID contracts were evacuated for

several months). FY 2009 funds designated for Madagascar’s environment program (roughly $9

million, of which approximately $7 million was biodiversity earmarked money) were reprogrammed

to other countries and there is a strong possibility that Madagascar’s FY 2010 biodiversity earmarked

funds (approximately $4.5 million) will be similarly reprogrammed if the political situation is not

resolved quickly.

Partnerships

In implementing its programs, USAID has worked with an enormous range of partners, some as

contractors or grantees, others as collaborators in advancing the environmental dossiers.While this

paper is intent on not personalizing the history of USAID’s interventions, this section cannot be

written without mentioning the role of the USAID Environment/Rural Development Team Leader,

who worked with USAID in Madagascar (as a U.S. Personal Services Contractor) for 18 years. Her

22 Signicant discontent with President Ravalomanana’s regime had been growing for some time among

both the populace and leadership. Different segments of the population were angry about different things,

including the use of state resources for private gain, favors to the President’s personal business interests

that were crowding out other business interests, dubious use of public funds including signicant off-budget

expenditures, excessive deconcentration of state powers and undermining of democratic institutions,

perceived injustices in dealing with the military, the emerging redominance of a Merina elite, and censorship

of the media (among others).The generalized frustration provided fertile ground for anyone with the

courage to stand up against the abuses.The opposition movement rallied all of the former Presidents of

Madagascar (many of whom had been ousted for similar abuses of power), several new pretenders to

power, and junior military ofcers. In the early months of 2009, a restive and frustrated populace took

to the streets in protest against Ravalomanana. On March 17th, President Ravalomanana purported

to transfer his authority to a senior military gure, who in turn purported to confer the presidency on

opposition leader Andry Rajoelina (then mayor of Antananarivo), who announced himself the head of the

High Transitional Authority (HAT).The United States characterized the transfer of power as a coup d’état

against a democratically elected president, and does not recognize the HAT.

Initially promising to hold early elections, in the year since assuming power, Rajoelina has demonstrated

a keen interest in staying on (even though at 35 he is constitutionally too young for the position of

President).The opposition movement (whose only common interest was to end the Ravalomanana

regime) has splintered, numerous efforts by the international community and the African Union to

formalize a process leading to early elections have failed, and the situation as of this writing remains

confused.The economy is in tatters: many companies have pulled out, tourism has plummeted, and the

government is near bankruptcy.

23 Per section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Program Appropriations

Act of 2009, the United States Government is required to suspend all assistance to governments that

come to power through a coup d’état. Programs in Guinea, for example, fell under this provision after the

December 2008 coup.

longevity alone is rare in the USAID system and contributed signicantly to the sustained, persistent,

learning-based approaches that characterized the program. She provided the institutional memory

that is critical to learning the lessons of the past and maintaining continuity. Personality counts,

however, and hers was one that thrived on complex institutional arrangements and a multiplicity

of actors. Some people feel that this complexity has unnecessarily hindered implementation, while

others celebrate the ideas and energy it generated. Regardless, her presence from EP I through EP III

is notable.

There have been hundreds of institutions and organizations that have been in some way connected

to USAID’s environment program in Madagascar over the past 25 years.This section highlights a few

groups of actors that have been most closely associated with shaping the direction of the program

or its implementation. Not listed, but of vital importance, are USAID’s primary partners: the people

and Government of Madagascar.

The Conservation Organizations. No paper on the environment movement in

Madagascar would be complete without acknowledging the conservation organizations

that have been pillars of the movement. In particular,WWF (The Worldwide Fund

for Nature/International, known as the World Wildlife Fund in the U.S.), Conservation

International,The Wildlife Conservation Society, and Missouri Botanical Gardens have

been active since well before the NEAP was even a distant dream.

The conservation

organizations have implemented a multitude of programs independent of USAID,

which have in many cases contributed knowledge and experience that shaped later

USAID interventions.They have also implemented numerous USAID grants. Each

has been active in establishing one or more of the agship national parks.

WWF’s pioneering work on landscape

No paper on the environmental

approaches around threatened biodiversity

program in Madagascar would be

elsewhere in the world helped to inform

USAID’s strategy as it moved on from ICDP

complete without acknowledging

to landscape approaches.WWF has also been

the conservation organizations

a leader in environmental education, creating

school and community-based environment

that have been pillars of the

(Vintsy) clubs, a monthly environment

movement... they have had as

magazine, etc. CI focused world attention on

Madagascar with its Hotspot

designation

much or more inﬂuence over the

and has played a lead role in conducting

GoM and environmental policy

the deforestation analyses that have been

used to monitor the health of Madagascar’s

as any of the major donors.

environment. CI and WCS have been leaders

in piloting carbon sequestration approaches

around Makira forest. All of the conservation organizations have brought a passion for

biodiversity, along with the scientic expertise needed to prioritize key areas for conservation.

24 This section does not mean to imply that the conservation organizations always work in tandem or share

identical perspectives.To the contrary, there have been many instances in which they have disagreed; some

will be mentioned in this paper.

25 The 1970 IUCN International Conference in Madagascar already called for the establishment of a Malagasy

section of World Wide Fund for Nature (Corson 178).

26 CI has targeted 25 Biodiversity Hotspots in the world based on species endemism and degree of threat.

Madagascar is rst on the list of the hottest Hotspots (it has more than 3% of the world’s endemic plants

and has lost more than 90% of its primary vegetation).The Hotspot list was intended to focus attention

and resources on saving these extraordinary resource banks (Myers, et al. 2000)

Together, the conservation organizations have exerted pressure on Congress to

maintain the biodiversity earmarks that have, since 1990, provided the majority of

funds to the Madagascar environment program.They have also been among the major

recipients of these funds, both in Madagascar and elsewhere in the world.

Their ubiquitous and constant presence has earned the conservation organizations a

place at the table that some would judge as excessively domineering, others as exerting

necessary leadership. In either case, few would dispute that they have as much or

more inuence over the GoM and environment policy as any of the major donors. It is

signicant that they have been able to maintain operations through each of the political

crises, are witness to the effects of crises on the environment, and have kept critical

programs alive, even when donor-supported programs have been obliged to pull back.

At the outset, relations between the scientic and social science communities tended

toward the antipathetic. Over time (and partly thanks to USAID’s persistent insistence on

integration in the projects they have funded) they have come to greater mutual understanding.

They have educated one another in a way that permits them to speak a common language

in pursuit of often similar goals. If some of the conservation organizations were viewed

initially as running roughshod over the interests of communities in their preoccupation

with biodiversity, they have over time become more sensitive to questions of economic

incentives, farmer constraints, and dialogue with local communities.The conservation

organizations remain tireless advocates of Madagascar and the biodiversity agenda.

Contractors and grantees. USAID’s environment programs were for the most part

implemented through cooperative agreements with NGOs and contracts with U.S.-based

development rms.

Among the development NGOs, CARE, Catholic Relief Services

(CRS), and Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT) have been particularly

active in the environment sector, while major environmental project contractors

have included Associates in Rural Development (ARD), Chemonics, Development

Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), and International Resources Group (IRG). In nearly all cases,

projects were implemented by a consortium of implementing partners. Smaller NGOs

and contractors often played important roles, especially in implementing creative

pilot approaches that have tested ideas later integrated into the larger projects.

Annex I (see attached CD) lists the major USAID-funded environment (and related)

projects during this period, as well as their primary implementers. In many cases, these

international partners further subcontracted with local NGOs who contributed particular

expertise (They are too numerous to be listed here, but can be found in most project

nal reports.) Under EP III, as the Mission tried to strengthen collaboration and strategic

planning around the forest corridors, it required all USAID-funded projects working in

a geographic zone to form an Alliance to encourage synergies between the different

interventions. Some of the Alliances also invited government ofcials and other projects

working in the area to participate, carrying out joint planning exercises, eld missions, etc.

These coordination exercises were generally deemed to be useful, but highly time consuming.

27 These earmarks signicantly fueled the growth of the conservation agencies in the 1990s when the ve

largest conservation agencies (which include CI,WWF, and WCS) managed more than 70% of USAID’s

spending on conservation. (Downie quoted in Corson). Since 2003, they have formed an International

Conservation Partnership that recommends appropriations levels for USAID’s biodiversity programs and

lobbies for those programs (Corson 2008).

28 This paper avoids focusing on specic contractors and implementers (and will not even mention them in

the text in many cases).The purpose is to get everyone to step back, depersonalize results and failures, and

assess the big picture and our collective accomplishments.

U.S. Forest Service (USFS) (2001-08). USFS carried out 21 missions to

Madagascar, primarily to provide technical assistance to projects and work with the DEF.

These missions were focused on forest sector reform, bidding procedures for forest

management contracts, management plans for plantations and watersheds, suggested

changes to forestry laws (permitting, etc.). In addition, 17 Malagasy forestry specialists,

mostly from DEF or ANGAP (Protected Area staff) were sent on study tours to the

United States where they visited parks and learned about park management issues.

Private sector. USAID projects have viewed the private sector as potential allies since 1994

when the CAP project began working with small, environmentally friendly enterprises. LDI

and BAMEX also adopted this approach, in addition to promoting Enterprise Development

Zones to encourage responsible investments around Protected Areas.The BAMEX business

centers provided information and training to small enterprises, especially in those areas

where economic development was expected to reduce pressures on natural resources.

Several projects have attempted to attract the interest of U.S. investors but the

results have been generally disappointing as initial enthusiasm is replaced by hard-

headed analysis of the difculties and risks of doing business in Madagascar.

The projects have worked less frequently directly with large in-country business interests.

Two notable exceptions were (1) the Global Development Alliance (GDA/LARO), formed

between the Rio Tinto Corporation (ilmenite mining), USAID, and the Region of Anosy

(Fort Dauphin) and (2) The Business and Biodiversity Offsets Program pilot with the Sherritt

Corporation (Ambatovy nickel mining). Lasting from 2003-08, GDA/LARO encouraged greater

environmental responsibility from the corporate partner, with help from USAID to develop

interventions in health, education, food security, and environmental programming.

This

represented a conscious decision to engage with a potentially problematic investor to identify

and mitigate the negative social and environmental effects of this huge mining operation.

A centrally funded cooperative agreement worked with the Sherritt Corporation to

develop mitigation and offset activities (reforestation, rerouting of the pipeline, etc.) related

to their massive nickel mining operation (2004-09). It was hoped to formalize some of

the approaches developed during this relationship (by strengthening the Madagascar

regulatory framework), but those policy advances were halted with the 2009 coup.

Peace Corps. Peace Corps opened in Madagascar in 1993 and the rst group of

environmental volunteers arrived about a year later. USAID’s biodiversity program directly

supported environment volunteers through a Participating Agencies Service Agreement

(PASA) with the Peace Corps. Most of the environment volunteers worked in park

management or environmental education. Many of the volunteers were assigned to work

with ANGAP to support their emerging role in managing the national parks, others

worked on ICDPs with CI,WWF,WCS, and still later some were assigned to the LDI and

ERI projects where they worked on community development and environment issues.

Universities and researchers.

International conservation researchers were the

pioneers of the environmental movement in Madagascar. Several ventured far beyond the

boundaries of their personal research to help set Madagascar’s conservation agenda.

29 While many “big business” investments have been put on hold for the moment, the trend is for larger

investors to come to Madagascar (especially in the extractive industries).This may recommend the GDA

model as a way of engaging corporate responsibility.

30 An interesting paper discussing the role of anthropologists working on environmental issues in Madagascar

is Kaufmann, The Sad Opaqueness of the Environment Crisis in Madagascar (2006).

When Madagascar closed to the international Hitching at least some of

development world from the mid 1970s to mid

the best academic brains

1980s, some of the few westerners allowed to

work in the country were research scientists.

to projects where they join

When the country “re-opened” they were poised

academic research excellence

to present the environmental case. Some of these

researchers were associated with universities that

with problems immediately

carried out early biodiversity inventories, including

relevant to the people and

Duke and North Carolina State,Yale,Washington

University, and State University of New York

nature of Madagascar has

(SUNY) (several of whom continued working as

proven highly productive.

partners in the implementation of the ICDPs).

Madagascar is a fertile ground for

researchers of all types. Ranomafana Park alone, for example, hosts more than 100

researchers per year.Thanks to the Valbio Center, Ranomafana now ensures that all

research carried out in the park is readily accessible.

Regrettably this is not the case for

much of the work on Madagascar which too often disappears at the boarding gate.

WWF Madagascar’s Ecology Training Program (ETP) played an important role in

increasing capacity among Malagasy scientists. More than 75 Malagasy students

have earned Master’s and PhD degrees through this program. In 2007, ETP was

turned over to the Malagasy International Association VAHATRA,

which continues

to promote Malagasy conservation biologists and publishes Malagasy Nature as

a forum for peer-reviewed scientic papers (many by Malagasy scientists).

The relationship between eld implementers and academics has been uneasy. Academics

nd it far too easy to take pot-shots at project shortcomings, often without feeling any

responsibility to contribute to making things right. Projects would like to improve their

interventions and use the knowledge generated by academia, but differing vocabularies,

world views, and time frames render this challenging. Hitching at least some of the

best academic brains to projects where they join academic research excellence with

problems immediately relevant to the people and nature of Madagascar (e.g. the

Cornell partnership with LDI and ERI projects) has proven highly productive.

Donor collaboration. Madagascar’s major donors have since the beginning been committed

to supporting the NEAP and working with the Malagasy government to implement it.This

joint collaboration is highly signicant but it has also posed major coordination challenges.

In addition to the U.S., major donors have been Germany, France, Switzerland, and Japan

(bilaterally) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the World Bank/International

Development Association, and the UNDP (multilaterally).

In the late 1980s, a Multi-Donor

Secretariat, located in the World Bank ofces in Washington, DC, was established. It was

tasked with coordinating and supervising implementation of the EPs, as well as disseminating

information to collaborating donors. Its off-site location signicantly limited its efcacy.

31 See http://icte.bio.sunysb.edu/pages/publication_list.html for a lengthy list of park based research reports.

32 Founded by Steve Goodman.

33 The EP strategy divided responsibilities with the U.S. and conservation organizations focusing on Protected

Areas, the World Bank on livelihoods, the French on mapping and land tenure.The Protected Area ICDPs

were also allocated among the donors with the U.S partnering seven PAs, the Germans three, and

UNESCO two.

The donors made a concerted effort to improve coordination under EP II, moving the

Secretariat to Antananarivo, and, from 1999, funded one expatriate and a Malagasy staff

person.The costs of the Secretariat for the Groupe de Bailleurs de Fonds (GBF) were

covered by a Trust Fund with contributions from the major participants (Switzerland,

the European Union, France, International Fund for Agricultural Development – IFAD,

USAID, and WWF). Coordination with the government took place through a Joint

Committee that included international partners, AGEX (implementing agencies such as

ONE, ANGAP), and the ministries.The Committee organized annual evaluation eld trips

that brought 40-50 top ranking ofcials and their bevy of 4x4s to the eld in carefully

scripted, but nonetheless eye-opening, confrontations with environmental realities.

In 2000, a decision was made to include the Rural Development sector in the Group’s

activities, which meant that additional international partners (such as the Food and Agricultural

Organization – FAO and the African Development Bank) were integrated into the Group. In

2002 the expatriate working for the GBF left and stafng was reduced to a single person at

the Secretariat. While the Secretariat is formally independent, it has been housed at the World

Bank ofces in Antananarivo, which resulted in some confusion over whom it represents.

In the end, the joint group was again separated into environment and rural development

donor groups due to the divergence of operating modalities between the two sectors.

For EP III, a Joint Coordination Committee was formed to further reinforce the linkages

between the donors and the GoM and to encourage joint strategy and implementation.This

included a joint Monitoring and Evaluation system.The system used a common set of indicators

that allowed results from various donors to be compiled in a single data base tracked by a

Coordination Unit (CELCO) under The Ministry of Environment/DEF.This Joint Committee

included more than 50 people representing donors, ministries (Environment,Tourism, Mining),

environmental institutions, and the larger conservation NGOs. For several years, the Secretary

General of the Ministry of Environment and USAID presided jointly over the committee in

tacit recognition of the central role USAID has played in Madagascar’s environment sector.

The size of this body and the very frequent turn-over of its members (especially

representatives of the Ministry of Environment) eroded its efcacy and efciency. Malagasy

members expressed concern that the government’s role was eclipsed by the weight of

the donors. Nevertheless, it played an important role in ensuring that donor and GoM

investments remained largely in line with the overall strategy, in promoting discussions

around the most critical and complex issues (such as land and resource tenure), and in

creating a common vision among various players.While the dominance of U.S. actors

(both the conservation organizations and USAID) was criticized by other international

partners, their inuence was based in large part on the long-term relationships they had

built with Malagasy partners which gave them an, admittedly, privileged place at the table.

In mid-2009, in response to the political crisis, the CC PTE (Cercle de Concertation–

Partenaires Techniques et Financiers – Environnement) was created. It groups

the technical and nancial partners with the objective of sharing information and

experiences.Three commissions were created to monitor key ongoing activities

concerning environmental governance, climate change, and SAPM. It was initially

facilitated by KfW and is now jointly presided by UNDP and French Cooperation.

Overall major accomplishments

Later chapters will address sectoral challenges and accomplishments directly related to USAID’s

interventions.This section presents a quick review of some of the most salient cross-sectoral

achievements. USAID signicantly contributed to all of these, as did many other partners and

participants.

Impressive network of national parks. Few – inside or outside the national park

system – would deny that there are remaining issues to be resolved, whether lofty (assuring

sustainable nancial management systems) or mundane (making sure that visitors have

access to clean toilets). All this aside, Madagascar’s national parks are truly spectacular

and much better equipped to receive visitors than they were in 1985 when only the

most intrepid ventured forth.There are currently 18 National Parks, six Strict Nature

Reserves, and 23 Wildlife Reserves. Six of these attract by far the greatest number of

visitors (Isalo, Analamazoatra/Mantadia, Ranomafana, Ankarana, Amber Mountain, and

Tsingy of Bemaraha) with visitor levels up to 30,000 per year in some of the parks.

The Tsingy is listed as a World Heritage Site, as is, since 2007, a collection of six parks

strung along the remaining eastern rainforest parks: Marojejy in the north, then Masoala,

Zahamena, Ranomafana, and Andringitra, before arriving at Andohahela in the south.

Thanks in part to the reputation of the park system, Madagascar has become an

international tourist destination. International visitors have increased nearly 30-

fold since the start of the NEAP (from 12,000 people in 1984 to 345,000 in

2008), largely based on growing international interest in its natural resources.

The rate of deforestation has been slowed. The rapid disappearance of Madagascar’s

natural forests (and the biodiversity that depends on them) was the primary driving

force behind the NEAP.While estimates of early deforestation rates vary widely and

were hindered by technological limits of the day, recent studies provide a more accurate

picture of deforestation rates since 1990.The rate of national deforestation, as reported

in the recent MinEnv/USAID/CI report, was assessed at 0.83% per year between 1990

and 2000. Over the period 2000-2005, the rate declined to 0.53% per year.

The overall reduction is notable and cause for celebration though it masks

considerable, and sometimes worrisome, variability. In comparisons by region, two

regions continue to suffer increasing rates of deforestation – one is the area around

Antsirabe, whose small remaining forests continue to disappear at over 4% per year.

The second is the area (Anosy) around Tolagnara where deforestation rates have

more than doubled and now exceed 1% per year. Aside from the Antananarivo area,

the only other region subject to rates exceeding 1% a year

is the critically important

forest area around Ambositra, home of Madagascar’s renowned wood carvers.

Pressures on the different types of forests also vary considerably.The deforestation rate of the

humid forests that comprise about half of Madagascar’s total forest area has been reduced

by half (from 0.79% to 0.35% per year).While it is tempting to attribute this to project

interventions, at least part of this reduction is due to natural factors.The remaining forests

often have at least a degree of natural protection, due to their higher elevation (making them

less favorable for agriculture) and in some cases benet from natural barriers (such as cliffs

34 Evolution de la couverture de forêts naturelles à Madagascar 1990-2000-2005.

35 These gures refer to Madagascar’s 22 regions.There are specic areas within regions that subject to

particularly high rates of deforestation (e.g. Ampanihy [1.3%] and Toliara [2%] districts in the southwest

dry forests¸ Vangaindrano [2.1%] sandy forests of the southeast, Antanambao [1.3%] eastern humid forest,

Ambanja [.98%] in the north).

or extreme steepness).The dry forest areas Recent methodological

are also subject to less deforestation than in

advances provide us with

the past (0.67% annually vs. 0.4% in the recent

evaluation), but the spiny forests continue to be

a more accurate picture of

battered at a rate that has seen no change since

deforestation rates, at least

1990 and still exceeds 1.2% per year. (The spiny

forests are often easily accessible and without

since 1990. e national rate

natural protection, being in atter coastal areas.)

of deforestation between 1990

Efforts to protect biodiversity through the

and 2000 is estimated to have

creation of national parks is paying off.The

been 0.83% per year. From

overall rate of deforestation in the parks is

0.12% per year, compared to 0.65% in the

2000-2005, the rate declined

forests that did not have protected status

to 0.53% per year.

in 2005. None of the six most visited parks

had rates exceeding 0.01% per year.

The environment now has a “pervasive presence” in Madagascar. Twenty-ve

years ago consciousness of the environment was limited to a very small number of largely

elite citizens of the island. It simply wasn’t an issue for most people. A generation later, the

situation has signicantly changed.While there may still be population pockets that have

not been touched in some way by the interventions of the last quarter century, they are

the exception to the rule. From ministries, to local government ofces, to the very frontiers

of the forest, people have been exposed to the “environmental message” – whether they

concur and are ready to join the cause or not. A farmer may still head for the forest to

cut a new tavy eld, but he almost certainly knows that he’s not supposed to be doing

it and could probably make a connection to the value of forests if pressed to do so.

Within government, ministries other than Environment now routinely address environmental

issues (e.g. sustainable nancing, tourism, mining), which is also an indication of mainstreaming.

We understand the Madagascar environmental situation much better.

As noted

in the introduction, the amount of information available is vastly different now from what

it was in 1985. (It is rather astonishing that the NEAP has proven to be so fundamentally

correct, given the paucity of information available at the time it was being drafted.)

Information improvements have taken place in the scientic sphere with massive studies of

biodiversity (that have required some fairly major adjustments of plant taxonomy) as well

as the social sciences where there is greater understanding of household economics and

decision making. Practical information about agricultural systems and why farmers adopt

new techniques have made valuable contributions.With more than two decades of research

in many of these elds, we have a better sense of trends. And, a major (if still incomplete)

effort has been made to render this information more accessible. Biological databases and

limited other information are now collected at the Réseau de Biodiversité de Madagascar

(REBIOMA: www.rebioma.net), which also links the user to other databases (i.e. ARSIE).

We have better tools to analyze the ecological and social situation.

Advances in the tools for biological analysis and priority setting have helped to establish

Madagascar’s preeminence in the biodiversity pantheon (justifying, for example, its

designation as one of the hottest Hotspots), but have also enabled scientists to

prioritize the most critical areas for national conservation efforts.The availability of

36 Marine resources are now at a similar level of information/understanding as the terrestrial resources were

a generation ago.

such resources was only a dream when NEAP began.They arm the conservation and

development communities with information that allows them to be more strategic

in their planning and to focus future efforts on what really matters most.

The previous section focused on information availability. Equally important have been the

development and testing of tools to enable the conservation community to monitor the

environmental situation and rene our understanding.The technology has changed in ways

that were unforeseeable a generation ago when even a basic Global Positioning System (GPS)

was still the technology of the future and military security restrictions severely limited the

utility of the information that it provided.Today, some villagers in Madagascar are using hand-

held GPS units to monitor their community forests. Our ability to determine deforestation

rates has increased signicantly and the technology continues to improve.The recent USAID/

CI report based on complex comparisons of LANDSAT images had to resolve some

delicate issues of how to deal with cloud cover, for example, as well as how to distinguish

different types of vegetation. Such advances will facilitate similar analyses in the future.

Others have improved methodologies for carrying out biodiversity assessments

measuring the carbon sequestration capacity of various types of forests,

to name

just a couple of the signicant advancements in the methodological domain.

Policies and procedures now exist for most major environment related

issues. USAID started with the goal of ensuring that Madagascar had the policy

framework in place to better manage its environment.That goal has largely been

met.This issue will be addressed in greater detail in the body of the report, but

it is sufciently important and overarching to warrant highlighting here.

Malagasy have been trained to a level where they can take leadership positions.

There are now large numbers of Malagasy who have been trained in scientic research,

technical elds, management, and environmental leadership.These talented Malagasy

constitute an invaluable asset to their country and to the environment movement.

Much of USAID’s training impact has been within the institutions and projects where

partners and staff have been extensively mentored.There is now a sizeable cohort

of people who have more than a decade of project experience; these people are

poised to take (or have already taken) key leadership positions in Madagascar. USAID’s

projects are renowned as training grounds, which can be frustrating when key staff are

“poached” by other institutions (often the World Bank, UN programs, and more recently

37 Steve Goodman.

38 Winrock.

MCC), but this has proven to be an effective strategy for “seeding” ideas and building

partnerships. USAID also nanced seven Malagasy Master’s degree candidates (under the

LDI project) for studies in the U.S.; all have returned to play key leadership roles.

USAID’s approach

We turn now to the characteristics of USAID’s approach that have contributed positively to

achieving the results reported in this paper as well as those that have hindered implementation in

one way or another.These threads weave through the various projects and activities, sometimes

adding a sparkle to the nal fabric and sometimes leaving a ragged edge that might be improved in

future interventions.

Positive Characteristics. The following attributes have signicantly contributed to the success of

USAID’s environmental program.

USAID’s environment program has been integrated and holistic, visionary, and focused.

Madagascar is a highly complex place and USAID did not shy from this complexity, while

maintaining a focus on a core set of issues.The program successfully worked at multiple

scales and consistently tried to balance conservation and development concerns.

The sustained involvement of key staff in the environmental team assured continuity and,

most important in the Malagasy culture, helped build credibility and long-term relationships

with Malagasy partners. It is notable that for 15 years there was a pattern of Mission

leadership where Deputy Directors were consistently promoted to Mission Directors,

which made for more stable and informed leadership at the top. In addition, as previously

noted, the Environment Team Leader remained the same through all three EP programs.

This continuity contributed to a culture of applied learning and adaptive

program management. Rather than the more usual pattern of new program managers

feeling the bureaucratic imperative to “make his/her mark” every 3-4 years, the

program was allowed to gradually evolve, making note of weaknesses in order to

improve the next generation of initiatives, but overall staying the course.

Some countries and programs, for reasons not easily explicable, galvanize a coterie of

passionate, committed, and persistent people. Madagascar has been one of

these and USAID has beneted from attracting an extraordinary group of professionals

to work on its programs. Many of the same names resurface time and again in project

39 Two of these program graduates work for CI, one worked for LDI, one left Madagascar to work for the

UN in Geneva, one served as Secretary General of tourism, one worked for the Ministry of Public Works,

and the last worked for the World Food Program. A limited number of professional staff have also gotten

travel opportunities.While overseas training has notable benets, especially in a country like Madagascar

where very few people ever have the opportunity to leave the island to get a broader perspective, the

immediate impacts of such training have often been less than hoped for. Specically, the benets seem

to have mostly been restricted to the individual him or herself and have not been integrated into the

institutional culture around them. Similarly, the success of programs working to train agents of the state

(DEF, for example) has been mitigated. Projects have found that training the older, more experienced

cadre is of limited benet since they quickly return to their previous practices.Training younger members

of the agency (or even recruiting new staff) has been more successful, but as long as these people

are reintegrated into hierarchical administrative structures the impact is limited and frustrations are

considerable.

40 At least one reviewer challenged this conclusion, noting that USAID’s interventions included forests,

trains, civil society, agriculture. I would argue that all of these interventions were conceptually linked to

environmental challenges and were carried out precisely because the program believed that they were

necessary to implement environmental objectives.

documents, consulting reports, and academic papers produced over the last quarter

century; many of the people who worked in Madagascar early in their careers are

now contributing as “elder statespeople.” Since some of these people have also veered

off at various points to work in other countries, they brought these experiences to

bear as well. A remarkable sense of teamwork

has characterized the venture, largely

surmounting contractor partisanship (with the possible exception of bidding season!).

Given the limited funds available, the mission wisely chose to maintain a strategic geographic

focus, readjusting this focus over time, but never losing sight of its importance.This discipline

strengthened the program and without it there would probably be fewer successes to report

today.

The Mission put a high premium on donor collaboration, in spite of its high transaction

costs. In many cases, USAID was called to play a leadership role as a senior and respected

actor, even if not the most consequential one in terms of nancial resources. As such, it was

able to leverage its many ideas and relatively few resources (especially from EP II on) to have

an impact disproportionate to the amount of funding it contributed.This happened both at

the planning level in Antananarivo as well as the project implementation level in the eld.

USAID was one of the few donors who placed senior expatriate staff in posts outside

the capital city. This helped to ensure a reality check from the eld while promoting

vertical integration of programs (at the policy and eld levels).The high prole eld

presence contributed to USAID’s reputation as a highly respected leader in environmental

programs in Madagascar and, in more than just a few cases, strong advocacy from USAID’s

eld projects mobilized a response not only from USAID, but other major donors. Senior

eld expatriates also played an important mentoring role for Malagasy working in regional

ofces and at the grass-roots level, thereby building capacity outside the capital.

Lastly, quality program documentation builds the bridge to “room for improvement” as

some projects did an outstanding job at being self critical and fully documenting what they

had done, while others have been signicantly less forthcoming. Some of the implementers

have been notably consistent in ensuring that documentation from their projects is made

readily available (CDs of all project and consulting reports compiled at the project’s

end, for example); all future projects should be expected to meet this gold standard.

Room for improvement in USAID projects and approach. The following issues constrained

implementation in the eld and warrant consideration in the planning and execution of future

interventions:

Insufcient funding. Funding levels did not consistently match the magnitude of the vision

and the amplitude of the challenges; biodiversity earmarked funds added critical resources

to the portfolio but forced interventions into boxes that were sometimes too tight to

respond to the vast scope of Madagascar’s natural resource management problems.

More Democracy and Governance and Economic Growth funds needed. The

constancy of environment (biodiversity) funds was not matched by those available for DG and

EG.This was a huge handicap to the program as those sectors were critical to environmental

success. In addition, uncertainties around this funding engendered some bureaucratic

gymnastics that had real effects on people and programs and probably compromised

USAID credibility in certain cases (when, for example, projects were prematurely closed).

41 This camaraderie has been much appreciated in the preparation of this paper.

Sectoral divides hindered holistic implementation. USAID institutional and

bureaucratic systems and, especially, sectoral divides, made it extraordinarily difcult to

implement a truly holistic approach on the ground. Persistent attempts to overcome

these difculties at the Mission and eld level were only partly able to compensate

for the lack of exibility and the near impossibility of creating projects that were

as multi-sectoral as the problems they were trying to address. (e.g., one Env/RD

funded project focused on production, while an Economic Growth project focused

on commercialization of the same crops with the same target population).

Procurement issues. Procurement problems (e.g. difculties in assuring timely rebidding

so as to maintain continuity in project activities) placed unnecessary stresses at key points

and created signicant inefciencies in implementation. In a country where local partners

(including government) are terribly weak and in some cases the projects act as proxy for

government services (basically providing environmental monitoring and enforcement), even

brief lapses in project attention can have serious implications. Restrictive funding mechanisms

(e.g., MOBIS, which disallowed infrastructure expenditures) articially limited the types of

permitted interventions, severely handicapped implementation, and compromised relations

with local communities when projects were unable to respond to their most urgent requests.

Implementation by a multiplicity of projects.

USAID’s structure

The program was implemented through a multiplicity

and procedures made

of projects and a plethora of implementers.This

often resulted in inefciencies and costly duplication

it nearly impossible to

of administrative services (even small projects

create projects that were

had to have full edged Admin/Finance teams).

Coordination costs were also high when as many

as multi-sectoral as the

as three or four projects might be working around

problems they were trying

a single set of issues in a single geographic area.

to address.

Inconsistent suspension and evacuation

procedures. USAID projects fare poorly during

Madagascar’s intermittent political crises, often with negative consequences on program

results (as will be discussed in later sections of this paper). Here, it should be noted that the

apparent randomness in the way these situations are handled also undermines the clarity

of the U.S.’ message to the GoM. In 2002, expatriates working on contracted projects were

sent home for several months (with serious consequences for project implementation).

There may have been reasons for doing this (security was cited at the time), but if so, was

it logical that related projects funded under cooperative agreements were not affected?

In 2009, in large part to send a message to the new regime, environment projects were

suspended, while much larger health projects were not.While the humanitarian concern

behind keeping the health projects going may have been laudable, what message really went

out to the government when these projects continued? And do we really want to imply

that our environment projects have no humanitarian value? The Department of State’s

internal logic

on these issues can appear arbitrary to local governments, beneciaries, and

partners, and as such decisions can locally damage USAID’s reputation and credibility.

Projects insufciently self-critical. At least in the ofcial documentation, projects too often

tended to be insufciently analytical and self-critical (though this was not always the case, as noted

in the “positives” above), making it hard to learn lessons and improve approaches. One possible

interpretation of these documents may be that this problem actually got worse over time as

42 Based on federal regulations and the differing in-country legal status of contractors and NGOs.

contractors and grantees got more invested and fearful of losing the next bid if they were perceived

as underperforming. Reporting success at times seems to have taken precedence over managing for

results.

The following chapters review the progress made in four broad areas considered vital to the success

of Madagascar’s environmental agenda: (1) policy frameworks and institution building, (2) forest

management, (3) reducing local pressures on natural resources, and (4) valorizing the economic

benets of natural resources.There is, obviously, considerable overlap between these closely

intertwined topics.

POLICIES AND

INSTITUTIONS

This section on policies and institutions discusses rst the policy framework, followed by institutional

strengthening.

IMPROVED, ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY

POLICY FRAMEWORK

A robust policy framework has always been seen as critical to preserving Madagascar’s environment.

USAID projects since EP I have maintained a balanced portfolio, addressing policy frameworks and

institutional strengthening on one hand, and eld interventions on the other.Those most active on

the policy front have been: KEPEM (EP I), PAGE (EP II), and Jariala (EP III).

Work in this domain has included both helping Madagascar dene appropriate natural resource

management policies and providing the tools needed to implement these policies (e.g., information

gathering, monitoring, and enforcement).These “tool kits” have been accompanied by training of

government and agency personnel, as well as private Malagasy rms and consultants to ensure the

availability of local technical expertise (to do environmental impact assessments, for example).

The Environmental Charter (1990) and the NEAP (1990) provided the policy foundation for all

subsequent programs.They were visionary and extensive in their reach. Notably, from the outset

they integrated conservation and sustainable economic development objectives. Intended to dene

the environmental agenda for 15 years, the NEAP was superseded by the Madagascar Action Plan

(MAP) when it was issued by President Ravalomanana in 2006.The MAP was a comprehensive

development program for Madagascar that focused on economic development, while highlighting

environmental issues (Objective 7:“Cherish the Environment”). It built on principles established in

the NEAP. MAP’s slogan (“Madagascar, Naturally”), like the document itself, was more oriented to

international consumption than to a domestic audience.The international partners, many of whom

had been instrumental in its drafting, were appropriately impressed and, as had been hoped, began

signing on to support various elements of the plan.

In addition to these overarching policy frameworks, specic codes and decrees governing forestry

(1997), parks (2002), and mining (2006) were all issued, many of them with considerable help from

USAID’s environmental policy projects.

The Forestry Law deserves special mention. It was a critical step forward in 1997 as it allowed the

State, in principle, to delegate management authority over forests to other actors, either public or

private. In theory, this opened up opportunities for co-management by local communities, sustainable

management contracts with private operators, and delegation of authority over parks. In fact, the

decrees that would allow full implementation of this delegation have not yet been promulgated,

except for the GELOSE Law and Forest Management Contract (GCF) decree that are focused on

43 Key documents for this section are Brinkerhoff and Yeager, Madagascar’s Environmental Action Plan:A Policy

Implementation Perspective (1993), Shaikh, A Review of the Impact of the KEPEM Program on Environmental

Policy in Madagascar (1999), and Raik, Forest Management in Madagascar: an Historical Overview (2007). The

latter reviews forest policy since pre-colonial times in Madagascar.

local communities.The Jariala project was moving ahead with the Ministry of Environment on texts

that would expand delegation authority more generally, but they were caught short by the 2009

political crisis and the new rules were never put into effect.

Other key policies that have been instrumental in advancing the environmental agenda in

Madagascar include:

Protected Area Entrance Fee (DEAP) regulations (1991) that allowed 50% of

park entrance fees to be allocated to proximate communities as needed to address local

development needs.

The MECIE (Environmental Impact Law, 1993) that required identication and mitigation of

the negative environmental impacts associated with all economic investments.

The legal framework needed to create Foundations (1994 and revised in 2004).This was a

critical step to working out sustainable nancing mechanisms for both the national parks and

Tany Meva.

GELOSE (1996, a forest management approach promoted by the French) and GCF

(2001) laws that allowed for the delegation/sharing of management responsibilities with local

communities.

The Code des Aires Protégées (COAP) (2003) that broadened the designation of national

parks to include all six IUCN categories and, signicantly, for the rst time allowed for co-

management of PAs.

Policy support projects have clearly recognized that while laws and overall frameworks are

necessary to improve resource management, they are far from sufcient. Managers responsible for

implementing such laws require practical tools to enable them to carry out their responsibilities.

The USAID projects provided pragmatic and practical tools to help the ministries and other

implementing agencies do their jobs well. Examples include:

The Environmental Impact Assessment Toolkit: Tools for tracking requests and

decisions, training packages for people preparing and analyzing environmental dossiers.

Forest re monitoring toolkit: GIS tools needed to detect and monitor forest res, as well

as track events over time.

Geographic databases Maps and statistics for USAID focal areas.

The Environmental Information Network System Association (ARSIE): Created

in 1998 to facilitate access to environmental information at the national level. Among other

things it collects environmental information, legislation, conservation and other data and

makes them available through databases accessible via the ARSIE website: www.arsie.mg.

The Durban Vision prioritization group used MARXAN, MAXENT, and ZONATION

spatial analyses tools that allowed analysis of huge data sets on the distribution of

threatened species and then overlay of maps as needed to focus attention on ecological

zones that would have the most impact on protecting threatened species.

INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING

Environmental Institutions and Structures

Madagascar’s partners have invested considerable

attention and funds into setting up, nurturing, and

While there has been

reinforcing the institutions needed to implement the

ample frustration over

ambitious environmental vision laid out in the NEAP.

the unevenness of policy

Given Madagascar’s extremely fragile State and lack of

implementation, projects

experience with results-oriented governance, it is perhaps

working on carbon

not surprising that this has been at best an inefcient and at

credit initiatives note

worst a Sisyphean process.

that without the enabling

policy framework (NEAP,

Donors have struggled from the outset with issues of

Durban Vision, GELOSE

where to place the core environmental institutions; there

in particular) it would be

has been continuing tension between, on the one hand,

much harder to advance on

efforts to engage government fully and promote ownership

carbon sales.The existence

of the environmental movement and, on the other, trying to

of these policies has

protect people and programs from the gross inefciencies

been crucial to reassuring

and potential manipulation/corruption to which they were

international partners

vulnerable when fully embedded within the government.

and to implementing the

As independent and semi-independent institutions were

complex institutional

created and supported (salary subsidies, equipment)

relationships needed to

to a level where they could become effective, rivalries

co-manage protected areas

have occurred with related government agencies. (This

and demonstrate avoided

happened notably in regard to ONE’s relationship with

deforestation.

the various ministries to which it has been attached and

ANGAP’s relationship with DEF).

And yet, when projects and programs have tried to counterbalance with greater support to

government institutions the results have been less than stellar: training investments are lost when

ministries disappear or staff is transferred and agencies “pick and choose” among project elements

(e.g. ignoring mechanisms designed for transparency while eagerly accepting material and salary

support).The credibility of donors perceived to be closely involved with corrupt agents of the

state can be severely compromised.While these issues are to be expected at a certain level, in

Madagascar they are more systemic than occasional.The basic conundrum has yet to be resolved in

any satisfactory way.

Still, there has been signicant capacity building at the “technocratic” level within various ministries

and institutions. Many people know what they’re supposed to do and how to do it, whether at the

ministry or eld ofce level.The problem is less one of knowledge and competence, as it is the

lack of government support and the authority to carry out one’s job correctly.This point will be

addressed further in the section on governance.

Even as they were dening the new institutional arrangements with the GoM and other donors,

USAID programs recognized that the relatively long commitment to implementing the NEAP (three

phases over 15 years) would only start the process.Without assurances of funding for institutions

and processes started during the EPs, there was little hope of keeping the initiatives alive over the

longer term. If EP I was focused largely on creating the institutional structures (e.g.,Tany Meva) that

would be necessary to “carry” sustainable funding mechanisms, EP II and III focused on identifying

funding mechanisms that would not be dependent on project funding cycles and the typically short

attention spans of donors.

The basic strategy for the PAs has been to create autonomous management structures (see ANGAP

below) with long-term funding provided through an afliated Foundation. Similarly, the Tany Meva

Foundation was established to provide at least modest nancing to local environmental interventions.

Direction des Eaux et Fôrets. Madagascar’s forest service was established as a control

and enforcement organization during the colonial period when they were also responsible for

encouraging local communities to plant eucalyptus plantations. In the 1960s and 70s DEF planted

vast tracts of pine (often on land expropriated from local communities). As the main enforcers of the

exclusion policy in protected areas and the government authority that seized lands for plantations,

they have traditionally had an antagonistic relationship with local communities.They were, however,

the jewel of the colonial administration in terms of training and professionalism, a characteristic

that continued until the dramatic policy changes of the early 1970s. Problems only deepened with

the increasing nancial crises that deprived

the organization of the funds needed to work

properly at the same time that the government

promoted what was essentially an open access

regime to natural resources.

Over the past 40 years, respect for the forestry

service has plummeted and they have been

consistently handicapped by lack of capacity (e.g.

transport) to enforce forest laws in very remote

and inaccessible areas. In addition, as much of the

forestry service is based in remote outposts and

has been very poorly trained and paid, there has

been a consistent problem of motivation and

widespread petty corruption (at the local level)

and not-so-petty corruption at the national level.

These weaknesses were well understood in

the design of the NEAP.Two strategies were

devised to overcome these weaknesses: capacity

building of the DEF itself and the creation of

semi-independent agencies (ONE and ANGAP)

to implement some of the EP mandates

viewed by the donors as most essential.The

tension between creating semi-autonomous

institutions (in the expectation that they would

be more effective) while trying to reinforce government structures frustrated by their perceived

marginalization has been a recurrent theme throughout the EPs.

Under EP I, U.S. institutional efforts were focused on creating ONE and ANGAP, while the World

Bank put resources into DEF capacity building through the Forest Management Project.

The Debt-

for-Nature project did train a cadre of some 400 nature protection agents at the local level.These

people, recruited primarily from the rural areas where they lived, did not have enforcement power.

Instead, they acted as liaisons with the forestry service for environmental education and “dissuasion”

of illegal activities. Debt for Nature also helped to construct some DEF ofces, provide uniforms, and

otherwise increase the professionalism of the forest service.

Capacity building of national environmental management structures

has been a pillar of USAID’s program in Madagascar since EP I. In

this picture, foresters practice techniques necessary for forest zoning.

(Photo credit: Andy Keck)

44 This project closed early after a poor evaluation.

Once ANGAP was founded, DEF was deprived of management responsibilities for the national

parks. (DEF opposed the creation of ANGAP, and jealousy over the greater resources contributed

to the park service have been a continuous source of friction.) All other forests (about 90% of the

total) remained under their purview, however.

KEPEM supported DEF on forest nance issues.The project initially estimated that stumpage fees

were inappropriately low in relation to the real value of the wood and, in addition, only 2% to 5% of

the fees were actually being collected. It worked with the forestry service to determine reasonable

charges for wood extraction and to improve fee collection.The funds were partly paid into a

National Forestry Fund (FFN) and partly allocated to reforestation activities.

Administrative and nancial issues continued to plague the DEF. KEPEM evaluations noted that DEF

was the only EP executing agency that received no direct donor subsidies.

As a result, staff were

paid little and were often not very motivated to carry out their responsibilities.

Recognition of the continuing shortcomings of the forestry service led to the EP II strategy of

transferring forest management from DEF to local communities. (See co-management).There was

some resistance in the forestry service to ceding power under these arrangements, a tension that

has persisted over the years. Attempts to strengthen the forestry service continued; the MIRAY

project focused on DEF information systems, both at the national and regional level. Maps that

allowed agents to carry out monitoring and evaluation of forest resources were prepared.A

complete review of wood harvesting permits was undertaken.

Databases to enable follow-up were

created in the priority corridor areas.

By the time Jariala (EP III) arrived, with a primary mission to reform DEF, it was judged to be still

“outdated, under-nanced, and unmotivated, both at staff and management levels.” (Jariala Project

Final Report 2009) Furthermore, discussions with stakeholders conrmed that they wanted a strong

and more transparent state structure to manage forest issues.The project prepared a comprehensive

reform plan (led by the Director General of DEF and involving extensive consultations with national

and eld staff). Implementation began in 2007.The project had to walk a tight wire between

maintaining a sense of “ownership” within the Agency, while ensuring that there was indeed progress

toward implementing necessary reforms.The approach involved embedding long-term staff and

consultants within the agency as well as improving communications systems.

Progress was slow (in part due to frequent turnover of senior staff at the Ministry), but not

insignicant.The World Bank committed to funding a voluntary departure plan (the average age of

local forestry agents was 52 years) to rejuvenate the staff.The GoM agreed to the principle of hiring

an additional 1,000 people over ve years, and a new organizational chart

was put into effect. In the

end, both retirements and recruitment have been delayed due to the political crisis of 2009, though

45 Prior to 1993, the National Forestry Fund never collected more than 200 million Fmg. By 1996, with

KEPEM support, revenues had increased to nearly 2,000,000,000 Fmg (a 10-fold increase). Ambiguities over

how these funds were being used persisted.

46 In 2004, DEF’s operating budget was about $400,000 to manage some 6-7 million ha of forest (WB EP III

Project Appraisal Report).

47 The 2001 review found that only 13 of the 418 permits reviewed were fully in order. Another 71 were

maintained on condition that the necessary fees were paid.A full 335 permits were revoked because they

had expired or were not in compliance with the rules. (MIRAY, 17)

48 How to ensure the sustainability of such mechanisms remains perplexing. By the time Jariala arrived (EP III),

they found no trace of the DEF databases introduced by MIRAY under EP II.

49 Jariala put signicant effort into improving personnel management. Success was elusive:“Human resource

management is a sensitive subject as it is perceived by decision-makers as the sole tool to establish their

internal “political” management. Proposals aimed at a transparent action were ignored outright...” (Jariala

16)

250 new agents were employed in early 2010.The possibility of creating an autonomous semi-public

agency (on the model of ANGAP) that would be called ANGEF was discussed (and supported by

the World Bank) but ultimately rejected by the GoM.

Numerous technical interventions increased the capacity of DEF to carry out its core responsibilities.

Regional ofces were formed and trained. A fully operational GIS unit was established at DEF (with

local capacity in several regions) and a Mobile Control Unit was tested.The GoM later followed

recommendations (already suggested by KEPEM) to separate management and enforcement roles,

creating an autonomous control directorate (Directorate for the Control and Improvement of

Integrity), linked to DEF and represented in all 22 regions.

On the nancial side, the Ministry (working with Jariala) strongly encouraged the transformation

of the Forestry Fund into an Administrative Public Entity (EPA) in order to promote greater

transparency and improve oversight. It also recommended that a signicant portion of forest

revenues be returned to regional/local ofces in order to motivate local forestry ofcials and ensure

that they had the resources needed to carry out their jobs. Much work went into creating the EPA,

and it was signed by the Ministry of Finance just before the project came to a screeching halt with

the political crisis of 2009.

Initial results of the reform efforts are promising, but those most closely involved remain wary. As the

Jariala nal report stated,“The main concern today is to sustain these results as a political decision

could wipe them out.”We can hope that at least the most immediately useful technical tools

transferred (inventory methods, data management,“how-to” manuals for certication) will become

part of the daily praxis, even if progress on some of the more dramatic reforms has been put on

hold.

ONE. The National Environment Ofce was founded during EP I’s KEPEM project when there was

still no Environment Ministry and there was a desperate need for management of the environmental

dossiers. It was initially intended to be a “small, but powerful, unit staffed with senior level technicians,

whose mandate was to serve as leader, orchestrator, and monitor of the EAP.” (Brinkerhoff and

Yeager 1993, 20). It would also coordinate all donor assistance under the EAP.Three donors (USAID,

UNDP, and the African Development Bank) provided initial support. It has had a rocky start-up,

however, and was caught up in endless bureaucratic wrangling over its place and its responsibilities,

especially once the Ministry of Environment was created. Initially given high prominence under the

Ministry of Finance, it was later “side-lined” to the Ministry of Agriculture and then transferred among

six different ministries between 1990 and 2000. ONE inevitably fell into a contradictory situation

regarding its policy leadership role:

At the heart of the problem is that ONE no longer has the nal authority of policy

making, yet retains de facto power through its well-staffed structure, budget and

general behavior vis-à-vis the Ministry of Environment and other EP II institutions...

(PAGE policy advisor Gregory Wordsworth, 2000)

Over time this was resolved by reducing ONE’s policy mandate and refocusing its mandate on

environmental impact assessments.This meant that greater attention to strengthening policy within

the mainstream government agencies was necessary.

50 By the time ANGEF was proposed, the idea that parastatals such as ANGAP would automatically be more

motivated, transparent, and better governed was losing credibility. In addition, some of the key functions

of ANGEF were inherently government issues (e.g. contracts for forests and protected areas).There was

a fear that a semi-autonomous ANGEF would merely reproduce the endless bureaucratic wrangling and

exorbitant operating costs that had characterized ANGAP.

The AGERAS process was developed between EP I and EP II to advance regional planning as needed

to implement the eco-regional approach. AGERAS regional technical units were established under

ONE to implement forest co-management arrangements and otherwise participate in the eco-

regional process.This proved to be an overly heavy mandate for ONE and, after the 2001 mid-term

review, a decision was made to allocate some of ONE’s responsibilities to other organizations

so that it could focus on its core mission. A new organization called Service d’Appui à la Gestion

Environnementale (SAGE) was established to oversee AGERAS and co-management activities, while

ONE continued to manage the environmental impact portfolio and environmental information

systems (as it does to this day).

Not tied to the generally dismal employment conditions of the public sector, and with considerable

donor support, ONE has generally been able to recruit good staff and keep them motivated. It is

notable that the Director General has remained in his position since the beginning of EP III, which

is a rarity in the more customary “revolving door” of Malagasy institutions.This contributed to a

more positive working relationship with USAID leadership and projects than has been the case with

some of the other Malagasy environmental agencies. ONE has, however, been recently criticized for

inconsistent application of the MECIE regulations, even after extensive mentoring, leading some to

question whether their “institutional heart” is really in the task.

During EP II, the eco-regional focus highlighted the lack of coordinating institutions at the regional

level.While the projects, by default, carried out some of these responsibilities, this was correctly

viewed as unsustainable. MIRAY, LDI, and others worked with local partners to establish participatory

and neutral planning structures that brought together state, NGO, civil society, and project actors

in a regional “platform” to deal with the practical aspects of eco-regional planning and action.These

platforms, which have different names (Comité Multi-local de Planication – CMP) in Fianarantsoa,

Comité Régional de Développement in Anosy) continue at various levels of operationality today and

the model has been picked up by various other local planning mechanisms.

ANGAP – Madagascar National Parks.

USAID was the principal donor responsible for

the institutional development of ANGAP. From the outset it was determined (based on prior

experiences around the world) that park management should be independent of government.This

was intended to avoid diversion and diffusion of park revenues and to ensure that professionals

capable of implementing technical specications needed to protect the resources were given

management responsibilities. ANGAP was initially created (1990) as a non-prot association

managing the parks on behalf of the Malagasy people, with power delegated by the State.This

independent status meant, for example, that it was not subject to civil service hiring and ring

regulations. Initially, nearly all operational funds were provided by USAID; over time funding sources

were diversied. Staff were initially recruited primarily from DEF.

While ANGAP’s technical skills have signicantly increased there have been recurrent problems with

serious nancial mismanagement. A 2007 IUCN audit noted that ANGAP had increased its technical

capacity to manage the park system, but still faced signicant challenges. Specically, the management

of 12 parks (including the ve most visited parks) was deemed satisfactory, three others were ranked

“average,” and the remaining 23 were judged “marginal” in terms of their management.

During the design of EP III programs, there was increasing pressure to “graduate” ANGAP and

provide it direct funding rather than mentoring the agency via one of the contractor projects,

as had happened previously. Substantial direct funding ($2 million) to ANGAP was subsequently

included under the MIARO project. During implementation, suspicion of mismanagement of an initial

tranche of funds was later conrmed by an audit. USAID made future fund transfers conditional on

ANGAP’s adoption of a more robust nancial management system. ANGAP resisted implementation

51 A key document for the early history of ANGAP is Swanson, National Parks and Reserves, Madagascar’s

New Model for Biodiversity Conservation, (1996).

of the new systems even when they were approaching bankruptcy. As such, USAID reallocated the

$1.3million originally allocated to ANGAP to the creation of new terrestrial and marine protected

areas. At this point the German agency KfW offered to partner ANGAP, implying that USAID had

somehow failed the relationship. ANGAP was rebranded as Madagascar National Parks and KfW

began another round of funding, accompanied by nancial and administrative technical support and

training.The recent misdirection of park funds in Antsiranana, similar to the Ranomafana abuses that

caused the initial USAID audit, suggest that the problem has not yet been resolved.

Tany Meva. Tany Meva was established (in 1996) as a Foundation to carry out environmental

activities at the local level. Initial funding was obtained through Debt-for-Nature swaps with the idea

that this would be a signicant long-term strategy for nancing local level interventions and could

eventually substitute for donor funding of community projects (such as that provided under SAVEM,

LDI, and ERI).Tany Meva’s stated goal remains “to become a national institution of reference in the

funding of programs or conservation actions and the sustainable management of the environment

on the community level.” In fact,Tany Meva occupies a relatively modest niche in Madagascar’s

institutional landscape. It is, however, notable that Malagasy have begun to act as “donors” and not

only recipients of project funds. Sustainable funding issues for Tany Meva are discussed below; the

Foundation now gives out about approximately $0.5 million per year to community groups who

propose projects related to climate change, the urban environment, forest co-management initiatives,

and environmental education and communication.

Sustainable Financing

The magnitude of Madagascar’s environmental challenge has humbled its partners since the rst

days of the program and sent them scrambling for additional funding sources.The rst debt-for-

nature swap (1981) predated the NEAP and nanced the $2.1 million conservation program around

protected areas as described in the projects section of this report. Since then, Madagascar has

become one of only a few countries in the world that has had experience with both commercial

and bi-lateral debt-for-nature swaps.

Acknowledging the need for long-term and reliable sources of funding, Madagascar and its partners

developed a sustainable nancing strategy. A Sustainable Financing Committee was created in

2000 (funded by the PAGE project) involving government, NGOs, private sector, and concerned

individuals.The Committee organized a symposium the following year and began analyzing the

feasibility of sustainable nancing mechanisms for various components of the Environmental Program.

Debt-for Nature Swaps and conservation trust funds were identied as the most likely near-term

funding strategies, followed by carbon funding and tourism-related mechanisms.

Proponents of sustainable nancing initially focused on assuring the long-term nancial needs of the

Madagascar national park system and Tany Meva.

The Protected Area and Biodiversity Trust Fund. Based on the strategy devised by the

Sustainable Financing Committee, the Foundation for Protected Areas and Biodiversity

was created

in 2005. Later that year, the President of Madagascar announced that 8% of the multilateral debt

(that had been forgiven) would be allocated to protected areas. (This intention was thwarted by the

2009 political crisis.)

52 A key document for this section is Marie de Longcamp, Le Financement de la Biodiversité à Madagascar.

(2007).

53 The French legal system has very little experience with foundations and the idea of philanthropic

foundations is little known in francophone circles.

The Protected Area and Biodiversity Trust Fund was initially estimated to need about $1-2 million

per year (when parks represented less than 2 million ha) to meet a signicant portion of park

operations expenses. At the time, 50% was considered a reasonable share for the trust fund, with

other funds coming from park revenues, government, etc.The size of the endowment needed to

nance these recurrent expenditures (the Trust Fund “share”) was estimated at approximately

$20million.

With the expansion of the protected areas under the Durban Vision/SAPM (to 6 million ha, of

which 2.65 million ha will be managed by Madagascar National Parks and the rest by various co-

management regimes), recurrent costs of management skyrocketed and are now estimated to be on

the order of $17-$18 million annually.

In 2005, the Trust Fund for Protected Areas and Biodiversity

in Madagascar (FAPBM) was created (with commitments from AFDI, CI, FFEM, KfW,WWF, and

the World Bank) to serve this function.The initial goal was to provide an annuity of at least $2.5-

3million per year to the protected areas.This has now been increased to a goal of $5 million, which

would cover about one-third of the MNP management costs. Currently the fund has about $33

million, is expected to increase to $50 million in the next year or two (negotiations to secure the

funding are currently ongoing), and may eventually reach $100 million.

Since the Fund is unlikely to generate sufcient funds anytime soon, it has been proposed to

complement the trust funds with fees from eco-tourism concessions in the parks (approved in

principle, but no concessions have yet been signed), a possible surcharge on air tickets into the

country, and a portion of the park entrance fee (the GoM currently contributes about $1 million

from tourist taxes and park entrance fees).

The Tany Meva Foundation’s initial funding

was set up as part of the USAID non-project

assistance activities. In exchange for U.S. budget

support (provided as the GoM fullled policy

conditionalities), the GoM invested the equivalent

of $12 million (in Malagasy francs) to establish

the Foundation. Set up under the old laws, the

Foundation was severely handicapped by rules

requiring, for example, that funds be held in-country

and in local currency. Monetary devaluations quickly

decimated the initial endowment. Since 2004, when

the new Foundation Law was voted, funds may be

held in off-shore accounts, with interest repatriated

tax free to the country.The $16 million trust fund

generates approximately $4-500,000 per year of

funds that are used for small grants, as described

above.

e initial presumption

behind the EP phases, that

government would somehow

“graduate” to a level where

structures were suﬃciently

robust and policies suﬃciently

internalized that they could

manage environmental issues

independent of donor support

seems, in retrospect, to have

been quaintly naïve.

Both Foundations are governed by independent boards made up of experts who bring specialist

knowledge (private sector, conservation, philanthropy, nance) to bear. In both cases a majority

of members hail from civil society. (The FAPBM remains under the tutelage of the Minister of

Environment but the Ministry has no control over the allocation of resources.) All board members

except one must reside in Madagascar.

One concern of funding these activities with an endowment is that yields can vary considerably

based on the world nancial situation.This poses risks, particularly for the park system, which must

have a minimum income to ensure its operations.

54 These are anticipated recurrent costs from 2012 or whenever the system is fully established and do not

include the approximately $50 million needed to establish the new protected areas.

Eventually, both funds might benet from infusions of carbon funds, though there is a dangerous

tendency to overestimate the likely revenues from carbon funds (at least in the short to medium

term) and imagine them covering far more needs than is realistically possible.

The use of carbon funding mechanisms to fund Payments for Eco-systems Services is addressed

below.

Discussion

In general and without exception, all projects that have worked on institutional strengthening report

that they were not able to fully implement their objectives, and that the challenge was too great for

the time allowed. In retrospect, the initial presumption behind the EP phases (that government would

somehow “graduate” to a level where structures were sufciently robust and policies sufciently

internalized that they could manage environmental issues independent of donor support) seems to

have been rather quaintly naïve.

One question that has surfaced with some regularity is the wisdom of putting so much effort into

parallel structures (ONE, ANGAP) at the expense of directly strengthening government institutions

(the ministries, DEF). Jariala worked with DEF in EP III, but belatedly.Would the situation have been

any different if the same intensity of efforts had gone into reforming and energizing DEF from the

outset? It is hard to answer this question retrospectively; many people suspect that even if signicant

funds had been put into government structures, the results would have been barely different, given

all we now know about larger governance issues in Madagascar.Without doubt, the lack of effective

enforcement of forestry policy (those powers never having been transferred to the new structures)

has undermined many environment sector initiatives.

On the policy front, the MECIE, which mobilized enormous resources and effort under both KEPEM

and PAGE, is considered to be a landmark success. It provided the GoM with the tools it needs to

monitor investments and to protect critical natural resources. Results of MECIE implementation

have been a mixed bag, however.There have now been a multitude of small environmental impact

assessments, some of which have been properly carried out and monitored. But there have also

been abuses where the process appears to have been used for little more than extorting funds from

vulnerable investors.

There have also been some notable successes in getting the biggest actors to participate. Rio

Tinto’s environmental assessment of the ilmenite mining operation near Fort Dauphin took years

and the studies are generally well regarded. USAID was able to inuence the company to conduct

participatory consultation with local communities; this exposed numerous potential problems and

contributed to QIT Fer Minerals Madagascar (QMM)’s decision to join the Global Development

Alliance that worked on social mitigation issues for several years.The recent Sherritt nickel mining

impact assessment, carried out on a huge scale in an ecologically fragile zone at Ambatovy, was much

less rigorous and demanding than the one to which Rio Tinto was subjected, however.

As huge new mining projects move into Madagascar, the need for rigorous environmental

assessments skyrockets.The technical challenges of evaluating and monitoring such investments

quickly surpass local expertise. Madagascar is vulnerable to pressure from powerful interests, on one

55 Sherritt’s operation will mine nickel and cobalt near Moramanga (near the Mantadia-Zahamena corridor)

and then transport the slurry via a 218 km buried pipeline to an industrial processing plant near Toamasina.

Approximately 1,300 ha of ecologically sensitive semi-pristine forest will be cut at the mine site and

extraction will produce acidic slurry that will have to be treated using limestone quarried near Toliara.

There are concerns, for example, that the Impact Assessment addressed the possibility of a cyclone on the

pipeline carrying the acidic slurry, but didn’t consider the possibility of two successive cyclones, which is not

an infrequent occurrence in the affected zone.

hand, and its possible inability to comprehend the complex technical implications of sophisticated

mining operations, on the other. Large western companies can be monitored by public opinion

(alerted by the conservation agencies), limiting their scope for massive abuse in an environmentally

sensitive and high visibility country like Madagascar. More worrisome are investments by countries

or companies where there is little accountability.The emerging dominance of Chinese mining and oil

interests in Madagascar raises worrisome issues in this regard.

MECIE’s impact was expanded when the World Bank integrated many of its requirements and

guidelines into the new mining code.

From policies to implementation. Having a complete policy framework for the environment

and the tools needed to implement the policies represents an enormous step forward. But having

tools and using them effectively are two different things. It is not, as several practitioners have

reported, an accident that some policies are never effectively implemented, even when all the

necessary tools are available to do so. Furthermore, decisions on whether information will be

used are highly political. Several project reports indicated that monitoring tools have been neatly

“forgotten” when the information they provided proved too politically sensitive or economically

inconvenient. As noted in the quotes below, this is a persistent problem area and it has not

signicantly improved over time.

In 1999, assessing what had happened under EP I, Asif Shaikh noted:

Many of the most intractable current problems in enforcing environmental policy are,

at their root, problems of “governance and transparency.” It is unrealistic to expect

environmental programs alone to solve problems with much deeper socio-political

origins. However, it is even more unrealistic to expect environmental policy to succeed if

they are not addressed. (Shaikh 1999, 15)

In 2003, at the outset of EP III,The World Bank conrmed that:

Over the years Madagascar has been able to streamline the environment into many

of the sector policies and develop institutions capable of dealing with many important

aspects of environmental governance. However, there is a widening disconnect

[emphasis added] between stated policies and regulations, and the capacity to monitor

and ensure enforcement of the new frameworks on the ground. (World Bank 2004,

11)

On the sustainable nancing front, enormous progress has been made.The commitments of various

donors demonstrate notable collaboration. Completing the necessary endowments is expected

to proceed without signicant difculty unless the government attempts to meddle in the nancial

affairs of the Foundations or the recipient institutions (notably the Madagascar National Parks) lose

the condence of the donors.

A related and as yet unresolved problem is how to sustainably nance ONE and the government

implementing partners. Currently, ONE expenses are largely paid for by fees paid during the MECIE

process, making ONE uncomfortably dependent on revenues from major mining interests – though

at least they have funds to maintain their operations.

The government agencies pose a greater challenge. Until the crisis, the donors were nancing

approximately 70% of the Ministry of Environment budget. It is essential that the DEF (or whoever

ends up with monitoring and enforcement authority within the government) be funded in order

to do its job, but the culture of corruption within these government agencies makes it much more

difcult for the donors to establish sustainable nancing mechanisms with any condence that the

funds will be used as intended.

PROTECTED AREA

DESIGNATION AND

MANAGEMENT

THE NATIONAL PARKS

EP I was heavily focused on creating the national park system for which Madagascar is justiably

renowned.This built on the seminal 1986 nationwide survey (Nicoll and Langrand 1989) of existing

protected areas and their known resources. Beginning with 450,000 ha under protected status, the

parks expanded to 1.7 million ha over the next several years.

These parks were nearly all inherited

from the colonial park system

that had reserved areas of particular beauty or known biological

interest.

As a newly created agency, ANGAP was given what was called “coordination responsibility”

for the 44 protected areas that included both national parks (there were 10 at the time) and strict

natural reserves. During EP I, ANGAP had neither eld management responsibility nor authority over

funding, except for two small reserves and Isalo Park, for which they were the designated principal

operator.

Several long-term international advisors (under SAVEM) worked very closely with ANGAP during

this period to create the necessary organizational structure and procedures to carry out the

coordination tasks.The remaining nine parks (as well as several of the reserves) were each assigned

an international operator (in some cases a consortium) that managed the parks during this period

when ANGAP was still becoming operational.The seven parks mentored with USAID support (and

where ICDPs were introduced) were: Andasibe-Mantadia (principal operator:VITA), Ranomafana

(SUNY/Stony Brook), Amber Mountain (WWF/CARE), Masoala (WCS/CARE), Andohahela (WWF),

Zahamena (CI), and Isalo (ANGAP). A sister park relationship was established with the South African

National Parks Board in 1995 and useful training and exchange visits took place.

While much of the commentary on this early period focuses on the ICDPs, important advances

were also being made to better manage the park natural resources. Masoala Park, for example,

carried out exhaustive biological inventories that informed the park boundaries and were used

to establish a zoning plan with sustainable use buffer forests. Ranomafana also drew up an early

comprehensive Park Plan (1995), identifying core conservation areas, zones to meet tourist and

research needs, and multiple use buffer zones.

At this time, forests that were not under protected area status were ofcially considered (though

not always by local communities) to be state lands and were under DEF’s management authority.

Furthermore, ANGAP was accorded no enforcement powers, even in protected areas.This

authority remained with DEF, which considerably muddied the situation. DEF also insisted on its

56 Note that Protected Area identication initially focused on terrestrial sites; only in EP III did attention

expand to coastal and marine zones.

57 The earliest parks date to 1927.

58 In the meantime, scientic knowledge about biodiversity has increased enormously. One of the factors

driving the expansion of protected areas was the recognition that the early parks (frequently recreational

in nature) did not adequately cover threatened resources.

      

       

exclusive rights to set entry fees for parks.This issue was nally resolved in 1996 when ANGAP was

authorized to set fees and manage park revenues. From the beginning, the principle was established

that 50% of all park fees would be shared with local communities.

The initial plan was for ANGAP to take over direct

management of the “ICDP” parks at the end of EP I

(in 1997). In fact, ANGAP assumed responsibility for

park management at ve of the seven parks at the

end of EP I; management responsibilities for Masoala

and Zahamena parks were transferred only later,

during EP III.

The MIRAY project closely mentored

ANGAP during this transition period.

During EP II, there were signicant advances in

the tools needed to successfully manage the park

network. Specically, the Plan GRAP (Plan de Gestion

du Réseau des Aires Protégées, developed with

assistance from MIRAY) set out the overall vision

as well as specic thematic management goals for

conservation, eco-tourism, sustainable development,

and environmental education.The GRAP also

proposed a gradual increase in the size of protected

areas so as to cover more ecologically critical areas.

Pragmatic advances in forest zoning characterized

this phase and conservationists began to classify the

remaining forests according to those most suited for

community management, forest conservation concessions, strict protected areas, and restoration

zones. For each zone, the appropriate management regimes were determined by the primary

function served by that forest, which might be:

• Ecological (forests representing a national biodiversity priority

and requiring national scale management);

• Regulatory (forests particularly useful for erosion control, hydrological

regulation, watershed management and considered regional priorities); or

• Productive (forests providing resources needed for local livelihoods).

Initially, these assessments were carried out at the broadest national scale, but later more focused

discussions at the regional level permitted 1:50,000 scale zoning maps to be made for the forest

corridors and other biodiversity priority areas.These proved to be valuable tools in advancing a

more participatory vision of forest management and decentralized spatial planning.

THE DURBAN VISION/SAPM

All of these spatial analyses were (unbeknownst to some of the participants) leading up to Durban

2003. In the months leading up to the IUCN Worlds Parks Conference, the conservation triumvirate

worked with President Ravalomanana and the DEF Director to prepare Madagascar’s commitment

to allocate 10% of its territory to protected areas status.This would put Madagascar in compliance

with the IUCN global goal established in Brazil a decade earlier.When President Ravalomanana

59 Transfer of parks under KfW sponsorship has only more recently taken place.

Madagascar has made enormous progress in establishing and

funding its national parks since the NEAP was launched. In

2003, President Ravalomanana committed to putting 10% of the

country’s land under protected area status. (Photo credit: Karen

Freudenberger)

      

  

       

made his now famous surprise announcement at the 2003 Durban World Parks Congress (6 million

hectares of Madagascar’s territory would be put under protected status), the decision was cheered

in the international community.

Unfortunately, few outside the conservation community were included in pre-announcement

discussions; details of how the approach would be implemented and explained to local communities

were not adequately prepared.As a result, the announcement sent shock waves along the forest

corridors where USAID projects were working.

Local communities immediately feared the worst

– that their traditional lands would be taken over by national parks.The projects in these areas,

which were equally unsure of the real implications of the announcement, were caught off guard,

having spent most of EP II trying to reassure skeptical communities that environmental interventions

along the corridor would not deprive them of their traditional lands. Now, villagers with machetes,

imagining the imminent seizure of “their” lands, had a sudden and erce desire to create tavy elds

and reinforce their traditional tenure rights before the arrival of the anticipated park.

Timber and mining interests also recognized the threat of an expanded park system and quickly

laid claim to concessions. By 2006 maps of mining concessions showed that nearly 80% of the

Fianarantsoa forest corridor was subject to mining claims.

Operationalizing the Vision

In the months that followed, a Durban Vision Group

(involving representatives of the GoM, ANGAP,

funding partners, conservation organizations, and NGOs) with multiple committees was established

to gure out how to operationalize the Vision. USAID played a key leadership role and the Mission’s

Environment/Rural Development Team Leader co-chaired the Technical Committee with the

Director General of the ONE.

A Prioritization Committee was established to identify priority areas for protection, based on

objective scientic criteria (plant and animal distribution and biodiversity threats) and using

sophisticated tools for planning and analysis.The objective of the exercise was to:

• Conserve the entirety of Madagascar’s unique biodiversity

(ecosystems, species, and genetic biodiversity

• Preserve Madagascar’s cultural heritage

• Maintain ecological services and sustainable use of natural

resources for poverty reduction and development

This process involved considerable internal debate (at multiple levels) and “bartering” over sites

that would be more strictly controlled versus those that would allow sustainable forest production

(especially as needed to meet local demand for fuel and wood products). Corson describes, for

example, a tendency for the French Cooperation and Malagasy ofcials to favor more commercial

exploitation.WWF tended toward the German position that advocated for at least small-scale

commercial exploitation so as to motivate local people’s interest in protecting a forest from which

they might gain benets. CI and WCS voiced the most protectionist policies.The seeming deadlock

60 Other projects also report having years of trust with local communities shattered as word of the Durban

announcement ltered down to the eld.

61 Many of these were for mining research permits.They established a claim to the territory but had for the

most part not yet been activated. High alerts from projects in the affected areas caused the GoM (2004)

to suspend all mining permits in areas that were anticipated to be put under protected area status.The

suspension was lifted in 2008 but permit holders were reminded that environmental impact assessments

were required before any mining could begin. (Raharinomenjanahary, et al. 2008, 8)

62 The name was later changed to the SAPM (Système des Aires Protegées de Madagascar) Commission.

was broken by the 2005 IUCN Mission, which

encouraged a more supple approach allowing

sustainable use of resources as needed to

meet local livelihood concerns (Corson

305). Following two IUCN visits the label

“conservation sites” was dropped in favor

of “system of protected areas,” emphasizing

the range of options available to protect the

forests in question.

In the nal plan for the SAPM de Madagascar,

2.65 million ha were designated for

management as parks by the Madagascar

National Parks, while 3.25 million ha (including

all the territory in the USAID focal area

corridors) was designated for co-management

with local communities or sustainable use

zones.

SAPM designated 2.65 million

ha as parks (to be managed by

Madagascar National Parks) and

3.25 million ha for co-management

or sustainable use. While this did

not entirely assuage the concerns

of local communities, it was an

important step toward accepting

multiple management regimes for

protected areas.

The most recent version of the SAPM exercise allocates land according to the IUCN categories as

follows:

Table II : Categories of Protected Areas in Madagascar

IUCN Category IUCN Management Objective Madagascar IUCN

Management Categories

I Ia) Strict Managed Reserve (primarily

for scientic purposes)

Ib) Wilderness area

Integral Nature Reserve

(Tahirin-javaboaary)

II National Park (managed primarily

for eco-system protection and

recreation)

National Park and Natural Park

(Valan-javaboaarimpirenena)

III Natural Monument (managed

primarily for conservation of specic

natural features)

Natural Monument

(Tahirim-bakoka Voajanhary)

IV Habitat/Species Management Area

(managed primarily for conservation)

Special Reserve

(Tahirin-javaboaary)

V Protected Landscape/Seascape

(managed primarily for landscape/

seascape conservation, recreation, or

culture)

Protected Harmonious Landscape

(Tontolo Mirindra Voaaro)

VI Managed Resource Protected

Area (managed primarily for the

sustainable use of natural eco-

systems)

Natural Resource Reserve

(Tahirin-karena Voajanahary)

In addition to this use-based typology, there are four proposed management systems: (1) state

management, (2) co-management, (3) private management, and (4) community management.

While this has not entirely assuaged the concerns of bordering villages (the limits of co-management

will be discussed further below), the acceptance of multiple management regimes introduced a

critical element of exibility.

SAPM helped to resolve an institutional issue that was becoming increasingly problematic and was

creating signicant tensions between the government and ANGAP. Over time, an uneasy allocation

of responsibility between ANGAP (responsible for the national parks) and DEF (responsible for all

other forested public lands) had engendered numerous institutional conicts. Under the new system,

both forests and protected areas are under the ultimate jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment

and Forests (Department of the System of Protected Areas), who then delegates management

responsibility for particular protected areas to ANGAP (later Madagascar National Parks), local

communities (COBAS and CB), NGOs and conservation agencies, depending on the status of each

area.

Discussion

Over the years, there has been tension between the stricter conservationists, who have favored

a more exclusionary model of forest protection (e.g. parks with clear boundaries and strict rules

of access), and conservation-development practitioners (who opt for co-management and some

local resource use). Given the massive territories now being accorded conservation status, there

is an increasing convergence of views around the idea that co-management is necessary since it is

impossible to protect such huge areas against hostile and/or hungry populations.

The rush (one million ha per year) to designate new protected areas and implement co-

management agreements as described below would have challenged even the most experienced

government structures in countries with none of the communication and infrastructure issues

faced in Madagascar.Whatever good intentions might have been behind the process, with looming

time pressures and limited funding, high level participatory rhetoric was rarely matched by true

consultation in the eld. Many (though certainly not all) of the “dialogues” with local communities

more closely resembled exhortations to accept and respect the new procedures. Given the scale of

the operation and the need to contact every affected community (sometimes multiple times), there

simply wasn’t time to conduct meaningful consultations.

Conservationists are quick to point out that the

process is ongoing and boundary decisions made up

until this point are still “temporary” as consultation

continues. And indeed, SAPM implementers have made

a signicant effort to increase local participation as the

process has advanced.The fact remains that among

many rural people SAPM gained an early reputation for

being top-down and largely engineered by outsiders.

This has bred skepticism and hostility that will be difcult

to overcome and increases SAPM’s vulnerability to

facile political opposition (as happened when colonial

conservation policies became the lightning rod for

criticisms when the more radical and populist Ratsiraka

regime came to power).

Madagascar has never (at least since 1972) had the

capacity necessary to enforce forest policy over vast

landscapes. As such, conservation depends in large

SAPM implementers have

made a signiﬁcant eﬀort to

increase local participation

as the process has advanced.

But for many rural people

SAPM gained an early

reputation for being top-

down and largely engineered

by outsiders. is bred

skepticism and hostility that

will be diﬃcult to overcome.

part on the cooperation of the citizenry.The failure to get the “buy-in” of these populations in the

establishment of SAPM,

whose success will now depend on co-management of more than half of

the country’s protected areas, does not bode well.

There is a looming issue that risks becoming increasingly problematic as co-management and

sustainable production regimes that allow off-take of wood and other products from non-core

forests are implemented more widely (see valorization of forest resources).There is very little

scientic information on the impact of various extractive activities on biodiversity.

How many trees

(or other products) can be harvested (and from what type of forest?) before it starts affecting key

biodiversity indicators? Are there harvesting methods that can reduce the negative impacts? How

can economic and biodiversity concerns be optimally balanced in these non-core and sustainable

production areas? These issues are likely to become increasingly important and increasingly

controversial; the lack of objective scientic and economic studies to answer these questions is a

handicap to strategic planning.

COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT (CBNRM): CO-MANAGEMENT

The motivation for co-management. Two principal factors have motivated the push for co-

management of natural resources. Early studies carried out during EP I emphasized the customary

tenure rights of local communities around forests and the existence of traditional governance

structures and management schemes for these natural resources. One of the factors identied

as accelerating deforestation was the fact that “modern” tenure systems have undermined these

traditional and customary arrangements creating a “race” to exploit forest resources.When outsiders

were able to circumvent “modern” restrictions by, for example, paying off DEF agents to obtain

permits, local communities no longer felt bound by traditional rules.To the contrary, they wanted

to benet from “their forests” before anyone else gained access. Co-management was proposed

as a way for local communities to again take greater responsibility for the natural resources in their

“terroir” (lands traditionally owned by the community) under limited authority delegated by the

State. By transferring rights back to local communities, it was assumed that they would be motivated

to manage the resources in a sustainable fashion.

The second factor pushing co-management was more pragmatic.The state has never had sufcient

means to systematically exclude local populations from using forest resources, especially when those

populations consider that the resources belong to them. (Each local forestry agent is responsible

for, on average, 5,000 km

of territory, often without functional transport or communications

systems.) If the State could perhaps protect a limited number of national parks from the worst cases

of incursion, once it was decided to also conserve vast spaces between parks (the eco-regional

approach of EP II and III, and then 6 million ha under SAPM), the limits of enforced exclusion became

evident.The World Bank estimates that approximately one million people live proximate to SAPM-

63 While the overall situation is glum on this issue, there are notable exceptions of projects that have taken

a people-centered approach to conservation activities and developed long and positive relationships

with affected communities.The Malagasy NGO Fanamby, Durrell, Birdlife International, and some of the

small but persistent and effective local projects (Ny Tanintskika in the Fianarantsoa corridor, for example)

have commendable track records of promoting positive social relations and economic growth alongside

conservation activities.

64 One of the very few is Hawkins and Wilme, Effects of Logging on Forest Birds (1996), which studied the

effects of logging in the Kirindy forest on birds.Their study dealt with a particular case, but this type of

information is needed for various eco-systems and endangered species.

65 A key source for the early history of CBNRM is Hagen, Evaluation des Projets Pilotes d’Aménagement des

Forêts Naturelles à Madagascar (2001). Hockley and Andriamarovololona, in The Economics of Community

Forestry Management in Madagascar: Is There a Free Lunch? (2007) and Shaikh (1999) address more recent

issues.

designated protected areas and will be affected by its provisions (Carret et al. 2010).With high

pressures from surrounding communities and little or no enforcement, there was de facto “open-

access” in many areas. Co-management provided a mechanism for transferring certain enforcement

responsibilities from a weak and absent state to proximate local communities.

Mechanisms for co-management. Two procedures for co-management were put into place:

Gestion Locale Sécurisée

(GELOSE 1996) and Gestion Contractualisée Forestière (GCF 2001).

GELOSE was a major accomplishment, as one of the rst laws to codify community-based resource

management in francophone Africa. Under the GELOSE system, the rights transfer is highly legalistic.

There is no actual transfer of title to the community; the State remains owner of the resources while

limited use rights are transferred to local communities (via a legally constituted Communauté Locale

de Base, or CLB). A management plan for the territory in question is drawn up between the parties

and a formal contract spells out the specic rights being transferred to the community. Signicantly,

the contracts have no provision for transferring enforcement or sanctioning authority.This remains

with the DEF agents who are usually far away and have little capacity to carry out this responsibility.

If the State collects user fees (ristournes) from outsiders, these are shared with the local community.

(Antona, et al. 2004, 837)

GELOSE procedures proved to be exceedingly complex with some 22 steps to get to the contract

stage. Nevertheless, it represented an enormous conceptual breakthrough in its implicit recognition

of customary tenure rights, designating a State-trained mediator to reconcile “formal” and

“traditional” resource use rules. (In practice, this potentially positive element was too often short-

changed by mediators who rushed through the process and merely applied preconceived formulas.)

Because GELOSE was so cumbersome, an alternative system (GCF) was implemented as a sort of

“fast-track” to co-management for State forest land; it does not require a State mediator and can

be negotiated directly between local authorities and community associations (called COBAs). Most

of the co-management contracts implemented through USAID projects used the simplied GCF

procedures.

GELOSE and GCF contracts are valid for only three years and must then be reviewed and renewed

for an additional 10-year period. In fact, few of the rst phase contracts have actually been through

the review process (even though the time for doing so has passed), which puts their status in limbo

(and resources at risk).

Implementation of co-management. Actual procedures for co-management have varied

enormously depending on the “sponsoring” agency and their views of how the contracts should

be implemented. In principle, a co-management contract includes three zones: a conservation zone

with no resource extraction, a sustainable use zone for daily subsistence resource extraction, and

a commercial zone (Raik and Decker, A Multisector Framework for Assessing Community-Based Forest

Management: Lessons from Madagascar 2007). A recent review found, however, that only three of

the six contracts studied had provisions for a “production zone” while the others demanded strict

conservation practices over the whole area (Hockley and Andriamarovololona 2007, 56).

All contracts ban tavy. However restrictions on local use rights for forest products vary considerably.

Knowledge about the impact of local harvesting on various non-timber forest products (sustainable

practices and levels) remains patchy and policies based on sound scientic evidence have yet to

be established for most products. Usually, extraction for subsistence needs (honey, craysh, vines,

medicinal plants, spade handles)

is permitted. In some cases, contracts impose blanket bans

on harvesting forest products and in others they impose complicated restrictions with regard

66 Antona 2004 gives a detailed description of Madagascar’s GELOSE and its history.

67 Forest products represent up to 30% of household revenues in communities along the forest corridors

(Andrianandrasana, et al. 2008, 30)

to permissible quantities, harvesting dates, and technical specications, often with little scientic

justication.Variations on what is permitted across sites and the difculty of enforcement make the

rules appear arbitrary to community members.When contracts call for community monitoring of

the resource to ensure that there is not excess off-take, this imposes additional costs relative to the

benets of participation. (Hockley, Jones, et al. 2005)

Controlling illicit activities. Co-management seems to work best when the area under

management still contains signicant resources of value to the local community (that is, it is not

severely degraded), but is not known to have resources of higher extractive value (mining or wood)

that would attract powerful outsiders. In short, COBAs are most effective in controlling non-

powerful outside interests. (This would include, for example, villagers from other communities; where

the power relations are relatively equal, local COBAs are condent enough to ban incursions into

their territory.)

The system is less effective in controlling more powerful interests. Communities tend to cave in

to organized or wealthy mining or logging interests bearing permits (legitimate or not). Since the

COBAs are not delegated with any formal enforcement power and there is usually no local forest

agent prepared to enforce the rules, outsiders behave with impunity. Up until now COBAs have

appealed to local projects to intervene directly or to nag government agents to respond. Otherwise

the system breaks down – not only do outsiders gain access to controlled resources, but the

incursion undermines restrictions on local access. Residents see that others are not respecting the

rules and therefore see no reason to follow them either.The situation reverts to de facto open

access.

Communities also have problems controlling incursions by their own community members (who

may live in the village but not belong to the COBA). Malagasy culture highly values the maintenance

of good relations within a community, making it difcult for the COBA to call a neighbor to task.

This raises questions about what the most appropriate and effective COBA should look like since

rarely do all members of a community belong.The most “indigenous” and traditional structures are

sometimes criticized because they are not democratic and representative of the community at large

(immigrants to the area, for example, may not be invited to participate).“Modern” structures tend to

favor the more educated elite, who are also then

more likely to accrue benets. In both cases,

issues arise with participation and enforcement.

There is no consensus around which model

works the best.

The costs of management. Comparison

of the costs of enforcing forest policies through

DEF or through COBA mechanisms conrm

that it is much less expensive to work through

the COBAs. One recent set of estimates

posited that it costs the COBAs about $.08 to

control a hectare of territory as opposed to

ANGAP’s local cost of about $5-$8 per hectare

to manage a small park (Hockley, 41).These

co-management costs underestimate the other

inputs needed to make this system sustainable

and effective (notably the need to provide some

external enforcement and the vulnerability of the In this photo, COBA members monitor tavy activity at the forest

co-management system when benets are not

edge. Enforcement of illicit activities within villages has proven difcult

sufcient to maintain community interest), but

due to the need to maintain good social relations.The state rarely

they are nonetheless telling. Given this advantage,

backs up COBA enforcement efforts. (Photo credit: Tom Erdmann)

there is a risk that co-management becomes

Co-management cannot be

little more than a cheap way to compensate for

carried out by the community

inadequacy of State control by transferring forest

patrol responsibilities to local communities.This

alone. e “co” implies a partner

imposes both nancial and time burdens on

who has, up until now, been

the community.The community may be willing

to take on these responsibilities if they gain

largely absent. And, economics

signicant benets in return, but this has rarely

count. Communities that don’t

been the case.

gain some immediate palpable

beneﬁts from protecting the forest

Discussion

The failure of co-management agreements

quickly lose interest and return

to transfer long-term tenure security to

to business as usual, whether

communities reduces the likelihood that they will

engage in long-term sustainable management

slash-and-burn agriculture or

practices. Good resource management nearly

uncontrolled extraction of forest

always requires that a certain amount of current

consumption be foregone in order to assure

products.

sustainability into the future.When contracts

are only good for three years and political instability reduces condence in future relations with the

State, communities have little incentive to manage with a view to the long-term.

Hockley and Andriamarovololona distinguish between three CBNRM scenarios, which differ

according to the degree of congruence between externally dened conservation objectives and the

interests of the community.

1. The pure win-win scenario. There are no conicts between external conservation

objectives and those of local people once communal action problems are solved. In

other words, once any tragedy of the commons has been resolved through appropriate

CBNRM institutions, conservation and development interests are perfectly congruent.

2. The net win-win. As the interests of external stakeholders and communities begin

to diverge, there might be some costs to communities but these are more than

made up for by the benets, meaning that CBNRM still benets both communities

and conservationists. For example, if communities reap benets from only a narrow

component of the area’s biodiversity, they may neglect other less useful components.

However if, overall, CBNRM is in their interest, this may be overcome as long as there

is external monitoring to ensure all aspects of the CBNRM agreement are being met.

3. The assisted win-win case. If the interests of communities and external agents are

even less closely aligned, the community may suffer a net cost as a result of CBNRM

which meets externally-dened criteria, and we can no longer speak of a true win-

win scenario. In these circumstances, CBNRM will require ongoing external support

to make it viable, in recognition of its wider benets and the interest that external

stakeholders have in its success.This external support will need to help secure a

sustainable source of revenue. (Hockley and Andriamarovololona 2007, 13-14)

Outsiders implementing co-management implicitly assumed the rst scenario. But, in fact, most

community contracts fall into Scenarios Two or Three. (The difference resides primarily in the way

the contract is set up and whether the forest resources produce benets for community members.)

This means that there is need to ensure both benets and enforcement to achieve the desired

outcomes.

There are various ways to compensate communities in the “assisted win-win scenario.” One of

these is through development assistance and, indeed, many co-management interventions implicitly

suggested that there would be a quid pro quo of development assistance in return for agreeing

to forego slash-and-burn agriculture (as well as certain harvesting rights) in forest zones. Given

the ambitious push to sign a very large number of contracts quickly (especially in the wake of the

Durban Vision), these implied promises generated the desired contract signatures, but have only

rarely resulted in the benets anticipated by communities.Where costs are incurred and the benets

are largely uni-directional in favor of the state, people are losing interest.This is happening on a large

scale in GCFs around the forest corridors where the number of villagers dropping out of the GCF

COBAs is high. In general, USAID- “sponsored” agreements have fared better because they were

implemented by projects with a standing presence in the area and could offer tangible benets; it is

not clear what will now happen in the absence of this project presence.

By the end of the ERI project, there was a strong move afoot to create Federations of COBAs

(similar to the Federations of KoloHarena Associations) so that they could better defend their

interests relative to the State. Five Federations (four in Fianarantsoa and one in Toamasina) had

been created by 2008; without follow-up their future remains in doubt (Andrianandrasana, et al.

2008, 11).The critical tools needed to implement effective co-management are now available.The

principles of co-management are now widely accepted, the policies and procedures needed to carry

it out have been drawn up, and there are numerous examples of what works (and what doesn’t)

to guide future action.While the system can and should be ne-tuned in light of recent experience,

the most important lesson to date may be that co-management cannot be carried out by the

community alone.The “co” implies an active partner. Studies of management transfers consistently

decry the absence of follow up and enforcement as needed to make the system work. Second,

economics count. Communities that don’t gain immediate benets from protecting the forest quickly

lose interest and return to business as usual, whether slash-and-burn agriculture or uncontrolled

extraction of forest products.

These issues take on particular signicance now that much of the nation’s forests are to be co-

managed under SAPM; weaknesses in the approach and its implementation will have far-reaching

consequences.

REDUCING PRESSURES

ON RESOURCES

BY SURROUNDING

COMMUNITIES

While local pressures on forests are not the only source of deforestation (some areas are subject

to more commercial pressure than others), slash-and-burn agriculture remains the primary source

of natural forest loss in most areas of the country.Wood-cutting for fuel is in general a lesser source

of deforestation (especially in areas where charcoal is made from eucalyptus or other non-forest

species), but continues to pose a serious risk in areas where natural forests are close to large towns.

Starting with the ICDP approach of EP I and continuing through the landscape approaches of EP

II and III, USAID’s programs have put signicant resources into trying to reduce these agricultural

pressures.

The Economic Context.

It is important to understand the economic context in which the

NEAP operated to comprehend the challenges faced by projects working in rural communities.The

crisis of 1972 was primarily an urban crisis that spawned a culture of rotaka (periodic unrest), usually

accompanied by strikes, student demonstrations, and other public manifestations of discontent.

In an effort to calm this debilitating pattern of urban civil disorder, successive governments have

systematically favored urban populations, often at the expense of the rural agricultural economy.

This has affected nearly all areas of economic policy, including monetary, scal, exchange rate, and

taxation policies. Most critically for rural people, rice pricing policies have consistently capped

prices in order to increase affordability for urban consumers, with the result that farmers have little

motivation to produce surplus rice and cannot afford to use inputs as needed to increase yields. As

a result, Madagascar (which has the highest per capita consumption of rice in the world) imports

hundreds of thousands of tons of rice every year. Projects focusing on rural development as a way

to stem pressures on natural resources have consequently been swimming upstream against a highly

unfavorable economic policy current.

ICDPs

EP I adopted the ICDP approach, implementing community development activities around protected

areas (generally within ve miles) in order to persuade communities of the advantages of supporting

these nature reserves in their backyards. SAVEM required that bidders for ICDP funds establish

consortia of at least one environmental NGO with at least one rural development NGO so as to

ensure that biodiversity and park-related activities were accompanied by development interventions.

68 I am indebted to Leon Rajaobelina for this succinct summary of the rural economic challenge.

69 In recognition of this unfavorable economic context, the BAMEX project was beginning to address key

economic issues impinging on rural development, including rice and fertilizer pricing.These initiatives

were unfortunately stopped when the Economic Growth strategic objective was dropped from USAID’s

portfolio (and BAMEX funding severely cut) in 2006.

70 Key documents for this section are McCoy, Madagascar’s Integrated Conservation and Development Projects:

Lessons Learned by Participants (1997) and Swanson, Hypothesis Testing: Do Targeted Activities Reduce

Pressures on Parks/Reserves Through Changed Human Behavior (1996).

This was viewed as a grand experiment where hypotheses were tested by different implementers

to assess which approach was the most successful and to compare the effectiveness of various

strategies.

While ICDP interventions were supposed to be focused on reducing deforestation, evaluations of

the program suggest that they were not sufciently targeted. In many cases, the implementers lacked

adequate understanding of the factors driving local populations to cut the forests and seemed mainly

intent on ensuring that the local populations did not get overly annoyed at the newly established

parks by buying them off with a range of social services and small income-generating activities.This

was at times likened to a “shot-gun approach” in which buckshot was let loose with hopes that one

or more projectiles would, by chance, hit the target. (Swanson 1996, 37) The main threat (slash-and-

burn agriculture) was largely neglected.

There were of course some benets to local populations, but the overall results were judged largely

inadequate.

Furthermore, controlling deforestation by proximate populations was only one part of

the solution since many forests were also under pressure by outsiders (whether immigrant farmers

from distant areas, charcoal makers or harvesters of valuable wood). And, it was recognized that

even if the vast majority of the population was willing to respect the rules, there would always be a

few who would seek to prot for private gain, highlighting the need for effective enforcement (a stick

to accompany the ICDP carrot).

Finally, information coming in from conservation assessments showed that (1) most of the country’s

biodiversity remained outside the national parks, and (2) the parks themselves were in many cases

too small to be sustainable and to ensure survival of some key species over evolutionary time.This

led to an emphasis on maintaining forest corridors (usually connecting signicant protected areas)

and larger forest blocks so as to allow species migration over larger areas and altitude gradients.

THE ECO-REGIONAL APPROACH

As such, starting in EP II (and continuing through EP III), the approach was expanded to an eco-

regional focus, where all the factors impinging on sustainable resource use around both parks and

forest corridors were considered.This required multi-level analysis in order to capture the local

threats (at the farming system) but also more structural issues (such as lack of markets, agricultural

inputs, etc.). EP II focused initially on three geographic areas (the Mantadia-Zahamena corridor, the

Ranomafana-Andringitra Corridor, and the Belalitra-Ambalamanga landscape (later dropped as a

priority zone) near Mahajanga.

The eco-regional (or landscape) approach required both sophisticated analyses of the threats and

ambitious programs to address them across vast areas. In fact, the amount of project funds available

(as well as the restrictions imposed by the biodiversity earmark and MOBIS funding mechanisms)

71 Peters, who was the Conservation Technical Advisor to the Ranomafana ICDP summarized the benets

(which he considered clearly insufcient) as follows:“...tourism in the area beneted less than 100 people,

infrastructure improvements were carried out in fewer than a dozen villages, and the project directly

employed just over 100 people, less than half of whom were from area villages. Although tourism to

Ranomafana generated approximately $30,000 in revenues in 1992, less than a quarter of that amount

(about $6,000) was retained locally in the form of wages.There is further evidence that those who have

benetted from tourism, improved infrastructure, and direct project employment, were not always poor

local villagers, but rather wealthier outsiders. Even RNPP social services like environmental education and

health sporadically reached only 18 villages during Phase I. It therefore stands to reason as well that very

few of those who threaten the park’s resources through tavy and other forms of resources exploitation

have obtained tangible benets from the existence of the park or its associated ICDP.” (Peters 1998, 27)

72 Key documents for this section are Freudenberger (Freudenberger and Freudenberger 2002) and

Erdmann, Eco-Regional Conservation and Development in Madagascar:A Review of USAID-funded Efforts in Two

Priority Landscapes (2010)

Tavy remains the principal cause of humid forest

destruction as forest reserves are transferred into

agricultural production zones; this photo from

Ambodigavy in the Zahamena forest corridor c. 1998.

(Photo credit: Karen Freudenberger)

severely limited both the amplitude and the nature of interventions, which fell short of the need

identied by the projects. Nevertheless, a wide range of studies and interventions generated large

amounts of information about farmer practices and receptiveness to changing traditional agricultural

practices, and there were modest reductions in deforestation rates in the areas where the projects

were most active.

Persuading farmers to abandon tavy

As the primary proximate cause of forest conversion in many of the priority biodiversity zones

(nationwide estimates suggest that 80-95% of deforestation is caused by agricultural conversion,

while the remainder is caused by extraction of wood for fuel or building materials), the PE II and

PE III eco-regional projects put enormous effort into persuading farmers to forego the extensive

slash-and-burn agricultural production system.

While these production systems were sustainable in

the past, when the population was small, fertile land was abundant, and 15-year fallows allowed soil

fertility to regenerate before land was put back into production, these conditions no longer exist in

Madagascar.With fallows that rarely exceed three years, there is rapid deterioration of soil fertility

and many lands are more or less abandoned for agriculture after 20-30 years (which equates with

fewer than 10 harvests).

Because land in the forest has been owned (depending

on whose tenure rules are applied) either collectively by

the neighboring community or by the State (but never by

individuals), tevy-ala

has long been a strategy used by farmers

to acquire private rights to land that was otherwise “off-

bounds.” Under tevy-ala, once land is cleared by a farmer, it

becomes his to farm, to fallow, or to pass on to his descendants.

The person who cleared the land gains ownership rights. Under

traditional community tenure systems, the village authorities

strictly regulated access to reserve land in the forest that

was only parsimoniously cleared if there was a demonstrable

shortage of land to meet the community’s basic needs. As

traditional land tenure systems broke down, these restrictions

weakened, and farmers with the means to do so made tevy-ala

a deliberate strategy for increasing their family holdings.

There have been centuries of attempts to ban tavy

(going

back to the Merina – the highland ethnic group that governed

Madagascar before colonization, then the French, now the

Madagascar National Parks.) Its persistence over time suggests

a deliberate outing of the regulations in part to reinforce

communities’ traditional claims to forest lands. As such, tavy

is a livelihood strategy, but also a symbol of resistance against

outsiders who presume to own lands that villagers consider to

be theirs.

73 A key document for this section is Styger, Rakotondramasy, et al. Inuence of Slash-and-Burn Farming

Practices on Fallow Succession and Land Degradation in the Rainforest Region of Madagascar (2006)

74 This section refers specically to interventions in the priority forest corridors. Slash-and-burn agriculture

also occurs in other areas of Madagascar and is sometimes known by terms other than tavy (hatsake in the

Menabe region of western Madagascar and much of the south, for example).

75 Tevy-ala refers to an initial cycle of slash-and-burn agriculture, when forest is rst cleared for agricultural

production.

76 This term refers to the whole cycle of slash-and-burn agriculture, not just the initial forest clearing.

Tavy and the Environment. Outsiders’ understanding of slash-and-burn as practiced in

Madagascar has advanced enormously thanks to numerous dissertations and other research (some

funded by USAID) that have carefully studied soil characteristics and farmers’ production decisions. It

is important, rst, to distinguish between tavy (more generally slash-and-burn or swidden agriculture,

which includes elds that are being put back into production after a fallow period) and tevy-ala

(the start of the process, when forests are initially cleared to create elds).The latter is of particular

concern because it directly clears primary forest and is an immediate cause of forest conversion.

We also know that tevy-ala does not primarily affect the forest fringes as was initially thought. Instead,

farmers go deep into the forest in search of desirable land (characterized by sunny slopes and/or

water sources).These pioneer colonies

act as poles of attraction for other farmers and contribute

to the very serious fragmentation that has now been observed in most of Madagascar’s forests. Tavy,

where farmers return to previously cultivated elds that were then put into fallow, is less immediately

threatening but (because it is unsustainable) will eventually result in farmers seeking new forest lands

when their tavy elds become infertile.

Ultimately, both environmental protection and improvements

to local livelihoods depend on transformation from the current

extensive system of agriculture which “uses up”

and then

discards the land to an intensive and sustainable production

system where farmers can continue to cultivate the same land

in perpetuity.This will almost certainly happen, as it has in just

about every agricultural system around the world that has

been constrained by increasing populations on limited lands

(the Boserupian model). If left to its own timing, however, there

is a very strong likelihood that the system will not evolve until

after most of the accessible forests have been converted into

elds (from the Malagasy farmer’s perspective the land is not

“limited” until the forest is gone). One of the primary goals of

USAID’s eco-regional projects was to motivate and facilitate

this transformation to a more intensive agricultural production

system well before the forest resources have been exhausted.

Alternatives to tavy. Numerous technical approaches were

essayed with varying degrees of success. In EP I much attention

was focused on the valley rice-growing areas where it was

thought that substantial increases in yields could signicantly

reduce farmer interest in tavy.This assumption had several

aws.While there were dramatic improvements in yields (using

System of Rice Intensication – SRI

techniques) on very small

77 A census of ve communes on the western (Betsileo) side of the Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor found

more than 2,800 families living inside the forest in 2008.The rate of occupation had signicantly increased

since 2005, when the corridor was declared a Durban Vision Protected Area (Raharinomenjanahary, et al.

2008, 20)

78 Farmers are acutely aware that their current practices discard the land; indeed that is why they engage so

vigorously in tevy-ala, which is very hard work. In some areas those who can afford to do so systematically

clear another hectare or so every year, just to make sure that they and their children will have adequate

land when they need it (Styger, personal communication).

79 SRI is a method for increasing rice yields that was developed in Madagascar by a French missionary-

agronomist in the 1980s. It requires very few (if any) additional inputs (improved seed varieties are not

required) but does demand a careful adherence to certain practices that are alien to both the Malagasy

rice growing tradition and, in some cases, practices recommended by rice researchers (e.g. initial seeding

on a dry bed, very early transplanting, no standing water in the rice eld).The effect on yields is subject to

some controversy but can range from twice to many times that obtained by traditional Malagasy rice-

growing methods. Oddly to some, adoption in Madagascar has been much lower than expected, while

higher adoption rates are observed in parts of Asia and West Africa (Barrett, et al. 2004).

Intensifying rice production (here a farmer in the

Ranomafana corridor has adopted some of the SRI

recommendations) can help to reduce pressures

on the forest but increased revenues can also give

farmers the means to hire labor to make additional

tavy elds. (Photo credit: Karen Freudenberger)

plots, adoption rates were much lower than expected e agricultural system must

primarily because poor farmers faced labor constraints

change from the current

that discouraged them from adopting the new method

and the new techniques introduced higher risks. SRI

extensive system that “uses

also demanded that farmers manage water meticulously

up” and then discards the

(to get just the right amount at particular times), which

required investments in small dams and water diversion

land to an intensive and

technologies.

sustainable production

The projects noticed that the very poorest farmers

system. e eco-regional

were not the primary cutters of the forest for tevy-ala.

projects tried to motivate

Pressure was greater from modestly more prosperous

farmers who generated at least small surplus; they

and facilitate this transition

could afford to take time (or hire others) to clear

before the forests are all cut.

new elds.

These farmers tended to have valley rice

elds and, contrary to initial expectations, increasing

yields perversely encouraged their interest in tevy-ala. (While this did not suggest a moratorium on

rice improvement technologies, neither were they a panacea for deforestation.) And nally, many

of the farmers nearest to the forest didn’t have valley land for paddy rice elds and were entirely

dependent on upland agriculture; they needed technologies that would work on hillside crops

(upland rice, often intercropped with beans, sesame, cucumbers, etc.).

Adoption and resistance. Over time the projects developed a panoply of proposed

improvements to the household livelihood system. Some addressed valley elds (i.e. SRI, sh-rice

culture, introduction of off-season crops such as sweet potatoes); some were focused on upland

elds (i.e. soil fertility interventions using compost and mulch, cover crops, contour plantings, no-

re clearing methods, new crop rotations); while still others proposed off-eld improvements to

household income (i.e. sh farming, honey). Perhaps the most interesting conclusion from all this was

that nearly every intervention was successful in certain areas

but little appreciated in others for

reasons that were not always immediately evident.

It is generally clear that labor constraints were underestimated and were a major reason why some

techniques (e.g. composting) had low adoption rates (and why burning continued to be a popular

labor-saving strategy for many, as discussed below). Land tenure issues also played a role since

farmers who borrowed land (a frequent occurrence) were less willing to invest in soil improvement

techniques. And nally, proposed interventions may not have adequately considered the positive

impact that re (ash) has on increasing PH values on acidic soils.

Nutrients are not effectively used

80 Under LDI, the project could contribute to these investment costs; the project nancing mechanism in ERI

did not allow such investments.

81 This phenomenon was identied and labeled the “poverty paradox” by Ferraro and Kramer (Ferraro and

Kramer, A Framework for Affecting Household Behavior to Promote Biodiversity Conservation, 1995).

They pointed out that poverty is at once a driver and a constraint of deforestation. Reducing the poverty

constraint to a point where people can hire labor may actually increase deforestation, especially since such

families are still very poor (their livelihoods remain natural resource dependent even after their incomes

rise).

82 In the Fianarantsoa region, two of the most popular interventions were (1) rice-sh culture (introducing

tilapia and carp into valley rice elds, adding nutrients to the paddy eld and providing protein and/

or revenues to the family at harvest) and (2) off-season sweet potato (a low-labor high-yield crop)

production because it provided food during the hungry season. An initiative that didn’t take hold was using

vetiver grass to contour farmers’ upland elds.Tenure insecurity was too uncertain on such elds to merit

the labor investment needed to plant vetiver (and vetiver risked causing conict with the landowner). New

techniques were tested either on demonstration plots managed by the KoloHarena, or in Farmer Field

Schools, where a particular technical topic was selected for study each season and various techniques were

tested under real farm conditions.

83 Personal communication, Erika Styger.

if the soils are too acidic, as they typically are in eastern Madagascar, and the addition of organic

matter or fertilizer does not adjust the PH fast enough. Farmers need to burn to address this

problem (or add lime or some other base to their elds). Agroforestry systems that fail to account

for the PH problem produce only mediocre yields of food crops and farmers have been reluctant to

plant trees that would interfere with burning.

For small farmers in remote areas, diversication remains a desirable characteristic of the production

system, especially under conditions of extremely high risk (whether meteorological, political,

economic, or physical). Farmers legitimately protect themselves against outsider efforts to “improve

efciency” at the expense of increasing risk. High variability in conditions (soil fertility, land tenure,

labor availability) faced by farmers even within the same community meant that interventions had to

be customized according to very local (even individual) needs.This helps to explain why there were

so very few examples of across-the-board adoption of particular new techniques.

The need for structural change. In general, projects felt that they reached the limits of what

could be achieved at the micro-level long before the desired adoption rates or impact had been

reached. In short, the desired transformation of the local economy almost always necessitated

more fundamental investments at the landscape scale (which were only occasionally carried out

due to funding constraints).The populations that pose the most threat to forests usually live in

extremely remote areas without adequate energy, transport, communication, credit, or markets.

This poses enormous barriers to the use of agricultural inputs, to commercialization, and to value-

added processing. On the positive side, in the cases where these systemic changes did occur (the

road or train was repaired, credit was made available under favorable conditions, an old irrigation

system was put back into operation or a new one built), farmers were quick to exploit new market

opportunities. Indeed, their response was often even higher than had been expected.

The landscape projects, in collaboration with projects working to reinforce civil society, devoted

signicant efforts to developing social capital as needed to compensate for constraints faced by

dispersed and low-density populations living at the forest fringes.They helped establish and then

nurtured the KoloHarena farmers movement (which will be discussed further later in this paper).

ERI introduced the farmer-to-farmer extension system

which, in the absence of other agricultural

services, permitted experimentation and sharing of ideas.These two networks were interrelated

and complementary in working on the most fundamental problems faced by local farmers (access

to agricultural inputs, commercialization of agricultural products, and sharing of information), while

effectively linking these communities to outside services.Toward the end of the project, farmers were

paying for extension services offered by farmer eld agents (specially trained KoloHarena members),

demonstrating the extent to which such information was valued.

Projects faced a constant and unresolved tension between the need to put enough investments

into particular areas/communities to have a real impact and the danger of creating dependencies

and unreasonable expectations, which could have a rebound effect when project activities cease.

If people perceive that benets are an exchange for not using the forest, then an end to the

benets may be perceived as a license to return to extractive activities.This issue would have been

mitigated had long-term structural improvements (transport, sustainable credit institutions, etc.) been

introduced more broadly but, in fact, projects ended up essentially “buying off ” people to not engage

in tevy-ala by offering discrete and, in some cases, probably ephemeral benets. As such, there remain

questions about whether people will continue the new livelihood patterns once the projects leave.

84 Initially the ERI project hired eld agronomists to live and work in remote communities near the corridors.

Later the system was changed so that the KoloHarenas actually hired their own agronomists, providing

extension services to KoloHarena members and others in the community. ERI provided refresher courses

and technical materials to these agronomists. Additionally, villages could designate Paysans Vulgarisateurs

and Paysans Animateurs who received special training and were certied after passing a competency exam.

These village extension agents were also compensated in cash or kind by the KoloHarenas.

Fire

Fire is a source of much controversy and debate since as much as 33,000 ha of Madagascar’s forests

and 839,000 ha of other wooded land burn every year. Much of the burning is on grasslands in areas

far from forest areas (primarily used for pasture management), but forest res that leave thousands

of hectares of charred vegetation in their wake are an annual occurrence.

Attempts to ban res have been made since the colonial period and have rarely been successful,

in part because not all res are man-made. In many cases it is virtually impossible to identify the

real source of a re, a characteristic that endears them to re-setters who prefer anonymity.

Furthermore, re policy has often been indifferent to the causes and implications of various types

of res. In lumping res together under blanket bans that don’t distinguish between res linked to

ordinary “livelihood” activities, res that are malicious or political, or res that target forests, they

have confused both the farmers and the authorities who are supposed to enforce the policies.This

undermines the credibility of all re restrictions.

Types of Fire. It is important to distinguish between res whose purpose is deforestation and

those that are intended for agricultural land management.The rst (unless they are political) are tevy-

ala res, set when farmers slash and then burn primary forest areas to create new elds. Fire here is

the tool for completing forest clearing. Outsider complaints would be the same if heavy equipment

or plant-killing chemicals were used to destroy the woody vegetation since the result (elds replacing

forests) is identical.The issue here is not so much re as it is forest transformation.

The second type of re is used to clear fallow elds of brush and pests. Farmers use re in this case

primarily as a labor-saving tool to rid the area of secondary vegetation before replanting and as a

way to control soil acidity. Many of the res that light the October skies are eld-clearing res. As

long as they do not get out of control, they have little direct impact on the forest (and many are in

areas far distant from remaining forests).Their indirect effects are more insidious, however. Fields that

are cleared with re suffer more rapid nutrient loss, in part because the plant species that are best

suited for fallows (because they more rapidly replenish nutrient loss) do not easily regenerate on

burned lands. As a result, after repeated burning these fallow elds are characterized by herbaceous

plants, rather than the woody species that would more effectively cycle nutrients.This leads to

decreased productivity and shortens the length of time until the elds become so infertile that they

are no longer worth planting.The sooner a eld becomes unproductive, the more new land farmers

have to acquire, usually from the remaining forests. In this case, the objection is to the use of re as a

tool.The farmer could gain the same result (or better) using a different eld-clearing technique.

This

is why projects have tried to promote agricultural systems that do not depend on burning.

In both cases, the res can get out of control and burn much larger areas than were initially intended.

If the act is perpetrated in secrecy, when res get out of control there are no other people around

to help control the conagration.

In still other cases, res are deliberately set, not to gain land but

as a manifestation of political discontent. Fires almost always increase during periods of political

unrest and to the extent that there are conicts over resource management, people will deliberately

burn the forests to express their frustration.

85 Key references for this section are Kull, Madagascar’s Burning Issue:The Persistent Conict over Fire (2002),

Styger, Mid-term Program Evaluation Report: Protable and Environmentally Sound Farming Practices Replace

Slash-and-Burn Agricultural Practices at the Landscape Level (2006), Rakotoson, Mobilizing Farmers’ Knowledge

of the Soil (2009).

86 Though, as discussed above, provision must be made for controlling soil acidity if burning is not allowed.

87 The ERI project found this such a problem that they nally came to an uneasy compromise, where they

unofcially accepted controlled burns on old elds as long as farmers made provisions to ensure that the

res would not escape control.

Fire Policy. State attempts to ban or restrict re have been unsuccessful for several reasons.The

rst is the most obvious: res will happen, regardless of human intervention (Kull describes this as

“ecological inevitability”).The second, however, is that policies have not adequately distinguished

between what types of re are banned and why. Lumping fallow management res with forest-

clearing res seems absurd to the farmer who is just trying to plant a eld.When policies seem

nonsensical and there is little capacity for enforcement or sanctions, people tend to ignore the

rules.Third, there is an acute shortage of enforcement capacity (in many areas, one forest agent is

responsible for thousands of hectares in areas where there are few or no roads). Not only are there

not enough ofcials to implement such policies, but those present are likely to sympathize with

farmers who use re to clear their elds since they probably use the same methods themselves.

And fourth, as noted above, it is devilishly difcult to identify the people who actually set the most

pernicious res since they have strong motives and multiple strategies for hiding their actions.

Since top-down enforcement has signicant limits, projects have experimented with local monitoring

and control in priority zones. Under the MIRAY project, communes that could demonstrate

achievement of re reduction goals received a “Green Label” certicate that gave them priority for

receiving funds for local development projects.

One thing that has changed signicantly in recent years is the ability to monitor re.With automated

monitoring systems that use satellite images to detect re in real time

(available at DEF since

2006 with the help of the Jariala project), it is now possible to accurately identify the extent and

evolution of burning. It is not yet clear how this will be used in practice since re control still requires

enforcement at the eld level, but it should provide information that can be used to make more

strategic decisions about which types of re should concern the conservation community and

enable resources to be targeted to those areas. At a minimum, this should reduce the time and

effort that is devoted to railing against res that are relatively harmless, and diminish the fall-out from

unnecessarily antagonizing rural populations.

Discussion

Unlike the ICDPs, the eco-regional approach has not been fundamentally called into question,

although the resources available to implement the response were not up to the challenge.

This was particularly a problem because most of the target populations live in dispersed and

extremely remote communities where it is expensive to reach them with project services. Project

reports lament their inability to address the infrastructure issues such as transport and irrigation,

which they considered imperative to meeting local needs and changing farmers’ production and

commercialization strategies.The eco-regional approach identied these structural issues, without

providing the means to address them on any signicant scale.

EFFORTS TO ALIGN CONSERVATION AND

LIVELIHOOD OBJECTIVES

The landscape projects internalized critiques of the ICDP approach and made a concerted effort to

better understand why farmers were using forest resources in unsustainable ways so as to identify

“best bets” for changing these behaviors. Discussions with communities proximate to threatened

resources quickly revealed that, not surprisingly, conserving biodiversity was not a signicant concern.

Lemurs meant protein for lunch and dark, loamy forests provoked dreams of future rice elds.

88 Fire Information for Resource Managers (FIRMS . http://maps.geog.umd.edu/rms/) and http://realerts.

conservation.org.

Recognizing that the use of protectionist language could backre given villagers’ extreme sensitivity

to perceived threats that their land might be taken over for a national park, projects reoriented the

approach and sought to package the message to make it understandable and motivating to local

communities.This was not just a matter of disguising a wolf in lamb’s clothes or “putting something

over” on local communities. It was rather a question of searching for the common interest around

the remaining Malagasy forests.

Save the Forest: Save Your Rice Fields. The forest is valuable to the world at large because

of its unique biodiversity; a more or less intact forest is valuable to local communities because of

its hydrological function and especially the role it plays in regulating water supplies to valley rice

elds. Projects focused on this theme in part because farmers are so sensitive to rice yields and had

themselves observed that when the forest was cut back, production suffered.

“Save the forest, save

your paddy elds” or some variation on this theme thus became the primary message used in efforts

to convince farmers that it was not in their interest to deforest the hills around their villages nor

to let others come in and do so. Simultaneously, the projects worked with community members to

reorient the household economy away from extractive or destructive forest activities.

This message proved to be somewhat e presumption that there is

controversial and largely ineffectual. Critics

a fundamental alignment of

have questioned the scientic veracity of the

message. Some researchers have been adamant

interests between the international

that the message does not reect reality and

community and local residents

that the hydrological effect of the forest on rice

eld production has been vastly overestimated

may have been a major conceptual

(Serpanie, Henckel, and Toillier 6-8 July 2009).

ﬂaw in USAID’s approach over

To the extent that the message has worked, it

is because villagers really do believe that there

the last 25 years...

is a connection between forest cover and

rice harvests, but for most the connection has

proven too tenuous to justify foregoing immediate benets (whether tavy or the collection of forest

products). If farmers could directly sell the water collected in “nature’s sponge,” and would lose those

revenues if the forest disappeared, the message might have been convincing. For most, given current

realities, it was not.

This has led others to observe that, fundamentally, there may not be a signicant alignment of

interests between the international community, which values biodiversity for its own sake, and

Malagasy farmers who are being asked to protect the forests on which biodiversity depends. Even if

we persist in the argument that there is a relevant connection between forest cover and hydrology,

one does not need a biodiverse forest to serve the hydrological function.

The presumption that there is a fundamental alignment of interests between the international

community and local communities may be a conceptual aw in the approach of the last 25 years.

USAID’s strategy through EP III implicitly assumed that since there was a substantial alignment of

interests, all parties would willingly contribute to achieving the common goal of saving Madagascar’s

remaining forests. If indeed the objective is not common (or sufciently motivating) and interests do

not align, then we move to a scenario in which the international community wants something that

the local community does not value, and probably has to pay for it (see Payments for Ecosystem

Services (PES).

89 In some cases farmers reported that after deforestation they were only able to produce one rice harvest a

year rather than two.

Payments for Ecosystem Services

Growing recognition of the practical challenges of implementing conservation through development

(made more difcult if, indeed, the local community does not share outsider concerns for protecting

the environment ), along with the realization that this would be a long and expensive undertaking,

made the idea of conservation payments increasingly attractive. Such payments were proposed by

academics as early as 1995 as a possibly more efcient way of meeting rural needs around protected

areas (Ferraro). Proponents suggested that direct payments to local communities who demonstrably

refrained from cutting the forest would reduce the lofty overhead expenses of projects and direct

more benets to people in remote areas near the parks.

There was a juncture, in the design of EP II, when the aws of the ICDP approach might either

have been “xed” via a conservation payments approach or by moving to a landscape strategy. In

part because the idea still seemed impractical (how would you keep payments going over the long

term?) and untested and in part because the reaction among key Malagasy ofcials was resoundingly

negative, EP II took the landscape route.

Developing a project around conservation payments. Over the next few years, concerns

over carbon emissions and global warming began to focus attention on the potential of tropical

forests to sequester carbon.The emergence of carbon markets, in which countries could potentially

fund reforestation in developing countries (and, in later

iterations, pay for avoided deforestation) in exchange for being

allowed to pollute in their own countries, suddenly added

a whole new dimension to conservation nance.The PAGE

project, under PE II, took up the challenge of imagining how

such a concept could be translated into practice and chose as

its pilot site the Makira forest in northeast Madagascar.

That initial idea slowly and painstakingly evolved into project

interventions over the next decade (in an experiment that

continues today).A consortium of partners has developed

practical implementation tools to eld test the concept. As such,

the Makira project has been groundbreaking both in Madagascar

and in the larger conservation world. It has faced the particular

challenges of being “ahead of its time” insofar as the larger

international policy framework for carbon credits is evolving

parallel to (and sometimes behind) the local mechanisms being

developed and tested in Makira.

While a relatively small project in the grand scheme of the

Madagascar portfolio, Makira is worth addressing in some detail

because any new projects are likely to consider adopting at least

some of its approaches.

Avoided deforestation. In general, the focus in Madagascar

has been on avoiding deforestation (keeping existing forests intact), rather than reforestation or

afforestation (although CI is currently doing some reforestation of forest corridors in Zahamena),

largely because the fundamental environmental concern is biodiversity, rather than merely “greening”

the country.This has complicated PES implementation because avoiding deforestation was not, in

90 Key documents for this section are Christopher Holmes, Forest Carbon Financing for Biodiversity Conservation,

Climate Change Mitigation and Improved Livelihoods: the Makira Forest Protected Area, Madagascar (2008),

Sommerville, The Role of Fairness and Benet Distribution in Community-Based Payment for Environmental

Services Interventions:A Case Study from Menabe, Madagascar (2009), Ferguson, REDD in Madagascar:An

Overview of Progress (2009).

This Menabe photo shows the well built with PES

funds in Tsitakabasia in return for villager protection

of forest resources. (Photo credit: Matt Sommerville)

USAID and partners pioneer

carbon credit sales.

The Makira project, in addition to its important

contribution to advancing knowledge and practical

mechanisms for implementing carbon sequestration/

PES payments, offers an interesting case study of the

complex relations between USAID and its partners.

In this particular case, we highlight how

complementary institutional strengths have helped to

overcome implementation constraints and created

a productive learning environment. All have learned

from this experiment, whose results will now be

“mainstreamed” into broader conservation and

development projects.

Since 1992,Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) has

worked with ANGAP in the creation and management

of Masoala National Park. Some years later, when

the PAGE project was looking for a pilot site for

eco-service payments, they identied Makira (near

Masoala) and relied heavily on WCS’s knowledge of

the area to design the project and facilitate access.

Given the technical complexity of this type of

intervention, and the fact that it was entering into

issues far outside the experience of the conservation

organizations, it is highly unlikely that WCS would have

taken on a PES program without the help of PAGE.

When it came to actually implementing the project,

however, USAID was no longer in a position to move

things forward.The Masoala peninsula was not one

of USAID’s priority areas at the time and, as initially

designed, it was anticipated that the project might

go through the Kyoto funding mechanisms. (Since

the United States has not signed the Kyoto Accord,

USAID would not have been an eligible partner.) Seed

funding for the project was thus provided by WCS and

Conservation International (CI).

Since 2008,Translinks (a centrally funded cooperative

agreement) is helping to globally disseminate the

results of the project, bringing the learning back into

the USAID fold.

the end, eligible under the Kyoto Protocol.

a result, Madagascar carbon sales from reduced

deforestation have so far gone through the

voluntary carbon market.

Makira is a forest with very high biodiversity

that is threatened by tavy, quartz, and wood

extraction, and burning for pasture land.The

forest in question covers about 401,000 ha and

was being converted to agricultural land at a

rate of about 1,500 ha per year. Approximately

150,000 people live around the protected area,

which suffers from the usual problems of poverty,

insufcient infrastructure, and remoteness.

Complex institutional arrangements were

necessary to get the project off the ground,

including DEF’s delegation of the management of

the protected area to WCS and the buffer area

to local communities.

Developing methodologies. The PAGE

project carried out initial assessments to

determine how much carbon is actually stored

in the Makira forest and methodologies were

rened for calculating the carbon value that could

be attributed to avoided deforestation. Essentially,

this involved taking measurements of the carbon

value found in three types of plots (dense forest,

degraded forest, and farmed or fallow lands).

The amount of forest that would be cut with and

without the project were then estimated, based

on an analysis of different threats in different

areas of the forest.Then the carbon sequestration

difference was calculated (how much more

carbon will be sequestered by the standing forest

over time vs. what would have been sequestered

if the forest had been cut or degraded).

For this particular pilot project, the potential

sequestered carbon turned out to be about

9.5 million tCO

equivalent over 30 years.The

Makira project is carrying out a pilot operation

to sell up to 300,000 tons of carbon on the

voluntary market. A total of 100,000 tons have

been sold to date and the revenues are being

directly re-invested into the management of

Makira Protected Area and the peripheral zones.

In 2008,WCS created a non-prot private sector

91 It is anticipated, however, that some sort of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

(REDD) mechanism will be accepted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC) and procedures for measurements and monitoring are currently being negotiated.

92 It was conservatively estimated that the natural forest sequestered about 322 tC/ha, the degraded forest

about 122 tC/ha and the farmed/fallow plots about 13 tC/ha.

        

         

company (the Makira Carbon Company, incorporated in the U.S.) with responsibilities for marketing

future emissions reductions from avoided deforestation in the Makira forest through an agreement

between WCS and the Government of Madagascar.

For our purposes, the exact numbers are of little concern except to note that there have been

considerable advances in developing the complex methodologies needed to measure biomass

and stored carbon and to estimate the benets of avoided deforestation.The nancial institution

needed to actually sell the carbon has been incorporated, and there are accepted contract models

governing relations between the Malagasy government, the project, and local communities including

how funds will be shared among the different entities. Under the current procedures, in a distribution

reminiscent of Protected Area Entrance Fee (DEAP) funds, 50% of the funds are returned to

the local communities for natural resource management, forest conservation, and community

development activities; 25% of the revenues are designated for management of the Makira

Protected Area; and the last 25% is to be allocated in part to the GoM, and in part to cover various

administrative costs, including monitoring and verication.

The lessons learned from Makira are also informing the carbon industry’s Voluntary Carbon Standard

(VCS). As one of the rst projects in the world to actually submit an avoided deforestation dossier

to the VCS, Makira is helping to dene appropriate methodologies and standards.VCS certication

will confer a “seal of approval” to potential buyers that the site can deliver on the avoided

deforestation that it promises.

Discussion

Eco-service payment projects are still young, with many bugs to be worked out.The Makira

project has not ventured into the world where local farmers (or communities) are directly paid

off in exchange for demonstrating that “their” forest has not been cut, as some have proposed.

Instead, they have set up mechanisms to capture carbon credits, 50% of which are then allocated to

development projects around the protected forests.The actual interventions have so far resembled

those implemented under the landscape approach (i.e. improved rice growing methods, provision of

credit, tree nurseries, income-generating activities, and health and population interventions).

In the Makira model, far from eliminating the “middle-man,” the development and conservation

organizations remain actively involved. In this particular project they are co-managers, with

the community, of the community forest zones.They are also implementing the development

interventions that compensate communities for not deforesting Makira, while helping them adopt

alternative livelihood strategies. In short, the main difference with previous landscape projects (not

insignicant if it actually happens) will be the sustainable nancing from a carbon marketplace that

will not be based on donor resources, project timetables, or nancing whims.

Unresolved issues. There is currently much greater willingness to consider Payments for Eco-

system Services as a way to motivate local protection of priority biodiversity sites.There are still

many unresolved issues in actually implementing such a program, however:

• How to protect it from nancial abuse and corruption?

• How to ensure that motivating payments actually get to those

who are doing the most damage to the forest?

93 Actual use of this mechanism is pending due to the current political crisis.

94 Payment schedules for such cash transfers were, in fact, calculated in some of the early studies (Minten

2003).

          

            

          

            

           

• How to ensure that the system doesn’t fall apart if someone

offers a slightly higher price to cut the forest?

• Will there be diminishing returns over time; once people get used to receiving

benets, will they up the ante or will the benets become less motivating?

• How to devise a payment system that is sufciently robust to

survive political manipulation and inevitable crises?

• Might not the rupture of payments be viewed as a license to deforest

once people become accustomed to being paid to protect?

• How to maintain people’s food security? Few remote people will be willing

to depend on purchasing food in areas where food imports depend on

precarious transport systems.Weaning farmers from tavy will require

signicant improvements to alternative food production systems.

• Will these very local/individual payments really be enough to help farmers transition

to non-subsistence livelihoods and assure necessary growth in the economy?

Many of these questions are little different from those faced by conservation-through-development

projects.They will probably only be answered over the next decade as more experimentation takes

place, just as the potential and limits of the ICDP and landscape approaches only became clear

once they were actually tried.There does seem to be a growing consensus that the most effective

next strategy will probably involve some combination of payment for ecosystem services and the

landscape approach (to identify and address some of the structural needs for transport, agricultural

extension, economic and agricultural policies) since neither appears sufcient to address the

complex challenges.

What is REDD really worth? The realistic potential of REDD payments must also be considered.

Madagascar’s existing forests cover something like 9.5 million ha. Estimates suggest that these forests

sequester roughly 350T CO

per hectare (probably too high since approximately half the forests

in question are dry or spiny forests).The World Bank has estimated that if carbon rights are sold

for $5 per ton of CO

, avoiding deforestation could generate something like $6 million per year

(World Bank 2010). If we also take the World Bank’s estimate that approximately 1 million people

are affected by the SAPM protected areas and would be eligible for some form of payment (though

perhaps at varying levels), we can quickly see that carbon funds will be insufcient to compensate

proximate populations (who are unlikely to change their behaviors for $6/person/year).

The problem is even more acute for the spiny and dry forests that have much lower sequestration

potential (because the forests are so “thin”). For such cases, if PES is the chosen strategy, sources of

funds other than carbon sales will have to be identied.

And nally, unless the forest is actually protected, REDD payments are, of course, not worth anything.

FIREWOOD AND CONSTRUCTION WOOD

EXPLOITATION

Until recently, most attention to small-scale forest aggression was focused on tavy, which is not

unjustied given that wood extraction is thought to account for only 5-20% of Madagascar’s

deforestation (Van de Plas cited in Jariala Stocktaking, 15). However, rewood harvesting is a threat

95 A key source for this section is Jariala, Etude Sur la Consommation et le Potentiel de Production de Bois (2009).

in particular areas where fuel wood is collected from the natural forest (around Mahajanga, for

example), rather than eucalyptus plantations. Recent studies suggest that it will be a growing threat

as demand increases and the state seeks to protect greater expanses of natural forest.This is likely to

become a point of increasing conict.

Current estimates put domestic wood consumption at 21.7 million m

, of which nearly 18 millionm

is for rewood or charcoal production (household energy needs).Theoretically, available forests

(outside protected areas) can produce up to 26 million m

on a sustainable basis, though the

production is not currently being managed in a sustainable fashion in most areas of the country.

Even more worrisome, however, is the fact that this equation will change over the next 15 years.

Since demand is growing by about 180,000 m

per year and supply is shrinking by about 70,000m

annually, by 2027 there will be an overall decit. As urban populations grow, the decit will accelerate

because urban populations consume nearly twice as much wood as rural populations (mostly

because they use charcoal rather than rewood; charcoal, as it is currently produced, is a highly

inefcient use of wood energy).

While not yet widely disseminated, projects have experimented with improving techniques both for

charcoal production and for harvesting of construction wood (currently, on average, 5m

of wood

is harvested to obtain 1m

of usable boards). If these techniques were widely adopted, they would

push back the time when overall decits are likely to occur by about 20 years. Given that much

charcoal production and wood production (60-80%) takes place illicitly, however, it will not be easy

to achieve widespread adoption rates.

While recommendations that Madagascar put more emphasis on gas or electricity as energy sources

for cooking resurge with predictable regularity, most studies show that this is neither realistic (as

they are much more expensive) nor advisable (as it would replace locally grown and, theoretically,

sustainable wood with imported non-renewable energy sources).

Malagasy villagers’ apparent apathy toward the natural forest (except as a potential source of land or

other extractable resources) does not extend to trees in general. Many communities carefully tend

their eucalyptus stands, planted under duress during the colonial period, but managed, sustained, and

even expanded in the interim because of the high value placed on rewood and pole production.

From the villager’s perspective: if you plant a eucalyptus tree, it belongs to you and it’s there when

you need to cut it; if you protect a natural forest, there’s a good chance that someone will announce

rules that will limit your rights to cut, harvest, or otherwise take what you want from it.The choice at

the community level is clear and explains why a village whose natural forest has been subject to re,

tavy, and extractive behavior may have been simultaneously nurturing and protecting its eucalyptus

grove.

VALORIZING NATURAL

RESOURCES

COMMERCIAL FOREST EXPLOITATION

Two assessments by international foresters in 2001 concluded that Madagascar’s forests should be

more productively managed and with an eye to increasing the commercial benets. In his assessment

Hagen lamented that there was not a single commercial forest being exploited on the basis of a

management plan.

Winterbottom added:

Forest exploitation practices were highly inefcient. Based on human transport over

long distances and the use of axes and other locally produced hand tools, it was

uneconomic to use and market anything other than higher value species and hand-

hewn planks. Only the highest value and most commercially valuable trees were

cut – and less than 15% of the harvested trees were ultimately used. Secondary

species were underused, and no efforts were made to ensure regeneration of a high-

value second crop.With few controls or criteria for issuing permits in existence, many

undercapitalized entrepreneurs were left to high-grade expanses of forests. Economic

returns were low, production was unsustainable, incentives for regeneration were absent,

and forest land use was unable to compete with shifting cultivation or conversion to

other uses.

Some years later, Jariala (Jariala Annual Report 2006) judged that 80-90% of wood was still being

extracted illegally.

In the battle over Madagascar’s forests, local timber interests have often found themselves sidelined,

especially once the Durban Vision threatened to put nearly all of Madagascar’s remaining natural

forests under protected status.Where, asked DEF, would the wood for fuel and construction come

from under this plan?

As it turns out, after the SAPM goes into effect (affecting 6 million ha of land, of which 4.7 million

ha is forested) there will still be over 4 million ha of forest (much of it in poor condition) that is

not under formal protected area status.The Jariala project worked with DEF to develop a KoloAla

(sustainable production forest) strategy.

The idea behind the KoloAla forest sites is to make sure

that these forests are placed under active management as needed to meet Madagascar’s needs for

wood products, while contributing to economic development, and protecting essential ecosystem

and conservation functions. It is estimated that a minimum of 2 million hectares needs to be set

aside for production forests to meet Madagascar’s current domestic requirements

for fuel and

building wood.

96 Two key documents for this section are Jariala Note Conceptuelle/KoloAla (2006) and Jariala Note

d’Application/KoloAla (2006).

97 He also noted that there was too much emphasis on developing management plans and not enough on

making sure that they made sense and were actually followed (Hagen 2001, 8-9).

98 This equates with what UNDP/GEF have called Managed Resource Protected Areas (MRPA), balancing

conservation with economic growth; the World Bank and European Union have also put considerable

resources into KoloAla approaches.

99 These domestic needs are currently estimated at 4 million m

per year, of which about 50% can be assured

from existing pine and eucalyptus plantations. Humid forests can produce about 2m

per ha of woody

forest products (fuel and construction) and dry forests about 0.2m

per ha.

Theoretically humid forests could produce up

to 10 times more (240m

) usable wood per

hectare than they do now (10-40m

per ha).

Sixty-year rotation schedules are assumed as a

default necessity to ensure regrowth of slow-

growing tropical species, though data is still

lacking to determine optimal rotation patterns.

As much as 40% of a given parcel would be

reserved for biodiversity and hydrological

purposes.The size of the parcels attributed to

a particular manager would vary considerably

according to the operator’s management

capacity but would be calculated to generate a

prot while respecting sustainable management

guidelines. A small community forest contract

would perhaps cover only 5-10,000 hectares,

while a larger operator might have a concession

agreement covering 100,000 ha.

There are several management options available

under the 2006 Forest Code, which allows

for public-private partnership: (1) long-term

contracts with the private sector under careful

monitoring to ensure respect of management

guidelines, (2) management by community

groups (COBAs), and (3) government-managed

but with short-term harvesting permits.The third option is the least promising due to likely problems

with transparent and timely rebidding as well as high administrative costs.

Currently, about 803,000 ha of natural forest have been dened as KoloAla sites by the Ministry. Of

these, about 100,000 ha are anticipated to be managed under government contract, 185,000 under

contract with communities, and 113,000 under contract with private operators. Only 3,700 ha had

actually been tendered with contracts awarded by the end of the Jariala project but management

schemes had been drawn up for another ve sites (370,000 ha). As with so many USAID

interventions, these pilot interventions set the stage and have established procedures (manuals,

standards for management plans, improved inventory and management techniques, draft contracts)

that show the way to more widespread adoption.

Scaling up to a level beyond what can be mentored and supervised carefully by a project opens

another set of issues and comes back to questions of sustainable governance.To be sustainable

such management plans anticipate long-term (60-120 year) rotation strategies for various parcels

within a forest block; private operators or communities who do not have condence in the security

of the contracts signed with the government are unlikely to adopt optimal long-term management

strategies. Short-term contracts may be more credible, but would not result in the desired long-term

sustainable management.

For sustainable harvesting to work, it is critical that “legitimate” forest products be differentiated

from those that have been harvested illegally since it is more expensive to harvest sustainably and

illegal products engender unfair competition.The “chain of custody” model (a series of procedural

reforms, accompanied by a new wood marking system, computer monitoring software, and training)

developed by DEF and Jariala at least theoretically enables forest products to be tracked from place

of origin to nal use. If legally adopted and applied, this tool will be a powerful addition to the forest

management arsenal.

Protected areas under the new SAPM system will be zoned into

various categories, approximately half of which will involve some

degree of co-management with either local communities or private

operators. Some KoloAla (production forest sites) will be within the

protected areas, while others may be dened outside the protected

area system. (Photo credit: IRG)

These sustainable forestry practices are at a nascent stage in Madagascar and their effective

deployment will require a sustained effort on the part of the international community. Risks are

inherent in the extraction of natural resources, especially when the State is weak and corruption

is systemic.There is a strong sense, however, that the alternative (no harvesting from Madagascar’s

natural forests) is both socially untenable and economically wasteful.

NATURAL PRODUCTS MARKETS

100

Several projects (specically LDI and BAMEX) have studied the potential of natural product markets.

Their work conrms the conclusions of studies carried out in other parts of the world: natural

products have signicant economic potential but they often involve worrisome trade-offs between

conservation and development objectives.

Natural products and sustainable harvest. While it is sometimes assumed that the product’s

economic value will motivate producers/collectors to manage the resource sustainably, growing

demand frequently leads to overexploitation.This is especially true when tenure relations are unclear

and people harvest from common areas.Where people are very poor and have a high discount rate,

they are also likely to try to capture maximum present benets, rather than planning for a modest

but more sustainable income stream into the future.

Both phenomena have been observed in Madagascar.There are cases where the collection of

silk worms has caused farmers to control re in the worms’ natural forest habitat, for example, as

there are cases where commercial harvesting has seriously damaged a natural population. Prunus

Africana, whose bark is used in herbal medicines is in the second category. It was eventually put on

a CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) list

banning exports in order to encourage regeneration of the over-harvested populations. In short,

the motivation to sustainably manage commercial forest products cannot be assumed; instead, clear

harvesting guidelines and enforcement measures are necessary.

In theory, natural markets provide interesting economic potential for remote communities where

they represent secondary economic activities that complement farming.This is a complicated sector,

however, where local harvesters are easily exploited. Products that are commercialized locally (and

there are many, as Malagasy are heavy users of natural medicines) are considerably less complex, but

also less lucrative. Some sell on the informal market and some enter the domestic formal sector.The

Institut Malgache de Recherches Appliquées, for example, conducts research on natural product-

based medicines and markets quality products domestically.When products (especially medicinal)

enter the international market the stakes rise considerably.These products are highly regulated and

often demand international certication (e.g. organic, fair trade).These complex issues, as well as the

long distances to market, mean that there are multiple layers between the harvester and the nal

buyer. It is promising that the KoloHarena cooperatives have, in a few cases, succeeded in substituting

for some of these intermediaries, thereby increasing benets to their members.

In short, like so many niche markets in Madagascar, this sector holds some promise but requires

signicant inputs to meet its full potential and to guarantee the quality and quantity of products put

on the market. In addition, there must be careful monitoring to be sure that rapacious extraction for

short-term benet does not do more damage to the environment.

100 A key document for this section is Juliard et al. Madagascar Aromatic and Medicinal Plant Value Chain Analysis

(2006)

ECO-TOURISM

101

Eco-tourism was viewed as a promising lever for environmentally friendly economic development

from the rst days of the NEAP.The early ICDP experiences anticipated that eco-tourism could

make a signicant contribution to about one-quarter of the country’s parks, while the others were

unlikely to benet due to their remoteness, lack of facilities, and lesser interest for visitors. Experience

of the past decades has continued to emphasize that this sector should generate moderate benets,

but cannot solve all the nancial problems for communities and parks, as some of the more quixotic

reports seem to expect. Having said this, before the 2009 political crisis, tourism was the second

most important source of foreign exchange ($400 million in 2008), after shrimp exports (World

Bank 2010).

Favorable characteristics of the tourism sector. The tourism sector in Madagascar has

some characteristics that are favorable, while others are more challenging. On the favorable side¸

the dispersal of sites of attraction in different areas of the country, and the fact that most are fairly

remote and rural, make it easier to link tourism to poverty reduction and, at least theoretically, to

ensure that benets are more widely distributed.The rules calling for 50% of tourist park entrance

fees (DEAP funds) to be used for local development projects have been a source of major benets

for some park neighbors.The pressures on these funds are great, however; at times, local ofcials

have tried to get their hands on the money, while during other periods ANGAP/MNP has called for

all the funds to be returned to headquarters and then redistributed from there. Supposedly this was

to enable less popular parks to gain some of the tourism benets but it has raised suspicion and

angered communities around the agship parks.

Tourism challenges. Several issues line up on the challenging side, however. First, the overall

number of tourists has thus far been limited by the number of incoming ights, which are few in

number.This not only physically limits the number of incoming visitors, it also keeps prices high. On

average, 60% of tourism expenditures go to airfare into the country, which is unusually high. Second,

the extremely poor transport infrastructure means that most tourists do not venture forth on their

own, but depend on central Antananarivo-based agencies.These groups tend to channel tourists on

well established routes, which limits the dispersal of benets. It also causes overcrowding at some

parks and underutilization of others.Third, the whole industry is highly vulnerable to the political

crises that get broad international coverage and can decimate the industry for extended periods.

102

One of the issues is whether eco-tourism is intended primarily to help the environment (beneting

the national parks and immediate surroundings, for example) or whether it is being asked to

contribute more generally to poverty reduction. For the moment, the former seems more

promising, especially as Madagascar has accepted the principle that private investors will be allowed

to acquire concessions (for hotels, food service, etc.) within the park boundaries. USAID projects

have recommended a concessioning policy since EP I, but ANGAP has been reluctant to relinquish

hold over this potentially lucrative sector.This issue has now been resolved in favor of private

management of facilities within the parks. Model contracts and even potential nancing through the

International Finance Corporation (IFC) are available for interested investors, though the crisis and

dramatic drop in tourist numbers has dampened interest for the moment.

Within the parks, sometimes arbitrary rules (e.g. no night-walks in some parks and discouraging

camping in the parks) limit the tourist products that can be offered and can lead tour operators to

propose similar products outside the parks, with a pursuant loss of revenues to the park system.

101 A key document for this section is USAID/CI, Increasing Competitiveness of Micro and Small Enterprise in

the Tourism Industry of Madagascar (2009)

102 International visitors to Madagascar fell from 345,000 in 2008 to 156,000 in 2009. From 2001 to 2002,

there was a drop from 170,000 to 62,000.

Fearing that anarchic development might kill the golden egg of tourism around the most popular

parks, several USAID-funded projects have tried to address tourism development issues.The CAP,

LDI, and BAMEX projects all worked with the government to establish Zones of Economic Activity

where, on one hand, eco-tourism would be encouraged if it met certain standards of the industry,

while prohibiting random development in these ecologically sensitive areas.This effort was more

successful in addressing the rst issue than the second.There are several examples of large eco-

friendly hotels in areas where they were formerly lacking, but in many cases they are surrounded by

haphazard development that little honors the milieu.

There have also been efforts, both by projects and the eco-establishments themselves, to encourage

backward linkages that would benet local communities.While again, there are isolated successful

examples, many operators have been frustrated by the lack of response by local communities.The

biggest hotel in the vicinity of Isalo Park (one of the most visited parks at 30,000 tourists per year),

continues to provision its vegetables from cities more than 200 km away. From these and similar

experiences, it is now clear that these types of linkages will require considerably more inputs to help

farmers and local communities meet the rigorous requirements of the tourism industry.

Land tenure issues are also a constraint to developing community friendly tourism. In one recent

case a project purposely tried to attract an investor to build a hotel in a community-managed forest.

In the end, the business decided to seek a concession in one of the national parks, fearful that tenure

arrangements were too insecure on community lands.

In looking ahead to the development of the tourism sector in Madagascar, several analyses have

noted that higher tourist numbers have been accompanied by lower “yields” (expenditures) per

tourist.This is generally not considered positive in the industry and specialists in the eld have

encouraged Madagascar to focus on higher end visitors.While there are certainly some benets to

this approach, others caution that maintaining diversity in the tourism sector (as in so many other

areas of the Malagasy economy) may be a sensible risk aversion strategy.

103

On the positive side, there is a growing movement in Madagascar to promote village-level tourism by

the “backpacker” set.While this will never have a signicant impact at the national scale, it can have a

very notable effect on local communities. Some NGOs are working to develop a network of these

sites, thereby making them more accessible to international tourists (via web sites, etc.). Some of the

corridor villages in priority eco-regions have been able to benet from these initiatives.

103 Different tourism proles react differently to political crises, for example, with independent and French

tourists returning sooner than high spending tour groups.

GOVERNANCE

This penultimate chapter discusses the thorny problem of bad governance which, unlike the spiny

forests of Madagascar, shows little sign of disappearing. From the earliest NEAP documents, there

has been a strong emphasis on institutional capacity building.Yet, as USAID projects have invested

monumental efforts to create and support environmental institutions, they have come up against

governance issues that paint a constant backdrop of frustration and periodic episodes of massive

upheaval.

In assessing the impact of governance issues

on Madagascar’s environment and program

results, we should look at both “normal” and

crisis periods, and wonder whether crises have

become a characteristic feature of Madagascar’s

political landscape.

PROBLEMATIC

CHARACTERISTICS

OF MALAGASY

GOVERNANCE

Business as usual

There have been tremendous efforts to improve governance. Here, A culture of turn-taking. The uncertainty of

a photo shows one of the National Leadership Institute’s training

political tenure in Madagascar, combined with the

programs for Madagascar’s 17,500 fokontany chiefs.While both

lack of democratic and civil society institutions

leadership and government training efforts have taken place at all

that could demand accountability, has created

levels, they have not yet produced the “good enough” governance

a culture of political “turn-taking” where top

needed for economic development and environmental protection.

posts in government are viewed by many as

(Photo credit: Paul Porteous)

opportunities to “take one’s share” before being

thrown out. Governments are reformulated

with great frequency. Ravalomanana reshufed

his cabinet no fewer than 11 times during his

rst ve-year term in ofce. Because lower staff positions in the ministries are distributed as political

booty and ministers need sympathetic staff who will not be unduly rigorous in their management

of state assets, key ofcials with substantive responsibilities are swept out with changes at the top.

The results of painstaking training and mentoring exercises are lost as ministers and their staff are

dispatched from the scene.This results not only in expensive loss of management capital, but it

can take months after such a ministerial reshufe for basic services to resume to some degree of

normalcy, leaving policies – and their enforcement – in limbo.

Corruption. As the potential to reap personal benets from the environmental sector are

considerable (logging permits, signicant donor funds), the ministry in charge of environment

104

among those most highly coveted and many of its ministers are known to have beneted from illicit

activities (as have the presidents under whom they served).When ministers are blatantly corrupt

104 As previously noted, environmental issues have been treated by different ministries over the period in

question.

and are not sanctioned for their activities, it is nearly impossible to create a culture of honesty lower

in the organization. Project documents comment repeatedly that corrupt practices are rampant

throughout the system.

105

Corruption undermines environmental programs at all levels and its insidious impacts reverberate

throughout the system. Permits for logging, mining, and even tevy-ala are distributed liberally in

ecologically sensitive zones.When a local DEF agent knows that the Minister is selling precious

hardwoods by the shipload, he can hardly be blamed for taking a $12 bribe (about half his monthly

pay) to issue a woodcutting permit.The permit itself might result in only 2 or 3 hectares of forest

being cut. But it ends up having a much greater impact if a village of 100 people who had agreed

to forego tavy observes the illicit deforestation, and everyone decides that they might as well get a

piece of the forest before it all disappears to the logger.

While rent-seeking behavior can be found at all levels and in all sectors, nancial reserves pose

particular temptation, especially for authorities who do not expect to be around very long and have,

as a result, little motivation to anticipate future problems. Graft has direct effects on the environment.

Funds set up for road repair (Fonds d’Entretien Routière or FER) are diverted to other purposes

and roads built by USAID projects (usually farm-to-market roads needed to encourage commercial

agriculture and reduce forest pressures) are often nearly impassable after a few years due to lack

of maintenance.

106

Politicians have tried to divert DEAP funds (revenues from the parks, to be split

with local communities where they are supposed to be used for development interventions) for

political purposes. Such incidents, multiplied across a multitude of sites, sectors, and levels, begin

to play a systemic role in undermining policy

Corruption, multiplied across

implementation.

107

a multitude of sites, sectors,

The ofce responsible for controlling corruption

and levels, plays a systemic

is the Bureau Indépendant Anti-Corruption

(BIANCO), established under the Ravalomanana

role in undermining policy

administration and supported by MISONGA.

implementation. When the

While BIANCO has made signicant progress

in dealing with local level corruption, larger and

donors are physically present

more politically sensitive transgressions are rarely

and vigilant, they are able to

addressed (the DEF agent is more likely to end

up in court than the Minister).This is in part

modulate some of the worst

because BIANCO operates directly under the

abuses, but this addresses neither

presidency and has only limited independence.

(More politically sensitive transgressions are

the problem of leakage, nor its

rarely addressed: the DEF agent is more likely

likely resurgence once the project

to end up in court than the Minister.) BIANCO

is also handicapped by corruption in the

is no longer present.

courts, recently rated as the third most corrupt

105 This looting of natural resources for private gain and its various nefarious effects is sometimes known as

the “resource curse.” It has been identied as a factor restraining economic growth in many very poor

countries.

106 Recognizing this problem, the CAP project put in a system of tolls on its rural roads.The system, in which

local communities collected the tolls and actually carried out the repairs themselves, worked well until a

few well placed truckers got the President’s ear and tolls were banned.

107 While one hesitates to venture into cultural issues in discussing patterns of corruption and bad governance,

many people (including Malagasy interviewed for this paper) surmise that certain fundamental aspects

of the Malagasy culture contribute to the perpetuation of these practices. Specically¸ Malagasy are very

hesitant to call others to task since maintaining positive social relations is a paramount social value that

can in some cases trump concern for actual results. (For example, you would not re someone simply

for incompetence since this would cause the person to lose face and could result in an undesirable social

backlash.) This phenomenon also undermines social accountability and leads to what some have labeled a

“culture of impunity.”

institution in Madagascar, after the Gendarmerie and Lands ofces. Even if BIANCO succeeds in

getting a violation to court,

108

cases against wealthy or powerful individuals are frequently thrown

out.

BIANCO has had serious capacity problems, made worse by recent donor funding freezes. In 2008,

USAID, Norway, the World Bank, FDR, IMC, and the GoM funded BIANCO. Of those only Norway

has continued to fund the corruption ofce and their budget has been slashed in half (to less than

$7 million a year).As a result only about 300 of the 5,000 cases submitted in 2009 were actually

pursued.

109

Projects have dealt with the problem by trying to control corruption within their direct zone of

inuence, whether at the community, commune, or central level.When the donors are physically

present and vigilant, they are able to modulate some of the worst abuses, but this addresses

neither the problem of leakage (corruption moves to a place where no one’s looking) nor its likely

resurgence once the project is no longer present.

Are crises normal?

Madagascar has suffered four acute political crises since Independence, three of them – 1991,

2002, and 2009 – during the 25 years covered by this report.This begs the question of whether

such intermittent crises have become a normal characteristic of the political landscape. If so, this

may differentiate Madagascar from other countries which suffer from similarly weak institutions

and structures.This paper will not attempt to analyze the underlying politico-cultural context that

contributes to this pattern but we note that the basic elements necessary for orderly political

transitions do not yet exist (e.g. solid political parties, objective electoral systems and courts, systems

of governmental checks and balances).

The political system has low credibility with the population, which opens the door to movements

that appeal directly to the populace, mobilizing their discontent to effectuate change outside the

electoral system. Each of the four crises has capitalized on widespread frustrations, calling people

into the streets to demand change.These movements have succeeded in ousting unpopular leaders,

without dealing with any of the underlying frustrations, whether lack of political voice or difcult living

conditions, that caused the initial discontent.

110

The pattern of political change being brought about

by social movements motivated more by frustration with past abuses than any forward-looking

vision for how power should be used to advance the national interest is becoming more deeply

entrenched. As such, it is not irrational to think that intermittent crises will remain a predictable part

of the political landscape for at least the foreseeable future.

108 Another interesting example of enforcement complexity is the Task Force established in October 2009 to

try to control illegal rosewood exports from the northeast forests. Joint patrols by the army, gendarmerie,

and police have been very effective in arresting some 300 loggers, all of them local workers (not the

powerful interests behind the exports).The Tribunals have not been able to keep up and most of the

cases have been thrown out or not dealt with. Rosewood exports continue unabated with poor farmers

under pressure to participate in the logging since otherwise the vanilla exporters (who also control the

rosewood sector) refuse to buy their vanilla. (Personal communication, Richard Marcus)

109 Personal communication, Richard Marcus.

110 The rst crisis (1972) may be an exception to the extent that it did nally rupture colonial bonds, though

the economic situation that followed was undeniably worse for most Malagasy.The 2002 crisis brought

people to the streets to protest electoral vote rigging and resulted in President Ravalomanana taking

power. His regime was later accused of similar electoral abuses.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Project experience working with local government institutions has been somewhat more positive,

though far from consistent across sites and situations.

111

In particular, there have been some

successes at the commune level.There are several reasons for this, notably that people actually

know one another at this scale so there is a greater sense of accountability. Communes, focused

primarily on immediate and usually pragmatic concerns, resist hyper-politicization and grandiose

empty promises. In addition, people can clearly

monitor whether promises (or funds) are

translated into interventions and whether those

interventions actually benet the population or

not.This introduces a degree of transparency

and accountability that is largely absent at higher

levels. Finally, the nature of these usually rural and

often remote communities is that people tend

to stay put.This means that even when there

are changes in elected ofcials, people who have

been trained remain in the community where

their skills can be used.

e Ravalomanana

deconcentration of power

translated into a massive national

eﬀort to dominate and control not

only the 1,392 communes, but

also the even smaller fokontany.

is was particularly insidious

Still, we should remember that Madagascar is a

in so far as it extended the reach

highly centralized country, with 97% of revenues

of the predatory state to this

generated from the center and less than 3%

ending up at the commune level (Civil Society

previously relatively functional

87). ERI provided administrative and mentoring

level of local government.

support to communes along the forest

corridors by supporting the Centre d’Appui aux

Communes (CAC) and reinforcing commune

skills to manage their internal affairs, raise and properly use tax funds, and lobby government

authorities to address critical problems (e.g., road washouts).This was beginning to have some

positive results.The EP III “Commune Mendrika” program focused on commune level planning and

interventions, with rewards for good governance and other achievements. MISONGA began to get

promising results with its mentoring program for female commune mayors.

The Commune Mendrika (Progressive Communes) program

rewarded communities that made signicant progress toward

environment, heath, governance, and economic goals. (Photo credit:

Erica Brewster)

111 Variability is high and it is dangerous to assume that communes behave responsively and accountably,

though it is sometimes happily the case.

While publicly lauding the communes, recent government policies have done much to undermine

their independence, demanding upward accountability rather than responsiveness to constituents.

The Ravalomanana “decentralization” was in fact a deconcentration

112

of power that translated into

a massive national effort to dominate and control not only the 1,392 communes (to the point of

imposing election results if necessary) but also the even smaller fokontany (approximately 17,000 in

number, each with roughly 1,000-4,000 inhabitants).This was particularly insidious as it extended the

reach of the predatory state to this previously relatively responsive level of local government.

CIVIL SOCIETY

113

There is widespread agreement that a more robust, daring, and visionary civil society movement

could positively inuence the political situation in Madagascar, help to temper abuses of power, and

possibly facilitate the emergence of more democratic and sustainable institutions. In other parts

of the developing world, civil society organizations serve as the training ground for future leaders.

This is not the case in Madagascar where civil society institutions remain notoriously weak, even in

comparison to African countries.

Characteristics of Malagasy civil society

While there are many types of civil society institutions, most in Madagascar fall under the category

of “associations,” which is a catch-all term used to denote voluntary organizations separate from the

State, whose purpose is not primarily prot-sharing (i.e., clubs, associations, and groups). Registering

an association is relatively simple (Association Law of 1960) and there are a multitude of small and

very resource-poor associations that, even in their own estimation, accomplish little. A recent World

Bank survey found that 42% had budgets of less than $100.The same survey found, not surprisingly,

that 67% judged that they were never or only occasionally effective (World Bank 2010, 94) To the

extent that they have an impact, it is usually at the community level.

About 9% of the civil society institutions in Madagascar are registered as NGOs.The NGO law

was put in place in 1997, with help from the KEPEM project, in part to identify and certify the

more robust organizations. As such, NGO status is more exigent, requiring a board of directors, a

regular income ow, and a nancial controller.The requirements are so rigorous that few apply and

Madagascar currently has only 116 ofcially registered national NGOs. Furthermore, as the Bank’s

Civil Society Assessment notes, most of these NGOs are not representative bodies and therefore do

not qualify as civil society organizations.

Instead, many of Madagascar’s NGOs are focused primarily on service delivery.The disengagement

of the State in the 1980s left large areas of Madagascar with few, if any, social services.This, alongside

the donor desire to work through local NGOs and promote capacity building, spurred the creation

of a cadre of semi-specialized service-oriented NGOs (including several in the environment sector)

that work primarily to implement donor activities. Linkages with donors accord them a more solid

112 Madagascar’s international partners have too frequently confused decentralization (which should normally

transfer power to local authorities, thereby empowering the base) with deconcentration of power

(which extends state power further and has often been used primarily for political ends or to extract

resources from the base). As such they have at times been unwitting accomplices in undermining local

empowerment.

113 A key document for this section is the World Bank’s Civil Society and Social Accountability in Madagascar

(Forthcoming). In this document, civil society is dened as “the arena, distinct from the market and the

state – in which citizens come together to pursue common interests through collective action, neither

for prot nor for the exercise of political power. Social accountability is dened as the articulation of

accountability relationships between citizens and the state, referring to (1) the broad range of actions and

mechanisms (beyond voting) that citizens can use to hold the state to account; and (2) actions on the part

of government, civil society, media, and other social actors that promote or facilitate these efforts.” (World

Bank 2010, 15)

nancial status, but their principal ties are often to the donor whose programs they are implementing

rather than to a constituent interest group.While these NGOs play a useful role, they are unlikely to

rock the boat by demanding State accountability or transparency.

The melding of politics and civil society. There is considerable overlap between civil society

and political leadership, especially in civil society organizations operating at the national level.

Consequently, ties between civil society and political power are closer than the ties between civil

society and their base (Personal communication, Marcus). In fact, many civil society organizations

have no real base and are composed of an elite clique surrounding an inuential – or “wannabe” –

politico. Such organizations will not act as government watchdogs and are vulnerable during periods

of political upheaval as they jockey for inuence.

The churches represent the broadest based civil society movement in Madagascar and do play a role

in demanding social accountability (calling for less corruption and more electoral transparency, for

example) but their credibility has been compromised by internal corruption and the intertwining of

church and political leadership.

114

This results in easy manipulation of the church for political ends.

USAID efforts to strengthen civil society

USAID has intermittently attempted to reinforce civil society institutions (from the earliest days of

EP I, with the PVO-NRMS project, then the LOVA component of SAVEM, ILO, RARY, and MIRAY,

concluding with the abbreviated MISONGA project in EP III) but the results are far from conclusive.

One of the factors limiting USAID’s success in this domain has been the fragility of DG funding and

the short time frames of projects. ILO was a three year project (that unfortunately coincided with

the 2001 crisis) and MISONGA closed early when funding for the Mission’s Democracy strategic

objective was substantially decreased. In Madagascar, where success is based on carefully nurtured

relationships and trust, these brief projects barely advanced beyond the start-up phase.This has

seriously hampered capacity building

115

efforts, which require sustained and gently persistent

interventions.

Communications and information. Among the more promising interventions intended to

facilitate civil society organization are those that have signicantly improved Madagascar’s notoriously

poor rural communications and access to information

116

more generally.While the situation has

improved considerably over the past decade, many of the more remote areas of Madagascar have

until very recently had no cell phone coverage (and this is still the case in many mountainous areas

near the threatened rainforests). MISONGA distributed hand-crank radios and created rural listening

groups; the Last Mile Initiative facilitated internet service in Ranomafana village next to the park; ERI

put ham radios into corridor villages allowing them to communicate with one another and with the

city for the rst time and successfully pressured the private sector to extend the cell phone coverage

to at least parts of the corridor.

114 The current situation where ex-President Ravalomanana is the Vice President of the FJKM, ex-President

of the National Assembly Lahaniriko is a pillar of the Lutheran church, and the Catholic hierarchy rather

quickly gravitated to putschist Rajaolina is a case in point.

115 We make a distinction here between sectoral projects that use NGOs as implementers for their

interventions and build sectoral capacity (in health, for example) and projects that are specically focused

on civil society capacity building, strengthening locally based agendas and advocacy.

116 Civil society has been trying to get a law passed guaranteeing the public’s access to state information.

Promoted by the President’s Council to Fight Corruption (CSLCC) and validated by various technical

committees and donors, efforts to promulgate the law were abruptly nixed by President Ravalomanana in

2006.

The KoloHarena Farmers movement has been one of the most

successful civil society interventions implemented under USAID

projects. As the association has grown and matured, however, some of

the environmental focus has dissipated. Here community extension

agents receive certicates honoring their work. (Photo credit: Pierrot

Men)

The effects of these types of intervention are hard to quantify, but without basic communication

services it is hard to imagine any serious mobilization of civil society in these remote areas. Similarly

important as a building block for civil society was ILO and MISONGA support for documentation

centers in Fianarantsoa and Mahajanga that have signicantly increased access to information and

continue to promote non-political policy dialogues on relevant local issues.

Civil society coordination. The fragility of civil society institutions is reected in their

coordinating bodies.The recent MISONGA effort (2005) to create the Common Charter for Civil

Society Organizations and the Plate-forme Nationale de la Société Civile Malgache (PFNSCM) is the

third effort to establish a civil society coalition over the past 15 years.The rst (under PVO-NRMS)

failed when politics created internal divisions in the coalition; the second association was also killed

by political maneuvering when opposition leaders tried to use the association to destabilize the

government.The latest association is said to represent over 2,000 civil society organizations from

all sectors but is already subject to internal strife.The President of PFNSCM is the wife of a former

minister, and there is concern that it will also be drawn into politics.

117

As has so often been the case

with DG interventions in Madagascar, support

from USAID has not been sustained enough to

provide the continued mentoring needed to get

these coordinating bodies beyond the start-up

hurdles.

The KoloHarena Farmers Associations.

It is interesting that the civil society movement

that may be the most well established among

those mentored under USAID projects is the

KoloHarena farmers movement.

118

Initially,

the KoloHarena associations had a strong

environmental focus.The target population was

the farmers living immediately adjacent to the

USAID priority forest corridors. In return for

agreeing to forego tavy, farmers who joined the

association were eligible for credit and other

project assistance to help them undertake

alternative agricultural and livelihood ventures.

The movement has gained strength over the

years as it has responded to the practical needs

of its members (e.g. running remote agricultural

supply centers and helping farmers connect

to buyers for commercial crops). KoloHarena

effectiveness has been greatly enhanced by their

access to the ham radio communications system

that the projects installed in communities along

the forest corridors.

117 MISONGA also helped the Ravalomanana government create the Consortium pour la Participation

Citoyenne (CNPC 2005) that is intended as a meeting place for government, civil society, and the

private sector. It includes representatives from civil society, religious organizations, the public sector,

high level government and political parties, the private sector, and the media.The relationship between

the Plate-forme and the Consortium has been conictual, and it is not clear what will happen to the

consortium with the change in government.

118 Supported by environment projects (LDI and ERI) for more than a decade, this intervention was not

dependent on DG funding.

The KoloHarena movement now numbers nearly 1,700 associations, serving about 20,000

members.They are joined in 30 cooperatives and 18 federations. Concomitant with KoloHarena

growth, however, has been a corresponding decline in its environmental focus. New associations

are being formed far away from the corridors and the emphasis has shifted to meeting agricultural

needs. From a sustainability perspective this is probably good, since it reects the association’s

responsiveness to member concerns rather than the interests of the project that founded it.The

movement offers some hope that people can and will organize around shared interests, though it’s

still too early to judge how it will fare now that the sponsoring projects have ended. It can hardly be

said to represent, however, the still elusive “indigenous environmental movement.”

Civil society, politics, and fear

There are few studies of why civil society As donors encourage civil

institutions are so persistently weak, but their

society institutions to demand

tendency to politicization is undoubtedly a

factor.With few outlets for political expression

greater transparency and social

and notoriously weak political parties, they

accountability from the State, we

often become tools for short-term political

maneuvering, without reference to guiding

burden them with an inherently

principles, or allegiance from a solid community

political responsibility. In so

base.This discourages participation by citizens

who fear being drawn into risky political

doing, we may sabotage their

machinations.

chances for success on more

Civil society institutions focused on service

mundane issues like selling beans

delivery are understandably reluctant to mobilize

and ginger.

for social accountability (calling politicians to

task for corruption or even advocating for local

interests) because this is immediately dened

as “oppositional” by those in power.There are multiple avenues for punishing those viewed as being

too critical, whether through tax audits, sending thugs to intimidate, or withdrawing visas (when

foreigners are involved).

As donors encourage civil society institutions to move beyond the immediate needs of their

members and demand state transparency and accountability, we risk burdening them with an

inherently political responsibility. In so doing, we may sabotage their chances for success on

more mundane, but nevertheless crucial issues (e.g., selling beans and ginger). It is critical that the

international partners remain sensitive to this paradox as they work with edgling groups like the

KoloHarena.

Finally, it is worth asking not only whether strengthening civil society is possible in the short and

medium term (experience to date is inconclusive), but also whether doing so will indeed translate

into a stronger indigenous environmental agenda. If there is not a genuine, grassroots concern for the

environment, there is little reason to think that civil society would adopt this as a long-term issue.

GOVERNANCE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The intricate interdependence of economics, environment, and governance is manifest every day

at every level in Madagascar.The cumulative result of their mutual sabotage is a rural economy that

has been stagnant or deteriorating for four decades.The periodic political crises have impacts that

are anything but subtle, however, and illuminate the extent to which environmental programs and

economic development are both fundamentally hostage to bad governance.

In each of Madagascar’s political crises (1972, 1991, 2002, and 2009), the economy has suffered huge

setbacks as a result of extended political turmoil. It can take years to re-establish stability and get

political and economic structures back to the point where they operate “normally.”The cumulative

effect of multiple crises is particularly damaging as investors realize that these are not isolated

incidents.With two crises in less than a decade, Madagascar has now lost substantial credibility with

its business partners.This is especially serious in sectors like tourism and textiles (an industry that

is set up to enable rapid ight if conditions turn unfavorable) that are sensitive to political instability.

Returning the situation to day-to-day “normalcy” does not necessarily translate into immediate

reinvestment in these sectors.

Madagascar’s political crises invariably involve long Madagascar’s political crises

periods of confusion where government systems

invariably involve periods of

falter, salaries are not paid, and there are few

attempts to enforce the law.When, as now, donor

confusion and little or no eﬀort

projects are put on hold, there is a near total

to enforce the laws of the land.

vacuum in terms of monitoring and control.The

result is a free-for-all, open access situation where

e result is a free-for-all, open

pent up demand for resources is liberated and

access situation where pent up

massive amounts of irreversible damage can be

done in a very short time.

119

demand for resources is liberated

and massive amounts of

As the economy goes into a tailspin and people

living at the margins are thrown into even more

irreversible damage can be done

extreme poverty, tevy-ala induced pressures also

in a very short time.

intensify. Again, the long-term effects are greater

than the immediate deforestation impact.We now

know that agricultural pressures on the forest

corridor are not only peripheral.With most of the corridors so narrow as to be easily accessible

throughout their width, patterns of occupation are highly opportunistic. Farmers seek the best land,

often far into the interior of the forests.These farmer pioneers act as poles of attraction for other

newcomers, further fragmenting vulnerable corridors. It is extremely difcult to later remove people

from these established settlements.The effects of a political crisis on the environment can undo years

of program investments.

Another often uncounted cost of political crises is brain-drain.The longer the duration of the crisis

120

and the more that donor activities are thrown into disarray, the more likely that the most competent

and highly skilled Malagasy will nd jobs outside the country. If and when (presumably under more

propitious conditions) USAID projects return to Madagascar it will be important to attract this

professional cadre back to Madagascar and to valorize their skills in the new projects.

119 Some of this is done by opportunistic and highly organized forces, sometimes with government linkages.

The current rapacious exploitation and export of hardwoods from the northeast is an example. In 2009,

25,000m

of illegal (the GoM issued “exceptional permits”) precious hardwoods were exported from the

northeast PAs.While conservationists believe that this will not have a huge biodiversity impact (unless the

logging continues for an extended time), its nancial effects are undeniable.The World Bank estimates the

value of this wood at $200 million, of which 25% would have been captured by the State if the wood had

passed through normal legal channels (Carret, et al. 2010).

120 The 1991 crisis was lengthy, but few Malagasy were yet working in projects.The 2002 crisis was shorter;

the current crisis has now lasted more than a year and is likely to disrupt the economy for signicantly

longer even if the political issues are resolved. Several former project and USAID employees have already

left to take up long-term positions managing environment programs in other African countries.

Discussion

Bilateral and multilateral donors are more or less obliged to partner with recipient governments,

which may explain their institutional optimism that the State is a benign force, or can be trained to

be one.This attitude is reected in continued efforts to “reform” the public sector and to train and

mentor state institutions. It assumes, implicitly, that “The State” wants to be reformed. It is perhaps

time to question this assumption and reect on what it means for environmental programs should it

prove to be false.

While not funded by USAID, the difculties encountered by Harvard’s Kennedy School (which

intensively mentored the Ravalomana regime to the point of seconding professors to work within

the Presidency and key ministries and carried

out major leadership training exercises) in

effecting signicant governance improvements We are left with the question

offers an interesting case study of the limits of

of whether progress on

such reform-minded approaches. Initial donor

optimism that the Ravalomanana regime (2002-

environmental issues can take

2009), which campaigned on a platform of

place in a context of a State that

change and seemed to start off with genuine

proclivities to reform, would carry out signicant

may not want to be reformed and

governance improvements was dashed as

may not have a true commitment

the positive rhetoric of the earlier years was

overtaken by practices sadly similar to those

to sustainably manage its

employed by previous corrupt regimes.

121

environment.

Real or expedient commitment?

Documents such as the NEAP, the Durban

Vision, and the MAP were largely drafted by outsiders. Both donor governments (that have to

demonstrate local buy-in) and the GoM (that desperately needs the accompanying nancial

resources) have an interest in demonstrating a Malagasy commitment to the principles of these

documents in order to maintain aid ows. If, as some have suggested, the GoM commitment to

these donor-driven agendas is at times more expedient than real (Brinkerhoff and Yeager 1993),

it is not surprising that implementation is characterized by passive, but very deliberate, resistance.

This helps to explain the litany of substandard achievements in the environment policy sector, which

may not be entirely accidental.Were there a robust grass-roots (or even intellectual) environmental

movement to hold leaders accountable for their rhetoric, the words might actually start to mean

something over time. In fact, however, there is little apparent support from the base.To the contrary,

in many cases politician-leaders tread a ne line between persuading the donors that they are

assiduously following an environmental agenda, while simultaneously reassuring the populace that

they won’t go very far in that direction.

It’s getting harder to impose good government. On the donor side, it is increasingly difcult

for donors to “impose” good governance procedures in Madagascar or to hold the GoM to its

own stated policy goals. Development trends of the last decade have favored direct government

support and limited oversight (so as not to be accused of meddling or non-respect of recipient

governments). If one donor puts conditionalities on its support, the GoM merely seeks out another

121 The World Bank’s Corruption Control Index gave Madagascar a score of 59.7% in 2002, but considered

that the situation had deteriorated to merit a score of only 51.5% in 2006 (Carret, et al. 2010, 85).

who will provide similar assistance with fewer management strings attached.

122

While this tames

donor arrogance, it has reduced accountability across the system and allowed inefciencies and

corrupt practices to persist longer than they otherwise might have.

The issues raised here are by no means unique to Madagascar, though Madagascar’s governance

problems are profound and persistent.The fact that other countries face similar issues is not much

consolation, however, unless we can show that those countries have made rapid and signicant

progress on economic and environment indicators in spite of governance weakness. In Madagascar,

we are left with the question of whether progress on environmental issues can take place in the

context of a State which may not want to be reformed and may not have a true commitment to

sustainably managing its environment. At a minimum that conclusion would beg a change in the

“benign state” approach employed by donors over the past quarter century.

Saving the Fianarantsoa forest corridor depends in

large measure on saving this train line that traverses

the corridor.The FCE railway debacle sadly illustrates

how bad governance can sabotage economic and

environmental progress. (Photo credit: Pierrot Men)

The Perfect Failure

The Fianarantsoa-East Coast (FCE) railway intervention

reects USAID’s efforts at their best. Creativity, continuity,

cooperation, exibility, strategic “out-of-the-box” thinking

and extraordinary mobilization of local communities all

contributed to what might have been a winning project...

yet turned out to be a spectacular failure.The following

is a sobering illustration of the interconnectedness of

environment, economics, and governance.

The railway crosses the Ranomafana-Andringitra

forest corridor. During EP I, the CAP project began

some tentative efforts to repair the ailing line because

commercial agriculture in the region depends on viable

transport systems. In 2000, the railway was devastated

by two cyclones.With train service halted and the line

buried by landslides, the PAGE project carried out a cost-

benet analysis to assess the consequences if the line did

not resume operation.The results showed that a likely

100,000 ha of primary forest would be cut by farmers

who, deprived of the opportunity to sell commercial crops,

would revert to slash-and-burn agriculture.

This conclusion engendered a rapid response: LDI

worked with USAID to mount an intense campaign to

save the railway. Eventually, $4.7 million of supplemental

congressional funds were obtained to carry out an FCE

Rehabilitation (FCER) Project. Armed with the PAGE

122 Still, even in the 1990s when USAID was one of the largest donors, threats to withdraw funds if the

government did not make adequate progress on structural adjustment fell on deaf ears. USAID did

actually carry through on the threat and pull back signicantly (as described in the rst chapter). A more

recent example was MNP’s ability to ignore USAID demands for more rigorous accounting.When USAID

withdrew its funds, the Park Service turned to the Germans for support.

studies and a new Master Plan of what was needed to properly rehabilitate the line, FCER

persuaded other donors to add more than $10 million to the endeavor, leveraging the

Congressional funds several times over.

In the meantime, on the ground, FCER and the governance projects (ILO, MISONGA)

were working on “social capital” issues, building solidarity among local stakeholders (train

users, mayors of villages along the line, the train workers) and reinforcing civil society

organizations to defend the interests of local users.

Rehabilitation work involved heavy construction but also mobilized hundreds of farmers

along the line to implement innovative bio-engineering solutions; they planted thousands of

fruit trees and millions of anti-erosive grasses on fragile embankments. Local people began

to “take ownership” of the railway.When political terrorists threatened to blow up the rail

infrastructures during the crisis of 2002, local civil society organizations assigned volunteer

guards to sleep in the tunnels for months on end, protecting them from sabotage.

Even with only half the intended rehabilitation program completed, the trains began running

on schedule and the FCE was able to double the number of trains per week.The local

economy responded with marked increases in the commercialization of bananas, coffee,

and other sustainably produced crops. Schools and health clinics reopened. In accord with

the agreements signed between USAID and the GoM, a privatization tender was launched

and two credible international consortia responded.

Then, disaster struck.The President decided, without explanation, that he did not want

to end parastatal management of the line after all. No amount of advocacy from the

well organized communities along the line, the railway workers, and international donors

could budge him from his position. In the past, when politicians knew they needed critical

votes from along the line, political pressure had sometimes helped. Now, with public

accountability replaced by obsequious appointed ofcials and rigged local elections,

government was impervious to the people’s voice.

The privatization tender was scrapped; donors pulled back (the World Bank alone

withdrew $7 million of promised funds) and the rehabilitation program ground to a halt.

The fundamental issues of parastatal management have not been resolved.The FCE is back

to the situation where there is a serious risk of accident and service is far too unreliable

to attract the businesses (eco-tourism and food processing) that had previously indicated

an interest in investing in the region. As farmers lose hope in the future of commercial

agriculture, tavy has resumed in the adjacent forest corridor.

           

            

      

STEPPING BACK:

ASSESSING RESULTS

IN TERMS OF THE

OVERALL IMPACT

ON MADAGASCAR’S

NATURAL

ENVIRONMENT

THE BOTTOM LINE

There has been notable progress in all areas where USAID has worked: at the policy and institutional

level, in park management and the creation of protected areas, in reducing pressures on forest

resources in particular locales.These successes have been much celebrated and have kept hope alive

that indeed progress is possible.Yet, as we step back after 25 years, honesty compels us to conclude

that the environmental crisis in Madagascar is far more acute now than it was at the outset of EP I:

• Forest area has diminished signicantly (10,650,142 ha of forest in 1990 vs.

9,413,218 ha in 2005: more than a million ha was lost in 15 years).

123

• Forests are still disappearing at an alarming rate (0.53% or about 100-150,000 ha

lost per year): deforestation has slowed, but come nowhere close to stopping or

reversing forest conversion.

124

• 80% of Madagascar’s forests are now located

In 1990 Madagascar had

within 1 km of a non-forest edge (Harper

about 11 million ha of forest

2007), which means that a determined or

desperate farmer with a machete and a box

and 11 million people.

of matches can walk to them within an hour.

• More than 3,300 families live and farm

Today the country has about

inside the Ranomafana-Andringitra

9 million ha of forest and 20

corridor (Raharinomenjanahary, et

al. 2008, 20-21) Eight million more

million people.

123 Evolution de la couverture de forêts naturelles à Madagascar (2009)

124 Up until 2001, the donors described the objective of NEAP as reversing Madagascar’s deforestation. In

that year, a multi-donor evaluation of the environmental program deemed that to be overambitious and

impossible to achieve.The consequence was that the objective was reformulated as slowing the rate of

degradation.

           

people are exerting pressure on natural resources than when NEAP was announced.

Family planning interventions have had some promising results on contraceptive

prevalence rates, but the overall population growth rate still hovers near 3%. As

welcome as lowered population growth rates in the future may be, they do not

change the fact that Madagascar’s population will double again in the next 20 years.

• The unacceptable economic situation has not changed; to the extent that the

economy has enjoyed limited growth in some areas, this has not translated

into economic improvements in the rural areas that put the greatest pressure

on forests and which remain desperately poor by any standards.

Bluntly put: in 1990 Madagascar had about 11 million ha of forest and 11m people.Today the

country has about 9 million ha of forest and 20 million people.

WITH SO MANY POSITIVE RESULTS,WHY

HAVEN’T WE SAVED THE FORESTS?

The NEAP vision in Madagascar was robust at the outset and has remained fundamentally relevant

even as new information has rened our understanding of the problem.While one can quibble over

specic interventions, criticize inappropriate administrative imperatives, and lament funding limits,

USAID’s approach has been admirably strategic and (at least on the environment front) sustained.

Scaling up: the logic

The program also had a persistent logic. It was founded on a solid base of eld activities that reached

into the lives of people living at the farthest frontier and having the greatest immediate impact on

the forests. From early on, however, it was recognized that while such localized project interventions

were desirable and necessary, their results would be limited in scope and time. It was necessary to

scale out in space and to ensure sustainability over time.

This was to occur through two mechanisms. At the local/regional level, investments in “structural”

factors (e.g. transport as needed to help farmers reorient from a purely subsidence livelihood to

a more diversied economic strategy) were intended to exert a systemic inuence on the local

economy and have an impact on vastly more people than could be reached by direct household

level interventions. At the national level, USAID would help the government create a favorable

policy framework that would also positively inuence the behavior of massive numbers of people.

Together (and with the complementary interventions of other donors) this would extend the reach

of USAID’s intervention over time and space.

USAID’s projects were at their strongest when they promoted active dialogue (and therefore

synergies) between the eld and policy levels so that policy interventions were ground-truthed

with local realities and approaches were coherent and mutually reinforcing.And this did happen,

if sometimes imperfectly. As such, both the strategy and its implementation were fundamentally

sound; they probably deserved to have better, more lasting results than they did. Once again, we are

brought back to the context in which these projects have operated.While it would be wrong to

suggest that the fault has been entirely exogenous to the projects, failure to acknowledge the larger

context is equally dangerous because it implies that correcting project aws would render their

results more profound and durable, which may not be the case.

Without adequate rural infrastructures, it is almost impossible to

transform rural economies away from subsistence agriculture yet this

is critical to reducing pressures on highly threatened forests. (Photo

credit: IRG)

Scaling down: the reality

Going back to a model in which specic ground level interventions are acknowledged to generate

results that are limited in scale and must thus be accompanied by structural changes (whether

infrastructure or policy) that will have a broader

and more lasting impact, we are obliged to

confront the evidence from the last 25 years:

in Madagascar policies and infrastructures are

as ephemeral – or more so – than project

interventions.When governments sweep in and

out of power on decennial breezes and people

and policies sweep in and out with them, when

the whole structure from top to bottom is

shaken with every change in constitution, when

the government is incapable of maintaining or

restoring infrastructures and every cyclone wipes

out dams and roads on which farmers depend

for their livelihoods (with no systematic provision

for rebuilding), it is almost impossible to build a

program that will have sustainable results at the

scale needed to protect Madagascar’s forests.

In the end, battered by these realities, USAID

projects too often settled for scaling down,

celebrating the micro-victories because that was

all they had.

The economy

It is not news to say that Madagascar’s environment problem is, fundamentally, an economic

development problem.The NEAP stated it as far back as 1988:

The different aspects of environmental degradation appear to be symptoms of a more

serious problem affecting Malagasy society. A variety of economic and historical factors

are involved – extensive changes within government, pricing mechanisms that provide

little incentive for producers, and excessive state control... (NEAP 29).

The World Bank’s 1996 Staff Appraisal Report (EP II) reiterated:“At the root of Madagascar’s

environmental problem is the economy’s failure to take off.” It then continued:

The environmental program ... will endow the country with the capacity to manage

its environmental resources more effectively and reduce the rate at which its natural

resources are being depleted. It will not be able to stop environmental degradation

altogether or to reverse it.This can only be achieved through an improvement in

Madagascar’s development performance.As in many other developing countries, the

ultimate outcome for the environment will depend on the economy’s ability to intensify

the use of land and develop non-agricultural sources of income. (The World Bank 2007,

11)

Yet, as we have seen throughout this paper, governance issues continue, inexorably, to undermine

economic progress. In the early years of NEAP implementation around Africa, institutional capacity

was consistently identied as the most critical factor in project success (Talbott 1993, 10)This,

correctly, drove a huge investment of resources into institutional capacity building in Madagascar. It is

now clear that while this was undoubtedly necessary, it was also insufcient: in Madagascar increased

capacity has spectacularly failed to translate into more benign or effective governance. Environmental

Environmental preservation

preservation is hostage to economic development.

Economic development is hostage to bad governance.

is hostage to economic

We knew this 25 years ago when the NEAP was rst

development. Economic

promulgated (though with perhaps less certitude and

sophistication than we know it now).We have lost

development is hostage to

signicant ground in the interim and time is running

bad governance. We knew

out.

this 25 years ago when NEAP

was launched. We have lost

IS MADAGASCAR

signiﬁcant ground in the

DIFFERENT?

interim and time is running

As we assess USAID’s environment program results

in Madagascar and consider implications both for

out.

future programs and for transferring lessons learned

to other countries, it may be useful to reect on the

extent to which conditions in Madagascar are special,

in comparison with other countries under severe

environmental threat.

How is Madagascar different and what does that imply for

future interventions?

Time. The rst factor that makes Madagascar different is time.

For many of Madagascar’s forests and species, the tipping point

(used here to describe the point where natural resources

have become too scarce to support the species that depend

on them and the resource base can no longer be easily

resurrected) is perilously close. Each species has its own tipping

point and some, we know, are tragically already living on the

wrong side of the balance.Time is truly running out. Slowing

the rate of degradation is not enough because, inexorably, you

still arrive at the tipping point.The issue for Madagascar more

urgently than many other countries is not just slowing the rate,

but stopping it before we reach that point of no return.

The difference in value accorded nature (international

concern vs. domestic/local interest). The second

characteristic that must be highlighted is the divergence in

the value the international community places on Madagascar’s

natural resources compared to that accorded by the Malagasy

(whether the State or local communities).This difference is

probably greater for Madagascar than for any other country

in the world though specic sites elsewhere may have similar

challenges.

125

The international community places an extremely

high value on Madagascar’s biodiversity because it is unique; it is

found nowhere else on earth. If we fail to protect the resources

in Madagascar, we can’t count on a neighboring country to

perhaps do better. Furthermore, to meet the biodiversity

125 In 1996, the World Bank wrote, “The discrepancy in Madagascar between threats to globally-signicant

biodiversity and government capacity to address them is unparalleled.“(World Bank 1996, 15) After 15

years of capacity building, we might now ask an even more profound question,“Even if endowed with the

capacity to act, do the government and people wish to do so...?”

The Indri (or babakoto) lemur, with a remaining

population of fewer than 10,000 and a rapidly

diminishing habitat, may already be on the wrong side

of its ecological tipping point. How much, collectively,

Wildlife Conservation Society)

concerns of the international community, Madagascar needs to maintain the entire spectrum of

species in all ecological niches. It all matters.This challenge is immensely greater than just ensuring the

“greening” of a country or space, or maintaining a few discrete areas as national parks.

On the other side of the equation, the Malagasy perspective on the natural forest per se can

best be characterized as indifferent. For most people (and certainly those that pose the greatest

threat to the forest) nature is appreciated if and when it can provide direct and palpable benets,

not as a more intrinsic or general good. People need rewood, not trees.They may need green

mountain ridges to encourage water inltration that benets rice elds, but it makes not the least

bit of difference whether that green band is composed of exotic or endemic species or whether

it provides a favorable ecosystem for lemurs or birds. People may well value particular elements

within the natural forest for medicine, fuel, or food, but pragmatic and urgent subsistence needs for

those goods do not necessarily translate into a determination to save the larger ecosystem so as to

maintain access to those goods in the future.

This unbalanced equation between intense international concern and local indifference is driving the

push toward conservation payments.

Vulnerability to natural disaster. A third characteristic, though sadly similar to some other

desperately poor countries, is Madagascar’s vulnerability to cyclones and natural disasters. In many

years, Madagascar is hit by two to ve cyclones, enough so that people have developed an array of

coping strategies (e.g., easily rebuilt houses in cyclone prone zones, avoidance of likely ood zones)

to deal with these “normal” events.This has mitigated, though certainly not fully avoided, the human

suffering. Infrastructure, however, continues to be enormously vulnerable to these disasters. It is rare

to enter a community where there is not some infrastructure that was destroyed by a past cyclone

and never repaired. In many cases, these broken irrigation systems or road and bridge washouts have

severely depressed the economic potential of the area.

This situation is likely to get dramatically worse over the next generation. Climate change scientists

think that cyclones will probably become more intense and therefore more destructive. In the

absence of enforced building and zoning codes, many of the millions of people who will be added

to Madagascar’s population over the next decades are likely to live in unsuitable areas, be they ood

plains or unstable slopes.This pattern is already terrifyingly visible in Antananarivo and other urban

areas.

When government demonstrates little responsiveness to local people’s concerns and there is no

functional taxation system to return money to local areas, the pattern of abandoned infrastructure is

unlikely to change.The “after the fact” ad hoc emergency responses of donors

126

are insufcient, slow,

and haphazard.This issue must be addressed in future environmental and economic development

strategies. It is as important to implement sustainable nancing mechanisms to deal with inevitable

infrastructure damage from natural disasters as it is to ensure the funds needed to manage the

national parks. In the absence of such mechanisms, efforts to help rural communities move away

from subsistence agriculture will be futile and natural resources will continue to be the insurance of

last resort.

126 USAID invests signicant food aid resources in preparedness, but they are insufcient to cover all

vulnerable communities given how widespread disasters are and neither do they systematically address

the more fundamental infrastructure issues. A possible solution would be to establish a system whereby

a portion of all donor funds for infrastructure projects are set aside in an endowed fund to repair those

infrastructures after national disasters.

EXTERNALITIES

Before looking ahead to the future, let us briey

touch on a few of the many exogenous factors

that will impinge on Madagascar’s environment

and possible U.S. responses.This section

highlights three that are particularly relevant:

climate change, increasing Chinese (and other

non-Western investments), and U.S. politics and

aid policies.

Climate Change

Concern about the effects of climate change

on Madagascar’s biodiversity and livelihoods

motivated the organization of the 2008 Climate

Change workshop in Antananarivo. USAID and

its partners (among them CI and WWF) played

a key role in helping the GoM to organize the

workshop with MacArthur Foundation support.

The U.S. Ambassador was a keynote speaker.

More than 130 experts participated, some

bringing experiences from Madagascar, while

others used sophisticated models to predict

the likely effects of climate change on different

species and eco-systems.

While this is not the place to review the extensive and sobering results of the workshop,

127

the

participants concluded that virtually all environmental issues now on the table will be exacerbated

by climate change.

128

The preservation of current forest corridors (as well as the protection of

riverine forests that are important avenues of connectivity and were identied as needing additional

research) becomes even more critical as threatened species will have to respond to climate variation

as well as disappearing habitats. Humans will become more vulnerable to intense weather patterns

and the incidence of cyclones is likely to increase by as much as 46% (Carret et al. 2010).There will

be considerable variation in weather changes across the country (some areas of the country will

become drier and hotter and some areas wetter), making it hard to devise general strategies. Upland

rain-fed agricultural systems will be particularly vulnerable. Coastal resources (including mangroves,

which are important shrimp reproduction zones) are likely to suffer signicant damage,

129

with

increased ooding in low-lying areas. Other second-order economic impacts may be felt in sectors

like tourism.

Improvements in climate monitoring data were identied as a priority need (even basic rainfall

statistics are lacking for much of Madagascar), especially in conservation priority areas. An acute

paucity of information was noted for marine and coastal ecosystems, including especially mangroves

and reefs.

127 See the Workshop Report: Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change on Madagascar’s Biodiversity and

Livelihoods.

128 Madagascar contributes little to climate change, producing only very modest gas emissions, estimated at

0.2T per capita per year, or about 1/20th as high as South Africa and 1/40th of US rates (Carret et al.

2010).

129 Madagascar’s marine and coastal areas are estimated to contribute 50% of national economic wealth;

shrimp represent 71% of the total value of sheries exports (USAID/Biodiversity Analysis and Technical

Support 2008, 36).

The arrival of multinational mining companies (here a photo of

Rio Tinto’s operations near Fort Dauphin) adds new challenges

to environmental conservation in Madagascar. (Photo credit: Qit

Madagascar Minerals)

The workshop issued a plea that greater attention be paid to protecting marine resources and

proposed that Marine Protected Areas extending from the shore to the continental shelf and deep

sea habitats be established.

The conference positively noted Madagascar’s role in implementing carbon sequestration pilot

projects (especially those focused on avoiding deforestation) and helping to develop practical

methodologies and approaches to making REDD work.

Increasing Chinese (and other non-Western

Investment) in Madagascar

When the NEAP was being drafted, Madagascar was coming out of a period of political and

economic isolationism where the country was largely sealed off from at least western international

forces. (Isolationism is a recurrent pattern in Malagasy politics, used as an international and domestic

policy tool since the 19th century.) The strategy faltered when pragmatic economic considerations

trumped political idealism. Madagascar signed a structural adjustment agreement with the IMF in

1984 and began soliciting donor funds. Shortly after, the rst aid workers arrived to nd acute

shortages of soap and toilet paper, among other problems of the day.

If Madagascar was at a different place at the dawn of the NEAP, so was Africa and the world. NEAP

evolved in a global context still dominated by the posturing that characterized the end of the Cold

War and (in Africa) francophone–anglophone rivalries. A prominent political observer in 1992 wrote,

“It is hard to make a case that Africa matters very much to China” (Segal 1992, 115).To all but a die-

hard few, francophone-anglophone tensions seem rather trivial at this point. And Africa now matters

to China a great deal.

Given the history of western interventions in Africa over the past centuries, it feels hypocritically

ethnocentric to comment on the “Chinese invasion”

130

or the arrival of numerous other “non-

traditional” (e.g. Saudi Arabia, South Korea) prospecting countries in Madagascar.The increasing

importance of these countries and their industries (which operate outside the constraints of most

western business) does, however, raise two cautionary notes relevant to the issues discussed in this

paper.

The rst issue concerns environmentally responsible extraction and investment.The Chinese are

interested in Madagascar’s oil,

131

minerals, and metals (e.g., bauxite), most of which are extracted

from environmentally sensitive areas.The objective is similar to those of western rms, whether Total

or Rio Tinto, seeking the same products.The differences play out in the amount of transparency

surrounding the deals, the environmental standards to which the operations must comply, and the

level of accountability to which the companies (or State rms) can be held.

Many of these operations are not being held to the standards of Madagascar’s Environmental Impact

laws. Chinese disregard for environmental concerns in many parts of its own country are well

documented; it is unlikely that China

132

would voluntary impose higher standards on its operations

in Madagascar. Furthermore, the very existence of such major international contracts is often hidden

130 Neither is this section intended to imply that there have not been benets from the Chinese-Malagasy

relationship. Specically, the Chinese have completed several important infrastructure projects.

131 In 2007 the Chinese won 30 and 35-year production rights to two major oil blocks, anticipated to produce

more than 5 billion barrels (Reuters).

132 It is interesting that the biggest, formal sector Chinese (sometimes national) companies are feeling some

international pressure on these points. Some large Chinese companies have participated in World Bank

discussions on responsible mining, for example. More worrisome are the small “rogue” industries that play

by few international rules. See H. French (2010) for a discussion of how these companies have operated in

the Congo.

from the public. Even the deal struck by Daewoo-South Korea to farm 1.3 million ha of farmland

with maize and palm trees (with the production to be exported to Korea) was hidden from the

Malagasy people and some sectors of government until it was nally uncovered by the Financial

Times. Soon after, it became a cause célèbre, contributing to President Ravalomanana’s overthrow.

When deals are secretly cut with high level government ofcials, it is difcult for concerned

environmentalists to leverage opposition. (The Korean land deal was somewhat different because

it alienated enormous tracts of land, which has always been a sore point in Madagascar. Spatially

limited environmental damage, or deals that affect State forests rather than privately owned farm

land, are likely to engender a lesser reaction from the populace.) Western companies, while far

from perfect in their environmental mitigation strategies, are at least subject to public pressure.

Embassies, conservation organizations, the popular press, and shareholders can all make life miserable

for large western companies who do environmental damage in charismatic poor countries such as

Madagascar.The result is evident: Rio Tinto has more than 70 people working specically on socio-

economic and environmental mitigation efforts around its ilmenite industry in Tolagnara

133

and

Sherritt’s Ambatovy vision statement commits to delivering “outstanding environmental and social

results.”

The second concern is the effect of these operations on governance.The “resource curse,” when

countries gain a signicant portion of their revenues from natural resources, has been shown to

consistently undermine good governance in poor countries. Specically, when government revenues

come primarily from natural resources, authorities are not dependent on taxes or other locally

collected funds that would force a measure of accountability.Then, when the funds are received,

if they are not invested in ways that will have long-term public benets, the country remains poor,

while having lost its resources assets. Future generations are condemned to perpetual poverty.

In a country like Madagascar where social accountability is extremely low and there is a culture of

“political turn-taking” the risks of this happening are exceedingly high.

134

The costs of such operations

are even higher when the extraction of the minerals (or metals or oil) not only uses up the

resource in question, but also destroys forests or other natural treasures (e.g. reefs) whose ancillary

destruction will have far-reaching consequences on the economy. In Madagascar, we could imagine

dire consequences on watersheds, shrimp production, etc. And nally, the riches generated by these

contracts cannot help but attract unscrupulous politicians into the fray, increasing the likelihood of

extra-legal transfers of power, to which Madagascar has already proven itself sadly vulnerable.

The Chinese policy of non-interference. All of these issues are exacerbated by the Chinese

principle of respecting State sovereignty and non-interference, as well as their general antipathy

to transparency and the promotion of good governance. Mutually benecial (to the individuals,

not necessarily the country) relationships are built with African leaders based in part on a shared

disdain for such western concepts. As summed up by the Sierra Leonean Ambassador to China (and

proudly reported in an ofcial Chinese publication):

“The Chinese just come and do it.They don’t hold meetings about environmental

impact assessments, human rights, bad governance and good governance. I’m not

saying it’s right, just that Chinese investment is succeeding because they don’t set high

benchmarks.” (Chinafrica February 2006, quoted in Taylor (2007, 16).

133 Rio Tinto has also named an International Advisory Panel, composed of two international scientists and one

highly renowned Malagasy conservationist to help them comply with sound environmental practices.

134 The country is currently experiencing a classic example.The Rajoelina camp gained power in large part by

criticizing Ravalomanana abuses (e.g. land sales to the Koreans and contracts to sell water to the Saudis,

both of which were cancelled with considerable fanfare when Rajoelina took ofce). But, within months

of taking ofce, the Rajoelina administration was complicit with massive export operations for precious

rosewood, destined for China.

As noted above, this makes it all the harder for western countries to take the high road and insist

on “good-enough” governance.Threats (to withhold donor funds, for example) only work when the

beneciary needs what you have to offer more than you value what they have.When someone else

is willing to replace the lost funding, without requiring comparable compliance, the ability to leverage

better governance or any other behavior is much reduced.

The primary challenge for the last generation of environmentalists, already difcult enough, was

tavy pressure by hundreds of thousands of small farmers. Remoteness, dispersal, and poverty made

this behavior difcult to inuence. For the next generation, the number of small farmer tavyistes

has grown to exceed a million. In addition, the environmental defense team will have to confront

pressure from enormous multinational companies and foreign powers seeking to extract valuable

mineral and fossil energy assets.The power, wealth, and (in some cases) unscrupulousness of the

latter are likely to prove formidable.

135

U.S. politics and aid policies

While this retrospective has focused primarily on what was happening in Madagascar over the past

quarter century, there have been numerous allusions to the larger USAID context and the myriad

ways in which it supported, constrained, and generally inuenced the program in Madagascar.The

relative abundance of development dollars during EP I quickly turned into a perpetual struggle

to make ends meet, and then just to keep the Mission open. Funding ebbs and ows were due

in small measure to what was happening in Madagascar at the time; the far larger inuence came

from U.S. foreign and international aid policies determined independently of anything happening

in country. Budget trends have not generally been favorable to Africa (with the exception of just

a few countries) in recent years and were it not for the biodiversity earmarks, many believe that

Madagascar’s USAID Mission would already have been closed, with funding maintained for only a

very few programs managed from afar.

As has been noted several times in this paper, decisions regarding USAID project funding are made

based on a basket of concerns, only some of which have to do with the results obtained in the eld.

This has been most evident in the cases where programs and projects have been suspended in

order to make a political statement, with catastrophic results on the ground.

Given the high importance this retrospective has accorded to “good-enough” governance as a

prerequisite to environmental success, it would be illogical to deny the use of conditionalities as

a mechanism for achieving better governance. However, pragmatism demands a close look at

decisions to suspend environmental programs as a way to “send a message” to successive Malagasy

governments. My reading of the evidence suggests that threats, conditionalities, and suspensions

have had little impact on the political situation in Madagascar, yet they have signicantly undermined

project results in the eld. As such, they have been costly and counterproductive.

As USAID considers its future interventions in Madagascar, it should anticipate these types of issues

(even accepting that one of the few certainties in Madagascar is the unpredictability of what happens

next) and think through likely responses before tying down an investment strategy.There will be

stressful confrontations of pragmatism and principle, and no easy answers. But we have enough

experience in Madagascar to know that the issue is likely to arise; only a very rich ostrich would go

into the next phase of operations unprepared.

135 In its recent policy document outlining future environmental challenges for Madagascar, the World Bank lists

as its Third Challenge:“Controlling the environmental impacts of large, especially mining, projects.” (Carret

et al. 2010).

    

      

     

With a relatively new administration working in the context of a severe international nancial crisis it

is hard to predict future funding levels, but few experts think that Madagascar is likely to benet from

a major resurgence of bilateral development assistance.This reality must inform strategic discussions

so that aid funds are allocated where they have the greatest chance of making a difference.There

is currently pressure to expand interventions to coastal areas, which are undoubtedly highly

meritorious of international attention. But can we do it all? Will this divert funds from forest

conservation and land-based biodiversity? What matters most? With needs certainly greater and

resources probably smaller, how will USAID position itself for future interventions? And what would

a USAID “commitment” look like in an agency that is now widely viewed as ineffectual/weak and

which is under intense critiques from both the left and the right, not to mention internally.When

funding vagaries make it difcult for the Agency to respect even two and three year contracts, can

we at this point imagine a credible 20-year commitment?

Given these realities, there is growing momentum to repackage the issues in an entirely different way.

Rather than focusing on USAID’s role in saving Madagascar’s forests, we would dene the issue as a

collective mission to protect earth’s biodiversity heritage that happens to reside, in large measure, in

Madagascar.This approach forms the basis of Scenario 3 below.

WHAT NEXT?

It is clear that if USAID decides to continue to

support the Madagascar environment program, it

will be worthwhile only if:

• It can mobilize signicantly greater

resources for the endeavor.

• It is willing to commit to truly long-

term support (long enough to offer

reasonable hope that Madagascar

will exit its current vicious cycle of

political self-destruction) and has

a clear strategy for dealing with

inevitable political disruptions.

• It is allowed to move beyond

the articial distinction between

environment and economic

growth/development to develop

a more ambitious, coherent, and

comprehensive plan that allows

environmental issues to be addressed

in tandem with economic concerns.

All actors in the next phase of environmental planning should incorporate signicant changes in the

international context into their analyses. If Madagascar’s environmental prole has risen over the

past 25 years, so has interest in its mineral and petroleum riches. Inuencing these giant national

and multinational industries will require different strategies from those employed in previous

environmental programs.

At the other end of the spectrum, we must better incorporate local voices and social justice

approaches into our treatment of biodiversity issues in Madagascar.This is not to say that we have

not listened; indeed there are many who have taken this seriously from the outset and others who

Many of Madagascar’s rural people, as this family who farms next to

Andringitra Park, depend on natural resources for their livelihoods.

Difcult as it may be, it is imperative that future interventions do even

better at incorporating local voices and social justice issues into our

treatment of biodiversity issues in Madagascar. (Photo credit: Karen

Freudenberger)

have learned to take it more seriously over the past 25 years. Regrettably, however, we collectively

blew it over SAPM, which was a critical test of whether we had mastered the art of taking local

concerns seriously, integrally, and from the outset. Instead, we remembered only belatedly that

people matter.We will pay dearly for that error in the years ahead.

As we move ahead, we must study alternative livelihood strategies before we impose restrictions

on forest use.We must understand where our interests correspond and where they don’t, and we

must not sweep the latter under the carpet. And nally, we must once and for all move beyond

the misplaced debate that frames the issue as forests/biodiversity versus the Malagasy people and

instead focus on real livelihood issues.Too often, critics sympathetic to the admittedly sad plight of

rural peoples exhort the international community to leave the villagers to their time-honored tavy

practices. In the very short term that may be a defensible position, but it seeds its own ominous

failure.

Once the forest is gone, there will be no chameleons, no lemurs ... but also no tavy. In many

communities, in well less than a generation, families will confront barren hillsides, infertile elds, and

landscapes and livelihoods that bear an eerie resemblance to Haiti. It is essential that we put concern

for the wellbeing of Madagascar’s poor on an equal footing with our concern for the environment.

But the status quo is not an acceptable solution. If we fail in our efforts to save Madagascar’s forests,

there will be no winners.

Three scenarios

The following section lays out three broad scenarios for how international donors in general, and

USAID in particular, might intervene in Madagascar. It is purposefully provocative in an attempt to

open up the debate and lay out issues that may otherwise be neglected in discussions that focus

primarily on ne-tuning the current approach.

Scenario 1: Forget it; it’s already too late and nothing we can realistically do will

be able to save the remaining resources. No one who has been working seriously on

environmental issues in Madagascar over the past 25 years will come easily to the conclusion that

it is too late and too impossible.There’s not much more to say about this, a tragically defeatist

conclusion that absolutely no one wants but probably more than a few (intellectually, if not in their

hearts) would judge to be the most honest.

This scenario proposes that scarce resources be devoted to other countries and contexts where we

have a better chance of success.The people who opt for this scenario would argue that even if we

commit to substantial interventions, the ultimate results will be little different and would, at best, only

insignicantly postpone the day of reckoning.

The likely result? Consequences for Madagascar’s people and the Earth’s precious biodiversity

that are far too depressing to commit to paper.

Scenario 2: Keep on track – Do more of the same, but better. This scenario would follow

the spirit of what has been done over the past 25 years, with additional ne- (and not-so-ne)

tuning.

136

Partners would have to mobilize signicantly more resources than what USAID has been

contributing up until now.There are lessons of the last 15 years that can certainly improve future

programs.

136 USAID/Biodiversity Analysis and Technical Support (2008), pp. 122-124, has a summary of priority goals

and recommended entry points for project interventions that could usefully build on USAID’s investments

to date.

At a minimum, in order to have any signicant impact, USAID (and its international partners) would

have to commit more funds than previously and for a period at least as long. Such an intervention

would work best if it had a long time frame of guaranteed funding (a minimum of 20 years) and

implementer continuity; results should be assured by periodic re-evaluation and ne-tuning, not

stopping and starting projects every few years.

Since the funds available would almost certainly be insufcient to “do it all,” it would be essential to

use the best information currently available to reprioritize and select the area(s) where we would

have the best chance to forestall arrival at a tipping point.While it is true that the more funds that

are available, the more areas that could be addressed, spreading funds too thinly would have no

impact at all.Wherever the intervention takes place, it would have to seriously address the economic

development side of the equation (including infrastructure), and work at least locally on a consistent

program of nurturing civil society.

Both this strategy and the next should make a concerted effort to attract talented Malagasy back to

the country.There are Malagasy working on environmental issues (or unemployed) all around the

world.The world needs them back in Madagascar. Giving these talented professionals the “cover”

they need to work effectively would be a critical contribution to Madagascar’s development.

The projects would, at a minimum, have to do serious damage control, designing projects to make

them as invulnerable as possible to government derailment. Unless there were to be strong evidence

of a genuine government commitment to the environmental program, it would probably not make

sense to invest signicant further resources in reforming the public sector.

The likely result? It’s hard to say, of course, but probably similar to what has happened to date.

Localized impact in the immediate project zone could be quite positive, but would depend on

how the project is implemented and the extent to which it succeeds in transforming at least the

local economy.We know, however, that the success of local projects cannot be separated from

national and international economies.This leaves results always vulnerable to larger governance

and economic development issues. Since USAID would only be able to “adopt” a relatively small

part of the environmental challenge, overall success would depend on the extent to which other

donors pick up the rest of the pieces and then coordinate to create programmatic and geographical

synergies. Forest loss would likely continue in areas where there is not a signicant and effective

donor presence.

Scenario 3:The ends justify the means – Break all the rules and GO FOR IT. This

scenario would be based on the conviction that Madagascar’s biodiversity is so important to the

world at large that we will collectively do everything that is needed to protect it.This would require

breaking many rules, or at least going against the “norms” that have governed development projects

in recent years.

This approach would require a common strategic vision (let’s not call it NEAP but, say, an

International Plan to Protect Madagascar’s Biodiversity) among the major international environmental

and development actors. It would studiously avoid assuming that this is Madagascar’s vision and

would be designed to work irrespective of whether Malagasy love their forests or care about

biodiversity.

Designing this scenario would require a multi-disciplinary summit of thoughtful Malagasy and

international thinkers to come up with a plan that has the best chance of success.There must

be serious attention to ensuring that people from all sectors of Malagasy society are included in

discussions about how to implement the approach.These consultations must be serious, deep, and

extensive.

This scenario would probably involve massive conservation payments

137

that would last long into

the future. Funds would be spent on cash payments to individuals or local communities that protect

forest resources, on infrastructure investments

138

as needed to help transform the local economy,

or some combination of both.The payments would need to be sufcient to cover most, if not all, of

Madagascar’s remaining forests. Economic improvement at all levels of the economy, and reaching

to the forest fringes, would be key. It would also be necessary to nd a formula giving government

enough of a stake so that they would not be tempted to undermine the process.

Implementation could be spear-headed by a consortium of the non-governmental conservation and

development organizations or by a multi-lateral agency. Continuity would be of the essence.While

USAID’s own resources are likely to be miniscule compared to the total size of this international

campaign, it could use its respected position to help conceptualize the new approach and identify a

role that would maintain its presence (and memory) at the table.

“Breaking the rules” in this case means going against current development notions that donors/

projects should be working themselves out of a job and “handing over the stick.”To the contrary, this

strategy would imply doing more than we have in the past and for much longer.

We would start with an implicit assumption that national governance/administrative systems may

not work.Therefore, alternative systems (e.g. payment management, monitoring of forest use) would

be established wherever necessary for the success of the program.

139

Care should be taken to do

this in a way that wouldn’t crowd out positive government initiatives, but also doesn’t shy away from

making necessary things happen.The donors or their designated partners might have to be involved

in all aspects of the program to ensure that it works according to plan: administering payments,

carrying out local development interventions at the landscape level, ensuring that the necessary

infrastructure and policies are implemented to move forward.We could not afford to lose sight of

the primary goal (ensuring protection of the forest). Other objectives, such as empowering local

institutions, would become clearly secondary.

National sovereignty? This is a serious concern. If this strategy were to be implemented without

economic benets to the people and be administered alongside a visibly rapacious and self-serving

government, there would inevitably be further revolts.The forests, having acquired greater political

and economic value, would also have greater value as symbols of protest and would massively burn.

If, however, the new strategy were to be implemented in conjunction with generalized improvements

in economic opportunity at all levels of the economy, and with an administration perceived to

nominally operate in the interest of the country (or more subtle when it doesn’t do so), the

populace would be more likely to tolerate the infringements on national sovereignty implied when

international interests prevail over perceived national concerns.

Long-term commitment to this process would be absolutely critical for success. Fundamentally, the

world at large would need to pay to protect Madagascar’s environment until such time as Malagasy

interests are roughly equivalent to outsider interests in environmental protection. At such time,

137 REDD payments would be largely insufcient, at least at current carbon prices.This approach would more

likely require some sort of international “tax” explicitly devoted to biodiversity preservation.

138 Infrastructure here refers to both the physical (roads, irrigation) and the social (education, agricultural

extension). Consideration should be given to engaging the Chinese as a partner since they have proven

themselves generally more competent than other donors at generating infrastructure results at the

necessary scale and speed. Remember, we expect to break some rules in this scenario. In this case there

would likely be a quid pro quo to meet Chinese interests; the environmental community might have to

accept some trade-offs in order to achieve the overall objective.The key is that these decisions would be

made strategically so as to optimize the overall impact on the environment.

139 Paul Collier’s The Bottom Billion addresses issues of working with fragile states. He notes that it is

sometimes necessary to bypass weak governmental institutions in the short term, while reinforcing those

institutions over the longer term.

Madagascar would also have to have a government capable of enforcing rules to prevent private/

minority interests from trumping the public/national interest. It could be a very – very – long time

before these two conditions occur.

This approach would require us to believe that it could work, and then to collectively commit the

resources to make it work. But we would also need clear benchmarks to assess whether we were

succeeding or not.We couldn’t let people continue to cut the forest while being paid the king’s

ransom not to do so. Pretending success might fool ourselves but would not fool Mother Nature.

Regular reviews should be scheduled and followed in order to identify and correct problems, but the

overall commitment could not waver unless the system proved unworkable. Participants should be

prepared to stay the course and weather political crises.

The likely results? One of the rules that would be broken would be a willingness to try even if

the results were uncertain.We would take the risk because we had run out of other options, we

didn’t think anything else would work in the time remaining, and the consequences of not trying

were unacceptable.

The challenges would be signicant.We could not afford to make the mistake of rolling this out too

fast, before all the details were worked out and sufcient consultation had taken place as described

above. On the other hand, the clock is ticking and the longer we wait before the program is

implemented, the more forests will have disappeared (50,000-80,000 ha of deforestation a year, with

the largest impact on the most vulnerable dry forests, seems a not unreasonable estimate of the

costs of delay). And doing it badly could be more damaging to the environment than not doing it at

all.

The risks of such an approach are not insignicant; this strategy could result in Madagascar holding

the world hostage to environmental extortion with demands to pay ever more for the coveted

resources. If we stopped paying, we could lose our entire investment in a very short period of time.

Madagascar would lose too, of course, but thus far the threat of catastrophic consequences for the

nation has proved largely ineffectual in bringing Malagasy leaders to reason.

CONCLUSION

Whether we conclude from this story that we have accomplished much or little is a matter of

personality and perspective. Regardless, Madagascar’s situation today and her prospects for the future

are profoundly troubling for all who care about her people and her environment.

A Malagasy proverb reminds us:

“Tsy mahafoy vola hamidy takotra, ka manta vary.”

If you won’t spend money to buy a lid for your pot, the rice won’t cook.

For environmentalists, the question no longer concerns our willingness to purchase a lid. Rather, what

are we going to do about the pot...?

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