Part 2-2, Question 30 225
that we “weep with those who weep,” in the same way that we “rejoice with those who rejoice.”
Therefore, mercy is not a special virtue.
Objection 4: Since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is not an intellectual virtue. Neither
is it a theological virtue, since it does not have God as its object. Similarly, it is not a moral virtue,
either. For it does not have to do with operations, since this pertains to justice; nor does it have to do
with the passions, since it is not traced back to any of the twelve ‘means’ that the Philosopher posits in
Ethics 2. Therefore, mercy is not a virtue.
But contrary to this: In De Civitate Dei 9 Augustine says, “In praising Caesar, Cicero spoke
much better and more humanely and more in keeping with pious sensibilities when he said, ‘None of
your virtues is more admirable or gracious than your mercy’.” Therefore, mercy is a virtue.
I respond: Mercy implies sorrow over the unhappiness of another.
Now this sorrow can, in one sense, denominate a movement of the sentient appetite. And on this
score mercy or pity is a passion and not a virtue.
However, in a second sense it can denominate a movement of the intellective appetite, insofar as an
individual is displeased by what is bad for someone else. Now this movement can be regulated by reason
and, in accord with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of the lower appetite can be
regulated. Hence, in De Civitate Dei 9 Augustine says, “This movement of the soul”—viz.,
mercy—“serves reason when mercy is offered in such a way that justice is preserved, whether one is
giving to the needy or forgiving the penitent.” And because, as was shown above (ST 1-2, q. 56, a. 4 and
q. 59, a. 4 and q. 60, a. 5 and q. 66, a. 4), the nature of a human virtue consists in the mind’s movements
being regulated by reason, it follows that mercy is a virtue.
Reply to objection 1: This passage from Sallust is taken to be about mercy insofar as it is a
passion unregulated by reason. For as an unregulated passion it impedes reason’s deliberation when it
makes for a departure from justice.
Reply to objection 2: Here the Philosopher is speaking of mercy and nemesis insofar as both of
them are passions. And, to be sure, they have a contrariety as to the estimation they have of the bad
things that happen to others. The one who experiences mercy is sorry about those bad things to the
extent that he thinks that an individual is suffering them undeservedly, whereas the one who experiences
nemesis (a) rejoices over them to the extent that he thinks that the individuals are suffering them
deservedly and (b) is saddened if things go well for the undeserving. And as is said in the same place,
“Both of the passions are praiseworthy and derive from the same moral disposition.”
However, as will be explained below (q. 36, a. 3), it is envy that is properly opposed to mercy.
Reply to objection 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the character of the good which is the object
of charity, and so they do not require virtues other than charity. By contrast, mercy has to do with a
special reason, viz., the unhappiness of the individual to whom mercy is shown.
Reply to objection 4: Insofar as it is a virtue, mercy is a moral virtue that has to do with the
passions, and it is traced back to the mean that is called nemesis, since it proceeds from the same moral
disposition, as Rhetoric 2 explains. To be sure, the Philosopher does posit these means as passions and
not as virtues, since they are praiseworthy even insofar as they are passions. However, nothing prevents
them from arising from an elective habit. And in this respect they assume the character of a virtue.
Article 4
Is mercy the greatest of the virtues?
It seems that mercy is the greatest of the virtues:
Objection 1: Divine worship seems especially relevant to virtue. But mercy is placed higher than